The Issue The issues are (a) whether petitioners' budget letters for fiscal year 1991-1992 should be accepted by respondent, and (b) whether the agency has utilized a non-rule policy in rejecting the letters, and if so, whether the policy has been adequately explained and justified.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioners are hospitals subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of respondent, Health Care Cost Containment Board (Board). As such, they are required to annually file their projected budgets with the Board for review and approval. This controversy relates to petitioners' fiscal year 1991-1992 budgets (1992 budget) and whether such filings conformed with the Board's requirements and should have been accepted. Budget letters for the fiscal year 1992 were filed by petitioners with the Board in May 1991. After the documents were reviewed by the Board's staff, on June 21, 1991, the Board issued virtually identical proposed agency action to each hospital advising the hospital that its budget letter was "nonconforming for the following reason: The hospital's maximum GRAA should be $ , instead of $ , ", with the appropriate dollar amounts inserted in the blanks. The letter went on to advise the hospital that it should resubmit a corrected budget document and until it did so, its submission would be considered incomplete. As provided for by agency rule, the hospitals then filed general and specific objections to this preliminary determination. After such objections were reviewed by the Board and presumably found to be without merit, petitioners requested a formal hearing to contest the proposed agency action. The Parties Petitioners are fourteen hospitals located throughout the State of Florida. Intervenor, Florida League of Hospitals, Inc., is a non-profit organization which is organized and maintained for the benefit of the proprietary hospitals which comprise its membership. The Board is a state agency charged with the responsibility of annually reviewing hospital budgets to insure that a hospital's charges do not exceed certain established thresholds. This is accomplished by an annual review of the budgets of all regulated hospitals. Intervenor, Citizens of the State of Florida, is represented by the Office of the Public Counsel. That office is charged with the responsibility of representing the citizens in all proceedings before the Board. The parties have stipulated that petitioners and the two intervenors have standing to initiate or participate in this proceeding. The Review Process As noted above, budgets must be filed on an annual basis at least ninety days prior to the beginning of a hospital's fiscal year. In these cases, all petitioners have fiscal years ending on August 31 and thus their budgets are due no later than June 1 of each year. There are two types of budget filings authorized by law. First, a hospital may file what is known as a budget letter, which is a one-page submission on a form provided by the Board. In the letter, the hospitals are required to acknowledge and certify to certain information contained in Subsection 407.50(2), Florida Statutes (1989). Secondly, a hospital may file a detailed budget which is more complicated than the budget letter and requires the completion of a twenty-seven page form. In a detailed filing, a hospital must provide, at a minimum, detailed information regarding the hospital's unit and hospital statistics, related party transactions, patient rates and discount policies, explanation of increases in revenue and expense, and prospective payment arrangements. The detailed budget filing is obviously a more expensive, complicated and time-consuming process than is the filing of a budget letter. It should be noted here that the current filing process was created by the legislature in 1988 when substantial amendments to the law were enacted. Those amendments provided, inter alia, that budget letters could be used for the first time beginning with fiscal year 1990. Prior to that time, all hospitals filed detailed budgets. Given the technical language which governs the Board's budget review process, a brief discussion regarding that process is appropriate. In very broad terms, the Board's principal function is to ensure that the revenues (charges) received by a hospital are not excessive or unreasonable. It performs this function by reviewing the budgets of each hospital during the annual budget review process. As is relevant to this controversy, the Board uses two major financial indicators in the review process. They are the gross revenues per adjusted admission and the maximum allowable rate of return, also known in regulatory parlance as the "GRAA" and "MARI", respectively. 1/ In order to measure the reasonableness of a hospital's charges, the Board requires each hospital to calculate a GRAA, which is the result of dividing the gross operating revenues of the hospital during a fiscal year by adjusted admissions. This financial indicator is basically a measure of revenue per case after adjusting for outpatient admissions and represents an average of all gross revenues per case. Except when authorized by the Board, a hospital may not increase its charges (GRAA) from one year to the next by more than its maximum allowable rate of increase. This percentage limitation, more commonly known as the MARI, is calculated pursuant to a statutorily defined formula. It is important to note that a budget letter is used when a hospital does not intend to increase its charges by more than the percentage amount specified in its approved MARI. Thus, in return for the hospital agreeing to operate within its MARI during the next fiscal year, the Board allows the hospital to have its budget approved through the less complicated budget letter process. Conversely, when a hospital intends to increase its charges from one fiscal year to the next by a greater percentage amount, it is obliged to file a detailed budget and subject itself to this more time-consuming process. In each budget letter filing, a "base GRAA" must be calculated. After that calculation is made, the base GRAA is then inflated by the hospital's MARI plus one, which produces what is known as the "budget letter GRAA". Thus, where a base GRAA is $10,000 and the MARI is 10%, the budget letter GRAA is $11,000, which is derived by multiplying the base GRAA ($10,000) by one plus the MARI (1 plus .10%, or 1.10). The budget letter GRAA represents the maximum projected gross revenues per adjusted admission the hospital can receive during the next fiscal year without having to justify the excess charges to the Board. The principal point of contention in these cases is the appropriate manner in which the base GRAA for each of petitioners' budget letters should be calculated. This in turn bears directly on the issue of whether petitioners are eligible to file a budget letter. There is no dispute as to the appropriate MARI, and the parties have agreed that the dollar figures and percentages applicable under each party's proposed calculations are accurately reflected in joint composite exhibit 1 received in evidence. Calculation of the Base GRAA Petitioners and supporting intervenor contend that the appropriate base GRAA should be calculated so as to most accurately reflect the GRAA from the previous fiscal year. In this vein, they have proposed three methodologies which are described on page 2 of joint composite exhibit 1 and are also discussed in greater detail in a subsequent portion of these findings. Petitioners cite the language in Subsection 407.50(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989) as the authority for these approaches. On the other hand, the Board and its supporting intervenor assert that the GRAA base must be calculated by using the methodology identified as alternative 5 on page two of joint exhibit 1 and also described in Subsection 407.50(3), Florida Statutes (1989). In every case, this produced a smaller base GRAA than was proposed by petitioners, and unless they accede to the Board's calculation, they will be required to file detailed budgets. Like the petitioners, the Board and supporting intervenor also rely upon the language in Section 407.50, Florida Statutes (1989) as authority for their position. Even so, petitioners contend that respondent's methodology is actually a rule, not duly promulgated, and thus it must be justified and explained in this proceeding as is required of any non-rule policy. In a separate final order issued this same date in Case Nos. 91-4762R through 91- 4776R, the undersigned has determined that the methodology is in fact a policy having all of the attributes of a rule and thus it must be defended and explicated in a section 120.57(1) proceeding. Pursuant to a statutory amendment enacted in 1988, existing subsection 407.50(1) provided a so-called phase-in period for calculating a budget letter GRAA in fiscal years 1990 and 1991, and the manner for doing so was spelled out rather clearly in the law. The problem here lies in the fact that other provisions within section 407.50, which are not as clear as subsection 407.50(1), govern the filing of budget letters for fiscal year 1992 and beyond. The problem was recognized by the Board as early as July 1988 when its general counsel prepared a memorandum for Board members which compared the then existing law with amendments just adopted by the 1988 legislature. At that time, the Board was advised that for fiscal year 1992 and beyond, the base GRAA would be calculated in a manner generally consistent with the methodology proposed by the Board in these cases. This memorandum was placed in what is known as the "Board Book", a compilation of all documents considered by the Board at its meetings, and copies of the memorandum were later distributed to virtually all regulated hospitals in the State. The memorandum read in pertinent part as follows: For FY 1992 and beyond, will be determined as in following 1992 example. Base for 1992 budget will be 1990 actual GRAA unless 1990 actual GRAA exceeded 1989 actual GRAA by more than Board-approved MARI, 1991 base will be 1989 actual GRAA inflated by Board-approved rate of increase for 1990. In addition, at a technical advisory panel meeting held on November 7, 1990, hospital representatives were advised that while subsection 407.50(1) provided a phase-in period with a specified procedure for calculating a budget letter GRAA, the Board staff was in the process of developing a calculation of budget letter GRAA for fiscal year 1992 and beyond. Testimony at hearing established that the Board staff conveyed a description of the methodology to hospital representatives at that time. These actions suggested that the Board intended for the base GRAA for fiscal year 1992 to be calculated differently than the methodology used during the phase-in period. Not surprisingly, there is no agency precedent on this matter since these cases represent the first occasion on which 1992 budget letters were filed and reviewed. As noted earlier, a budget letter is appropriate when a hospital does not seek a rate of increase in GRAA in excess of the MARI for the hospital's next fiscal year. Whether the rate of increase in the GRAA is of such magnitude as to require detailed review is directly dependent on the manner in which the base GRAA is calculated, and this issue lies at the heart of the dispute. This is because the Board uses the results of the calculation (base GRAA x applicable rate of return) solely for the purpose of creating a so-called threshold GRAA, which if exceeded by the hospital's requested GRAA, triggers the need for detailed review. Thus, the calculation simply provides the Board with a means for determining whether the proposed increase in the GRAA falls within budget letter guidelines. 2/ In every case here, petitioners' GRAA exceeded the Board's threshold GRAA so as to trigger the need for a detailed budget. The Board's calculation of the base is done in a manner consistent with subsection 407.50(3). That subsection reads in pertinent part as follows: In determining the base, the hospital's prior year audited actual experience shall be used unless the hospital's prior year audited actual experience exceeded the applicable rate of increase in which case the base shall be the gross revenue per adjusted admission from the year before the prior year, increased by the applicable rate of increase for the prior year, and then inflated by the applicable rate of increase for the current year. Thus, the methodology requires that the prior year audited actual experience be used as the starting point unless such charges exceeded the applicable (approved) rate of increase. Although the parties agree that 1991 actual data would be the most desirable to use, that data is unavailable. Therefore, fiscal year 1990 results of operation, which are the most current audited actual experience, must necessarily constitute "the prior year audited actual experience" within the meaning of the statute. To determine whether the 1990 actual experience exceeded the applicable rate of increase, the Board measured the increase in the actual GRAA from 1989 to 1990. If the actual rate of increase did not exceed the approved rate of increase, the Board took the 1990 actual GRAA, inflated that amount by the applicable rate of increase for the current year (1991), and used the resulting number as the base GRAA. Conversely, if the 1990 actual GRAA exceeded the 1989 approved GRAA by more than the authorized rate, the Board used the 1989 actual GRAA (the gross revenues from the year before the prior year) inflated by the 1990 MARI, as further increased by the applicable rate of increase for the current year (1991) to produce the GRAA base. The Board has used the above described methodology for several reasons. First, it found nothing in subsection 407.50(2) which calculated a base for budget letter submissions. Indeed, the word "base" is found only in subsections 407.50(1) and (3), and by its own terms the former subsection does not apply to 1992 budget letter filings. Thus, the Board calculated the base in accordance with the method prescribed in subsection (3). Second, prior to the change in the law in 1988, the budget review process was "budget-based" in contrast to the present process which is tied to actual rates of increase. In other words, under the "old" process, the Board compared a budget under review with a prior budget number while the "new" process compares the budget under review with prior actual numbers. The Board's methodology is consistent with this philosophy and ties the base measurement to actual experience rather than estimated or budget figures. Third, for budget years 1990 and 1991, hospitals did not incur a penalty for exceeding their GRAA. The Board now intends to impose a penalty should this threshold be exceeded by hospitals in 1992 budget year and beyond. The Board's methodology is obviously geared toward this type of review process. Fourth, if a hospital's actual charges are less than its budgeted GRAA, by increasing the budgeted GRAA by the MARI as petitioners propose, a hospital's actual rate of increase would be greater than the MARI. Under the Board's methodology, a hospital would be required to justify such an increase. Similarly, if the Board's methodology was not used, a hospital could file a budget letter certifying a maximum GRAA which exceeds the threshold GRAA under subsection 407.50(3), thereby circumventing the detailed review process. Such a result should be avoided since to do otherwise would create an internal conflict within the terms of section 407.50 and would be contrary to the Board's mission under the law, as expressed in subsection 407.003(3)(a), which is to "contain hospital charges that exceed certain thresholds". Finally, Board experience shows that it is not unusual for a hospital to have a wide variance between actual experience and budget. Indeed, as many as one half of all hospitals have a marked variation between actual results and budget projections. Because of this, the Board methodology is a reasonable way in which to take these variances into account in the budget review process. Collectively, these considerations support a finding that, while not perfect or ideal in every respect, the Board methodology is logical, reasonable and appropriate. Petitioners have lodged several objections to the methodology. First, they point out that seven of the fourteen petitioners went through detailed budget review during their last budget filing and were required to justify all matters in their 1991 budgets. Thus, they contend that if they do not agree with the Board imposed budget letter GRAA, they must undergo detailed review a second time for some items that were already reviewed and approved in the prior budget year. However, the greater part of the review here will be of new projections for 1992 which were not included in the 1991 budget. Therefore, there will be little, if any, redundancy in the process. Moreover, detailed review is called for whenever a hospital seeks a rate of increase greater than its MARI even if this occurs in consecutive budget years. Secondly, petitioners contend that two hospitals were penalized by the use of the methodology simply because they had less charges than were budgeted. In other words, when actual results of operations became available, two hospitals learned that their actual charges were less than their budgeted charges. 3/ This resulted in at least one hospital receiving a smaller budget letter GRAA in 1992 than it had in 1991. Petitioners characterize this as a "perverse incentive" since the Board's methodology seemingly encourages a hospital to increase its charges to the budgeted level to avoid having its charges reduced in future years. However, the legislature recognized this anomaly by providing that if a hospital's GRAA increased at a rate of increase lower than its MARI, it would receive "banked" percentage points which it could carry forward in the form of credits to subsequent budget years. In these cases, no hospital elected to use banked credits. Then, too, if a hospital desires a greater rate of increase (and concomitant larger GRAA), it has the statutory mechanism to justify that increase through the detailed budget review process. Similarly, for those hospitals that exceed their budget, and under the Board's methodology are faced with a future reduction in revenue caps, they need only justify those excess charges in the detailed review process in order to avoid this dilemna. Petitioners also criticize the methodology because it does not consider the budget GRAA from the previous fiscal year even though a hospital has already gained approval to operate at the prior year budget level. However, this argument fails to recognize that the use of actual data over budget data is preferred since budgets are merely projections that are often times not attained. Petitioners next point out that the current detailed budget review scheme now codified in Chapter 10N-5, Florida Administrative Code, was not adopted until after subsection 407.50(3) became law in 1988. Thus, they suggest that the word "base" in subsection (3) represents a statutory directive to use a GRAA base specific to detailed budget review. However, the rules in question implement subsections 407.05(6) and 407.50(6) rather than subsection 407.50(3), and the challenged base GRAA calculation is not used during that subsequent detailed budget review process. In other words, even though subsection (3) pertains generally to detailed budget review and provides a calculation of a "base", the Board has opted to use a different methodology found in chapter 10N- 5 in the detailed review process. Although the legislature amended the law in both 1989 and 1991, it chose not to disturb this process or otherwise limit the Board's authority to continue to apply those rules. Therefore, the Board's rejection of petitioners' interpretation is found to be persuasive. Finally, it should be recognized that fiscal years 1990 - 1992 are so-called transition years after the major substantive changes in the law in 1988 and it is not unexpected to have some unusual cases arise. While petitioners have cited a few such cases occurring in budget year 1992, the appropriate remedy is to explain and justify these abnormalities through the detailed review process. Accordingly, these criticisms are found to be without merit. Alternative Proposals Petitioners have proposed three alternative methodologies to calculate the base. They are identified as alternatives 2, 3 and 4 on page 2 of joint composite exhibit 1. 4/ Petitioners assert their alternatives most accurately reflect the GRAA from the previous fiscal year and thus are in compliance with the language in subsection 407.50(2)(a) that requires a hospital to acknowledge its applicable rate of increase in its GRAA "from the previous fiscal year". Accordingly, in formulating their methodologies, petitioners have relied heavily on the words "previous fiscal year" and in some form or fashion have tied all of their calculations to the year 1991. Under petitioners' proposal, a hospital could presumably choose from one of the three alternatives depending on which one was best suited to that hospital's financial circumstances. Petitioners have first proposed to calculate the base by taking the 1990 actual GRAA and inflating it by the 1991 MARI. They contend that this alternative is reasonable because it uses the most recent actual data (1990) as well as reliable numbers (1991 MARI). While this methodology is the same as the Board's methodology for those hospitals whose 1990 actual GRAA did not exceed their 1990 budget GRAA, petitioners do not propose to use it in that manner. Rather, they intend to use it to calculate the base GRAA for two hospitals whose 1990 actual results exceeded budget projections. By doing so, however, those hospitals would be allowed to circumvent the otherwise required detailed review process. Secondly, petitioners suggest that the 1991 budget GRAA be used as the base for calculating a 1992 budget GRAA. This methodology was apparently designed for seven hospitals which underwent detailed budget review during the last fiscal year. Petitioners contend this formula is reasonable because the 1991 budget GRAA has already been approved by the Board, and the seven hospitals had extensive review of last year's budgets. Even so, there is nothing that prohibits detailed review, if warranted, in consecutive budget years, and in any event, actual data is generally preferred over budget projections. Lastly, petitioners propose that the same methodology described in subsection 407.50(1) and used for budget years 1990 and 1991 be used again on the theory that if it was reasonable in those years, it is still reasonable to use now. This methodology calls for the higher of fiscal year 1990 actual GRAA inflated by the 1991 MARI or 1991 budget GRAA to be used as the 1992 base GRAA. Pursuant to the methodology, five hospitals have used the 1991 budget letter GRAA as their 1992 base GRAA. However, by its own terms the methodology used in subsection 407.50(1) is specifically limited to budget years 1990 and 1991, and the law contemplates a change in the calculation of the base in all subsequent budget years. Moreover, the use of actual versus projected numbers is to be favored. In short, then, while the three methods arguably have some beneficial features, they still do not have all of the favorable attributes found in the Board's methodology.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board confirming that petitioners' budget letters should be rejected as being non-conforming. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of October, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1991.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1, The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $4,500.00. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 1 Filed May 30, 2013 10:06 AM Division of Administrative Hearings ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this 24 day of Mee, » 2013. rh eth nee Seoay eficy for Health Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 CERTIFY that a true and correct of this Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this 77 day of a , 2013. Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail! Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Tria Lawton-Russell Michael P. Gennett, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Akerman Senterfitt Agency for Health Care Administration One SE Third Avenue, 25" Floor (Electronic Mail) Miami, Florida 33131-1714 (U.S. Mail) Stuart M. Lerner Gladys Valdes, President Administrative Law Judge Pointe of North Gables Division of Administrative Hearings 5890 S.W. 8" Street (Electronic Mail) Miami, Florida 33144 (U.S. Mail)
The Issue Whether the Respondent's policy of requiring justification of a hospital's rate of increase in its GRAA in excess of the National Hospital Input Price Index (hereinafter referred to as the "NHIPI") is an invalidly promulgated rule?
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact were contained in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation: The Petitioner's name and address are Doctors Memorial Hospital, 401 E. Byrd Avenue, Bonifay, Florida 32425. Doctors Memorial is a 34-bed short-term general acute care hospital located and operating in Holmes County. Doctors Memorial is owned by National Healthcare of Holmes County, Inc. The name and address of the agency affected are the Hospital Cost Containment Board, Executive Office of the Governor, State of Florida, Woodcrest Office Park, Building L, Suite 101, 325 John Knox Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32303. The HCCB I.D. number of Doctors Memorial is 10-0078. On or about March 27, 1986, Doctors Memorial submitted to the HCCB its projected 1987 fiscal year budget. Doctors Memorial's 1987 fiscal year begins on July 1, 1986, and runs through June 30, 1987. On May 16, 1986, Doctors Memorial received the Staff analysis and preliminary findings and recommendations relative to its 1987 fiscal year budget. Doctors Memorial was advised that the Staff would recommend to the HCCB that Doctors Memorial's budgeted gross revenue per adjusted admission and net operating revenue per adjusted admission for fiscal 1987 be adjusted downward for reasons set forth in the Staff analysis. Doctors Memorial timely filed its petition challenging Staff's recommendations on May 30, 1986. Doctors Memorial has standing in these matters based on the facts alleged in its petitions. The Respondent indicated in its preliminary findings and recommendations that the following policy applied to the review of the Petitioner's 1987 budget: Current agency policy states that hospital's [sic] exceeding the MARI can only increase gross revenue per adjusted admission to the National Hospital Input Price Index (NHIPI) of 3.7 percent without further justification. Any increase in excess of the NHIPI must be sufficiently justified and quantified to staff. The NHIPI is an average rate of inflation for hospitals in the United States. It represents the additional costs of providing services by hospitals in the country caused by inflation. The policy contained in the Respondent's preliminary findings and recommendations was developed and imposed upon the Petitioner after the Respondent's analysis, Mr. Lasko, had made an initial draft of his review of the Petitioner's budget for fiscal year 1987. After learning of the policy, Mr. Lasko redrafted his review which was signed on May 15, 1986 and subsequently sent to the Petitioner. The policy contained in the Respondent's preliminary findings and recommendations was contained in a memorandum dated May 16, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the "May 16 Memorandum"), and signed by Mr. Pattillo, the Chief Financial Analyst of the Respondent, on May 22, 1986. In the May 16 Memorandum it was stated that: Any increase over the previous year's GR/AA inflated by the NHIPI, shall be justified by the hospital to the staff's satisfaction utilizing the statutory review criteria of section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes. The policy contained in the Respondent's preliminary findings and recommendations and its May 16 Memorandum, based upon instructions contained in the May 16 Memorandum, is to apply to all 1987 budgets that are subject to budget review. The policy contained in the May 16 Memorandum was further explained in a memorandum dated June 19, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the "June 19 Memorandum"). The June 19 Memorandum was signed by Mr. Pattillo. In the June 19 Memorandum it was indicated that hospitals subject to review may even have to justify an amount of increase less than the NHIPI. The policy of the Respondent embodied in its May 16 Memorandum and its June 19 Memorandum has not been adopted as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1985).
Findings Of Fact HRS is a state agency responsible for the administration of the Florida Medicaid Program provided for in Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The medicaid program was implemented through Section 409.902, Florida Statutes. The peer review aspect of the Florida Medicaid Program involves the responsibility of insuring that hospitals comply with state and federal utilization review requirements. The Petitioner, at all times material hereto, was the treating facility for the four patients involved in the issues in this case. It is assigned Medicaid Provider No. 011976800. The medicaid/medical benefits program for the State of Florida administered by HRS under Title XIX of the Social Security Act reimburses hospitals for "medically necessary" in-patient hospital care provided to medicaid beneficiaries. See Rule 10C-7.039, et. seq. The determination of "medical necessity" is to be made by the hospitals' utilization review committee and by the utilization and quality control PRO which is under contract to provide that service with HRS. Utilization review is defined as "regular prescribed program for the review of each recipient's need for services to insure efficient provision of care". HRS has established procedures for determining the medical necessity and appropriateness of care for use by hospitals and by the PRO's. The procedures include a review of medical record documentation against a list of criteria published by HRS. These criteria are popularly called ISD criteria. "ISD" is an acronym signifying severity of illness, intensity of service, and "discharge screens." Each medicaid recipient must meet ISD criteria for severity of illness before being admitted to a hospital. They must also meet the intensity of service ISD criteria for continued hospitalization. Once a patient meets one of the ISD discharge screens (standards), there is the indication that the patient is ready to be discharged. The ISD criteria are to be used as a "basis for professional determinations of the medical necessity of acute care hospitalizations" by the hospital utilization review (UR) committee and the PRO. These criteria are not an absolute measure of medical necessity. They may be balanced or overridden by a physician during the review process. The severity of illness (SI) criteria are acknowledged by HRS to be set at a high level. The SI criteria need not be met to justify an admission, however. "If treatment has been rendered and the intensity of service criteria are met, or if evidence relevant to more than one severity of illness indicator is available, lower levels than those specified in the criteria may justify certifying the admission. A case presenting marginal findings for certifying an admission will be referred to the physician advisor." See Respondent's Exhibit 4, page 6. According to the policy expressed in the HRS manual for hospitals providing services to medicaid beneficiaries, the hospital UR committee may consider "other supporting data as the committee deems appropriate" and contact the attending physician when determining medical necessity. Similarly, when medical necessity is an issue at the PRO level of review, the attending physician is to be contacted by the PRO and given an opportunity to speak to the physician advisor of the PRO so as to provide additional information going to the question of medical necessity. If the PRO denies coverage, HRS then accepts the PRO determination and does not conduct any independent review. HRS, having charged the hospital UR committee and the PRO with the evaluation of medical necessity, does not conduct its own review of the medical record or undertake any independent evaluation of medical necessity before notifying the relevant physician and hospital if reimbursement is denied. The Petitioner is in compliance with the medicaid program concerning utilization review. The hospital has established a UR plan which has been approved by the PRO and by HRS. The UR plan utilizes the same ISD criteria as the PRO. The UR committee was monitored to make sure that it was complying with the utilization review requirements. The five cases at issue were reviewed by five different physicians on the Center's UR committee and were felt to meet the criteria and to be medically necessary as appropriate admissions and appropriate lengths of stay. The PRO, however, disagreed with the UR committee. The attending physician was contacted by the PRO and asked to call a physician advisor to discuss these cases and to provide additional information to the advisor. The attending physician followed those instructions and attempted numerous times to contact the physician advisor with additional information concerning the cases but was never given the opportunity to do so. These PRO denials included one admission denial following a suicide attempt, despite the fact that "suicide attempt" is included in the ISD criteria as justification for admission. This denial of admission itself is clearly in error. Although this proceeding is a de novo one and not a proceeding designed to simply review the appropriateness and legal efficacy of the HRS initial decision, it is noteworthy, to the extent that HRS' position relies heavily on the PRO review of the patient admissions and lengths of stay in question, that the PRO's work product is of marginal credibility. This is because the PRO which was responsible for the UR and reviewed these cases lost its designation as an approved PRO and became involved in criminal litigation concerning a failure to carry out medical reviews properly. The PRO was unable to meet payroll obligations for its nursing and physician reviewers. The records of the PRO reviews of the five cases at issue in this proceeding were not available to HRS. Consequently, HRS had no information concerning the underlying data or facts relied upon by the PRO nor whether the PRO actually consulted the attending physician or whether its physician advisor did. Thus, the testimony of the attending physician, to the effect that he attempted to contact the physician advisor but was not permitted to as to any of these cases, is uncontraverted. The approved UR committee, in conducting its procedure at the Center, determined that the admission and lengths of stay of the five patients involved was medically necessary and compensable as determined by five physicians taking part in that process. The PRO, although it informed the physicians that they had the right to speak to a physician advisor, did not actually afford them that opportunity. The PRO determination was accepted by HRS without any HRS personnel speaking to the attending physician. Although HRS later allowed one day of an admission immediately following a suicide attempt, it upheld the other PRO determinations without actually knowing or reviewing any underlying information which might have been relied upon by the PRO and without HRS personnel conferring with the attending physician or affording him the opportunity to provide them with additional information. If the PRO, its physician advisor and HRS had given the attending physician the opportunity to explain and provide additional information concerning medical necessity, perhaps this dispute could have been resolved without the necessity and expense of formal proceedings. This is a de novo proceeding and, therefore, the information from the attending physician which was not utilized by the PRO or HRS in the review of these cases can be brought forward at this time providing the attending physician's testimony and evidence is deemed relevant, material, competent and credible. The attending physician named above, in fact, testified in this proceeding. His testimony is deemed competent and credible on the material issues and is not refuted by the Respondent. Based upon the attending physician's testimony, which is accepted, especially since no other physician with knowledge of the facts concerning these patients testified, the following findings of fact are made: Patient M.D.: This patient was treated at the emergency room following a suicide attempt on August 19th and transferred by the police to the Center where she was then admitted. She had previously sought out-patient treatment unsuccessfully. The initial examination showed her to be moderately depressed, avoiding eye contact, showing psycho-motor retardation, and crying easily. She made the statement that her two children would be better off if she were dead. She was placed on the medication prozac but after several days remained depressed and crying and complaining of insomnia. She was then given "Pamelor" which caused some adverse side effects, but she appeared to respond to the medication as to her depression. During her stay, she received an intensive rehabilitation program of at least three encounter therapies per day. On the basis of the medical record alone, patient M.D. met the following criteria: AK11-A (suicide attempt); AK57-B (treatments). These criteria do not require that the patient remain suicidal or admit to being suicidal during the in- patient stay in order to justify further treatment. The HRS representative testified that nursing notes indicated that the patient could perform some self- care functions during her hospitalization ("activities of daily living" or "ADL's"). Because of this and because the physician noted that the patient was denying suicidal ideations, she interpreted that circumstance to mean that the discharge "screen" or standard of "able to function in a non-hospital environment" was met after August 20th, the day of admission. However, HRS also admitted that whether the patient could function in a non-hospital environment was a medical decision to be made on the hospital level and the PRO level. The attending physician testified that records of self-care in a restricted hospital environment do not mean that the patient could function in a non-hospital setting. He further testified that the patient in this instance required treatment and did not meet the discharge standard or "screen" of being "able to function in a non-hospital environment" before August 30th. He testified that the services could not be effectively provided on an out-patient basis prior to August 30th. That testimony is accepted and the fact established. The ISD criteria and explanatory bulletins promulgated by HRS do not contain requirements that a patient remain suicidal during a stay nor a discharge criteria that equates self-care in the hospital environment with the ability to care for oneself safely and adequately in a non-hospital environment. On the basis of the evidence presented, the in-patient admission of M.D. from August 20th to August 30th met the criteria for admission and continued stay. The services provided were shown by unrefuted testimony to be medically necessary and the discharge screens or criteria were not satisfied until August 30, 1991. Patient M.D. (Admission of September 21, 1990 through September 29, 1990): Nineteen (19) days after her first discharge, patient M.D. again attempted suicide. She had been referred for out-patient care after her previous hospitalization but did not follow up and obtain that care and did not continue to take her medication. She wrote a suicide note on the second attempt and was treated in an intensive care unit for three days before being re- admitted to the Center. Throughout her hospitalization, she received intensive rehabilitation therapy as before and remained in a highly-restricted, locked unit, where suicide precautions were in effect. She was assigned to a counselor for "one-on-one" therapy in addition to her group therapy. Her attending physician did not consider her able to function in a non-hospital environment prior to September 29th, and his testimony so establishes. The HRS witness, when asked whether she had an opinion when the patient should have been released, stated a date prior to the actual discharge based upon her opinion that the patient was able to function in a non-hospital environment. That decision, however, is a medical decision which the witness was not qualified to make. In any event, the fact that a patient might be able to perform some "ADL" functions in a highly-supervised, protective hospital setting does not mean that the patient is well enough and responsible enough to perform those functions adequately and safely on her own outside a supervised hospital setting. In summary, based upon the unrefuted evidence presented, particularly the testimony of the attending physician, the in-patient admission of M.D. on September 21, 1990 met the ISD criteria for admission and continued stay. The services were medically necessary and the patient was not appropriately ready for discharge until September 29, 1991. Patient W.P. (Admission of April 11, 1990 to April 16, 1990): This patient suffered a severe psychotic episode a month before her admission and then presented to an emergency room stating that she was "about to lose it" and that it was only her religious beliefs which prevented her from committing suicide. This alarmed the attending physician concerning her suicidal ideation and possibility. The patient had been married five times and was then seeing a married man and also allegedly contemplating a lesbian relationship with that man's wife. She had been blamed by her family for the death of her grandchild. Upon her admission, it took her approximately three days to become aware that she was in a locked psychiatric unit. This indicated to the physician that she did not fully comprehend where she was or what she was doing in terms of her orientation as to reality of time and place. She was severely depressed, out of touch with reality, and not able to perform the affairs of daily living (ADL's). She exhibited anorexia and insomnia at the time of admission. She indicated merely that she was not eating as much as she had previously. She was placed on prozac, to which she responded in approximately five days. The services provided to her after her admission met the intensity of service criteria for a continued stay. The physician testified that she did not meet discharge standards prior to the actual discharge date whereupon she was referred to out-patient care for follow-up treatment. The physician's testimony establishes that necessary medical services could not have been effectively or safely provided on an out-patient basis prior to the discharge date. The physician's testimony establishes that in the artificial environment of a hospital, the notations in medical records that a patient is eating and sleeping does not mean that she is able to perform those functions outside of the hospital safely and adequately or will consistently do so if left to her own devices. The HRS witness admitted that not eating and not sleeping is relevant to the question of whether a patient can perform normal ADL's. The later contention by HRS that inability to perform ADL's requires a patient to be in a "nearly vegetative" state is simply unsupported by medical testimony nor by any definition in evidence. The unrefuted testimony of the attending physician establishes that the in-patient admission of patient W.P. on April 11, 1990 met the ISD criteria for admission and continued stay and that the services were medically necessary. The patient was not recovered sufficiently for appropriate discharge until April 16, 1990. Patient D.G. (Admission of May 4, 1990 to May 11, 1990): This patient had a recent history of heavy drug usage and criminal convictions near the time of her admission. HRS had removed her children from her custody, which created an additional crisis in her life, as did the fact that her husband was then in prison. The attending physician stated that the patient was exhibiting acute withdrawal symptoms from drug usage and delirium tremors from the drugs upon her admission. She was at a high risk of resuming her heroin use and threatened suicide if she did not get help for her addiction. A urine screen performed was positive upon her admission for drug usage and withdrawal symptoms. Impending delirium tremors were exhibited at that time. She was depressed and required acute medication, being placed on a high dose of both librium and anti- depressants. D.G. could not be treated in a de-toxification unit because of her suicidal ideation and attendant depression. She received intensive therapy consisting of three sessions per day while she was hospitalized. Her depression responded to the medication and discharge planning began on her third day of admission, with a view toward placing her in a de-toxification unit. She was discharged to complete her de-toxification as soon as a placement was available. The HRS witness opined that because D.G. was not "comatose" or "impending comatose", she did not meet the admission standards for substance abuse and because she was able to sleep, eat, and dress herself in the hospital, she did not meet the admission criteria concerning performance of ADL's. The attending physician testified, however, that she was in withdrawal from heroin use, needed de-toxification, and could not be admitted to a de-toxification program until her other psychiatric problems had been stabilized. The attending physician, by his training, his experience, and by his personal contact with and treatment of the patient, is best able to evaluate the patient's medical circumstance, need for admission and treatment and the length of treatment required. Consequently, his testimony as to this patient and all the others is accepted over that of the non-physician HRS witness. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, the in-patient admission and stay of D.G. was medically necessary and could not have been provided effectively in a less-restrictive or out-patient setting. Patient S.R. (Admission of June 20, 1990 to June 29, 1990): Upon this patient's admission, she related not having slept for two months and not having eaten for five days. She had then undergone approximately three years of out- patient treatment unsuccessfully and had no family or community-support system in the area where she lived. She related that her ex-husband had been abusive and had recently abducted her daughter and vandalized her home. She related that her ex-husband had threatened her daughter's life and had had S.R. arrested and supposedly transported to the Palm Beach County Women's Stockade. She testified that she was unable to sleep or eat and was taking 10 to 12 baths per day. She complained of being unable to remember simple tasks, to take care of simple matters such as paying her rent, and was in the habit of wearing the same clothes from three to five days in a row without changing or washing, or being unable to remember whether she had washed or not. The patient was also taking a high dosage of a chronic asthma medication, which includes steroids. This can cause serious problems with depression. The patient was severely depressed and had recently started smoking. The patient met the ADL admissions criteria and while she was in the hospital, she received services which met the intensity of services criteria. The HRS witness admitted that the medical record note which stated "past two months she had not slept at all" constitutes insomnia and the record note "is not eating, has gone five days without food" constitutes anorexia. Based upon the evidence submitted at hearing, the in-patient treatment of S.R. from June 20, 1990 to June 29, 1990 met the criteria for admissions and continued stay and was shown by the treating physician's testimony to be medically necessary. The services could not have been safely and adequately provided on an out-patient basis, and the discharge standards were not satisfied as to this patient until June 29, 1990, when she was discharged.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore
The Issue The issue is the determination of the amount of investigative, legal, and expert witness costs that Petitioner is entitled to recover from Respondent pursuant to section 409.913(23), Florida Statutes (2017).
Findings Of Fact Following an evidentiary hearing that spanned all or part of 24 hearing dates from January 2018 through May 2019, the administrative law judge issued a 357-page recommended order on September 24, 2019, containing 1996 findings of fact and conclusions of law identifying the proper code of the Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) applicable to each of hundreds of specific patient encounters, recommending that Petitioner enter a final order using these CPT codes to recalculate the total overpayments owed by Respondent by applying Petitioner's statistical formula for extending overpayments from the sampled recipients to the universe of recipients during the audit period, and reserving jurisdiction to enter another recommended order, if the parties were unable to settle Petitioner's claim for investigation, legal, and expert witness costs. By final order entered on November 13, 2019, Petitioner substantially adopted the recommended order, determined total overpayments of $176,144.40, imposed a fine of $35,228.88, and reserved jurisdiction to transmit the file to DOAH, if either party requested it to do so, for a determination of Respondent's liability for investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. Petitioner issued three "final" audit reports (FARs) prior to transmitting to DOAH the file that was designated as DOAH Case 17-0598MPI. In the first FAR, which was issued on January 28, 2014, Petitioner determined a total overpayment of about $235,000, a fine of about $47,000, and costs of about $5000. In the second FAR, which represented the work of the second peer reviewer, Dr. Rathore, Petitioner determined that the total overpayment was about $100,000 greater. In the third FAR, which was dated December 15, 2017, and represented the work of the third peer reviewer, Dr. Stovall, who testified at length at the hearing, Petitioner determined a total overpayment of $177,578.68, a fine of $35,515.74, and costs of $11,114.61. From one perspective, Respondent's challenge to the third FAR produced a very modest victory. A comparison of the third FAR to the final order reveals that the final overpayment and fine amounts are about $1700 lower than the amounts stated in the third FAR. From another perspective, Respondent's challenge to the third FAR produced unalloyed defeat. At the conclusion of the litigation, he (still) owed Petitioner over $210,000, or about 99.2% of the overpayment and fine claims in the third FAR. The Office of the Attorney General incurred $27,717.08 in costs, which excludes any amount representing fees for its attorneys, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law. Although the administrative law judge never left Tallahassee for any of the hearing sessions, one of Petitioner's two attorneys had to travel to Fort Myers, where Dr. Stovall practices, in order to assist her with accessing specific information in the voluminous medical records that occupied center stage in the underlying case. This travel was reasonable and necessary. According to their timesheets, two attorneys made the trip on three occasions: for the second attorney, the dates were February 1 through 2, 2018; November 9, 2018; and December 17 through 19, 2018. The second attorney's participation in the underlying case was very helpful. At times, his availability permitted the scheduling of hearing dates in order to move the case along, even at the slow pace that it took. However, the second attorney's participation did not require that he accompany the first attorney on two trips to Fort Myers to assist Dr. Stovall and one trip to Miami to attend Respondent's testimony. For some reason, Petitioner's cost documents include only two travel events for the second attorney--evidently a round trip. Bearing the dates of December 27 and 28, 2018, these expenses omit a rental car or other ground transportation at the remote site, so as to suggest that the first and second attorneys shared such transportation. For these two dates, the total expenses for the second attorney are $1786.52, and Petitioner's claim must be reduced by this amount. Except for some minor expenses, the vast majority of the remaining costs of the Office of the Attorney General are for court reporting services and were reasonable and necessary. As reduced by the amount noted in the preceding paragraph, the adjusted costs of the Office of Attorney General were $25,930.56 and were reasonable and necessary. Petitioner incurred $19,170.86 in costs, exclusive of any amount paid Dr. Rathore. Petitioner did not claim entitlement to reimbursement for any payment to the first peer reviewer. Petitioner initially claimed entitlement to reimbursement for $3225 paid Dr. Rathore, but wisely withdrew that claim during the hearing because Dr. Rathore's upcodings were largely useless. By contrast, the $15,912.50 paid Dr. Stovall was entirely reasonable and necessary due to her impressive facility with coding, knowledge of pediatric infectious diseases, and communication skills. Costs of under $750 each for investigative and nursing services were reasonable and necessary; contrary to Respondent's strenuous and repeated objections, nurse Kinser dutifully discharged her responsibilities without usurping the authority reserved for the peer reviewer. The $1781.25 paid Dr. Huffer, the statistician, bears special comment. Respondent did not concede the accuracy of Petitioner's statistical formula for extending overpayments from those determined with regard to a small subset of the recipients audited. Prior to the testimony of Dr. Huffer, the administrative law judge warned that, barring an exceptionally effective cross-examination, Dr. Huffer's testimony would be superfluous, unless Respondent intended to call an expert statistician to explain the flaws of the formula. Nevertheless, Respondent maintained his objection to the formula, and Dr. Huffer testified for over three hours--testimony that was very helpful, but somewhat dry, except for the memorable moment that he disclosed that he had to adjust the confidence interval for the fact that the sampling of recipients happened to miss two or three mega-recipients, whose inclusion would have doubled or tripled the number of patient encounters in this case. The costs of Petitioner of $19,170.86 were reasonable and necessary. The total costs are thus $45,101.42. Respondent produced no evidence of his financial resources, earning ability, and needs.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order determining that Respondent owes $45,101.42 in investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen A. Lenoir Post Office Box 561823 Miami, Florida 33256 (eServed) Robert A. Milne, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Shena L. Grantham, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Room 3407B 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Bill Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Shevaun L. Harris, Acting Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1, The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part Il, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $10,000.00 in administrative fines. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. In addition the Respondent shall pay the Agency $6,000.00 as survey fee in accord with law. The checks are to be made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and contain the AHCA ten-digit case number and should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 1 Filed March 20, 2015 11:10 AM Division of Administrative Hearings 3. Conditional licensure status is imposed on the Respondent beginning on June 13, 2014 and ending on July 28, 2014. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this / O day of Mag, , 2015. ot, h buf Seca for Health Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correc; y of this Final Order yas served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this Ja ay of ere. , 2015. Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Deborah E. Leoci Jonathan s. Grout, Esq., Office of the General Counsel Attorney for Facility Agency for Health Care Administration Goldsmith & Grout, P.A. (Electronic Mail) PO Box 2011 Winter Park, Florida 32790 (U.S. Mail)
Findings Of Fact Tampa General Hospital is a 530 bed short term general acute care hospital. Hillsborough County Hospital is a 157 bed general acute care hospital. Both are divisions of Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, a public hospital system located in Tampa, Florida. T. 25; Hearing Officer E. 1. Tampa General Hospital and Hillsborough County Hospital filed timely petitions and have standing to seek such hearings. On January 29, 1987, both petitioners filed fiscal year 1986 actual reports as required by statute and rules of Tampa General Hospital. On April 23, 1987, Tampa General Hospital filed in revision to its actual report with respect to RPICC charges and receipts. It is officially recognized that a recommended order has been entered on this date in the consolidated DOAH case numbers 87-5207H and 87-5208H recommending that the April 23, 1987, revision be deemed final and not a correction submitted pursuant to section 12, chapter 87-92, Laws of Florida. If this conclusion is correct, the question of approval or disapproval of the April 23, 1987, revision is moot. The Board, however, contends that it has generally has the authority to disapprove a report of this nature pursuant to its rules and the statutes establishing the Board. On June 9, 1987, and the weeks thereafter, both Petitioners sought to correct their 1986 actual reports with respect to funds received by the Petitioners from Hillsborough County pursuant to the special sales tax enacted pursuant to chapters 84-373 and 85-555, Laws of Florida. These proposed corrections were submitted pursuant to section 12, chapter 87-92, Laws of Florida. The Hospital Cost Containment Board contends that it generally has authority to disapprove reports filed with the Board by hospitals regulated by the Board, and specifically contends that authority extends to revisions sought by the Petitioners with respect to both the sales tax funds and the RPICC funds. The Board has proposed to adopt rule 27J-1.0075 pursuant to its interpretation of it is authority and cites section 395.505, Fla. Stat. (1987) as general authority for such rulemaking. The portion of rule 27J-1.0075 challenged in this case provides; (2) A hospital may correct its 1986 fiscal year data for purposes of the redistribution of the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund surplus, if such correction is verified by the hospital's independent certified auditors. Such corrections shall not be considered if received at the Board office after September 29, 1987. All such corrections shall comply with the following criteria, to the Board's satisfaction. (E.S.) The proposed rule was not published in the Florida Administrative Weekly until September 4, 1987, well into the period for filing corrections to 1986 actual reports pursuant to section 12, chapter 87-92, Laws of Florida. Since the record in these cases is consolidated with the section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., cases, all of the findings of fact in the recommended order in DOAH case numbers 87-5207H and 87-5208H entered this same date, including the Appendix to that recommended order, are incorporated in this order by reference for purposes of background information in this rule challenge.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $1,000.00 in administrative fines. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 1 Filed September 17, 2012 12:02 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 3. Conditional licensure status is imposed on the Respondent beginning on March 9, 2012, and ending on March 20, 2012. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this wi 3 day id often Z , 2012. } i ViDenr fe , EA fing Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct, jy ot this Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this / ay of , 2012. OOP; A Fe Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Thomas J. Walsh II Anna Small, Esq. Office of the General Counsel Allen Dell Agency for Health Care Administration Counsel for Respondent (Electronic Mail) 202 South Rome Avenue, Suite 100 Tampa, Florida 33606 (U.S. Mail) Lingle F. Bogan Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail)
