Findings Of Fact On or about January 26, 1990, the Respondent sought competitive bids through Invitation to Bid Number 590:2123 for the lease of certain office space in Plant City, Florida. The bid opening occurred on March 1, 1990, and Intervenor was determined to have submitted the lowest responsive bid. In addition to Intervenor's bid, bids were received from Petitioner and Walden Investment Company, which is not a party in this case. On or about May 8, 1990, the Respondent notified all bidders of its intent to award this lease to Intervenor, and on May 10, 1990, the Petitioner filed its notice of protest concerning this award claiming that Intervenor's bid was not responsive to the parking requirements in the Invitation to Bid. Section 15 of the Invitation to Bid requires that a minimum of 65 parking spaces be provided, and that a minimum of 15 of these spaces must be full size and a minimum of 5 must meet ANSI standards for handicapped parking spaces. No definition or specification for full size parking spaces is provided in the Invitation to Bid. Petitioner did not establish that there is a commonly accepted standard for full size parking spaces in the construction or development industry, or that the Respondent uniformly requires all full size parking spaces to be of certain dimensions. The Intervenor certified in its bid that it would meet the parking space requirement of the Invitation to Bid. The Respondent does not require detailed site plans which would depict actual dimensions for each parking space to be submitted with each bid. Rather, Section 10(d) of the Invitation to Bid requires only a line drawing "drawn roughly to scale", and specifies that final site layout will be a "joint effort between the department and the lessor so as to best meet the needs of the department". The Intervenor did submit a rough line drawing with its bid which depicts 71 parking spaces. The Respondent routinely accepts a bidder's certification that it will meet the parking requirements in an Invitation to Bid, and if those requirements ultimately are not met, the Respondent may proceed against the performance bond which the successful bidder is required to post. The Petitioner presented evidence that there is not enough room on Intervenor's site to provide 15 full size parking spaces measuring 10 feet wide by 20 feet long. However, there is nothing in the Invitation to Bid, or in the City of Plant City's Code which requires full size parking spaces of this dimension. Based upon its certification and the inclusion of a rough line drawing showing space for parking in excess of the requirements in the Invitation to Bid on this site,, it is found that Intervenor was responsive to the parking requirements in this Invitation to Bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's protest and awarding Lease Number 590:2123 to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Farley, Esquire District 6 Legal Office 4000 West Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Blvd. 5th Floor, Room 520 Tampa, FL 33614-9990 Alan Taylor P. O. Box 7077 Winter Haven, FL 33883-7077 Richard C. Langford, Esquire P. O. Box 3706 St. Petersburg, FL 33731-3706 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent’s intended award of a lease for office space to a bidder other than Petitioner was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, on or about May 18, 1998, advertised and released RFP for Lease No. 800:0184 in order to procure approximately 5,000 square feet of office space in Lake City, Florida. Three timely filed proposals were submitted in response to the RFP. One of the submissions was determined to be nonresponsive and rejected. The two other proposals submitted by Petitioner and William and Willene Giles (Giles) were deemed responsive and evaluated by Respondent personnel. Site visits were made to each of the proposed sites. The sites were then evaluated using a numerical scoring system. Respondent’s initial posting of bid results on August 4, 1998, indicated a tentative award of the lease to Giles. Giles received a total score of 88.5 points. Petitioner received the maximum points with respect to cost, but was given only a total of 75.7 points. The RFP clearly requires that a bidder must provide a site layout drawn to scale which indicates the facility location and dimensions of each parking space. Also, the number of parking spaces assigned to other tenants must be identified. A bidder must agree to provide 25 parking spaces on site for use by Respondent. The site plan submitted with the Giles proposal shows five of the required parking spaces are located on property abutting the Giles property. Those five parking spaces do not currently exist on that property. No ingress or egress is shown on the site plan, although such is required by the RFP. The Giles bid should demonstrate requisite control over the adjacent property utilized in that bid. Such is not the case. Documents submitted to indicate control of the property by Giles are deficient. In addition to holders of life estates in the property, fee owners of the property must also agree to use of the property in conjunction with the lease between Giles and Respondent. The evidence does not establish that the fee owners have provided their consent. Testimony of Mary Goodman, an expert witness on behalf of Petitioner, establishes that the Giles’ bid did not demonstrate the requisite control of the property, specifically the parking area, required by the RFP at the time of bid opening. The Giles bid was not responsive. Petitioner’s bid identifies and offers for lease space in the Lake City Professional Plaza. The drawing submitted with the bid mistakenly identifies the area of the proposed lease space as “Grant Plaza.” Additionally, Petitioner’s bid did not contain a Public Entity Crime Addendum as required by the RFP. Failure to meet this requirement, by terms of the RFP, “will result in immediate disqualification of your proposal.” Other errors in Petitioner’s bid include the drawing submitted in the bid response which depicts parking. The drawing indicates that there are “new” parking spaces which are to be 10 feet wide by 19 feet deep. Under local land use regulations, new regular parking spaces must be 10 feet by 21 feet with a requirement that handicapped spaces measure 12 feet by 20 feet. Petitioner’s bid fails to comport with applicable local land use regulations. On page 2 of the RFP, Respondent reserves the right to reject any and all proposals which are not responsive. Neither the Giles’ bid nor the Petitioner’s is found to be responsive.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding none of the bids to be responsive and making such other disposition as may be deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Helton, Jr., Esquire Scott C. Wright, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert A. Sweetapple, Esquire Sweetapple, Broeker and Varkas 465 East Palmetto Park Road Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue The issue is whether Department of Lottery Rule 53ER88-16, entitled Handicap Accessibility, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it does not require handicap parking spaces at the location of lottery ticket vendors.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Steven Krisher was trained and practiced as a dentist until he developed the disability of multiple entrapment neuropathy, which now has progressed to the point that he can no longer engage in gainful employment, drive an automobile, exercise, or engage in sports. In order to be mobile outside his home he uses a wheelchair. He holds a permit for disabled parking from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. The Department of Lottery promulgated Rule 53ER88-16, Florida Administrative Code, to replace its prior rule on handicap accessibility. The text of the current rule, which is the subject of this challenge, is as follows: Retailers shall be required to provide accessibility for disabled persons on habitable grade levels according to the following minimum specifications: A ramp 44 inches wide for changes in level in excess of 1/2 inch at doorways. The grade shall be not more than 1 inch vertically in 12 inches horizontally. A platform at the top of the ramp which is five feet by five feet if the door opens onto the platform, or three feet deep and five feet wide if the door does not open onto the platform. Aisles or pathways from the entrance door to the counter at which lottery tickets are sold shall be 44 inches in width. A clear turn-around space of at least five feet square in front of the counter at which lottery tickets are sold. An entrance door meeting one of the following specifications: Single leaf walk-through swinging door, 32 inches; One leaf of manually operated multiple- leaf swinging door, 32 inches; Any other walk-through opening, 29 inches. The Department shall not enter into a retailer contract with any retailer whose application is received by the Department after the date of adoption of this rule until the retailer is in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 1 through 5 above. All retailers whose applications were received by the Department prior to the effective date of this rule shall, not later than 90 days after contracting with the Department, provide the Department with a certificate under oath, affirming that the retailer is in full compliance with the handicap accessibility requirements set forth above. This section does not apply to a retail location which has an entrance door threshold more than 12 inches above ground level.
The Issue Whether Willie J. Thompson is entitled to the $5,000.00 prize for a winning lottery ticket presented by Mr. Thompson to the Department of the Lottery for collection?
Findings Of Fact Horace Bell purchased lottery ticket number 04-202290-059 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ticket") on approximately December 11, 1988. The Ticket was an instant winning ticket in the amount of $5,000.00, in the Florida Lottery's Money Tree Instant game. Willie J. Thompson drove Mr. Bell, his wife and other family members to Tallahassee on December 12, 1988, to file a claim for the prize. Upon arriving at the Lottery's offices Mr. Bell found that he did not have proper identification. Therefore, he allowed Mr. Thompson to present the ticket for collection because Mr. Thompson had proper identification. On December 12, 1988, Mr. Thompson completed a Florida Lottery Winner Claim Form (hereinafter referred to as the "Form") and submitted the Form and the Ticket to the Lottery. On the back of the Ticket Mr. Thompson listed his name and address on the spaces provided for the person claiming the prize and signed the Ticket. Mr. Thompson listed his name, Social Security Number, address and phone number on the Form. Mr. Thompson signed the Form as the "Claimant." In a letter dated December 12, 1988, DHRS notified the Lottery that Mr. Thompson owed $4,026.40 in Title IV-D child support arrearages as of December 12, 1988. Mr. Thompson has been paying his child support arrearages by having $30.00 taken out of each of his pay checks. The $5,000.00 prize was forwarded from the Lottery to the Comptroller on December 12, 1988. By letter dated December 20, 1988, Mr. Thompson was notified that the $5,000.00 prize for the Ticket he submitted was being transmitted to the Comptroller for possible payment of his Title IV-D child support arrearages. Mr. Thompson was notified by the Comptroller by letter dated December 28, 1988, that the Comptroller intended to apply $4,026.40 of the $5,000.00 prize toward his unpaid obligation. Mr. Thompson was provided a state warrant for the $973.60 balance of the $5,000.00 prize. Mr. Thompson requested a formal administrative hearing to contest the proposed action of the Comptroller. Mr. Thompson's total obligation as of the date of the formal hearing had been reduced by the court-ordered $30.00 payments he has made since December, 1988. As of the date of the formal hearing, Mr. Thompson's total obligation was $3,335.60. His obligation will reduce further by payments made up until the date of the issuance of a Final Order in this matter. Mr. Thompson should be given credit for these additional payments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it Is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued providing for payment of the portion of the $5,000.00 prize attributable to the Ticket owed by Mr. Thompson as child support arrearages as of the date of the Final Order to DHRS. The balance of the $5,000.00 prize should be paid to Mr. Thompson. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1989. APPENDIX Case Number 89-1102 The Petitioners have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1. 1. 2. 2-3. 3. 4 and 6. 4 7. 5 9. 6 11. 7 13. 8-9 Conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Jo Ann Levin Senior Attorney Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Louisa E. Hargrett Senior Attorney Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chriss Walker Senior Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Willie J. Thompson Post Office Box 3655 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Carolyn K. Peterson, entered a drawing held by Respondent, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (Division), on September 12, 1984, for priority entitlement to apply for one of thirteen new quota alcoholic beverage licenses to be issued for Seminole County. Peterson initially was not successful, having been ranked 15. Later, three applicants selected in the September 12 1984, drawing failed to qualify or file a proper application. By letter dated January 25,1985, the Division notified Peterson that her ranking now entitled her to apply For licensure. The January 25, 1985, letter informed Peterson "you must file a full and com- plete application within 45 days of the date of this letter pur- suant to Rule 7A-2.17, Florida Administrative Rule." The letter also notified Peterson: "Failure to file your complete application within such 45 day period will be deemed a waiver of your right to file for the new quota license." The Division consistently follows Rule 7A-2.17. On February 4, 1985, Peterson and her husband went to the Division's Orlando office to inquire concerning application for licensure. Peterson's husband, who had experience in applying for quota alcoholic beverage licenses, inquired whether it was necessary to jump through the procedural hoop of having a location selected and reflected in the application only to put the resulting license in escrow while seeking a more suitable license location within 180 days. The Division's representative, former employee Carolyn Thompson, responded that applicants no longer had to jump through that procedural hoop but could leave the designation of the location of the license blank on the initial application so long as a suitable location was selected and the application updated within 180 days. Thompson partially typed the application forms for Peterson, duplicated them so that Peterson could file the completed application in duplicate as required, and kept a copy for the Division's files. Thompson also gave Peterson, and kept a copy of, an instruction form for completion of Peterson's application. Thompson did not explicitly tell Peterson or her husband that Peterson could file the completed application after the expiration of the 45 day time limit. The Petersons confused the 45-day deadline for filing a full and complete application with the 180-day deadline for obtaining an appropriate location and zoning approval. As a result, the Petersons misunderstood and believed that the application was not required to be completed and filed within 45 days. After the February 4, 1985 meeting, the Petersons inquired about the process of finding a suitable location with suitable zoning. Meanwhile, they let the 45-day time limit ex- pire without filing a full and complete application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, deny the application of Petitioner, Carolyn K. Peterson, for a quota alcoholic beverage license. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Carolyn K. Peterson 797 Pinetree Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Thomas A. Klein, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire General Counsel. Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Howard M. Rasmussen, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Kearney, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX To the extent Petitioner's written final argument contains proposed findings of fact, they are rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and the Findings of Fact. Respondent's proposed findings of fact 1 through 5 are accepted, but 4 is subordinate and 5 is unnecessary.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of her disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bernice Buchanan, an 81-year-old female, lives in a condominium at 700 Seabrook Court, Unit 103, Altamonte Springs, Florida. The condominium unit was purchased by Petitioner and is within the Key West Condominiums complex. Respondent, Key West Condominium Association, Inc. ("Key West Association"), a not-for-profit corporation, is responsible for the operation of Key West Condominiums, which consists of 60 units. Petitioner has a meniscus tear in her right knee, arthritis in her right knee and right shoulder, and degenerative discs in her lumbar and cervical spine. As a result of the degenerative discs, there are no ligaments between Petitioner's bones in the affected area, thereby causing the degenerated discs to push on her muscles and nerves. Moreover, because there are no ligaments in the affected areas, Petitioner has a problem with balance and must walk very slowly. Finally, because of Petitioner's degenerative disc condition, Petitioner has severe pain when she walks, sits, or lies down. Petitioner's physician, John F. Ryan, M.D., submitted documentation which stated that Petitioner is not allowed to lift more than 15 pounds due to her degenerative discs and severe knee pain. Also, Dr. Ryan indicated that because of the severe pain in Petitioner's right knee, she is limited in walking, even moderate distances. Petitioner's degenerative disc condition and knee pain are permanent disabilities. Petitioner anticipates having surgery that may reduce or alleviate the pain caused by the degenerative discs. She is also contemplating having knee replacement surgery which should help the right knee. However, unless and until Petitioner has the surgeries, it is impossible to know if those procedures will alleviate her pain and/or otherwise improve her impaired mobility issues. While surgery may possibly improve some of Petitioner's medical conditions, that is not an option with regard to her arthritis. Petitioner is not aware of any surgery or other medical procedure that will improve and/or alleviate the pain she is experiencing due to the arthritis in her knee and shoulder. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any of her physicians have recommended any such procedure. Although Petitioner's ability to walk is impaired, she does not presently use any walking devices such as a cane or walker. Petitioner's ability to drive is not impacted by her medical conditions and associated physical impairments. In fact, Petitioner regularly drives to places such as the grocery store, church, and to visit family. The Key West Condominium complex has three types of parking spaces: (1) assigned garage spaces1; (2) unassigned uncovered non-handicap parking spaces ("regular parking spaces"); and (3) unassigned uncovered handicap parking spaces ("handicapped parking spaces"). Petitioner has an assigned garage space which is located in a bank of four garages. That assigned parking space is about ten feet wide. The regular parking spaces are not assigned and may be used by homeowners, residents and visitors on a "first come, first serve basis." The handicap parking spaces are not assigned and may be used by the homeowners and residents of Key West Condominiums and their visitors who have appropriate handicap decals. There is one handicap parking space located to the left of the bank of garages where Petitioner's garage space is located. Also, there are several regular parking spaces to the right of that garage bank. Because Petitioner's assigned garage is only ten feet wide, it is difficult for her to enter and exit her small Toyota sedan when it is parked in the garage. Nonetheless, provided Petitioner does not have groceries or packages to remove from her car, the garage space is "adequate." Due to the width of Petitioner's assigned garage, when Petitioner parks her car in that space, the car doors cannot be opened wide enough to allow her to remove groceries or packages from her vehicle. Thus, when Petitioner has groceries or packages to unload from her vehicle, in order to unload them, she must park in a space other than her assigned garage space. When Petitioner has groceries and/or other packages to unload and carry into her unit, she usually parks in a regular parking space in front of and close to her condominium unit. When Petitioner parks in the regular parking spaces, it is easier for her to unload the groceries from her car and carry them to her unit. If all of the regular parking spaces in front of her building are occupied by other vehicles, Petitioner has sometimes double-parked behind those vehicles. In those instances, Petitioner would unload the groceries or packages from her car, take them into her condominium unit, and then return to her car and park it in her assigned garage. Petitioner no longer double parks behind vehicles parked in the regular parking spaces when she has groceries and/or packages to unload from her car and take to her condominium. The reason is that Petitioner found that double parking and walking behind parked vehicles to unload her groceries was dangerous. When Petitioner has groceries or packages to take into her condominium and no regular parking spaces are available, she must park across the street and wait until a space becomes available. In such instances, Petitioner reported that she sometimes had to wait for up to 25 minutes for an available space. Petitioner's decreased mobility and impaired ability to walk, even moderate distances, and her lifting restrictions significantly impair her ability to retrieve groceries and packages from her car and carry them into her unit. Petitioner's assigned garage is 47 feet and nine inches from the front door of her unit. The handicap space to the left of the garage bank is 90 feet from the front door of Petitioner's unit. The regular parking space to the right of the garage bank, which Petitioner sometimes uses, is 38 feet from Petitioner's front door. In a letter dated May 15, 2007, Petitioner requested that the Key West Association provide her with a parking space close to her unit marked "Handicapped Parking" and designated only for her. Petitioner noted that she did not need space for a wheelchair. Finally, Petitioner advised Key West Association that the request was based on medical reasons. At the time Petitioner wrote the May 15, 2007, letter, there was a handicap parking space with the painted markings of a handicap parking space. However, that handicap parking space did not have a "handicap parking" sign designating that space as such. In her May 15, 2007, letter, Petitioner advised the Key West Association that the handicap parking space referenced in paragraph 29 would not meet her needs because it was too far for her to carry her groceries. In June 2007, the Key West Association Board of Directors ("Board"), denied Petitioner's request for the regular parking space closest to her unit to be designated as a "handicap parking" space reserved for her use only.2 Instead, the Board directed Petitioner to use the handicap parking space to the left of the garage bank. The Board also notified Petitioner that it would reinstall the "Handicapped Parking" sign"3 at the above-referenced handicap parking space. The Board did not designate the handicap parking space for Petitioner's exclusive use. Therefore, it could be used by any Key West Condominium homeowner or resident or their visitors with a handicap decal. The handicap parking space that the Board made available for use by Petitioner is located between two garage banks so that the handicap space is bordered on each side by a wall of the abutting garage bank. As noted above, the handicap parking space that the Board told Petitioner to use is 90 feet from the front door of Petitioner's condominium; this is 52 feet farther than the regular parking space in front of Petitioner's building. The Board's June 2007, denial letter expressed concern about the cost of constructing the handicap parking space. Additionally, the Board noted that construction of a new handicap parking space would result in the loss of two non-handicap parking spaces. (This was because two non-handicap parking spaces were needed to construct one handicap parking space.) By letter dated September 12, 2007, Petitioner advised the Key West Association that she was still having problems with parking. Petitioner reiterated that the handicap parking space, which the Board had opened for use (by re-installing the handicap parking sign), was too far for her to carry her groceries and other items (90 feet from the front door of her unit). Petitioner also noted that she had the following problems with the handicap parking space: (1) The handicap parking space was often occupied by a vehicle with no handicap decal; (2) Petitioner was required to exit her vehicle on the side of the parking space next to the wall of the garage bank; and (3) After exiting the handicap space, she could only access the sidewalk to her unit by stepping over a curb into the grass or walking around her car to the other side.4 Based on the problems enunciated in her September 12, 2007, letter, Petitioner again requested a "handicapped parking space closest to [her] building without having to walk in between cars." Petitioner wanted the requested handicap parking space to be for her exclusive use. Along with Petitioner's letter was a note from her physician, Dr. John Ryan, which supported her request for a handicap parking space. Dr. Ryan's note stated, "[d]ue to her [Petitioner's] medical condition, I request that [Petitioner] be assigned a parking area closest to her building. She requires a handicap space." There is no evidence that the Key West Association ever responded in writing to Petitioner's September 12, 2007, request or asked for additional information about her medical condition. Reggie Caruso, the deputy building official, is the principal plan reviewer for new and large construction projects, including condominium complexes, for the City of Altamonte Springs, Florida. Mr. Caruso is familiar with the parking requirements for condominium complexes, and his office enforces the laws and regulations applicable thereto. Unless otherwise exempt, condominium complexes are required to have a certain number of handicap parking spaces. However, except for the public areas, the Key West Association has the discretion to place the handicap parking spaces wherever it chooses and/or where such spaces are needed. Section 553.5041, Florida Statutes (2008),5 regulates parking spaces for persons with disabilities (i.e., handicap parking spaces) and applies to Key West Condominiums. Subsection 553.5041(5)(c)1., Florida Statutes, provides that: (1) handicap parking spaces be no less than 12 feet wide; (2) the parking access aisle be no less than five feet wide and be placed adjacent to the handicap parking space; and (3) the access aisle be part of an accessible route to the building or facility entrance. Also see Sections 11-4.6.2(1) and 11-4.6.3, Florida Building Code.6 Subsection 553.5041(4), Florida Statutes, provides that the number of "accessible parking spaces" (handicap parking spaces) must comply with the parking requirements in Section 4.1.2(5)(a) of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") Accessibility Guidelines. These requirements have been adopted and are in Section 11-4.1.2(5)(a) of the Florida Building Code. The number of handicap parking spaces in the Key West Condominium complex complies with applicable law, if the handicap parking space discussed below that does not meet minimum legal requirements, is counted. Subsection 553.5041(4)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that "[t]he number of parking spaces for persons who have disabilities must be increased on the basis of demonstrated and documented need." In or about mid-November 2008, Mr. Caruso inspected the handicap parking space that the Board advised Petitioner to use. That inspection revealed two areas in which that handicap space and the adjacent access aisle were not in compliance with Subsection 553.5041(5)(c)1., Florida Statutes, and the Florida Building Code.7 The first area of non-compliance involves the width of the handicap parking space and adjacent access aisle. Here, the handicap parking space, including the adjacent access aisle, is tapered and has a width that ranges from 16 feet to 18 feet. Accordingly, at certain points, the handicap parking space, including the adjacent access aisle, is only 16 feet wide, not 17 feet, the prescribed minimum width. During the inspection, Mr. Caruso observed that a "fixed" building (a bank of garages) was on each side of the handicap parking space, including access aisle. Thus, Mr. Caruso determined that there is no reasonable way to change the space so that the minimum width of the handicap parking space and adjacent access aisle is 17 feet at all points as prescribed in Subsection 553.5041(5)(c)1., Florida Statutes.8 The second area of non-compliance concerns the requirement that the access aisle be connected to an accessible route. During his inspection of the handicap parking space, Mr. Caruso observed that there is no direct route from the handicap parking space's adjacent access aisle to a sidewalk. Instead, there is a five-inch high curb which obstructs the accessible route. Consequently, the access aisle is not connected to the access route (sidewalk) to the building in which is located Petitioner's unit or any other building in the complex. Mr. Caruso testified credibly that to establish an accessible route from the access aisle (adjacent to the handicap parking space), part of the five-inch high curb would have to be removed and the concrete would have to be extended from the access aisle to the sidewalk. The removal of the curb would result in compliance with the requirement in Subsection 553.5041(5)(c)1., Florida Statutes, that the access aisle connect with and is "part of an accessible route to the building." Also, the removal of the curb would make the space safe because persons using the space would no longer have to step over the five-inch high curb to get to the accessible route. Even if the curb is removed, the parking space, including access aisles, would still not be in compliance with law because the space does not meet the minimum width requirement of 17 feet prescribed in Subsection 553.5041(5)(c)1., Florida Statutes. Moreover, as noted above, because the handicap parking space is bordered on each side of a "fixed" building, it cannot reasonably be brought into compliance. Marty Boble is a planning and development review specialist for the City of Altamonte Springs. In that position, he determines compliance as it relates to the number of parking spaces on-site. In November 2008, Mr. Boble went to the Key West Condominium complex and inspected the property, including the above-referenced handicap parking space. He also reviewed the Key West Condominium plans, which showed the buildings and parking spaces in the complex. The Florida Building Code requires the Key West Condominium complex to have two parking spaces per dwelling. Key West Condominium, which counts its garage spaces as parking spaces, not only meets the requirement as to number of spaces per unit, but exceeds it by 20 spaces. To construct a new handicap parking space that complies with the legally prescribed width requires that two non-handicap parking spaces be used. Thus, the result of constructing a new handicap parking space would result in the loss of two existing regular parking spaces. Nonetheless, Key West Association would still be in compliance with the Code requirement of two parking spaces per unit because it currently has 20 more spaces than required.9 Petitioner's request for a handicap parking space near her condominium unit is reasonable. In light of her impaired ability to walk, even moderate distances, and her lifting restrictions, Petitioner is unable to retrieve groceries and other packages from her vehicle and take them to her unit. Without an accommodation for her handicap, Petitioner cannot have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her condominium unit. In this case, Petitioner has a disability which significantly impairs her ability to walk. Thus, Respondent is required to provide her with a reasonable accommodation. As of the date of this proceeding, Respondent has not provided any accommodation to Petitioner. The reasonable accommodation that Respondent should provide is to convert non-handicap or regular parking spaces into a handicap parking space. This remedy is required due to the non-compliance issue of the handicap space which cannot be corrected.10 By converting two non-handicap or regular parking spaces to one handicap parking space, Respondent will be able to construct and provide a handicap parking space that complies with applicable law and regulations. The accommodation offered by the Key West Association and its Board is not a reasonable one. As noted above, the handicap parking space offered to Petitioner did not comply with the provisions of Subsection 553.5041(5)(c)1., Florida Statutes. Moreover, the Key West Association failed to take steps to bring that parking space into partial compliance and to make it safe for Petitioner's use, although it had more than a year to do so. Finally, even though it was clearly established that Petitioner needed a space closer to her unit, the Key West Association and its Board offered her a space that was not only unsafe and non-compliant with law, but was further away from her unit. The Declaration of Condominium for Key West provides that material alterations of common elements, such as regular parking spaces, require approval of two-thirds of the owners at a properly noticed meeting. Despite the Key West Association's position, use of two regular parking spaces to construct a handicap space is a material alteration, it never called a meeting for that purpose.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order: Finding that Respondent, Key West Condominium Association, Inc., discriminated against Petitioner, Bernice Buchanan, under the FFHA by refusing to make a reasonable accommodation for her handicap; Ordering Respondent to cease the discriminatory practice; and Ordering Respondent to provide a handicap parking space close to Petitioner's condominium unit. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2009.
