Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
STANISLAW BUDZINSKI AND KAZIMIERA BUDZINSKI vs CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 91-002124 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Apr. 04, 1991 Number: 91-002124 Latest Update: Aug. 16, 1991

The Issue Whether Appellants were wrongfully denied a variance of 16-17 parking spaces that could allow an existing 2170 square foot restaurant to transfer and use its 2-COP State alcoholic beverage license at 201 South Gulfview Boulevard on Clearwater Beach, in the City of Clearwater.

Findings Of Fact Appellants own real property on the north corner of South Gulfview Boulevard and First Street on Clearwater Beach. The property is in a zoning district designated as CR-28 (Resort Commercial District/Commercial Tourist Facilities), and is primarily used by Appellants to operate a motel business. The surrounding land uses to the north, south and east are primarily motel. To the west is a public parking lot and the beaches. In May 1990, Appellants leased a portion of the ground floor to James B. Mayes so that he could operate a restaurant known as Britt's Beachside Cafe at that location. In order to build a restaurant on premises, 2170 square feet of gross floor area was improved by the lessee. Pursuant to code, 11 parking spaces were needed for the restaurant to meet parking space requirements for an eating establishment at this site. The parking space calculation was made according to the formula of one space per 100 square feet of gross floor area, the general parking formula for restaurants, with a 50 percent reduction allowed for Clearwater Beach locations. Prior to the opening of the business, only 9 off-street parking spaces were allocated to Britt's Beachside Cafe. During May 1990, a variance of 2 parking spaces was requested by Appellants and granted by the Development Code Adjustment Board. At that time, Britt's Beachside Cafe was involved with food and non-alcoholic beverage sales. With the approved variance, the restaurant was granted an occupational license and a certificate of occupancy for the operation of the restaurant at this location. Previously, Mr. Mayes operated his restaurant in a larger motel with a smaller parking lot and fewer parking spaces approximately 60 feet north of the subject property for almost four years. The former restaurant had 120 seats for patrons as opposed to the current 84 seats. Beer and wine was sold in the restaurant under a 2-COP State alcohol beverage license. The beverage license was acquired because this location was exempt from the current city parking requirements under a grandfathering provision of the Clearwater Code. In addition, Mr. Mayes' restaurant was exempt from the code requirement that 51 percent of sales had to be from food and non-alcoholic beverages because the business existed before the ordinance went into effect. When the restaurant moved, the exemption from current parking space requirements remained with the original location, and the exemption from the 51 percent sales from food and non-alcoholic beverages for the business was removed. The 2-COP State alcohol beverage license for Britt's Beachside Cafe, however, was attached to the business and could easily transfer to the new location if local zoning laws permitted its use there. In order to have the alcoholic beverage license transferred to the new business location, the state requires the business to continue with its compliance with local zoning and development laws. To accomplish this, the restaurant is required to have one parking space per 40 square feet of gross floor area, with the 50 percent reduction formulated and allowed for a Clearwater Beach location. As Britt's Beachside Cafe is currently operating under the 11 parking space requirement, 16-17 more parking spaces are needed for the business to transfer the beverage license to the new business location. The actual number of parking spaces for the restaurant on location is During site review prior to the granting of the certificate of occupancy, city staff improperly counted four illegal parking spaces along First Street as legitimate, non-conforming off-street parking spaces. The restaurant caters primarily to persons walking to the restaurant either from adjacent motels or the beach. Few automobiles are driven and parked at Britt's Beachside Cafe. Even when the business was located in the other motel with more seating and fewer parking spaces, parking was never a problem in the area. There is considerable public parking immediately adjacent to Appellant's property, both across the street, and approximately one block to the north. When restaurant patrons are unable to use the parking spaces on location, they park in these convenient public spaces. Since Mr. Mayes relocated his restaurant, he has served beer and wine on premises, without charge. It has always been his intent to transfer his 2- COP State alcoholic beverage license to this new location if permitted to do so through a parking space variance. The City's requirement that the restaurant acquire more off-street parking spaces is factually unnecessary if the sole purpose of the ordinance is to provide parking for the restaurant patrons. At the old location, parking was never a problem. Likewise, no problems exist at the new location. As the restaurant no longer seeks to expand, the major differences a parking variance would make are that Mr. Mayes could charge for the beer and wine served and use his 2-COP license. When Appellants proceeded through the first phase of the approval process to obtain a decision from the Planning and Zoning Board, their conditional use application met with approval. It was determined, however, that the preliminary approval would be subject to the obtainment of a parking space variance, which needed to be decided by the Development Code Adjustment Board. Accordingly, the application proceeded to the second phase. If granted in the second phase, Appellants would go to the City Commission for a variance from the separation requirement. The application for a variance that removes the requirement for 16-17 additional parking spaces to enable the sale of beer and wine on premises was denied by the Development Code Adjustment Board and this appeal followed. The appeal was filed based upon the allegation that the decision of the Development Code Adjustment Board departs from the essential requirements of law. The Code of Ordinances of the City of Clearwater requires additional parking for establishments with alcoholic beverage licenses, which by nature of their license only, can be converted from restaurants to taverns or night clubs. Mr. Mayes' restaurant, which is subject to the additional parking space requirement because of the type of alcoholic beverage license he seeks to transfer, is already prevented from converting to a tavern or a night club by virtue of the restaurant's location in the CR-28 zoning district. In the CR-28 zoning district, all alcoholic beverage sales for consumption on premises shall be located only within a hotel or motel in conjunction with a 4-COP license or within a restaurant deriving 51 percent or more of its gross revenue from the sale of food and non-alcoholic beverages. The restrictive requirement that a 2-COP license be used solely to accompany a restaurant business, as opposed to a tavern or night club in the special CR-28 zoning district, is balanced by the Clearwater Code provision that reduces the required number of parking spaces by 50 percent for Clearwater Beach locations and the opportunity to have a business that sells alcoholic beverages in a resort commercial district. The 2-COP license was acquired prior to the restaurant's move to its current location. If Appellants request for a parking space variance is denied, Mr. Mayes' application for transfer of his beverage license to a new location will likely be denied by the state, pursuant to Section 561.331, Florida Statutes. The request for the variance is based primarily on Mr. Mayes' desire for greater financial return on his business and to keep his 2-COP license attached to the restaurant. The Development Code Adjustment Board has granted parking variances to other 2-COP restaurants before and after Appellants' application in the same zoning district. These variances were based on applications and evidence presented at Board hearings.

Florida Laws (2) 286.0105561.331
# 1
JOHN PAUL GALLANT vs. CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 88-004968 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004968 Latest Update: Jan. 05, 1989

Findings Of Fact On or about April 5, 1988, Petitioner filed an application for a variance to replace an existing four foot fence extending to the seawall on his property at 643 Harbor Island, Lot 12 Island Estates, Clearwater, Florida. The subject property is zoned RS-6. Petitioner had already replaced his previous fencing prior to the filing of this application with wooden fencing which extends on the north and south side of his property through the setback to the seawall. The Development Code Adjustment Board considered Petitioner's application at its meeting on May 12, 1988, and based upon the Petitioner's explanation that the variance was sought simply to replace an existing fence that had termite damage, the Board approved his application on a 3 to 2 vote. The variance approval was conditioned upon the Petitioner obtaining a building permit within one month of the approval. Petitioner failed to obtain the required building permit, and no excuse was offered for this failure. Therefore, he had to reapply for the variance. On or about July 21, 1988, Petitioner filed his variance reapplication. The Development Code Adjustment Board considered this reapplication on August 25, 1988, at which time Petitioner again stated that he was simply replacing an existing fence. Due to a tie vote, consideration of the reapplication was continued to the Board's meeting of September 8, 1988. At the meeting on September 8, he explained for the first time that while the fencing on the south side of his property was simply the replacement of a previous fence which had extended to the seawall, the fencing on the north side was not. The previous fence on the north side of his property had stopped prior to the fifteen foot setback. With this clarification, the Board approved his variance reapplication for the south side of his property, but denied the variance for the north side. Petitioner has timely appealed the denial of his variance reapplication as it relates to the north side of his property. Petitioner testified at hearing that prior to the construction of his current wooden fence, he had a wood fence all the way to the seawall on the south side of his property. Since he had to replace that fencing due to termite damage, he took the opportunity to also replace and extend the wooden fencing on the northern side of his property through the setback. This action was not based on any hardship, but simply because he and his family felt it would look better if he had the same fencing on both sides of his property. It is clear and undisputed that Petitioner constructed a new fence on the north side of his property through the setback without obtaining a variance or permit. He did this simply for aesthetic reasons, and not due to any hardship. He failed to disclose this in his applications, or when the Board met on May 12 and August 25, 1988 to consider this matter.

Florida Laws (1) 120.65
# 2
RICHARD P. LEVY, D/B/A T-SHIRT FACTORY vs CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 91-005218 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Aug. 19, 1991 Number: 91-005218 Latest Update: May 04, 1992

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the evidence sustains the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board (the Board) to deny the application of the Appellant, Richard P. Levy, d/b/a T-Shirt Factory, for a four parking space variance at his property located at 1498 Gulf to Bay Boulevard, at the junction of Gulf to Bay Boulevard, Highland Avenue and Court Street, Clearwater, Florida. (The variance is required as a result of his desire to convert 877.5 square feet of storage space in his building on the property to retail use.)

Findings Of Fact Appellant, Richard P. Levy, d/b/a T-Shirt Factory, owns part of lots 5 and 8, and all of lots 6 and 7, Block G, Boulevard Heights, at 1498 Gulf to Bay Boulevard, at the junction of Gulf to Bay Boulevard, Highland Avenue and Court Street, 0.24 acres, more or less, Clearwater, Florida. The T-Shirt Factory utilizes back-out parking into Gulf to Bay Boulevard and Highland Avenue. This type of parking for retail use is a traffic hazard and does not conform to the requirements of the City of Clearwater Land Development Code (the Code), but the property enjoys the benefit a having its retail use "grandfathered" under the Code because the prior owner also used the property and parking for retail sales at the time the Code was adopted. Gulf to Bay Boulevard is a busy and fairly high speed traffic artery. Highland Avenue also is a busy street. They meet at an acute angle with the Appellant's property inside the angle. Gulf to Bay Boulevard and Court Street, also a busy and fairly high speed traffic artery, meet at an acute angle just across the street from the Appellant's property, further complicating the traffic pattern in the vicinity of the Appellant's property. The Appellant filed its application for a four parking space variance to allow him to convert 877.5 square feet of storage space in his building on the property to retail use. The Appellant can make reasonable use of his property without the additional retail space. The Appellant's primary purposes in increasing retail space are to directly increase revenue and profit and to make the retail displays in his store more attractive and more spacious, in large part to prevent shoplifting and thereby indirectly increase revenues and profit. As now planned, unless advertised, the existance of additional retail space in the store would not be readily apparent to passers by not already familiar with the store. Nonetheless, the Appellant did not prove that the additional retail use will not lead eventually to additional use of the existing back-out parking on Gulf to Bay Boulevard and Highland Avenue. Even if the retail space were expanded as planned, and not advertised, the expansion eventually could lead to an increase in retail business, one of the Appellant's primary long term purposes.

# 3
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION vs. JAMES BROWN, D/B/A RAMROD DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 78-001234 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-001234 Latest Update: Sep. 19, 1979

Findings Of Fact Mariposa Road appears on the plat of Ramrod Shores Marina Section subdivision (the Subdivision), which was filed in the official records of Monroe County in 1960; and on revisions of the original plan, one of which was filed in 1963, and the more recent of which was filed in 1969. On February 9, 1960, Monroe County accepted the dedication of Mariposa Road, and the County has owned it since. Mariposa Road borders the Subdivision on the east, separating it from Torch Ramrod Channel which leads into Niles Channel which leads into the Gulf of Mexico to the north; to the south Torch Ramrod Channel leads into Newfound Harbor which opens onto the Atlantic Ocean. Mariposa Road runs from State Road 4 northerly through a tidal mangrove community along the water's edge to the northern edge of the Subdivision. Midway, Angelfish Road meets is perpendicularly. Cape Sable Corporation, the original developer of the Subdivision, trucked in oolitic limestone fill to construct Mariposa and Angelfish Roads, and to repair the roads after occasional washouts. In 1968 or 1969, Sayward Wing drove a Studebaker north on Mariposa Road from its intersection with State Road In 1969, James Lewis drove south on Mariposa Road. In his Lincoln, he was unable to drive up onto State Road 4 where Mariposa Road dead ends into it, but the found the road passable otherwise. By October of 1974, all fill placed on Mariposa Road south of Angelfish road had washed out. In October of 1974, or shortly before, a bulldozer cleared the road site south of Angelfish Road. In this stretch, the centerline of the marl roadbed was three to four tenths of a foot above the national geodetic vertical datum. In 1975, and again the following year, Monroe County placed fill on Mariposa Road. In June of 1976, there was fill on the site and a road ran north from Angelfish Road but there was no fill in Mariposa Road's roadbed south of Angelfish Road. In August of 1976, there was a standing water in the Mariposa roadbed between State Road 4 and Angelfish Road. By January of 1977, and possibly as early as November of 1976, rock fill had been spread in the roadbed from State Road 4 to north of Angelfish Road, however, and the roadway was complete. By October of 1977, 96 cubic yards of fill had been placed in the roadbed, but water stood on both sides of the roadway. About 278 cubic yards of fill had been placed on Angelfish Road. On the day of the hearing, fill had been placed in the Mariposa roadbed to a height two or three feet above adjacent ground, making the road two or three feet higher than it had been in January of 1977. The road was higher and wider than it had been in October of 1977. The area landward of Mariposa Road and north of Angelfish Road was dry, while much of the area immediately landward of Mariposa Road and south of Angelfish Road was wet. Sometimes water stands a foot deep west of Mariposa Road. Wetland vegetation predominated on lot 11 in block 4 and most of lots 12, 13 and 14 in block 2 of the Subdivision, all of which lie west of Mariposa Road. The tidal mangrove community intersected by Mariposa Road still supports wading birds and various marine for organisms, including killifish, needlefish and jelly fish. The mangroves' root systems stabilize the shoreline and filter out certain substances which would otherwise run off into the channel. Decaying plant matter produced by red and spider mangroves supports various microorganisms which constitute an early link in the food chain culminating in commercial fisheries. Mariposa Road separates plan matter on the west side of the road from the waters of Torch Ramrod Channel. In October of 1977, the rock which was used to build Mariposa Road was loosely packed. Water from Torch Ramrod Channel percolated through the road even when it was not high enough to move across the road in a sheet, which sometimes happened. There were also low lying places in the road through which tidal waters flowed to the landward side of Mariposa Road. With the addition of fill since then, water reaches wetlands west of the road only by percolation or capillary action, or in the form of rainfall. The wetlands are impounded and unable to drain into the channel. Significantly less frequent tidal inundation coupled with constant evapotranspiration will increase the salinity of the remaining water, which makes survival of the existing mangroves doubtful. These mangroves, which do not attain any great size because of the limiting effect of the caprock in the area, exhibited no signs of stress in October of 1977. On the day of the hearing, however, a biologist visited the site and concluded that the mangroves were suffering from stress and might die off altogether in as little two years, as a result of the interference with tidal action caused by the rock fill. Removal of the fill would ten to restore the mangroves west of Mariposa Road to health and would permit decaying plant matter and related microorganisms on the landward side of Mariposa Road to contribute to the ecosystem of Torch Ramrod Channel; several of the Subdivision lots would be opened to waters of the State. In October of 1977, respondent admitted repeatedly causing fill to be deposited in the Mariposa roadbed. Petitioner has never issued a permit authorizing respondent to place fill on Mariposa Road, not has respondent applied to petitioner for such a permit. Monroe County never authorized respondent place fill material or anything else on Mariposa Road. Petitioner's exhibit No. 7). Before March 8, 1979, petitioner reasonably expended six hundred four dollars and seventy-nine cents ($604.79) in investigating the source of the fill. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the amended notice of violation. That respondent pay petitioner six hundred four dollars and seventy- nine cents ($604.79). That respondent, within twenty days of entry of the final order, file an application for a permit or submit a proposed restoration plan and compliance schedule to petitioner for approval. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of August 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: H. Ray Allen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Paul Horan, Esquire 513 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040

Florida Laws (4) 403.031403.087403.141403.161
# 4
STANISLAW BUDZINSKI AND KAZIMIERA BUDZINSKI vs CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 97-001109 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Mar. 10, 1997 Number: 97-001109 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1997

Findings Of Fact Lior Hason is the owner of Britt's Cafe, a restaurant which occupies property owned by the Petitioner's Stanislaw and Kasimiera Budzinski. On or about December 19, 1995, Harry S. Cline, an attorney for Mr. Hason and the Budzinskis, filed an application for a variance from the City of Clearwater's Development Code, for the purpose of eliminating three required parking spaces from the front of the subject property for the construction of an outdoor cafe at 201 South Gulfview Boulevard. The Code requires one parking space per 200 square feet of gross floor area, and a variance was required to remove three existing parking spaces from the unit's parking space inventory. The matter was brought before the City's Development Code Adjustment Board at its January 11, 1996 meeting. Mr. Cline appeared at the meeting on behalf of the applicant and presented the project. No one else was present to speak in support of or in opposition to the request. However, four letters in opposition from neighboring business owners were submitted. Notwithstanding these objections, the Board determined that the applicant had substantially met all standards for approval listed in the City's Land Development Code; and upon vote of the Board, the application was approved, subject to certain conditions, by a three to two majority. Mr. Hason entered into discussions with City officials to determine what was necessary. Official City reaction was initially favorable. Mr. Hason was advised of the requirements for the project and had plans drawn which called for a deck with a 35 to 36 inch railing with landscaping around it, and with posts and lights. When the plans were submitted to the City officials, the only change suggested was to raise the railing height to 45 inches, which was done, after which the City approved the plans and the permit was granted. The deck was then constructed exactly according to the approved plans. At some time during 1996, Mr. Hason discussed with some City employees putting an awning over the deck. During these discussions, the City employees sent Mr. Hason a copy of Section 41.221(1)(c), Clearwater City Code, which provides for awnings to be removable. Mr. Hason considered the sending of this Code provision to be tantamount to a favorable reply to his inquiry, and, based on that, he finalized his plans for the installation of a removable awning. The proposed awning is designed in such a fashion as to be extendible and retractable on a frame, capable of easily being pulled up against the front of the building like a drapery. With a minimum of further effort, consisting of the removal a several bolts, the entire awning construction can be removed from the frame. Mr. Hason submitted his application for the variance to install the awning on February 2, 1997. In the interim, the City employees with whom Mr. Hason discussed the project changed their position from favoring the project to opposing it. He was ultimately advised in December 1996 or January 1997 that the awning could not be permitted because an awning could not be approved over a deck for which a permit should not have been issued and for which the issuance was a mistake. Though the Board had not yet voted on the application, no information was given to Mr. Hason as to what he could do to make the project approvable. His application, on February 2, 1997, was submitted because, Hason claims, he had been told, by someone not further identified, that applying for a variance for the awning would make everything right. The Variance Staff Report submitted to the Board by the appropriate City employees acknowledged that the frame over which Mr. Hason proposed to put the awning does not meet code because it was constructed within a required setback area from South Gulfview Boulevard, but since the frame was built pursuant to a City-issued permit, consistent with City policy, the City accepted its existence. In its final recommendation to the Board, the staff concluded that notwithstanding the encroachment into the setback area, the project "appears to comply with all standards for approval, provided attention is given to the external appearance of the cafe:" The staff then went on to recommend approval of the project subject to certain conditions, all of which, Mr. Hason accepts and agrees to. Nonetheless, the Board denied the permit by a vote of four to one. Mr. Hason contends that the Board vote was an attempt by the Board to get back at him because of what it perceived as his failure to comply with the conditions placed upon the issuance of the first permit and his alleged misrepresentation of the scope of his project at the time. Mr. Hason, however, categorically denies he has done anything contrary to the dictates of the City. He went back to City officials many times during the construction of the deck to make sure the project was built as required. The majority of the Board members believe, however, that the deck as constructed, goes far beyond the limited structure approved by the granting of the parking space variance in January 1996. This animosity toward the project can be seen from a review of the audio record of the February 13, 1997, Board meeting where, during a colloquy between a Board member and Mr. Hason, it appeared the member was somewhat put out by the entire situation. His analysis indicates a less than complete recollection of the matter, however. Whereas one of the conditions to the issuance of the initial permit was that the area of the outdoor cafe should not be greater than 25 percent of the indoor area of the restaurant, this member pointed out that the 69 outdoor seats were far in excess of 25 percent of the 115 or so indoor seats. This constituted a confusion of seating as opposed to area. No evidence was presented concerning whether Mr. Hason had violated the area constraint. In the main, however, while it appeared that a majority of the Board members were unhappy about the way the project developed, and expressed the opinion that the project did not conform to what they had intended to approve, there was no indication any member s vote was motivated by anything other than a sincere belief in the correctness of his position. There was no indication of any inappropriate or vindictive action by anyone on the Board or its staff. Stephen Sarnoff, a central permitting specialist with the City reviewed the plans for the initial construction and for the current application. As he recalls, the plans for the initial deck construction did not show any support beams, fans, overhead structure or latticework fencing, and the deck, as built, does not conform to the plans as submitted. City Code requirements call for a railing of from 30 to 42 inches high. The current railing of 45 inches does not conform to that standard, and Mr. Sarnoff is not aware of any request from the City that the railing be raised to that height, as Mr. Hason claims. By the same token, while there is no requirement in the ordinance that a deck be of a certain height, anything higher than 12 inches is considered a structure and a waiver is required. This deck was approved for 12 inches. A certificate of occupancy is usually issued for a deck, but in the instant case, such a certificate has not been issued because the deck, as built, is not in compliance with the 1996 approval. If it is brought into compliance, it will be approved. Sarnoff is aware of and familiar with other outdoor restaurant decks built at various locations in the Clearwater area, as indicated by Mr. Hason. Some are not within the CR-28 zone and do not come under the same standards as are applicable here. Others, which must conform to the instant requirements appear to have movable awnings which are acceptable. Still others are in a different zoning district with different set-back requirements, and some were initially denied, but were subsequently approved when they were brought into compliance with the requirements. John Richter, a senior planner for the City, was the individual who prepared the staff report on the instant project and initially recommended approval, contingent upon changes to the external appearance of the facility. He made suggestions and has discussed the project with Hason on his several visits to the property. He did discuss an awning with Hason at some point, but their discussions did not deal with its mobility. All in all, Mr. Richter concluded that the project appears to meet the standard for approval, provided attention is given to the external appearance of the cafe. David S. Shuford, the City's central permitting director and development code administrator indicated that the variance required for the awning, which was an integral part of the structure already built, was not automatically granted with the granting of the permit for the deck structure. Section 42.221, Clearwater City Code, was adopted to promote a more festival atmosphere in some of the outdoor tourist areas. The intent of subsection (l)(c) of that provision was to require the use of moveable items and to design structures that would meet wind requirements and not interfere with pedestrian traffic. The term "moveable" means what it says, and in Shuford's opinion, from the plans he saw, the proposed awning would not be easily moveable on a daily basis. The Clearwater City Code establishes the area in question as one where, once guidelines are developed, they will be adopted and be complied with. Mr. Shuford opines that the current deck, in the rafter area, goes beyond what was proposed at the time the project was submitted for the parking variance and was approved. This is what appears to be the source of the difficulty the Board members have with it. However, if designed to comply with the guidelines, this awning could be approved. He would agree with the conditions outlined in the staff recommendation so far as they relate to painting and architectural matters.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.69
# 5
JOHN TAYLOR, III vs. CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 86-002119 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-002119 Latest Update: Jan. 08, 1987

Findings Of Fact John Taylor, III, Petitioner, owns property located at 1200 South Missouri Avenue in the City of Clearwater which is zoned CC (commercial center). The subject property consists of a mall and movie theater. On or about April 17, 1986, Michael Johnson, on behalf of Petitioner, applied for a variance to allow two message signs on the subject property and also to allow total message signage of 256 square feet. Without a variance, the subject property can have only one message sign which cannot exceed 192 square feet. The property presently has one message sign and total message signage of 176 square feet located on its marquee. At a meeting of the Development Code Adjustment Board on May 8, 1986, Petitioner's variance application was denied. The parties stipulated that Fusco Corporation is the manager of the mall located on Petitioner's property and further that Fusco is the owner of all improvements on the property. Further, Cineplex-Odeon has leased the theater located on the subject property and has renovated and expanded it from two to five movie theaters. Finally, Michael Johnson was employed by Cineplex-Odeon to install the changeable message sign which is the subject of this variance. The second message sign which is sought by this variance would be located 350 feet from Missouri Avenue, which runs north and south in front of the subject property. Specifically, it will be located in the front wall of the theaters next to the ticket counter, and will be 16 feet long by 4.4 feet high. The sign would actually be a display case, 6 inches deep, with five individual poster display cases, which would be used to display coming attraction posters. Each display case would have a hinged glass door, through which the poster could be seen. Coming attraction posters are 2 feet long by 3.3 feet high. The 6 inch depth of the display case extends equally into, and protrudes out of, the front wall of the theater. Petitioner has not established that a hardship would exist if this variance is not approved. Coming attraction posters can be, and in fact are, displayed in the theater lobby. During the renovation of the theater, the front wall could have been removed and a window installed to allow viewing of the lobby posters from outside the theater. Finally, the existing sign on the property could be used to advertise coming attractions, as well as movies which are currently playing. The display case for which this variance is sought on behalf of Petitioner is a "changeable message sign," as that term is used in Section 134.011(a), Land Development Code, since it would be a graphic communication or device which would be primarily used to convey information or advertise and would also be prominently visible from outside the theater.

Florida Laws (1) 120.65
# 7
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS vs. BILLY MARLAR, D/B/A RAINBOW MOTEL, 88-004429 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004429 Latest Update: Aug. 18, 1989

The Issue Whether the construction activity was begun within the 45 day period within which the issuance of the permit by the city could have been challenged and was not in compliance with local codes and ordinances.

Findings Of Fact The Department of Community Affairs is the state land planning agency empowered to enforce the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. (Section 380.031-.032, F.S.). Billy Marlar owns and operates the Rainbow Motel, located at 123 Water Street, Apalachicola, Florida. (R. 9) Petitioner Marlar is the record title holder of wharf lots 13 and 14 in the City of Apalachicola according to the map or plat commonly used. Lots 13 and 14 are held in the name of Rainbow Motel and Marina. Lots 13 and 14 are located within the Riverfront District, as identified in the Land Development Code of the City of Apalachicola. (R. 57) Old plats reflect that the dimensions of wharf lots 13 and 14 are 206.54 feet wide and approximately 70 feet deep, or 14,250.75 square feet. Over the years, sand has accreted to the eastern boundary of these wharf lots and for the past 35 years there have been improved structures on the eastern boundary of the property. Although the Franklin County tax rolls reflect wharf lots 13 and 14 as being approximately 200 feet wide by 180 feet deep, the Rainbow Hotel is built on pilings over water or land which is tidal. Inspection of the property reveals that the water line of the Apalachicola Bay lies approximately at the western edge of the main portion of the hotel. On May 13, 1988, Billy Marlar applied for a permit to construct a concrete parking lot on wharf lots 13 and 14 in the City of Apalachicola. (Rainbow Exhibit 2) On May 16, 1988, the Apalachicola Planning and Zoning Commission considered Mr. Marlar's application at a special meeting, and granted the permit application. (Rainbow Exhibit 9). On May 25, 1988, Permit No. 1172 was forwarded to the Department of Community Affairs for consideration as a development order. (Rainbow Exhibit 2). Prior to the permit being forwarded to DCA, construction of the parking lot commenced. A portion of the parking lot was poured on May 23, 1988, and the remainder of the parking lot was completed within 2 - 3 weeks of that date. (R. 50-51, 53). The Land Development Code provides that lot coverage within the Riverfront District shall contain a minimum of 50 percent pervious surface. The term "pervious surface" means that water will percolate through that surface that covers the earth. (R. 59). The concrete parking lot constructed by Billy Marlar on wharf lots 13 and 14 is not a pervious surface. (R. 70). The dimensions of the portion of the parking lot on lots 13 and 14 are 78 feet along the northern boundary, 205 feet along the eastern boundary, 78 feet along the southern boundary and 205 along western boundary. There is a planter in the southwestern corner which has approximately 704 square feet. The proposed finding submitted by the Department states that the parking lot contains 12,589.87 square feet, which will be the area used. (DCA Exhibit 1 and R. 71). The dimensions of the pervious surface of the property are based upon the area of the non-tidal portion of the two lots. The dimensions of the non- tidal area of the two lots are determined from resolution of the conflicts in the testimony and evidence presented and an examination of the property. The western boundary is 215 feet; northern boundary is 112 feet; eastern boundary is 215 feet; and southern boundary is 122.5 feet. The total non-tidal area of the two lots based upon these dimensions is 25,208 square feet. (Rainbow Exhibit 3). Although the records of the Franklin County Property Appraiser's Officer indicated the dimensions of wharf lots 13 and 14 were 200 feet wide by 180 feet deep, a substantial portion of the eastern boundary of that area is submerged. (Rainbow Exhibit 3 and 5, R. 32). Conflicting evidence was presented as to the dimensions of the non-tidal property from the street frontage to the mean high water line. The drawings show a meander line along the mean high water line; however, observation revealed water under the majority of the hotel, particularly on the northeast corner. Based upon those observations, the eastern boundary on non-tidal land is computed as a straight line parallel to the western edge of the longest portion of the hotel and five (5) feet to the east of longest portion of the hotel running from southern boundary to the northern boundary. See pencil additions to Rainbow Exhibit 3 made by fact finder after observation of the property pursuant to motion. A portion of the Rainbow Motel and the Pot Restaurant extend over the water. (R. 32 and Rainbow Exhibit 3). A portion of the hotel approximately 21.9 feet by 17.3 feet and 5 feet by 136.32 feet is located on the pervious surface of lots 13 and 14. Approximately 33% of the restaurant, the dimensions of which are 47 by 46 feet, is located on the pervious surface of lot 13. The buildings cover a total of 1,781 square feet. The total impervious surface on lots 14 and 13 is 14,371 square feet. The total non-tidal area of the two lots is 25,209 square feet. The impervious surface must be reduced by 1767 square feet. (R. 76).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered requiring Billy Marlar and Rainbow Hotel to bring the project into compliance within 30 days by removal of 1767 square feet of impervious surface from the non-tidal portions of lots 13 and 14. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of August, 1989. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1989. ANNEX A Consideration of Proposed Findings of Fact The proposed findings of the Department of Community Affairs were read and considered as follows: Paragraphs 1-10 Adopted. Paragraph 11 The proposed dimensions are rejected as being contrary to the best evidence of the dimensions of the non-tidal area of the two lots. Paragraphs 12 & 13 Adopted. The proposed findings of Marlar and Rainbow Hotel were read and considered as follows: Paragraphs 1 & 2 Adopted. Paragraph 3 The existence of non-tidal land to a depth of 180 feet is rejected as contrary to the best evidence. Paragraph 4 & 5 Substantially adopted. Paragraphs 6 & 7 Rejected as a finding, although included as portions of the conclusions of law or statement of case. Paragraph 8 Some land has accreted; however, that the accretion is all pervious surface is rejected as contrary to best evidence. Paragraph 9 The stormwater management plan is irrelevant to how much of the pervious area of the two lots is covered with impervious structures. Paragraph 10 The city map is rejected as the best evidence of the area of the non-tidal area of the two lots. COPIES FURNISHED: L. Kathryn Funchess, Esquire David L. Jordan, Esquire C. Laurence Keesey, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Thomas G. Pelham, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Deborah Hardin-Wagner, Esquire Governor's Legal Office The Capitol, Room 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 J. Ben Watkins, Esquire 41 Commerce Street Apalachicola, Florida 32 320 J. Patrick Floyd, Esquire 408 Long Avenue Post Office Drawer 950 Port St. Joe, Florida 32456 Honorable Jimmy Nichols Mayor, City of Apalachicola Post Office Box 10 Apalachicola, Florida 32320 Apalachicola Planning and Zoning Commission Post Office Box 10 Apalachicola, Florida 32320

Florida Laws (5) 120.57380.04380.05380.0555380.07 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-22.201
# 8
THOMAS A. NOTT vs CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS, 99-001233 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Mar. 18, 1999 Number: 99-001233 Latest Update: Jun. 16, 1999

The Issue The issue in this appeal is whether to sustain the decision of the City Planning and Zoning Board (the Board) to deny Thomas Nott a conditional use permit to sell pre-owned motor vehicles at his business at 700 Cleveland Street, Clearwater, Florida.

Findings Of Fact Thomas A. Nott owns Lots 6 and 7, Gould & Ewing's Plat 2nd Addition. The street address is 700 Cleveland Street, Clearwater, Florida. This property is on the northeast corner of Cleveland Street and East Avenue. The property is in the Core-2 (C-2) subdistrict of the Urban Center (UC) zoning district. The Clearwater Downtown Redevelopment Plan states in pertinent part: An extremely important aspect of the way Downtown Clearwater functions and is perceived involves transportation within and into the Downtown. If the traffic flow into Downtown is efficient and the entryways are attractive, Downtown Clearwater is more likely to be frequented by citizens and visitors. If traffic flow is congested and the roadsides are unappealing, the Downtown is less likely to be a place where people visit, live and shop and where entrepreneurs invest money. * * * Cleveland Street is the single most important roadway in Downtown Clearwater. Due to it[s] "Business S.R. 60" designation, it carries a substantial amount of the traffic heading to Clearwater Beach, as well as the bulk of the office and retail traffic headed for Downtown. . . . In the Downtown Core area, Cleveland Street has been attractively landscaped with paving block and planters. This treatment has greatly improved the appearance of the Downtown along Cleveland Street. However, these efforts are, to some extent, undermined by the poorly landscaped sections of Cleveland Street outside the Downtown Core area. Land uses outside of the Downtown Core along Cleveland Street are relatively unattractive and are poorly landscaped. A remedial landscaping program should be considered as a top priority for improving this important entryway. The City also has adopted Design Guidelines for new construction, building additions, facade alterations, and signage for the Urban Center zoning district. A section on "Landscape and Streetscape Guidelines" suggests the use of different kinds of planters and curb "neck-out" street corners to create larger pedestrian areas that incorporate benches, specialized pavers, and lighted bollards. Landscaping, including shade trees, are suggested to provide separation between people and vehicles. A subsection on "Open Spaces" states: "Designers of site improvement areas are encouraged to explore opportunities to incorporate usable open space with the project (development) area." Nott's property is in a transition area between the more attractively landscaped City core to the west and the less attractive portions of Cleveland Street to the east. Immediately to the west across East Avenue is the Pinellas Trail. Immediately to the west of the Trail, fronting on Cleveland Street, is the historic United States Post Office building, which is listed on the National Register of historic buildings. (Since it still functions as a working post office, a large number of mail delivery trucks park and operate out of the back of the post office to the north.) The Trickels Jewelers building to the immediate east of Nott's property also is attractively landscaped, especially along Myrtle Avenue. The other properties to the north, east, and south of Nott's property are less attractive. They include: an automobile and marine repair business; a restaurant with little or no open space; an import car repair service business with little or no open space; and a car rental business. Ideally, the City would like Nott's property to become the start of an eastward expansion of the more attractive urban core along Cleveland Street. Nott's property is 0.26 acre in area; its dimensions are 105 feet in width and 109 feet in depth. Unlike most properties in the downtown urban core, the building on Nott's property is set back quite a distance from the streets. The building has one story and is just 1500 square feet. In the past, the property has been used as an automobile gas and service station and as a car rental business. Before Nott bought the property, the building was in disrepair and in decline. Approximately four years ago, Nott was considering relocating from South Beach in Miami, where he was in the business of selling pre-owned motor vehicles. Initially, he investigated relocating to Dunedin, but an official with Clearwater's redevelopment agency persuaded him to take advantage of Clearwater's commitment to redevelop the downtown urban core, as well as interest-free financing available through the agency to improve the property. Nott bought the property, borrowed approximately $50,000 interest-free, and invested that and an additional $50,000 of his own money to improve the property. His plan was to conduct two businesses at the property: a roller skate and bicycle rental business catering to users of the Pinellas Trail; and a pre-owned motor vehicle sales business. Due to family priorities, Nott had to delay his departure from Miami and only was able, with the help of a nephew, to open the skate and bicycle shop. The 121 square feet of storefront planned for the vehicle sales business was used as storage space for the skate and bicycle shop pending opening of the vehicle sales business. The skate and bicycle shop, called Fritz's Skate Shop, had been operating for approximately three years when Nott became ready to open his pre-owned vehicle sales business. When he went to get an occupational license towards the end of 1998, Nott learned that a conditional use permit would be required. In discussions with staff of the City's Planning and Zoning Board, Nott also was informed that a new zoning code was going into effect which would prohibit vehicles sales at Nott's property and that he would have to expedite his application for it to be considered under the existing zoning regulations. Nott filed an application for a conditional use approval on or about January 12, 1999. At the time, Nott was not familiar with Clearwater's zoning regulations and did not address some zoning requirements. Specifically, while the sketch Nott drew by hand to approximate scale to serve as the required site plan met the minimum requirements as to form, it only showed a three-foot grass buffer along Cleveland Street and a three-foot buffer of shrubs along East Avenue, while the City's development code required at least a ten-foot landscaped buffer along Cleveland Street and at least a five-foot landscaped buffer along East Avenue. The sketch also showed parking that would obstruct vehicle flow in the parking lot and failed to show a large oak tree on the site. Finally, the sketch showed parking for the display of vehicles for sale along Cleveland Street. Nott's application was set for hearing at the Board's last scheduled meeting on March 2, 1999, just six days before the new zoning and development code would take effect. Nott still did not know all of the applicable regulations under the existing code. For some reason, Nott did not obtain a complete set of the City's zoning and development regulations until approximately February 17, 1999. Nott blamed the delay on foot-dragging by the Board's staff, and he questioned whether the staff was being uncooperative to undermine his application. Nott testified that he did not get a complete set of the applicable zoning and development regulations until after he sent a letter of complaint to the staff director on February 13, 1999. The staff denied any intention to delay Nott's application or be uncooperative. The staff blamed some of the delay on the time it took for Nott to prepare and submit an acceptable site plan. It appears that Nott entered into the application process thinking that there would be no problem meeting the City's requirements and expecting the Board's staff to walk him through the process. When Nott's expectations were not met, he perceived that the staff was treating him unfairly. But it is found that Nott's evidence did not prove unfair treatment. In fact, due to Nott's inexperience, the staff was required to give Nott more assistance than usual. For his presentation to the Board, Nott had a consultant use a photograph of the site to create a computer- visualization of the proposed vehicle sales business. The photograph depicted one vehicle parked in front of the building, as well as four vehicles parked along Cleveland Street and one parked along the east property line in two of the areas identified on the site plan as parking for the display of vehicles for sale. The visualization did not add any landscaping. At the time, Nott thought the concern was adequate parking; he did not know at the time that landscaping also would be important to his application. When Nott got and reviewed the applicable zoning and development code provisions and the staff's report, he realized that he had not addressed the landscaping buffer requirements. He had his consultant further modify the computer-visualization to add a landscaping buffer. This visualization was presented at the Board hearing on March 2, 1999. However, the visualization still depicted vehicles parked along Cleveland Street and was not clear as to the width of the landscaping buffer. The site plan was not modified, so the extent of the proposed landscaping buffer could not be ascertained from the site plan. At the Board hearing, Nott stated that he would be willing to do whatever the City said was necessary in order for him to receive a conditional use permit. But Nott made no specific proposals. Essentially, Nott was asking the City to formulate an acceptable application for him. The staff report indicated that an on-site traffic circulation problem could be cured by eliminating two customer parking spaces in front of the building. But it was impossible to determine from the evidence in the record how a wider landscaping buffer would impact either traffic circulation in the parking lot, parking, or the large oak tree. The staff report pointed out that Nott's application proposed to maintain minimal (7%) open space on the site. The neighbor to the immediate east (Trickels Jewelers) has 30-35% open space, including attractive landscaping along Myrtle Avenue. At the Board hearing, Nott claimed "open space" credit for the shade canopy provided by the large oak tree on-site and contended that the credit would increase his "open space" to 30-35% as well. But even if open space credit can be given for shade canopy over a parking lot, Nott's testimony was insufficient to prove the extent of the tree's shade canopy. Besides, it could not be ascertained from the record whether the tree would have to be removed to meet landscaping buffer, traffic circulation, and parking requirements. Nott testified at the appeal hearing that, after he proposed and depicted parking of vehicles for sale along Cleveland Street, the "Division of Motor Vehicles" advised him that it would not allow him to display vehicles in that location. Nott testified that he would simply eliminate the display parking spaces along Cleveland Street and limit the display of vehicles for sale to 12 at any one time in parking spaces adjacent to the building and along the east property line. But it was not clear from the record whether all of the remaining spaces depicted on the site plan for display parking would remain available for that purpose after adding landscaping buffer, and also maintaining adequate traffic circulation and customer parking. In addition to agreeing to meet the perimeter landscape buffer requirements, Nott also agreed to condition approval on: (1) operating his vehicle sales business only 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Monday through Saturday; (2) not using windshield advertising, flags, or banners; (3) only selling vehicles with a retail value of $10,000 or more; and (4) not operating a "buy here-pay here" used car lot.

# 9
CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS vs LORI GOLDSTON, 94-003161 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Jun. 06, 1994 Number: 94-003161 Latest Update: Feb. 28, 1995

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Lori Goldston, was employed by the Petitioner, City of Clearwater, for approximately seven and one-half years as a Building Construction Inspector II. On April 13, 1994, Respondent was placed on administrative leave and on April 21, 1994, she was terminated and all pay and other benefits were terminated as of 4:00 p.m. on April 21, 1994. Specifically, Respondent was terminated for alleged violations of Rule 14, Sections 1(b), (d), (k), and (1) of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations of Respondent, to-wit: (b) Is incompetent in the performance of the specific duties of [her] position. (d) Has been careless or negligent in the care of the property of the City; or has participated in the unauthorized use thereof. Has been . . . guilty of conduct un- becoming a City employee defined as scandalous or disgraceful conduct while on or off duty where such conduct tends to embarrass the City or bring its service into public disrepute. Has violated any lawful and reasonable official regulation or order or failed to obey any lawful and reasonable direction made and given . . . by [her] superior officer when such violation or failure to obey amounts to insubordination or serious breach of discipline which may reasonably be expected to result in a lower morale in the department or to result in loss, inconvenience, or injury to the City or the public. During the week of April 4, 1994, Tom Chaplinsky received two complaints that a City vehicle was observed leaving the city limits with a magnetic sign covering the City seal. The complainants related that the driver appeared to be Respondent and that the vehicle was heading north on alternate route 19 when it was so observed. Vick Chadora, assistant central planning director, requested that Chaplinsky investigate the complaints. Chaplinsky along with Kevin Garriot, a building code analyst, initiated an investigation to check Respondent's inspection schedule and job sites for the day of April 11, 1994. Chadora and Chaplinsky reviewed Respondent's inspection schedules and job sites on April 11, 1994, and discovered that most of Respondent's inspections were completed by mid-morning. Chadora then instructed Chaplinsky to check Respondent's residence which is located north of Palm Harbor, approximately 8 to 10 miles outside of the city limits. During mid-morning on April 11, 1994, Chaplinsky parked near the end of the dead end street on which Respondent's residence is located. He saw what appeared to be her city vehicle but was unable to make a positive identification. On Tuesday, April 12, 1994, Chaplinsky again found that a majority of Respondent's inspections had been completed by mid-morning. Chaplinsky contacted her by radio at approximately 11:00 a.m., to determine her location and she replied that she was in Clearwater Beach. Chadora drove to the beach area while Chaplinsky and Garriot drove to Respondent's residence between 11:00 and 11:15 a.m. Messrs. Chaplinsky and Garriot parked at the entrance to the dead end street where Respondent resides and waited. At approximately 11:45 a.m., Chaplinsky and another staff assistant began trying to reach Respondent by radio. At approximately 12:55 p.m., Respondent answered her radio. At that time, Respondent was asked to investigate a complaint on the beach. At approximately 1:20 p.m., Messrs. Chaplinsky and Garriot observed Respondent in her city vehicle, with the City seal covered, leaving her neighborhood. They lost Respondent in traffic but later caught up with her at the site of the complaint. At that time, the City seal on her vehicle was no longer covered. On April 13, 1994, Messrs. Chaplinsky and Garriot again drove to Respondent's residence during mid-morning and waited at the entrance to her street. Respondent was observed leaving the City in the city vehicle with the City seal covered. At approximately 2:55 p.m. on April 13, 1994, with Messrs. Chaplinsky and Garriot present, Respondent was advised by Chadora that two people had complained that she was using her city vehicle with the City seal covered while leaving the city limits. Before Chadora could complete his inquiry, Respondent immediately denied that it was her. Upon Respondent's repeated and adamant denial, Chadora told her that he and Garriot has observed her leaving her residence on Tuesday, April 12 and Wednesday, April 13 in the City vehicle. Upon being confronted with that information, Respondent admitted that they had caught her in a lie and she admitted that she did leave the city limits in the city vehicle. Respondent indicated that she was trying to complete a construction project at home in order to re-finance and satisfy a balloon note which was coming due and the lender was insisting that certain renovations be completed prior to closing. During 1990, Respondent was disciplined for leaving the city limits and going to her home. At that time she was specifically advised that she should not leave the city limits to return home in the city vehicle without first obtaining permission from her supervisor. For that offense, Respondent was suspended for four days. Petitioner has a system of progressive discipline in effect which is utilized to discipline employees who engage in conduct contrary to the City's rules and regulations. An employee who violates the rules accumulates points under the disciplinary system. An employee who receives up to 60 points within a specified period (24 months), can be subjected to discharge. Respondent accumulated 140 points for the alleged infractions that she received for leaving the City limits during the days April 11-13, 1994. Petitioner also has a liberal sick leave policy which employees may avail by demonstrating need to use sick leave. Respondent did not advise Petitioner that she was suffering from any medical disability or other infirmity which would warrant the utilization of sick leave prior to her discharge. Respondent maintained that she failed to advise Petitioner of her need for sick leave -- she suffers from severe depression which is prompted by a chemical imbalance in her brain -- because she did not want other employees to know about her problems as she feared it would be common knowledge among her colleagues. Respondent attempted to show that she was being treated unfairly and more harshly than other employees had been treated for similar misconduct. Specifically, Respondent related an incident wherein an employee threw a temper tantrum during a grievance meeting, tossed a beeper against a bookcase and was generally insubordinate when he was questioned about an infraction. Petitioner explained that that employee "blew up" when he was confronted about a simple rule infraction and that employee was suspended as was Respondent when she was first disciplined for leaving the City in a vehicle without authorization in 1990. Respondent failed to show that she was treated more harshly or that she was the recipient of disparate treatment by Petitioner. Respondent demonstrated that the other employee was similarly treated when Petitioner was disciplined in 1990. Moreover, that employee was subjected to discharge when he later violated the city's rules and regulations (a drug offense-employee failed a urinalysis screen). Petitioner had no way of knowing prior to April 21, 1994, that Respondent requested or was otherwise in need of "an accommodation" due to her health in April of 1994.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing Respondent from her position of a Building Construction Inspector II effective April 21, 1994. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February 1995. APPENDIX The following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1, adopted as modified, paragraphs 2, 18, and 19, Recommended Order. Paragraph 3, rejected, unnecessary. Paragraph 4, adopted as modified, paragraph 18, Recommended Order. Paragraph 7, rejected, irrelevant. Paragraph 8, conclusionary and argument. Paragraph 11, adopted as modified, paragraph 22, Recommended Order. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 5, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 16, Recommended Order. Paragraph 8, rejected, irrelevant. Paragraph 11, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraphs 2, 14, and 19, Recommended Order. Paragraph 13, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraphs 15 and 16, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraph 17, adopted as modified, paragraphs 17-20, Recommended Order. Paragraph 18, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 23, Recommended Order. Paragraphs 19-22, rejected, irrelevant and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles A. Lance, Esquire Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748 Robert McCormack, Esquire Prestige Professional Park 2655 McCormick Drive Clearwater, Florida 34619 Karleen DeBlaker City Clerk City of Clearwater P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer