Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: East Pasco Medical Center (EPMC) is a non-profit 85-bed acute care hospital facility located in the East Pasco subdistrict of HRS District V. There are only two hospitals in the subdistrict -- EPMC in Zephyrhills and Humana in Dade City, which is approximately ten miles north. Humana is a 120- bed acute care hospital facility. Both facilities offer the same services and share the same medical staff. On or about September 17, 1987, EPMC submitted an application for a Certificate of Need to add 35 medical/surgical beds via a fourth floor addition to its existing facility. Its existing 85 beds are located in private rooms, and it is proposed that the additional 35 beds will also be placed in separate rooms. The application submitted to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) projected a total project cost of $4,531,000. This figure was revised at the hearing to a project cost of $2,302,900. With regard to acute care services, the State Health Plan seeks to assure geographic accessibility. All residents of East Pasco County currently have access to acute care hospital services within the travel times suggested by the State plan. The State Health Plan also seeks to promote the efficient utilization of acute care services by attaining an average annual occupancy rate of at least 80 percent. The District V Local Health Plan emphasizes that additions to inpatient acute care beds in a subdistrict should not be considered unless a numeric bed need is shown and certain occupancy thresholds have been met. The recommended occupancy thresholds for medical/surgical beds are 80% for the subdistrict and 90% for the facility seeking to add beds. Application of the bed need methodology contained in HRS's Rule 10- 5.011(1)(m), Florida Administrative Code, indicates a numeric need for 57 additional acute care medical/surgical beds in the East Pasco subdistrict for the planning horizon period of July, 1992. The rule provides that HRS will "not normally approve" additional beds unless average occupancy in the subdistrict is greater than 75 percent. However, the rule permits HRS to award additional beds when there is a calculated need, notwithstanding low occupancy in the subdistrict, if the applicant had a minimum of 75% average occupancy during the 12 months ending 14 months prior to the Letter of Intent. Rule 10- 5.011(1)(m)7.e., Florida Administrative Code. The rule also permits HRS to award additional beds where the calculated numeric need substantially exceeds the number of existing and approved beds in the subdistrict and there is an access problem related to travel time. For the relevant time period, the acute care occupancy rate for the East Pasco subdistrict was below 75% percent. Indeed, over the past few years, the average occupancy rate in that subdistrict has been 54 to 58 percent. Humana only operates at about a 55% occupancy. The East Pasco subdistrict does experience seasonal fluctuations in medical/surgical occupancy, with the season for high occupancy beginning in late October and ending in mid- to late April. In addition to tourists, it is expected that the revival of the citrus industry in East Pasco County will bring more migrant pickers to the area during the peak season months. The seasonal increase in occupancy directly corresponds with a large increase in seasonal population, particularly in the Zephyrhills area. The Zephyrhills area population is much older than the Dade City population and is also much older than the State average. The HRS acute care bed need rule includes considerations of seasonal peak demands. When considering both hospitals in the subdistrict, there has been a decline in peak seasonal occupancy rates over the past few years. While the population of the East Pasco subdistrict has grown, and is expected to increase by approximately 7,200 in 1992, there is a trend of declining utilization in the subdistrict. This decline is due to increased used of outpatient services and shorter lengths of hospital stay attributable to the current reimbursement system. The medical/surgical use rate fell from 454 patient days per 1,000 population in 1986 to 414 patient days per 1,000 population in 1988. There was a similar decline in the acute care use rate. Assuming a constant medical/surgical use rate, the projected demand for 1992 would be 2,980 additional medical/surgical patient days in the subdistrict according to population projections, and about 4,267 incremental patient days according to local health council projections. EPMC's Letter of Intent to add 35 additional beds was filed in mid- July, 1987. Its acute care occupancy rate for the period of April, 1986 through March, 1987 was 75.3 percent. Occupancy at EPMC from May, 1986 to April, 1987 was 73.6%; occupancy from June, 1986 through May, 1987 was 73%; and occupancy from July, 1986 to June, 1987 was 72.2 percent. EPMC does experience periods of high occupancy during the peak season months. High occupancy levels have a greater impact upon smaller hospitals due to their lesser degree of flexibility. On occasion, during the winter months, EPNC is required to refuse admittance to patients due to crowded conditions within its facility. Patients are sometimes transferred or referred to other facilities, including Humana, although the necessity for such transfers or referrals is occasionally due to a lack of intensive or critical care beds as opposed to a lack of medical/surgical beds. During the periods of time when EPMC had high occupancy levels, beds were available at Humana. EPMC's current payor mix includes a high level of Medicare (over 60%), and it is committed, through both its Christian mission and an agreement with the County, to treat indigent and Medicaid patients. The actual amount of indigent or charity care provided by EPNC was not established. In any event, EPMC desires to increase its bed size in order to help maintain a proper payor mix at the hospital so as to ensure the financial survival of the hospital. It is felt that a greater number of beds, given the rise in population, and particularly elderly population, would allow EPNC to serve a greater number of private and/or third party insurance paying patients. While the evidence demonstrates that EPMC may operate with a less favorable payor mix than Humana, the evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate that EPMC will suffer financial ruin without additional beds. Likewise, it was not established that the patients which EPNC must turn away in the winter months are consistently paying patients. Increasing the number of beds at EPNC to 120 beds does not necessarily mean that its profitability would be improved. Volume and payor mix are the most critical factors in determining whether a hospital will be profitable. There is currently a nursing shortage throughout the nation. Rural areas, such as the eastern portion of Pasco County, experience even greater difficulty in attracting nursing personnel to the area. Due to the shortage of nurses, as well as the seasonal demand, EPMC is required to use contract care nurses throughout the year. While it would prefer to employ its own nursing staff, EPMC will use contract staff due to the seasonal variations in its nursing requirements. The use of contract or registry nurses costs 50% to 60% more on a daily basis; however, lower occupancy during the off-peak months does not justify year- round employment for as large an in-house nursing staff. For its proposed 35 beds, EPMC projects nurse manpower requirements as follows: 1 nurse manager, 4.2 R.N. charge nurses, 15.1 R.N. staff and 14.1 L.P.N. staff, for a total of 34.4 full time equivalent nursing positions. The recruiting efforts of EPNC to fill these positions will include advertising, visiting nursing schools and colleges, utilizing student nurses at the hospital and use of the Adventist Health System international network. Humana currently has 15 vacancies, or 12 to 13% of its nursing staff. Humana's nursing salaries have increased 20% over the past eighteen months. As noted above, EPNC and Humana compete for the same nursing personnel. Humana's personnel director believes that if EPNC increases its nursing staff by 34 FTEs, Humana's nursing staff will be approached to fill those positions. As a consequence, Humana will experience additional nursing shortages and will be required to further increase salaries. It is proposed that the project cost of adding 35 beds to EPMC will be financed with 100% debt financing through a bond issue. The financing will be part of a much larger bond issuance intended to finance several other projects within the Adventist hospital system. No evidence was adduced that such a bond issuance had been prepared or approved, and there was no evidence concerning the other projects which would be financed in conjunction with this project. In 1987, EPNC was carrying about five million dollars of negative equity. The hospital is currently greater than 100% financed. As noted above, the original Certificate of Need application filed with HRS listed the total project cost to be $4,531,000. In its response to omissions, EPMC stated that the construction cost would be $175 per square foot. In the updates submitted at the hearing, EPNC proposed a project cost of $2,302,900, which included a construction cost of $85 per square foot. A more reasonable cost for the addition of a floor to an existing facility would be $125 per square foot, plus an inflation factor of 6% and architectural and engineering fees of 6 to 7%. The proposed equipment list submitted by EPNC fails to include major equipment items such as an overhead paging system, a nurse call system, examination room equipment, medication distribution equipment, bed curtains, shower curtains, patient and staff support lounge items, and IV pumps. EPNC's updated equipment cost budget fails to include tax, freight, contingency and installation costs. The projected equipment costs should be tripled to adequately and reasonably equip a 35-bed nursing unit. The projected utilization and pro formas submitted by EPMC are not reasonable and were not supported by competent substantial evidence. EPMC's projected utilization for the proposed 35-bed unit is 8,950 patient days in the first year of operation and 9,580 in the second year of operation. Applying the current use rate to the population projections submitted by EPMC's expert in demographics and population projections produces only about 2,980 additional patient days in the year 1992. Given the fact that EPMC's current market share is approximately 54%, there is no reason to believe that Humana would not absorb at least some of those projected additional patient days. There are many months of the year in which additional patient days could be filled within the existing complement of 85 beds at EPNC. Depending upon the ultimate cost of the project, the break even point for financial feasibility purposes would be approximately 3,500 to 4,000 patient days. The concept behind a pro forma is to develop a financial picture of what operations will be in the first two years of operation. EPMC stated its revenues and expenses in terms of 1988 dollars and used its current revenue- to-expense ratios for projecting operations four years into the future. This is improper because gross revenues are going up, reimbursement is not increasing as rapidly and expenses, particularly salaries and insurance, are increasing. In addition, EPMC's projected 1992 salaries in several categories were less than they are currently paying for such positions. EPMC currently provides good quality of care to its patients. The only future concern in this realm is the fact that in the winter months, its intensive and critical care unit beds are often full and there is no room for additional patients. Additional medical/surgical volume from the proposed 35- bed unit would lead to additional intensive and critical care bed demand.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of East Pasco Medical Center for a Certificate of Need to add 35 acute care beds to its existing facility be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30 day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. (Case No. 88-1227) The proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties have been carefully considered and are accepted, incorporated and/or summarized in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: Petitioner: Third sentence rejected as not established by competent, substantial evidence. Accepted, but not included as irrelevant to the ultimate resolution of the issues. Rejected. The Personnel Director of Humana presented testimony in this proceeding. Accepted as an accurate restatement of testimony, but rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. 16. Second sentence rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. A18. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 20. First sentence rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. First sentence rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 27 and 30. Accepted as an accurate restatement of testimony, but rejected as an erroneous conclusion of law. Rejected as immaterial to the issue of need in the year 1992. First sentence rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. First and third sentences rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. 37 and 38. Rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. 44. Last sentence rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Accepted only if the factors of volume and payor mix are also considered. Partially rejected as speculative and not supported by competent substantial evidence. All but first two sentences rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence and an erroneous conclusion of law. Rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence and an erroneous conclusion of law. Last sentence rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Second sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. 58. Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial. 60. Rejected as not established by competent substantial evidence. 62 - 67. The actual figures regarding total costs, projected utilization and those figures utilized in the pro formas were not established by competent substantial evidence and, therefore, the findings regarding the financial feasibility of the project are rejected. 71. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 74. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 77. Rejected as an improper factual finding and contrary to the evidence. 78 and 79. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. First sentence rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Last sentence rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Respondent: 2 and 6. Partially accepted with the additional considerations of the applicant's occupancy levels and geographic accessibility. 9. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 19(a) Interpretation of rule not sufficiently explicated at hearing. 56 - 58. Actual figures are not established by competent evidence due to the failure to establish with reliability the total costs of the project. Intervenor: Second sentence accepted with the additional considerations of the applicant's occupancy levels and geographic accessibility. Third sentence rejected. Interpretation of rule not sufficiently explicated at hearing. First sentence rejected, but this does not preclude a consideration of such a period. Third sentence rejected as not established by the greater weight of the evidence. 31. Second sentence rejected as speculative. 40 and 41. Accepted as factually correct, but not included due to the showing of unused capacity within the East Pasco subdistrict. 55 and 56. Actual figures are not established by competent evidence due to the failure to establish with reliability the total costs of the project. 63 and 72. Same as above with regard to second sentence. 92. Rejected as an overbroad statement or conclusion. 97. Second sentence rejected as overbroad and not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: E.G. Boone and Jeffrey Boone 1001 Avenida del Circo Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 Stephen M. Presnell Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, Florida 323a2 James C. Hauser Messer, Vickers, Caparello, French & Madsen, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the application of Delray Community Hospital for a certificate of need to add 24 acute care beds meets, on balance, the applicable criteria for approval.
Findings Of Fact The Agency For Health Care Administration ("AHCA") administers the state certificate of need ("CON") program for health care services and facilities. In August 1994, AHCA published a numeric need of zero for additional acute care beds in District 9, Subdistrict 5, for southern Palm Beach County. In September 1994, NME Hospitals, Inc. d/b/a Delay Community Hospital, Inc. ("Delray") applied for a certificate of need ("CON") to add 24 acute care beds in District 9, Subdistrict 5, for a total construction cost of $4,608,260. AHCA published its intent to approve the application and to issue CON No. 7872 to Delray, on January 20, 1995, in Volume 21, No. 3 of the Florida Administrative Weekly. By timely filing a petition, Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc. ("Bethesda"), which is located in the same acute care subdistrict, challenged AHCA's preliminary decision. Bethesda also filed a petition challenging Rule 59C-1.038, Florida Administrative Code, the acute care bed need rule, which resulted in a determination that the need methodology in the rule is invalid. Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. AHCA and NME Hospital, Inc., DOAH Case No. 95-2649RX (F.O. 8/16/95). Delray and Bethesda are in a subdistrict which includes five other hospitals, Wellington Regional Medical Center ("Wellingon"), West Boca Medical Center ("West Boca"), Palm Beach Regional Medical Center ("Palm Beach Regional"), J. F. Kennedy Medical Center ("JFK"), and Boca Raton Community Hospital ("BRCH"). The hospitals range in size from 104 to approximately 400 beds. Wellington, West Boca, and Palm Beach Regional have fewer, and Bethesda, JFK and BRCH have more than Delray's 211 beds. Bethesda, located in Boynton Beach, is accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospital Organizations ("JCAHO") for the maximum time available, 3 years. Bethesda has 330 beds, and offers obstetrics, pediatrics, and emergency room services. An average of 10 patients a month are transferred, after their condition is stabilized, from the emergency room at Bethesda to other hospitals, and most are participants in the Humana health maintenance organization ("HMO"), which requires their transfer to an Humana- affiliated hospital. Approximately one patient a month is transferred for open heart surgery or angioplasty after stabilization with thrombolitic therapy at Bethesda. Bethesda has a 12-bed critical care unit, a 12-bed surgical intensive care unit, and a telemetry or progressive care unit. From October to April, Bethesda also opens a 10-bed medical intensive care unit. Even during this "season," when south Florida experiences an influx of temporary winter residents, Bethesda's critical care beds are very rarely full. Only one time during the 1994-1995 season was a patient held overnight in the emergency room waiting for a bed at Bethesda. Only diagnostic cardiac caths are performed at Bethesda due to the absence of back-up open heart surgery. Delray is located on a medical campus with Fair Oaks Hospital, a 102 bed psychiatric facility, and Hillhaven Convalescent Center, which has 108 beds. Delray is physically connected to Pinecrest Rehabilitation Hospital, which has 90 beds. The campus also includes a medical mall, with outpatient services, a home health agency, and medical office buildings. Delray has a medical staff of 430 physicians. Delray is a for-profit hospital owned and operated by NME Hospitals, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of National Medical Enterprises, which after merging with American Medical International, does business as Tenet Health Care Corporation ("Tenet"). Tenet owns, operates, or manages 103 facilities, including Fair Oaks and Pinecrest Rehabilitation Hospital. Delray owns Hillhaven Convalescent Center, but it is managed by the Hillhaven nursing home management company. NME Hospitals, Inc., also owns West Boca Medical Center, which is approximately 10 to 12 miles from Delray. South Florida Tenet Health System is an alliance of the Tenet facilities, which has successfully negotiated managed care contracts offering the continuum of care of various levels of providers within one company. AHCA published a numeric need of zero for additional acute care beds in the southern Palm Beach County subdistrict, for July 1999, the applicable planning horizon. Delray's application asserts that special circumstances exist for the approval of its application despite the absence of numeric need. AHCA accepted and reviewed Delray's application pursuant to the following section of the acute care bed need rule: (e) Approval Under Special Circumstances. Regardless of the subdistrict's average annual occupancy rate, need for additional acute care beds at an existing hospital is demonstrated if a net need for beds is shown based on the formula described in paragraphs (5)(b), (7)(a), (b), (c), and (8)(a), (b), (c), and provided that the hospital's average occupancy rate for all licensed acute care beds is at or exceeds 75 percent. The deter- mination of the average occupancy rate shall be made based on the average 12 months occupancy rate made available by the local health council two months prior to the begining of the respective acute care hospital batching cycle. The need methodology referred to in the special circumstances rule indicated a net need for 1442 additional beds in District 9. All parties to the proceeding agree that the net need number is unrealistic, irrational, and/or wrong. That methodology was invalidated in the previously consolidated rule challenge case. Delray also met the requirement of exceeding 75 percent occupancy, with 75.63 percent from January through December 1993. In 1994, Delray's occupancy rate increased to 83 percent. In 1993, occupancy rates were 55.6 percent in District 9 and 52.5 percent in subdistrict 5. At individual hospitals, other than Delray, occupancy rates ranged from lows of 25.5 percent at Wellington and 35 percent at Palm Beach Regional to highs of 58 percent at BRCH and JFK. A study of four year trends shows declining acute care occupancy at every subdistrict hospital except Delray. Delray points to occupancy levels in intensive care units as another special circumstance for adding new beds. Currently, Delray has 8 beds in a trauma intensive care unit ("TICU"), 8 in a surgical intensive care unit ("SICU"), 7 in a critical or coronary care unit ("CCU"), 7 in a medical intensive care unit ("MICU"), and 67 beds in a telemetry or progressive care unit ("PCU"). For the fiscal year ending May 31, 1994, occupancy rates were 80 percent in the PCU, 91 percent in CCU, and 128 percent in SICU. If the CON is approved, Delray plans to allocate the 24 additional beds to increase the PCU by 10, CCU by 7, and the SICU by 7 beds. Expert testimony established 75 percent to 80 percent as a range of reasonable occupancy levels for intensive care units. A PCU, telemetry, or step down unit serves as a transition for patients leaving ICUs who require continued heart rate monitoring. PCU staffing ratios are typically 1 nurse to every 4 patients. CCU is used for patients who have had heart attacks or other serious cardiac problems and continue to need closer personal monitoring. SICU is used primarily for post-surgery open heart patients. The TICU is used for patients with neurological injuries and those in need of neurosurgery. When the ICUs are full, overflow patients are placed in holding areas of the ICU, the emergency room ("ER"), telemetry unit, or in a medical holding unit behind the emergency room. During the season, from November to April, from 20 to 55 patients are in holding areas, most of whom would otherwise be in an ICU or PCU bed. Critical care nurses are moved to the holding areas to care for critical patients. Additional staffing requirements are met, in part, by using contract nurses from an agency owned by Tenet, called Ready Staff. Other temporary or traveling nurses go through a three day orientation and are paired with regular staff mentors. Traveling nurses have three to six month contracts to work at various hospitals throughout the county, as needed. Intensive care nurses are cross-trained to work in any of the ICUs, but the same nurses usually are assigned to open heart and trauma patients. Since May 1991, Delray has been the state-designated level II trauma center for southern Palm Beach County, as is St. Mary's Hospital for the northern areas of the County. Trauma patients are transported by ambulance or helicopter, and treated in two designated trauma rooms in the emergency department. The state designation requires Delray to have one of its eight trauma surgeons, trauma nurses, anesthesiologists, and certain other ancillary services available in the hospital at all times. Delray also must have a bed available in its TICU. CON Review Criteria By supplemental prehearing stipulation, the parties agreed that Delray's CON application includes the information and documents required in Section 408.037, Florida Statutes. The parties also stipulated that the project is financially feasible in the short term, and that proposed construction costs and methods, and equipment costs are reasonable. Based on prehearing stipulations, the statutory review criteria in dispute are as follows: 408.035(1)(a) - need in relation to district and state health plans; 408.035(1)(b) and (1)(d) - availability, accessibility, efficiency, and adequacy of other hospitals; 408.035(1)(b) and (1)(c) - quality of care at other hospitals and the applicant's ability to provide and record of providing quality of care; 408.035(1)(h) - availability of critical care nurses; and 408.035(1)(i) - long term financial feasibility. State and District Health Plans The 1993 Florida State Health Plan has a preference for approving additional acute care beds in subdistricts with at least 75 percent occupancy, and at facilities equal to or in excess of 85 percent occupancy. Subdistrict 5 and Delray do not meet the preference. See, Finding of Facts 9 and 10. The state health plan also includes a preference for hospitals which are disproportionate share Medicaid providers. Delray does not meet the preference, and notes that 70 percent of its patients are over 65 years old and entitled to Medicare reimbursement. In fact, there are no disproportionate share providers in the subdistrict. Delray meets the state plan preference for proposing a project which will not adversely affect the financial viability of an existing, disproportionate share provider. The state health plan also has four preferences related to emergency services, for accepting indigent patients in ER, for a trauma center, for a full range of ER services, and for not having been fined for ER services violations. Delray meets all four preferences related to emergency services. The 1990 District 9 Health Plan, with a 1993 CON Allocation Factors Report, favors applicants who serve Medicaid/Indigent, handicapped, and underserved population groups. In 1992 and 1993, approximately 2.5 percent of the patients at Delray were in the Medicaid program. Delray also provided 3 percent indigent and charity care for 1993. The hospital's 1992 financial reports do not indicate that it provided any indigent or charity care. In 1993- 1994, Delray had the lowest percentage of Medicaid and charity patients at a state designated level II trauma center. AHCA proposes to condition approval of CON 7872 on Delray's providing 2.4 percent of total annual patient days to Medicaid and 1 percent of total annual patient days to charity care, as projected by Delray in Table 7 of the application. Under the district health plan, priority is given for applicants who document cost containment. One example of cost containment, according to the plan, is sharing services with other area hospitals to enhance efficient resource utilization and avoid duplication. Delray describes its patient- focused care model as an example of cost containment. In response to rising labor cost, the underutilization of certain required categories of employees, and the large number of staff interacting with each patient, Delray created the model which emphasizes cross-training of staff to work in teams led by a registered nurse. Delray has not proposed sharing services with other hospitals, and has not documented cost containment as that is described in the district health plan. Availability, Accessibility, Efficiency and Adequacy of Other Hospitals Additional acute care beds at Delray will not meet any demonstrated numeric, geographic, or financial need. Acute care beds are available in adequate numbers in the subdistrict. Roughly half, or 800, of the subdistrict's 1700 beds were empty most days in 1993 and 1994. Bethesda's expert in health care planning and financial feasibility testified that some available, more appropriate alternatives to the approval of additional beds at Delray are the transfer of patients to other subdistrict hospitals, including Tenet's West Boca, the transfer of unused bed capacity from one area of the hospital to another, or the transfer of unused bed capacity from West Boca to Delray. Bethesda also contends that Delray could find alternatives to placing outpatient surgery and outpatient cardiac cath patients in inpatient beds from four to twenty-three hours for observation and care. In support of Delray, AHCA's expert testified that institution-specific demand, in Delray's case, has reached the level of community need, because other subdistrict hospitals are not adequate or available to treat the type of patients treated at Delray. All of Delray's patients come from areas of the county which overlap the service areas of other hospitals, which shows the absence of any geographic access barriers. A diagnostic related group, or DRG, analysis shows that most of the categories of diagnosed illnesses or injuries treated at Delray are also treated at other subdistrict hospitals. The DRGs exclusively treated at Delray are related to trauma. Others treated in the subdistrict only at Delray and JFK are related to angioplasty and open heart surgery. Of the state level II trauma centers, Delray reported the highest percentage, 96.5 percent, of discharges of all patients were urgent or emergent cases. By comparison, the lowest were 65.6 percent at St. Joseph's Hospital in Tampa and 66 percent at West Florida Regional Medical Center, and the next highest was 94.2 percent at Bayfront Medical Center. Bethesda's expert suggested that the number was too high and could result from miscoding. Approximately 70 to 90 trauma patients are treated each month at Delray and approximately 50 percent of those are admitted to the hospital. One Bethesda witness, a doctor on the staff at both Bethesda and Delray, testified that he was called in once when Delray refused to go on "by-pass status," to send an incoming trauma patient to St. Mary's, knowing the patient was likely to need a CT scan. At the time, Delray's main scanner inside the hospital was inoperable or undergoing repairs. The patient who arrived by helicopter was taken by ambulance to another scanner on the campus, approximately 1000 yards away from the hospital. The same doctor also complained that ER patients who are upgraded to trauma status cannot be downgraded by trauma surgeons. There was no evidence how often the inside CT scan is unavailable and, consequently, no showing that altering this practice would result in an appreciable decline in the demand for trauma services at Delray. Similarly, there was no evidence of any impact on hospital admissions resulting from upgrading emergency patients to trauma patients. Trauma victims seldom require open heart surgery. Therefore, a different category of patients served only in the subdistrict at JFK and Delray is open heart surgery patients. Because of its location in an area with a large population over age 65 and due to the services it provides, one Delray witness described Delay, as a "cardiac" hospital. Delray has no pediatric or obstetric services. The percentage of residents over 65 in Delray's service area is about 35 percent, in contrast to a statewide level approaching 20 percent. Delray began an open heart surgery program in August, 1986. There are now approximately 50 cardiologists on staff, 19 performing cardiac catheterizations ("caths") and angioplasties, and three performing open heart surgeries. In fiscal year 1993, approximately 1900 cardiac caths, and 450 open heart surgeries were performed at Delray. In fiscal year 1994, that increased to approximately 2100 patients cathed and 540 open heart surgeries. Through April 1995, or 11 months into the fiscal year, there were approximately 2300 caths and 526 open heart surgeries. The cath labs are available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, within forty-five minutes notice. By comparison, the cath lab at Bethesda operates on weekdays until 3:30 p.m. Ten to twelve physicians use Delray's two cardiac cath labs and a third overflow lab, if needed. The cath labs at Delray and Bethesda are considered "open" because any qualified staff physician is eligible to receive privileges to use the lab. A backlog occurs in the Delray cath lab when critical care beds are not available for patients following caths. Delray has three open heart surgery operating rooms and three open heart surgeons, with the capacity to perform 1000 open heart surgeries a year. Within the subdistrict, approximately 11 miles from Delray, JFK also provides cardiac cath, angioplasty, and open heart surgery services. JFK has 369 beds and is equipped with two cardiac cath labs, each with the capacity to accommodate 2000 procedures a year. In fiscal year 1994, approximately 3200 caths were performed at JFK. The cath lab is "closed," meaning JFK has entered into an exclusive contract for services with one group of invasive cardiologists. JFK's medical staff has relatively little overlap, approximately 10 to 15 percent, with the medical staff at Delray. Across all patients and all diagnoses, there is also relatively little geographic overlap. JFK, by and large, serves the central area and Delray serves the southern area of Palm Beach County. The average census in thirty critical care beds at JFK was 16.5 patients in 1994, and 18.4 in the first six months of 1995. A high range of 70 percent to 80 percent occupancy in JFK's critical care beds is reached during the peak season. Although JFK's thirty critical care beds are not officially divided into different types of intensive care services, a de facto designation has developed. Depending on the patient mix, the same 16 beds are generally used for cardiac critical care. The average daily census for cardiac critical care was 13.4 in March 1994 and 23.4 in February 1995. Overall, there is no excess capacity in the district in critical care beds during the height of the season. The average occupancy of all critical care beds in southern Palm Beach County was 104 percent in February 1992, 98 percent in February 1993, and 93.5 percent in February 1994. Open heart surgery and angioplasty are more frequently than not scheduled up to a week ahead of time. Most cardiac patients can be admitted to any emergency room and stabilized with thrombolytic therapy before transfer to another hospital for an angioplasty or open heart surgery, without compromising their conditions. However, at Delray, cardiac patients are more likely to be emergent or urgent cases, remaining in the hospital for stabilization, scheduled for surgery within 24 hours, and remaining in SICU an average of forty-eight hours following surgery. The older patients are more difficult to transfer because they tend to have more consulting specialists on the staff of the hospital in the service area where they reside. Transferring open heart surgery patients from Delray to JFK is not beneficial as a health planning objective during the season, when JFK operates at reasonable levels of 70 percent to 80 percent occupancy in critical care beds and exceeds the capacity of its de facto cardiac critical care beds. Delray's emergency department can accommodate 23 patients at one time. Over the past three years, ER visits have increased by approximately 1,000 each year. Approximately 20 percent to 25 percent of patients treated in its emergency room, excluding trauma patients, are admitted to Delray. During the winter season, there are also more emergency room patients who do not have local physicians, most complaining of cardiac and respiratory problems. By federal law, certain priority categories of emergency patients must be taken to the nearest hospital. Federal law also prohibits patient transfers to a different hospital unless a patient's medical condition is stable, the patient consents, and the other hospital has an available bed and a staff doctor willing to take the patient. Patient condition and consent are major factors preventing transfers of elderly residents of the Delray service area to other hospitals. Delray also reasonably expects an increase in patients due to an increase in its market share, managed care contracts, and population in its service area. Managed care contracts, usually for 3 year terms, are not alone a reliable basis for making long term community health planning decisions. Combining trends in growth, population aging, declining lengths of stays in hospitals, market share and the greater consumption of inpatient services by people over 65, however, Delray reasonably expects an incremental increase of 1667 discharges by 1999. At 80 percent occupancy, the incremental patients attributable to population growth alone, according to Delray's expert, justifies an additional 34 beds. For a substantial part of 1994, ICU, CCU and medical/surgical beds at Delray exceeded reasonable occupancy standards. In the first four months of 1995, medical/surgical occupancy levels ranged from 96.7 percent to 119.4 percent. Given those levels and the projected growth, transfer of beds from medical/surgical units is not a reasonable option for increasing the supply of critical care beds. Delray is small when compared to all other high volume open heart surgery and level II trauma hospitals in Florida. Another option suggested by Bethesda's expert was the transfer of beds from West Boca to Delray. Because the beds have already been built, a transfer would not reduce capital or fixed costs at West Boca. The only effect that was apparent from the evidence in this case would be a statistical increase in subdistrict utilization. In addition, with 171 beds, West Boca is relatively small and in a growing area of Palm Beach County. Bethesda's contention that Delray could stop using inpatient beds for the four to twenty-three hour outpatients was not supported by the evidence. There was no showing that the physical plant or space exists for the construction of observation beds near an ambulatory surgery center. Given the testimony that all hospitals use inpatient beds for certain outpatients, and that Delray averages five to seven outpatients in inpatient medical/surgical beds at any time, there is no evidence of a practical alternative with any significant impact on the overcrowding at Delray. Bethesda also challenged the need for critical care for fractures, cellulitis, and fever of unknown origin, which were among the diagnoses listed for patients in the ER hold. However, Bethesda's expert also acknowledged that some patients in ER hold at Delray were waiting for medical/surgical beds not only ICU beds. Patients are placed in holding areas whenever assignment to an appropriate bed is not possible within thirty minutes of the issuance of orders to admit the patient. Delray proved that it is unique in the subdistrict in treating trauma patients and cardiac patients in a service area with minimal geographic and medical staff overlap with that of JFK. The transfer of such patients to other hospitals in the subdistrict is often not practical or possible. Delray also demonstrated that other subdistrict hospitals are not available alternative intensive care providers when their ICUs are also full or over optimal levels of occupancy, during the season. In addition, the demographic characteristics of Delay's service area support projected increases in inpatient days due to increased market share, population aging and growth. All of these factors indicate that Delray cannot, as Bethesda suggests, control its own growth, transfer, or redirect patients. Quality of Care and Availability of Critical Case Nurses Delray is JCAHO accredited. There is no evidence that quality of care affects hospital utilization in southern Palm Beach County. Open heart surgery mortality rates from 1990 to 1994 were 1.9 percent at JFK and 3 percent at Delray, but the data is not adjusted to take into consideration "case-mix," meaning the severity of illnesses, and is, therefore, meaningless as a comparison. A 1994 Medicare case mix index report shows Delray treating the sickest patients followed by JFK, then Bethesda. The sicker, older patients, exert more pressure on ICUs. Because ICU nursing ratios are one-nurse-to-one-patient or, more typically, one-to-two and PCU ratios are one-to-four, PCUs provide a step down from ICUs. PCU beds are used for patients who no longer need ICU care, but require more intense monitoring than that provided on the medical/surgical floors with nurse/patient ratios of one-to-twelve or one-to-twenty. In PCU or telemetry beds, radio signals transmit data to heart monitors. However, if PCU beds are not available, patients are left in the ICUs longer than necessary, aggravating the backlog cause by crowded ICUs. Critical care is a resource-intensive service, and Bethesda argues that Delray cannot increase the service because of the shortage of critical care nurses in Palm Beach County. However, the testimony presented by Bethesda is not consistent. Bethesda's expert in critical care nursing and critical care unit management testified that vacancies are difficult to fill, that there is a shortage of critical care nurses, but that Bethesda does not experience a shortage of critical care staff. There is no explanation why Bethesda has no shortage, but Delray would if its CON is approved. Delray's director of neuroscience and critical care testified that she maintains a file of available critical care nurses and can recruit the additional staff needed due to Delray's competitive salaries and benefits. Long Term Financial Feasibility There are no revenues or expenses during construction of the 24 beds, just construction costs. After the beds are in service, Delray projects net income of $1,951,164 in 1997 and $2,003,769 in 1998. In projecting revenues and expenses for the beds, Delray used its historical percentages of patients in each unit receiving a particular type of care and the historical cost of that care, and assumed that the same breakdown in the 24 new beds. Using the historical financial experience, Delray constructed a pro forma for the 24 beds, with an expected average daily census of 21.6 patients. If the 24 new beds are used only for existing holding area patients then, as Bethesda contends, Delray's pro forma should show a shift of revenues and expenses to the new beds, and the same amounts deducted from the remainder of the hospital. Delray already charges holding area patients based on the intensity of nursing care provided, even though the patients are not physically located in an ICU. The ER hold patients accounted for 2,210 patient days in 1994, which are reallocated to ICU beds in the pro forma. However, Delray also projected an incremental increase of 7,865 patient days which, contrary to Bethesda's claim, does not include or double- count the ER hold patient days. Of these, 54 percent of incremental patient days are projected to be in the ICUs or PCU. The additional patients will, therefore, spend 46 percent of total patient days in medical/surgical beds. Routine revenue estimates of $492 a day in year one were criticized as too low for the projected 54 percent ICU/46 percent medical/surgical mix. However, $492 a day is a reasonable estimate of incremental routine revenues for the hospital as a whole. In 1994, patients at Delray spent 44 percent of total days in medical/surgical beds as compared to the projection of 46 percent for new patients. There is no material variation from 44 percent to 46 percent, therefore $492 a day is a reasonable projected incremental routine revenue. Delray has demonstrated, in an incremental analysis, the financial feasibility of adding 24 critical care beds for existing and additional patients. Delray has also considered the financial impact of additional patients in all categories of beds. Although criticized by Bethesda for this approach, Delray explained that a critical care bed generates revenues from a medical/surgical bed when patient's condition is downgraded. The financial analysis is reasonable, particularly since Medicare pays a flat rate by DRG regardless of how a patient's total days are divided between ICUs and medical/surgical beds. Bethesda questioned whether the use of new beds for new patients will eliminate the use of holding areas. The movement of patients in and out of ICUs will be enhanced by having more ICU and PCU beds, even if the additional beds do not eliminate entirely the use of holding areas during the peak season. Projected average occupancies are expected to reach 98 percent in March 1997 and 1998. Delray also demonstrated that the share of its projected increased admissions which would have otherwise gone to Bethesda is approximately 150 patients, representing a net decline in revenue to Bethesda of approximately $257,000, in comparison to Bethesda's net income of $9 million in 1994. Bethesda also will no longer receive a county tax subsidy of $1 million in income and $3.5 million in restricted funds, after 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered issuing Certificate of Need 7872, approving the addition of 24 acute care beds, to NME Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Delray Community Hospital, conditioned on the provision 2.4 percent of total annual patient days to Medicaid and 1 percent of total annual patient days to charity care. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0730 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner, Bethesda Memorial, Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in Findings of Fact 14. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 2, 7, and 10. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 23 and 27. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 23. Accepted in Findings of Fact 22. 21. 43. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Accepted in Findings of Fact 23. 8,9. Accepted in Findings of Fact 19 and 20. 10. Accepted except first sentence in Findings of Fact 15. 11-12. Accepted in Findings of Fact 16. Accepted in Findings of Fact 18. Rejected in Findings of Fact 15-18. 15-17. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Accepted in Findings of Fact 35. Rejected first sentence in Findings of Fact 30. Accepted in part and rejected in part in Findings of Fact 23-29. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14 and accepted in Findings of Fact 23-25. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 4. 26. Rejected in Findings of Fact 27. 27-28. Accepted in Findings of Fact 30. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. Rejected first sentence in Findings of Fact 38-43. 31-32. Rejected in or subordinate to Finding of Fact 43. 33. Accepted in Findings of Fact 40. 34-35. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 39-41. 36. Accepted in Findings of Fact 37. 37(1). Accepted in Findings of Fact 40 and 41. 37(2). Accepted in Findings of Fact 11. 37(3). Accepted in Findings of Fact 39 and 43. 38-39. Accepted in part and rejected in part in Findings of Fact 40 and 40-48. Rejected in part in Findings of Fact 40 and 41. 49-51. Rejected in Findings of Fact 41. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 41. Rejected in Findings of Fact 38-42. 54(A). Rejected in Findings of Fact 33. 54(B). Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 33. 54(C). Rejected 54(D-E). Subordinate to Findings of Fact 34. 54(F). Accepted in Findings of Fact 19. 54(G). Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38. 54(H). Accepted in Findings of Fact 22. 54(I). Subordinate to Findings of Fact 34. 54(J). Subordinate to Findings of Fact 30. 54(K). Subordinate to Findings of Fact 28. 54(L). Rejected as speculative in Findings of Fact 35. 54(M). Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7 and 34. 54(N). Conclusions rejected. See Findings of Fact 16. 54(O-P). Conclusions rejected. See Findings of Fact 24. 54(Q). Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. 54(R). Conclusions rejected. See Findings of Fact 24. Accepted in Findings of Fact 12. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21 and 23. Accepted in preliminary statement. Accepted in Findings of Fact 12. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 29. Accepted in Findings of Fact 35. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. 62-63. Accepted in part in Findings of Fact 27-29. Accepted in Findings of Fact 23, 27 and 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 30 Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26 and 27. Accepted in part in Findings of Fact 28. Accepted in Findings of Fact 23. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. Accepted in Findings of Fact 26. Accepted in Findings of Fact 35-37. Accepted in Findings of Fact 27. 79-81. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 28. 82-85. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 28. Accepted in Findings of Fact 10. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 28 and rejected in Findings of Fact 35. Rejected in general in Findings of Fact 27 and 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 28. Rejected in Findings of Fact 35. Accepted in Findings of Fact 30. 94-98. Accepted in part or subordinate to Findings of Fact 28 and 29. 99-100. Rejected in or subordinate to Finding of Fact 28 and 29. 101. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. 102-104. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27, 28 and 35. 105. Accepted in Findings of Fact 28. 106-107. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. 108-111. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Accepted in Findings of Fact 35. Accepted in Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. 117-122. Accepted in Findings of Fact 5 and 35. Rejected in Findings of Fact 37. Accepted in part and rejected in part in Findings of Fact 44. Respondent, AHCA, Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in or subordinate to preliminary statement. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 1. Accepted in Findings of Fact 4. Accepted in Findings of Fact 13 and 25. 5-6. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 1 and 8-10. Accepted in Findings of Fact 4 and 26. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 24 and 31. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. Accepted in Findings of Fact 21. Accepted in Findings of Fact 22. Accepted in part and rejected in part in Findings of Fact 8, 9 and 34. Respondent, NME, Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in Findings of Fact 2. Accepted in Findings of Fact 11. Accepted in Findings of Fact 4 and 6. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Accepted in Findings of Fact 6. 6-10. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 24-26. Accepted in Findings of Fact 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. 13-14. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 8-13 and 23-34. Accepted in Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Accepted in Findings of Fact 10. Accepted in Findings of Fact 5, 12 and 34. Accepted in Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Accepted in Findings of Fact 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 13, 23 and 35. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 11-12 and 28. Accepted in Findings of Fact 11. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 11. Accepted in Findings of Fact 14 and 34. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 25. Rejected. Accepted in Findings of Fact 35. Accepted in Findings of Fact 13 and 31. Accepted in Findings of Fact 24. Accepted in Findings of Fact 13. Accepted in Findings of Fact 36. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12 and 13. Accepted in Findings of Fact 23 and 29. Accepted in Findings of Fact 29. 36-43. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 11 and 12. 44-50. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 22 and 23-29. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 34. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 28. Accepted except last sentence in Findings of Fact 24. 55-56. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 22 and 33. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 28. Accepted in Findings of Fact 22. Accepted in Findings of Fact 24. Accepted in Findings of Fact 26. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. Accepted in Findings of Fact 23. 63-65. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 30. 66-67. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 31. 68-72. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 7 and 30. 73-76. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 8 and 9. Accepted in Findings of Fact 34. Accepted, except last phrase in Findings of Fact 15-20. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 21-22. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 22-34. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. 83-86. Accepted in Findings of Fact 12 and 35-37. 87-89. Accepted in Findings of Fact 35-37. Accepted in Findings of Fact 30. Accepted in Findings of Fact 38 and 39. Accepted in Findings of Fact 38. Accepted in Findings of Fact 41. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38. 95-99. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 38-42. Accepted, except first sentence, in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 44. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. 102-104. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 16 and 19. 105-106. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. 107-108. Issue not reached. See Findings of Fact 14. 109-114. Accepted in or subordinate to Findings of Fact 44. COPIES FURNISHED: John Gilroy, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kenneth Hoffman, Esquire W. David Watkins, Esquire OERTEL, HOFFMAN, FERNANDEZ & COLE 2700 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael J. Glazer, Esquire C. Gary Williams, Esquire MACFARLANE, AUSLEY, FERGUSON & MCMULLEN Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Tom Wallace Assistant Director Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 10432 filed by East Florida-DMC, Inc. (DMC), to build an 80-bed acute care hospital in Miami-Dade County, Florida, AHCA District 11, or CON Application No. 10433 filed by The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Florida d/b/a Jackson Hospital West (JW), to build a 100-bed acute care hospital in Miami-Dade County, Florida, AHCA District 11, on balance, satisfy the applicable criteria; and, if so, whether either or both should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the parties’ stipulations, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, other evidence presented at the final hearing, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County d/b/a Jackson Hospital West and Jackson Health System (JHS) JHS is a taxpayer-funded health system located in and owned by Miami-Dade County. It is governed by The Public Health Trust of Miami Dade-County, Florida (PHT), a seven-member board. JHS owns and operates three acute care hospitals in Miami-Dade County--Jackson Memorial Hospital (JMH); Jackson North Medical Center (JN); and Jackson South Medical Center (JS)--as well as three specialty hospitals: Holtz Children’s Hospital (Holtz); Jackson Rehabilitation Hospital; and Jackson Behavioral Health Hospital. JHS also owns and operates numerous other non- hospital healthcare facilities within Miami-Dade County. JHS’s applicant in this proceeding is JW which, if approved, will be another acute care hospital in JHS. JHS is an academic teaching institution, and the University of Miami (UM) is JHS’s affiliated medical school. Over 1,000 UM residents staff JMH pursuant to an operating agreement with JHS. JN and JS are not academic medical centers. JHS annually receives sales tax and ad valorem tax revenues from Miami-Dade County in order to help fund its operations. JS and JN are community hospitals operated as part of JHS. JS was acquired in 2001. JS is licensed for 226 beds and is also home to a verified Level II trauma center. The JN facility was acquired by JHS in 2006. The facility is licensed for 382 beds. East Florida (DMC) DMC is an affiliate of HCA Healthcare, Inc. (HCA), the largest provider of acute care hospital services in the world. DMC will operate within HCA’s East Florida Division (EFD), which is comprised of 15 hospitals, 12 surgery centers, two diagnostic imaging centers, four freestanding emergency departments, nine behavioral health facilities, and one regional laboratory, along with other related services. There are three HCA-affiliated hospitals in Miami-Dade County: KRMC; Aventura Hospital and Medical Center (Aventura); and Mercy Hospital, a campus of Plantation General Hospital (Mercy). Kendall Regional (KRMC) KRMC, which is located at the intersection of the Florida Turnpike and Southwest 40th Street in Miami-Dade County, is a 417-bed tertiary provider comprised of 380 acute care beds, 23 inpatient adult psychiatric beds, eight Level II neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) beds, and five Level III NICU beds. It is a Baker Act receiving facility. KRMC is a verified Level I trauma center. It also has a burn program. KRMC is also an academic teaching facility, receiving freestanding institutional accreditation from the Accrediting Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) in 2013. KRMC currently has six residency programs including, among others, surgery, internal medicine, podiatry, anesthesia, and surgical critical care. Its teaching programs are affiliated with the University of South Florida, Nova Southeastern University, and Florida International University. KRMC also participates in scholarly and clinical research. In 2017, KRMC had over 82,000 Emergency Department (ED) visits. It treated over 115,000 total inpatients and outpatients that year. There are 850 physicians on KRMC’s medical staff. It offers a full range of medical surgery services, interventional procedures, obstetrics (OB), pediatric, and neonatal care, among many other service lines. KRMC primarily serves southern and western portions of Miami-Dade County but also receives referrals from the Florida Keys up through Broward County, Palm Beach County, and the Treasure Coast. Its main competitors include, but are not limited to: Baptist Hospital; Baptist West; South Miami Hospital; PGH; Hialeah; CGH; JS, and Palm Springs General Hospital. The Tenet Hospitals PGH, Hialeah, and CGH are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Tenet South Florida. These are all for-profit hospitals. PGH is a 368-bed tertiary facility that opened in the early 1970s. It has 297 licensed acute care beds, 48 adult psychiatric beds, 52 ICU beds, and 15 Level II NICU beds. It is located at the Palmetto Expressway and Northwest 122nd Street in Hialeah, Florida. The hospital employs about 1,700 people and has over 600 physicians on its medical staff. PGH is a tertiary-level facility offering a variety of specialty services, including adult open heart surgery, a comprehensive stroke center, and robotic surgery. It has inpatient mental health beds and serves the community as a Baker Act receiving facility. It also offers OB and Level II NICU services with approximately 1,500 births a year. It has approximately 70,000 ED visits and between 17,000 and 18,000 inpatient admissions per year. In addition to its licensed inpatient beds, PGH operates 31 observation beds. PGH is ACGME accredited and serves a significant teaching function in the community. It has approximately 89 residents and fellows. The hospital provides fellowships in cardiology, critical care and interventional cardiology, and also has rotations in neurology and gastroenterology. Residents from Larkin General Hospital also rotate through PGH. PGH generally serves the communities of Opa Locka, Hialeah, Miami Lakes, Hialeah Gardens, Doral, and Miami Springs. In reality, all of the hospitals in the county are competitors, but more direct competition comes from Palm Springs Hospital, Memorial in Miramar, Mount Sinai, Kendall, and even its sister hospital, Hialeah. Hialeah first opened in 1951 and is a 378-bed acute care facility. It has 356 acute care beds, 12 adult psychiatric beds, and 10 Level II NICU beds. The ED has 25 beds and about 40,000 visits per year. It has approximately 14,000 inpatient admissions and 1,400 babies delivered annually. It offers services including cardiac, stroke, robotic surgery, colorectal surgery, and OB services. The hospital has a Level II NICU with 12 beds. CGH is located in the City of Coral Gables and is near the border between Coral Gables and the City of Miami on Douglas Road. It first opened in 1926. Portions of the original structure are still in use. CGH has 245 licensed beds, over 725 employees, 367 physicians, and over 100 additional allied providers on its medical staff. The hospital has a full-service ED. Its service lines include general surgery, geriatrics, urology, treatment of cardiovascular and pulmonary disease, and others. The hospital has eight operating rooms and offers robotic surgery. The ED has 28 beds divided into the main area and a geriatric emergency room. It had about 25,000 ED visits last year, which is lower than prior years, due in part to the presence of over a dozen nearby urgent care centers. CGH has over 8,500 inpatient admissions per year and is not at capacity. While patient days have grown slightly, the average occupancy is still just a little over 40%, meaning, on average, it has over 140 empty inpatient beds on any given day. The hospital is licensed for 245 beds, but typically there are only 180 beds immediately available for use. Agency for Healthcare Administration (AHCA) AHCA is the state health-planning agency charged with administration of the CON program as set forth in sections 408.31-408.0455, Florida Statutes. The Proposals Doral Medical Center (DMC) DMC proposes to build an 80-bed community hospital situated within the residential district of Doral. The hospital will be located in southwestern Doral in zip code 33126 and will serve the growing population of Doral, along with residential areas to the north and south of Doral. The hospital will be located in the City of Doral’s residential district on Northwest 41st Street between Northwest 109th Avenue to the east, and Northwest 112th Avenue to the west. Doral has seen significant growth in the past 15 years and has been consistently included on the list of the fastest growing cities in Florida. The new facility will have a bed complement of 80 licensed acute care beds, including 72 medical/surgical and eight OB beds. The proposed acute care hospital will be fully accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Facilities and licensed by the State of Florida. No public funds will be utilized in construction of the hospital and it will contribute to the state, county, and municipal tax base as a proprietary corporation. DMC will offer a full range of non-tertiary services, including emergency services, imaging, surgery, intensive care, cardiac catheterization, and women's services, including an OB unit, and pediatric care. DMC will be a general medical facility that will include a general medical component and a surgery component. Although DMC will operate an OB unit, NICU services will not be offered at DMC. If DMC’s patients need more advanced services, including NICU, the EFD hopes they will receive them from KRMC. The open medical staff will be largely community-based, but University of Miami physicians would be welcome at DMC. Before the hospital is built, KRMC will construct and operate a freestanding emergency department (FSED) at the location that will eventually become the ED of DMC. Construction of the FSED is now underway, and Brandon Haushalter, chief executive officer (CEO) of KRMC, estimated that it will open in March or April of 2019. Jackson West JHS proposes to build a community hospital to be known as “Jackson West” near the eastern edge of Doral. The proposed 100-bed general acute care hospital would have medical surgical and obstetrical beds and offer basic acute care services. JHS is a public health system owned by Miami-Dade County. All of JHS’s assets, as well as its debts, belong to the county. JHS is a not-for-profit entity, and therefore does not pay taxes, though it receives hundreds of millions of dollars from property taxes and sales taxes in Miami-Dade County. JHS’s main campus is a large health campus located near the Midtown Miami area in between Allapattah (to the north) and Little Havana (to the south). In addition to JMH, the campus includes Holtz Children’s Hospital, a behavioral health hospital, an inpatient rehabilitation hospital, and several specialty clinics. Bascom-Palmer Eye Institute, a Veterans Administration hospital, and University of Miami Hospital are also located adjacent to Jackson West’s main campus. JMH is a 1,500-bed hospital with a wide array of programs and services, including tertiary and quaternary care, and a Level I trauma program, the Ryder Trauma Center. JMH receives patients from throughout Miami-Dade County, elsewhere in Florida, and internationally. JMH is a teaching hospital and has a large number of residents, as well as professors from the University of Miami, on staff. UM and JMH have had a relationship for many years, and in addition to research and teaching, UM provides physician staffing to JMH. JN is a 342-bed community hospital located in between Miami Gardens and North Miami Beach, just off of I-95 and the Turnpike. JS is a 252-bed community hospital located in the Palmetto Bay area just south of Kendall. It has stroke certification and interventional cardiology, and was recently approved for a trauma program, which began in May 2016. Both JN and JS were existing hospitals that were acquired by JHS. JHS has never built a hospital from the ground up. In 2014, JHS leadership directed its internal planning team to review the healthcare needs of county residents. JHS’s analysis identified a need for outpatient services in western Miami-Dade, the only remaining quadrant of the county in which JHS did not have a hospital or healthcare program at the time. As part of its due diligence, JHS then consulted healthcare firm Kurt Salmon & Associates (KSA) to independently evaluate the data. KSA’s investigation validated a need in the west county for adult and pediatric outpatient services, including need for an FSED. This prompted JHS to explore opportunities for expansion of outpatient services where needed: in the western corridor of Miami-Dade. This was also the genesis of JHS’s long-range plan to first build an FSED in the Doral area, to be followed ultimately by the addition of a general acute care hospital at the site. The JW site is a 27-acre parcel of land located just west of the Palmetto Expressway and north of 25th Street. The site is in an industrial area only a short distance from the western end of the runways at Miami International Airport. The site is located in zip code 33122, which is very sparsely populated. JW proposed a primary service area (PSA) consisting of zip codes 33126, 33144, 33166, 33172/33122, 33174, 33178, and 33182, and a secondary service area (SSA) of zip codes 33155, 33165, 33175, and 33184. JW intends to serve general, acute care non-tertiary patients and OB patients. Detailed below, trends in the JW service area do not demonstrate need for its proposed hospital. The location of the JW site will not contribute to the viability of the proposed hospital. According to 2010 census data, only 328 people live within a one-mile radius of the JW site. Since 2000, only 32 total people have moved into that same area around the JW site--an average of three per year. There are virtually no residences within a one-mile radius of the JW site. From 2000 to 2010, the population within a two- mile radius of the JW site decreased by a rate of 9.4%. The JW health planner projects JW’s home zip code of 33122 will have a total population of only eight (8) people in 2022. From 2012 to 2014, the use rate in the JW service area for non-tertiary patients decreased by 3.9%. That decline continued at a steeper pace of 4.2% from 2014 to 2017. This was largely due to the 65+ age cohort, the demographic of patients that utilize inpatient services the most. The 65+ age cohort is growing at a slower pace in the JW service area than in Miami- Dade or Florida as a whole. Non-tertiary discharges in the JW service area are declining at a greater pace than that of Miami- Dade County--negative 4.2% compared to negative 1.9%. The rate of projected population growth in the JW PSA is decreasing. The projected rate of growth for the JW service area is lower than that of Miami-Dade County and Florida as a whole. The OB patient base JW intends to rely on is projected to remain flat. The inpatient discharges for all ages in the JW service area have declined from 2014 to 2017. For ages 0-17, discharges in the JW service area declined 21.4% during that time period. The discharges for ages 18-44 declined by 4.8%, and the discharges for ages 45-64 declined by 8.9%. The discharges for the important 65+ age cohort declined by 0.1%. Specifically, the discharges for ages 65-74 declined by 6.5%, and the discharges for ages 75-84 declined by 3.3%. The discharges for ages 85+ are the only age cohort that has not declined from 2012 to 2017. Overall, the non-tertiary discharges per 1,000 population (i.e., use rate) for all ages in the JW service area declined from 2012 to 2014 by 6%, and from 2014 to 2017 by 7.8%. Despite these declines in discharges in the JW service area, the health planners who crafted the JW projections used a constant use rate for the 0-17, 18-44, and 45-64 age cohorts. The JW health planners used a declining use rate for the 65+ age cohort. These use rates were applied uniformly across all zip codes, despite wide variance in actual use rates in each zip code. Applying the zip code specific use rates in conjunction with the other assumptions used by the JW health planner demonstrates that the JW projections are unreasonable. For instance, JW’s reliance on a uniform use rate over-projects the number of discharges in JW PSA zip code 33178 by nearly 1,000 patients. This occurs because the population is only growing at a 2% rate in the zip code, but JW’s reliance on service area-wide projections cause the discharges to grow at an extraordinary rate of 8.9% per year. Applying actual use rates across all zip codes causes a drastic change in the JW PSA and SSA definition. Section 408.037(2) requires a CON applicant to identify its PSA and SSA by listing zip codes in which it will receive discharges in descending order, beginning with the zip code with the highest amount of discharges, then proceeding in diminishing order to the zip code with the lowest amount of discharges. The zip codes, which comprise 75% of discharges, constitute the PSA; and the remaining zip codes, which consist of the remaining 25% of discharges, makes up the SSA. However, JW did not project its utilization in this manner. In its application, JW did not define its service area, PSA, and SSA zip codes in descending order by number or percentage of discharges. When this correct adjustment is made, its PSA consists of zip codes 33126, 33172, 33178, 33174, 33144, and 33165; and its SSA consists of zip codes 33175, 33166, 33155, 33182, and 33184. Zip codes 33166 and 33182 were in the original JW PSA, and zip code 33165 was in the original JW SSA. As such, JW’s home zip code should actually be in its SSA. JW health planners call this illogical, but it demonstrates that the JW site is located within a zip code that has almost no population of potential patients. JHS is developing an FSED and outpatient/ambulatory facilities on the JW site regardless of whether its CON application for a hospital is approved. Construction has begun on the JW site, and JHS is actually building a “shelled in” structure intended to house a future hospital, notwithstanding lack of CON approval for the hospital. There is no contingency plan for use of the shelled-in hospital space if CON approval is not obtained. JHS executives unequivocally stated that they intend to continue pursuing CON approval for the JW hospital, even if the proposed DMC hospital is approved. Indeed, JHS has filed third and fourth CON applications for its proposed JW hospital. The budget for the JW campus is $252 million. Sixty to $70 million is being funded from a bond issuance approved by voters in Miami-Dade County. Notably, the bond referendum approved by voters made no mention of a new hospital. The remaining $180 to $190 million is being funded by JHS, which has chosen to only keep 50 days cash-on-hand, and put any surplus toward capital projects. This is well below the number of days cash-on-hand ws advisable for a system like JHS. The specific programs and services to be offered at JW have not been finalized, but it is clear that JW will be a small community hospital that will not offer anything unique or different from any of the existing hospitals in the area, nor will it operate NICU beds. Patients presenting to JW in need of specialized or tertiary services will need to be transferred to another hospital with the capability of serving them, most likely JMH. The Applicants’ Arguments Doral Medical Center (DMC) DMC’s arguments in support of its proposed hospital may be summarized as follows: Geographic features surrounding Doral create transportation access barriers for the residents of the area; Doral is a densely-populated community that is growing quickly and lacks a readily accessible hospital; KRMC, which is the provider of choice for Doral residents, is a growing tertiary facility that cannot sufficiently expand to meet its future demands. DMC will serve much of the same patient population currently served by KRMC and help decompress KRMC’s acute care load so KRMC can focus on its tertiary service lines; From a geographic standpoint, the Doral community and its patients are isolated from much of Miami-Dade County to the north, west, and east, and the nearest hospitals. East Florida-DMC is a subsidiary of HCA and would be a part of the HCA EFD. Michael Joseph is the president of the EFD, which includes 15 hospitals and other facilities from Miami north through the Treasure Coast. Mr. Joseph authorized the filing of the DMC CON application, which proposes an 80-bed basic acute care hospital that includes 72 medical surgical and eight OB beds. As noted, there will be neither unique services at DMC nor any tertiary services, such as a NICU. HCA anticipates that DMC patients needing tertiary services would be referred and treated at KRMC. The proposed hospital would be built on 41st Street, between Northwest 109th Avenue and Northwest 112th Avenue. This site is located on the western edge of Doral, just east of the Everglades. When the consultants were retained to write the first DMC CON application, HCA had already made the decision to go forward with the project. Mr. Joseph described Miami-Dade County as one of the most competitive markets in the country for hospital services. There is robust competition in the Miami-Dade market from the standpoints of payors, physicians, and the many hospitals located in the county, including Jackson, HCA, Tenet, Baptist and others. HCA is not proposing this project because any of the existing hospitals in the area do not provide good quality care. HCA is currently building an FSED on the DMC site that will open regardless of whether the DMC hospital is approved. Mr. Joseph acknowledged that there is a trend toward outpatient rather than inpatient care. Inpatient occupancy of acute care hospitals in Miami-Dade County has been declining in recent years. Managed care has added further pressure on reducing inpatient admissions. Surgical advances have also resulted in fewer inpatient admissions. Surgeries that formerly required an inpatient stay are now often done on an outpatient basis. Mr. Joseph agreed that 30 minutes is a reasonable travel time to access an acute care hospital. The home zip code for the proposed DMC hospital is 33178. KRMC’s market share for that zip code is 20%. Individuals in that zip code are currently accessing a wide variety of hospitals. PGH is only 6.7 miles away and has the fourth highest market share in that zip code. HCA’s healthcare planning expert, Dan Sullivan, acknowledged that, if approved, DMC would likely have an adverse financial impact on KRMC and other area hospitals. Several witnesses testified that the travel time from the DMC site to KRMC is about 10 minutes, and that an ambulance could do it in as little as five minutes. As to the argument that the residents of Doral face geographic access barriers, the evidence did not indicate that there is anything unique about Doral from a traffic standpoint compared to other parts of Miami-Dade County. People come in and out of Doral on a daily basis in significant numbers for work and other reasons via various access points. Witnesses agreed that 25 to 30 minutes is a reasonable drive time for non-tertiary acute care services, and the evidence showed that residents of Doral, and the DMC service area, are well within 30 minutes of multiple hospitals providing more intensive services than are proposed by DMC. Indeed, many residents of DMC’s service area are closer to other hospitals than to the DMC site. None of the DMC witnesses were able to identify any patient in Doral who had been unable to access acute care services, or had suffered a bad outcome because of travel from Doral to an area hospital. The evidence did not establish that there currently exists either geographic or financial access barriers within the service area proposed to be served by DMC. Jackson West As in its Batch One application, JW advances six arguments as to why its proposed hospital should be approved. They are: It will serve a significant amount of indigent and Medicaid patients. JHS already serves residents of the proposed service area, which JW characterizes as “fragmented,” in that residents go to a number of different hospitals to receive services. Development of the freestanding ED and ambulatory center is under way. JW would provide an additional opportunity to partner with UM and FIU. There is physician and community support for the project. JW will add to the financial viability of JHS and its ability to continue its mission. JW presented very little analysis of the types of factors typically considered in evaluating need for a new hospital. JW did not discuss existing providers and their programs and services, the utilization of existing hospitals, and whether they have excess capacity, or other important considerations. Instead, JW advanced the six arguments noted above, for approval of its proposed hospital, none of which truly relate to the issue of need. First, JW states that its proposed hospital will serve a significant level of Medicaid and indigent patients. While it is true that JHS serves a significant amount of Medicaid and indigent patients, there are a number of reasons why this is not a basis to approve its proposed hospital. As an initial matter, JW treads a fine line in touting its service to Medicaid and indigent patients, while also targeting Doral for its better payer mix and financial benefit to JHS. JHS also receives an enormous amount of tax dollars to provide care to indigent and underserved patients. While other hospitals in Miami-Dade County provide care to such patients, they do not receive taxpayer dollars, as does JHS, although they pay taxes, unlike JHS. Also, Medicaid is a good payer for JHS. With its substantial supplement, JHS actually makes money from Medicaid patients, and it costs the system more for a Medicaid patient to be treated at a JHS hospital than elsewhere. More significantly, there is not a large Medicaid or indigent population in Doral, nor evidence of financial access issues in Doral. Second, JW argues that its CON application should be approved because JHS already serves patients from the Doral area, which JW characterizes as “fragmented” because area residents go to several different hospitals for care. This so- called “fragmentation” is not unique to Doral, and is not unusual in a densely-populated urban market with several existing hospitals. The same phenomenon occurs in other areas of Miami-Dade County, some of which actually have a hospital in the localized area. The fact that Doral residents are accessing several different hospitals demonstrates that there are a number of existing providers that are accessible to them. As discussed in greater detail below, residents of the Doral area have choices in every direction (other than to the west, which is the Everglades). JHS itself already serves patients from the Doral area. If anything, this tells us that patients from Doral currently have access to the JHS hospitals. Third, JW argues that its CON application should be approved because development of the JW campus is under way. This is irrelevant to the determination of need, and is simply a statement of JHS’s intent to build an FSED and outpatient facilities on a piece of land that was acquired for that purpose, regardless of CON approval. Fourth, JW argues for approval of its proposed hospital because it would provide an additional opportunity to partner with UM and Florida International University (FIU). However, the statutory criteria no longer addresses research and teaching concerns, and JHS’s relationship with UM or FIU has no bearing on whether there is a need for a new hospital in the Doral area. Moreover, JW did not present any evidence of how it would partner with UM or FIU at JW, and there does not seem to be any set plans in this regard. Fifth, JW claims that there is physician and community support for its proposed hospital, but it is very common for CON applicants to obtain letters in support for applications. Indeed, the DMC application was also accompanied by letters of support. Sixth and finally, JW argues that its proposed hospital will add to the financial viability of HSA and allow it to continue its mission. However, JW provided no analysis of the projected financial performance of its proposed hospital to substantiate this. The only financial analysis in the record is from KSA, a consulting firm that JHS hired to analyze the programs and services to be developed at JW. The KSA analysis posits that the JW FSED project will lose millions of dollars and not achieve break-even unless there is an inpatient hospital co-located there so that JW can take advantage of the more lucrative hospital-based billing and reimbursement. The sixth “need” argument relates to the issue of JHS’s historical financial struggles, which bear discussion. Only a handful of years ago, the entire JHS was in dire financial trouble, so much so that selling all or parts of it was considered. Days cash-on-hand was in the single digits, and JHS fell out of compliance with bond covenants. JHS’s financial difficulties prompted the appointment of an outside monitor to oversee JHS’s finances. Price Waterhouse served in that role, and made several recommendations for JHS to improve its revenue cycle, make accounting adjustments, and improve its staffing and efficiency. As a result of these recommendations, JHS went through a large reduction in force, and began to more closely screen the income and residency of its patients. As a result of these measures, overall financial performance has since improved. Despite its improved financial position, JHS still consistently loses money on operations, including a $362,000,915 loss as of June 30, 2018. JHS clearly depends upon the hundreds of millions of non-operating tax-based revenues it receives annually. JHS’s CEO expressed concerns over decreases in the system’s non-operating revenue sources, and claimed that JHS needs to find ways to increase its operating revenue to offset this. JW is being proposed as part of this strategy. However, JHS’s chief financial officer testified that “the non-operating revenues are a fairly stable source of income.” In fact, JHS’s tax revenues have gone up in the last few years. JHS sees the more affluent Doral area as a source of better paying patients that will enhance the profitability of its new hospital. Beyond this aspiration however, there is no meaningful analysis of the anticipated financial performance of its proposed hospital. This is a glaring omission given that a significant impetus for spending millions of public dollars on a new hospital is to improve JHS’s overall financial position. The KSA analysis referenced above determined that changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System rule would result in the JW campus losing hundreds of millions of dollars and never reaching “break even,” absent an inpatient hospital on the campus for “hospital based” billing and reimbursement. Though a financial benefit to the system, the increased reimbursement JHS would receive by having an inpatient hospital on the JW campus would be a financial burden on the healthcare delivery system since it would cost more for the same patient to receive the same outpatient services in a hospital- based facility. Reports by KSA also state that a strategic purpose of JW is to attract patients that would otherwise go to nearby facilities like PGH and Hialeah, and to capture tertiary or higher complexity cases which would then be sent to JMH. JW’s witnesses and healthcare planning experts fully expect this to happen. In 2015, and again in 2017, JHS conducted a “Community Health Needs Assessment,” which is required by law to be performed by public safety net hospitals. The assessments were conducted by gathering responses to various questions from a wide array of community leaders and stakeholders, including the CEOs of JHS’s hospitals, about the healthcare needs of the community. The final Community Health Needs Assessment documents are lengthy and cover a variety of health-related topics, but most notable for this case is that: (1) nowhere in either the 2015 or 2017 assessment is the development of a new hospital recommended; and (2) expansion into western Miami-Dade County scored by far the lowest on a list of priorities for JHS. In its application and at hearing, JW took the position that JW can enter the Doral area market without impacting existing providers to any meaningful extent. While JW acknowledges that its proposed hospital would impact the Tenet Hospitals, it argues that the impact is not significant. The evidence established that the financial impact to the Tenet Hospitals (calculated based upon lost contribution margin) would total roughly $3 million for lost inpatients, and $5.2 million including lost outpatients. While these losses will not put the Tenet Hospitals in financial peril, they are nonetheless significant and material. The Existing Healthcare Delivery System Miami-Dade County is home to 18 freestanding acute care hospitals, comprising a total of 7,585 licensed and approved acute care beds. With an average annual occupancy of 53.8% in calendar year 2017, there were, on average, approximately 3,500 unoccupied acute care beds in the county on any given day. While the countywide occupancy rate fluctuates from year to year, it has been on a downward trend in the past several years. As pointed out by several witnesses, the lack of a hospital in Doral is not itself an indication of need. In addition, population growth, and the demands of the population for inpatient hospital beds, cannot be considered in a vacuum. Sound healthcare planning requires an analysis of existing area hospitals, including the services they offer and their respective locations; how area residents travel to existing hospitals and any barriers to access; the utilization of existing hospitals and amount of capacity they have; and other factors which may be relevant in a given case. The population of Doral currently is only about 59,000 people. It is not as densely populated as many areas of Miami-Dade County, has a number of golf course communities, and is generally a more affluent area with a higher average household income than much of Miami-Dade County. As set forth in JW’s CON application, the better payer mix in Doral was a significant factor behind its decision to file its CON application. Although there is not a hospital within the Doral city limits, there are a number of healthcare providers in Doral and several hospitals nearby. PGH and Palm Springs Hospital are just north of Doral. KRMC is just south of Doral. Hialeah is northeast of Doral. CGH, Westchester General, and NCH are southeast of Doral. JMH and all of its facilities are east of Doral. And there are others within reasonable distance. KRMC is only six miles due south of the proposed DMC site, and PGH is just eight miles north of the DMC site. As to the JW site, PGH is 6.9 miles distant, CGH is 8.6 miles distant, and Hialeah is 7.4 miles distant. Residents of the Doral area have many choices in hospitals with a wide array of services, and they are accessing them. The parties to this case, as well as other existing hospitals, all have a share of the Doral area market. JW calls this “fragmentation” of the market and casts it in a negative light, but the evidence showed this to be a normal phenomenon in an urban area like Miami, with several hospitals in healthy competition with each other. Among the experts testifying at the hearing, it was undisputed that inpatient acute care hospital use rates are on the decline. There are different reasons for this, but it was uniformly recognized that decreasing use rates for inpatient services, and a shift toward outpatient services, are ongoing trends in the market. Recognizing the need for outpatient services in the Doral area, both JW and DMC (or, more accurately, their related entities) have proposed outpatient facilities and services to be located in Doral. Kendall Regional Medical Center KRMC is currently the dominant hospital provider in the Doral area. Regarding his motivation for filing the DMC application, Mr. Joseph readily admitted “it’s as much about protecting what I already currently provide, number one.” KRMC treats Medicaid and indigent patients. KRMC has never turned away a patient because it did not have a contract with a Medicaid-managed care company. The CEO agreed that there is no access problem for Medicaid or charity patients justifying a new hospital. It was argued that KRMC is crowded, and the DMC hospital would help “decompress” KRMC, but the evidence showed that KRMC has a number of licensed beds that are not being used for inpatients. In addition, its ED has never gone on diversion, and no patient has ever been turned away due to the lack of a bed. Moreover, the census at KRMC has been declining. It had 25,324 inpatient admissions in 2015, 24,649 admissions in 2016, and 23,301 in 2017. The most recent data available at the time of hearing reflected that KRMC has been running at a little less than 75% occupancy, before its planned bed additions. KRMC is between an eight to 10 minute drive from Doral, and currently has the largest market share within the applicants’ defined service areas. KRMC is readily available and accessible to the residents of Doral. KRMC currently has a $90 million dollar expansion project under way. It involves adding beds and two new floors to the West Tower--a new fifth floor which will add 24 ICU beds and 24 step-down beds, and a new sixth floor which will house the relocated pediatric unit and 12 new medical-surgical beds. KRMC is also adding a new nine-story, 765 parking space garage and other ancillary space. This expansion will reduce the occupancy rate of KRMC’s inpatient units, and in particular its ICUs. These bed additions, in conjunction with increasing emphasis on outpatient services and the resultant declining inpatient admissions, will alleviate any historical capacity constraints KRMC may have had. There are also a number of ways KRMC could be further expanded in the future if needed. The West Tower is designed so it could accommodate a seventh floor, and the East Tower is also designed so that an additional floor could also be added to it. In addition, KRMC recently completed construction of a new OR area that is built on pillars. The new construction includes a third floor of shelled-in space that could house an additional 12 acute care beds. Moreover, this new OR tower was designed to go up an additional two to three floors beyond the existing shelled-in third floor. It is clear that KRMC has implemented reasonable strategies for addressing any bed capacity issues it may have experienced in the past. Decompression of KRMC is not a reason to approve DMC. Palmetto General Hospital Evidence regarding PGH was provided by its CEO Ana Mederos. Ms. Mederos is a registered nurse and has lived in Miami-Dade County for many years. She has a master of business education from Nova University and has worked in several different hospitals in the county. Specifically, she was the chief operating officer (COO) at Cedars Medical Center, the CEO at North Shore Medical Center, the CEO at Hialeah Hospital, and has been the CEO at PGH since August of 2006. Ms. Mederos is one of the few witnesses that actually lives in Doral. She travels in and out of the area on a daily basis. Her average commute is only about 15 minutes, and she has multiple convenient options in and out of Doral. PGH is located just off the Palmetto Expressway at 68th Street. It opened in the early 1970s and has 368 licensed beds, including 52 ICU beds. The hospital employs about 1,800 people and has over 600 physicians on its medical staff. PGH’s occupancy has declined from 79.8% in 2015 to 64% in 2016, and even further to 56.7% in 2017. There are many reasons for this decline, including pressure from managed care organizations, the continued increase in the use of outpatient procedures, improvements in technology, and increased competition in the Miami-Dade County market. Ms. Mederos expects that inpatient demand will continue to decline into the foreseeable future. PGH recently activated 31 observation beds to help improve throughput and better accommodate the increasing number of observation patients. PGH offers high-quality care and uses various metrics and indicators to measure and monitor what is going on in the hospital. The hospital has also been recognized with numerous awards. Through its parent, Tenet, PGH has contracts with just about every insurance and managed care company that serves the community. The hospital treats Medicaid and indigent patients. PGH’s Medicaid rate of $3,580 per patient is significantly lower than the rate paid to JMH. PGH has an office dedicated to helping patients get qualified for Medicaid or other financial resources, which not only helps the hospital get paid for its services, it also assists patients and families to make sure that they have benefits on an ongoing basis. Roughly 9-10% of PGH’s patients annually are completely unfunded. PGH only transfers patients if there is a need for a service not provided at the hospital, or upon the patient’s request. PGH does not transfer patients just because they cannot pay. PGH pays physicians to take calls in the ED which also obligates those physicians to provide care to patients that are seen at the hospital. PGH is a for-profit hospital that pays income taxes and property taxes, and does not receive any taxpayer subsidies like those received by JHS. Ms. Mederos reviewed the applications of JW and DMC, and articulated a number of reasons why, in her opinion, neither application should be approved. She sees no delays in providing care to anyone in the area, as there are hospitals serving Doral in every direction. There are a multitude of FSEDs available and additional FSEDs are being built in Doral by both applicants. There is another FSED being built close to PGH by Mount Sinai Medical Center. NCH has also opened an FSED that has negatively affected the volume of pediatric patients seen at PGH. There are also multiple urgent care centers. It was Ms. Mederos’ firm belief that persons living in Doral have reasonable geographic access to both inpatient and outpatient medical services. Ms. Mederos’ testimony in this regard is credited. There are no programs or services being proposed by either applicant that are not already available in the area. Ms. Mederos also noted that there is currently no problem with access to OB services in the area. However, she has a particular concern in that both applicants propose to offer OB services, but neither is proposing to offer NICU services. The evidence showed that most all of the hospitals that provide OB services to the Doral area offer at least Level II and some Level III NICU services. Thus, in terms of OB care, both proposed hospitals would be a step below what has developed as the standard of care for OB patients in the county. Ms. Mederos acknowledged that PGH does not have a huge market share in the zip codes that the applicants are proposing to serve, but that does not mean that the impact from either would not be real and significant. If a hospital is built by either applicant, it will need physicians, with some specialists in short supply. There are tremendous shortages in certain medical fields, such as orthopedics and neurology. In addition, there will be additional competition for nurses and other staff, which will increase the cost of healthcare. The loss of $1.3 to $2 million in contribution margin, as projected by Tenet’s healthcare planner, is a negative impact on PGH as hospital margins become thinner, and those numbers do not include costs like those needed to recruit and retain staff. PGH is again experiencing a nursing shortage, and losing nurses, incurring the higher cost for contract labor, paying overtime, and essentially not having the staff to provide the required services is a serious potential adverse impact from either proposed new hospital. JHS also tends to provide more lucrative benefits than PGH, and a nearby JW hospital is a threat in that regard. As a final note, Ms. Mederos stated that her conviction that there is no need for either proposed hospital in Doral is even more resolute than when she testified in the Batch One Case. With continued declines in admissions, length of stay and patient days, the development of more services for the residents of Doral, the shortages of doctors and nurses, the ever increasing role of managed care that depresses the demand for inpatient hospital services and other factors, she persuasively explained why no new hospitals are needed in the Doral area. Coral Gables Hospital (CGH) Maria Cristina Jimenez testified on behalf of CGH, where she has worked in a variety of different capacities since 1985. She was promoted to CEO in March 2017. She has lived in Miami her entire life. Ms. Jimenez has been involved in initiatives to make her hospital more efficient. She is supportive of efforts to reduce inpatient hospitalizations and length of stay, as this is what is best for patients. Overall, the hospital length of stay is dropping, which adds to the decreasing demand for inpatient services. CGH is accredited by the Joint Commission, has received multiple awards, and provides high-quality care to its patients. It also has contracts with a broad array of managed care companies as do the other Tenet hospitals. CGH treats Medicaid patients, and its total Medicaid rate is less than $3,500 per inpatient. The hospital has a program similar to PGH to help patients get qualified for Medicaid and other resources. CGH also provides services to indigent patients, and self-pay/charity is about 6% of the hospital’s total admissions. The hospital does not transfer patients just because they are indigent. Physicians are compensated to provide care in the emergency room and are expected to continue with that care if the patients are admitted to the hospital, even if they do not have financial resources. CGH also pays income and property taxes, but does not receive any taxpayer support. CGH generally serves the Little Havana, Flagami, Miami, and Coral Gables communities, and its service area overlaps with those of the applicants. In order to better serve its patients and to help it compete in the highly competitive Miami-Dade County marketplace, CGH is developing a freestanding ED at the corner of Bird Road and Southwest 87th Avenue, which is scheduled to open in January 2020. This will provide another resource for patients in the proposed service areas. Ms. Jimenez had reviewed the CON applications at issue in this case. She does not believe that either hospital should be approved because it will drain resources from CGH, not only from a financial standpoint, but also physician and nurse staffing. CGH experiences physician shortages. Urologists are in short supply, as are gastrointestinal physicians that perform certain procedures. Hematology, oncology, and endocrinology are also specialty areas with shortages. The addition of another hospital will exacerbate those shortages at CGH. While CGH does not have a large market share in the proposed PSA of either applicant, anticipated impact from approval of either is real and substantial. A contribution margin loss of $1.2 to $2.2 million per year, as projected by Tenet’s healthcare planner, would be significant. The drain on resources, including staff and physicians, is also of significant concern. Hialeah Hospital Dr. Jorge Perez testified on behalf of Hialeah. Dr. Perez is a pathologist and medical director of laboratory at the hospital. More significantly, Dr. Perez has been on the hospital’s staff since 2001 and has served in multiple leadership roles, including chair of the Performance Improvement Council, chief of staff; and since 2015, chair of the Hialeah Hospital Governing Board. Hialeah offers obstetrics services and a Level II NICU with 12 beds. Approximately 1,400 babies a year are born there. Hialeah’s occupancy has been essentially flat for the past three years, at below 40%, and it clearly has ample excess capacity. On an average day, over 200 of Hialeah’s beds are unoccupied. Like other hospitals in the county, Hialeah has a number of competitors. The growth of managed care has affected the demand for inpatient beds and services at Hialeah. Hialeah treats Medicaid and indigent patients. Approximately 15% of Hialeah’s admissions are unfunded. As with its sister Tenet hospitals, Hialeah is a for- profit hospital that pays taxes and does not receive tax dollars for providing care to the indigent. Dr. Perez succinctly and persuasively identified a variety of reasons why no new hospital is needed in Doral. First and foremost, there is plenty of capacity at the existing hospitals in the area, including Hialeah. Second, both inpatient admissions and length of stay continue trending downward. Care continues to shift toward outpatient services, thereby reducing the demand for inpatient care. According to Dr. Perez, if a new hospital is approved in Doral it will bring with it adverse impacts on existing hospitals, including Hialeah. A new hospital in Doral will attract patients, some of which would have otherwise gone to Hialeah. Moreover, Doral has more insured patients, meaning the patients that would be lost would be good payors. There would also be a significant risk of loss of staff to a new hospital. Dr. Perez’s testimony in this regard is credible. Statutory and Rule Review Criteria In 2008, the Florida Legislature streamlined the review criteria applicable for evaluating new hospital applications. Mem’l Healthcare Grp. v. AHCA, Case No. 12- 0429CON, RO at 32 (Fla. DOAH Dec. 7, 2012). The criteria specifically eliminated included quality of care, availability of resources, financial feasibility, and the costs and methods of proposed construction. Lee Mem’l Health System v. AHCA, Case No. 13-2508CON, RO at 135 (Fla. DOAH Mar. 28, 2014). The remaining criteria applicable to new hospital projects are set forth at section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes. Section 408.035(1)(a): The need for the healthcare facilities and health services being proposed. Generally, CON applicants are responsible for demonstrating need for new acute care hospitals, typically in the context of a numeric need methodology adopted by AHCA. However, AHCA has not promulgated a numeric need methodology to calculate need for new hospital facilities. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e) provides that if no agency need methodology exists, the applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology, which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory and rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Both applicants propose to build small community hospitals providing basic acute care and OB services in the Doral area of western Miami-Dade County. Both applicants point to the increasing population and the lack of an acute care hospital in Doral as evidence of need for a hospital. The DMC application focuses largely on geographic access concerns, while the JW application is premised upon six arguments as to why JHS contends its proposed JW hospital should be approved. The lack of a hospital in Doral is not itself an indication of need.3/ In addition, population growth, and the demands of the population for inpatient hospital beds, cannot be considered in a vacuum. Sound healthcare planning requires an analysis of existing area hospitals, including the services they offer and their respective locations; how area residents travel to existing hospitals, and any barriers to access; the utilization of existing hospitals and amount of capacity they have; and other factors which may be relevant in a given case. Doral is in the west/northwest part of Miami-Dade County, in between the Miami International Airport (to the east) and the Everglades (to the west). It is surrounded by major roadways, with US Highway 27/Okeechobee Road running diagonally to the north, US Highway 836/Dolphin Expressway running along its southern edge, US Highway 826/Palmetto Expressway running north-south to the east, and the Florida Turnpike running north- south along the western edge of Doral. To the west of the Turnpike is the Everglades, where there is minimal population and very limited development possible in the future. The City of Doral itself has an area of about 15 square miles, and is only two or three times the size of the Miami International Airport, which sits just east of Doral. Much of Doral is commercial and industrial, with the largest concentration of residential areas being in the northwest part of the city. While there is unquestionably residential growth in Doral, the population of Doral is currently only about 59,000 people. Doral is not as densely populated as many areas of Miami-Dade County, has a number of golf course communities, and is generally a more affluent area with a higher average household income than much of Miami-Dade County. JW proposes to locate its hospital on the eastern side of Doral, just west of Miami International Airport, while the DMC site is on the western side of Doral, just east of the Everglades. JW’s site is located in an industrial area with few residents, while the DMC site is located in an area where future growth is likely to be limited. Both sites have downsides for development of a hospital, with both applicants spending considerable time at hearing pointing out the flaws of each other’s chosen location. Both applicants define their service areas to include the City of Doral, but also areas outside of Doral. Notably, the entire DMC service area is contained within KRMC’s existing service area, with the exception of one small area. While the population of Doral itself is only 59,000 people, there are more concentrated populations in areas outside of Doral (except to the west). However, the people in these areas are closer to existing hospitals like PGH, Hialeah, KRMC, and others. For the population inside Doral, there are several major roadways in and out of Doral, and area residents can access several existing hospitals with plenty of capacity within a 20-minute drive time, many closer than that. It was undisputed that inpatient acute care hospital use rates continue to decline. There are different reasons for this, but it was uniformly recognized that decreasing inpatient use rates, and a shift toward outpatient services, are ongoing trends in the market. These trends existed at the time of the Batch One Case. As observed by Tenet’s healthcare planner at hearing: “The occupancy is lower today than it was two years ago, the use rates are lower, and the actual utilization is lower.” Both applicants failed to establish a compelling case of need. While there is growth in the Doral area, it remains a relatively small population, and there was no evidence of community needs being unmet. Sound healthcare planning, and the statutory criteria, require consideration of existing hospitals, their availability, accessibility, and extent of utilization. These considerations weigh heavily against approval of either CON application, even more so than in the prior case. Section 408.035(1)(b): The availability, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing healthcare facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant; and Section 408.035(1)(e): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to healthcare for residents of the service district. As stated above, there are several existing hospitals in close proximity to Doral. Thus, the question is whether they are accessible and have capacity to serve the needs of patients from the Doral area. The evidence overwhelmingly answers these questions in the affirmative. Geographic access was a focal point of the DMC application, which argued that there are various barriers to access in and around Doral, such as a canal that runs parallel to US Highway 27/Okeechobee Road, train tracks and a rail yard, industrial plants, and the airport. While the presence of these things is undeniable, as is the fact that there is traffic in Miami, based upon the evidence presented, they do not present the barriers that DMC alleges. Rather, the evidence was undisputed that numerous hospitals are accessible within 20 minutes of the proposed hospital sites, and some within 10 to 15 minutes. All of Doral is within 30 minutes of multiple hospitals. These are reasonable travel times and are not indicative of a geographic access problem, regardless of any alleged “barriers.” In addition, existing hospitals clearly have the capacity to serve the Doral community, and they are doing so. Without question, there is excess capacity in the Miami-Dade County market. With approximately 7,500 hospital beds in the county running at an average occupancy just over 50%, there are around 3,500 beds available at any given time. Focusing on the hospitals closest to Doral (those accessible within 20 minutes), there are hundreds of beds that are available and accessible from the proposed service areas of the applicants. KRMC is particularly noteworthy because of its proximity to, and market share in, the Doral area. The most recent utilization and occupancy data for KRMC indicate that it has, on average, 100 vacant beds. This is more than the entire 80-bed hospital proposed in the DMC application (for a service area that is already served and subsumed by KRMC). Moreover, KRMC is expanding, and will soon have even more capacity at its location less than a 10-minute drive from the DMC site. From a programmatic standpoint, neither applicant is proposing any programs or services that are not already available at numerous existing hospitals, and, in fact, both would offer fewer programs and services than other area hospitals. As such, patients in need of tertiary or specialized services will still have to travel to other hospitals like PGH, KRMC, or JMH. Alternatively, if they present to a small hospital in Doral in need of specialized services, they will then have to be transferred to an appropriate hospital that can treat them. The same would be true for babies born at either DMC or JW in need of a NICU. Similarly, there are bypass protocols for EMS to take cardiac, stroke, and trauma patients to the closest hospital equipped to treat them, even if it means bypassing other hospitals not so equipped, like JW and DMC. Less acute patients can be transported to the closest ED. And since both applicants are building FSEDs in Doral, there will be ample access to emergency services for residents of Doral. This criterion does not weigh in favor of approval of either hospital. To the contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly established that existing hospitals are available and accessible to Doral area residents. Section 408.035(1)(e), (g) and (i): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to healthcare, the extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness, and the applicant’s past and proposed provision of healthcare services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. It goes without saying that any new hospital is going to enhance access to the people closest to its location; but as explained above, there is no evidence of an access problem, or any pressing need for enhanced access to acute care hospital services. Rather, the evidence showed that Doral area residents are within very reasonable travel times to existing hospitals, most of which have far more extensive programs and services than either applicant is proposing to offer. Indeed, the proposed DMC service area is contained within KRMC’s existing service area, and KRMC is only 10 minutes from the DMC site. Neither applicant would enhance access to tertiary or specialized services, and patients in need of those services will still have to travel to other hospitals, or worse, be transferred after presenting to a Doral hospital with more limited programs and services. Although it was not shown to be an issue, access to emergency services is going to be enhanced by the FSEDs being built by both applicants. Thus, to the extent that a new hospital would enhance access, it would be only for non-emergent patients in need of basic, non-tertiary level care. Existing hospitals are available and easily accessible to these patients. In addition, healthy competition exists between several existing providers serving the Doral area market. That healthy competition would be substantially eroded by approval of the DMC application, as HCA would likely capture a dominant share of the market. While approval of the JW application might not create a dominant market share for one provider, it would certainly not promote cost-effectiveness given the fact that it costs the system more for the same patient to receive services at a JHS hospital than other facilities. Indeed, approval of JW’s application would mean that the JW campus will have the more expensive hospital-based billing rates. Florida Medicaid diagnosis related group (DRG) payment comparisons among hospitals are relevant because both DMC and JW propose that at least 22% of their patients will be Medicaid patients. Data from the 2017-18 DRG calculator provided by the Medicaid program office was used to compare JHS to the three Tenet hospitals, KRMC, and Aventura Hospital, another EFD hospital in Miami-Dade County. The data shows that JHS receives the highest Medicaid rate enhancement per discharge for the same Medicaid patients ($2,820.06) among these six hospitals in the county. KRMC receives a modest enhancement of $147.27. Comparison of Medicaid Managed Care Reimbursement over the period of fiscal years 2014-2016 show that JHS receives substantially more Medicaid reimbursement per adjusted patient day than any of the hospitals in this proceeding, with the other hospitals receiving between one-third and one-half of JHS reimbursement. In contrast, among all of these hospitals, KRMC had the lowest rate for each of the three years covered by the data, which means KRMC (and by extension DMC) would cost the Medicaid program substantially less money for care of Medicaid patients. Under the new prospective payment system instituted by the State of Florida for Medicaid reimbursement of acute care hospital providers, for service between July 1, 2018, and March 31, 2019, JHS is the beneficiary of an automatic rate enhancement of more than $8 million. In contrast, KRMC’s rate enhancement is only between $16,000 and $17,000. Thus, it will cost the Medicaid program substantially more to treat a patient using the same services at JW than at DMC. Furthermore, rather than enhance the financial viability of the JHS system, the evidence indicates that the JW proposal will be a financial drain on the JHS system. Finally, JHS’s past and proposed provision of care to Medicaid and indigent patients is noteworthy, but not a reason to approve its proposed hospital. JW is proposing this hospital to penetrate a more affluent market, not an indigent or underserved area, and it proposes to provide Medicaid and indigent care at a level that is consistent with the existing hospitals. JHS also receives the highest Low Income Pool (LIP) payments per charity care of any system in the state, and is one of only a handful of hospital systems that made money after receipt of the LIP payments. HCA-affiliated hospitals, by comparison, incur the second greatest cost in the state for charity care taking LIP payments into consideration. Analysis of standardized net revenues per adjusted admission (NRAA) among Miami-Dade County acute care hospitals, a group of 16 hospitals, shows JHS to be either the second or the third highest hospital in terms of NRAA. KRMC, in contrast, part of the EFD/HCA hospitals, is about 3% below the average of the 16 hospitals for NRAA. DMC’s analysis of standardized NRAA using data from 2014, 2015, and 2016, among acute care hospitals receiving local government tax revenues, shows JHS receives more net revenue than any of the other hospitals in this grouping. Using data from FY 2014 to FY 2016, DMC compared hospital costs among the four existing providers that are parties to this proceeding and JMH as a representative of JHS. Standardizing for case mix, fiscal year end, and location, an analysis of costs per adjusted admission shows that the hospitals other than JMH have an average cost of between a half and a third of JMH’s average cost. The same type of analysis of costs among a peer group of eight statutory teaching hospitals shows JHS’s costs to be the highest. It should also be noted that if JW were to fail or experience significant losses from operations, the taxpayers of Miami-Dade County will be at risk. In contrast, if DMC were to fail financially, EFD/HCA will shoulder the losses. When the two applications are evaluated in the context of the above criteria, the greater weight of the evidence does not mitigate in favor of approval of either. However, should AHCA decide to approve one of the applicants in its final order, preference should be given to DMC because of its lower costs per admission for all categories of payors, and in particular, the lower cost to the Florida Medicaid Program. In addition, the risk of financial failure would fall upon EFD/HCA, rather than the taxpayers of Miami-Dade County. Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e): Need considerations. Many of the considerations enumerated in rule 59C- 1.008(2)(e) overlap with the statutory criteria, but there are certain notable trends and market conditions that warrant mention. Specifically, while the population of Doral is growing, it remains relatively small, and does not itself justify a new hospital. And while there are some more densely populated areas outside of the city of Doral, they are much closer to existing hospitals having robust services and excess capacity. Doral is a more affluent area, and there was no evidence of any financial or cultural access issues supporting approval of either CON application. The availability, utilization, and quality of existing hospitals are clearly not issues, as there are several existing hospitals with plenty of capacity accessible to Doral area residents. In terms of medical treatment trends, it was undisputed that use rates for inpatient hospital services continue trending downward, and that trend is expected to continue. Concomitantly, there is a marked shift toward outpatient services in Miami-Dade County and elsewhere. Finally, both applicants are proposing to provide OB services without a NICU, which is below the standard in the market. While not required for the provision of obstetrics, NICU backup is clearly the most desirable and best practice. For the foregoing reasons, the considerations in rule 59C-1.008(2)(e) do not weigh in favor of approval of either hospital.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Healthcare Administration enter a final order denying East Florida-DMC, Inc.’s CON Application No. 10432 and denying The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Florida, d/b/a Jackson Hospital West’s CON Application No. 10433. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), should grant the application of the Petitioner, RHPC, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Hospital (Riverside), for a certificate of need, CON Action No. 6582, for the addition of 31 acute care beds.
Findings Of Fact The Applicant and the Application. The applicant, the Petitioner, RHPC, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Hospital (Riverside), is a 102 bed acute care hospital 1/ located at 6600 Madison Street, New Port Richey, Florida, in the West Pasco County Subdistrict of HRS Service District 5, which also includes Pinellas County and East Pasco County. Included among its complement of beds are 14 obstetrical (OB) beds. There are no existing pediatric beds. Riverside's application is for a certificate of need to spend approximately $2,000,000 to renovate its existing OB unit, add 14 beds to the OB unit, add 11 medical/surgical beds and add six pediatric beds. The addition of the pediatric unit will be accomplished by relatively minor alterations to existing space and existing beds, and the cost attributable to this phase of the application is negligible. Similarly, the 11 additional med/surg beds will be accomplished by adding beds to existing private rooms, to create semi-private rooms, at a cost of only approximately $44,000. (Gas and electric lines for the additional beds already have been run to the headwall of these rooms and can be connected without difficulty or much expense.) Most of the $2 million total capital expenditure proposed in the application is attributable to the cost of modernizing the OB unit, with the addition of 14 beds in the process. The addition of 14 beds to the unit does not add significantly to what the modernization effort would cost without the addition of the 14 beds. The proposed new OB unit would include private rooms, to go along with the semi-private rooms that make up the existing 14-bed unit. In addition, the proposed modernized 28-bed OB unit would consist of the combined labor/delivery/recovery/post-partum (LDRP) rooms now preferred by most patients. Pertinent State Health Plan Provision. The 1989 State of Florida Health Plan states at the outset of a list of preferences to be utilized in comparing applications for additional acute care beds: No additional acute care beds should generally be approved unless the subdistrict occupancy rate is at or exceeds 75 percent, or, in the event of an existing facility, an applicant shall demonstrate that the occupancy rate for the most recent 12 months is at or exceeds 80 percent. The Need Methodology. Using the F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038 methodology, the district and subdistrict would show numeric need of approximately 201 and 230, respectively. See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(5). Regardless of the calculated bed need, HRS does not normally approve additional beds in a subdistrict unless the annual average acute care bed occupancy rate is 75 percent or higher during the 12-month base period of July, 1989, through June, 1990. See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(d). The 670 licensed beds in the West Pasco Subdistrict reported only 68.92% occupancy during the 12- month base period, resulting in no projected need for additional acute care beds in the subdistrict for the applicable 1996 planning horizon. Even when a subdistricts's need for additional acute care beds projected by the methodology is zero, an application by an existing hospital still may be approved where that hospital's annual average occupancy rate exceeds 75 percent for the 12-month base period (again, in this case, from July, 1989, through June, 1990.) See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(e). During the 12-month base period from July, 1989, through June, 1990, Riverside's occupancy averaged 72.40%, not high enough to be approved under F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(e). Observation Bed Days. Three types of beds days are included in a category of so-called "outpatient observation bed days." First, "twenty-three hour patients" are patients who are not eligible for inpatient services under the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) criteria for the Medicare program. Second, "observation patients" are similar non-Medicare patients. Third, some outpatients (or ambulatory surgery patients) also use beds for part of a day. With new cost containment and review/regulation developments in hospital care, more patients are spending up to 23 hours in the hospital before a decision is made that further hospitalization in not needed. As a result, "observation" bed use has increased. Outpatient observation services have been recognized and defined by HCFA. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida (the Medicare intermediary) and the Health Care Cost Containment Board (HCCCB) have addressed issues such as reimbursement, billing and reporting of observation beds. Services are provided to "observation bed" patients under doctor's orders, including diagnostic services, observation and monitoring by nursing personnel and/or medical intervention or treatment. Calculation of occupancy rates under the HRS need methodology does not take into account the so-called "observation bed days." 2/ There was no evidence that any part of District V or the West Pasco Subdistrict are inaccessible geographically. Other Need Factors. The evidence showed that there is a seasonal peak utilization and occupancy of acute care beds in District V and in the West Pasco Subdistrict during approximately October or November through March or April each year. This seasonal peak is reflected by the statistics. As previously stated, Riverside's occupancy averaged 72.40% during the period from July, 1989, through June, 1990. During the first quarter of 1990, occupancy was 86.83%. Riverside's average occupancy for calendar year 1990 was 73.87%. For the period from March, 1990, through February, 1991, average occupancy for Riverside's acute care beds was 71.2%. 3/ For the period from March, 1990, through February, 1991, occupancy for Riverside's obstetrics beds was 92.9%. There is no acute care pediatric unit in the West Pasco subdistrict. Subdistrict residents (as well as others in Riverside's general service area) needing level II pediatric services generally go to a Pinellas County or East Pasco County hospital for them. Given the choice, some but not all of these patients likely would prefer to get these services at Riverside, depending primarily on the severity of the particular medical needs. But the evidence did not quantify the number predicted to switch to Riverside. Also, occupancy of pediatric beds in Pasco county was less than 15% during 1987 and 1988. Medical Care for the Poor. The State Health Plan also notes that the uncompensated care burden on hospitals has grown during the 1980s because of a growing number of low-income persons; simultaneously, the proportion of persons covered by Medicaid has dropped. Numerous statewide studies, moreover, have shown that hospitals' uncompensated care is increasing at the same time that their ability to absorb the cost of care is decreasing. Riverside's predecessor bought the hospital from Pasco County in 1982. As a condition to the purchase, Riverside's predecessor agreed to provide Medicaid and indigent care for Pasco County in perpetuity. When Riverside purchased the hospital on December 29, 1983, it assumed the contractual obligation to provide Medicaid and indigent care in perpetuity. Riverside is a disproportionate share provider within the meaning of the State and local health plans. Approximately, 13% of Riverside's total annual patient days are for Medicaid patients. In 1990, 2,647 of Riverside's obstetrical, and 4,272 of its non-obstetrical patient days, were Medicaid. Riverside's charity care deduction from gross patient revenue for fiscal year 1990 was 1.07% of gross patient revenue. Riverside's Medicaid deduction from gross patient revenue for fiscal year 1990 was 5.96% of gross patient revenue. Approximately, 14.8% of Riversides's services go to Medicaid and indigent patients. Although Riverside has only 14% of the beds in the West Pasco subdistrict, it does more than 90% of the non-emergency, non-OB Medicaid care. Approval of the Riverside application would enable Riverside to spread its administrative and overhead costs over a larger base, thereby reducing average charges. Approval of the Riverside application also would make Riverside more profitable and thereby better able to absorb the cost of the Medicaid and indigent care it provides. If Riverside converts existing acute care beds to pediatric or OB beds, it probably would have to squeeze out paying patients during seasonal occupancy peaks, thereby losing more revenue and profits. Competition. If the Riverside application is approved, Riverside's share of the market represented by the West Pasco subdistrict will rise from approximately 14% to approximately 18%. HCA controls the rest of the market. There are no existing OB beds in the West Pasco subdistrict other than at Riverside. The HCA hospital in New Port Richey had an OB unit which it recently abandoned. As a result of the grant of Bayonet Point's application, CON Action No. 6583, with which Riverside had been in direct competition in this application review cycle, Bayonet Point now is approved for a seven-bed OB unit as part of its bed complement. Upgrading its existing OB unit and adding 14 more OB beds will enable Riverside to capture more private paying patients, which will better enable it to compete with the HCA hospitals. At present, Riverside's OB unit is utilized almost exclusively by indigent and Medicaid patients because of the hospital's contract with Pasco County. This unit now is operating at close to absolute capacity. With the upgrades and additional beds, Riverside can work to capture some private pay patients; without them, Bayonet Point will capture the private pay patients. Financial Feasibility. Riverside operated at a deficit from 1983 essentially to the present. By the end of 1990, Riverside had accumulated a deficit of $8.8 million. Riverside's corporate parent, American Healthcare Management, Inc. (AHM), was funding the deficit. From 1985 through December, 1989, AHM was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. During that time period, there was legitimate concern whether AHM would be able to continue to fund Riverside deficits. AHM emerged from bankruptcy in December, 1989, stronger financially. It has since become stronger still. AHM reduced its debt by approximately $88 million. Part of the debt reduction was achieved by the sale of $43 million of underperforming assets. In addition, $45 million of bond debt was exchanged for common stock on September 30, 1991. The interest savings on the bond-for-stock exchange is $6 million a year. As a result, AHM's current debt-to-equity ratio is approximately $160 million to $130 million. AHM's corporate staff has been reduced from about 102 to 65. Its corporate office were transferred from expensive quarters in Dallas, Texas, to less expensive quarters in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Corporate expenses have been greatly reduced as a result. Accounts receivable have been reduced by better collection methods, and the $43 million of assets sold to reduce corporate debt had been underperforming. AHM had $21 million cash and short-term investments as of December 31, 1989. As of the date of the final hearing, it had $18 million cash and short- term investments. Riverside's gross margin (profit) for the first nine months of 1991 was $4 million. After depreciation, amortization, and interest and home office costs, Riverside generated approximately $1.2 million for the first nine months of 1991. Internal cash flow generated by AHM and Riverside would be sufficient to finance Riverside's application project. Since the capital costs of Riverside's proposed project are relatively small, financial feasibility is relatively easy to achieve. Besides costing relatively little, the 31 new beds will not increase intercompany interest or management fees significantly. In addition, the 31 new beds would enable Riverside to better compete for private pay patients. Given the expected utilization of the new beds, the proposed project will be to the financial benefit of the applicant. The pro forma bears this out. It projects 75.11% occupancy for the 31 new beds in the second year of operation (July, 1994, to June, 1995). (This projection does not include expected "observation bed days.") A profit of $2,477,199 for the 31 beds is projected for the second year of operation (not counting any portion of the preexisting intercompany interest or management fees).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Riverside application for a certificate of need, CON Action No. 6582, for the addition of 31 acute care beds. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1992.
The Issue The issue is whether Hialeah Hospital, Inc. may be licensed for a 21-bed psychiatric unit, without first obtaining a certificate of need, on the basis that it provided psychiatric services before a certificate of need was statutorily required.
Findings Of Fact Background of the Controversy The Parties The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (the Department) is responsible for determining whether health care projects are subject to review under the Health Facility and Services Development Act, Sections 381.701- 381.715, Florida Statutes. It also licenses hospitals under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes. The Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities renders decisions about requests for grandfather status which would exempt a psychiatric service offered at hospital from certificate of need review. The Department's Office of Licensure and Certification issues licenses but does not grant grandfather exemptions. A hospital will not receive separate licensure for psychiatric beds unless a certificate of need has been obtained for those beds, or the beds are in a psychiatric unit which had been organized before certificate of need review was required. See Section 381.704(2), Florida Statutes (1987). A hospital can provide inpatient psychiatric services to a patient in one of three ways: a) as a patient housed among the general hospital population, b) as a patient housed in a special unit organized within the hospital and staffed by doctors, nurses and other personnel especially to serve patients with psychiatric diagnoses, or c) in a hospital organized as a psychiatric specialty hospital. Serving patients through methods b and c requires special certificate of need approval and licensure. Most community hospitals place psychiatric patients among the general patient population; few hospitals create a distinct psychiatric unit; fewer hospitals still specialize as psychiatric hospitals. Hialeah Hospital, Inc. is a 411-bed general hospital in Hialeah, Florida. It does not currently hold a certificate of need for licensure of a distinct psychiatric unit. As a result, its reimbursement for psychiatric services from the Federal government for Medicare patients is limited. The Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) generally reimburses hospitals for services based upon flat rates which are paid according to categories known as diagnostic related groups. Hialeah Hospital now receives reimbursement for services it renders to psychiatric patients on this basis. If it is entitled to a grandfather exemption from certificate of need review, and its distinct psychiatric unit is separately licensed by the Department, Hialeah Hospital will receive cost-based reimbursement for services to psychiatric patients, which will result in higher income to the hospital. Approval of the grandfathering request will not result in a) any capital expenditure by the hospital, b) the addition of staff, or c) a change in the type of services currently offered at the hospital. Just before July 1, 1983, the hospital had an average daily census of 16-17 psychiatric patients. If the psychiatric services the hospital has offered do not qualify for grandfathering, Hialeah Hospital may apply for a certificate of need for a distinct psychiatric unit. Even without a psychiatric certificate of need, Hialeah is still entitled to continue to serve patients with psychiatric diagnoses among its general population, and to receive the lower diagnostic related group reimbursement for those services from HCFA. Palmetto General Hospital is a licensed general hospital with 312 acute care beds and 48 separately licensed psychiatric short-term beds operated as a distinct psychiatric unit. It is located near Hialeah Hospital, and both hospitals serve the same geographic area. The primary markets of both hospitals overlap. They compete for patients, including psychiatric patients. Agency Action Under Review From 1973 to 1979 the license issued to Hialeah Hospital by the Department bore a designation for 21 psychiatric beds, based on information submitted in the hospital's licensure application. The hospital then dropped the psychiatric bed count from its licensure applications. This change probably was caused by a problem generated by an announcement from the Northwest Dade Community Health Center, Inc., the receiving facility for psychiatric emergencies in northwestern Dade County, which includes Hialeah. That center had written to the Hialeah Police Department, informing the police that when the center was not open, it had a crisis worker at the Hialeah Hospital emergency room, and that persons needing involuntary psychiatric hospitalization should be taken to the Hialeah Hospital emergency room. The only other hospital in Hialeah treating psychiatric patients was Palmetto General Hospital, which did not accept, as a general rule, patients who could not pay for care. The Hialeah Police Department thereafter began dropping psychiatric patients at Hialeah Hospital, much to the distress of the Hialeah Hospital emergency room staff. The Hospital thereafter dropped the designation of any of its beds as psychiatric beds on its annual licensure applications. It still received psychiatric patients from Jackson Memorial Hospital when that hospital reached its capacity for psychiatric patients. On its 1980 licensure application Hialeah Hospital collapsed all of its medical, surgical and psychiatric beds into a single figure. This was consistent with its practice of serving medical, surgical and psychiatric patients throughout the hospital. Hialeah Hospital filed similar licensure applications in 1981, 1982, 1983. In 1984 there was a dispute over the total number of beds to be licensed, which was resolved in early 1985. In 1985, after a change in the licensing statute which is discussed below, the Department informed Hialeah Hospital that its application for licensure was incomplete and could not be processed until Hialeah explained its basis for seeking separate licensure for 20 short-term psychiatric beds. In its response, Hialeah's Vice President stated: [W]e felt it was appropriate to indicate that Hialeah Hospital did accept psychiatric admissions. These patients have been randomly placed in the institution, many times based on other primary or secondary diagnoses. The application indicates bed usage, not that it is currently a discrete unit. Hialeah Hospital does currently have a Letter of Intent [on file] for establishment of a discrete med/psych unit. Hialeah Ex. 24a On August 1, 1985, the Department's Office of Licensure and Certification informed Hialeah Hospital by certified mail that the application for licensure of 20 short-term psychiatric beds was denied for failure to have obtained a certificate of need for them or to have obtained an exemption from review [both could only come from the Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities]. The hospital was provided a clear point of entry to challenge this determination through a proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, but Hialeah filed no petition for review of that decision. Instead, Hialeah pursued the certificate of need application which it had filed in April, 1985 for separately licensed psychiatric beds. There was no reason to challenge the August 1, 1985, denial because the factual bases alleged by the Department were true--the hospital had no certificate of need for psychiatric beds and had not yet asked the Department's Office of Community Health Facilities to decide whether Hialeah qualified for grandfathered beds. On October 21 and 23, 1986, Hialeah Hospital wrote to the Office of Community Health Facilities seeking a determination that it was entitled to have 21 pyschiatric beds grandfathered on its license. In certificate of need application 4025 Hialeah Hospital sought the establishment of a distinct 69 bed psychiatric unit at Hialeah, with separately licensed beds. The application went to hearing and was denied on its merits on February 17, 1987, in DOAH Case 85-3998. In his recommended order, the Hearing Officer discussed the issue of whether Hialeah Hospital was exempt from certificate of need review because it already had a psychiatric unit. He found that the issue was not appropriately raised in the proceeding before him, which was Hialeah Hospital's own application for a certificate of need to establish a psychiatric unit. He therefore found he lacked jurisdiction to consider the grandfathering issue. Hialeah Hospital v. HRS, 9 FALR 2363, 2397, paragraph 5 (HRS 1987). The Department adopted that ruling in its May 1, 1987, final order. Id. at 2365. A letter dated December 5, 1986, from the Office of Community Medical Facilities denied Hialeah's request to grandfather 21 short-term psychiatric beds on its license and thereby exempt them from certificate of need review, as requested in Hialeah's letters of October 21 and 23, 1986. The Department denied the grandfathering request for four reasons: When the Department conducted a physical plant survey on June 1, 1980, there were no psychiatric beds in operation at the hospital; The hospital bed count verification form returned to the Department on January 31, 1984 by the Director of Planning for Hialeah, Gene Samnuels, indicated that the hospital had no psychiatric beds; An inventory of psychiatric beds had been published by the Department in the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 17, 1984 which showed that Hialeah Hospital had no psychiatric beds, and Hialeah never contested that inventory; The Department had not received evidence demonstrating that psychiatric services were provided "in a separately set up and staffed unit between 1980 and 1985." This letter again gave Hialeah a point of entry to challenge the Department's decision to deny licensure of psychiatric beds and it was the genesis of Hialeah's petition initiating this case. It is significant that the Department's Office of Community Health Facilities gave Hialeah a clear point of entry to challenge the December 5, 1986, grandfathering denial with full knowledge that the Department's Office of Licensure and Certification had denied a request from Hialeah Hospital on August 1, 1985, to endorse psychiatric beds on Hialeah's 1985 license. The Departmental personnel knew that those two denials involved different issues. Once the Office of Licensure and Certification told the hospital it had to produce either a certificate of need or a grandfathering approval to have psychiatric beds endorsed on its license, the hospital had to turn to the Office of Community Health Facilities to get a ruling on its grandfathering claim. The letter of December 5, 1986, was the first ruling on the merits of Hialeah Hospital's claim that it was entitled to have 21 beds grandfathered. History of the Department's Specialty Bed Recognition Psychiatric Beds in Florida Hospitals Before July 1, 1983 Before April 1, 1983 no state statute or Department rule required that psychiatric beds in a hospital be located in physically distinct units. Psychiatric patients could be located throughout a hospital. They were not required to be placed in rooms having distinguishing characteristics, or to use group therapy rooms, dining rooms, or other rooms exclusively dedicated to use by psychiatric patients. There were, of course, hospitals that had distinct psychiatric units, and some entire hospitals which were specifically licensed as psychiatric hospitals. After 1983, a hospital had to obtain a certificate of need to organize what had previously been diffuse psychiatric services into a distinct unit dedicated to serving patients with psychiatric diagnoses. Today no special certificate of need is required to serve psychiatric patients in the general hospital population, but without separate licensure the hospital receives Medicare reimbursement from the federal government for psychiatric patients at the level established by the diagnostic related groups, not cost based reimbursement. Before July 1, 1983 annual hospital licensure application forms asked hospitals to identify their number of psychiatric beds as an item of information. The hospital licenses issued, however, were based on the hospital's total number of general medical-surgical beds, a category which included psychiatric beds. The 1983 Amendments to the Florida Statutes and the Department's Rules on Specialty Beds In April of 1983, the Department adopted a rule which established a separate need methodology for short-term psychiatric beds, Rule 10-5.11(1)(o), Florida Administrative Code. Thereafter, the Legislature amended the statutes governing the hospital licensing, Section 395.003, Florida Statutes (1983) by adding a new subsection (4) which read: The Department shall issue a license which specifies the number of hospital beds on the face of the license. The number of beds for the rehabilitation or psychiatric service category for which the Department has adopted by rule a specialty bed need methodology under s. 381.494 shall be specified on the face of the hospital license. All beds which are not covered by any specialty bed need methodology shall be specified as general beds. Section 4, Chapter 83-244, Laws of Florida (underlined language was added). In the same Act, the Legislature amended the planning law to require hospitals to apply for certificates of need to change their number of psychiatric and rehabilitation beds. Section 2, Chapter 83-244, Laws of Florida, codified as Section 381.494(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1983). The Department's rules defined short-term psychiatric services as: [A] category of services which provide a 24- hour a day therapeutic milieu for persons suffering from mental health problems which are so severe and acute that they need intensive, full-time care. Acute psychiatric inpatient care is defined as a service not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and a stay of 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. Rule 10- 5.11(25)(a), Florida Administrative Code (1983), effective April 7, 1983. A minimum size for any new psychiatric unit was prescribed in Rule 10- 5.11(25)(d)7., which states: In order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost, short-term inpatient psychiatric hospital based services should have at least 15 designated beds. Applicants proposing to build a new but separate psychiatric acute care facility and intending to apply for a specialty hospital license should have a minimum of 50 beds. After the effective date of the rule, April 7, 1983, no hospital could organize its psychiatric services into a distinct psychiatric unit using specialized staff unless the unit would have at least 15 beds. This did not mean that a hospital which already had organized a distinct psychiatric unit using specialized staff had to have at least 15 beds in its unit to continue operation. Whatever the number of beds, whether fewer or greater than 15, that number had to appear on the face of the hospital's license. Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes (1983). To change that number, the hospital had to go through the certificate of need process. Section 381.494(1)(g) Florida Statutes (1983). Those hospitals whose pre-existing units were endorsed on their licenses can be said to have had those units "grandfathered". There is no specific statutory exemption from certificate of need review for pre-existing units, but such treatment is implicit in the regulatory scheme. The Department's Grandfather Review Process To know which hospitals were entitled to continue to operate discrete psychiatric units without obtaining a certificate of need, the Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities had to identify hospitals which had separate psychiatric units before the July 1, 1983, effective date of Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes (1983). An inventory of beds in the existing psychiatric units also was necessary to process new certificate of need applications. The Department's rule methodology authorized additional beds in psychiatric units based upon a projected need of 15 beds per 10,000 population. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)1., Florida Administrative Code (1983). The Legislature approved the psychiatric service categories which the Department had already adopted by rule when it enacted Section 4 of Chapter 83- 244, Laws of Florida. The Legislature thereby validated a process the Department had initiated in 1976 with its Task Force on Institutional Needs. That group had developed methodologies to be used throughout the state to determine the need for different types of medical services, because local health systems agencies were reviewing CON applications based upon idiosyncratic methodologies. To develop review criteria for psychiatric services, the Task Force had to both define psychiatric services and determine how it should measure them. In doing so, the Department looked for assistance to publications of entities such as the American Hospital Association and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. According to the American Hospital Association, psychiatric services are services delivered in beds set up and staffed in units specifically designated for psychiatric services. In the Task Force report, a psychiatric bed was defined as: A bed in a clinical care unit located in a short-term, acute care hospital or psychiatric hospital which is not used to provide long-term institutional care and which is suitably equipped and staffed to provide evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment of persons with emotional disturbances. An inpatient care unit or clinical care unit is a group of inpatient beds and related facilities and assigned personnel in which care is provided to a defined and limited class of patients according to their particular care needs. HRS Exhibit 14 at 92 and 1-5. The definition of a psychiatric bed in the Report of the Department Task Force on Institutional Needs is compatible with the requirements of the Florida Hospital Cost Containment Board in its Florida Hospital Uniform Reporting Manual. Reports made by hospitals to the Hospital Cost Containment Board include information about services provided in separately organized, staffed and equipped hospital units. The information provided to the Board assisted the Department in determining which Florida hospitals already were providing psychiatric services in separately organized, staffed and equipped hospital units before separate licensure became necessary. The Department surveyed hospitals to determine the number of existing beds in distinct psychiatric units. It also looked to old certificates of need which referenced psychiatric services at hospitals, reports hospitals had made to the Florida Hospital Cost Containment Board, to past licensure applications the Department had received from hospitals, and to the Department's 1980 physical plant survey. These sources of information were, however, imperfect, for the reasons which follow: 1. Certificates of Need Issued 22. Before July 1, 1983, certificates of need were required for the initiation of new services which involved capital expenditures above a certain threshold dollar amount. Hospitals which had a long-standing psychiatric units would have had no occasion to request a certificate of need for psychiatric services. Review of certificates issued would not turn up a hospital with a mature psychiatric service. 2. Hospital Cost Containment Board Information 23. The reports from hospitals during the early years of the Hospital Cost Containment Board are not entirely reliable, because the hospitals did not yet have uniform accounting systems in place, despite the Board's attempt to establish uniform accounting methods through its reporting system manual. Hospitals commonly made errors in their reports. If the reports were prepared correctly, they would identify hospitals with discrete psychiatric units. Hialeah's HCCB Reports for 1981, 1982 and 1983 indicated that the hospital had no active psychiatric staff, no psychiatric beds and no psychiatric services. 3. Departmental Survey Letters 24. In Spring, 1983, the Department tried to verify the existing inventory of beds for specialty services such as psychiatric services, comprehensive medical rehabilitation services and substance abuse services. There is no record, however, that this survey letter was sent to Hialeah Hospital. In late 1983 or early 1984, the Department again attempted to establish inventories for psychiatric beds and rehabilitation beds. It distributed a cover letter and a form entitled "Hospital Bed Count Verification", which asked hospitals to confirm the Department's preliminary count of the hospital's "number of licensed beds". Hialeah's planner returned the form verifying that Hialeah Hospital was licensed for 411 "acute general" beds and that it had no short or long term psychiatric beds. The answer was correct, for that is the figure which appeared on Hialeah's license at that time. The Department did not ask the hospitals for an average daily census of short-term psychiatric patients. The cover letter for the survey form told hospital administrators that the Department was seeking to verify its preliminary bed count for services for which a special bed need methodology had been established, viz., long and short term psychiatric beds, substance abuse beds and comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds. The cover letter drew attention to the Department's intention to use the data collected from the responses to the form as a beginning inventory for short-term psychiatric beds. The cover letter also cautioned hospitals that when completing the form, they should "keep in mind the service definitions". Copies of the definitions were attached to the form. The appropriate inference to be drawn from the answer given by Hialeah Hospital to the survey form was that in January, 1984, the hospital had no beds organized into a short term psychiatric unit. This is consistent with the later letter from the hospital's vice president quoted in Finding of Fact 6, above. The Department published on February 17, 1984, its base inventory of psychiatric and rehabilitation beds in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The publication stated that "any hospital wishing to change the number of beds dedicated to one of the specific bed types listed will first be required to obtain a certificate of need." 10 Florida Administrative Weekly at 493. Hialeah was shown as having no psychiatric beds. Id. at 498. The notice did not specifically inform the hospitals of the right to petition for a formal hearing to challenge the inventory figures published. 4. Licensure Files 25. Although, the Department's licensure application form listed "psychiatric" as a possible hospital bed utilization category before 1983, these categories were set up for informational purposes only. No definitions were given to hospitals describing how beds should be allocated among the categories available on the form, making those figures unreliable. Before 1980 Hialeah Hospital had listed psychiatric beds on its licensure applications, see Finding of Fact 5, above. Since 1980 it listed no psychiatric beds. 5. Physical Plant Survey The Department performed a physical plant survey in 1980 to determine the total number of beds in service at each hospital. That survey did not attempt to make distinctions between different types of services listed on the survey form. The Department's architect who performed the survey did not attempt to evaluate the quality or intensity of the psychiatric services provided at any hospital. Each of the types of information the Department examined to determine the existing inventory of short-term psychiatric beds in 1983 had weaknesses, and no single source is dispositive. It is difficult to credit the assertion that Hialeah Hospital had a distinct psychiatric unit before July, 1983 which was not reflected in any of these sources of information. The use of multiple sources of information served as a cross-check on information from each source. It is understandable that Hialeah would not have applied for a certificate of need to operate a separate psychiatric unit. Before 1983, no such application was needed if the establishment of the unit entailed an expenditure of money below a threshold amount. All of its reports to the Hospital Cost Containment Board, however, indicate that there was no separate psychiatric service at the hospital and that the hospital had no active psychiatric staff. With respect to the Department's survey letters, while the 1984 survey form itself did not specifically inform hospital administrators that their responses would be used to establish a base inventory of psychiatric beds, the cover letter did make that clear. This should have put the hospital's planner, who filled out the form, on notice that if Hialeah had a discrete, short-term psychiatric service the number of beds in that unit should be listed. What is perhaps the most significant point is that the hospital reported no psychiatric beds on its licensure application at all from 1980 to 1985. Medical doctors in general practice can and do treat psychiatric patients, in addition to doctors who specialize in psychiatry. No doubt patients commonly were admitted to the hospital who had primary diagnoses of psychiatric illnesses. The hospital's licensure filings, however, since 1979 fail to record any psychiatric beds. This is important evidence that the hospital did not regard itself as having any distinct unit organized to provide psychiatric care. The Hospital's 1985 correspondence from the Hospital's vice president to the Department, quoted in Finding of Fact 6 confirms this. The failure to list any psychiatric beds at Hialeah on the Department's 1980 physical plant survey is not significant, since determining the number of psychiatric beds was not the focus of that survey. It is true that the Department never conducted site visits at all hospitals to determine whether they had a) distinct psychiatric units, b) psychiatric medical directors, c) written psychiatric admission and treatment policies, or d) psychiatric policy and procedures manuals. The efforts the Department did make to establish the beginning inventory of psychiatric beds were reasonable, however Hialeah Hospital's Licensure History and Efforts to Obtain Grandfather Status The entries on Hialeah's applications for annual licensure from the Department are cataloged above, and need not be repeated. During the years 1980-84, after it ceased listing psychiatric beds on its licensure application, psychiatric services were still being provided to patients throughout the hospital. In 1984, the hospital engaged in correspondence with the Department over the appropriate number of licensed beds for the hospital as a whole. Ultimately the hospital and the Department agreed that 411 beds should be licensed. In its 1985 licensure application, Hialeah then requested that 20 short-term psychiatric beds be listed on the license. The Office of Licensure and Certification questioned this. Ultimately, the Office of Licensure and Certification refused to endorse those 20 psychiatric beds on the license because there was no certificate of need on file for them, nor any statement from the Office of Community Medical Facilities granting the hospital an exemption from that licensure requirement. Hialeah Hospital did not challenge that decision in a proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The discussions between the hospital and the Department's Office of Community Medical Facilities continued, and by late October, 1986, Hialeah requested the Department to approve 21 short-term psychiatric beds at the facility, and sent the Department backup material which it believed justified a grandfather determination. After review, the Department denied the grandfather request by letter dated December 5, 1986. The Department's Action Regarding Other Grandfathering Requests Hialeah's is not the first request the Department received for grandfathering beds. After June of 1983, when the Legislature required CON approval for hospitals to change their number of psychiatric or rehabilitation beds, a number of institutions made similar requests. 1. Comprehensive Medical Rehabilitation Beds The rule on comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds was developed by the Department at the same time as the rule on psychiatric beds. The Department used a similar process to determine the existing inventory of both types of beds. The Department determined that preexisting comprehensive medical rehabilitation units at Parkway General Hospital, Naples Community Hospital, Orlando Regional Medical Center, Holy Cross Hospital, and University Community Hospital entitled those facilities to grandfathering of their comprehensive medical rehabilitation services. The Department has also determined that a preexisting distinct psychiatric unit at Palmetto General Hospital entitled that institution to grandfather status for its psychiatric beds. Parkway General Parkway General Hospital did not specify rehabilitation beds on its licensure applications for the years 1980 through 1984. The Department denied Parkway's request for endorsement of 12 comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds on its 1985 license because Parkway had not obtained a certificate of need for them or an exemption from review. The Department thereafter determined that Parkway had been providing comprehensive medical rehabilitation services before June, 1983 in a physically distinct and separately staffed unit consisting of 12 beds. It then endorsed 12 beds on Parkway's license, even though the rule which became effective in July, 1983 would require a minimum unit size of 20 beds for any hospital organizing a new comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit. See Rule 10-5.011(24), Florida Administrative Code. Naples Community Hospital The Department granted Naples Community Hospital a grandfather exemption for its rehabilitation beds in February, 1987. In had not listed the rehabilitation beds on its license application for the years 1983-1985, had not returned the Department's bed count verification form, nor did it challenge the bed count which the Department published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The hospital had applied for and received a certificate of need in January of 1981 to establish a 22-bed rehabilitation unit and that unit began operation in late 1982. The Department ultimately determined that the hospital had provided rehabilitation services in a physically distinct unit and the services were organized and delivered in a manner consistent with applicable regulatory standards. It granted a grandfather request in February, 1987. Orlando Regional Medical Center A grandfather exemption for 16 rehabilitation beds was granted to Orlando Medical Center in 1986. The 16-bed brain injury unit had been authorized by the Department through certificate of need number 2114 before the Department had adopted its rule governing comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds in 1983. The services were provided in a physically distinct unit. The Department determined the 20-bed minimum size for a new unit did not apply to a unit which qualified for grandfathering. Holy Cross Hospital The Department granted a grandfather exemption for comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds to Holy Cross Hospital after a proceeding was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings to require the Department to recognize the existence of a 20-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation center. The Department determined by a site visit that Holy Cross had established a separate unit, probably in 1974, long before the Department's comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit rule became effective in July, 1983. The unit had its own policy manual, quality assurance reports, patient screening criteria, and minutes of multidisciplinary team staff conferences. The hospital had neglected to report the unit in its filings with the Hospital Cost Containment Board but the hospital contended that it never treated the unit as a separate unit for accounting purposes, and had not understood the need to report the unit as a distinct one under Hospital Cost Containment Board reporting guidelines. The hospital corrected its reporting oversight. The grandfathering is consistent with the hospital's actual establishment of the unit long before the Department's rules went into effect. University Community Hospital A dispute over whether to grandfather a comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit which went through a Chapter 120 administrative hearing and entry of a final order involved University Community Hospital (UCH). The Department initially determined that the nine comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds at UCH had been in existence before July, 1983 and were exempt from certificate of need review. That decision was challenged in a formal administrative proceeding by a competing hospital, Tampa General. The competitor was successful, for both the Hearing Officer in the recommended order and the Department in the final order determined that University Community Hospital's 9 bed rehabilitation unit was not entitled to be grandfathered. University Community Hospital v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 11 FALR 1150 (HRS Feb. 14, 1989). In determining that grandfathering was inappropriate, the Department found that the hospital had not prepared separate policies and procedures for its rehabilitation unit before the rule on comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds became effective, and that the unit did not have a physical therapy room on the same floor as the patients. The beds supposedly dedicated to rehabilitative care were mixed with non- rehabilitative beds, so that a semiprivate room might have one bed used for rehabilitative care and another for an unrelated type of care. This conflicted with the requirement that the rehabilitation unit be physically distinct, with all patients and support services located on the same area or floor, rather than scattered throughout the hospital. The Department also determined that many hospitals offer physical therapy, occupational therapy, or speech therapy, but that to qualify as a comprehensive medical rehabilitation center, these services had to be coordinated in a multidisciplinary approach to the patient's needs, which had not been the case at University Community Hospital. The common strand running through the grandfathering decisions on comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds is that grandfathering is appropriate when a hospital demonstrates that before the comprehensive medical rehabilitation rule became effective in July, 1983, it had a separate unit which met the standards and criteria for a comprehensive medical rehabilitation unit (other than the minimum size for new units). Psychiatric Beds Tampa General Hospital Only two cases involve a decision on whether psychiatric services at a hospital qualify for grandfathering. Tampa General Hospital, which was owned by the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, operated 93 psychiatric beds in 1981, 71 at Hillsborough County Hospital and 22 at Tampa General Hospital. A certificate of need granted in 1981 authorized the expenditure of $127,310,000 for the consolidation of both hospitals and an overall reduction of 14 psychiatric beds after the hospitals were integrated. When the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority obtained its certificate of need, it was not necessary to differentiate between general acute care beds and psychiatric beds for licensure purposes. Increased demand for acute care beds led Tampa General to close its psychiatric unit and make those 22 beds available for ordinary acute care. After the 1983 statutory and rule changes regarding the separate licensure of psychiatric beds, the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority told the Department that Tampa General had no psychiatric beds in operation. On its 1985 licensure application, the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority applied for licensure for 22 psychiatric beds at Tampa General and 77 at Hillsborough Hospital. The Department denied the request for the psychiatric beds at Tampa General. The Final Order entered in Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. HRS, 8 FALR 1409 (Feb. 16, 1986), determined that there had been a discontinuation in the use of psychiatric beds at Tampa General, and that to allow Tampa General to add psychiatric beds after the statutory and rule changes in 1983 would frustrate the certificate of need process and would be detrimental to good health care planning. Palmetto General Hospital Palmetto General Hospital participated in an administrative hearing in 1975 regarding the disapproval of its proposed expansion, which included the dedication of one floor and 48 beds as a psychiatric unit. The Hearing Officer found that there was a need for psychiatric beds in the community and recommended that the Secretary of the Department issue a certificate of need "for that portion of the applicant's proposed capital expenditures relating to the addition of a 48 bed psychiatric unit". Palmetto General Exhibit 32, at 12, paragraph 2. The order of the Hearing Officer was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal in Palmetto General Hospital, Inc. v. Department of HRS, 333 So.2d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The approval of the 48 psychiatric beds is clear only from a review of the Hearing Officer's order. Certificate of Need 292X was issued for the 48 psychiatric beds. Palmetto General exhibit 45. Palmetto received Medicare certification for its psychiatric inpatient unit, and listed 48 short-term psychiatric beds on its licensure applications each year from 1979 to 1983. It failed to show its psychiatric beds on the bed count verification survey form sent by the Department. Palmetto General's chief financial officer told the Department on June 10, 1983 that Palmetto General did not have psychiatric beds in a separately organized and staffed unit. This resulted in the issuance of a license which showed no psychiatric beds. The Department itself wrote to the administrator of Palmetto to learn why the 48 short-term psychiatric beds had not been listed on Palmetto's application for licensure in 1985. Palmetto wrote back and acknowledged that it did have 48 short-term psychiatric beds. A license showing those 48 beds was then issued. Thereafter, staff from the HRS Office of Comprehensive Health Planning took the position that the 48 short-term psychiatric beds should not have been listed on the license, and the Department's Office of Licensure and Certification requested that the 1985 license containing the endorsement for those 48 psychiatric beds be returned to the Department for cancellation. Palmetto then sought an administrative hearing on the attempted cancellation of the license. Palmetto and the Department entered into a Final Order dated March 9, 1986 which agreed that Palmetto met all the requirements for the designation of 48 short-term psychiatric beds on its license. Palmetto, had, in fact, operated a 48 bed psychiatric unit on its third floor since 1981, but moved that unit to the sixth floor in 1985. It was dedicated exclusively to psychiatric patients and there were specific policy and procedure manuals developed and used in dealing with psychiatric patients since 1981. The history of Palmetto's licensure is certainly one replete with contradictions. It is inexplicable that the chief financial officer of the hospital would have told the Department in 1983 that it had no separately organized and staffed psychiatric unit when, in fact, it had such a unit. It was also unclear why it would have shown no psychiatric beds on the bed count verification form returned in late December or early January, 1984, or why its April, 1983, and its 1985/1986 license application forms listed no psychiatric beds. Nonetheless, it had obtained a certificate of need for a psychiatric unit after administrative litigation and an appeal to the District Court of Appeal. The unit was opened and remained continuously in existence. It had appropriate policies and procedures in place for a distinct psychiatric unit as the 1983 statutory and rule amendments required for separate licensure of psychiatric beds. History of Psychiatric Bed Services at Hialeah Hospital Since at least 1958, Hialeah Hospital has had psychiatrists on its medical staff, and the number of psychiatric physicians on staff has increased. Thirteen psychiatrists had admitting privileges at the hospital by 1983; there are now 23 psychiatrists with privileges. As is true with most community hospitals, physicians specializing in psychiatry would admit patients to the general population at Hialeah Hospital if they needed intensive psychotherapy or medication which needed to be monitored by nurses. Patients who were homicidal, suicidal or intensely psychotic were not admitted to Hialeah Hospital. Those patients need a more intensive psychiatric environment, either in a locked psychiatric unit or in a psychiatric specialty hospital. The persons physicians placed at Hialeah through 1983 did not need the intensive services of a discrete psychiatric unit. Hialeah Hospital indicated on its licensure application to the Department that it had 21 psychiatric beds throughout the 1970's, but ceased this listing in the 1980's as set forth in Finding of Fact 5 above. The nature of the services available at the hospital had remained constant. Under the psychiatric diagnosis coding system published in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual III, (which is commonly used by psychiatrists) Hialeah Hospital had an average daily census of 25 patients with primary or secondary psychiatric diagnoses in 1980, and 18 in 1981. Only about 25 percent of those patients had a primary psychiatric discharge diagnosis. The additional patients had secondary psychiatric diagnoses. Hialeah must rely on these secondary diagnoses to argue that its average daily census for psychiatric patients approached 21 beds. It was not until 1985 that Hialeah consolidated its psychiatric services to a medical/psychiatric unit. That unit serves patients with medical and psychiatric diagnosis as well as patients with solely psychiatric diagnoses. Before 1983, there was no medical director of psychiatry at Hialeah Hospital, and no separate policies and procedures for the admission of patients to a psychiatric unit, nor any staff dedicated to the care of psychiatric patients. To be sure, the hospital was in a position to provide quality psychiatric care to patients whose needs were psychotherapy, monitored medication, or individual counseling by psychiatric physicians and nurses. This reflects the reality that not all patients who need to be placed in the hospital for psychiatric care require the services of a separate medical/psychiatric unit. Patients with more acute psychiatric illness do need interdisciplinary approaches to their care. These interdisciplinary approaches are more expensive than serving psychiatric patients in the general hospital population. This is why the Federal government provides higher, cost-based reimbursement to the hospitals with specialty psychiatric licenses. Hialeah has not proven that the psychiatric services it was providing before 1983 were significantly different from those provided in typical community hospitals which did not have distinct psychiatric units. Hialeah's long-standing relationship with the Northwest Community Mental Health Center is not especially significant. Certainly, the Center was aware that Hialeah was a potential source of psychiatric care. Baker Act patients who needed hospitalization were taken there between 1980 and 1983. There was a flow of patients back and forth between the Center and the hospital's inpatient population, and discharge plans by Hialeah's social workers included referrals back to the Mental Health Center for follow-up and outpatient care. Similarly, the Dade-Monroe Mental Health Board knew that Hialeah was a potential provider of inpatient psychiatric services. The predecessor to the current local health council, the health systems agency of South Florida, recorded that there were psychiatric admissions at Hialeah Hospital in the early 1980's, and the health systems agency recommended a conversion of existing beds to psychiatric services because of a need for additional psychiatric services in the area. None of this, however, means that Hialeah had operated a distinct psychiatric unit before 1983 which entitles it to grandfather status.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application of Hialeah Hospital for grandfather status for 21 short-term psychiatric beds, and the inclusion of those short-term psychiatric beds on its license and on the Department's bed inventory be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, the following relevant facts are found: Humana of Florida, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Humana, Inc., is the owner of Women's Hospital in Tampa. Women's Hospital presently has 192 licensed beds, of which 96 are used for obstetrical patients and 96 are used for gynecological patients. It is dedicated to meeting the physical, psychological, educational, social and environmental needs of women and newborns and offers a total program of obstetrical, neonatal and gynecological care. Although not designated by the State as a Level III facility, Women's Hospital in Tampa has the personnel and equipment necessary to provide Level III care. It treats many high-risk obstetrical patients and their newborns, as well as premature infants. High-risk infants do not require transfer to another hospital with Level III capabilities. Every practicing obstetrical/gynecological physician in Tampa is on the staff of Women's Hospital. Petitioner submitted an application for a Certificate of Need to add a fifth floor to its existing facility and to increase its licensed obstetrical bed complement from 96 beds to 130 beds. Of the 34 additional obstetrical beds requested, 12 are to be allocated to an antepartum unit. These 12 beds would be organized as a separate self-contained unit to care for obstetrical patients experiencing or likely to experience a complicated pregnancy and/or delivery. The types of obstetrical patients who would utilize a separate antepartum unit would include diabetics, patients who experience difficulties with blood pressure, kidney disorders and conditions associated with the heart and thyroid. In many instances, the antepartum patient is ambulatory or quasi-ambulatory and is thus able to meet many of her own needs. As a result, the intensity of nursing care in an antepartum unit is lower than that which would be expected in a postpartum obstetrical unit, resulting in a cost-savings to the antepartum patient. The total proposed capital expenditure for the addition of a fifth floor and 34 obstetrical beds is approximately $2.8 million. While petitioner is licensed for 96 obstetrical beds, only 62 of those beds were in operation at the time of the final hearing in this proceeding. Based on the 62 beds in operation, the average obstetrical bed occupancy rate was 112 percent from September, 1982 through August, 1983. Due primarily to the temporary discontinuance of obstetrical services at St. Joseph's Hospital located across the street from petitioner, occupancy levels have reached 130 percent since January of 1983. Such occupancy levels create significant problems in terms of patient care and facility, physician and nursing efficiency. The difficulties associated with scheduling surgery and infection control are exacerbated with overcrowded conditions. Because newborns and postpartum mothers are more susceptible to infection, it is medically necessary to separate and segregate postpartum and gynecological patients. Petitioner had 4,600 deliveries last year and projects it will have 5,800 deliveries this year. If all 96 obstetrical beds were currently in operation, petitioner's occupancy levels would be approximately 70 percent. An indication of adequate utilization of obstetrical beds is an average annual occupancy level of 75 percent. Petitioner expects to reach the 75 percent occupancy level of its existing licensed 96 beds within the next year and a half to two years. Petitioner presently has no private obstetrical rooms at its facility. When a patient requires isolation from other patients, one of the beds in the semiprivate room is not available for use. Due to high occupancy levels, petitioner is unable to offer a private room to any of its obstetrical patients when it is not medically necessary to do so. Thus, even without the addition of 34 beds, petitioner desires to construct a fifth floor to allow it to reconfigure its units and convert a number of semiprivate rooms into private rooms by transferring existing licensed beds to the fifth floor. This would enhance the hospital's ability to utilize its bed complement in a more efficient manner. Even without additional beds, petitioner's Executive Director believes that by amortizing construction costs over a period of 20 to 25 years and reducing its operating margin, there would not be a significant impact upon patient charges as a result of the fifth floor addition. Should petitioner be granted a Certificate of Need allowing it to construct a fifth floor with no new beds, petitioner would be willing to accept conditions concerning the conversion of existing semiprivate rooms to private, such as capping over medical gas outlets, deactivating wall outlets and light fixtures for a second bed and furnishing the new rooms on the exclusive basis of a private room. The conversion of semiprivate rooms to private rooms could be a less costly alternative to the addition of new beds in some instances. To the extent that the addition of private beds provides a potentiality for greater utilization of existing services, additional patient revenues can be generated. It is not the policy if the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to grant approval for "shelled in" or "banking" space due to the potential competitive advantage it affords by allowing a future increase of beds without significant cost. Petitioner has the ability to adequately staff its proposed project with all necessary technical, nursing, and medical personnel, and will provide an acceptable level of patient care. Sufficient funds are available to construct and operate the project and the project has immediate and long-term financial feasibility. Its costs and methods for the proposed construction are reasonable, appropriate, and cost-efficient. The respondent HRS has promulgated Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code which establishes a uniform methodology for determining the number of acute care hospital beds needed five years into the future within the eleven HRS service districts throughout the State. The Rule addresses the need for general medical and surgical, intensive care, pediatric and obstetrical acute care services in hospitals and the Department will not normally approve applications for additional beds if the new beds would cause the number of beds in a particular district to exceed the number calculated to be needed under the Rule's methodology. Rule 10-5.11(23) calculates need through a series of formulas by considering the need for the various types of individual services and then adding these figures together to produce a figure indicating the total number of acute care beds which would be needed in a particular District within a five-year time frame. Then, after certain adjustments, all existing licensed and approved acute care beds are subtracted from the total bed need to determine the net bed need within the District. Subdistrict allocations by type of service are to be made by the individual Local Health Councils consistent with the District total acute care bed allocations, with certain adjustments permitted. As of the date of the hearing in this cause, the Sixth District's Local Health Council's plan for the allocation of beds on a service specific or subdistrict basis had not been adopted. The acute care bed need methodology set forth in Rule 10-5.11(23) takes into account the population for the service area projected five years into the future, the historic utilization rate for particular types of service, average lengths of stay, optimal occupancy rates for the various types of services, and, with regard to obstetrical bed projections, the fertility rate of women between the ages of 15 and 44. The Rule sets forth the manner in which the figures for these various components are to be derived. Utilizing the methodology for determining acute care bed need as set forth in the Rule, District VI presently has 950 acute care beds in excess of the beds projected to be needed in the year 1988. By applying the subportion of the Rule relating to obstetrical beds to Hillsborough County, there are presently 47 obstetrical beds in excess of the number needed for 1988. While the petitioner agrees with the basic generic form of the methodology contained in Rule 10-5.11(23), petitioner would substitute different data than that mandated under the Rule and perform certain adjustments. For example, petitioner would adjust the numbers used in the formula by increasing the statewide fertility rate for the years 1979-81 by 5 percent, by factoring in a number of 2 percent to 3 percent to represent the in-migration of obstetrical patients, by increasing the statewide average length of stay from 3.5 to 3.8 days so as to reflect the actual experience at petitioner's facility, by making an adjustment for hospital stays by an obstetrical patient which do not result in a delivery and by making a downward adjustment for those births which do not occur in a hospital setting. Petitioner would also subtract from the number of existing and/or approved beds the 15 obstetrical beds at St. Joseph's Hospital which were taken out of service on an interim basis as of December 31, 1982, pending the development of a comprehensive plan for the delivery of obstetrical services on a decentralized basis. The parties to this proceeding have stipulated that St. Joseph's Hospital contemplates that its future obstetrical service will be centered around birthing rooms, rather than actual labor, delivery and recovery rooms, and that it is reasonable to expect that, once the service is resumed, approximately 360 deliveries will occur with this number increasing over time. After making all these adjustments and utilizing different data in the formula for determining need, petitioner concludes there is a 1988 need in District VI for 26 or 27 additional obstetrical beds. Petitioner's analysis of bed need based both on an institution-specific analysis and a trend analysis resulted in a finding of from 32 to 36 additional beds needed at petitioner's facility by the year 1988.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need in its entirety be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 2nd of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John H. French, Jr., Esquire & James C. Hauser, Esquire Messer, Rhodes & Vickers P.O. Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Claire D. Dryfuss Assistant General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Bldg. 1, Room 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Pingree Secretary Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Certificate of Need Application No. 8614, filed by Vencor Hospitals South, Inc., meets, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration relied upon an unpromulgated and invalid rule in preliminarily denying CON Application No. 8614.
Findings Of Fact Vencor Hospital South, Inc. (Vencor), is the applicant for certificate of need (CON) No. 8614 to establish a 60-bed long term care hospital in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), the state agency authorized to administer the CON program in Florida, preliminarily denied Vencor's CON application. On January 10, 1997, AHCA issued its decision in the form of a State Agency Action Report (SAAR) indicating, as it also did in its Proposed Recommended Order, that the Vencor application was denied primarily due to a lack of need for a long term care hospital in District 8, which includes Lee County. Vencor is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Vencor, Inc., a publicly traded corporation, founded in 1985 by a respiratory/physical therapist to provide care to catastrophically ill, ventilator-dependent patients. Initially, the corporation served patients in acute care hospitals, but subsequently purchased and converted free-standing facilities. In 1995, Vencor merged with Hillhaven, which operated 311 nursing homes. Currently, Vencor, its parent, and related corporations operate 60 long term care hospitals, 311 nursing homes, and 40 assisted living facilities in approximately 46 states. In Florida, Vencor operates five long term care hospitals, located in Tampa, St. Petersburg, North Florida (Green Cove Springs), Coral Gables, and Fort Lauderdale. Pursuant to the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, filed on October 2, 1997, the parties agreed that: On August 26, 1996, Vencor submitted to AHCA a letter of intent to file a Certificate of Need Application seeking approval for the construction of a 60-bed long term care hospital to be located in Fort Myers, AHCA Health Planning District 8; Vencor's letter of intent and board resolution meet requirements of Sections 408.037(4) and 408.039(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59C-1.008(1), Florida Administrative Code, and were timely filed with both AHCA and the local health council, and notice was properly published; Vencor submitted to AHCA its initial Certificate of Need Application (CON Action No. 8614) for the proposed project on September 25, 1996, and submitted its Omissions Response on November 11, 1996; Vencor's Certificate of Need Application contains all of the minimum content items required in Section 408.037, Florida Statutes; Both Vencor's initial CON Application and its Omissions Response were timely filed with AHCA and the local health council. During the hearing, the parties also stipulated that Vencor's Schedule 2 is complete and accurate. In 1994, AHCA adopted rules defining long term care and long term care hospitals. Rule 59C-1.002(29), Florida Administrative Code, provides that: "Long term care hospital" means a hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Part 1, F.S., which meets the requirements of Part 412, Subpart B, paragraph 412.23(e), [C]ode of Federal Regulations (1994), and seeks exclusion from the Medicare prospective payment system for inpatient hospital services. Other rules distinguishing long term care include those related to conversions of beds and facilities from one type of health care to another. AHCA, the parties stipulated, has no rule establishing a uniform numeric need methodology for long term care beds and, therefore, no fixed need pool applicable to the review of Vencor's CON application. Numeric Need In the absence of any AHCA methodology or need publication, Vencor is required to devise its own methodology to demonstrate need. Rule 59C-1.008(e) provides in pertinent part: If no agency policy exists, the applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Vencor used a numeric need analysis which is identical to that prepared by the same health planner, in 1995, for St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. (St. Petersburg). The St. Petersburg project proposed that Vencor would manage the facility. Unlike the current proposal for new construction, St. Petersburg was a conversion of an existing but closed facility. AHCA accepted that analysis and issued CON 8213 to St. Petersburg. The methodology constitutes a use rate analysis, which calculates the use rate of a health service among the general population and applies that to the projected future population of the district. The use rate analysis is the methodology adopted in most of AHCA's numeric need rules. W. Eugene Nelson, the consultant health planner for Vencor, derived a historic utilization rate from the four districts in Florida in which Vencor operates long term care hospitals. That rate, 19.7 patient days per 1000 population, when applied to the projected population of District 8 in the year 2000, yields an average daily census of 64 patients. Mr. Nelson also compared the demographics of the seven counties of District 8 to the rest of the state, noting in particular the sizable, coastal population centers and the significant concentration of elderly, the population group which is disproportionately served in long term care hospitals. The proposed service area is all of District 8. By demonstrating the numeric need for 64 beds and the absence of any existing long term care beds in District 8, Vencor established the numeric need for its proposed 60-bed long term care hospital. See Final Order in DOAH Case No. 97-4419RU. Statutory Review Criteria Additional criteria for evaluating CON applications are listed in Subsections 408.035(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, and the rules which implement that statute. (1)(a) need in relation to state and district health plans. The 1993 State Health Plan, which predates the establishment of long term care rules, contains no specific preferences for evaluating CON applications for long term care hospitals. The applicable local plan is the District 8 1996-1997 Certificate of Need Allocation Factors Report, approved on September 9, 1996. The District 8 plan, like the State Health Plan, contains no mention of long term care hospitals. In the SAAR, AHCA applied the District 8 and state health plan criteria for acute care hospital beds to the review of Vencor's application for long term care beds, although agency rules define the two as different. The acute care hospital criteria are inapplicable to the review of this application for CON 8614 and, therefore, there are no applicable state or district health plan criteria for long term care. (1)(b) availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization and adequacy of like and existing services in the district; and (1)(d) availability and adequacy of alternative health care facilities in the district. Currently, there are no long term care hospitals in District 8. The closest long term care hospitals are in Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Fort Lauderdale, all over 100 miles from Fort Myers. In the SAAR, approving the St. Petersburg facility, two long term care hospitals in Tampa were discussed as alternatives. By contract, the SAAR preliminarily denying Vencor's application lists as alternatives CMR facilities, nursing homes which accept Medicare patients, and hospital based skilled nursing units. AHCA examined the quantity of beds available in other health care categories in reliance on certain findings in the publication titled Subacute Care: Policy Synthesis And Market Area Analysis, a report submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, on November 1, 1995, by Levin-VHI, Inc. ("the Lewin Report"). The Lewin Report notes the similarities between the type of care provided in long term care, CMR and acute care hospitals, and in hospital-based subacute care units, and subacute care beds in community nursing homes. The Lewin Report also acknowledges that "subacute care" is not well-defined. AHCA has not adopted the Lewin Report by rule, nor has it repealed its rules defining long term care as a separate and district health care category. For the reasons set forth in the Final Order issued simultaneously with this Recommended Order, AHCA may not rely on the Lewin Report to create a presumption that other categories are "like and existing" alternatives to long term care, or to consider services outside District 8 as available alternatives. Additionally, Vencor presented substantial evidence to distinguish its patients from those served in other types of beds. The narrow range of diagnostic related groups or DRGs served at Vencor includes patients with more medically complex multiple system failures than those in CMR beds. With an average length of stay of 60 beds, Vencor's patients are typically too sick to withstand three hours of therapy a day, which AHCA acknowledged as the federal criteria for CMR admissions. Vencor also distinguished its patients, who require 7 1/2 to 8 hours of nursing care a day, as compared to 2 1/2 to 3 hours a day in nursing homes. Similarly, the average length of stay in nursing home subacute units is less than 41 days. The DRG classifications which account for 80 percent of Vencor's admissions represent only 7 percent of admissions to hospital based skilled nursing units, and 10 to 11 percent of admissions to nursing home subacute care units. Vencor also presented the uncontroverted testimony of Katherine Nixon, a clinical case manager whose duties include discharge planning for open heart surgery for patients at Columbia-Southwest Regional Medical Center (Columbia-Southwest), an acute care hospital in Fort Myers. Ms. Nixon's experience is that 80 percent of open heart surgery patients are discharged home, while 20 percent require additional inpatient care. Although Columbia-Southwest has a twenty-bed skilled nursing unit with two beds for ventilator-dependent patients, those beds are limited to patients expected to be weaned within a week. Finally, Vencor presented results which are preliminary and subject to peer review from its APACHE (Acute Physiology, Age, and Chronic Health Evaluation) Study. Ultimately, Vencor expects the study to more clearly distinguish its patient population. In summary, Vencor demonstrated that a substantial majority of patients it proposes to serve are not served in alternative facilities, including CMR hospitals, hospital-based skilled nursing units, or subacute units in community nursing homes. Expert medical testimony established the inappropriateness of keeping patients who require long term care in intensive or other acute care beds, although that occurs in District 8 when patients refuse to agree to admissions too distant from their homes. (1)(c) ability and record of providing quality of care. The parties stipulated that Vencor's application complies with the requirement of Subsection 408.035(1)(c). (1)(e) probable economics of joint or shared resources; (1)(g) need for research and educational facilities; and (1)(j) needs of health maintenance organizations. The parties stipulated that the review criteria in Subsection 408.035(1)(e), (g) and (j) are not at issue. (f) need in the district for special equipment and services not reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. Based on the experiences of Katherine Nixon, it is not reasonable for long term care patients to access services outside District 8. Ms. Nixon also testified that patients are financially at a disadvantage if placed in a hospital skilled nursing unit rather than a long term care hospital. If a patient is not weaned as quickly as expected, Medicare reimbursement after twenty days decreases to 80 percent. In addition, the days in the hospital skilled nursing unit are included in the 100 day Medicare limit for post-acute hospitalization rehabilitation. By contrast, long term care hospitalization preserves the patient's ability under Medicare to have further rehabilitation services if needed after a subsequent transfer to a nursing home. (h) resources and funds, including personnel to accomplish project. Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated that Vencor has sufficient funds to accomplish the project, and properly documented its source of funds in Schedule 3 of the CON application. Vencor has a commitment for $10 million to fund this project of approximately $8.5 million. At the hearing, AHCA also agreed with Vencor that the staffing and salary schedule, Schedule 6, is reasonable. (i) immediate and long term financial feasibility of the proposal. Vencor has the resources to establish the project and to fund short term operating losses. Vencor also reasonably projected that revenues will exceed expenses in the second year of operation. Therefore, Vencor demonstrated the short and long term financial feasibility of its proposal. needs of entities serving residents outside the district. Vencor is not proposing that any substantial portion of it services will benefit anyone outside District 8. probable impact on costs of providing health services; effects of competition. There is no evidence of an adverse impact on health care costs. There is preliminary data from the APACHE study which tends to indicate the long term care costs are lower than acute care costs. No adverse effects of competition are shown and AHCA did not dispute the fact that Vencor's proposal is supported by acute care hospitals in District 8. costs and methods of proposed construction; and (2)((a)-(c) less costly alternatives to proposed capital expenditure. The prehearing stipulation includes agreement that the design is reasonable, and that proposed construction costs are below the median in that area. past and proposed service to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Vencor has a history of providing Medicaid and indigent care in the absence of any legal requirements to do so. The conditions proposed of 3 percent of total patient days Medicaid and 2 percent for indigent/charity patients proposed by Vencor are identical to those AHCA accepted in issuing CON 8213 to St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. Vencor's proposed commitment is reasonable and appropriate, considering AHCA's past acceptance and the fact that the vast majority of long term care patients are older and covered by Medicare. services which promote a continuum of care in a multilevel health care system. While Vencor's services are needed due to a gap in the continuum of care which exists in the district, it has not shown that it will be a part of a multilevel system in District 8. (2)(d) that patients will experience serious problems obtaining the inpatient care proposed. Patients experience and will continue to experience serious problems in obtaining long term care in District 8 in the absence of the project proposed by Vencor. Based on the overwhelming evidence of need, and the ability of the applicant to establish and operate a high quality program with no adverse impacts on other health care providers, Vencor meets the criteria for issuance of CON 8614.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue CON 8614 to Vencor Hospitals South, Inc., to construct a 60-bed long term care hospital in Fort Myers, Lee County, District 8. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kim A. Kellum, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Blank, Rigsby & Meenan, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Introduction Petitioner, Leesburg Regional Medical Center ("Leesburg"), is a 132-bed acute care private, not-for-profit hospital located at 600 East Dixie Highway, Leesburg, Florida. It offers a full range of general medical services. The hospital sits on land owned by the City of Leesburg. It is operated by the Leesburg hospital Association, an organization made up of individuals who reside within the Northwest Taxing District. By application dated August 13, 1982 petitioner sought a certificate of need (CON) from respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), to construct the following described project: This project includes the addition of 36 medical/surgical beds and 7 SICU beds in existing space and the leasing of a CT scanner (replacement). The addition of the medical/surgical beds is a cost effective way to add needed capacity to the hospital. Twenty-four (24) beds on the third floor will be established in space vacated by surgery and ancillary departments moving into newly constructed space in the current renovation project. A significant portion of this area used to be an obstetric unit in the past; and therefore, is already set up for patient care. The 7 bed SICU unit will be set up on the second floor, also in space vacated as a result of the renovation project. Twelve additional beds will be available on the third and fourth floors as a result of changing single rooms into double rooms. No renovation will be necessary to convert these rooms into double rooms. It is also proposed to replace the current TechniCare head scanner with GE8800 body scanner. Based on the high demand for head and body scans and the excessive amount of maintenance problems and downtime associated with the current scanner, Leesburg Regional needs a reliable, state-of-the-art CT scanner. The cost of the project was broken down as follows: The total project cost is $1,535,000. The construction/renovation portion of the project (24 medical/surgical and 7 SICU beds) is $533,000. Equipment costs will be approximately $200,000. Architectural fees and project development costs total $52,000. The CT scanner will be leased at a monthly cost of $16,222 per month for 5 years. The purchase price of the scanner is $750,000 and that amount is included in the total project cost. The receipt of the application was acknowledged by HRS by letter dated August 27, 1982. That letter requested Leesburg to submit additional information no later than October 10, 1982 in order to cure certain omissions. Such additional information was submitted by Leesburg on October 5, 1982. On November 29, 1982, the administrator for HRS's office of health planning and development issued proposed agency action in the form of a letter advising Leesburg its request to replace a head CT scanner (whole body) at a cost of $750,000 had been approved, but that the remainder of the application had been denied. The basis for the denial was as follows: There are currently 493 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district of HSA II. Based upon the HSP for HSA II, there was an actual utilization ratio of existing beds equivalent to 2.98/1,000 population. When this utilization ratio is applied to the 1987 projected population of 156,140 for Lake/Sumter counties, there is a need for 465 medical/surgical beds by 1987. Thus, there is an excess of 28 medical/surgical beds in the Lake/Sumter sub-district currently. This action prompted the instant proceeding. At the same time Leesburg's application was being partially denied, an application for a CON by intervenor-respondent, Lake Community Hospital (Lake), was being approved. That proposal involved an outlay of 4.1 million dollars and was generally described in the application as follows: The proposed project includes the renovations and upgrading of patient care areas. This will include improving the hospital's occupancy and staffing efficiencies by reducing Med-Surg Unit-A to 34 beds and eliminating all 3-bed wards. Also reducing Med-Surg Units B and C to 34 beds each and eliminating all 3-bed wards. This will necessitate the construction of a third floor on the A wing to house the present beds in private and semi-private rooms for a total of 34 beds. There is also an immediate need to develop back-to-back six bed ICU and a six-bed CCU for shared support services. This is being done to fulfill JCAH requirements and upgrade patient care by disease entity, patient and M.D. requests. Another need that is presented for consideration is the upgrading of Administrative areas to include a conference room and more Administrative and Business office space. However, the merits of HRS's decision on Lake's application are not at issue in this proceeding. In addition to Lake, there are two other hospitals located in Lake County which provide acute and general hospital service. They are South Lake Memorial Hospital, a 68-bed tax district facility in Clermont, Florida, and Waterman Memorial Hospital, which operates a 154-bed private, not-for-profit facility in Eustis, Florida. There are no hospitals in Sumter County, which lies adjacent to Lake County, and which also shares a subdistrict with that county. The facilities of Lake and Leesburg are less than two miles apart while the Waterman facility is approximately 12 to 14 miles away. South Lake Memorial is around 25 miles from petitioner's facility. Therefore, all three are no more than a 30 minute drive from Leesburg's facility. At the present time, there are 515 acute care beds licensed for Lake County. Of these, 493 are medical/surgical beds and 22 are obstetrical beds. None are designated as pediatric beds. The Proposed Rules Rules 10-16.001 through 10-16.012, Florida Administrative Code, were first noticed by HRS in the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 12, 1983. Notices of changes in these rules were published on September 23, 1983. Thereafter, they were filed with the Department of State on September 26, 1983 and became effective on October 16, 1983. Under new Rule 10-16.004 (1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, subdistrict 7 of district 3 consists of Lake and Sumter Counties. The rule also identifies a total acute care bed need for subdistrict 7 of 523 beds. When the final hearing was held, and evidence heard in this matter, the rules were merely recommendations of the various local health councils forwarded to HRS on June 27, 1983 for its consideration. They had not been adopted or even proposed for adoption at that point in time. Petitioner's Case In health care planning it is appropriate to use five year planning horizons with an overall occupancy rate of 80 percent. In this regard, Leesburg has sought to ascertain the projected acute care bed need in Lake County for the year 1988. Through various witnesses, it has projected this need using three different methodologies. The first methodology used by Leesburg may be characterized as the subdistrict need theory methodology. It employs the "guidelines for hospital care" adopted by the District III Local Health Council on June 27, 1983 and forwarded to HRS for promulgation as formal rules. Such suggestions were ultimately adopted by HRS as a part of Chapter 10-16 effective October 16, 1983. Under this approach, the overall acute care bed need for the entire sixteen county District III was found to be 44 additional beds in the year 1988 while the need within Subdistrict VII (Lake and Sumter Counties) was eight additional beds. 2/ The second approach utilized by Leesburg is the peak occupancy theory methodology. It is based upon the seasonal fluctuation in a hospital's occupancy rates, and used Leesburg's peak season bed need during the months of February and March to project future need. Instead of using the state suggested occupancy rate standard of 80 percent, the sponsoring witness used an 85 percent occupancy rate which produced distorted results. Under this approach, Leesburg calculated a need of 43 additional beds in 1988 in Subdistrict VII. However, this approach is inconsistent with the state-adopted methodology in Rule 10- 5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, and used assumptions not contained in the rule. It also ignores the fact that HRS's rule already gives appropriate consideration to peak demand in determining bed need. The final methodology employed by Leesburg was characterized by Leesburg as the "alternative need methodology based on state need methodology" and was predicated upon the HRS adopted bed need approach in Rule 10-5.11(23) with certain variations. First, Leesburg made non-rule assumptions as to the inflow and outflow of patients. Secondly, it substituted the population by age group for Lake and Sumter Counties for the District population. With these variations, the methodology produced an acute care bed need of 103 additional beds within Lake and Sumter Counties. However, this calculation is inconsistent with the applicable HRS rule, makes assumptions not authorized under the rule, and is accordingly not recognized by HRS as a proper methodology. Leesburg experienced occupancy rates of 91 percent, 80 percent and 73 percent for the months of January, February and March, 1981, respectively. These rates changed to 86 percent, 95 percent and 98 percent during the same period in 1982, and in 1983 they increased to 101.6 percent, 100.1 percent and 95.1 percent. Leesburg's health service area is primarily Lake and Sumter Counties. This is established by the fact that 94.4 percent and 93.9 percent of its admissions in 1980 and 1981, respectively, were from Lake and Sumter Counties. Although South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial are acute care facilities, they do not compete with Leesburg for patients. The staff doctors of the three are not the same, and there is very little crossover, if any, of patients between Leesburg and the other two facilities. However, Lake and Leesburg serve the same patient base, and in 1982 more than 70 percent of their patients came from Lake County. The two compete with one another, and have comparable facilities. Leesburg has an established, well-publicized program for providing medical care to indigents. In this regard, it is a recipient of federal funds for such care, and, unlike Lake, accounts for such care by separate entry on its books. The evidence establishes that Leesburg has the ability to finance the proposed renovation. HRS's Case HRS's testimony was predicated on the assumption that Rule 10-16.004 was not in effect and had no application to this proceeding. Using the bed need methodology enunciated in Rule 10-5.11(23), its expert concluded the overall bed need for the entire District III to be 26 additional beds by the year 1988. This calculation was based upon and is consistent with the formula in the rule. Because there was no existing rule at the time of the final hearing concerning subdistrict need, the witness had no way to determine the bed need, if any, within Subdistrict VII alone. Lake's Case Lake is a 162-bed private for profit acute care facility owned by U.S. Health Corporation. It is located at 700 North Palmetto, Leesburg, Florida. Lake was recently granted a CON which authorized a 4.1 million dollar renovation project. After the renovation is completed all existing three-bed wards will be eliminated. These will be replaced with private and semi-private rooms with no change in overall bed capacity. This will improve the facility's patient utilization rate. The expansion program is currently underway. Like Leesburg, the expert from Lake utilized a methodology different from that adopted for use by HRS. Under this approach, the expert determined total admissions projected for the population, applied an average length of stay to that figure, and arrived at a projected patient day total for each hospital. That figure was then divided by bed complement and 365 days to arrive at a 1988 occupancy percentage. For Subdistrict VII, the 1988 occupancy percentage was 78.2, which, according to the expert, indicated a zero acute care bed need for that year. Lake also presented the testimony of the HRS administrator of the office of community affairs, an expert in health care planning. He corroborated the testimony of HRS's expert witness and concluded that only 26 additional acute care beds would be needed district-wide by the year 1988. This result was arrived at after using the state-adopted formula for determining bed need. During 1981, Lake's actual total dollar write-off for bad debt was around $700,000. This amount includes an undisclosed amount for charity or uncompensated care for indigent patients. Unlike Leesburg, Lake receives no federal funds for charity cases. Therefore, it has no specific accounting entry on its books for charity or indigent care. Although Leesburg rendered $276,484 in charity/uncompensated care during 1981, it is impossible to determine which facility rendered the most services for indigents due to the manner in which Lake maintains its books and records. In any event, there is no evidence that indigents in the Subdistrict have been denied access to hospital care at Lake or any other facility within the county. Lake opines that it will loose 2.6 million dollars in net revenues in the event the application is granted. If true, this in turn would cause an increase in patient charges and a falling behind in technological advances. For the year 1981, the average percent occupancy based on licensed beds for Leesburg, Lake, South Lake Memorial and Waterman Memorial was as follows: 71.5 percent, 58.7 percent, 63.8 percent and 65.7 percent. The highest utilization occurred in January (81 percent) while the low was in August (58 percent). In 1982, the utilization rate during the peak months for all four facilities was 78 percent. This figure dropped to 66.5 percent for the entire year. Therefore, there is ample excess capacity within the County even during the peak demand months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Leesburg Regional Medical Center for a certificate of need to add 43 acute care beds, and renovate certain areas of its facility to accommodate this addition, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The petitioner Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, a public body corporate, owns and operates two public hospitals - Tampa General Hospital and Hillsborough County Hospital. In 1981, the Authority received Certificate of Need Number 1784 which authorized an expenditure of $127,310,000 for the consolidation of the two hospitals. The project involved new construction and renovation at Tampa General, delicensure of beds at Hillsborough County Hospital and the transfer of those beds to Tampa General. The Certificate provided for a total of 1,000 licensed beds at Tampa General Hospital and for the "renovation, new construction, consolidation and expansion of service per application." The completion of the total project was projected to occur by October, 1987, but is presently running about four months behind schedule. When the Authority received its Certificate of Need in 1981, it was then operating a total of 93 psychiatric beds between the two hospitals -- 71 at County Hospital and 22 at Tampa General. The plan for consolidation and the 1981 Certificate of Need called for an overall reduction of 14 psychiatric beds - from 93 total beds between the two facilities to 79 total consolidated psychiatric beds, at the conclusion of the project. At the time the Authority obtained its Certificate of Need in 1981, there was no differentiation between determinations of need for general acute care beds and psychiatric beds. The number of psychiatric beds operated by a hospital were not separately listed on a hospital's license. As noted above, Tampa General was operating 22 psychiatric beds when it received its 1981 Certificate of Need. Because of an increased demand for acute care beds (non- psychiatric medical and surgical beds) in late 1982, Tampa General closed the psychiatric unit and made those 22 beds available for acute care. In the Authority's 1983-85 license for Tampa General, those 22 beds were included in the 637-bed total, which was not broken down by bed type. An attachment to the license indicates that the total bed count should read 671. In the space designated for "hospital bed utilization," the figure "O" appears after the word "psychiatric." (Respondent's Exhibit 1) In 1983, the statutory and regulatory law changed with regard to the separate licensure and independent determination of need for psychiatric beds. Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes, was amended to provide, in pertinent part, that the number of psychiatric beds is to be specified on the face of the license. Rule 10-5.11(25), Florida Administrative Code, adopted in 1983, set forth a specific psychiatric bed need methodology for use in future Certificate of Need decisions. In order to implement its new 1983 policy and rule with regard to the separate licensure and determination of need for psychiatric beds, HRS conducted a survey to determine the number of existing psychiatric beds in the State. Hospitals then had the opportunity to indicate whether their existing beds were to be allocated or designated as acute care beds or psychiatric beds. HRS conducted the survey by directly contacting each hospital which had previously indicated it was operating a psychiatric unit and then contacting by telephone any facility not answering the initial inquiry. In August and September of 1983, the Authority indicated to HRS that Tampa General did not have any psychiatric beds in operation. HRS published the results of its survey and final hospital bed counts in the February 17, 1984 edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 10, Number 7. The inventory listed Hillsborough County Hospital as having 77 psychiatric beds and Tampa General Hospital as having O psychiatric beds. The notice in the Weekly advised that hospital licenses would be amended in accordance with the published inventory to reflect each hospital's count of beds by bed type. Hospitals were further notified that "Any hospital wishing to change the number of beds dedicated to one of the specific bed types listed will first be required to obtain a certificate of need." (Respondent's Exhibit 2). For economic and business reasons, and in order to accomplish a more orderly consolidation of the two hospitals, the Authority now desires to re-open a small, self-funding psychiatric unit at Tampa General Hospital. It wishes to utilize the maximum number of psychiatric beds designated in its 1981 Certificate of Need application (93), including the beds which had been temporarily changed in late 1982 to acute care beds, while gradually phasing out a sufficient number of beds at the County Hospital to bring the total number of psychiatric beds down to 79 by late 1987. In order to implement this plan, the Authority applied to the office of Licensure and Certification in 1985 for the licensure of 77 psychiatric beds at County Hospital and 22 psychiatric beds at Tampa General Hospital. The Authority acknowledges that it should have applied for only 16 psychiatric beds at Tampa General Hospital to meet the 1981 figure of a total of 93 beds. HRS issued a license for the 77 requested psychiatric beds at County Hospital, but issued a license for only 2 psychiatric beds at Tampa General. The record does not adequately reflect the rationale for licensing even 2 beds at Tampa General. It is not economically or practically feasible for a hospital to operate a separate 2-bed psychiatric unit. The rationale for refusing to license the remaining psychiatric beds requested is the change in the statutory and regulatory law occurring in 1983 and the survey results published in 1984 illustrating Tampa General to have no psychiatric beds in operation at that time. The stated reason for denial is "because you have failed to obtain a Certificate of Need or exemption from [CON] review . . . ." (Petitioner's Exhibit 3).
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the request of the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority for the licensure of 16 short-term psychiatric beds at Tampa General Hospital be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 24th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 1985. APPENDIX-CASE NO. 85-3109 The proposed findings of fact submitted by the petitioner and the respondent have been approved and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below. Petitioner Page 3, last sentence and Page 4, first sentence Rejected, not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Page 6, first full paragraph Rejected, not a finding of fact. Page 6, second paragraph Rejected, not a finding of fact. Page 7, Reject those findings based upon a conclusion that Tampa General has Certificate of Need approval for psychiatric beds. Respondent 9. Second and third sentences Rejected, irrelevant and immaterial to issue in dispute. COPIES FURNISHED: William S. Josey, Esquire Allen, Dell, Frank and Trinkle P. O. Box 2111 Tampa, Florida 33601 R. Bruce McKibben, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================ =
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Based upon an agreement between the petitioner and the respondent, and a later addendum, petitioner received Certificate of Need Number 1460 in February of 1981 granting the petitioner the authority to construct 126 additional general medical/surgical beds but to only license and operate 72 of such beds. The instant proceeding involves petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need to license and operate the remaining 54 beds which have been previously constructed under Certificate of Need Number 1460. St. Joseph's Hospital is a 649-bed full service major referral hospital in Hillsborough County owned and operated by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegheny. Its services include a comprehensive community mental health center, a comprehensive pediatric unit with 88 beds, a radiation therapy center, a 60- bed community cancer center, cardiac catheterization, cardiac surgery and a large and active emergency room. It serves a considerable number of indigent patients and participates in the Medicaid and Medicare programs. Petitioner is now requesting permission to license the regaining 54 beds which were authorized to be constructed pursuant to Certificate of Need Number 1460. The project involves no additional construction or renovation inasmuch as all 126 beds previously authorized have been completed. No capital expenditure will be required in order to place the 54 beds into operation. If the Certificate of Need is granted, petitioner intends to create two specialty medical/surgical units: a 32-bed cardiac surgical unit to accommodate patients from the open heart surgical program and a 22-bed medical unit for psychiatric patients requiring medical treatment. There currently are no other beds available in the hospital to convert for use for the psychiatric patient or for the cardiac surgical unit. Petitioner has been operating, on occasion, at occupancy levels in excess of 90 percent. At times, it has been necessary to place non-emergency patients in the emergency room and have them remain there until beds become available. There are sometimes up to 40 patients on the waiting list for elective surgery. Due to the shortage of empty beds, petitioner cannot now admit new members to its medical staff. Steady operation of the hospital at occupancy levels exceeding 90 percent can have an adverse effect upon the efficiency of the nursing staff and the quality of care offered to patients. Because the bulk of projected growth in Hillsborough County is expected to occur in the center and northwestern area of the county, it is anticipated that the pattern of utilization of petitioner's facility will continue. While the licensing of the 54 additional beds involves no capital expenditure on petitioner's part, it is estimated that, if petitioner is not permitted to license these beds, a total yearly loss of over $3.8 million will be experienced. This figure is the sum of lost net revenues from the beds in the amount of $87,339 and lost net ancillary revenues in the amount of $2.36 million, as well as the absorption of $232,750 in yearly depreciation costs and $1.14 million in committed indirect costs. Petitioner anticipates a loss per patient day, calculated at 100 percent occupancy, of $16.82 if the licensing of the beds is not approved. This would result in an increase of current patient charges by 9.1 percent in order to maintain petitioner's budgeted profit margin. Petitioner is located in HRS District VI which, at the time of the hearing, was composed of Hillsborough and Manatee Counties. Some 81 percent of all beds in the District are located in Hillsborough County. As of the time of the hearing, the District had 3,899 licensed acute care beds, with 606 additional beds having been approved but not yet operational. The generally accepted optimum utilization rate for acute care beds is 80 to 85 percent. For District VI, the overall utilization rate is below the optimum level. In Manatee County, utilization of acute care beds is at 78.3 percent. In Hillsborough County, the utilization level is at 77.4 percent, with the major referral hospitals experiencing a higher level of utilization than the smaller community hospitals. Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, contains the governing methodology for determining acute care bed needs of the various Districts. Applications for new or additional acute care hospital beds in a District will not normally be approved if approval would cause the number of beds in that District to exceed the number of beds calculated to be needed. Application of the Rule's formula to District VI results in a total acute care bed need of 3,622 projected for the year 1988. Given the 4,505 existing and approved beds in the District, there are 883 excess beds in District VI under the Rule's formula methodology for projecting need. The 1982 Health Systems Plan adopted by the Florida Gulf Health Systems Agency makes no bed need projections for other specialty medical/surgical beds," but shows no need for medical/surgical beds. Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, provides that other criteria may result in a demonstration of bed need even when the formula approach illustrates no need for beds. When additional beds are approved pursuant to other criteria, those beds are counted in the inventory of existing and approved beds in the area when applying the bed need formula to review future projects. The formula methodology does account for the inflow and outflow of patients in a specific area. While Rule 10-5.11(23) permits the Local Health Councils to adopt subdistrict bed allocations by type of service, the Council for District VI had not adopted its local health plan as of the date of the hearing in this matter. The Rule itself simply addresses the need for general acute care bed needs in the future.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. for a Certificate of Need to license 54 acute care medical/surgical beds be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ivan Wood, Esquire David Pingree Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein Secretary One Houston Center Department of Health and Suite 1600 Rehabilitative Services Houston, Texas 77010 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard, Suite 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
