The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer.
Findings Of Fact On December 11, 1995, Petitioner, GEORGE S. BARNES, filed an application for licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer with Respondent, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING. Petitioner has been employed in the security business since 1988. Petitioner is also an ordained minister and works with Earth Mission, Inc., a community organization assisting troubled juveniles. Petitioner currently resides in St. Petersburg, Florida. Petitioner's application was filed with the Respondent's Tampa Regional Office. Respondent, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, is the agency of the State of Florida having statutory authority for the administration of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, including the licensure of Class "D" Security Officers. Petitioner's application reflected that in October of 1993, Petitioner had previously been issued a license as a Security Officer in the State of Florida. The application stated that Petitioner was employed by Weisser Security beginning in 1993. Petitioner's application further reflected that Petitioner had been convicted of possession of marijuana in 1987 in Pinellas County, that Petitioner had been convicted of battery in 1994 in Pinellas County, and that Petitioner was currently on probation. Petitioner signed the application affirming that the information contained in the application was true and correct to the best of his knowledge. Petitioner's signature was notarized by Cyndi Lynn Cutchall, a Notary Public of the State of Florida, Commission No. CC511419. Petitioner has a criminal record evidencing three misdemeanor convictions. On February 15, 1988 Petitioner pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Case No. CTC 87- 27269, County Court, Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner was ordered to pay a $250 fine. On May 25, 1995, Petitioner pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of misdemeanor battery. Case No. 94-33011MMF, County Court, Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner was placed on probation for one year, ordered to participate in the Family Violence Program, pay a fine of $150, and to have no contact with the victim, or with his step-daughter Starleetha Williams. On December 6, 1995, Petitioner pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of misdemeanor battery. Case No. CRC-95-021199CFANO-K, County Court, Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner was placed on probation for one year, ordered to undergo mental health counseling, successfully complete all treatment, and to have no further contact with his step-daughter, Starleetha Williams. Petitioner was at the time of the filing of his application for licensure, and is currently, on probation. On December 11, 1995, Petitioner went to Tampa, Florida for the purpose of filing an application for licensure as a security officer with Respondent. Petitioner had obtained a computer printout of his criminal record from Pinellas County. The computer printout reflected his prior convictions for possession of marijuana and his first conviction for misdemeanor battery. The printout did not at that time reflect Petitioner's second conviction for misdemeanor battery which had occurred only five days earlier on December 6, 1995. Petitioner sought the assistance of Cyndi Lynn Cutchall in completing the application. The record indicates that Cyndi Lynn Cutchall was a Notary Public in the State of Florida. Petitioner assumed that Ms. Cutchall, who was located in the state office building, was employed by the Respondent; however, Ms. Cutchall was not called as a witness, and there is no evidence indicating that she was an employee of Respondent. Petitioner partially completed the application himself; however Section V of the application was completed by Ms. Cutchall. Section V indicates that Petitioner was convicted of possession of marijuana in 1987, and battery in 1994. Petitioner testified that he informed Ms. Cutchall of his second conviction for battery, but that she instructed him that because his second battery conviction was not yet on the computer printout, it was not necessary to include the second battery conviction on his application. Petitioner knew that his application was inaccurate, but nonetheless signed his application affirming the truth and correctness of the information contained therein. Ms. Cutchall notarized Petitioner's signature. Petitioner's misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana occurred in 1988. This conviction resulted from an incident in which Petitioner was stopped while driving a relative's car in which a marijuana cigarette was discovered. Petitioner paid the fine imposed by the court. It appears that Petitioner obtained a license as a security officer in October 1993, subsequent to this offense. Petitioner's two convictions for misdemeanor battery in 1995 arose from family problems. The first incident resulted from a domestic dispute between Petitioner and his wife in which his wife slipped and fell on their kitchen floor during the dispute. The second incident initially involved very serious felony child sexual abuse charges; however, during Petitioner's trial, the charges were reduced to misdemeanor battery to which Petitioner pled nolo contendere. Petitioner denies both battery charges, and specifically denies any inappropriate contact with the child in question. Petitioner and his wife are currently separated, and Petitioner has no contact with the child involved in the second battery case. Although it appears that Petitioner may have had previous contact with the victim of the second battery, it now appears that Petitioner is complying with the terms of his probation in accordance with the order of the court. There is no evidence that Petitioner's probation was ever revoked for a violation. Petitioner is not employed as a security officer, pending resolution of these proceedings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer with leave for Petitioner to reapply for licensure upon successful completion of Petitioner's current probation. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. RICHARD HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Ted J. Starr, Esquire Post Office Box 12827 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Michelle Guy, Esquire Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station No. 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Sandra B. Wortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether or not the Respondent, Anita J. Shear, R.N., is entitled to have her terminated license No. 27650-2 reinstated, in view of the alleged allegations that the Respondent has been found guilty of the conviction of a felony in the course of the State of Florida. (See Section 464.151(1)(b) and Section 464.21(1) Florida Statutes.)
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the Administrative Complaint presented by the Petitioner, Florida State Board of Nursing, against the Respondent, Anita J. Shear, R.N. The case is presented as Docket No. FSBN 78-70. The Administrative Complaint seeks to deny the re-registration of the terminated license of Anita J. Shear, who held license No. 27650-2 (terminated). The alleged grounds for the denial of the re-registration are based upon the alleged plea of guilty to the felony charges of unlawfully obtaining services, goods, wares or other things of value by means of a worthless check or draft in the amount of $187.00 in a case in the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, Case No. 77-2285. The allegation is that the Respondent entered the plea on or about March 14, 1978, and was adjudicated guilty of the felony by the Court and sentenced to serve a term of one year in jail upon certain terms and conditions. There is an additional ground stated in the Administrative Complaint for denying the re-registration, which is to the effect that the Respondent on or about March 14, 1978, entered pleas of guilty to the felony charges of uttering a forged instrument (three counts); grand larceny (three counts) and intentionally receiving, retaining, disposing or aiding in the concealment of stolen property, well knowing the same to be stolen (three counts). This series of pleas were allegedly presented in the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, in Case No. 77-2304, for which the Respondent was allegedly adjudicated guilty of all those aforementioned felonies in Case No. 77-2304. At a time prior to March 31, 1978, the Respondent, Anita J. Shear, R.N., was a holder of license No. 27650-2, held with the Florida State Board of Nursing. That license was to practice as a Registered Nurse in the State of Florida. The Respondent, prior to March 31, 1978, had failed to timely renew her license and had terminated according to the terms and conditions of Section 404.151(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The timely renewal spoken of meant that the Respondent had failed to renew her license before the expiration date of the current license under which she was allowed to practice her profession in the State of Florida. On March 31, 1978, the petitioner received an application for reinstatement of the Respondent's license, filed by the Respondent. The Petitioner failed to re-register the Respondent for reasons as set forth in the summarization of the Administrative Complaint. The Respondent was advised of this denial of re-registration on May 1, 1978. This in turn led to the consideration of the case by formal hearing with the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings. The facts revealed that the Respondent, Anita J. Shear, in the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, in Case No. 77- 2285, entered a plea of guilty to unlawfully obtaining services, goods, wares or other things of value by means of a worthless check or draft in the amount of $187.00, for which she was adjudged guilty and sentenced to a term of one year in the Dade County Jail with the provision that after nine months served, the remaining three months should be stayed and withheld and the Respondent be placed on probation for a period of two years, subject to the terms and conditions of the Court. This plea and sentence were entered on March 14, 1978. This offense for which the Respondent entered her plea is a felony under the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 832.05(3), Florida Statutes. On March 14, 1978, in the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, in Case No. 77-2304, the Respondent entered a plea of guilty to uttering a forged instrument (three counts), felonies under the provisions of Section 831.02, Florida Statutes; grand larceny (three counts), felonies under the provisions of Section 812.021, Florida Statutes, and intentionally receiving, retaining, disposing or aiding in the concealment of stolen property, well knowing the same to be stolen (three counts). The latter plea was made in accordance with the provisions of Section 812.031, Florida Statutes, but it is unclear from the evidence presented whether or not those pleas were to the misdemeanor offenses of receiving stolen property or to the felony offenses. The Respondent was adjudicated guilty of those offenses found in Case No. 77- 2304 and was given a period of probation of two and one-half years beginning at the expiration of the sentence in Case No. 77-2285. A statement of Court action in cases Nos. 77-2285 and 77-2304 may he found in the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. After discovering the existence of the felony conviction stated above, placed against the Respondent, the Petitioner has denied the Respondent's application for re-registration. The Petitioner may deny the license to the Respondent in view of the felony convictions under the authority established in Section 464.21, Florida Statutes, which states: "464.21 Disciplinary proceedings.-- GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINE.--The board shall have the authority to deny a license to any applicant or discipline the holder of a license or any other person temporarily authorized by the board to practice nursing in the state whose default has been entered or who has been heard and found guilty by the hoard of: * * * "Conviction of a felony in the courts of this state . . ." Therefore, the Petitioner was correct in denying the Respondent's application for re-registration as a Registered Nurse.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Anita J. Shear, R.N., have her application to re-register as a licensed Registered Nurse in the State of Florida, DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire 1107 Blackstone Building 233 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Anita J. Shear Post Office Box 215 Buena Vista Station Miami, Florida 33137 Geraldine B. Johnson, R.N. Investigation and Licensing Coordinator Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Board of Nursing 6501 Arlington Expressway Jacksonville, Florida 32211
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, Daniel James Bradley's, application for licensure as a resident life including variable annuity and health insurance agent should be denied for the reasons stated in Respondent, Department of Financial Services', Notice of Denial dated April 26, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for the licensure of insurance agents in the State of Florida pursuant to the authority granted in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). On January 3, 2004, Mr. Bradley filed an on-line application with the Department seeking licensure as a resident life including variable annuity and health insurance agent. The on-line application form included the following question: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered?. Mr. Bradley answered "No," which was a false answer. The Department conducted an internal investigation during the application process, and the criminal history check obtained by the Department revealed that in 1995 Mr. Bradley was charged with two counts of Obtaining Property for Worthless Check(s) (one check in an amount over $150 and one check in an amount less than $150). On May 31, 1995, in State of Florida v. Daniel J. Bradley, Case No. 94-2473F, in the Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County, Florida, Mr. Bradley appeared before Judge Robert B. Bennett and entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of Obtaining Property For a Worthless Check (over $150), which is a third degree felony in violation of Subsection 832.05(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). Judge Bennett withheld adjudication of guilt and imposed a fine and court cost in the amount of $250 that was paid by Mr. Bradley. Mr. Bradley testified that during the 1995 period, he was in the midst of a domestic dispute that was finalized in a dissolution of marriage, when he wrote two checks to Sears. He explained further that at the time the checks were written, sufficient funds were in the joint checking account at the bank, but his then-estranged wife withdrew all bank funds without his knowledge or consent resulting in the overdrafts. Explaining his "no" response to the criminal history question on his on-line licensure application form, Mr. Bradley asserted a lack of fully understanding the (intended) meaning of the term "punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more." Mr. Bradley testified that he "did not know, and had no reason to know, [or be concerned] that the worthless check charge to which he pled nolo contendere was punishable by imprisonment of one year or more," even though he knew the crime was a third- degree felony. Continuing, Mr. Bradley explained in detail his ongoing domestic entanglement then, as well as his financial obligations now. Mr. Bradley explained that he has undertaken the obligation to care for his parent(s) and his need for income to pay for his children's education. In effect, Mr. Bradley offered an "excusable neglect and a lack of knowledge" explanation for the "no" answer on his on-line licensure application form. Mr. Bradley earnestly insisted that it was not his "intent" to mislead, conceal, or lie about the criminal background question. He explained in detail that he "did not understand nor was he advised by his attorney, Susan Maulucci, or the Sarasota County Circuit Court that any offense that he had been accused or pled guilty to was punishable by a term of incarceration of one or more years." In conclusion, Mr. Bradley stated, "[I]f I had previous knowledge of such information I would never have answered incorrectly. If the question had addressed a felony charge punishable by one or more years, I would have certainly answered yes based on the assumption of a felony being the subject of the question not the period of punishment." It appears from his post-hearing submittal that he was under the impression that the term "felony" is missing from the question and that by the omission, he was somehow misled. The blame-shifting inference Mr. Bradley sought is that it was the omission by the Department to include the word "felony" in its application form that misled him. This suggestion is rejected. Mr. Bradley's explanation becomes even more suspect when one considers: his knowledge and experience as a military police officer; at the time he signed the plea document, it was clear that he was facing up to five years in prison for the crime(s) with which he was charged; when arrested on both misdemeanor and felony check charges, he spent the night in jail; and finally, he signed two bonds, one for the misdemeanor charge and a separate bond for the felony charge before he was released from jail. Mr. Bradley was individually and personally responsible for the accuracy of his answer. His misrepresentation of the truth by answering "no," if not intentional, supports the inference of a reckless or careless disregard as to the truth of the matter asserted. At the time he answered "no" on his application form, Mr. Bradley knew, without a doubt, that he had pled "no contest" to a felony worthless check charge in the Sarasota County Circuit Court in Florida. During his court appearance, he was identified and was personally informed by the presiding judge that he faced a felony charge, and he agreed to enter his plea of nolo contendere to that felony charge. On May 31, 1995, in open court, Mr. Bradley signed an "Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights" form that contained in paragraph 1, the following statement: "I am pleading to the charge of worthless check (2 counts), and I understand the maximum penalty provided by law is five (5) years prison." (Emphasis added.) After the court accepted his plea, sentenced him, and imposed court costs, Mr. Bradley signed the court's acknowledgement reflecting the disposition of the proceeding. Only after completion of the foregone process was Mr. Bradley free to leave the courtroom.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing the Petition herein filed by Petitioner, without prejudice, for Petitioner to reapply as provided in the Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(4). DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2004.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's certification as a firefighter should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, James F. Mathis, is a certified firefighter. On April 7, 1997, Respondent pled guilty to the charge of unlawful sexual battery upon a child under the age of 16, contrary to Section 800.04(3), Florida Statutes. Respondent was sentenced to 180 days in jail, ten years' probation, no contact with the victim, no allowance for early termination of probation, admission to sex offender treatment, and payment of court costs. However, adjudication was withheld. Respondent presented evidence to show: the factual basis for the charge; his rehabilitation; the unlikelihood of a repeat offense; how his plea of guilty came to Petitioner's attention; Respondent's dedication and commitment to quality service as a firefighter; the quality of Respondent's service as a firefighter; and the desire of the Bayshore Fire Protection and Rescue Service District and the local community to have the benefit of Respondent's services as an employed firefighter. Petitioner did not contest Respondent's evidence but took the position that the evidence was irrelevant. As reflected in the Conclusions of Law, it is agreed that the evidence was irrelevant, and no additional findings are necessary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order revoking Respondent's certification as a firefighter. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrence F. Lenick, Esquire Post Office Box 430 Bonita Springs, Florida 34133 James F. Mathis 11260 Shirley Lane North Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Lisa S. Santucci, Esquire Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent attempted to obtain his license to practice medicine by fraudulent representations, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(a), Florida Statutes, or if Respondent misrepresented or concealed a material fact during any phase of a licensing or disciplinary process, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(gg), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is what penalty the Board of Medicine should impose.
Findings Of Fact By application dated and acknowledged on December 27, 1993, Respondent applied for a medical license by endorsement. Respondent filed the application with the Board of Medicine on January 12, 1994. Question 6 on the application asks: Have you ever been convicted of a felony? Yes No ; a misdemeanor? Yes No . Have any judgments ever been entered against you? Yes No . Have you ever been sued for malpractice? Yes No . In response, Respondent typed X’s in the “No” boxes for the first two questions in Question 6. Immediately above the signature of Respondent and acknowledgement of the notary public, on the last page of the application, is the statement: I have carefully read the questions in the foregoing application and have answered them completely, without reservations of any kind, and I declare under penalty of perjury that my answers and all statements made by me are true and correct. Should I furnish any false information in this application, I hereby agree that such act shall constitute cause for denial, suspension or revocation of my license to practice medicine/surgery in the State of Florida. In fact, on October 24, 1988, Respondent was found guilty, after a three-day jury trial, of 12 misdemeanor counts of failure to remit a total of over $47,000 in state sales taxes due from November 20, 1985, through December 20, 1986. On December 22, 1988, the court sentenced Respondent to pay a fine of $12,000 on all 12 counts and reasonable court costs, and serve six months’ probation on each of the 12 counts, with the periods of probation to run consecutively. Respondent’s explanation for the omission from the application is that he mistakenly believed that the only misdemeanors covered by the question were those involving the practice of medicine. Respondent’s explanation for the nondisclosure is unreasonable. Nothing in the language of Question 6 limits the scope of the inquiry to misdemeanors involving the practice of medicine. The preceding question in Question 6 asks about felonies without qualification or limitation, and it is absurd to interpret this question as not asking about any felony, such as bank robbery, even though the felony did not involve the practice of medicine. For the same reason, Respondent knew that he was to have disclosed any misdemeanor, even if it did not involve the practice of medicine. Respondent’s explanation for the commission of the crimes is more plausible. Briefly, Respondent testified that he had invested about $100,000 of the total of $250,000 in the acquisition of the Philadelphia franchise of long-distance telephone provider that had emerged immediately following the breakup of AT&T in the mid 1980s. Essentially reselling AT&T long-distance services, the new company paid AT&T at wholesale for the services that it marked up and sold at retail to end users. Respondent explained that he had been an absentee owner for much of the time. Also, the AT&T billing for this new arrangement was confused and irregular. Changes in ownership preceding and following Respondent’s investment in the company further complicated the situation. A Pennsylvania revenue auditor contacted Respondent over a year after he had sold his stock in the company in 1986, gotten married, and been traveling extensively out of state. At this time, Respondent learned of the company’s sales tax problems, which involved a complicated telecommunications excise tax. Respondent’s corporate purchaser was no longer operating the company, which had become bankrupt. Respondent paid the taxes due, but the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nevertheless prosecuted him for his role in the failure of the company to pay its taxes. After sentencing, Respondent paid the fine and served his probation without incident. He disclosed the misdemeanor convictions to the Pennsylvania agency regulating the practice of medicine and was able to continue practicing medicine there. After consideration of Respondent’s application, the Florida Board of Medicine issued Respondent license number ME 0066606.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Tanya Willaims, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin C03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Kim M. Kluck Carol Gregg Senior Attorneys Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Christopher Grillo 1 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 700 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Victor Rudolph Cobham made application for filing for examination as a Life and Health Agent on February 12, 1987, (hereafter, "application"). Question 8 of that application and Petitioner's answers thereto read as follows: Have you ever been charged with a felony? Yes If YES, give date(s): Dec. 16, 1983 What was the crime? Possession of cocaine & cannabis Where and when were you charged? Dade County, Dec. 16, 1983 Did you plead guilty or nolo contendere? Nolo Contendere on Appeal Were you convicted? Yes - Conviction reversed by 3rd District Court of Appeal Was adjudication withheld? See attachments to application Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged. See attachments to application If there has been more than one felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the Information or Indictment and Final Adjudication for each charge is required. In response to the above question 8 Petitioner listed no other charges, convictions, or pleas, however he had, in fact, been charged on at least three other occasions. Petitioner was charged by an August 3, 1978 Information with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), possession of cannabis in a felony amount, and possession or sale of a controlled substance implement (paraphernalia) in Case No. 78-7960 in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. All of these charges were felony charges. Petitioner plead guilty to all charges. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. Petitioner was also charged by a September 18, 1978 Information with failure to redeliver a hired vehicle (rental car) in Case No. 78-10543 in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, which charge constitutes a felony. Petitioner pled guilty. Adjudication was withheld. In 1967, Petitioner was also charged with passing a worthless bank check but the charges were dropped because the check was paid. Whether this was a felony or misdemeanor charge is not clear. On March 31, 1987, the Insurance Commissioner denied Petitioner's application to sit for the insurance agent's examination due to this failure to divulge in his responses to question 8 of his application the facts contained in findings of fact 4-6, supra. Petitioner's position was that he had subconsciously omitted the information on the two 1978 charges due to the lapse of time and that since these charges did not result in any "convictions" no fraud was committed by him in failing to disclose them in response to question 8 of the application. He further asserted that because the Third District Court of Appeal reversed his conviction in the 1983 case, he had a "clean record." He offered no specific explanation for failing to reveal the 1967 charges except that with respect to all charges, he also asserted that he had assumed the agency would do an extensive background check as a result of his admission concerning the 1983 charge and would therefore discover all the charges prior to 1983 as well. Having weighed the credibility of Petitioner's testimony; the undersigned finds that Petitioner committed a material misstatement, misrepresentation, and fraud upon his application and that his reasons for his misstatement, misrepresentation and fraud are neither logical nor credible as mitigation therefor. Petitioner was previously a licensed insurance agent but has allowed his licensure to lapse. He has worked in insurance in one way or another for most of his adulthood. He is now an articulate 56 year old man who has completed two years of college. By education, training, and experience, Petitioner knows the difference between a charge and a conviction. Question 8 on the application requested that he list and explain all charges, not just convictions. It asked for types of pleas entered and whether adjudication had been withheld, thereby giving Petitioner every opportunity to explain the status of his record. Petitioner is knowledgeable about the various nuances of the judicial dispositions of each of the charges brought against him, and his failure to reveal them on his application can only be construed as deliberate misstatement, misrepresentation, and fraud.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for filing for examination as a Life and Health Agent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of September, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: William Gunter Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Angelo A. Ali, Esquire 400 Roberts Building 26 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Lealand L. McCharen, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact On November 22, 1989, T. L. James & Company, Inc. was convicted of conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition. This is a public entity crime. T. L. James executed a Public Entity Crimes Affidavit on July 24, 1994. On the affidavit T. L. James disclosed the conviction. Pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes, the Department of management Services (DMS) shall investigate public entity crimes to determine if the convicted company should be placed on the convicted vendors' list. After receiving the affidavit from T. L. James, DMS conducted an investigation and discovered mitigating factors as defined and listed in Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. These factors are: payment of fines and damages totalling $600,000, cooperation with the officials criminally investigating and prosecuting the case, cooperation with DMS' investigation, instituting safeguards in the bid estimation process to prevent further irregularities, and providing full and accurate notice. All other facts stipulated to by the parties pursuant to the Joint Stipulation previously filed in this case are hereby adopted and incorporated by reference.
