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WILLIAM B. HUNT vs MARION COUNTY, 94-007071GM (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Dec. 19, 1994 Number: 94-007071GM Latest Update: Sep. 22, 1995

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact have been determined: Background The parties Respondent, Marion County (County), is a local government subject to the comprehensive land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered and enforced by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive land use plans and amendments made thereto. Petitioner, William B. Hunt, owns property and resides within the County. Petitioner also submitted written comments to the County during the public hearing held on April 7, 1994, concerning the adoption of an amendment to the County's comprehensive plan. Therefore, he is an affected person within the meaning of the law and has standing to bring this action. The nature of the dispute In July 1991, the County initially transmitted its proposed comprehensive land use plan to the DCA. The DCA issued an Objections, Recommendations, and Comments (ORC) report for the County's plan on October 18, 1991. The County issued a response to the DCA's ORC report and adopted its comprehensive plan in January 1992. In April 1992, the DCA issued a notice of intent to find the comprehensive plan not in compliance. In an attempt to bring the County's plan into compliance, the DCA and County entered into a settlement agreement in March 1993. Pursuant to the agreement, the County was supposed to adopt certain remedial amendments to its comprehensive plan. In August 1993, the County adopted remedial amendments to its comprehensive plan. In October 1993, the DCA issued a notice of intent to find the remedial amendments not in compliance. In another attempt to bring the County's plan into compliance, the DCA and County entered into another settlement agreement in February 1994, and into an addendum thereto in April 1994. Pursuant to this agreement, the County adopted the agreed-upon remedial amendments to its comprehensive plan by Ordinance No. 94-12 on April 7, 1994. On May 30, 1994, the DCA issued a cumulative notice of intent to find the County's comprehensive plan and remedial amendments in compliance. On June 18, 1994, petitioner filed a petition to intervene with the Division of Administrative Hearings seeking to challenge the newly amended plan. After being advised that the petition was filed in the wrong forum, and that he incorrectly sought to intervene rather than to initiate a new proceeding, on December 13, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for an administrative hearing with the DCA. In his lengthy petition, which contains allegations running some fifty-four pages in length, petitioner has challenged the County's plan, as amended, in numerous respects. In his proposed order, however, petitioner has summarized his complaints into the following categories: (a) "many" of the plan objectives are not "specific or measurable," (b) "many" policies in the plan are not "adequate," (c) "many" of the required objectives and policies are not found within a particular element, (d) "many" policies in the plan defer implementation to the land development regulations, or to other kinds of regulations, that are to be adopted after the plan is adopted, (e) "publications" adopted by reference in the plan "have not been adequately cited," (f) "the plan does not control growth," and it "designates an over- allocation of land that can be developed at non-rural densities and intensities," (g) the plan violates the concurrency provision on State Road 200, and (h) the plan fails to include an analysis of projected mass transit level of service and system needs. Is the Plan, as Amended, in Compliance? Generally In attempting to prove the allegations in his petition, petitioner offered only the testimony of a DCA land use planning manager and the County's acting planning director, both of whom concluded that the plan, as amended, was in compliance. Because both witnesses generally refuted all allegations raised in the petition, and they disagreed with the theories advanced by petitioner through his direct examination, the record in this case clearly supports a finding that the plan, as amended, is in compliance. Notwithstanding this state of the record, the undersigned will address in general terms the broad issues raised in the petition, namely, the adequacy of the plan's supporting data and analysis, the adequacy of the goals, objectives and policies, the plan's internal consistency, and the plan's consistency with the state comprehensive plan. In addition, the undersigned will address the more specific objections raised by petitioner in his proposed recommended order. Adequate data and analyses Petitioner has alleged that the County's plan, as amended, is not in compliance because ten elements were not supported by adequate data and analyses, as required by Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code. However, petitioner either abandoned these allegations or failed to prove them to the exclusion of fair debate. Goals, objectives and policies Petitioner further alleged that the County's plan, as amended, is not in compliance because a number of the goals, objectives and policies (GOPs) contained in the various elements were inadequate in that they did not meet some of the requirements for GOPs in Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code. However, petitioner either abandoned these allegations or failed to prove them to the exclusion of fair debate. Internal consistency of plan Petitioner next alleged that the County's plan, as amended, is not in compliance because the internal consistency requirements in Chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code, had not been met. Based on the findings of fact above, however, it is clear that the evidence failed to show to the exclusion of fair debate that the County's plan contained GOPs that were in conflict with each other, thereby rendering the plan internally inconsistent. Consistency with state comprehensive plan Petitioner has also alleged that the County's plan, as amended, is not in compliance because it is not compatible with, and does not further, a number of goals and policies of the State Comprehensive Plan, which are contained in Section 187.201, Florida Statutes. Petitioner failed to present any evidence showing that the County's plan, as amended, is not compatible with, and does not further, the State Comprehensive Plan. Other objections Petitioner has alleged in his proposed recommended order that some of the objectives and policies used by the County do not conform to the definition of those terms in Rule 9J-5.003, Florida Administrative Code. However, the evidence established that those definitions are not mandatory, they merely provide clarification for the local government, and the local government is free to use other definitions in its plan so long as they generally conform with the codified definition. Since the challenged objectives and policies generally conform with the above rule, and they provide the means for their achievement, they are found to be in compliance. Petitioner also alleges that some elements in the plan lack certain policies and objectives required by chapter 9J-5 and thus are deficient. The more persuasive evidence shows, however, that each of the challenged elements was adequate in terms of containing the necessary policies and objectives, and thus the requirements of chapter 9J-5 have been satisfied. Petitioner next alleges that many of the policies in the plan defer implementation to the land development regulations (LDRs) or other regulations that will not be adopted until after this plan becomes effective. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, however, some of the policies do not defer to the LDRs. In cases where they do, the LDRs must still be adopted in accordance with strict time limitations established by Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, and thus the necessary guidance in the plan is not lacking. Petitioner further contends that "publications" adopted by reference in the plan "have not been adequately cited." He specifically refers to policy 1.5 of the Traffic Circulation Element which adopts by reference, and without specific citation to a page number, a manual entitled Institute of Traffic Engineers Trip Generation. Through testimony of witness Manning, however, it was established that it is impractical and unnecessary for the local government to cite specific page numbers of the manual in the plan itself. Indeed, reference to the title of the manual is sufficient. Therefore, those provisions of the plan which incorporate by reference other publications without detailed citations are found to be in compliance. Petitioner has also complained that the plan does not control growth, and it over allocates land to non-rural purposes. In this regard, the County's future allocation of land use was made through the use of a multiplier, which is a planning technique for assessing future land use needs. This technique, and the accompanying calculations, were not shown to be unreasonable or to produce inappropriate results. It was further established that, in making its projections, the County exceeded the requirements of chapter 163. Indeed, in the words of a DCA planner, the County made one of the "most honest assessments of development of any plan in the state." Petitioner next asserts that policy 2.1 of the Traffic Circulation Element allows a 20 percent degradation to the existing level of service for two segments on State Road 200, and thus it "violates the concurrency provision of the act and Rule 9J-5." While the level of service for roads must be consistent with Department of Transportation standards to the maximum extent possible, if it cannot meet them, the local government may show justification for deviation from those standards. In this case, the County presented justification for deviating from those standards by 20 percent on State Road 200 as authorized by Rules 9J-5.0055(1)(d) and 9J-5.007(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code. Therefore, the questioned policy is deemed to be in compliance. Finally, petitioner alleges that the plan fails to include an analysis of projected mass transit level of service and system needs. Admittedly, such an analysis is not found in the plan. However, this is because the County does not operate a public mass transit system. In circumstances such as these, the County is required by chapter 163 to have a mass transit element in its plan, but it is not required to adopt an objective on this subject. Therefore, the absence of such an analysis does not render the plan not in compliance.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that Marion County's comprehensive plan, as amended by Ordinance No. 94-12, is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-7071GM Petitioner: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 2-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 4a.-4c. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 4d. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 4e. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 4f. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 4g. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. 7-9. Covered in conclusions of law. Respondents: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Note: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, irrelevant, not supported by the more credible, persuasive evidence, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: William B. Hunt 3531 S. E. 30th Terrace Ocala, Florida 34471 Gordon B. Johnston, Esquire 601 S. E. 25th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34471-2690 Brigette A. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Dan R. Stengle, Esquire General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100

Florida Laws (4) 120.57163.3184187.20190.603 Florida Administrative Code (2) 9J-5.0039J-5.0055
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs ROBERT LOUGHLIN, T/A PARTIN PARK, 90-001904 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Mar. 28, 1990 Number: 90-001904 Latest Update: Jan. 24, 1991

The Issue The issue is whether the Respondents are subject to discipline for offering and selling lots in a subdivision. The Department contends that the Respondents were required to obtain an order of registration before selling land, and to comply with other requirements with respect to their sales practices. The Respondents contend they are exempt from the registration and other regulatory requirements.

Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency responsible for the enforcement of the Florida Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, Chapter 498, Florida Statutes. Orlando East Corporation is a Florida corporation formed in 1980 by Robert J. Loughlin which engages in the business of selling unimproved real estate in the State of Florida. It is not a government agency. Robert J. Loughlin is the President and sole shareholder of Orlando East Corporation. Between 1980 and 1986 the corporation acquired title to approximately 97 lots in the Partin Park Subdivision, a plated subdivision which contains 768 lots located in Orange County, Florida. The plat is recorded in Plat Book N at page 67 in Public Records of Orange County. The subdivision was originally approved by the Board of County Commissioners of Orange County, on February 9, 1926. On April 15, 1980, Orlando East purchased lots 1-24 and 25A in block 5 of the subdivision and lots 24-48 in block 14; on December 5, 1985, the corporation purchased lots 1-24 in block 8 of the subdivision; on June 27, 1986, the corporation purchased lots 25-48 of block 8 of the subdivision. Obviously, Orlando East Corporation is not the original subdivider of Partin Park. The Respondents have offered for sale, and sold 60 of the lots they had purchased in Partin Park by conveying 3-lot parcels in 20 sales transactions. Some of the parcels were sold by agreements for deed (nine sales), or by warranty deed or exchange agreements (11 sales). The relevant documents were executed by Mr. Loughlin on behalf of the corporation. All sales took place before February 16, 1987. One of the purchasers under an agreement for deed was Shirley Katonka. Mr. Loughlin solicited purchasers for the parcels owned by Orlando East through long distance telephone calls to out-of-state purchasers. The Respondents have not obtained an Order Of Registration to sell the lots under Sections 498.005(12), and 498.029, Florida Statutes. Neither do the Respondents have a current Public Offering Statement approved by the Division for the lots offered for sale or sold in the Part in Park subdivision. None of the land conveyed by Orlando East Corporation in the subdivision was sold as part of a reservation program approved by the Division under Section 498.024, Florida Statutes. None of the lots were re-platted after Respondents purchased them. The lots were not offered for sale as cemetery lots. The offer to sell parcels in Partin Park subdivision was not registered with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities, nor with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. The sales of each 3 lot parcel in the subdivision were for $5,000 or less. The parcels were sold without any residential or commercial buildings located on them and without the obligation of Orlando East Corporation or Mr. Loughlin to construct residential or commercial buildings on them for the purchasers. The Division had not granted an order exempting Part in Park subdivision from the registration requirements of Chapter 498 Florida Statutes, before any of the 20 sales were made by the Respondents. None of the 20 purchasers the Respondents solicited for sales received a synopsis, which had been approved by the Division, of the sales script used in conjunction with the long distance telephone solicitations. The original plan Orlando East Corporation and Mr. Loughlin had for the distribution of the lots was to sell all lots to fewer than 45 persons. This was accomplished by grouping the lots into parcels of 3-lot units. There were no covenants, declarations, or legal restrictions on the property which prohibited Orlando East Corporation from disposing of the property as individual lots. One of the reasons lots were sold in 3-lot units was to provide a purchaser a large enough piece of property so that the owner might be able to build a house on it, after obtaining a variance from the local government. The property was not sold as a home-site subdivision, however. The individual lots as plated measured 25' x 140', but the 3-lot units meet the county requirements that building lots have 75 feet of frontage and a minimum of 10,000 square feet. Of the eleven agreements for deed, eight of the original purchasers are making payments on their lots. Ms. Shirley Katonka cancelled her purchase several years ago. The Respondents are receiving a gross income of $750 per month for the eight active agreements for deed. The monthly expenses of operation for the Respondents' business is between $300 and $350 per month, leaving the Respondents a net profit of between $400 and $450 per month for the eight active contracts, assuming the purchasers continue to pay under their agreements for deed. Orlando East Corporation currently has $450 in the bank. Respondents are not offering or selling lots now, but are awaiting the outcome of this proceeding. There is no evidence that the Respondents have been selling lots in Partin Park under a common promotional plan with any other person or entity, and the Division does not contend that they are involved in a common promotional plan with any other person or entity. The Respondents argue that their subjective plan of disposition for their 97 lots is determinative of whether they are entitled to an exemption from the registration requirements of Section 498.025(1)(d), Florida Statutes. They contend that their plan of distribution would have provided for no more than 32 sales.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents to be subject to Chapter 498, to have violated Section 498.051(1)(a) and (d), fining them $1,000 each, and requiring them to give purchasers the opportunity to rescind their purchases under Sections 498.023(2)(c) and 498.051(3)(a), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NOS. 90-1904 and 90-2515 Rulings on findings proposed by the Department: Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 2. Implicit in Finding 3. 4 - 7. Adopted in Finding 3. To the extent necessary, adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Finding 7. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 7. Adopted in Finding 8. Adopted in Finding 9, but amended to reflect the figure of $5,000. 18 and 19. Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 10. Adopted in Finding 11. Adopted in Finding 12. Adopted in Finding 16. Rejected as argument. Rulings on findings proposed by the Respondent: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Findings 2 and 3. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Findings 4 and 5. Rejected as unnecessary, but implicit in Finding 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Only the conduct of the Respondent is at issue here. Implicit in Finding 12. Implicit in Finding 12, although there is no legal impediment to selling individual lots. Adopted in Finding 12, except for the final sentence which is rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 12. Implicit in Finding 12. Sentence one adopted in Finding 4, the remainder rejected as a conclusion of law. Adopted in Finding 7. Adopted in Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 14. Adopted in Finding 14. Adopted in Finding 14. Adopted in Finding 15. Adopted in Finding 15. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Finding 16. 28 - 30. Rejected as unnecessary, because the Division's policy is derived from the language of the act and is consistent with the decision in Associated Mortgage Investors v. Department of Business Regulation, 503 So.2d 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). COPIES FURNISHED: Calvin L. Johnson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Harold M. Braxton, Esquire Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156 Matthew Carter, Director Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Janet E. Ferris, Secretary Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS vs. THEODORE C. BOLDT, 88-002745 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002745 Latest Update: Aug. 29, 1988

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent, Theodore C. Boldt, was a professional land surveyor registered by the State of Florida under license Number LS002387, granted after examination on July 9, 1976, with an expiration date of January 31, 1989. The Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Land Surveyors, (Board), was and is the state agency charged with the regulation of land surveying in this state. On August 5, 1985, the Board entered a Final Order in which it concluded Respondent had violated various sections of the Florida Statutes and Rules. The Board suspended Respondent's license to practice land surveying for six months and, inter alia, required him to submit twenty-five surveys representative of his land surveying practice, accompanied by field notes and record plats for review by the Board. Respondent has submitted fifteen of the surveys, the first ten of which were accepted by the Board. Survey eleven through fifteen, however, were determined to be unsatisfactory. On the basis of that Board determination, an Administrative Complaint was filed in this case alleging that the five surveys failed to meet minimum acceptable standards and thereby constituted a violation of Florida Statutes. The surveys in question were evaluated by Walter A. Paxton, Jr., a registered land surveyor for fifteen years, who has spent a total of thirty-five years in the surveying field. During the course of his career, he has done several thousand surveys and has never had a complaint filed against him. As a part of his practice, he keeps up with the Rules and Standards of the profession by review of agency bulletins and letters and by taking continuing education seminars. Mr. Paxton graded these surveys utilizing a Minimum Standards Probation Report Checklist which identified numerous items for evaluation and grading. Grades available included violation; acceptable, which means that the answer meets the requirements of the rules; not applicable, which means that the subject matter does not pertain to the case under consideration; and marginally acceptable, which refers to an error of a minor nature, such as a typographical error, which is not a true violation of the Rule setting forth minimum standards. With regard to the first survey evaluated, Survey Exhibit 11, Mr. Paxton found one violation. Under the pertinent rule, each survey must fall into a descriptive category to be designated on the drawing. In this case, Respondent described the survey as a "Boundary" survey when, in fact, it should have been described as "As Built." A "Boundary" survey is generally utilized only for raw acreage and this property had a structure built on it. Mr. Paxton also found one marginally acceptable item in that the survey did not reflect the relevant Rule under which the survey was conducted. As to Survey Exhibit 12, Mr. Paxton found two violations. Again, the type of survey described was wrong and the survey failed to show the lot dimensions on the West side of the final drawing. The field notes reflected 81 feet for the West side of the lot. Of the four marginally acceptable issues, the first dealt with the completeness of the survey and relates to the Respondent's failure to put in the total dimensions as described above. In the second, the drawing failed to show the bearings on the finished product. The third relates to Respondent's failure to indicate the adjoining lot and block number on the South side of the drawing. The fourth pertains to Respondent's failure to reflect the Rule number in his certification. This last was a deficiency in each of the five surveys in question. As to survey Number 13, Mr. Paxton found one violation which again related to Respondent's use of the term "Boundary" survey instead of "As Built" on a survey of a lot on which a structure has been erected. Two marginally acceptable items related to the failure to show the Rule in the certification and Respondent's failure to list both lot and block when identifying lots adjacent to the property under survey. This, too, is a repeat deficiency. In the fourth survey, Number 14, Mr. Paxton found three violations and three marginally acceptables. The violations related to the Respondent's failure to show a Block identification on the survey and his showing only of the lot number. The second was that Respondent's field notes did not indicate a closure on elevation, but instead, showed only the elevation from the benchmark to a point on the ground. Respondent admitted this was a violation. The third related to Respondent's failure to indicate the original benchmark on the drawing but only the site benchmark. In this case, Respondent admits to this but indicates he could not find the original benchmark because of the distance from the site of the survey. He described the search therefor as being "hard" to do. The marginally acceptable items on this survey again relate to Respondent's failure to show the Rule number in the certification portion of the survey; his failure to include the Block number in addition to the Lot number on the sketch; and his failure to identify adjoining property Lot and Block numbers on the drawing. The fifth survey contained two violations and four marginally acceptable items. The violations were, again, the failure to properly describe the survey as "As Built", and the failure to indicate angles on the field notes. The four marginally acceptables relate to the Respondent's failure to refer to the Rule in his certification; his failure to indicate the block number as well as the lot number on the sketch; the failure to maintain acceptable quality field notes (the failure to list the angles as required); and the failure to reflect on the second sketch of this property a revision date indicating the first sketch was changed. Based on the above identified violations and marginally acceptable items, Mr. Paxton concluded that the surveys in question here do not meet the acceptable standards of the State of Florida for surveys and it is so found. Respondent does not deny that the actions alleged as violations or marginally acceptable areas occurred. He objects, however, to the fact that they were described as violations. Mr. Boldt has been in the surveying profession for 49 years, having started with his father at the age of 10. It is his practice not to put the Block number on a survey unless Lots beside or behind the Lot being surveyed are in a different Block. This practice has been accepted by various banks and the county since he has been doing it and certainly since 1983, when the subject was made a matter of Rule. By the same token, banks and the county have also for years accepted without question his use of the descriptive term, "Boundary" for the type of survey. Accepted use is irrelevant, however, if the rules in question prescribe otherwise. From his testimony it can only be gathered that Respondent complies with the Rules "when he can." When Mr. Paxton pointed out that the requirements identified here appear in the Rules of the Board, Respondent pointed out that the Rules were "new Rules". This approach to the profession of land surveying, while satisfactory to him, is not acceptable when measured against the Board rules.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a registered land surveyor in Florida be suspended for 18 months with such suspension to be stayed for a probation period of 18 months under such terms and conditions as the Board of Professional Land Surveyors may specify. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of August, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: G. W. Harrell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Theodore C. Boldt 5424 Hayden Blvd. Sarasota, Florida 33582 Allen R. Smith, Jr. Executive Director DPR, Board of Professional Land Surveyors 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

Florida Laws (4) 120.57455.227472.031472.033
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BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS vs. DENNIS HEASLEY, 84-000640 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000640 Latest Update: Oct. 17, 1986

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations involved in this administrative hearing, the Respondent, Dennis Heasley, was a licensed land surveyor having been issued license number LS 3466 by the State of Florida. In January 1981 Respondent was an employee of James Bushouse and Associates, a land surveying firm. On January 31, 1981, MidSouth Engineering (MidSouth), a licensed land surveying company, entered into a contract with Figg and Muller Engineers, Inc., and the State of Florida, Department of Transportation, to provide engineering and land surveying services for the new Sunshine Skyway Bridge project. On June 10, 1981, MidSouth entered into a contract with Bushouse for Respondent, Heasley, and other Bushouse employees to perform some of the land survey services called for in the contract MidSouth had with the Department of Transportation. Thereafter, MidSouth entered into an agreement with Respondent Heasley and one Jorge R. Saniz providing that, for a fee of $200,000.00 Heasley and Sainz would provide land surveying and consulting services to MidSouth for its work under its state contract. On or about June 26, 1981, Heasley and Sainz began their work under the agreement with MidSouth, and the work called for by the agreement was satisfactorily completed by July 31, 1981. Thereafter, Heasley billed MidSouth for the unpaid remainder of the contract price and was paid. The contract between MidSouth and the State of Florida provided for payment by the State based on crew day rates wherein the State would pay so much money per crew day expended. The work in issue here was to take no more than 85 crew days with an upper limit on payment to be approximately $300,000.00. Respondent actually completed the work in 34 days. His speedy completion of the job resulted in MidSouth receiving less under its contract than anticipated. Shortly after completion, he became an employee of MidSouth. In the course of his continuing employment, he worked on some other aspects of the bridge project that were awarded to MidSouth. Respondent's lump-sum contract with MidSouth called for payment to him of $200,000.00. Out of that sum he was supposed to pay all his and Sainz' job expenses which included the salary, housing, and feeding of the employees he hired to perform the actual surveying work. His understanding with MidSouth called for him to utilize approximately 12 to 16 crew members. During the time the work was being performed, Respondent and Mr. Sainz rented a house near the work-site in which crew members were provided a place to live. Food paid for by Respondent Sainz was provided as were laundry facilities. The sums paid for these items as well as the transportation of the workers and the worker's salaries were to come from the $200,000.00 fee paid by MidSouth. Payments were made on the basis of periodic draws. Either Heasley or Sainz would contact MidSouth and state that some money was required for expenses and a sum was furnished. As this sum was expended Respondent would ask for more. He indicates that the relationship was like a game in that he asked for as much as he thought he could get and MidSouth would pay as little as it thought it could get away with. In any event, no actual per diem monies were paid by Respondent to the employees who were working on the survey crew. Respondent admits that during the 34 days this arrangement was in effect, he kept very few records and receipts. He relied on MidSouth to keep all the expense records and whatever receipts he received for money spent, he sent in to MidSouth which made up the payroll for Heasley and Sainz' crew members from the times he called in. Several months after the subcontract between Heasley, Sainz, and MidSouth was completed, Heasley was called by Tom Heinly, Executive Vice- President of MidSouth and his immediate supervisor, with a request that he, Heasley, prepare, sign and submit a list of per diem expenses for the crew which worked on the contract referenced above. In the course of the conversation, Heinly asked that it be prepared a certain way. In response, Respondent told Heinly that he could not do that because he had not paid the money as per diem payments but had provided payment in kind in the form of food, lodging, and laundry. Heinly advised Respondent to think about it and later called back again asking that Heasley prepare and sign a statement indicating per diem money paid. Heinly argued that MidSouth was entitled to the money and asked that Heasley do this as a favor. Again, Heasley refused. The third time Heinly called Heasley, he indicated that the list would be strictly a memorandum between Heasley and MidSouth to account for some of the money advanced by MidSouth and that the list had nothing to do with the State. Heinly assured Heasley that the improper, inaccurate list would not go to the State since this was one of Heasley's concerns. Heinly indicated that he had talked with representatives of the State and had been assured that it was legitimate to file an invoice such as this. Heasley was led to believe that the State would not reimburse MidSouth for advances made for in-kind payments but would reimburse for actual per diem expenses. Ultimately, since Heasley was convinced by Heinly that MidSouth was entitled to be reimbursed for these monies and since, to the best of his recollection, he, Heasley, had paid out in in-kind expense a sum similar to that claimed on the per diem list, it would be all right to so certify. Therefore, he agreed to sign the list after the third request. The list which Heasley signed was prepared by MidSouth personnel, not Heasley, and was brought to Heasley by Mr. Duffer, MidSouth's chief accountant. Respondent does not recall going over the list at the time he signed it and verified neither the names nor the amounts set out thereon. When he checked it over much later, he found that some of the names on the list should not have been there. Respondent admits signing the document and admits that the document as signed was false. When investigators from the State Attorney's Office initially talked with Mr. Heasley about this incident he was less than forthright. Though they had advised him they were investigating the relationship between MidSouth and the Department of Transportation, the tenor of their questions indicated to him that they were investigating him and his answers were evasive and, in fact, erroneous. However, when he subsequently found out the nature of the investigation, he attempted to get word to the investigators that he would like to continue the discussion. He was unable to do so, however, and was not interviewed by these officials again. He was, however, subsequently interviewed by Mr. Cartwright who, in mid to late 1981, was conducting an investigation into the MidSouth, Heasley and Sainz relationship with the Skyway Bridge project. An engineer with the State had expressed some concern regarding invoices submitted by MidSouth and the preliminary inquiry showed some cause for concern. As a result, a full investigation was begun which revealed that MidSouth had little if any documentation to cover invoices submitted to the State. It also showed that the company's accounting procedures and internal control were almost nonexistent. As a part of the investigation Cartwright interviewed Heasley who admitted that he had signed the documents referred to above regarding per diem payments. Heasley also admitted that in some cases the payees did not receive the money claimed but in his opinion, the bottom line balanced out and MidSouth was entitled to the total sum.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Dennis Heasley's license as a land surveyor in the State of Florida, be placed on probation for a period of two years, under such terms and conditions as shall be established by the Board of Land Surveyors, and that he be reprimanded and pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 E. C. Deeno Kitchen, Esquire Melissa Fletcher Allaman Post Office Drawer 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Allen R. Smith, Jr. Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 2.01455.227472.031472.033
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PATRICK F. SMITH AND MARK O`DONNELL vs TOWN OF LANTANA, 09-002891GM (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lantana, Florida May 27, 2009 Number: 09-002891GM Latest Update: Oct. 10, 2011

Conclusions On March 10, 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of the Division of Administrative Hearings entered an Order Closing File in the above captioned case.

Other Judicial Opinions OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL - CALDWELL BUILDING, 107 EAST MADISON STREET, MSC 110, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-4128, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS 2 Final Order No. DEO11-0006 FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE THEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Economic Opportunity, and that true and correct copies have been furnished to the persons listed below in the manner described, on this fopllriay of October 2011. : Miriam Snipes, Agency Clerk DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 107 East Madison Street, MSC 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 By U.S. Mail: Alfred J. Malefatto, Esquire Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 777 South Flagler Drive, Suite 300E West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 R. Max Lohman, Esquire Corbett and White, P.A; 1111 Hypoluxo Road, Suite 207 Lantana, Florida 33462 Brian Joslyn, Esquire Gregory S. Kino, Esquire Boose, Casey, Cikin, Lubitz, Martens, McBane & O*Connell Northbridge Center, 19th Floor 515 North Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-4626 By Hand Delivery: David L. Jordan, Assistant General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street, MSC 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 By Filing with DOAH: The Honorable D. R. Alexander Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Final Order No. DEO11-0006

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NORTH BROWARD COUNTY RESOURCE RECOVERY PROJECT, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 86-000674 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000674 Latest Update: Jul. 01, 1986

Findings Of Fact The Resource Recovery Facility The purpose of the Applicants' proposed resource recovery facility (RRF), a solid waste-fired electrical power plant, is to dispose of municipal solid waste and recover energy. This "waste to energy" facility will initially dispose of up to 2,200 tons of refuse each day, and generate up to 55.5 megawatts of electrical power. The ultimate disposal capacity of the proposed facility is 3,300 tons of refuse each day, and a generating capacity of 83.25 megawatts. The proposed RRF complex will include an administrative building, scalehouse/weigh station, receiving and handling building, furnace boilers, turbine generators, ash disposal area, and electrical substation. The site development plans for the project contemplate that solid waste will be delivered by truck to the enclosed refuse receiving and handling building. All waste will be stored and processed inside the main facility. The Site The site for the proposed RRF is an undeveloped 25-acre parcel of land situated on the south side of Northwest 45th Street (Hilton Road), midway between the Florida Turnpike and Powerline Road; an unincorporated area of Broward County. The uses surrounding the site are predominantly industrial. On the south side of Hilton Road, between the Florida Turnpike, which lies to the west, and Powerline Road, which lies to the east, are welding shops, engine repair shops, and automobile salvage yards. Located north of Hilton Road is an industrial zoned area which includes an asphalt batching plant. Immediately south and east of the project site is a newly permitted landfill area which will function as an expansion of the existing landfill located immediately south and west of the site's boundaries. Consistency of the site with local land use plans and zoning ordinances Broward County has adopted a Comprehensive Plan, pursuant to Chapter 163 Florida Statutes, which establishes guidelines and policies to promote orderly and balanced economic, social, physical, environmental and fiscal development of the area. Pertinent to this proceeding are the Broward bounty Land Use Plan-map and the Unincorporated Area Land Use Plan (the land use plan element of the comprehensive plan), and Broward County's zoning ordinances. The proposed site is designated industrial under the Broward County Land Use Plan-map and the Unincorporated Area Land Use Plan. The proposed RRF is a utility for solid waste disposal and, as such, an allowable use under the industrial designation of both plans, and satisfies the goals, policies, and objectives of the Broward County Comprehensive Plan. On April 22, 1986, the Board of County Commissioners of Broward County approved the rezoning of the site to Planned Unit Development (PUD) Special Complex District, and approved the RRF conceptual site plan. The proposed RRF is a Planned Special Complex under Broward County's PUD zoning ordinances and, as such, a permitted non-residential use. 1/ The Department of Community Affairs, Department of Environmental Regulation, and South Florida Water Management District concur that the proposed RRF is consistent and in compliance with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances. The Public Service Commission did not participate in this land use portion of the power plant siting process. Notice of the land use hearing was published in the Fort Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel on April 21, 1986, and in the Florida Administrative Weekly on April 18, 1986.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Siting Board, enter a Final Order granting certification for the location, construction and operation of the proposed facility, subject to the conditions of the certification attached to this Recommended Order as Appendix II. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of January 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January 1987.

Florida Laws (5) 403.501403.502403.507403.508403.519
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BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS vs. WALTER L. MOYER, 87-002539 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002539 Latest Update: Dec. 03, 1987

The Issue The issues for determination are whether, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, Walter L. Moyer, violated Section 472.033(1)(g) and (h) F.S. and Rule 21 HH-2.01(3) by performing a land survey in a negligent or incompetent manner, without due care and without due regard for acceptable professional standards, and violated Section 472.033(1)(e), (g) and (h) F.S., and Rule 21HH- 2.01(3) and (5) FAC, by providing a false or deliberately inaccurate survey sketch to a client on two separate occasions.

Findings Of Fact Walter L. Moyer has been licensed by the State of Florida as a registered surveyor from approximately August 1977 until present, and holds license number LS 0002828. His address for license purposes is Palm Bay, Florida, in Brevard County. His practice as a surveyor has been primarily in construction-related surveys and lot surveys, with very few parcel surveys. THE CHILCOTT SURVEY (COUNT I) In June 1984, Charles and Robin Chilcott purchased property on Grant Road, in Brevard County, consisting of approximately 1.44 acres of undeveloped land. The Chilcotts acquired the parcel with the intent to construct a home and keep their horses. Shortly after purchase, the Chilcotts retained Moyer to prepare a boundary survey of the parcel. The cost of the survey was $315.00 including $7.50 extra cost for two concrete monuments, rather than iron rods, at the front corners, as requested by the Chilcotts. The survey was performed on July 27, 1984, and Moyer was paid. He furnished the Chilcotts several sketches of survey which he had signed and sealed. In 1985, the Chilcotts hired a contractor, Casey Jones, and commenced building their house. At the request of Casey Jones, Moyer prepared both the foundation and final surveys. These two surveys were added to the boundary survey on September 26, 1985, and November 23, 1985, respectively. At the time that the field work on the foundation and final survey was done, Moyer detected no problems with the monumentation he had initially set in the boundary survey. He did not see any evidence that the monuments had been disturbed. The final survey shows the house to be 17.35 feet inside the east lot line. The Chilcotts wanted at least that distance because the area is zoned agricultural and they did not want the neighbor's livestock close to the house. They also understood that the county required a minimum 10-foot set-back. In connection with the construction of their home, and in reliance upon Moyer's survey identifying their property's boundary, the Chilcotts installed a well and a fence and had approximately 800 feet of sod planted along the east boundary. The Chilcotts have since learned that those improvements are not on their property and that their house is, in fact, only 7.25 feet from the lot line. In May, 1986, David Rothery, a Florida licensed land surveyor, performed a boundary survey of the Donald Waterbury parcel adjacent to and just east of Chilcott's land on Grant Road. Rothery checked and double-checked his field measurements and still found a ten foot discrepancy in the placement of the monuments on the eastern corners of the Chilcott parcel. Those monuments were ten feet too far to the east and were, therefore, placed ten feet within the Waterbury boundaries. He did not observe any indication that the monuments had been moved, and when he placed his corners for the proper boundaries, he found no evidence that monuments had ever been there before. As required, the monuments placed by Moyer had his identification on them. Rothery put a dotted line on his survey with the notation, "Apparent survey error on adjoining property by Walter Moyer Land Surveying". Rothery also called Moyer and told him about the discrepancy. On the morning of May 10, 1986, Moyer went back out to the Chilcott property and discovered that his monuments were ten feet too far to the east. He was in the process of moving them when he was confronted by Charles Chilcott. He told Chilcott that an error was made, that he "dropped ten feet". There was some discussion about possible remedies such as paying for the well and fence to be moved or buying the ten feet from Waterbury. Chilcott did not let Moyer finish moving the monuments. That night, Chilcott, who had never met Moyer before, but had only communicated by phone or in writing, called Moyer's house and confirmed that it was the same person he had seen moving the monuments. That was the last time Chilcott spoke with Moyer. Chilcott called Moyer's house several times over the following months, but always reached Mrs. Moyer and his phone calls were not returned. Moyer did contact Waterbury about purchasing the ten foot strip. Waterbury was concerned about how this would affect his eventual ability to build on his lot and refused to sell. Waterbury is not pressing the Chilcotts about their encroachments; he simply expects to have the matter resolved sometime in the future. By a letter dated 8/18/86, the Chilcotts requested damages of $2,500.00 from Moyer, including an estimate of costs to move the well, fence and a power pole and to replace sod. On September 13, 1986, another letter from Chilcott to Moyer listed the same plus additional damages, for a total demand of $4,025.00. In a letter to Chilcott dated August 27, 1987, Moyer offered to pay the application fee to seek a variance from the setback requirement and offered to provide a final survey and half the cost of moving the well. The letter denied that the problem was Moyer's fault and said that Moyer believes that the markers were moved between the date the survey was completed and the date of the foundation. The Chilcotts rejected that offer. No evidence in this proceeding supports Moyer's contention that the Chilcotts or someone else moved the monuments he originally set in 1984. The evidence does establish a strong circumstantial basis for finding that the monuments were not moved, but were incorrectly placed by Moyer at the time that the boundary survey was completed. Setting the monuments properly is an essential component of conducting a boundary survey. Moreover, when a subsequent final survey is done, it is the duty of the surveyor to assure that the original monuments have not been disturbed during construction and site work by a contractor. Assuming that Moyer is correct in his contention that the monuments were moved after they were set by him, but before the foundation was placed, it was his duty to discover that fact. He did not, since his final survey shows that the house is 17.35 feet from the boundary, whereas the house is, in fact, approximately seven feet from the adjoining property. Except when witness monuments are used, as when a tree or other obstruction sits on a boundary corner, it is a violation of standard surveying practice to place a monument other than where it is shown on the survey drawing. In this instance, the drawing is accurate; as described in the Chilcott deed, the northeast corner of their property is 600 feet from the section corner. There was no need for witness monuments here; yet the east boundary monuments are ten feet off and are 590 feet from the section corner. There is no overlap in the legal descriptions of the Waterbury and Chilcott properties to account for the overlap in monuments discovered by David Rothery, the Waterbury surveyor. Surveying is a system of checking measurements. Both human and equipment errors in the profession are neither rare nor entirely common. Even the most up-to-date electronic equipment is subject to discrepancies. Checking and rechecking field measurements helps alleviate errors. The minimum technical standards developed by and for the profession are intended to reduce errors, although it is not clear that slavish adherence to those principles will absolutely prevent any possibility of error. When errors do occur, the standard of the profession is to work with the client to resolve the problem. In some cases, this may mean the purchase of the client's property or adjoining property if the party is willing to sell. Moyer's limited offers do not meet the established standards of the profession. THE BURGOON-BERGER SURVEYS COUNTS II AND III On August 21, 1986, Moyer signed and sealed a survey sketch of Lot 22, Block 2245, Port Malabar, Unit 44, in Brevard County Florida for Burgoon-Berger Construction Co. The survey of Lot 22 showed the drawing of an improvement within the boundaries of the lot with a notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV 25.86." Next to the date on the survey is the abbreviation, "FND". The survey was submitted to the Palm Bay Building Department on August 26, 1986, the day before the pre-slab inspection. A pre-slab inspection is done before the slab is poured; therefore, at the time the survey was signed and sealed, the concrete slab had not yet been poured. On October 20, 1986, Moyer prepared a sketch of survey of Lot 7, Block 1054, Port Malabar Unit 20, in Brevard County, Florida for Burgoon-Berger Construction Co. The survey sketch indicated an improvement within the boundaries of the lot, with the notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV 26.87". Next to the date on the survey is the notation "FND". The survey was submitted to the City of Palm Bay on October 28, 1986. The pre-slab inspection was done by the City on October 22, 1986. Again, the survey was signed and sealed before the slab was actually poured. The notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV", is commonly understood to mean "foundation, finished floor elevation". "FND" is commonly understood to mean "foundation". Moyer, himself, has used both notations to signify those common usages. Foundation is generally accepted in the land surveying profession to mean something permanent and constructed, like a concrete slab, not bust the ground or wooden form boards used to guide the pouring of the slab. A survey which depicts an improvement with the note, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV", when the floor has not been finished misrepresents the status of the construction of that project. Reviewing personnel at the Palm Bay Building Department rejected the surveys and alerted the City's Flood Plain Administrator. That individual, Maria Parkhurst, reported the incidents to the Department of Professional Regulation. Lots 22 and 7 are both in the flood plain and slab elevation is significant, as the City must assure that federal maximum elevation requirements are met. The City requires the submission of surveys containing slab elevation data. Banks also rely on foundation surveys submitted by contractors in order to determine the state of construction before the release of a foundation draw. That is, before the contractor is entitled to partial payment for his work, the bank needs to know if the work has been done. Both Moyer and his client, Bergoon-Berger, intended the notation in these cases to mean "finished form", not "finished floor". Burgoon-Berger had Moyer perform a survey after the wooden form boards were constructed, but before the concrete slab was poured, in order to assure that the house was placed properly on the lot. The survey was somehow submitted prematurely to the city, whereas because Moyer and his client intended that the poured slab be re-surveyed before the sketch was submitted. When the survey for Lot 7 was resubmitted to the City on October 31, 1986, the slab had been poured and, while the elevation remained the same, the size of the fireplace foundation was slightly smaller. The notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV" remained the same, with nothing on the face of the survey sketch to indicate that this later version was the finished floor, rather than the finished form. Moyer no longer uses these abbreviations. A survey is not valid until it is signed and sealed, but once it is signed and sealed, it signifies to the client and to the public at large that the information provided therein is true and accurate. The standard of professional land survey practice dictates that abbreviations which are not commonly accepted should be explained on the face of the drawing. The professional standards also dictate that even if a client asks for certain information on a survey, in anticipation that other third parties might rely on the survey the professional should either refuse to indicate improvements that do not exist yet or indicate unambiguously that the improvements are intended, but still under construction. Notwithstanding Bergoon-Berger's and Moyer's intentions with regard to the two surveys at issue, Moyer failed to meet professional standards when he signed and sealed those surveys and released them to his client.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final Order be issued finding Respondent guilty of Counts I, II and III of the Amended Administrative Complaint and placing him on probation for a period of two years, under such conditions as the Board may deem appropriate, including, but not limited to the participation in continuing professional education courses and the pursuit of a reasonable resolution to the Chilcott's boundary problems arising from the Respondent's negligence in performing their survey. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of December, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1987. APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings on the parties' proposed findings of fact. Petitioner (Count I) Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraph 2. 3-4. Adopted in Paragraph 3. Incorporated in Part in Paragraph 1., as to the limitation of experience, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in Paragraph 3. Adopted in part in Paragraph 3, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 9-10. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 4. 14-18. Adopted in Paragraph 3 and 4. Adopted in Paragraph 11. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted in Paragraph 5. Adopted in Paragraph 11. 23-28. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Adopted in part in Paragraph 8, however the accurate date is May 10, 1986, and the evidence is inconclusive as to whether Moyer spoke to either of the Chilcotts before coming back. This fact is not material. 32-33. Adopted in Paragraph 8. 34. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 35-37. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 8. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 9. Adopted in part in Paragraph 9, otherwise rejected as unsubstantiated by competent evidence and immaterial. Adopted in Paragraph 6. 42-43. Rejected as cumulative. 44. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 10. 45-47. Rejected as cumulative. 48-49. Adopted in Paragraph 12. 50-51. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 13. Rejected as cumulative. 54-55. Adopted in Paragraph 14. (Counts II and III) Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraph 15. Adopted in Paragraph 16. 4-6. Adopted in Paragraph 17. Adopted in Paragraph 20. Adopted in Paragraph 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 18. Adopted in Paragraph 25. Adopted in Paragraph 18. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 25. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 25. Respondent Adopted in Paragraph 1. 2-5. Addressed in Background. Adopted in Paragraph 2. Adopted in Paragraph 3. 8-11. Rejected as immaterial. 12-13. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted in Paragraph 5. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Adopted in part in Paragraph 7. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence, except for the fact that the Chilcott house is 7 feet from the boundary. That fact is adopted in Paragraph 6. 19-20. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 8. Adopted in Paragraphs 9, 10, and 14. Adopted in Paragraph 10. Rejected, except as adopted in Paragraph 10. 24-25. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 11. Adopted in part in Paragraph 14, otherwise rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 13. Rejected as immaterial. While the boundary depiction is accurate, the placement of the house is in error on the final and foundation surveys and, of course, the markers are erroneously set. 30-33. Addressed in Background. 34. Adopted in Paragraphs 15 and 17. 35-36. Adopted in part in Paragraph 22, otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 37-38. Rejected as immaterial. 39. Adopted in Paragraphs 19 and 22. 40-44. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: DAVID R. TERRY, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 JAMES P. BEADLE, ESQUIRE 5205 BABCOCK STREET N. E. PALM BAY, FLORIDA 32905 ALLEN R. SMITH, JR., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 TOM GALLAGHER, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 WILLIAM O'NEIL, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750

Florida Laws (5) 120.572.01455.225472.0337.25
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JOSEPH C. WOODS vs. BOARD OF LAND SURVEYORS, 85-002217 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002217 Latest Update: Dec. 12, 1985

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a civil engineer and registered land surveyor in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. He took and passed the examination for land surveyor in Massachusetts in 1957 and was subsequently licensed by endorsement in New York and Pennsylvania based on having passed the Massachusetts examination. He has been a practicing land surveyor for some 28 years and is an experienced and well-qualified practitioner. Petitioner was unable to produce a copy of the 1957 examination he took in Massachusetts since no copy could be located in the files of the Massachusetts agency which licenses land surveyors. Similarly, no copy of the 1957 Florida examination is contained in the files of the Florida Board of Land Surveyors. By reason of Petitioner's experience he was exempted from taking the Fundamentals portion of the Florida examination but was required to take the Principles and Practices section. After recomputation Petitioner was awarded a final grade of 68 on this examination, two points below a passing grade of 70. Petitioner acknowledged in his testimony that retention of the workbook he was issued at the examination would not have changed any of the wrong answers he put on the answer sheet. He also acknowledged that to a question asking for the size of the survey marker used in Florida surveying he guessed 2" instead of the correct answer of 3". Had Petitioner correctly answered two questions regarding size of survey markers, he would have passed the examination. He also acknowledged that the answer to several of the questions he missed would have been known by a Florida land surveyor and had he familiarized himself with Florida law regarding land surveying he would have passed the examination. He also acknowledged it was customary to take a refresher course before sitting for an examination. Petitioner lost eight points on one question, the answer to which was premised on changing a filed plat plan as the question directed. In Massachusetts a filed plat plan may not be changed and, since Petitioner considered the question to require the examinee to perform an unlawful act, viz., change the filed plat plan, he declined to do so and received a zero grade on this eight-point question.

Florida Laws (1) 472.015
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BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS vs. RALPH G. PURVIS, 84-002000 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002000 Latest Update: Oct. 17, 1990

Findings Of Fact Respondent has been licensed to practice land surveying in Florida at all times relevant to this proceeding. However, between January 31, 1983 and August 27, 1983, his license was inactive due to his failure to renew. His license was reinstated automatically upon payment of the $80 biannual renewal fee in August, 1983, along with payment of a $20 late fee levied by Petitioner. On May 12, 1983, while his license was inactive, Respondent signed a boundary survey in his capacity as a registered land surveyor which included the following certification: "I hereby certify that the plat shown hereon is a true and correct representation of a survey of the property described in the caption thereof, made under my direction, and is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief, and there are no encroachments unless shown." The property at issue was surveyed by Mr. Teddy O. Potter, who has a surveying business in West Palm Beach, but is not licensed as a land surveyor. Respondent is a former business associate of Potter's and certified the drawing as a favor to Potter. Respondent had not visited the property or participated in the boundary survey in any way. His certification was based on his inspection of the drawing and faith in Potter whom he had earlier trained. The property is owned by Mr. Thomas Burdsall who originally retained Potter to survey the property for mortgage purposes in 1979. The survey at issue here was required for the construction of a warehouse. Burdsall again contacted Potter who updated his 1979 drawing without resurveying the property. It should be noted that Respondent was not involved in the earlier survey, which was certified by another Potter associate. Utilizing Potter's boundary markers and the drawing certified by Respondent, Burdsall's contractor laid out the building and began construction. Potter then did a third (tie- in) survey revising the May 12, 1983 survey to show actual building placement. This tie-in survey revealed no encroachment. Subsequent to the tie-in survey, City inspectors observed what they believed was encroachment by the partially completed structure. A meeting was held and Potter agreed to call in a registered land surveyor to conduct a resurvey. Potter retained Mr. Robert Turso, a registered land surveyor, who conducted the resurvey and confirmed the suspected encroachment. As a result, it was necessary to remove and rebuild portions of the newly constructed building at considerable expense to the owner, Thomas Burdsall. The testimony of Petitioner's expert witness established that the survey certified by Respondent failed to meet certain minimum technical standards recognized in the land surveyors' profession which are set forth in Rule 21HH-6.03, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C). Specifically, the following deficiencies were identified: 21HH-6.03(4), F.A.C., requires that reference to all bearings be shown and clearly stated. In the subject survey drawing, no bearings were shown. 21HH-6.03(6), F.A.C., requires the survey to comply with the real property description and all discrepancies with the boundary corners from the boundary lines shown by the survey are to be indicated. Here, the corners were not shown nor were the discrepancies between those corners and plat dimensions shown. 21HH-6.03(7), F.A.C., requires all angles to be shown directly on the drawing or by bearings or azimuths. In this survey, no angles were shown. 21HH-6.03(8), F.A.C., requires that the intersection and the distance to the nearest intersection be shown. These requirements were not met. 21HH-6.02(10), F.A.C., requires adjoining lots and blocks be shown in surveys of lots in recorded subdivisions. This requirement was not met. 21HH-6.03(18), F.A.C., requires monuments to be found or set. This was not accomplished, and no corners were shown on the drawing to be found or set. 21HH-6.03(19), F.A.C., requires boundary monuments be appropriately constructed, identified and set. This was not accomplished here.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's license as a land surveyor for a period of four months. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of November, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Shields, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Allen R. Smith, Esquire Executive Director Board of Land Surveyors 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ralph G. Purvis Post Office Box 16084 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph W. Lawrence, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.682.01455.227472.025472.033
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS vs MARION COUNTY, 07-000867GM (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Feb. 19, 2007 Number: 07-000867GM Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2024
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