Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Ralph Woodson, requested a formal administrative hearing on or about March 6, 1987, with respect to civil penalties which the Petitioner proposed to levy on the Respondent. P. Ex. 5. A formal administrative hearing was initially set for June 23, 1987, by notice of hearing mailed to the Respondent at his address at Route 1, Box 410B, Groveland, Florida 32236. This was the address that was recorded for Ralph Woods on the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Complaint which was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Department of Labor and Employment Security as pertaining to the request for hearing by the Respondent. That same document is P. Ex. 1. On May 26, 2987, a continuance was granted in the case, and an amended notice of hearing was sent to the Respondent, Ralph Woodson, at the same address. The amended notice of hearing scheduled the case for 9:00 A.M., December 4, 1987, room 532, Curtis Petersen Building, 200 N. Kentucky, Lakeland, Florida. The Hearing Officer was in the above hearing room until after 10:00 A.M. on December 4, 1987, but the Respondent did not attend the hearing. The Respondent had adequate notice of the formal hearing. On May 13, 1986, Mr. Woodson was observed by the compliance officer, William R. Brooks, driving a Ford van carrying three workers. When he arrived, Mr. Woodson gave directions to the workers as to where to go in the grove and what to pick. Mr. Woodson admitted to Mr. Brooks that he was the crew leader for those workers as well as other workers in the grove at that time. On May 13, 1986, the Respondent was working as a labor crew leader or farm labor contractor in an orange grove in Indian River County. The Ford van had numerous safety defects. There were rust holes in the floor boards, the tires were slick (no tread) so as to be likely to cause failure, and the benches upon which the workers were sitting as they rode into the grove were not secured to the floor properly. The Ford van had been used by Mr. Woodson to transport workers 120 miles one-way on the day in question. Mr. Woodson had an expired state registration with him but was not registered with the State of Florida as a farm labor contractor on May 13, 1986. Mr. Woodson had a State of Florida registration application in his possession stating that he intended to be a farm labor contractor and not transport workers. Notwithstanding that fact, he was transporting workers. The van in which Mr. Woodson was transporting workers was not covered by any motor vehicle insurance. Mr. Woodson was aware that he was supposed to have postings in his vehicle and at the work site, but did not.
Recommendation It is therefore recommended that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter its final Order finding that the Respondent, Ralph Woodson, has violated the above enumerated statutes and assessing a civil penalty of $2,600. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 117, Montgomery Building 590 Executive Center Circle East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Ralph Woodson Route 1, Box 410B Groveland, Florida 32236 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Kenneth Hart, Esquire General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 131 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue Whether State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and State Farm General Insurance Company ("State Farm") made a material misrepresentation or material error in connection with the rate filing that is the subject of this proceeding. For the purpose of this proceeding, a misrepresentation or error would be material if it resulted in the Department approving "ex-wind" (meaning without windstorm coverage) homeowners insurance rates that are excessive for policyholders whose wind coverage is being non-renewed in Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties.
Findings Of Fact The parties in this proceeding have stipulated to the following findings of fact. Based upon a review of the record in this case, these stipulated facts appear to be accurate and are adopted. In December 1995, State Farm submitted a homeowners insurance rate filing effective April 1, 1996, for new business, and May 1, 1996, for renewal business. With regard to the December 1995, homeowners rate filing, the Department of Insurance approved a 13.8 percent statewide rate increase on February 12, 1996. On February 18, 1996, State Farm formally announced that it would non- renew over three years the wind coverage for 62,000 policies in Dade, Broward, and Pinellas Counties in Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association eligible areas. On February 22, 1996, the Department issued a Notice of Withdrawal of Rate Approval ("Notice") to State Farm with regard to homeowner rates approved for Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. Subsequent to the issuance of the Notice, the Department requested that State Farm submit to the Department actuarial information giving further consideration to the proposed non-renewal of wind coverage to policyholders in Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. The evidence adduced in this matter consisted of an affidavit of Douglas S. Haseltine, a Department actuary, on behalf of the Department, and of pre-filed testimony of Mark Brannon, a State Farm actuary, and of the rate filing that is the subject of this litigation and of certain actuarial information that had been provided by State Farm to the Department pursuant to the request described in paragraph 5 above. The record in this matter otherwise includes the Request For Formal Proceedings filed in this matter by State Farm, with attachments, which include the Notice, and the stipulation filed by the parties on May 31, 1996. The Haseltine affidavit provides in pertinent part that: "For policyholder whose wind coverage is non-renewed, their remaining premium for coverage ex-wind is not excessive." The Brannon testimony and the attachments to it establish the methodology by which State Farm establishes rates for policyholders in different territories throughout Florida for homeowners insurance, including both homeowners insurance policies that included wind coverage and policies that excluded wind coverage (hereinafter "ex-wind policies"). The Brannon testimony also provided that the rate filing did not reflect the distributional changes that would result from the non-renewal plan that was subsequently announced on February 20, 1996. Mr. Brannon further testified that, in his expert opinion, the failure to point out this non-renewal program did not constitute a material error or material misrepresentation because when the filing was made the decision to initiate these non-renewals had not been made, and because: Even if the non-renewal program had been announced prior to December 15, 1995, it would not have changed the rate request. State Farm's original rate request was a 24 percent increase. The approved rate request included a 40 percent wind or hail exclusion discount. This discount applied to the FWUA eligible areas of Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. The amount of this discount was not changed by the non-renewal program. Thus, the non-renewal program would not have had a material effect on the filing, even if I had known of the program at the time the filing was made. Mr. Brannon further testified that the rates proposed in the filing are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory, stating: Q: Are the rates you have proposed in this filing excessive or unfairly discriminatory? A: It is my expert opinion that the proposed rates are reasonable and are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory. Specifically, the proposed rates for both those policies which exclude windstorm or hail coverage, and the rates for those policies which include wind- storm or hail coverage, meet the statutory requirements and are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory. It appears that there is no misrepresentation or error in the rate filing itself, because the decision that the Department contends should have been disclosed had, as a matter of fact, not yet been made at the time of the filing. Moreover, if State Farm had an obligation to disclose this decision to the Department prior to the Department's approval of the rate filing, any misrepresentation or error flowing from the failure to disclose would not be material to the filing because the data subsequently provided to the Department and other evidence in this matter show that: Policyholders whose wind coverage will be non-renewed will receive a discount that is actuarially sound and commensurate with the reduction in coverage: and hence, Policyholders whose coverage will be renewed "ex-wind" will not be charged rates that are excessive.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: (1) finding that there was not a material misrepresentation or material error made by the insurer or contained in the rate filing; and (2) dismissing the Notice. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Vincent J. Rio, III, Esquire TAYLOR, DAY & RIO Suite 206 311 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1807 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently a registered farm labor contractor with Social Security Number 248-92-9496 and certificate number 4-92-9496-G87R. On or about February 11, 1986, Respondent acted as a farm labor contractor without a certificate of registration which was in full force and effect, and in her possession. While acting as a farm labor contractor in February, 1986, she failed to display prominently at the site where work was to be performed, and also failed to display on all vehicles she used to transport employees, a written statement in the workers' language showing the rate of compensation she received from the grower, and the rate of compensation she was paying her employees. In connection therewith, Respondent also failed to submit evidence to Petitioner that each vehicle she used to transport employees complied with the requirements of Chapters 316 or 320, Florida Statutes, prior to transporting farmworkers, or in lieu thereof, bore a valid inspection sticker showing the vehicle had passed the inspection in the state in which it was registered. She also failed to submit proof that she had taken out a policy of insurance to insure against liability for damage to persons or property arising out of the operation or ownership of a vehicle she used in February, 1986, to transport workers in connection with her acting as a farm labor contractor. Respondent failed to prominently display a copy of her application for a certificate of registration at the site where work was being performed in February, 1986 and also on all vehicles she used to transport employees. Prior to contracting for the employment of farmworkers, Respondent did not insure that the farm labor contractor displayed to her a current certificate of registration issued by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order assessing an administrative penalty of $2600.00 against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 2562 Executive Center Circle East Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Mary L. White 13 Garvey Lane Frostproof, Florida 33843 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Kenneth Hart, Esquire General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 131 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2151
Findings Of Fact On September 17, 1987, the Petitioner entered a nolo contendere plea to two felonies: possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana. The plea was entered in Case No. 86-342-CF, in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, Florida, and the Petitioner was adjudged guilty of the offenses. In the Court's judgment of guilt, it was found to the Court's satisfaction that the Petitioner was not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that RICHARD EPPS should suffer the penalty authorized by law. As a result of the Court's findings, the Petitioner, RICHARD EPPS, was sentenced to three years probation. He was ordered to serve five months in the county jail as a condition of that probation. On January 25, 1988, the Petitioner completed an application for a Florida Farm Labor Contractor Certificate of Registration. The purpose of the application was to obtain a new certificate as he was no longer eligible for a renewal of his prior certificate. On March 16, 1988, the Respondent notified the Petitioner of its intent to refuse to issue the certificate of registration. The reasons given were: 1) The U.S. Department of Labor recommended against it due to the felony convictions. 2) By rule, the Respondent is required to cooperate with any federal agency. 3) Once a certificate is obtained, each contractor must comply with all applicable statutes, rules, and regulations for the protection or benefit of labor. The Petitioner has used marijuana in the past. He has never used it during working hours, and his work crew was unaware that he has ever used marijuana. He has never allowed drugs in the work place and he no longer uses marijuana. The Petitioner has never used cocaine or other illegal drugs, except for the marijuana. The Petitioner's arrest on November 6, 1986, for the possession of cocaine and marijuana was a result of his location in the wrong place at the wrong time. When he went to his marijuana supplier's home to purchase marijuana for his personal use, the house was raided by the Arcadia Police Department. Originally, all of the people within the house where individually charged with possession of all of the drugs stored there. The Petitioner's plea of nolo contendere was a result of a plea bargain agreement. The Petitioner is aware that his former drug activity was criminal in nature, and he has stopped his marijuana use with the help of voluntary counseling, his family, the fact that he is on probation, and the fact that his habit got him into serious trouble. The Petitioner will not endanger the safety of a work crew as a result of his past use of marijuana. There is no evidence that the safety of the work crew was ever endangered as a result of the Petitioner's past habit or that his presence in the fields will be harmful to farm workers. The Petitioner has never engaged in transporting farm workers beyond state lines. His crew leader activities are confined to less than twenty workers and he works for one farmer, Mr. Bobby Williams in Arcadia, Florida.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a registered farm labor contractor whose Social Security number is 266-30-9569. Respondent worked as a farm labor contractor only during the potato season which usually begins in March or April. Therefore, Respondent did not apply for certification as a farm labor contractor until March 31, 1986 even though his previous certification as a farm labor contractor had expired on December 31, 1985. There was credible evidence that Respondent had been using a 1968 Chevrolet vehicle to transport farm workers which carried a valid inspection sticker and was covered by Respondent's liability insurance. The 1968 Chevrolet "broke down" and was replaced by a 1974 Dodge Van on May 6, 1986 which had passed inspection on May 6, 1986 and added to Respondent's liability insurance policy on the same date. There was credible evidence that a valid inspection certificate and insurance certificate for the 1974 Dodge Van had been furnished to Petitioner's local office in Palatka on May 1986 but was not received in Petitioner's Tallahassee Office where the official files are maintained until a later date. On May 6, 1986, Respondent was cited for failure to have the 1974 Dodge Van properly insured and inspected. There were other violations cited but the Petitioner resolved those in favor of Respondent. There was credible evidence that Respondent had operated as a farm labor contractor for a substantial number of years without being cited for any violations under the Farm Labor Registration Law, Chapter 450, Part III, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a farm labor contractor as that term is defined in Section 450.2(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, enter a Final Order dismissing all charges filed against the Respondent. Respectfully submitted and entered this 9th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Security Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Willis Glover 21 North Main Street Crescent City, Florida 32012 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue Should the Department of Insurance (now known as the Department of Financial Services, Office of Insurance Regulation) (Department) approve three insurance endorsement forms that State Farm Florida Insurance Company (State Farm) filed on November 15, 2001?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: State Farm is a domestic insurance company that the Department has licensed to transact property and casualty insurance in the State of Florida. The Department is the state agency charged with the duty to regulate insurers doing business in the State of Florida. State Farm offers five types of homeowners' policies that have been approved for use in Florida, an FP-7921 (HO1), FP-7923 (HO3), FP-7924 (HO4), FP-7925 ( HO5-Extra), and FP-2926 (HO6). The HO1 is a "named perils" policy and provides coverage only for those perils specifically named in the policy. This policy is not offered in other states, and in Florida accounts for less than one percent of all of all policies in force. The HO3, HO5, and HO6 policies are known as "open perils" policies providing coverage for all risks unless specifically excluded by the policy. Although similar to HO3, the HO5 policy provides somewhat broader coverage with respect to settlement provisions. The HO6 policy is specifically geared toward condominium owners and the HO4 policy is the policy form that applies to renters. Of all the policies offered in Florida, the HO3 is the most widely used policy form and will be quoted from and used as the exemplar in this Recommended Order. The HO3 policy contains introductory provisions entitled "Declarations" and "Definitions," and is then divided into two coverage sections, Sections I and II. Section I refers to property coverage and with Section II referring to liability coverage. Section I is divided into a number of subcategories including the following: Coverage A (Dwelling), Coverage B (Personal Property), Section C (Loss of Use), Additional Coverage, Losses Insured, Losses Not Insured, and Conditions. Following the Section II provisions there are additional sections entitled "Section I and II-Conditions" and a section entitled "Optional Provisions." The HO3 policy provides coverage under Coverage A (Dwelling) for all risks of loss unless it is a "loss not insured." As stated in the policy: "We insure for accidental direct physical loss to the property described in Coverage A, except as provided in SECTION I - LOSSES NOT INSURED." (Emphasis in the original.) However, coverage for personal property (Coverage B) does not provide such "open perils" coverage. Rather, it provides coverage only for 16 named perils, contains a number of limitations on personal property that it does cover, and reflects a number of personal property items that it does not cover. All of State Farm's homeowners' policies currently provide some limited coverage relating to mold. Although the policies exclude mold as a covered peril, they provide some limited coverage for mold-related losses resulting from covered perils, such as a covered water loss that causes mold-related damage. Historically, there have been exclusions in property insurance for ordinance of law, earth movement, flood, war, the neglect of the insured, and nuclear hazard. Mold that resulted from a covered peril has historically not been excluded. On November 15, 2001, State Farm filed three proposed endorsement forms (Fungus (Including Mold) Exclusion Endorsement): (1) FE-5397 for use with HO1 policies; (2) FE- 5398, for use with HO3, HO5, and HO6 policies; and (3) FE-5399 for use with HO4 policies. The homeowners' policies, which the endorsements were to apply, had been previously approved by, and were on file with the Department, in accordance with Section 627.410, Florida Statutes. The goal of the endorsements was to eliminate mold coverage from State Farm's existing homeowners policies in Florida. State Farm's current rates do not include the cost of providing the mold coverage that the endorsements seek to exclude. However, there is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that State Farm would need to substantially raise its rates to include those costs. Before filing the mold-exclusion endorsements, State Farm entered into discussions with the Department about giving policyholders the choice of buying back some of the to-be- excluded mold coverage through buy-back endorsements (buy- backs). State Farm filed its buy-backs in June 2002, after failing to work out a solution with the Department that would have allowed for their approval. Although the Department disapproved the buy-backs in December 2002, State Farm has committed itself to provide policyholders with the optional buy-backs, if the exclusions are approved. If the exclusion endorsements are approved along with the buy-back provisions, any cost increase would be restricted to those policyholders who choose to purchase mold coverage through a buy-back. State Farm's filings of mold-exclusion endorsements are consistent with a nationwide effort by State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, an affiliate of State Farm to eliminate mold coverage in homeowners policies. In Florida, State Farm's endorsements accomplish the complete elimination of mold coverage chiefly through the addition of a new exclusion for fungus, including mold, within "SECTION I - LOSSES NOT INSURED." (Emphasis in the original.) The endorsements, when coupled with the underlying policy, state in relevant part as follows: 2. We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of the excluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss; or (d) whether the event occurs suddenly or gradually, involves isolated or widespread damage, arises from natural or external forces, or occurs as result of any combination of these: * * * g. Fungus. (Emphasis in the original.) (The text of the endorsement is underlined.) The endorsements delete all references to the term mold found in SECTION 1 - LOSSES INSURED. (Emphasis in the original.) The endorsements define fungus as follows: "fungus" means any type or form of fungus, including mold, mildew, mycotoxins, spores, scents or byproducts produced or released by fungi. (Emphasis furnished.) This total exclusion of mold coverage, using language clearly encompassing all manner of causation and occurrence, replaces the mold exclusions in the existing policies that do not use such broad language. The difference between the post- and pre-endorsement policies can be seen from comparing the above-quoted endorsement as incorporated into HO3 policy on the one hand, with the mold exclusions as they currently exist in the HO3 policy on the other hand. While the endorsements totally exclude coverage for fungus (mold), and deny payment for mold damage historically provided to insureds, the endorsements are not ambiguous, notwithstanding the testimony offered by the Department to the contrary, which lacks credibility. The endorsements do not add coverage. Instead, the endorsements eliminate coverage for mold that currently exists. However, this fact alone does not render the endorsements inconsistent, misleading, or deceptive when the endorsements are read in their entirety along with the remaining provisions of the policies. State Farm's endorsements were initially deemed approved pursuant to Section 627.410, Florida Statutes, which provides that an endorsement filed with the Department is deemed approved if it is not approved or disapproved within 30 days, or 45 days if there has been an extension, of its filing.. By letter dated June 28, 2002, the Department withdrew its deemed approval of the three endorsements and notified State Farm of its basis for disapproval. The Department's original disapproval letter cites three bases for disapproval. The Department asserts that State Farm's endorsements: (1) contain ambiguities in violation of Section 627.411(1)(b), Florida Statutes; (2) deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract, also in violation of Section 627.411(1)(b), Florida Statutes; and (3) deny policyholders the right to obtain "comprehensive coverage" as that term is used in Section 626.9641(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which is part of the policyholders' bill of rights. On December 4, 2002, the Department moved for leave to amend its original disapproval letter. The motion was granted. The Department's amended disapproval letter, which the Department back-dated to June 28, 2002, reiterates the previously alleged bases for disapproval and cites two additional bases for disapproval: (1) the alleged violation of Section 626.9641(1)(b), Florida Statutes, itself constitutes a violation of Section 627.411(1)(a), Florida Statutes; and (2) the endorsements, because they exclude coverage that "through custom and usage has become a standard or uniform provision" in Florida, violate Section 627.412(2), Florida Statutes. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that the provision for mold coverage has, through custom and usage, become a standard or uniform provision. Likewise, there is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that there is a "natural association between mold and water." In the fall of 2001, the Department began receiving a large influx of filings seeking to exclude or severely limit coverage for mold. Including State Farm's filing, the Department received between 400 and 450 filings representing between 200 and 250 insurers primarily between October 1, 2001, through the end of 2002. In the face of the inordinate number of filings, the Department sought input from all sectors of the public. The Department met with insurers and other interested persons and held four public forums around the state to determine the impact the filings would have on insurance contracts, the industry, and the market place. In the mean time, the Department routinely sought waivers from the insurers of the statutory review period set forth in Section 627.410(2), Florida Statutes, and additionally requested that insurers withdraw their filings. Insurers were advised by the Department that failure to waive the statutory review period or to withdraw their filings would result in the filing being disapproved. The Department initially approved the endorsements to limit or exclude mold coverage of three insurers: USAA, Maryland Casualty, and American Strategic. However, the Department withdrew its approval for each of these companies in letters dated September 18, 2002. The Department asserts that it does not have a policy to disapprove filings simply because they discuss mold or seek to limit or exclude coverage for claims involving mold damage. The Department admits that it is required to examine all filings based upon the statutory scheme. However, the Department has not approved a single one of the over 450 filings, regardless of the language or structure of the endorsements. The simple fact is that the Department had a policy from the fall of 2001 through December 16, 2002, imposing a moratorium on the exclusion or limitation of mold coverage. The Department altered that policy on December 17, 2002, when it entered into a settlement with Florida Farm Bureau General Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), wherein Farm Bureau's endorsement was approved allowing a reduction in mold coverage from policy limits to a sub-limit of $10,000.00 per occurrence, $20,000.00 annual aggregate. The Department's previous position that policies offered to Florida's consumers should not be significantly reduced was abandoned at that time. There was insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that the $10,000.00 coverage was a reasonable amount of coverage for the vast majority of claims for mold damage. The endorsements seek to limit or exclude coverage for mold that has existed for decades. There is scant Florida experience to support the need for limitations or exclusions on mold coverage. Even so, the Department cannot disapprove endorsement forms without authority to do so. There is no statutory authority mandating mold coverage to the extent of policy limits or otherwise in order for policyholders to have comprehensive coverage. Beginning September 15, 2001, the Department did not approve a single mold endorsement seeking to exclude or limit coverage for mold as a resulting loss from a covered peril until December 17, 2002, when it approved a filing by Farm Bureau as a part of a settlement of an administrative proceeding in which the parties were awaiting ruling after a final hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order approving the endorsements filed with the Department by State Farm on November 15, 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services Office of Insurance Regulation 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Anthony B. Miller, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services Office of Insurance Regulation 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 C. Ryan Reetz, Esquire Jim Toplin, Esquire Amie Riggle, Esquire Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 1221 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Vincent J. Rio, III, Esquire State Farm Florida Insurance Company 315 South Calhoun Street, Suite 344 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the alleged violations.
Findings Of Fact At the hearing of this case, the Petitioner's Motion that the request for admissions be deemed admitted was granted, resulting in the following facts being admitted: Waldron Produce of Citra, Florida, paid Respondent to supervise farmworkers harvesting peanuts on August 7, 1986. Respondent did not present to each farmworker he employed a notice of payment, showing the amount of compensation, number of hours worked, the rate of compensation, the name and federal identification number of legal employers of the farmworkers during the pay period, in detail, each and every deduction made from wages. Respondent did not retain for a period of three years an exact copy of each notice of payment form or a copy of the detachable part of the check, draft, or voucher that had been issued to each farmworker he employed. Respondent supervised a crew of farmworkers hand-harvesting peanuts approximately five miles east of Highway 301 on the north side of county road 319 in Marion County, Florida, on August 7, 1986. Respondent did not post his application for a certificate of registration at the work site of the farmworkers on August 7, 1986. Respondent did not post a working conditions statement at the work site of the farmworkers showing the rate of compensation the grower paid him and the rate of compensation he was paying the farmworkers on August 7, 1986. Respondent contracted with Waldron Produce for the employment and supervision of farmworkers without first displaying to Waldron Produce a current certificate of registration issued by the Bureau. In addition, the following facts are based upon evidence introduced at hearing: Respondent did not give wage statements to his workers. On August 20, 1986, Respondent met with CCCO Parker for a payroll audit. The audit revealed that Respondent was not giving wage statements to workers. Respondent did not make social security deductions and forward them to the social security administration. The audit revealed that Petitioner was not keeping the records by last name of each farmworker, or in a condition to facilitate inspection by the Bureau. (See testimony of Parker.) Respondent's records showed that he had paid Mr. Stanley Davy $77.00 for work during the week of August 4 through August 8, 1986. Mr. Davy received only half of the $77.00 and he worked approximately 11 to 12 hours per day. (See testimony of Davy.)
Recommendation Having found Respondent guilty of violating Sections 450.301, 450.33(7), 450.33(4)(a) and (b) , and 450.33(6), it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a Final Order imposing an administrative fine of $2,500 against Respondent. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Nathaniel Manns, Jr. Route 4, Box 4852 Citra, Florida 32627 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Kenneth Hart, Esquire General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 131 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of violating provisions governing resident migrant farmworker housing and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At no material time has Respondent ever had a Residential Migrant Housing Permit for any residential rental property that he owns on Marion St. or Hand Ave. in LaBelle. At all material times, Respondent spoke and corresponded directly with Petitioner's representatives concerning their claims of violations. Based on a preliminary investigation, Petitioner's environmental health specialist, Saul Gonzalez, determined that more than five unrelated migrant farmworkers were living in property owned by Respondent on Marion St. in LaBelle. Mr. Gonzalez telephoned Respondent and offered him an opportunity to obtain the required permit to rent residential housing to migrant farmworkers. By letter dated October 22, 1993, Mr. Gonzalez confirmed that he would give Respondent until October 27 within which to file an application for a Residential Migrant Housing Permit. Following the receipt of an application for a Residential Migrant Housing Permit for a "rental unit" located at "521 Marion," Petitioner's representatives conducted prelicense inspections of the property. They inspected four separate inhabitable structures, which were all owned by Respondent. The structures were located at 495, 497, 519, and 521 Marion St. The only structure at which Petitioner's representatives ever found at least five unrelated migrant farmworkers residing was 497 Marion St. At no time did Petitioner's representatives determine that five or more unrelated migrant farmworkers were residing at the three other Marion St. addresses. The violations cited by Petitioner's representatives in Citation C-8 actually were intended for 497 Marion St., not 521 Marion St., as set forth in the citation. Additionally, one of Petitioner's representatives gave Respondent until January 1, 1994, within which to correct the deficiencies and obtain a permit, but Petitioner filed Citation C-8 on December 28, 1993. On December 28, 1993, Mr. Gonzalez and another employee of Petitioner visited three inhabitable structures located at 204, 212, and 234 Hand Ave. These structures are three separate mobile homes owned by Respondent. Petitioner's representatives found over five unrelated migrant farmworkers residing in the westernmost trailer. In defense of both citations, Respondent, based on advice of counsel, argued that state regulation of migrant farmworker housing is preempted by federal regulation. He reasoned that federal law meant that he was not required to obtain a Residential Migrant Housing Permit in order to rent to migrant farmworkers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of operating residential migrant housing at one of his properties on Hand Ave. and imposing an administrative fine of $500. ENTERED on August 17, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 17, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1: adopted or adopted in substance. 2: rejected as irrelevant. 3: adopted or adopted in substance. 4: adopted as to the nine migrant farmworkers, whom Petitioner proved were unrelated. However, Petitioner failed to prove that the requisite number of unrelated migrant farmworkers resided in the other trailer. 5-8: adopted or adopted in substance. 9: rejected as irrelevant. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1: rejected as irrelevant. 2: adopted or adopted in substance. 3-4: rejected as irrelevant. 5-9: rejected as irrelevant. 10: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence, although, as to the easternmost trailer, Petitioner proved that the residents were migrant farmworkers, but not that at least five of the residents were unrelated. 11 and 13: rejected as irrelevant. 12: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Kim Tucker, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Eugenie G. Rehak District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services P.O. Box 60085 Ft. Myers, FL 33906 Wayne E. Rowlee 30 Hardee St. LaBelle, FL 33935
Findings Of Fact Respondent Charles W. Crowell, a State Farm agent under the terms of an agency agreement declaring him an independent contractor, has never employed 15 or more employees at any one time. During the 20 weeks next before petitioner Donna Clark left his employ, he had no more than three full-time and two part- time employees. As a State Farm agent, Mr. Crowell is contractually bound not to represent other insurance companies. State Farm, which has employed more than 15 persons at all pertinent times, prescribes policy forms, premiums, fees and charges for insurance, and prescribes underwriting rules its agents (and so their employees) must follow. Most premiums reach State Farm in the form of checks drawn by insured persons. But, as required by state law and his agreement with State Farm alike, Mr. Crowell maintains a separate premium fund account, into which customers' cash premium payments are deposited. Moneys are disbursed directly from this account to State Farm, which has the right to audit the account. State Farm determines Crowell's compensation based on the amount of premiums it receives on policies he has written, and writes him checks accordingly. At year's end, State Farm reports these payments to the IRS on a form 1099, not on a W-2 form. Mr. Crowell receives no compensation directly from the premium fund account. When an agent retires and in certain other instances, State Farm allocates policies among remaining agents, while honoring preferences policyholders express for particular agents. But it does not restrict agents to a particular territory or otherwise dictate where its agents conduct business. State Farm reserves the right to approve any advertising by an agency using State Farm's name or logo. But certain business cards bearing the logo are "pre-approved," except for the name of the agent or other employee in the agent's office which is to appear on the card. Mr. Crowell sets his own hours and it was he who decided the office would open at nine and close at five. Some days he does not open his office for business, even though State Farm offices are open. If he closes his office on days State Farm is closed, it may well be because he cannot do business with State Farm. But he is free to keep office hours on such days if he chooses. His compensation does not depend directly on the amount of time his office is open, or on the amount of time he spends at work. Mr. Crowell, not State Farm, decides whom to employ in his office, and sets hours, salaries and benefits for these employees. He, not State Farm, personally pays wages and benefits (if any), along with employment taxes for which employers are liable on account of their employees. But, on unemployment compensation tax forms, gives as the employer's name "CHARLES W. CROWELL STATE FARM INSURANCE COS" and signs as Charles W. Crowell Agent." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. Mr. Crowell drew salary checks in favor of Ms. Clark and other employees in his office on his own business checking account, which is not subject to audit by State Farm. These salary checks did not bear State Farm's name or logo. The parties have stipulated, as follows: "5. Crowell's office is located at 908 Michigan Avenue in Pensacola, Florida, and he personally owns the property and building where his office is located. State Farm has no interest or property rights in this facility. The only forms, manuals, and other documents located in Crowell's office which are the property of State Farm are insurance product information, including names of policyholders. The equipment, furniture and other supplies located at or used in Crowell's office are owned or leased by Crowell, and not State Farm. Crowell personally hired Donna M. Clark, and State Farm took no part in, exercised no control over, and had no input regarding Crowell's decision to hire Ms. Clark. Crowell sets the work hours, wages and benefits of his employees, including the number of employees employed by his business, without consultation with or the approval of State Farm. Crowell personally pays the salaries or wages and employment taxes, including Florida Workers' Compensation, Unemployment Compensation, Social Security (FICA) and federal tax withholding, on all of his employees, including Ms. Clark, and State Farm pays no salaries to or taxes on behalf of any of Crowell's employees. State Farm provides no benefits to the employees of its State Farm agents, and Crowell decides whether employment benefits such as health or life insurance are provided to Crowell's employees, including whether there is any cost to the employee. Such policies can be purchased by the State Farm Agent from State Farm, if he chooses to do so. Crowell, not State Farm, maintains all personnel records on his employees, including Ms. Clark. State Farm does not have any personnel records as to petitioner Donna Clark. Crowell's business is to sell State Farm policies and service State Farm policyholders. State Farm prescribes policy forms, premiums, fees and charges for insurance, and prescribes underwriting rules pertaining to writing State Farm insurance. Employees of State Farm Agents such as Mr. Crowell are not required to attend State Farm meetings or training sessions. State Farm offers training on topics selected by State Farm Agents, to which the State Farm Agents, such as Mr. Crowell, may choose to send their employees, for a fee payable to State Farm. State Farm requires Crowell to maintain a premium fund account, which is a trust account for the deposit of insurance premiums which are the property of State Farm. All cash premiums from policyholders are deposited to the premium fund account, and premium funds are promptly forwarded to State Farm. Premiums paid by check are sent directly to State Farm, and the large majority of premiums received by Crowell are by check. The premium fund account is subject to auditing by State Farm. As part of the audit of the premium fund account, State Farm develops a profit and loss statement which compares the claims experience of policies serviced by the Agent to the premiums generated by those policies and thus reflects the profit or loss to State Farm. Such profit and loss statement is for State Farm's own use in determining its own profitability and does not show or indicate the success of Mr. Crowell in his personal business as an insurance agent. Crowell maintains separate accounts for his personal and business funds which are not subject to any auditing by State Farm. Crowell is not paid for his sales activities out of the premium fund account, but is paid on a commission basis after all premium funds have been deposited with State Farm. Crowell personally directed Clark to attend certain training courses conducted by the local district manager of State Farm on underwriting insurance and product knowledge only. State farm does not require State Farm Agents to send their employees to training courses conducted by State Farm. State Farm does not allow employees of State Farm Agents to attend training courses concerning financial management or conduct of the agency, and Clark did not attend any such courses." Although not stipulated by the parties, evidence showed that, at one of the training courses Ms. Clark attended, a speaker told employees in attendance that they comprised State Farm's "front line." State Farm decides, with input from its agents, which courses and seminars to offer, but it is up to individual agents to decide who, if anybody, attends from their offices. State Farm employees known as agency managers coordinate operations of agents in their assigned area. When the agency manager decides another agent is needed, he recruits a trainee, who works for State Farm for two years or so (unless discharged earlier.) After this period of training, State Farm offers most trainees the opportunity to terminate employment and become agents. With State Farm's permission, an agent may incorporate. Even as independent contractors, agents receive contributions from State Farm toward personal insurance premiums, which are treated as part of the agents' income. The State Farm manager for the Pensacola area while Ms. Clark worked in Mr. Crowell's office offered bonuses to agents' employees who won contests, although this violated company policy. Ms. Clark did not, however, participate in any contest or receive a bonus. A number of unlicensed people in Mr. Crowell's office sign policies when he is unavailable. Because this practice is widespread, Insurance Commissioner Gallagher has insisted that insurance agents see that more office staff are licensed. Accordingly, State Farm's agency manager has asked State Farm agents to identify office personnel for licensure. Employees of a State Farm agency must be approved by State Farm, in order to obtain licenses. After an agent identifies an employee and the employee sits for an examination, State Farm does a background check and makes its decision about sponsorship. Ms. Clark did not seek licensure as an insurance agent, although she was among those who signed policies. In the course or her work, she spoke directly with underwriting personnel in Jacksonville, on Mr. Crowell's behalf or with his acquiescance.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petition. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Realtions 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Karen Lessard, Esquire 15 West LaRua Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Kathryn Errington, Esquire HARRELL, WILTSHIRE, SWEARINGEN, WILSON & HARRELL, P.A. 201 East Government Street P.O. Drawer 1832 Pensacola, FL 32501 Mary Jarrett, Esquire 2065 Herschel Street P.O. Box 40089 Jacksonville, FL 32203
The Issue Whether Respondent, Debruyn Produce Co. owes Petitioner, Florida Farm Management Inc. the sum of $4,846.00 for watermelons shipped by Petitioner and handled by Respondent as Petitioner's agent during the period from May 30, 1989 through July 5, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant fact are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, Florida Farm Management, Inc. was a "producer" of agricultural products in the state of Florida as that term is defined in Section 605.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Debruyn Produce Co. was a licensed "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued license number 596 by the Department, and bonded by Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless) for the sum of $47,000.00, bond number R2-27-13, with an effective date of November 13, 1988 and a termination date of November 13, 1989. At all times material to this proceeding, Debruyn was authorized to do business in the state of Florida. Around the last week of April, 1989, Petitioner and Respondent orally agreed, among other things, for Petitioner to produce certain quantities of Mickey Lee Watermelons and for Respondent to market those watermelons. This oral agreement was reduced to writing, executed by the Respondent and sent to Petitioner to execute. Petitioner, after making certain changes in the agreement and initialing those changes, executed the agreement and returned it to the Respondent. It is not clear if Respondent agreed to the change since they were not initialed by Respondent. However, the parties appeared to operate under this agreement as modified by Petitioner. Under the agreement, Respondent was to advance monies for harvesting and packing, furnish containers and labels for packing and agreed to pay certain chemical bills. Petitioner was to reimburse any monies advanced by the Respondent for (a) harvesting or packing; (b) containers and labels and; (c) chemicals, from the proceeds of the sale of watermelons. Any balance owed Petitioner for watermelons was to be paid within 30 days. Additionally, Respondent was to receive a commission of 8% of net FOB, except 30 cent maximum on sales of less than $6.25 per carton and 40 cents per carton for melons delivered on contract to National Grocers Co. The relationship of the parties was to be that of producer and sales agent. Before entering into the agreement with Respondent, Petitioner had agreed to furnish National Grocers Co. four shipments of melons totalling 8,000 cartons. Respondent agreed to service that agreement. Although Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger shows a credit of $6,007.13 for chemicals paid for by Respondent, the parties agreed that only $3,684.68 was expended by Respondent for chemicals and that Respondent should receive credit for that amount. The parties agree that Respondent advanced a total of $18,960.00 for harvesting and packing and the Respondent should be given credit for this amount. The parties agree that Respondent paid to Petitioner the sum of $12,439.32 and the Respondent should be given credit for this amount. Cartons and pads for packing the melons were shipped on two occasions and the total sum paid by Respondent for those cartons and pads was $17,225.00. The cartons were printed with the logo of Respondent on one side and the logo of Petitioner on the other side. Petitioner agrees that the number of cartons and pads used by him came to $12,463.78 and the Respondent should be given credit for that amount. All cartons and pads in the sum of $17,255.00 were delivered to Petitioner's farm. The amount in dispute for the remainder of the carton is $4,762.22. The Respondent was responsible under the agreement to furnish cartons and pads (containers). Respondent ordered the cartons and pads after determining from Petitioner the number needed. There were two orders for cartons and pads placed and delivered. There was an over supply of cartons and pads delivered to Petitioner. This over supply was the result of a miscommunication between Petitioner and Respondent as to the amount of cartons and pads needed. Petitioner agrees that all of the cartons and pads were delivered to his farm but that he was unable to protect these cartons and pads from the weather. However, Petitioner advised Respondent that the remainder of the carton and pads could be picked up at his farm. Respondent contended that he was denied access to the farm and was unable to pick up the remainder of the cartons and pads and, therefore, they were ruined by exposure to the weather. While there may have been times when Respondent attempted to retrieve the carton and Petitioner was unavailable, there is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent was intentionally denied access to Petitioner's farm to retrieve the cartons. Clearly, the ordering, purchasing and storing of the cartons and pads was a joint effort and both Petitioner and Respondent bear that responsibility. Therefore, the Petitioner is responsible for one-half of the difference between the total cost of the cartons ($17,225.00) and the amount used by Petitioner ($12,462.78) which is $2,381.11 and Respondent should be given credit for this amount. Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger shows that Petitioner shipped melons to Respondent in the amount of $54,715.63, after adjustments for complaints and commission. Respondent's accounts payable ledger shows receiving melons from Petitioner in the amount of $51,483.00, after adjustments for complaints and commission. The difference in the two ledgers in the amount of is accounted for as follows: Invoice No. 210066 - Customer paid $2.00 per carton less on 93 cartons, Petitioner agreed to the reduction. However, Petitioner's account is in error by 9 cents which reduces total amount to $54,715.54. Invoice No. 210067 - Respondent paid for more melons than Petitioner shows were shipped - $39.60. Invoice No. 210068 - difference in calculation of commission $13.32 Invoice No. 2100105 - difference due to Petitioner not agreeing to adjustment in price taken by customer. $2,886.00 Invoice No. 2100239 - difference of $108.04 due to Respondent allowing customer adjustment which Petitioner did not agree to. Invoice No. 2100267 - difference of $210.00 for same reason stated in (e) above. Petitioner should be allowed the difference due to miscalculation of commission in invoice Nos. 210068, 2100134 and 2100160 in the sum of $68.10 since Petitioner's calculation was in accordance with the agreement. There was no dispute as to the condition of melons being as contracted for upon receipt. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the melons shipped under invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 by Petitioner were not of the size and number contracted for by the customer. As to invoice Nos. 2100239 and 2100267, the adjustments were made after the fact without contacting Petitioner. As to invoice No. 2100105, the Petitioner shipped the melons to Russo Farms, Inc., Vineland, N.J., as per Respondent's order who then unloaded the melons and reloaded on Russo's truck and shipped to another buyer. It was this buyer's complaint that resulted in Russo demanding an adjustment. Respondent granted such adjustment without approval of the Petitioner. Although Respondent did contact Petitioner in regard to this complaint, Petitioner would not authorize a federal inspection, which he could have, but instead, requested that Respondent obtain an independent verification of the basis of the complaint. Instead of an independent verification of the complaint, Respondent had Russo evaluate the load as to size of melons and number of boxes. No complaint was made as to condition of the melons. Petitioner would not accept Russo's evaluation because based on the total weight of the melons shipped, as indicated by the freight invoice, Russo's evaluation could not have been correct. The only evidence presented by Respondent as to size and number of melon in regard to invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 was hearsay unsupported by any substantial competent evidence. Petitioner should be allowed the difference in invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 for a sum total of $3,204.00. No adjustment should be made for the differences in invoice No. 210067 other than the 9 cent error made by Petitioner because this amount is not used in Petitioner's calculation of the gross amount due for melons shipped. Therefore, the sum total of all melons sold and shipped is $54,715.63 - 0.09 = $54,715.54. The amount due Petitioner is calculated as follows: Sum total of melons shipped with proper adjustments $54,715.54 Subtract from that the following: Chemicals 3,684.68 Advances 18,960.00 Cost of Cartons $12,462.78 + 2,381.11 14,773.89 Payment 12,439.32 Subtotal of Deductions 49,857.89 Difference and amount owed $4,857.65
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent Debruyn Produce Company, Inc. be ordered to pay the Petitioner Florida Farm Management, Inc. the sum of $4,857.65. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Debruyn Produce Company, Inc. fails to timely pay Petitioner, Florida Farm Management, Inc. as ordered, the Respondent, Peerless Insurance Company be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and that the Department reimburse the Petitioners in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner. 1. Not a finding of fact but the issue in this case. 2.-3. Adopted in findings of fact 2 and 4. Adopted in finding of fact 8. Adopted in finding of fact 4. First sentence adopted in finding of fact 7. The balance is not material but see findings of fact 16-23. Not material but see findings of fact 16-23. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record but see findings of fact 9-14. Adopted but modified in findings of fact 21 and 22. 10(A), 10(C)(1), 10(E), and 10(F) adopted in finding of fact 24. 10(C)(2)(3), 10(d) rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. See findings of fact 5, ,7, 9 - 15. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent. 1.-7. Adopted in findings of fact 2, 1, 4, 4, 4, 6, and 7 respectively as modified. Not material. This involved invoice Nos. 210066 and 210067 and adjustment were agreed to be Petitioner and is not part of this dispute. See Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger, Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Adopted in finding of fact 21 as modified. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Not material. This involved invoice No. 2100160 and adjustments were granted by Petitioner and is not part of this dispute. See Petitioner's Exhibit 1. 12.-13.Adopted in finding of fact 21 as modified. Adopted in finding of fact 5, and 9-15 as clarified. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record but see findings of fact 9-15. Adopted in finding of fact 13 as clarified. Adopted in finding of fact 23 as clarified but see findings of fact 9-22.
