Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Respondent, Dr. Julius A. Okuboye, was a medical doctor licensed by and in the State of Florida. In the first of six cases upon which Petitioner bases its case, the patient was receiving medical treatment for a fracture of the right femur, (thigh bone), at Gateway Community Hospital in St. Petersburg, Florida during the period November 21, 1982 and January 13, 1983. Petitioner contends Respondent failed to properly perform the surgical procedure; failed to properly consider alternative courses of treatment; and failed to keep adequate medical records justifying the course of treatment taken. Respondent reduced the bone fracture here by using a metal plate running lengthwise along the bone in an attempt to brace the fracture by securing it to the bone with, initially, screws. The plate used by the Respondent was too short for the procedure in that it did not extend beyond the upper limits of the fracture by that distance considered by some to be appropriate. Petitioner's first expert felt the use of the plate which was too short and the screws used to affix it, which were too short, was improper practice. In his opinion, the procedure followed by the Respondent herein required the patient to undergo three separate operations rather than one, which unnecessarily exposed this elderly patient to infection and the risk of anesthesia on three separate occasions. Petitioner's other expert believes that because the Respondent used a plate which was too short for the fracture involved, it was necessary for him to go back in and fix the plate with Parham bands considered by many in the field to be an old-fashioned practice. These bands, when used, tend to devitalize the tissue. He believes that once having used them, however, Respondent should have used more screws to affix the plate and the bands. In addition, the plate did not fix the smaller bone fragments at the bottom of the fracture. Both experts state Respondent should have considered reducing the fracture by the use of traction and bed rest as an alternative to surgery. On the other hand, Respondent's experts disagreed with Petitioner's experts. One, Dr. Weiss, indicated that Respondent had two choices: (1) a prolonged traction and immobilization which, itself, poses a great risk for an elderly patient, or (2) the surgical fixation which was chosen. Here, the reduction was good but the plate was too short. Dr. Weiss contends, as was urged by Respondent, that this was beyond his control and while it would have been better to use a longer plate, the Respondent used the correct procedure and the fact that a second and third operation was necessary, was beyond his control. His choice to do them was appropriate. The other expert, Dr. Bodden, pointed out that even though the smaller plate was used, there is no assurance a larger plate would have precluded the second and third operations. He believes that in light of all of the medical problems presented in this case and since the ideal plate was not available, Respondent's choice was prudent. The length of the plate was improper but in the opinion of Dr. Bodden, the patient's bone structure contributed to the breakage after the plate was installed. Further, the use of Parham bands was not inappropriate. They have been used for many years and are still widely accepted and used. In fact, he uses them himself. Prior to the surgery, Respondent contacted the operating room charge nurse to determine if the proper plates were available, and was assured by her that a full set of plates was available for the surgery. It was only after entering the operating arena, opening the incision into the patient's leg, and thereafter opening the sterilized and sealed package containing the plates that it was determined the proper plate was not present. Absent a showing to the contrary, it is found it would have been improper to open the plate package in advance of surgery to check since such a procedure would have destroyed the sterile nature of the package. In light of the above, Respondent's actions were appropriate. As to the issue of the adequacy of Respondent's medical records on other patients, an analysis of the records showed that no discharge summary was prepared by the Respondent nor were progress notes kept by him on December 22, 23, 25, and thereafter for several weeks on an irregular basis. It may be that Respondent was not the primary physician and only the consultant, but the records fail to show who was the responsible physician and who was ultimately responsible for the patient. A consultant should always reflect in the patient records who he is and in what capacity he has seen the patient as well as his area of expertise and the actions he has taken. Here, the Respondent's failure to do so, notwithstanding some expert evidence to the contrary, renders the records kept by him inadequate. In the case of the patient who was treated by the Respondent as a consultant on a fracture of the left hip at Gateway Community Hospital between October 27, and November 10, 1983, Petitioner's experts have no quarrel with the orthopedic treatment rendered the patient by Respondent. However, Respondent failed to make proper entries in the patient's medical records and the notes therein were made by an internist. Respondent saw the patient on only four of the nine days the patient was hospitalized and in the opinion of the expert, proper practice requires a doctor, or his substitute in the absence of the doctor, to see the patient each day. It may be that this practice, which is generally accepted as appropriate throughout the medical community, is somewhat less significant in the field of orthopedic surgery. Respondent's expert indicated he did not feel constrained to see his patients each day subsequent to surgery so long as he was kept aware of the patients' conditions. While he makes progress notes, he does not dictate discharge summaries or any of the other records since these are prepared by residents based on the notes he has put in the file. The medical records for this patient show no progress notes by the Respondent on November 1, 3, 4, and 5, 1983, during which time the patient was in the hospital under the Respondent's care. In one expert's opinion, the missing of three consecutive day's progress notes renders the records below standard. Respondent indicates he saw the patient frequently right after the surgery, but once he was satisfied that her orthopedic problems were progressing satisfactorily, did not see her during the time she was being treated for medical problems unrelated to the orthopedic surgery by an internist. He did write medical notes on the first five postoperative days at the conclusion of which his postoperative care for the orthopedic surgery was completed. Were it not for her unrelated medical problems, the patient would have been released and he did see her once, (Nov.2) prior to her discharge after her medical problem had been resolved. On the basis of all the testimony, it is found that in this case, Dr. Okuboye did not fail to keep proper medical records. Respondent also saw a patient for a fracture of the left lateral malleolus, (the protuberance on both sides of the ankle joint), and is alleged to have failed to timely perform an examination of the patient; failed to have timely provided treatment; and failed to have performed a complete examination. In this case, Petitioner's expert pointed out that the chart kept by the Respondent failed to show any reference to a knee injury which was disclosed on post-treatment X-rays evaluated by him. Respondent is also alleged to have failed to have cleaned and irrigated the wound which was a part of the injury, and that he administered only an intramuscular injection of antibiotics. In the opinion of the witness, it makes no difference if there was an infection or not. It is, in his opinion; a bad practice to not debride and clean the wound. Further, he was concerned that the patient records kept by the Respondent did not reflect whether the Respondent responded to the emergency room at the time he prescribed the treatment or not. From the review of the records, he could not tell. Review of the case records by Respondent's expert showed there was no open fracture which required debridement or specific cleaning. The wound was a small abrasion. As a general rule, an injury should be more than 1/2 inch in size or have some bone showing in order to require debridement, (removal of foreign material and dead or damaged tissue). If those conditions are present, proper procedure is to clean the wound and to provide antibiotics, which the Respondent did, and the treatment recommended by him met appropriate standards. This is the better point of view. As to the records kept by the Respondent, a note regarding the action taken here was dictated by Respondent two days after the patient was discharged. The patient records show a postoperative X-ray was taken by Respondent but there is no indication in the record showing that surgery was done. The patient was admitted through the emergency room and was sent to the floor even before the Respondent was contacted. As a result, Respondent did not see the patient in the emergency room. The ER notes prepared by someone else refer to an abrasion and an approximately 1/4 inch tear in the skin. The injury was cleaned in the ER and the patient was sent to the floor after which the Respondent was advised by telephone there was a "questionable" fracture of the ankle. In response, Respondent gave orders for immobilization of the wound and administration of antibiotics. The following day, when Respondent saw the patient, he could see no open wound nor could he find evidence of a fracture. As a result, he discontinued the prescription for antibiotics and discharged the patient who, it should be noted, did not sustain an infection and who did well in his recuperation. Respondent indicates he had been told by the family physician who admitted the patient and the nurses on the floor, with whom he discussed the patient, that there was no open wound sustained by this patient. On the basis of this information, Respondent prescribed the questioned course of treatment and it would appear it was appropriate and well within standards. Between November 12, and November 22, 1983, Respondent acted as surgical consultant regarding a patient being treated at Gateway Community Hospital for a metatarsal fracture. Respondent performed an open reduction and internal fixation of the fracture and Petitioner now claims that Respondent failed to keep adequate medical records justifying the course of that patient's treatment. In that case, Petitioner does not claim improper treatment by the Respondent. However, one expert for Petitioner could not determine with any degree of certainty whether or not the procedure was required because of the absence of pre- operative X-rays and because of the inadequacy of the records for him to look at. The other Petitioner expert agreed that the Respondent took adequate care of the patient but because of the absence of postoperative film, the taking of which is a general practice within the medical community, he was not able to determine, nor would the Respondent be able to determine, whether the surgeon missed anything in performing the surgery. Respondent's evidence unequivocally contradicted the testimony of both Petitioner's experts. There were X-rays taken prior to the procedure by Respondent which showed a fracture of the outside metatarsus, (long foot bone). He proposed outpatient surgery of one day and reduced the fracture, inserting two pins as security. The postoperative X-rays show proper reduction. In fact, there are several sets of postoperative films and those taken after the holding pins placed in the fracture were removed show good reduction and full healing. Respondent discharged the patient from orthopedic care after surgery for release the next day if approved by the referring, physician, Dr. Lew. However, Dr. Lew kept the patient in the hospital one or two days after that for a reason not related to the orthopedic surgery done by Respondent. This would tend to explain the reason for there being no follow-up progress notes on the two days following the operative report done by Respondent on November 23. The failure to keep adequate notes adversely affects the entire care team not just the attending physician, as without adequate notes, the team cannot tell what is going on with the patient. The entire care is summarized in the progress notes and the failure to make notes on time leaves a hole. That cannot be said to have been the case here, however, since the orthopedic treatment of the patient was completed with the dictation of the operative report and the patient was discharged by Respondent. The patient's retention in the hospital for several days more was by another physician on a matter totally unrelated to the Respondent's treatment and Respondent had no responsibility to keep records on that portion of the patient's hospitalization. It cannot be said, then, that Respondent's records were inappropriate in this case. Respondent is also alleged to have improperly failed to perform a procedure of open reduction and internal fixation of an ankle fracture on a patient treated by him at Gateway Hospital between January 20, and January 25, 1983. In this case, Petitioner's expert questions whether the inner bone was properly reduced. X-rays taken subsequent to the procedure, show the reduction left a big gap and an irregular joint and the doctor feels the procedure, as it was done, was below standards. The other Petitioner expert concurs. There were two fractures. The smaller, did not need to be fixed since it was less than 1/3 of the ankle area and medical opinion indicates that fractures of less than 1/3 of the area should not be fixed. The other was fixed improperly in that Respondent should have used a tension band instead of a screw. If he had done so, there would have been a better fixation. Respondent's expert disagrees, pointing out that the postoperative X- rays show the position of the bones as placed by the Respondent, was quite acceptable. The failure to get an anatomic, (as developed by nature), reduction is not indicative of substandard care. It is sometimes not possible to put bones back the way they were prior to the fracture. In the instant case, when the operation and casting were done, the results were acceptable. The doctor concludes this was a very difficult operation to do and under the circumstances, the Respondent's performance met the standards within the community. Respondent's other expert agrees. This was an extremely difficult fracture of three sections of an ankle. Admittedly, Respondent's work resulted in a slight bone irregularity. A smooth reduction would be ideal, but it is unlikely that an anatomic reduction could be had in this case. No matter how skilled the work, a fracture of this kind is likely to result in some arthritis, and the failure to use a tension band, as suggested by one of Petitioner's experts, as opposed to a screw as chosen by the Respondent is a matter of choice. Neither gives better results and the Respondent's choice here, in these circumstances, was reasonable. Between December 18 and December 27, 1984, Respondent performed an open reduction and internal fixation of a fractured right hip. Petitioner alleges that Respondent performed a surgical procedure which was unnecessary, failed to properly perform the surgical procedure done, and failed to keep adequate medical records justifying the patient's treatment. In this case, Respondent inserted a Jewett nail, a non-collapsing nail, into the bone. The bone collapsed and drove the nail up into the end of the bone in an inappropriate manner. One of Petitioner's experts took issue with Respondent's use of the Jewett nail calling it an outdated device. In his opinion, the Respondent did not plan properly to have the appropriate device on hand when it was needed. His opinion is supported by that of the other Petitioner expert who pointed out that the procedure resulted in an inadequate fixation. He contends the Respondent should have used a collapsible nail and that Respondent's technique of cutting the bone after the collapse was inappropriate and resulted in a shortening of the leg. He believes this procedure was improper and falls below medical standards in the community. He was also of the opinion that Respondent's record keeping in this case was inadequate. Petitioner's expert in medical records found several problems with Respondent's records on this patient. The initial note was dictated after surgery instead of when the consult was first done. No progress notes were in the file for those days when the patient was not seen by the Respondent. There was no showing that the patient was seen by someone left in charge by Respondent in his absence. Since medical records provide a history of the case and allow the follow-on staff to provide continuation of care, the evidence showed Respondent's records in this case were below standard. Respondent's witness, Dr. Weiss, does not believe that the use of the Jewett nail is necessarily inappropriate. The fact that the Jewett nail did not work out for the Respondent in this case and required follow-up surgery, is not necessarily indicative of improper treatment. Studies of similar fractures in elderly patients show that 70% had some deviation and many similar cases show penetration of the head of the bone by the nail such as was the case here. While there are newer nails used by many orthopedic surgeons, the Jewett nail is still appropriate. The physician can avoid penetration at the time of the insertion and Respondent did so, but penetration cannot always be avoided after surgery when weight is placed on the limb. Respondent's other expert who reviewed this case stated that the fixed nail used by Respondent, if properly used, gives equally good results as the newer collapsible nail. Cutting of the bone is a well known and appropriate procedure in cases where necessary, as here. In evaluating the testimony of the experts, it should be noted that neither of the Board's experts interviewed Respondent or in any way discussed with him his professional reasons for doing what he did. Their opinions given here as expert testimony were based on evaluation of records and X-rays only whereas the opinions of Respondent's experts were based on review of the same documentation and also on interviews with Respondent who was questioned and who expounded on his medical rationale. Having analyzed the procedure done by the Respondent here and having evaluated the testimony of all witnesses, it is found that the procedure as followed by Respondent did not fall below the appropriate medical standards within the community. However, the allegation regarding Respondent's failure to keep proper medical records has been established. Respondent is a native of Nigeria, who took his medical training in England, graduating from Kings College Medical school in 1961. He interned in the United States at Bridgeport Hospital, served his residency and as a research fellow in Canada, and returned to the United States for a two year general surgery and three year orthopedic surgery residency at Albert Einstein Medical Center in New York. Respondent came to Florida in 1973 and has been in private practice as a sole practitioner since that time. He is Board eligible in orthopedic surgery and certified in neurological and orthopedic surgery by the American College of Neurological and Orthopedic surgery, not to be confused with the American Board of Orthopedic Surgery. He is also a member of the Royal College of Surgeons. At one time, Respondent practiced at Gateway Hospital in St. Petersburg where all the cases involved in the proceeding came up and where he was involved in legal action involving a matter he had handled. Respondent won that case but nonetheless, had to sue the hospital to recover his expenses. When Gateway Hospital was sold to Humana, he was again involved in litigation with the hospital to retain his privilege to practice there. Thereafter, he was called before the hospital committee regarding the instant cases in a staff privilege matter and as a result, the hospital referred them to the Department of Professional Regulation. Respondent believes two factions in the medical community seek his dismissal and the revocation of his license. He presented a detailed litany of grievances against various members of the hospital staff and others who, he contends, are engaged in a program to destroy him professionally and remove him from the practice of medicine. Since his medical privileges at the hospital have been rescinded, he can no longer accept referrals in orthopedic surgery from other members of the staff at Gateway and as a result, referrals that would ordinarily go to him, are now going to other, more favored members of the staff who retain surgical privileges. He contends his troubles, which culminated in this hearing, are both economically and racially motivated, and also involve an effort to rid the hospital of foreign trained physicians. There is no evidence to corroborate Respondent's charges and , therefore, the decision regarding his standard of practice and his record keeping must be based on the professional evidence presented at this hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Julius A. Okuboye, be reprimanded. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of February, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearings Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1988. Appendix to Recommended Order In Case No. 86-1048 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Accepted to the extent that Respondent's reduction was not anatomic but rejected to the extent "it possibly could have been better treated in a cast." Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as to all but last sentence which is irrelevant since the latter portion of the hospitalization discussed here was after patient had been discharged by Respondent and did not relate to orthopedic treatment. Accepted and incorporated herein. 14-16. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. 17&18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. 20-21. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. 22. Accepted as to certain records and rejected as to others as discussed in the body of the Recommended Order. For the Respondent Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected as a restatement of Petitioner's position. Remainder accepted and incorporated. First sentence rejected as above. Last sentence accepted and incorporated. Remainder rejected as a restatement of the evidence. First sentence rejected as above. Second sentence rejected as a restatement of evidence. Third through Sixth sentences accepted and incorporated. seventh rejected as a restatement of Petitioner's position. Eighth and Ninth sentences accepted and incorporated. First sentence rejected as above. second sentence accepted. Remainder accepted and incorporated. First sentence rejected as above. Remainder accepted and incorporated. First sentence rejected as above. Remainder accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as to some cases, accepted as to others as defined in the Findings of Fact herein. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Bryant, Esquire Suite 2000, Ashley Tower 100 South Ashley Drive Tampa, Florida 33602 Glenn M. Woodworth, Esquire Woodworth and Dugan, Chartered Wittner Centre West 5999 Central Avenue Suite 103 St. Petersburg, Florida 33710 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated sections 460.413(1)(m), 460.413(1)(ff), 460.413(1)(n), and 460.413(1)(r), Florida Statutes (2006),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B2-17.0065, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of chiropractic medicine in Florida, pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 460, Florida Statutes. Dr. Christian was at all times material to the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint a licensed chiropractic physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 5756 on or about February 4, 1998. At all times material to the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Christian, Dr. Davidson, and Dr. Kalin were employees of Comprehensive Physician Services, Incorporated (CPS). Dr. Christian was the sole stockholder of CPS. On April 17, 2006, M.M. was involved in an automobile accident when the car, in which she was a front-seat passenger, hit a tree on the passenger side. The window next to M.M. shattered and M.M. received lacerations to the right temple area of her head. M.M. was transferred by ambulance to the emergency room at Northside Hospital. While in the emergency room, a CT scan was performed on M.M.'s head. The CT evaluation was normal. The lacerations were sutured, and M.M. was discharged from the emergency room. On or about April 26, 2006, M.M. presented to CPS for treatment of injuries due to the automobile accident on April 17, 2006. M.M., who was a minor at the time, was accompanied by her mother to CPS. M.M.'s complaints were headaches; neck pain and stiffness; mid-back pain and stiffness; lower back pain and stiffness; difficulty sleeping due to pain; and difficulty with concentration. She indicated that, on a scale of one to ten, with ten being the most, the stiffness in her neck and middle back was a five. On examination, Dr. Christian found that M.M. had cervical and thoracic tenderness. In his initial report, Dr. Christian noted the hyperabduction tests were positive, and there was "left side reduced pulse/paresthesia due thoracic outlet compression consistent with compression from seat belt trauma." However, the test results contained in the medical records show that there are negative findings on the hyperabduction tests. When questioned about the discrepancy, Dr. Christian testified that the positive findings were a result of the grip/pinch test that he performed. He indicated that he made a mistake in his initial report and that the report should have stated right side reduced pulse. He could not explain how the grip/pinch test would lead him to conclude that there was a reduced pulse because M.M.'s pulse would not be measured during a grip/pinch test nor could he explain how he could learn from a grip/pinch test that there was paresthesia. Later, he testified that the difference in the results was not due to the grip/pinch test, but was a result of a second hyperabduction test that he performed prior to the grip/pinch test. Dr. Christian's testimony is not credited. Dr. Christian's practice is to have an assistant come into the examination room during the testing. As he performs the test, he tells the assistant the results of the test, and the assistant will record the test results. The medical records do not show a second hyperabduction test being recorded by an assistant. Therefore, the examination results are contrary to the results stated in the initial report for April 26, 2006. In his examination records of April 26, 2006, Dr. Christian noted that there was "R [circled] Visual Acuity Diff." M.M.'s mother was present during the examination and observed Dr. Christian testing M.M.'s vision on April 26, 2006. Dr. Christian testified that he first tested M.M.'s vision on May 24, 2011. His testimony is not credited. Dr. Christian's practice is to put findings of the previous chiropractic examination on the report of the examination that he is currently conducting so that a comparison could be made. The examination report of April 26, 2006, and May 24, 2006, are the same with the exception of notations on the May 24, 2006, report of 5/23 near the present complaints section and the section where areas of muscle spasms on the spine are noted. In his follow-up report dated May 24, 2006, Dr. Christian wrote: "Certainly today I see evidence of her continuing to have some alterations of visual acuity . . .". Dr. Christian testified that he had incorrectly included the term "continuing" in this statement. Dr. Christian's testimony is not credited. His statement that the alterations of visual acuity were continuing comports with M.M.'s mother's testimony that the first visual testing was done on April 26, 2006, and the examination report of April 26, 2006. Based on the examination reports for April 26, 2006, and May 24, 2006, there is no indication of what tests Dr. Christian used to test M.M.'s vision nor is there any indication of the exact nature of the problem with the right eye. Dr. Christian's initial report does not mention the visual acuity difference. His follow-up report of May 24, 2006, does not indicate the difference that M.M. is experiencing with her right eye. In his examination records of June 14, 2006, and July 25, 2006, Dr. Christian notes: " R [circled] side vision distance diff." In his final report of July 25, 2006, Dr. Christian noted as a current symptom, "[r]ight sided visual alteration with peripheral." He listed as a diagnostic impression: "Concussion with residual affecting peripheral visual field on the right, persistent." However, contrary to his final report, Dr. Christian testified at final hearing that M.M.'s problem with her peripheral vision had improved. On April 26, 2006, Dr. Christian's treatment plan included the following treatment for M.M. three times a week for four weeks: intersegmental traction, hot pack, and neuromuscular release for the full spine; inferential, alternating cervical to dorsal and dorsal to lumbar; full spine massage; and full spine aqua treatment. The therapist assistant was to determine which treatment modalities and areas to treat at each treatment session. Dr. Christian signed each of the daily treatment notes. On April 26, 2006, Dr. Christian referred M.M. to Dr. Kalin. According to Dr. Christian, Dr. Kalin had experience in emergency rooms treating patients who had sustained trauma. Dr. Christian wanted Dr. Kalin to look at the two lacerations that M.M. had sustained. However, there were no outward signs of infection of the lacerations, and the lacerations had healed. Dr. Christian also wanted to determine if there was any post concussion symptoms. Dr. Kalin evaluated M.M. on May 1, 2006. His initial diagnosis was that she had a "cervical musculoskeletal ligamentous strain" and a "[s]ubacute lumbosacral musculoskeletal ligamentous strain." His examination did not reveal any abnormality with M.M.'s vision. He did find that the lacerations may leave permanent scarring. In his interim report dated May 24, 2006, Dr. Christian stated: "Dr. Kalin was not able to mention the fact that she [M.M.] struck her head or had laceration and dizziness with nausea and vomiting following the impact." This statement is contrary to what Dr. Kalin stated in his report. Dr. Christian further noted in his report that he would follow- up with Dr. Kalin to see if Dr. Kalin had an addendum as to whether there is additional follow-up for post-concussion symptomology. In his report of May 1, 2006, Dr. Kalin did not make any findings of a concussion or post-concussion syndrome. On May 25, 2006, a staff member of CPS sent the following request to Dr. Kalin: Dr. Kalin, Dr. Christian asked if you could please make an addendum [sic] to your report on [M.M.] for her concussion-post concussion syndrome. Thanks! Kimberly Dr. Kalin replied: "pt had no symptoms of headache or memory/concentration when I saw her." No mention was made in Dr. Christian's interim report dated May 25, 2006, that Dr. Kalin did not find any evidence of post-concussion syndrome. On May 1, 2006, Dr. Christian wrote a prescription for hydrotherapy for M.M. for three times a week for four weeks. M.M. received treatment at CPS on May 1, 2006. M.M. indicated to the therapist that on a scale of one to ten that she rated her low back pain and low back stiffness as a four and her neck stiffness as a five. The therapist noted that there was cervical and lumbar tenderness. M.M.'s treatment on May 1, 2006, consisted of hot therapy and hydrotherapy to the cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas, and intersegmental traction to the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar areas. X-rays of M.M.'s cervical and lumbar spine were ordered. The radiologist who read the X-rays had the impression that M.M. had a cervical muscle spasm and a lumbar muscle spasm. On May 4, 2006, M.M. received treatment at CPS. She rated her neck stiffness and low back stiffness as a three. There was no notation of any tenderness by the therapist. M.M. received the following treatment in the thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas: hot therapy, intersegmental traction, and hydrotherapy. On May 4, 2006, ultrasound studies were performed on M.M. by Charles W. Hirt, M.D. (Dr. Hirt). Dr. Hirt's impression was that there were findings that showed evidence of a left- sided thoracic outlet syndrome. On May 9, 2006, M.M. returned to CPS for treatment. She rated her neck stiffness and lower back stiffness as a two. The therapist noted that there was tenderness in the cervical and lumbar areas. M.M. was given hot therapy, intersegmental traction, and trigger point therapy in her cervical, thoracic, and lumbar areas. She received myofascial release, massage, and hydrotherapy in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. On May 16, 2006, M.M. was treated at CPS. She rated her neck stiffness as a one and her low back stiffness as a two. The therapist noted tenderness in the lumbar area. The treatment to M.M.'s cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas included intersegmental traction, trigger point therapy, myofascial release, and massage. She was given interferential treatment to her lumbar and sacral areas and hot therapy to her cervical, thoracic, and lumbar areas. On May 18, 2006, M.M. presented for treatment at CPS. She rated her neck and low back stiffness as a one. The therapist did not note any tenderness. M.M. received the following treatment in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas: hot therapy, intersegmental traction, trigger point therapy, myofascial release, and massage. On May 23, 2006, M.M. went to CPS for treatment. She rated her lower back stiffness as zero. The therapist noted tenderness in the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar areas. M.M. was given a massage and myofascial release in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. She received inferential treatment and trigger point therapy in her lumbar and sacral areas and hot therapy and intersegmental traction in her thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. On May 24, 2006, Dr. Christian did a follow-up examination of M.M. M.M. rated the neck and lower back stiffness as zero. Dr. Christian noted in his follow-up report that all the symptoms that he had noted in his initial report of April 26, 2006, had improved. His follow-up report stated: "Cerebellar function tests, as far as assessed are abnormal with a positive Rhomberg test for possible concussion." His follow- up report also stated: "Certainly today, I see evidence of her continuing to have some alterations of visual acuity and a positive Rhomberg, which would be consistent with post concussion syndrome." On May 25, 2006, M.M. returned to CPS for further treatment. She rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. The therapist noted tenderness in M.M.'s cervical and lumbar areas. M.M. was treated with myofascial release and massage in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. She received trigger point therapy in her lumbar and sacral areas and inferential treatment in her thoracic area. She also received intersegmental traction in her thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. M.M. received treatment at CPS on May 30, 2006. Again, she rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. The therapist did not note any tenderness. Hydrotherapy, hot therapy, and intersegmental traction were provided to M.M. in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. She received inferential treatment in her lumbar and sacral areas. On June 13, 2006, M.M. again returned to CPS for treatment. She rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. The therapist noted tenderness in M.M.'s cervical, thoracic, and lumbar areas. M.M. received intersegmental traction, myofascial release, and massage in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. M.M. was given hot therapy in her thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. She received trigger point therapy in her cervical and thoracic areas. On June 14, 2006, M.M. presented at CPS for a follow- up visit with Dr. Christian. She rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. He reduced her treatment to one per week for the next four to five weeks. In his examination record of June 14, 2006, Dr. Christian noted: " R [circled] side vision distance diff." On June 20, 2006, M.M. returned to CPS for treatment. Again, she rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. The therapist did not note any tenderness. M.M. was given hot therapy and intersegmental traction for her thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. She was given hydrotherapy for her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. On June 22, 2006, ultrasound studies were done on M.M. by Dr. Hirt. His impression was that she likely had thoracic outlet syndrome on the left side. On May 24, 2006, Dr. Christian referred M.M. to Dr. Davidson for a second opinion for post concussion. Dr. Davidson examined M.M. on June 27, 2006. In his report dated June 27, 2006, Dr. Davidson concluded that she had had a mild concussion, a cervical strain, and a lumbosacral strain. He recommended that her soft tissue therapy be discontinued. Dr. Davidson did not find any abnormalities in M.M.'s vision. On July 25, 2006, M.M. was examined by Dr. Christian. M.M. rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. Dr. Christian noted the following in his final report dated July 25, 2006. If the patient's symptoms of altered visual field persist and evaluation by an ophthalmologist or a neuro-ophthalmologist may be appropriate. If she begins to have any difficulty with sleep, mood swings, feelings of dizziness or persistent headaches a neuro-psychiatric evaluation for continued post concussion deficits may be appropriate. Dr. Christian discharged M.M. on July 25, 2006, and M.M. was to return for treatment on an as needed basis. Dr. Christian's initial report dated April 26, 2006; interim report dated May 24, 2006; follow-up report dated June 14, 2006; and final report dated July 25, 2006, were dictated by Dr. Christian. The reports were being mailed to someone or some entity based on the note at the end of each report, which stated: "DICTATED BUT NOT PROOFREAD TO AVOID DELAY IN MAILING." At the closing of each report, Dr. Christian stated: "If I can be of further assistance in this regard, please do not hesitate to contact me." It is not clear to whom the reports were directed, but it is clear that the reports were meant to convey the examination, evaluation, and treatment of M.M. to the reader of the report. These reports did not accurately report the examination results of M.M. in at least two instances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Christian violated sections 460.413(1)(m) and 460.413(1)(ff) and rule 64B2-17.0065; finding that Dr. Christian did not violate sections 460.413(1)(n) and 460.413(1)(r); imposing an administrative fine of $2,500; placing Dr. Christian on probation for one year; and requiring Dr. Christian to attend a continuing education course on record-keeping. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN BELYEU KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a medical doctor should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the administrative complaint, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Bernardo G. Bilang, was a licensed medical doctor having been issued license number 0026846 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine (DPR or Board). He has been licensed by the Board since July 19, 1976. Respondent presently practices medicine at 1201 South Highland Avenue, Suite 11, Clearwater, Florida. His specialty, if any, is not of record. Around 10:45 p.m. on February 2, 1986, N.K., a seventy-four year old female, was transported by ambulance to the emergency room of Morton F. Plant Hospital, Inc. (hospital) in Clearwater, Florida. When admitted, she complained of nausea, diarreah, dehydration, vomiting, fatigue and not feeling well. Also, she had experienced some pain in her back. With the exception of the back pain, which had begun more than a day earlier, all other symptoms had begun on February 2. Doctor Linda L. Shaffer was the emergency room physician on duty on the evening of February 2. Doctor Shaffer initially observed that the patient looked "acutely ill." She examined the patient and found her to be coherent and alert but very weak, as evidenced by her lack of grip strength In slurred speech, the patient answered questions very faintly and generally in one word answers. As might be expected, the patient was dehydrated. Her vital signs at 11:00 p.m. here as follows: rectal temperature - 104.6 degrees; blood pressure 152 over 96; respiration - 24; and pulse - 101. She also had tenderness across the middle of the back on both sides but did not have a stiff neck. After a preliminary physical examination and history were completed, and while the patient remained in the emergency room area for a few hours, Dr. Shaffer ordered a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, complete blood count, electrolyte panel, chemical profile, two tests of kidney function, blood cultures, and urinalysis. The patient was then placed on a cardiac monitor, had a foley catheter inserted to obtain a urine speciman, and was given tylenol to reduce her temperature. Also, an IV was started. After finding the chest to be essentially clear and the abdominal examination negative, Dr. Shaffer diagnosed the patient as follows: "fever/dehydration - possible sepsis?" The latter diagnosis (sepsis) meant the patient may have had either a bacterial or viral infection in her blood stream affecting her entire system in a "generalized way." For a seventy-four year old patient, sepsis is a serious condition and can be life threatening if not promptly treated. The normal treatment for sepsis is antibiotics, fluids, medicines to elevate the blood pressure and reduce the temperature, and occasionally the use of steroids. It is noted, however, that a viral infection will not respond to antibiotics. If the use of antibiotics is indicated, they must be started immediately to kill the infection. After concluding her examination, Dr. Shaffer ruled out the threat of cardiac arrest and believed the patient, although "seriously ill," was not suffering from a terminal ailment. Nonetheless, she was concerned with the patient's low white blood cell count (3500) which was indicative of an infection, and one more likely of a viral nature. At the same time, she knew that influenza "was quite prevalent at the time" and might produce symptoms like those experienced by N.K. However, she stuck by her preliminary diagnosis of a possible bacterial infection. Respondent was on call the evening of February 2 for patients such as N.K. who were admitted to the hospital but had no personal physician. 1/ He was telephoned by Dr. Shaffer at 1:20 a.m. on February 3 concerning the patient's status. After being told the patient's symptoms, vital signs, available test results (which did not include the blood cultures, urine culture and chemistry profile) and Dr. Shaffer's preliminary diagnosis respondent requested Dr. Shaffer to admit N.K. to the hospital. He then gave telephonic orders to the nurse regarding N.K.'s future treatment. At that point, responsibility for the patient shifted to respondent. Respondent's first orders at 1:25 a.m. were (a) the patient be given nothing by mouth except medications (b) the IV be continued, (c) she be given atrophine and phenergaan intramuscularly if diarrhea occurred, (d) she be given compazine, if necessary, for nausea and vomiting, and (e) she continue to be given ten grains of tylenol every four hours for her fever. The patient was then transferred from a critical care room to a room where more stabilized patients are kept. According to a nurse on duty that evening, she did not consider N.K. to be a "problem" patient who required extra care or attention. It is noted here that the patient records reflect that respondent initially suspected that N.K. might have the flu, a fairly common ailment in the area at that time. At 1:40 a.m., the patient's vital signs were as follows: blood pressure 124 over 80; respiration rate - 24; and pulse - 92. There is no indication that her temperature was taken at that time but the records indicate that an hour earlier, it had droped to 103.1 degrees. At 2:25 a.m., the patient was moved from an emergency room bed to a semi-private room in the general ward. At 3:05 a.m., N.K.'s temperature was again checked and found to be 103.5 degrees. At 4:00 am., the patient's condition had begun to seriously deteriorate. She manifested signs of being "very lethargic," that is, it was difficult to awaken her, and she appeared to be weaker on her left side. According to Dr. Shaffer, such a localized weakness was indicative of "some process" involving the patient's brain and spinal cord. Also, N.K. still had a rectal temperature reading of 103.5 degrees. At 5:40 am., N.K.'s fingers and toes became cyanotic, that is, they turned blue in color, indicating a lack of circulation. Also, she was confused and her lethargy continued. By then, her respiration rate had increased to 32, almost twice the normal rate. Her blood pressure (138 over 70) began dropping which was a sign of sepsis shock, that is, the peripheral blood vessels were dilating causing the pressure to drop and circulation to be impaired. At 6:05 am., the head nurse, believing there to be an emergency situation, spoke with respondent by telephone. She relayed the previous findings from 5:40 a.m. and noted that the patient's temperature had risen to 104.7 degrees while her blood pressure had dropped to 126 over 70. The nurse did not recall whether she was able to reach respondent immediately or if it took a few minutes for him to return the call. In any event, respondent gave telephonic orders that mandol, a second generation antibiotic, be given to the patient intravenously every six hours, and she be given one gram of solu-cortef, a steroid medication, for shock. Also, he ordered an arterial blood gas analysis and that N.K. be given oxygen by nasal cannula when necessary. Although the telephonic orders were given at 6:05 a.m., the drugs had to be requested and obtained (after mixing) from the hospital pharmacy. In some cases, it takes several hours to receive a drug from the pharmacy, particularly during other than normal daytime hours. The steroid IV was eventually started at 6:30 a.m. but the mandol was never received and administered. When the patient's condition did not improve and actually continued to deteriorate, respondent was telephoned again by a nurse at 6:40 a.m. By then, the patient's entire skin had turned a bluish color indicating very poor circulation. After being briefed by the nurse, including the results of the just received blood gas report, but still without knowing the precise cause of N.K.'s ailment, Dr. Bilang issued a "CMO" order. This means "comfort measures only" and that no aggressive steps, such as resuscitative measures, be taken by hospital personnel to prolong the life of the patient. According to Dr. Shaffer, had resuscitative steps been taken at that time, the patient's chances for survival were around "twenty percent, maybe less." The patient expired at 7:13 a.m. The primary cause of death was listed as meningococcial meningitis, a bacterial infection having a 70% to 80% mortality rate, and a "quite uncommon" infection in a seventy-four year old patient. Laboratory results obtained several days after the patient's death revealed she had gram-negative sepsis. Doctor Bilang arrived at the hospital and pronounced the patient dead at 7:20 a.m. This was the first time respondent had seen and examined the patient. Respondent then dictated a history and physical examination which appear in the patient records. These reports were based on information previously provided by others. On February 21, 1986 respondent dictated a discharge summary which indicated a pre mortem physical finding. This report was also placed in the expired patient's records. Several months later, respondent prepared a second physical examination and history for the patient. This was dictated on July 31, 1986 and again was based on the notes of other persons. However, respondent made the following note at the beginning of the physical examination and history: "Disregard above notes. Patient expired prior to my seeing her in the ward." Two medical experts testified on behalf of the Board. They are Drs. Matthew M. Cohen and Laurence Neufeld, both board certified family practitioners in Tallahassee and Tampa, Florida, respectively. A Shreveport, Louisiana board certified internist, Dr. John M. Brady, presented expert testimony on behalf of respondent. In addition, Dr. Linda L. Shaffer, an experienced physician, testified from her perspective as an emergency room physician at the hospital in question. As might be expected, the experts reached differing conclusions regarding respondent's treatment of the patient. Pertinent findings based on the experts' relevant testimony are made below. There was a consensus among the experts that the emergency room doctor's role is to pass on to the admitting physician all the information the doctor has gathered from the examination and tests. It is then the responsibility of the admitting physician to ask the emergency room doctor appropriate questions concerning the patient, order vital signs to be taken at specified intervals, and give other directions to the monitoring staff (nurses) concerning steps to be taken in the event of changes in the patient's condition. The experts also concluded that the primary physician, in preparing a history and physical examination of the patient, should not rely on the emergency room doctor's notes and findings but should personally conduct his own physical and history in a more thorough manner. This is especially true when, as here, the emergency room physician is unable to conclusively establish the cause of the patient's illness. In Dr. Cohen's opinion, respondent should have suspected meningitis at the outset of N.K.'s admission. This was because of her lethargy, high fever and back pain, all being symptoms associated with that infection. Doctor Cohen also noted that respondent was cognizant of Dr. Shaffer's preliminary diagnosis of possible sepsis, knew that pneumonia and urinary tract infection were not the causes of the infection, and still had no idea what caused N.K.'s infection. Given these considerations, Dr. Cohen opined that respondent should have ordered further tests to confirm N.K.'s ailment, such as a lumbar puncture (spinal tap), an X-ray of her abdomen, a reexamination of the abdomen or a head scan. Doctor Cohen further suggested that after those tests were completed, it would have been prudent for respondent to "employ a sort of antibiotic recipe for dealing with a septic, elderly person." In other words, he should have used a group of intravenous antibiotics that would cover most of the possible causes for that type of infection. In addition to the foregoing omissions, Dr. Cohen was of the opinion that Dr. Bilang erred further when, after receiving advice from the nurse at 6:05 a.m. and 6:40 a.m. concerning the patient's rapid deterioration in health, he failed to institute aggressive antibiotic therapy and instead prescribed mandol, a drug Dr. Cohen felt was too little, too late. According to Dr. Cohen, respondent compounded his mistakes by issuing a CMO order when the patient did not have a terminal illness and without consulting the patient's family. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, the expert concluded that respondent did not conform with minimally acceptable medical standards in the community. Doctor Cohen next opined that it was inappropriate for respondent to prepare a history and physical after the patient's death and to base those items on information gathered by others. He labeled these matters "false and misleading" and a deviation from the standard expected of a doctor. Doctor Neufeld initially pointed out that respondent erred by failing to start a broad spectrum (third generation) antibiotic regimen when he assumed responsibility for the patient at 1:20 a.m. According to the witness, such a regimen was called for because respondent was aware of the patient's age, high fever, slurred speech, dehydrated condition, the very strong possibility of sepsis, and his own inability to promptly obtain blood cultures from the laboratory to aid in confirming or ruling out various ailments. Further, respondent had no concrete evidence that the patient was suffering from the flu, an illness he initially thought N.K. might have. Even if respondent was unsure if the infection was viral or bacterial, Dr. Neufeld pointed out that respondent nonetheless should have assumed the patient was septic and started an antibiotic regimen until the cultures were received from the laboratory or the fever subsided. Moreover, even if the patient had a viral infection, the antibiotics would not have harmed her. By respondent waiting until 6:05 a.m., and then ordering mandol rather than a stronger drug, Dr. Neufeld opined that respondent fell below the minimum standard of care for community physicians. Doctor Neufeld stated further that respondent deviated from the same standard of care by issuing a CMO order when the patient did not have a terminal illness. Doctor Neufeld echoed Dr. Cohen's sentiments that the prevailing community standards did not call for a CMO order unless the patient was afflicted with a terminal, irreversible illness and only after a physical examination had been performed by the physician. Doctor Neufeld found the physical examination documented by Dr. Bilang on pages 10 and 11 and the accompanying discharge summary on pages 13 and 14 of the patient records to misleading since both erroneously suggested a pre mortem physical finding. Also, Dr. Neufeld opined that the medical records did not justify the course of treatment to the patient. However, the basis for this opinion is not clearly delineated in the record. Doctor Neufeld conceded that though he would have gone to the hospital at 1:20 a.m. to examine the patient, respondent did not violate the standard of care by evaluating the needs of the patient by telephone. Even so, Dr. Neufeld maintained that respondent should have ordered antibiotics after his consultation with Dr. Shaffer. The expert differed in one respect with Dr. Cohen and agreed with respondent that the records, at least at 1:20 am., did not call for a spinal tap or head scan, and respondent's failure to perform those tests at that time was acceptable. Finally, although he acknowledged that an order for a third generation antibiotic regimen at 6:05 a.m. might not have been mixed and ready for patient use by the time the patient expired, Dr. Neufeld opined that respondent still had a duty to use all available measures to keep her alive until the drugs were received. According to Dr. Shaffer, she observed Dr. Bilang on a day to day basis and considered him a "caring, competent, practicing physician." However, she stated that respondent was sometimes too busy" and overextended" himself. As a consequence, she was "concerned" that he was taking care of too many patients at the same time. Although she did not consider herself qualified to render an opinion, she opined that respondent did not deviate from the minimally acceptable standards for Clearwater area physicians when he failed to initially order antibiotics for N.K. at 1:20 a.m. This was because, if a physician was unsure if a patient had a viral syndrome or a bacterial septic condition, he might wait "a little bit of time" to see what course of treatment was required. Further, the decision to order antibiotics is a "judgment call" by a doctor and depends in part on two "iffy" tests, a lumbar puncture and a gram stain of the blood smear. The latter test result was not available until several days after the patient expired. According to Dr. Brady, respondent's course of treatment and overall conduct, with one exception, fell within the minimal acceptable standards of care for physicians. The exception pertained to respondent's issuance of a CMO order. After reviewing the patient's records, Dr. Brady concluded that respondent could not have known the patient was suffering from a bacterial infection since nothing in the physical examination was suggestive of meningococcemia, the organism affecting the patient. Thus, he concluded that the patient's illness was probably not diagnosable until shortly before she died. This was because the patient did not have a stiff neck (nuchal rigidity), purplish skin rash, or signs of shock, which are the normal indications of meningitis, and because the infection is extremely rare and has an incidence rate of only one case per one hundred thousand persons in a given year. Even so, he conceded that if the disease occurs, its physical signs can manifest in a very short period of time and could have begun shortly after the patient was first examined by the emergency room physician around 11:00 p.m. Once respondent recognized the severity of the patient's ailment, and prescribed mandol at 6:05 a.m., Dr. Brady agreed that mandol would not have had any beneficial effect on the patient even if administered immediately after being ordered. Instead, the witness would have ordered a third generation antibiotic which is more effective in treating gram negative rods. While he characterized respondent's choice of mandol as "not the best thing to do", he nonetheless said "it was not an unreasonable thing to do" given the circumstances. The expert next agreed with the Board experts that a CMO order is appropriate only when the patient has a terminal illness and has requested that no life-sustaining measures be used. In this case, he agreed that the patient records did not justify this action. He added, however, that the patient would probably have expired no matter what resuscitative efforts were undertaken. Finally, while Dr. Brady did not think respondent was attempting to falsify his records by copying the notes of others in preparing the post-mortem physical and patient history, he noted that respondent should have indicated on his February 3, 1986 notes that he was copying the records of others. Having evaluated the testimony of the experts, the undersigned has resolved the conflicts in favor of the Board. Accordingly, it is found that respondent fell below the minimum standard of care by failing to initially recognize the patient's septic condition and prescribing a comprehensive antibiotic regimen, by failing to institute the same regimen at 6:05 a.m. after becoming aware of her critical condition, and by issuing a CMO order at 6:40 a.m. when the patient did not have a terminal illness. Further, respondent filed reports on February 3 and 21, 1986 which he knew or should have known were misleading and false, namely, a patient history, physical examination and discharge summary prepared post mortem which suggested that such reports were based on pre mortem findings by respondent. Finally, it is found that the records maintained by respondent were inadequate to justify the issuance of a CMO order since the patient did not have a terminal illness. By stipulation approved by Board order dated October 30, 1987, respondent was reprimanded by the Board, paid a $1,000 fine, was placed on monitored probation for a year, and agreed to take twenty hours of continuing medical education in the area of prescribing medicinal drugs. Official Board records indicate that respondent's license still remains on a probationary status presumably because of the pending proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of the violations discussed in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order, and that respondent's medical license be suspended for two years. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1989.
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Petitioner on the basis of alleged violations of the Medical Practice Act, Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. In an eight-count Amended Administrative Complaint, the Respondent has been charged with four violations of Section 458.331(l)(m), Florida Statutes, and four violations of Section 458.331(l)(t), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is, and has been at all times material to this proceeding, a licensed physician in the State of Florida. His license number is ME0022079. Facts regarding Patient #1 The Respondent provided medical treatment to Patient #1 from April 20, 1987, through April 12, 1988. During the period of that treatment Patient #1 was approximately 92 years old and was diagnosed as having organic brain syndrome. Respondent obtained a brief past medical history of the patient and failed to document the patient's current complaints or review any prior medical records of the patient. On May 26, 1987, Respondent diagnosed the patient with pedal edema and ordered Hygroton 25 mg., but failed to document in the medical records the number of times per day the patient was to take the medication or the dosage for the medication. On June 6, 1987, the patient presented with shortness of breath and a blood pressure of 110/80. Respondent did not perform any tests or examinations to determine the cause of the symptoms. On July 14, 1987, and September 22, 1987, the patient again presented with shortness of breath and pedal edema and Respondent only recorded the lungs as clear and took her blood pressure. Respondent did not perform any other tests or examinations to determine the cause of the symptoms. On October 26, 1987, when the patient presented with shortness of breath, Respondent noted an arrhythmia and blood pressure of 136/82. However, Respondent did not perform any tests or examinations to determine the course of the symptoms. When the patient presented with arrhythmia, the applicable standard of care 5/ required Respondent to perform an EKG, to check her digoxin levels, and monitor her electrolytes and renal functions. Respondent's medical records for the patient did not meet the applicable record-keeping standards 6/ because the records were incomplete, inadequate, and illegible. Specifically, the records did not have diagnoses, did not have a plan of treatment, and did not include thorough examinations or histories, making it impossible to determine the appropriate treatment for the patient. Facts regarding Patient #2 Respondent provided treatment to Patient #2 from July 11, 1978, until September 13, 1988. Patient #2, a male, was seventy-one years old when such treatment began. The patient had a history of gastric ulcers. Nevertheless, Respondent prescribed nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medications which exacerbate or increase difficulties with gastric ulcers and bleeding without obtaining a complete history or conducting a full examination. Respondent's medical records did not document whether Respondent assessed the risk to the patient, discussed the risk with the patient, or made any determinations that the risks outweighed the benefits for the patient. In 1978, the patient presented with a chronic cough and chronic bronchitis. However, Respondent did not perform any chest x-rays to determine the origin of the cough or to rule out lung carcinoma. Over the years, the cough persisted and in 1982-1983, the patient experienced shortness of breath and increased ankle edema. Respondent prescribed diuretics without determining the etiology of the edema and without conducting renal status or electrolyte monitoring. In 1985, the patient was hospitalized with severe ankle swelling. Respondent did not aggressively treat the possibility of deep vein thrombosis or cellulitis, nor did he treat the patient with anticoagulants to lessen the risk of a blood clot going to the lung. The applicable standard of care required anticoagulant treatment under these circumstances. In 1987, the patient suffered a severe weight loss with the chronic cough. The Respondent's records do not reveal any attempt to make a diagnosis. On December 15, 1987, the patient complained of abdominal problems, which could have related to the steroidal anti-inflammatory medications prescribed. The Respondent's records fail to document any laboratory tests or examinations by Respondent to determine the cause of the complaints. Respondent breached the applicable standard of care by failing to perform an EKG on the patient when he presented with dizziness, light-headedness or syncopal episodes from September 1987, until July 12, 1988. When the patient presented on August 30, 1988, and September 13, 1988, with very serious complaints of precordial chest pain, shortness of breath, and palpitations, a reasonably prudent physician would have suspected that the patient was having a heart attack. Despite the symptoms, Respondent made a psychiatric diagnosis, rather than fully evaluating the heart and cardiac status. Respondent's medical records for the patient did not comply with the applicable record-keeping standards in that they did not contain thorough examinations or histories, and did not have diagnoses or plans of treatment for the patient. Facts regarding Patient #3 Respondent provided care to Patient #3 from November 17, 1987, until May 16, 1989. Patient #3, a female, was eighty-five years old when such treatment began. Respondent should have been aware from the patient's initial presentation, that the patient did not qualify to reside in an adult congregate living facility and should have taken steps to have her admitted to a skilled nursing facility. Respondent's failure to do so is a breach of the applicable standard of care. Respondent's initial examination of the patient was limited and Respondent failed to conduct an EKG to reveal the origin of the patient's pedal edema or irregular heartbeat. Respondent also failed to diagnose, treat, or refer the patient for a consult to evaluate her vision and hearing loss. Even though the diagnosis was not made in the Respondent's records, it is apparent from the medications prescribed by Respondent that the patient was being treated for congestive heart failure. She also had pedal edema, shortness of breath, and cardiac arrhythmia. Respondent failed to perform or conduct the appropriate tests and examinations to make a diagnosis of the patient's condition or to provide effective treatment. The patient had frequent episodes of high blood pressure for which Respondent prescribed diuretics. Respondent's prescribing of Tenormin violated the applicable standard of care and subjected the patient to serious cardiac risks. Respondent's medical records for the patient were illegible for the most part and in many instances omitted information about the diagnosis and course of treatment. For these reasons the records failed to comply with applicable record-keeping standards. Facts regarding Patient #4 Respondent provided treatment to Patient #4 from April 1985 until January 5, 1988. Patient #4, a male, was seventy-four years old when such treatment began. When the patient originally presented to Respondent, he was on cardiac medications, had complaints of possible arrhythmias, and had a history of organic brain syndrome and tardive dyskinesia. Respondent was required by the applicable standard of care to evaluate the patient's cardiac condition, renal status, and potassium level. Respondent breached the standard of care by failing to conduct these evaluations and examinations. On October 1, 1985, the patient presented with back pain. Rather than conducting a physical exam to determine the source of the pain, Respondent violated the standard of care and treated the pain symptomatically. The patient was prescribed an anti-psychotic drug, Mellaril, and throughout Respondent's care exhibited side effects, including falls with resulting abrasions. Respondent failed to discontinue the drug or take appropriate measures to determine the extent of the patient's condition and implement a course of treatment. On July 23, 1987, Respondent prescribed an amount of Dalmane considered excessive for geriatric patients. These inappropriate prescriptions constitute a departure from the applicable standard of care. Respondent's medical records for the patient were replete with omissions of physical exams, diagnoses, and plans of care, and were inadequate as to patient history and justification for course of treatment. For these reasons the records failed to comply with applicable record-keeping standards. Facts regarding prior discipline Respondent has been the subject of prior disciplinary action by the Board of Medicine. The prior disciplinary action was based on deficiencies in Respondent's record-keeping. The prior disciplinary action does not appear to have improved Respondent's record-keeping in any significant way.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine issue a final order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of four counts of violations of Section 458.331(l)(m), Florida Statutes, and four counts of violations of Section 458.331(l)(t), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and Imposing administrative penalties consisting of all of the following: (a) an administrative fine in the total amount of $4,000.00 (representing a $500.00 fine for each of the eight counts); (b) a one-year period of suspension of the Respondent's license; and (c) a one-year period of probation following the suspension, during which probation period the Respondent shall be required to have his records reviewed by a supervising physician approved by the Board, such supervising physician to provide quarterly reports to the Board regarding the sufficiency of the Respondent's record-keeping. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February 1995.
The Issue The issue for consideration was whether the Respondent's license as a physician in Florida should be disciplined because of the alleged misconduct outlined in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Respondent, Moheb Ishad Girgis El-Far was licensed as a physician in Florida under license number ME 0026895, and the Board of Medicine was the state agency responsible for the licensing and monitoring of physicians in this state. At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent practiced medicine with a specialty in obstetrics at his clinic located a 401 East Olympic Avenue, Punta Gorda, Florida. Patient 2, C.L., first went to see Respondent at his office in Punta Gorda in January, 1989 because she was pregnant and had heard he was delivering babies in his office. She was referred to the Respondent by the Sarasota Health Department when she indicated she wanted to have her child in a birthing center. During that first visit, the doctor and patient agreed on a treatment plan which would culminate with the baby's being delivered in his office and C.L. paid for this pursuant to their agreement. During the period of the patient's prenatal care with the Respondent, he told her her baby was due on August 30, 1987, and when labor began, she was to come to his office and bring her own sheets. On August 24, 1987, C.L. began her labor and went to Respondent's office as agreed. By the time she got there, she was about ready to deliver and a few minutes after her arrival, she did so in a birthing room with her husband present. At the time of the delivery, both Respondent's wife and Ms. L.'s boss, neither of whom played any part in the proceedings, were standing in the doorway to the birthing room. No nurse was present and C.L. cannot recall seeing any sterilization or resuscitation equipment in the room. C.L. experienced little pain during the delivery, which appeared to go smoothly. Afterwards however, Respondent told her she had sustained an inverted uterus and when Respondent attempted to remove the afterbirth, she started to hemorrhage. When this happened, Respondent gave her a shot and towels with which she was to try to stem the bleeding while he tried to correct the uterine problem. He was unsuccessful and thereafter called the paramedics who came to his office and took C.L. to St. Joseph's Hospital in Punta Gorda for treatment. Respondent did not treat her at the hospital because he had no hospital privileges. While there she required 6 units of blood and 2 units of plasma. At no time during the course of her prenatal care did Respondent advise her to go to the hospital. She fully recovered. C.L. was shown pictures of Respondent's office taken by Department investigators at some time subsequent to her delivery. With the exception of the fetal monitor which she had seen in his office, the pictures she saw bore little similarity to the condition of the office whenever she was there. Though the office was not as messy as the pictures show, she was, nonetheless concerned about its condition at the time of her delivery. The carpet was dirty and so was the aquarium. She could not do anything about it at that time, however, and it was not so bad as to cause her to feel unsafe. S.K., Patient 1, first went to the Respondent for her pregnancy care in November, 1987 on a referral from a friend. They agreed on a fee of $1600.00 for prenatal care and delivery in his office. During these initial discussions, Respondent did not discuss in detail with the patient the possibility of complications. He stated only that if there were complications, they could probably be treated in the office. S.K. went to Respondent's office about 6 times after that initial visit. During this period, on an early visit, Respondent gave her some medicine samples and a prescription for vitamins. When she asked about the cost, he said he would include the cost of the samples when he billed her insurance company. During these visits, she also saw his personal office, an examining room, and a small room where the patient's blood pressure was taken. She noted that the office was not as clean and orderly as others she had seen, and in fact, was usually in a state of disarray. On one occasion when Respondent examined her, he was wearing a wrinkled shirt with a blood spot on it. The next time she went for a visit, Respondent was wearing the same shirt. S.K. was shown pictures of Respondent's office taken by investigators and several were similar to conditions she observed there. His personal office was not well organized and there was clutter about but not as aggravated as appears in the photos. Based on her experience with other doctors, Respondent's office was far more untidy and in disarray but not necessarily nonsterile or unsafe. On February 5, 1988, S.K. went to Respondent's office because she was having pains and thought she was in labor. When she called him and explained her symptoms, he told her to come in and he examined her when she did. He gave her something to calm her and to try to stop her labor in an attempt to save her baby. He gave her a shot of demerol and put her in an examining room to lie down. She slept there for quite a while with her husband present. When she awoke she again began to have pains but Respondent would not give her any more medicine. After a while, the baby spontaneously delivered while Respondent was sleeping in another room. He was called but by the time he came in, the baby was dead. He asked S.K. if she wanted to see the fetus but she declined. After a period of recovery, she was released to return home. When this patient came into the office that day and it appeared she was going to deliver, her husband asked Respondent if he thought she should be in the hospital. Respondent replied that it was up to her because the baby, if delivered, was too premature to survive. The decision not to go to the hospital was hers. Respondent did not try to dissuade her from going. In fact, in most ways she considered Respondent's treatment of her to have been satisfactory. During the period she was in his office Respondent was in and out of the room checking on her. The only complaint she has relates to his handling of the fetus she delivered. About 2 weeks after delivery she again went to see Respondent at his office where he showed her her baby which he had preserved in a jar of formaldehyde. This was a strange and sad experience for her. Mr. K. basically confirms that testified to by his wife. While she was in labor or sleeping prior to the delivery, he wandered about the building into other parts of the clinic. He also rested in one of the examining or birthing rooms and observed the general state of cleanliness of the facility was poor. For example, the floor and rugs were spotted throughout with a dark stain and the examining table also had a dark stain on it. These stains looked to him like blood. In addition, the hallway carpets were dirty, there were bags off debris laying out, spare pieces of wood were stacked in the halls, and medical instruments were left out in the birthing and examining rooms. In his opinion, many of the pictures shown to him displayed scenes similar to what he saw when he was there with his wife. Both Dr. Borris and Dr. Marley agreed that Respondent's treatment of Ms. K. had no relationship to her miscarriage. By the same token, neither claims that his treatment of Ms. L.'s inverted uterus was inappropriate. Both agree, however, that other factors in Dr. El Far's operation of his practice as regards both patients failed to conform to generally accepted standards of care in providing obstetrical services. Specifically, he failed to have a nurse present during the delivery; he failed to have emergency equipment in the form of resuscitative and lifesaving equipment available to handle potential surgical complications which might have arisen; he had no emergency backup care available; and he had no hospital privileges in Punta Gorda, the area in which he was engaged in an obstetrical practice. Without those privileges, it was not prudent for him to undertake a delivery in the office. While the prenatal care of patient 1 was within standards, the balance of Respondent's practice was below standards because: the patient was not monitored while in the office; if the conditions as appearing in the pictures existed at the time he was seeing patients, he did not meet sanitation standards because of the general disarray.; he attempted a delivery in his office when a hospital was only 1.5 miles away, (not prudent in light of the patient's condition when there was no emergency to justify it); and his records were not complete. The standard of a reasonably prudent physician is the same regardless of the locality. Acceding to the wishes of a patient, when to do so is not in the patient's best interests, is not necessarily acceptable medical care. Mr. Cook, the Department's investigator, inspected Respondent's office on September 16, 1988, in the company of investigator Clyne, as a result of a call he received from an agent of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement who was then on the premises. When they arrived, they observed a female sitting on the couch in the waiting room changing a baby's diaper. From conversation he had with Respondent at the time, Mr. Cook inferred the lady was a patient. In addition to the previously mentioned lady and the state investigative personnel, Cook also noticed two children, who Respondent indicated were his, running freely about throughout the building. Cook examined the patient log maintained by Respondent for that day and noted that two patients were scheduled. Nonetheless, while he was there, there were no nurses, receptionists or office staff present. Though Respondent claims he did not have any patients that day, and though Cook did not see any other than the lady aforementioned, from the patient log and the fact that at least one patient was there, it is found that Respondent was engaged in at least a minimum practice and was available to see patients. Mr. Cook observed conditions in Respondent's office on the day in question that were inconsistent with a proper medical practice. Trash was not contained, food was left open, and dust and dirt were in evidence, all in the area where medical services were or would be rendered. Mr. Cook took photos and a video tape of the condition of Respondent's office. The photos were those shown to the two patients who testified herein and to Mr. K. Though he looked throughout the office, Mr. Cook could find no sterilization equipment, no general anesthesia equipment, no blood transfusion equipment, and no emergency resuscitation equipment. When asked about his sterilization capability, Respondent stated his "heater" was broken and in for repairs. When during a visit to Respondent in October, 1988, Ms. Clyne told him he needed sterilizer equipment, he indicated it had recently been purchased. On that visit, Respondent had a patient in the office. Ms. Clyne again went to Respondent's office on February 15, 1989 and observed it to be still in a state of disarray. Ms. Hampton, another Department investigator, visited with Respondent in his office on January 11, 1989 and found it to be unsatisfactory. The waiting area was cluttered, the carpet was dirty, the walls stained, and magazines were laying around. The clinic area was piled up with mail leaving no counter space. Respondent took Ms. Hampton on a tour through the office during which she observed the computer, patient records, and the typewriter to be unclean. Her examination of the halls, examining rooms, birthing rooms, and the like revealed that in one room, a sink had an unclean speculum in it and others were lying about. The paper on one examining table was soiled and when Respondent saw that, he quickly tore it off. The spread in one of the birthing rooms was soiled and the floor needed sweeping. Trash cans were not lined and needed cleaning. The covering on the baby examining table was soiled and there were bloody cotton balls on a table in the room. She, too, saw no evidence of any sterilization, anesthesia, or emergency resuscitation equipment. On this visit, Respondent indicated he was not seeing any new patients; only those former patients who were still pregnant. Respondent indicates that during the period from July 4 through September 16, 1988 he had closed up his office for an extensive vacation and was living in his office on that latter date. He does not deny that his office was in the condition as depicted in the photos when they were made but contends he has since cleaned it up and put new carpet down. During the period his office was closed, he referred his patients to other doctors and has not been actively practicing while waiting for his malpractice insurance to come through. Respondent also does not deny that the Certificate of Education form he signed and submitted to the Board was in error. He contends, however, that at the time he signed it he believed it to be a certificate of regular continuing education hours, not a certification used for approval for dispensing drugs. He also claims that at no time did he intend to defraud the Board, and when Ms. Clyne brought the error to his attention, he wrote to the Board explaining what had happened. He contends that when he affirmed the statement that he had the appropriate hours, he considered the "a" in "affirm" to be a negative prefix indicating he did not have the required hours. This contention is both ingenuous and unbelievable. It is found that Respondent well knew the meaning and effect of the certification he signed and his affixing his signature thereto was both false and with intent to mislead.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license to practice medicine in Florida be suspended for two years and that he thereafter be placed on probation for an additional period of three years under such terms and conditions as are imposed by the Board of Medicine. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-1507 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner: 1.- 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected in so far as it editorializes on the condition of the clinic. While below standard, there was no evidence of health hazard to patients. 6.-8. Accepted and incorporated herein. 9. & 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. 11. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. Accepted. For the Respondent: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contra to the weight of expert testimony. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Accepted in so far as it finds that Respondent's performance of medical procedures was within standard. Rejected as to the finding that overall care and practice was within standards. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry G. McPherson, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 David K. Oaks, Esquire The Professional Center 201 West Marion Avenue Suite 205, Box 3288 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel DPR 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine DPRB 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is liable for overpayment of Medicaid claims for the period from 9/1/94 through 9/30/96, as stated in Respondent's Final Agency Audit Report dated May 5, 1998.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the Agency for Health Care Administration (Respondent) was the state agency charged with administration of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida pursuant to Section 409.907, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Henry M. Rubinstein, D.C., (Petitioner) was a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida and was providing chiropractic services to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner provided the services pursuant to a contract with Respondent under the Medicaid provider number 0503517-00. His Medicaid patients for years have included children and multi-handicapped children. Petitioner has published in peer review journals and is a board certified chiropractor. Dennis L. Jones, D.C., is a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida. 1/ He was involved in the creation of Florida's Medicaid program and monitors the Florida Chiropractic Medicaid Program. Dr. Jones also serves as a Medicaid chiropractic consultant, including the issuance of prior authorizations for treatment. Prior authorizations are required for a chiropractor to provide and bill for visits by Medicaid recipients in excess of the set limited number. The maximum number of visits allowed per year prior to July 1, 1994, was 12, and after July 1, 1994, was 24. After July 1, 1994, prior authorization was required for visits beyond 24 for Medicaid recipients under the age of Prior authorization was granted for requests that demonstrated medical necessity. Dr. Jones denied many of Petitioner's requests for prior authorization. He denied the requests on the basis that the treatments were extending for periods of up to two years without detailed explanation of medical necessity to substantiate such extended periods of care. Dr. Jones observed that Petitioner's requests for such extended care routinely lacked substantiation and documentation for such extended care, such as x-rays, orthopedic and neurological findings, and subjective/objective descriptions. However, Dr. Jones granted some of Petitioner's requests for prior authorization to exceed the maximum number of visits. Dr. Jones had concerns as to the sufficiency of the documentation of Petitioner's requests for prior authorizations. As a result, when such requests were granted, Dr. Jones noted on the request forms that supplemental medical necessity needed to be documented more completely in the future. In 1996, Dr. Jones related his concerns about Petitioner in a letter to Respondent and included with the letter prior authorizations for primarily special needs children covering the years 1994 through 1996. Twenty-nine prior authorizations were included, with 25 of them for special needs children. His concerns related primarily to Petitioner's Medicaid patients who were special needs children and for whom Dr. Jones had reviewed only prior authorizations submitted by Petitioner. Further, in his letter, Dr. Jones requested an investigation into possible patient brokering, a criminal act. However, a request from a complainant for an investigation into a particular area of alleged violation does not prevent Respondent from identifying and investigating other areas of possible violation revealed by the documents provided. Dr. Jones' letter was referred to one of Respondent's employees, Judith M. Jensen. At that time, Ms. Jensen was also in the process of reviewing another complaint lodged against Petitioner by Dr. Jones, regarding prior authorizations for children, but covering a different time period--from 1993 through 1995. Ms. Jensen was, and is, employed by Respondent as a Human Services Program Specialist. Her duties include monitoring Medicaid claims and investigating Medicaid complaints and aberrant billings for Respondent's Medicaid Program Integrity Office. In investigating all billing irregularities or specific complaints, a review is typically made of the Medicaid provider's medical records. Substantiation of Medicaid claims that are submitted and paid is by adequate and proper medical record documentation. An audit, based upon a billing irregularity or complaint, is usually begun with the selection of a provider or a group of providers. Next, a sample of the chosen provider's Medicaid claims is chosen for a particular time period, which is the audit period. An analyst for Respondent then requests from the provider the medical records for the Medicaid recipients sampled for the audit period. The medical records are provided to and analyzed by a medical peer reviewer. If the medical peer reviewer recommends denial of payment for any of the claims, resulting in overpayment, Respondent forwards a preliminary audit letter to the Medicaid provider, describing the audit findings and requesting any supplemental medical records. A review of any submitted supplemental medical records is conducted, and the audit findings are adjusted in accordance with the results of the review. If an overpayment continues to be indicated after the review, Respondent forwards a final audit letter to the Medicaid provider. Respondent has a limited number of analysts and medical peer reviewers. Due to such constraints on Respondent, sampling is utilized due to its reliability, cost-effectiveness, and commonly accepted method for review of high volumes of Medicaid claims. Ms. Jensen initiated Respondent's review of Petitioner's Medicaid claims. She began the audit by requesting an ad hoc computer report on Petitioner's billing history for all Medicaid recipients under the age of 21 for the time period from 9/1/94 through 9/30/96. Ms. Jensen's request concentrated only on Medicaid recipients under the age of 21 because Dr. Jones alerted Respondent primarily to prior authorizations for children. Ms. Jensen received the ad hoc computer report, which was a detail of all of Petitioner's Medicaid billings for Medicaid recipients under the age of 21 for the period from 9/1/94 through 9/30/96. The report provided that for the time period indicated, Petitioner billed and was paid for 4,499 claims for 85 recipients, for a total amount of $71,731.30. Having received this information, Ms. Jensen requested a computer-generated selection of a random sample of 20 recipients from the total population of the 85 recipients. Twenty recipients were randomly selected from the total population of the 85 recipients, which showed, among other things, claims totaling 1,307 and payment for the claims totaling $20,710.69. Afterwards, Ms. Jensen requested Petitioner to provide all the medical records for the 20 sampled recipients for the time period from 9/1/94 through 9/30/96. Petitioner complied with Ms. Jensen's request. Having received the medical records, Ms. Jensen engaged a peer review consultant, Dr. Ronald J. Hoffman, D.C., to evaluate the records submitted by Petitioner. She provided the medical records to Dr. Hoffman.. 2/ He was provided with the medical records of only 10 Medicaid recipients on two separate occasions, instead of all 20 at the same time. The Medicaid recipients' medical records were not "sanitized" when they were submitted to Dr. Hoffman, meaning that the names of the Medicaid recipients and provider, Petitioner, were not redacted. Dr. Hoffman, as a peer reviewer, rarely reviews files which have been sanitized. The failure to sanitize the medical records found to be of no consequence to Dr. Hoffman's determinations. Dr. Hoffman is a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida and has been practicing for over 30 years. His practice includes patients who are pediatric and multi-handicapped, but these patients comprise a very small number of his patients. He performs chiropractic Medicaid utilization review for Respondent and is a Medicaid provider. He has performed chiropractic utilization review for more than 15 years. For the Medicaid program, Dr. Hoffman has been a consultant since 1997, but Petitioner's review was the first peer review performed by Dr. Hoffman for the Medicaid program. When Dr. Hoffman performs peer reviews for Respondent, he relies upon State statutes and Respondent's guidelines, specifically, The Chiropractic Coverage and Limitation Handbook, and his years of experience Dr. Hoffman is knowledgeable about what a medical record should contain in order for the medical record to demonstrate medical necessity for Medicaid reimbursement purposes. The medical record should contain the complete medical history; an examination showing the condition of the patient and why the patient is being treated; symptoms; standardized testing, including orthopedic and neurological tests; treatment notes; a treatment program; objective findings; special procedures; and an evaluation of the patient's progress. 3/ Petitioner agrees that, according to the Medicaid provider reimbursement handbook, the following are requirements for medical records: patient history; chief complaint for each visit; diagnostic tests and results; diagnosis; treatment plan, including prescriptions; medications, supplies, scheduling frequency for follow-up or other services; progress reports, treatment rendered; original signatures and dates; dates of service; and referrals to others. Dr. Hoffman was aware from review of the medical records provided by Petitioner that the Medicaid recipients were special needs children. However, he was unaware of Florida's special needs statutes (Subsections 409.803(1)(c) and 409.9126(1)(b), and Section 409.9121, Florida Statutes), which address, among other things, health care needs for special needs children, and he did not use the statutes in his determination. The failure to use the special needs statutes had little or no effect on Dr. Hoffman's review. The undersigned is persuaded and a finding of fact is made that Dr. Hoffman's failure to use the special needs statutes in his review did not invalidate his determinations. Dr. Hoffman was tendered and is accepted as an expert in chiropractic medicine. He is also found to be an appropriate peer reviewer for Petitioner's situation. Dr. Hoffman's testimony is found to be credible. After having reviewed the medical records, regarding the 20 randomly sampled Medicaid recipients, pursuant to Respondent's Medicaid peer review, Dr. Hoffman produced two reports of his findings. 4/ During his review, Dr. Hoffman considered all of the Medicaid recipients' visits, including those that had been granted prior authorization. Patient 1 was recipient K.K., with a date of birth of 5/18/86. 5/ Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 1's medical records did not support a finding of medical necessity. The medical records failed to support justification for Patient 1's 198 visits from 11/10/94 through 9/10/96. X-rays contained in the medical records were of such poor quality that they were of no diagnostic value; however, the x-rays were not a factor in the determination of medical necessity. Petitioner's medical notes were practically the same for each visit, with Petitioner noting practically the same comment(s); and there was no recorded orthopedic or neurological testing and no standard chiropractic evaluation forms justifying the number of treatments billed. Patient 1's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 1, 198 claims were paid in the amount of $3,081.30. Prior authorizations granted totaled $2,964. 6/ Patient 2 was recipient N.M., with a date of birth of 8/11/83. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 2's medical records lacked documentation demonstrating that the treatments were a medical necessity for Medicaid reimbursement purposes for the 175 visits from 7/12/94 through 6/27/96. The medical records contained no standard medical notes or examination forms and no orthopedic, neurological or chiropractic examination forms to justify treatments; and were redundant and repetitive. X-rays contained in the medical records were of such poor quality that they were of no diagnostic value; but, the x-rays have no impact on the determination of medical necessity. Patient 2's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 2, 175 claims were paid in the amount of $2,726.50. Prior authorizations granted totaled $2,964. Patient 3 was recipient D.A., with a date of birth of 4/6/89. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 3's medical records lacked justification for the 173 visits from 8/23/94 through 7/30/96. The medical records contained no standard procedures performed by an acceptable chiropractic physician licensed in the State of Florida. The medical records also indicated that a medical radiologist, Dr. Robert S. Elias, M.D., read the recipient's x-rays for the purpose of a medical diagnosis of treatment and that Dr. Elias' diagnosis directly conflicted with Petitioner's diagnosis; however, the x-rays were not a factor in the determination of medical necessity. Patient 3's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 3, 173 claims were paid in the amount of $2,693.70. Prior authorizations granted totaled $2,604. Patient 6 was recipient T.W., with a date of birth of 2/5/90. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 6's medical records lacked justification for the 160 visits from 1/3/95 through 9/3/96. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes, no specified diagnosis, and no routine re- examinations. Furthermore, the medical records failed to show why Petitioner was treating Patient 6. X-rays contained in the medical records were not of diagnostic quality and were, therefore, of no diagnostic value; however, the x-rays had no impact on the determination of medical necessity. Patient 6's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 6, 160 claims were paid in the amount of $2,502.20. Prior authorizations granted totaled $1,882.90. Patient 24 was recipient G.H., with a date of birth of 7/20/95. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 24's medical records failed to justify the approximately 73 visits. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes, no objective findings, and no standardized testing, including range of motion, muscle spasms, and orthopedic or neurological tests. For many of the visits, the only documentation contained in the medical records consisted of the same notation or statement: "Patient doing well." Patient 24's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 24, 72 claims were paid in the amount of $1,158.09. The medical records do reflect that any prior authorizations were granted. Patient 25 was recipient O.M., with a date of birth of 4/25/83. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 25's medical records failed to justify the 87 visits. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes, no justification of diagnosis, and no standard medical tests. The notes that were recorded were quite sparse and repetitive and typically recorded as "Doing well." Patient 25's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 25, 71 claims were paid in the amount of $1,131.69. Prior authorizations granted totaled $753.60. Patient 27 was recipient C.F., with a date of birth of 2/12/84. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 27's medical records failed to justify the 67 visits from 10/11/95 through 3/25/96. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes, no standardized examination forms, and no documentation of Patient 27's progress. Patient 27's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 27, 67 claims were paid in the amount of $1,079.59. The medical records do reflect that any prior authorizations were granted. Patient 28 was recipient K.H., with a date of birth of 8/22/94. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 28's medical records failed to justify the 69 visits. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes and no standardized testing, and showed no specific treatment provided based upon the requirements of the Medicaid laws. Patient 28's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 28, 66 claims were paid in the amount of $1,031.79. The medical records do reflect that any prior authorizations were granted. Patient 33 was recipient K.D., with a date of birth of 2/15/84. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 33's medical records failed to justify the 73 visits. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes and no standardized testing. Patient 33's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 33, 51 claims were paid in the amount of $800.70. Prior authorizations granted totaled $376.80. Patient 35 was recipient T.M., with a date of birth of 10/15/91. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 35's medical records failed to justify the 51 visits from 2/15/95 through 6/10/96. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes justifying the treatment provided. The medical records also stated that Dr. Elias read Patient 35's x- rays for the purposes of medical diagnosis of treatment and that Dr. Elias' diagnosis directly conflicted with Petitioner's diagnosis; however, the x-rays were not a factor in determining medical necessity. Patient 35's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 35, 51 claims were paid in the amount of $828.39. Prior authorizations granted totaled $753.60. Patient 39 was recipient B.T., with a date of birth of 8/8/95. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 39's medical records failed to justify the 47 visits from 2/9/95 through 10/19/95. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes justifying the treatment provided. Patient 39's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 39, 47 claims were paid in the amount of $765.59. Prior authorizations granted totaled $753.60. Patient 40 was recipient T.H., with a date of birth of 7/11/84. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 40's medical records failed to justify the 46 visits from 11/15/94 through 2/28/95. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes justifying the treatment provided. The medical records also indicated that Dr. Elias read the recipient's x-rays for the purposes of medical diagnosis of treatment and that Dr. Elias' diagnosis directly conflicted with Petitioner's diagnosis; however, the x-rays were not a factor in determining medical necessity. Patient 40's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 40, 46 claims were paid in the amount of $731.70. Prior authorizations granted totaled $753.60. Patient 45 was recipient T.W., with a date of birth of 9/26/90. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 45's medical records failed to justify the 22 visits from 4/24/95 through 11/15/95. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes justifying the treatment provided. Patient 45's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 45, 26 claims were paid in the amount of $408.20. Prior authorizations granted totaled $376.80. Patient 48 was recipient S.L., with a date of birth of 1/31/91. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 48's medical records failed to justify the 23 visits from 3/25/96 through 9/11/96. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes justifying the treatment provided. Patient 48's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 48, 23 claims were paid in the amount of $388.79. The medical records do reflect that any prior authorizations were granted. Patient 54 was recipient H.A., with a date of birth of 1/31/88. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 54's medical records failed to justify the 7 visits from 9/6/95 through 10/2/95. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes justifying the treatment provided. Patient 54's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 54, 19 claims were paid in the amount of $298.30. The medical records do reflect that any prior authorizations were granted. Patient 58 was recipient T.W., with a date of birth of 11/19/81. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 58's medical records failed to justify the 23 visits from 3/25/96 through 9/30/96. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes justifying the treatment provided. Patient 58's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 58, 17 claims were paid in the amount of $294.59. The medical records do reflect that any prior authorizations were granted. Patient 59 was recipient C.P., with a date of birth of 4/11/93. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 59's medical records failed to justify the 22 visits from 4/10/96 through 10/9/96. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes, no documentation of standardized testing of the spine, no documentation of standard tests, including orthopedic and neurological tests, and no medical justification for ongoing care and treatment. Patient 59's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 59, 16 claims were paid in the amount of $278.89. Prior authorizations granted totaled $376.80. Patient 64 was recipient M.L., with a date of birth of 8/20/89. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 64's medical records failed to justify the 8 visits from 8/30/95 through 10/2/95. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes, no documentation of standardized testing, and no description of Patient 64's pain or physical condition. Patient 64's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 64, 13 claims were paid in the amount of $204.10. The medical records do reflect that any prior authorizations were granted. Patient 69 was recipient A.L., with a date of birth of 1/14/92. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 69's medical records failed to justify the 9 visits from 2/27/95 through 3/20/95. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes, and the documentation contained in the records was minimal and repetitious. Patient 69's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 64, 13 claims were paid in the amount of $204.10. The medical records do reflect that any prior authorizations were granted. Patient 77 was recipient N.J., with a date of birth of 4/16/80. Dr. Hoffman's opinion was that Patient 77's medical records failed to justify the 7 visits from 3/6/95 through 3/29/95. The medical records contained no standardized chiropractic notes justifying the treatment provided. Patient 77's medical records failed to demonstrate medical necessity for the visits. For Patient 77, 7 claims were paid in the amount of $137.59. The medical records do reflect that any prior authorizations were granted. Dr. Hoffman recommended denial of all claims for the 20 sampled Medicaid recipients for the period from 9/1/94 through 9/30/96 due to Petitioner's failure to adequately document medical necessity in the recipients' medical records. For the 20 sampled Medicaid recipients for the period from 9/1/94 through 9/30/96, the total of the Medicaid payments was $20,710.69. As a result, the denial amount, the overpayment, for the 20 sampled recipients was the same, $20,710.69. The overpayment for the 20 sampled Medicaid recipients was extrapolated to the entire universe or total population of the 85 Medicaid recipients under the age of 21 for the period from 9/1/94 through 9/30/96, which resulted in a total projected overpayment of $70,518.26. The actual total amount of Medicaid payments for the 85 Medicaid recipients for the covered time period was $71,731.30. Considering the actual total payment of $71,731.30, the projected overpayment of $70,518.26 is very close to the actual total payment and is inherently reasonable. There is an expectation that, because all the claims of the 20 sampled Medicaid recipients were denied, the projected denial for all the claims in the universe of 85 recipients would be very close to the actual total payment. The difference between the projected overpayment of $70,518.26 and the actual amount paid of $71,731.30 is $1,213.04. This difference is negligible and such negligible difference reflects the inherent accuracy and reliability of the statistical methodology utilized. The maximum error range is 5 percent. The difference between the projected overpayment total and the actual payment total is also well within the maximum error range of 5 percent, or $3,587, for a 95 percent statistical confidence interval. To illustrate Respondent's statistical methodology, first, begin with sampled Medicaid recipient Patient 1. As indicated previously, the total number of actual claims for the total population of 85 Medicaid recipients, who were under the age of 21, was 4,499, and the total amount paid for the claims was $71,731.30; the data being taken from Respondent's Medicaid claims database. For Patient 1, 198 claims were audited and $3,081.30 was the total amount paid for the claims. All of the $3,081.30 was denied and determined to be an overpayment. Second, the same process was used with all 20 Medicaid recipients sampled, which produced a total of 1,307 claims, which were all denied, and produced a total of $20,710.69 in overpayment. The total sampled overpayment of $20,710.69 was divided by the total number of sampled claims (1,307) to obtain a mean overpayment per sampled claim of $15.85. The overpayment per sampled claim of $15.85 was multiplied by the number of claims in the total population (4,499) to obtain a point estimate of the total population overpayment, which was $71,291.04. Third, adjusting the point estimate of $71,291.04 for any potential statistical error, Respondent's model reduces the point estimate by 1.73 standard deviations, yielding an error- adjusted total overpayment of $70,518.26. Respondent has a level of confidence that there is 95 percent chance that actual overpayment is a minimum of $70,518.26. The point estimate of $71,291.04 is very close to the actual payment of $70,731.30 for the claims of the total population of the 85 Medicaid recipients; therefore, the overpayment of $70,518.26 is relatively conservative. Respondent's audit was conducted in conformity with Respondent's standards and conformed to Respondent's manner in conducting audits. The audit also had no known deviations or irregularities or deficiencies in the technical processes utilized, except the failure to take into account the prior authorizations granted. As to the statistical aspect of Respondent's audit, Respondent presented the testimony of a statistical expert, Dr. James T. McClave, Ph.D. 7/ Dr. McClave's testimony is considered credible. Using statistical methods in Medicaid overpayment determinations is a common and well-accepted standard of practice. Statistical modeling in Medicaid auditing scientifically and accurately determines the extent of overpayments in a population of payments from a small sample of overpayments drawn from the population of payments. Statistical modeling is capable of providing reliable estimates of the integrity, or lack thereof, of a Medicaid provider's billings, within reasonable time and resource constraints. In the statistical formula, a sample of claims is used to obtain a valid statistical estimate of the overpayment, if any, associated with the entire population of claims from which the sample of claims was drawn. A point estimate, being the best estimate the sample has to offer of the overpayment, is taken; and then a factor, allowing for the uncertainty associated with the sample, is subtracted such that there is a specified level of confidence that what is obtained is the conservative estimate of what the total population overpayment would be. The point estimate is referred to as "the lower 95 percent confidence bound," 8/ and the number obtained is a number which one "can be 95 percent confident that it is an underestimate of what the total overpayment would be" 9/ if the entire population was sampled. Respondent complied with the statistical methodology. The random selection process and the ad hoc computer report were valid and reliable. The results of the sampling and extrapolation were valid and reliable on the basis of the total population of Petitioner's Medicaid patients was pediatric patients and the results were limited to Petitioner's Medicaid patients under the age of 21. Further, the sample size of 20 Medicaid recipients from the total population of 85 was adequate. However, the results of the sampling and extrapolation are not reliable as they pertain to the failure of Respondent to take into consideration the granted prior authorizations. Respondent is compelled and should be provided an opportunity to re-apply its statistical methodology in light of granted prior authorizations not being considered. Uncertainty now exists as to what effect the granted prior authorizations would have on the outcome of the total overpayments. The denial of all of Petitioner's claims was a situation of first impression for Respondent. Prior to the instant case, Respondent had had no chiropractor's Medicaid claims go through peer review and denial recommended. By letter dated February 4, 1998, Respondent forwarded to Petitioner a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (Preliminary Audit Report). The Preliminary Audit Report informed Petitioner, among other things, that Respondent's preliminary determination was that Petitioner had received an overpayment of $70,518.26 due to the claims being determined not medically necessary, and requested, among other things, that Petitioner submit any additional information or documentation which may reduce the overpayment. The Preliminary Audit Report also informed Petitioner of the overpayment calculation and statistical formula used by Respondent. In response to the request for additional information or documentation, Petitioner forwarded to Ms. Jensen a videotape and testimonials. Ms. Jensen did not send the testimonials and videotape to Dr. Hoffman, the peer reviewer, for his review because these items (1) were determined by her to have been created prior to recording of the medical records at issue, and, therefore, did not constitute a medical record for review; and (2) were, consequently, not relevant. The undersigned is persuaded and a finding of fact is made that the testimonials and videotape were not relevant and need not have been submitted to Dr. Hoffman for his review. By letter dated May 5, 1998, Respondent forwarded to Petitioner its Final Agency Audit Report (Final Audit Report). The Final Audit Report, based upon the recommendations of Dr. Hoffman, notified Petitioner, among other things, that the final determination was that he had received an overpayment of $70,518.26, due to the Medicaid claims not being medically necessary. The Final Audit Report also notified Petitioner, among other things, of the overpayment calculation and statistical formula used by Respondent. Moreover, Petitioner was notified that his type of violation warranted termination from the Medicaid program and a $2,000 fine, but that, in lieu of termination from the Medicaid program, he could continue as a provider by paying a $5,000 fine. In a subsequent letter to Petitioner, regarding clarification of continued participation in the Medicaid program, Ms. Jensen explained that, as a requirement for continued participation in the Medicaid program, in addition to the $5,000 fine, Petitioner must comply with Medicaid policy and Florida Statutes and rules. Petitioner was placed on notice that to continue as a Medicaid provider he must abide by Medicaid billing requirements. Respondent's Final Audit Report did not contain any notice of mediation being available. Section 120.573, Florida Statutes, requires notice of whether mediation (settlement) is available in agency action that affects substantial interests. There is no dispute that Respondent's Final Audit Report affects Petitioner's substantial interests. No evidence was presented that either Petitioner inquired about mediation or that Petitioner or Respondent sought or desired mediation. Moreover, no evidence was presented that Petitioner was harmed or suffered as a result of not receiving the notice. No evidence was presented to support a finding that the basis of the audit findings involved a conspiracy. A finding of fact is made that the basis of the audit findings does not involve a conspiracy between Respondent and its employees and Dr. Jones and Dr. Hoffman and Dr. McClave or anyone else. Respondent did not initiate any disciplinary action against Petitioner's license as a chiropractor and, therefore, Subsections 455.225(1) and 455.621(1), Florida Statutes, are not applicable. No evidence was presented that any criminal action was referred or taken against Petitioner as a result of Respondent's audit. No evidence was presented that Respondent suspected Petitioner of having committed a criminal violation, that a criminal act had been committed by Petitioner, or that Respondent had determined that Petitioner had committed a criminal act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order against Henry M. Rubinstein, D.C. and therein: Sustaining the failure of Dr. Rubinstein's medical records, except as to granted prior authorizations, for Medicaid recipients under the age of 21 for the period from 9/1/94 through 9/30/96, to demonstrate medical necessity. Sustaining the Final Agency Audit Report, except as indicated and consistent with this Recommended Order. Requiring Dr. Rubinstein to repay overpayments, without interest, in an amount subsequently determined in a proceeding by the Agency for Health Care Administration and within a time period under terms and conditions deemed appropriate. Imposing a fine of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 2000.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent has failed to practice medicine at the level of care, skill, and treatment recognized by reasonably prudent, similarly-situated physicians, by allegedly failing to appreciate the nature of a complaint, failing to order a proper diagnostic test, and failing to make a timely referral to an appropriate specialist, as well as whether the Respondent failed to keep adequate medical records documenting a rationale for his diagnosis of the patient, in alleged violation, respectively, of Sections 458.331(1)(t) and 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the practice of medicine and enforcing the licensure and practice standards contained in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, and appurtenant rules. The Respondent, at all times material to this proceeding, has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida holding license number ME 0032003. On or about October 3, 1986, Patient #1, a thirty-five year-old male, presented to the Respondent's office with complaints of testicular pain, swelling, and a lump in the vicinity of the left testicle. The patient was seen by Dr. Laski, a physician (M.D.) employed by the Respondent. Dr. Laski examined the patient and diagnosed him as suffering from epididymitis. Epididymitis is an inflammation of the epididymis, which is a series of tubules that runs from the testicle to the vas deferens. The epididymis partially surrounds the testicle but is not actually a part of the testicle itself. The epididymis is part of the scrotal structures, and is attached to and continuous with the testicle, both being located within the scrotum. Patient #1 related that while working at his job as a truck driver, he was straining, trying to lift or move a 427-pound hot tub, when he felt pain and swelling in the left testicle, associated with a small lump. Upon diagnosing epididymitis, Dr. Laski started a treatment regimen of antibiotic and anti- inflammatory medications. He required the patient to return in four to five days. Dr. Laski saw the patient the second time on October 8, 1986 with continued complaints of left testicular pain. Dr. Laski again continued the same diagnosis and treatment. On October 13, 1986, Patient #1 again presented to Dr. Laski with continued left testicular pain with a small mass on the left testicle. Dr. Laski continued his diagnosis of epididymitis and continued the antibiotic and anti-inflammatory medications, although he changed the type of antibiotic prescribed. The patient visited a fourth time on October 17, 1986, and Dr. Laski found a tender nodule over the left testicle but also found that the remainder of the symptoms, consisting of pain and swelling, had disappeared. Dr. Laski found on the patient's first and fourth visits to him, and noted in the medical records, a mass or nodule on the left testicle; however, on the fourth visit, he found that the acute symptoms had disappeared. Dr. Laski still felt the nodule, which he could not ascribe to anything related to the purported accident experienced by the patient. Therefore, Dr. Laski felt that a urologist would be the appropriate person to see, "to take no chances and to make sure that there was not something else." Dr. Laski, accordingly, noted in his records that a referral to a urologist was in order. This was on Friday afternoon, October 17, 1986. The Respondent's office staff apparently made an attempt to refer the patient to a urologist that afternoon but was unsuccessful, due to the inability to contact the urologist's office. Apparently, the patient was instructed to call the Respondent's office the following Monday or Tuesday concerning the referral appointment. The patient maintains that he called the Respondent's office on Tuesday and was told that they could not send him to a specialist until the Respondent himself saw the patient. The Respondent disputes this and states that there is no such policy in his office that he had to see any patient before referral out to a specialist could occur. In any event, on October 22, 1986, Dr. Laski saw the patient again and called in the Respondent, who also examined the patient. The evidence of record does not indicate clearly why the Respondent took over the care and treatment of the patient from Dr. Laski at this point; however, that was apparently the case. When the Respondent initially saw Patient #1 on October 22, 1986, the Respondent did not enter in his medical records information which would either affirm or negate the presence of a mass or nodule, as identified by Dr. Laski. The Respondent testified, however, that he felt something "because, here, I'm palpating something, yes." Because he felt something in the left testicle, the Respondent ordered a urinalysis. The urinalysis was a routine "dipstick" urinalysis without microscopic slide or culture evaluation for bacteria. The Respondent testified that he wanted the urinalysis as diagnostic information because he was "palpating something". He did the urinalysis by dipstick method, such that he was able to evaluate the color, quality, and specific gravity of the urine sample. The results were negative. Dr. Carmichael testified, however, that the Respondent should have gone farther and done a microscopic evaluation in which white blood cells, if present, could have been visualized in the urine sediment. Dr. Carmichael testified that a urine culture could have been performed even though the patient had already been through two different antibiotic courses, because, as it was the Respondent's feeling that the epididymitis had not yet been resolved, there was the possibility of the presence of a type of bacteria which had not been affected by the antibiotics already administered. According to Dr. Carmichael, if the culture grew out of a pathogenic organism, "you would then have a very good likelihood that that is a causative organism, and you could tell what drug to use." The urinalysis, however, as Dr. Carmichael established, would not rule out epididymitis. The microscopic urinalysis, if done, could have been normal and the culture could have been negative; and epididymitis could still have been present. However, the lack of these tests contributed to the Respondent's inadequate assessment of the patient's status. The Respondent had Patient #1 visit a second time on November 5, 1986. On the second visit, the Respondent found, and the medical records showed, that there was a small area of "prominence" (nodule) in the epididymis. The Respondent chose to continue to observe the patient, however, to continue the prescription of the anti-inflammatory medication and ordered the patient to return in one month. Dr. Carmichael opined that another diagnostic procedure could have been used with the patient, presenting in this status at this point in his treatment course, which could have helped differentiate whether there was actually a definite mass present or not. That is, the Respondent could have ordered an ultrasound test, a procedure which uses high-frequency sound waves to outline areas of soft tissue that will not be depicted on x-rays. Dr. Herold, the Respondent's expert witness, acknowledged that ultrasound could be ordered if there is some uncertainty in the doctor's mind about the diagnosis, although he opined that it would not be the usual procedure to order an ultrasound test when the doctor suspects epididymitis to be the problem. Here, the Respondent still felt comfortable with his diagnosis of epididymitis. However, in the face of Dr. Laski's finding on October 17, 1986 that there was some sort of nodule present and that he was uncertain enough to feel the need to refer the patient to a specialist, it was established by Dr. Carmichael that if the ultrasound had been ordered of the genital area, it could confirm the diagnosis of epididymitis or, correspondingly, whether an actual tumor was present at that time. In any event, the Respondent's treatment plan as of November 5, 1986 was to continue observation and order Patient #1 to return in one month. The patient failed to return until January 12, 1987, for unexplained reasons. On that date, the Respondent examined the patient and immediately noted a hard, non-tender mass in the area of the epididymis. The Respondent then immediately referred the patient to a urologist, Dr. Antar, who testified on behalf of the Petitioner. On or about January 19, 1987, Dr. Antar evaluated the patient and determined that surgery was immediately necessary, because his immediate impression was that the mass was cancerous. Blood tests revealed that the tumor markers were very high, and Dr. Antar felt that there was no reason to observe further. Three days later, Dr. Antar performed a radical orchiectomy on the left testicle (removal of the testicle). The testicular tumor was a teratoma. A teratoma is a tumor which appears to be benign but behaves like a malignancy. Moreover, however, a biopsy of a lymph node from the left side of the patient's neck showed three elements of cancer: the teratoma, embryonal cancer cells, and choriocarcinoma cancer cells. Dr. Antar established that all three indications were coming from the left testicle. Thus, the cancer had metastasized from the left testicle to the lymph system. However, Dr. Antar established that through chemotherapy the cancer cells which had migrated were eliminated, since this type of cancer, although it is virulent, is particularly amenable to chemotherapy. The medical records show that the Respondent saw the patient on three occasions; October 22, 1986, November 5, 1986, and January 12, 1987. The patient had also been seen by Doctor Laski independently of the Respondent for the first four visits and in conjunction with the Respondent's initial examination on October 22, 1986. Thus, Dr. Laski, before the Respondent, had seen the patient four times in three weeks. It was Dr. Laski's judgement that the symptoms of the acute problem had gone away but that, because a nodule remained which Dr. Laski could not explain, he should be referred to a urologist. The Respondent then took over his care for unexplained reasons but did not carry out Dr. Laski's recommendations for a urological evaluation by a specialist. The Respondent contended in his testimony that he would always honor another physician's recommendation but did not specifically indicate in his testimony or in the medical record why Dr. Laski's recommendation that a urologist be consulted and see the patient was not carried out. Even though, in fact, the Respondent noted in his subsequent examinations the prominence in the left testicle, he simply continued to diagnose the problem as epididymitis and elected to continue to "observe". The medical record prepared by Dr. Laski included the recommendation that the patient be referred to a urological specialist. Thus, the Respondent should have known of this recommendation whether or not he actually conversed with Dr. Laski about the referral (the record does not indicate whether they actually conversed about this subject or not). In any event, as shown by Dr. Carmichael, the Respondent's notes in the medical record do not provide any explanation or justification for merely continuing to observe the patient. The medical records prepared by the Respondent do not support his decision not to follow up and have the patient actually referred to a urologist and not to conduct further tests or investigation of the left testicle, such as an ultrasound test. Given the course of treatment by the Respondent, consisting merely of continuing to observe for another month, along with the continuing of a prescription for an anti-inflammatory, with the unexplained inconsistent deletion of the prescription for an antibiotic, even though the Respondent believed that the epididymitis was continuing; the medical record kept by the Respondent for the patient did not justify this course of treatment. He did not order any further diagnostic tests and yet, according to the record, ignored the recommendation that a specialist consultation be effected. All three of the medical experts testifying established that such a tumor could have initially presented as epididymitis. Dr. Carmichael opined that when a person has a lump or soreness in the testicle, he frequently tries to relate it to some type of activity, like lifting or straining. He opined that the usual presenting complaint of a testicular tumor would be a lump, with some sort of soreness or discomfort. Dr. Antar, the urologist who ultimately saw the patient and operated, testified that people with testicular cancer can present as having epididymitis. Dr. Antar testified that they need to be treated with antibiotics for two to three weeks, to be rechecked to be sure the epididymitis is dissolved and that the testicle has returned to normal. Dr. Herold also opined that the inflammation of epididymitis can occur as a result of trauma or as a reaction to the presence of a tumor. If the Respondent had such an awareness, as described by these experts, he did not act on it, however. He elected merely to continue the anti-inflammatory medication and part of the course of treatment already tried by Dr. Laski, in spite of the fact that his employee and colleague had already shown, and entered in his medical record, that the rest of the supposed epididymitis symptoms had disappeared, that there still remained a tenderness and small mass on the left testicle and that a consultation with a specialist was in order. Respondent's reaction upon first seeing the patient on October 22nd was that there was a tenderness in the left testicle and a swelling in the epididymitis, as well. The Respondent's testimony and his medical records simply do not explain why he ignored Dr. Laski's recommendation that a specialist see the patient and be consulted, if all he himself was going to do, at least for the ensuing one and one-half months, was to continue the anti- inflammatory therapy the patient had already been given.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Board of Medical Examiners finding that the Respondent has violated Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as found and concluded above, for which a penalty of a $1,000.00 fine and one year's probation should be imposed. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Final Order determine that Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, has been violated, for which the penalty of a reprimand and administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 be imposed. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, as to both Counts, that 20 hours of continuing medical education in the area of oncology and five hours in the area of risk management, over and above that required for licensure, be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-930 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-8. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. 11-20. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Respondent did not submit numbered proposed findings of fact and it is, therefore, difficult to rule on the proposed findings of fact specifically. Nevertheless, the first two paragraphs of the proposed findings of fact are accepted. The third paragraph is, for the most part, established by the evidence of record. However, it is rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter to the extent that they differ from the proposed findings of fact in the third paragraph in the Respondent's proposed findings of fact. The fourth paragraph of the Respondent's proposed findings of fact is accepted but not necessarily for the material import the Respondent proposes. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Whalin Makant, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Northwood Centre, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 James Facciolo, Esquire KENT, HAYDEN, ET AL. 200 West Forsyth Street Suite 1330 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
