Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Respondent, Dr. Julius A. Okuboye, was a medical doctor licensed by and in the State of Florida. In the first of six cases upon which Petitioner bases its case, the patient was receiving medical treatment for a fracture of the right femur, (thigh bone), at Gateway Community Hospital in St. Petersburg, Florida during the period November 21, 1982 and January 13, 1983. Petitioner contends Respondent failed to properly perform the surgical procedure; failed to properly consider alternative courses of treatment; and failed to keep adequate medical records justifying the course of treatment taken. Respondent reduced the bone fracture here by using a metal plate running lengthwise along the bone in an attempt to brace the fracture by securing it to the bone with, initially, screws. The plate used by the Respondent was too short for the procedure in that it did not extend beyond the upper limits of the fracture by that distance considered by some to be appropriate. Petitioner's first expert felt the use of the plate which was too short and the screws used to affix it, which were too short, was improper practice. In his opinion, the procedure followed by the Respondent herein required the patient to undergo three separate operations rather than one, which unnecessarily exposed this elderly patient to infection and the risk of anesthesia on three separate occasions. Petitioner's other expert believes that because the Respondent used a plate which was too short for the fracture involved, it was necessary for him to go back in and fix the plate with Parham bands considered by many in the field to be an old-fashioned practice. These bands, when used, tend to devitalize the tissue. He believes that once having used them, however, Respondent should have used more screws to affix the plate and the bands. In addition, the plate did not fix the smaller bone fragments at the bottom of the fracture. Both experts state Respondent should have considered reducing the fracture by the use of traction and bed rest as an alternative to surgery. On the other hand, Respondent's experts disagreed with Petitioner's experts. One, Dr. Weiss, indicated that Respondent had two choices: (1) a prolonged traction and immobilization which, itself, poses a great risk for an elderly patient, or (2) the surgical fixation which was chosen. Here, the reduction was good but the plate was too short. Dr. Weiss contends, as was urged by Respondent, that this was beyond his control and while it would have been better to use a longer plate, the Respondent used the correct procedure and the fact that a second and third operation was necessary, was beyond his control. His choice to do them was appropriate. The other expert, Dr. Bodden, pointed out that even though the smaller plate was used, there is no assurance a larger plate would have precluded the second and third operations. He believes that in light of all of the medical problems presented in this case and since the ideal plate was not available, Respondent's choice was prudent. The length of the plate was improper but in the opinion of Dr. Bodden, the patient's bone structure contributed to the breakage after the plate was installed. Further, the use of Parham bands was not inappropriate. They have been used for many years and are still widely accepted and used. In fact, he uses them himself. Prior to the surgery, Respondent contacted the operating room charge nurse to determine if the proper plates were available, and was assured by her that a full set of plates was available for the surgery. It was only after entering the operating arena, opening the incision into the patient's leg, and thereafter opening the sterilized and sealed package containing the plates that it was determined the proper plate was not present. Absent a showing to the contrary, it is found it would have been improper to open the plate package in advance of surgery to check since such a procedure would have destroyed the sterile nature of the package. In light of the above, Respondent's actions were appropriate. As to the issue of the adequacy of Respondent's medical records on other patients, an analysis of the records showed that no discharge summary was prepared by the Respondent nor were progress notes kept by him on December 22, 23, 25, and thereafter for several weeks on an irregular basis. It may be that Respondent was not the primary physician and only the consultant, but the records fail to show who was the responsible physician and who was ultimately responsible for the patient. A consultant should always reflect in the patient records who he is and in what capacity he has seen the patient as well as his area of expertise and the actions he has taken. Here, the Respondent's failure to do so, notwithstanding some expert evidence to the contrary, renders the records kept by him inadequate. In the case of the patient who was treated by the Respondent as a consultant on a fracture of the left hip at Gateway Community Hospital between October 27, and November 10, 1983, Petitioner's experts have no quarrel with the orthopedic treatment rendered the patient by Respondent. However, Respondent failed to make proper entries in the patient's medical records and the notes therein were made by an internist. Respondent saw the patient on only four of the nine days the patient was hospitalized and in the opinion of the expert, proper practice requires a doctor, or his substitute in the absence of the doctor, to see the patient each day. It may be that this practice, which is generally accepted as appropriate throughout the medical community, is somewhat less significant in the field of orthopedic surgery. Respondent's expert indicated he did not feel constrained to see his patients each day subsequent to surgery so long as he was kept aware of the patients' conditions. While he makes progress notes, he does not dictate discharge summaries or any of the other records since these are prepared by residents based on the notes he has put in the file. The medical records for this patient show no progress notes by the Respondent on November 1, 3, 4, and 5, 1983, during which time the patient was in the hospital under the Respondent's care. In one expert's opinion, the missing of three consecutive day's progress notes renders the records below standard. Respondent indicates he saw the patient frequently right after the surgery, but once he was satisfied that her orthopedic problems were progressing satisfactorily, did not see her during the time she was being treated for medical problems unrelated to the orthopedic surgery by an internist. He did write medical notes on the first five postoperative days at the conclusion of which his postoperative care for the orthopedic surgery was completed. Were it not for her unrelated medical problems, the patient would have been released and he did see her once, (Nov.2) prior to her discharge after her medical problem had been resolved. On the basis of all the testimony, it is found that in this case, Dr. Okuboye did not fail to keep proper medical records. Respondent also saw a patient for a fracture of the left lateral malleolus, (the protuberance on both sides of the ankle joint), and is alleged to have failed to timely perform an examination of the patient; failed to have timely provided treatment; and failed to have performed a complete examination. In this case, Petitioner's expert pointed out that the chart kept by the Respondent failed to show any reference to a knee injury which was disclosed on post-treatment X-rays evaluated by him. Respondent is also alleged to have failed to have cleaned and irrigated the wound which was a part of the injury, and that he administered only an intramuscular injection of antibiotics. In the opinion of the witness, it makes no difference if there was an infection or not. It is, in his opinion; a bad practice to not debride and clean the wound. Further, he was concerned that the patient records kept by the Respondent did not reflect whether the Respondent responded to the emergency room at the time he prescribed the treatment or not. From the review of the records, he could not tell. Review of the case records by Respondent's expert showed there was no open fracture which required debridement or specific cleaning. The wound was a small abrasion. As a general rule, an injury should be more than 1/2 inch in size or have some bone showing in order to require debridement, (removal of foreign material and dead or damaged tissue). If those conditions are present, proper procedure is to clean the wound and to provide antibiotics, which the Respondent did, and the treatment recommended by him met appropriate standards. This is the better point of view. As to the records kept by the Respondent, a note regarding the action taken here was dictated by Respondent two days after the patient was discharged. The patient records show a postoperative X-ray was taken by Respondent but there is no indication in the record showing that surgery was done. The patient was admitted through the emergency room and was sent to the floor even before the Respondent was contacted. As a result, Respondent did not see the patient in the emergency room. The ER notes prepared by someone else refer to an abrasion and an approximately 1/4 inch tear in the skin. The injury was cleaned in the ER and the patient was sent to the floor after which the Respondent was advised by telephone there was a "questionable" fracture of the ankle. In response, Respondent gave orders for immobilization of the wound and administration of antibiotics. The following day, when Respondent saw the patient, he could see no open wound nor could he find evidence of a fracture. As a result, he discontinued the prescription for antibiotics and discharged the patient who, it should be noted, did not sustain an infection and who did well in his recuperation. Respondent indicates he had been told by the family physician who admitted the patient and the nurses on the floor, with whom he discussed the patient, that there was no open wound sustained by this patient. On the basis of this information, Respondent prescribed the questioned course of treatment and it would appear it was appropriate and well within standards. Between November 12, and November 22, 1983, Respondent acted as surgical consultant regarding a patient being treated at Gateway Community Hospital for a metatarsal fracture. Respondent performed an open reduction and internal fixation of the fracture and Petitioner now claims that Respondent failed to keep adequate medical records justifying the course of that patient's treatment. In that case, Petitioner does not claim improper treatment by the Respondent. However, one expert for Petitioner could not determine with any degree of certainty whether or not the procedure was required because of the absence of pre- operative X-rays and because of the inadequacy of the records for him to look at. The other Petitioner expert agreed that the Respondent took adequate care of the patient but because of the absence of postoperative film, the taking of which is a general practice within the medical community, he was not able to determine, nor would the Respondent be able to determine, whether the surgeon missed anything in performing the surgery. Respondent's evidence unequivocally contradicted the testimony of both Petitioner's experts. There were X-rays taken prior to the procedure by Respondent which showed a fracture of the outside metatarsus, (long foot bone). He proposed outpatient surgery of one day and reduced the fracture, inserting two pins as security. The postoperative X-rays show proper reduction. In fact, there are several sets of postoperative films and those taken after the holding pins placed in the fracture were removed show good reduction and full healing. Respondent discharged the patient from orthopedic care after surgery for release the next day if approved by the referring, physician, Dr. Lew. However, Dr. Lew kept the patient in the hospital one or two days after that for a reason not related to the orthopedic surgery done by Respondent. This would tend to explain the reason for there being no follow-up progress notes on the two days following the operative report done by Respondent on November 23. The failure to keep adequate notes adversely affects the entire care team not just the attending physician, as without adequate notes, the team cannot tell what is going on with the patient. The entire care is summarized in the progress notes and the failure to make notes on time leaves a hole. That cannot be said to have been the case here, however, since the orthopedic treatment of the patient was completed with the dictation of the operative report and the patient was discharged by Respondent. The patient's retention in the hospital for several days more was by another physician on a matter totally unrelated to the Respondent's treatment and Respondent had no responsibility to keep records on that portion of the patient's hospitalization. It cannot be said, then, that Respondent's records were inappropriate in this case. Respondent is also alleged to have improperly failed to perform a procedure of open reduction and internal fixation of an ankle fracture on a patient treated by him at Gateway Hospital between January 20, and January 25, 1983. In this case, Petitioner's expert questions whether the inner bone was properly reduced. X-rays taken subsequent to the procedure, show the reduction left a big gap and an irregular joint and the doctor feels the procedure, as it was done, was below standards. The other Petitioner expert concurs. There were two fractures. The smaller, did not need to be fixed since it was less than 1/3 of the ankle area and medical opinion indicates that fractures of less than 1/3 of the area should not be fixed. The other was fixed improperly in that Respondent should have used a tension band instead of a screw. If he had done so, there would have been a better fixation. Respondent's expert disagrees, pointing out that the postoperative X- rays show the position of the bones as placed by the Respondent, was quite acceptable. The failure to get an anatomic, (as developed by nature), reduction is not indicative of substandard care. It is sometimes not possible to put bones back the way they were prior to the fracture. In the instant case, when the operation and casting were done, the results were acceptable. The doctor concludes this was a very difficult operation to do and under the circumstances, the Respondent's performance met the standards within the community. Respondent's other expert agrees. This was an extremely difficult fracture of three sections of an ankle. Admittedly, Respondent's work resulted in a slight bone irregularity. A smooth reduction would be ideal, but it is unlikely that an anatomic reduction could be had in this case. No matter how skilled the work, a fracture of this kind is likely to result in some arthritis, and the failure to use a tension band, as suggested by one of Petitioner's experts, as opposed to a screw as chosen by the Respondent is a matter of choice. Neither gives better results and the Respondent's choice here, in these circumstances, was reasonable. Between December 18 and December 27, 1984, Respondent performed an open reduction and internal fixation of a fractured right hip. Petitioner alleges that Respondent performed a surgical procedure which was unnecessary, failed to properly perform the surgical procedure done, and failed to keep adequate medical records justifying the patient's treatment. In this case, Respondent inserted a Jewett nail, a non-collapsing nail, into the bone. The bone collapsed and drove the nail up into the end of the bone in an inappropriate manner. One of Petitioner's experts took issue with Respondent's use of the Jewett nail calling it an outdated device. In his opinion, the Respondent did not plan properly to have the appropriate device on hand when it was needed. His opinion is supported by that of the other Petitioner expert who pointed out that the procedure resulted in an inadequate fixation. He contends the Respondent should have used a collapsible nail and that Respondent's technique of cutting the bone after the collapse was inappropriate and resulted in a shortening of the leg. He believes this procedure was improper and falls below medical standards in the community. He was also of the opinion that Respondent's record keeping in this case was inadequate. Petitioner's expert in medical records found several problems with Respondent's records on this patient. The initial note was dictated after surgery instead of when the consult was first done. No progress notes were in the file for those days when the patient was not seen by the Respondent. There was no showing that the patient was seen by someone left in charge by Respondent in his absence. Since medical records provide a history of the case and allow the follow-on staff to provide continuation of care, the evidence showed Respondent's records in this case were below standard. Respondent's witness, Dr. Weiss, does not believe that the use of the Jewett nail is necessarily inappropriate. The fact that the Jewett nail did not work out for the Respondent in this case and required follow-up surgery, is not necessarily indicative of improper treatment. Studies of similar fractures in elderly patients show that 70% had some deviation and many similar cases show penetration of the head of the bone by the nail such as was the case here. While there are newer nails used by many orthopedic surgeons, the Jewett nail is still appropriate. The physician can avoid penetration at the time of the insertion and Respondent did so, but penetration cannot always be avoided after surgery when weight is placed on the limb. Respondent's other expert who reviewed this case stated that the fixed nail used by Respondent, if properly used, gives equally good results as the newer collapsible nail. Cutting of the bone is a well known and appropriate procedure in cases where necessary, as here. In evaluating the testimony of the experts, it should be noted that neither of the Board's experts interviewed Respondent or in any way discussed with him his professional reasons for doing what he did. Their opinions given here as expert testimony were based on evaluation of records and X-rays only whereas the opinions of Respondent's experts were based on review of the same documentation and also on interviews with Respondent who was questioned and who expounded on his medical rationale. Having analyzed the procedure done by the Respondent here and having evaluated the testimony of all witnesses, it is found that the procedure as followed by Respondent did not fall below the appropriate medical standards within the community. However, the allegation regarding Respondent's failure to keep proper medical records has been established. Respondent is a native of Nigeria, who took his medical training in England, graduating from Kings College Medical school in 1961. He interned in the United States at Bridgeport Hospital, served his residency and as a research fellow in Canada, and returned to the United States for a two year general surgery and three year orthopedic surgery residency at Albert Einstein Medical Center in New York. Respondent came to Florida in 1973 and has been in private practice as a sole practitioner since that time. He is Board eligible in orthopedic surgery and certified in neurological and orthopedic surgery by the American College of Neurological and Orthopedic surgery, not to be confused with the American Board of Orthopedic Surgery. He is also a member of the Royal College of Surgeons. At one time, Respondent practiced at Gateway Hospital in St. Petersburg where all the cases involved in the proceeding came up and where he was involved in legal action involving a matter he had handled. Respondent won that case but nonetheless, had to sue the hospital to recover his expenses. When Gateway Hospital was sold to Humana, he was again involved in litigation with the hospital to retain his privilege to practice there. Thereafter, he was called before the hospital committee regarding the instant cases in a staff privilege matter and as a result, the hospital referred them to the Department of Professional Regulation. Respondent believes two factions in the medical community seek his dismissal and the revocation of his license. He presented a detailed litany of grievances against various members of the hospital staff and others who, he contends, are engaged in a program to destroy him professionally and remove him from the practice of medicine. Since his medical privileges at the hospital have been rescinded, he can no longer accept referrals in orthopedic surgery from other members of the staff at Gateway and as a result, referrals that would ordinarily go to him, are now going to other, more favored members of the staff who retain surgical privileges. He contends his troubles, which culminated in this hearing, are both economically and racially motivated, and also involve an effort to rid the hospital of foreign trained physicians. There is no evidence to corroborate Respondent's charges and , therefore, the decision regarding his standard of practice and his record keeping must be based on the professional evidence presented at this hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Julius A. Okuboye, be reprimanded. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of February, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearings Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1988. Appendix to Recommended Order In Case No. 86-1048 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Accepted to the extent that Respondent's reduction was not anatomic but rejected to the extent "it possibly could have been better treated in a cast." Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as to all but last sentence which is irrelevant since the latter portion of the hospitalization discussed here was after patient had been discharged by Respondent and did not relate to orthopedic treatment. Accepted and incorporated herein. 14-16. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. 17&18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. 20-21. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. 22. Accepted as to certain records and rejected as to others as discussed in the body of the Recommended Order. For the Respondent Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected as a restatement of Petitioner's position. Remainder accepted and incorporated. First sentence rejected as above. Last sentence accepted and incorporated. Remainder rejected as a restatement of the evidence. First sentence rejected as above. Second sentence rejected as a restatement of evidence. Third through Sixth sentences accepted and incorporated. seventh rejected as a restatement of Petitioner's position. Eighth and Ninth sentences accepted and incorporated. First sentence rejected as above. second sentence accepted. Remainder accepted and incorporated. First sentence rejected as above. Remainder accepted and incorporated. First sentence rejected as above. Remainder accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as to some cases, accepted as to others as defined in the Findings of Fact herein. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Bryant, Esquire Suite 2000, Ashley Tower 100 South Ashley Drive Tampa, Florida 33602 Glenn M. Woodworth, Esquire Woodworth and Dugan, Chartered Wittner Centre West 5999 Central Avenue Suite 103 St. Petersburg, Florida 33710 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated sections 460.413(1)(m), 460.413(1)(ff), 460.413(1)(n), and 460.413(1)(r), Florida Statutes (2006),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B2-17.0065, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of chiropractic medicine in Florida, pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 460, Florida Statutes. Dr. Christian was at all times material to the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint a licensed chiropractic physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 5756 on or about February 4, 1998. At all times material to the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Christian, Dr. Davidson, and Dr. Kalin were employees of Comprehensive Physician Services, Incorporated (CPS). Dr. Christian was the sole stockholder of CPS. On April 17, 2006, M.M. was involved in an automobile accident when the car, in which she was a front-seat passenger, hit a tree on the passenger side. The window next to M.M. shattered and M.M. received lacerations to the right temple area of her head. M.M. was transferred by ambulance to the emergency room at Northside Hospital. While in the emergency room, a CT scan was performed on M.M.'s head. The CT evaluation was normal. The lacerations were sutured, and M.M. was discharged from the emergency room. On or about April 26, 2006, M.M. presented to CPS for treatment of injuries due to the automobile accident on April 17, 2006. M.M., who was a minor at the time, was accompanied by her mother to CPS. M.M.'s complaints were headaches; neck pain and stiffness; mid-back pain and stiffness; lower back pain and stiffness; difficulty sleeping due to pain; and difficulty with concentration. She indicated that, on a scale of one to ten, with ten being the most, the stiffness in her neck and middle back was a five. On examination, Dr. Christian found that M.M. had cervical and thoracic tenderness. In his initial report, Dr. Christian noted the hyperabduction tests were positive, and there was "left side reduced pulse/paresthesia due thoracic outlet compression consistent with compression from seat belt trauma." However, the test results contained in the medical records show that there are negative findings on the hyperabduction tests. When questioned about the discrepancy, Dr. Christian testified that the positive findings were a result of the grip/pinch test that he performed. He indicated that he made a mistake in his initial report and that the report should have stated right side reduced pulse. He could not explain how the grip/pinch test would lead him to conclude that there was a reduced pulse because M.M.'s pulse would not be measured during a grip/pinch test nor could he explain how he could learn from a grip/pinch test that there was paresthesia. Later, he testified that the difference in the results was not due to the grip/pinch test, but was a result of a second hyperabduction test that he performed prior to the grip/pinch test. Dr. Christian's testimony is not credited. Dr. Christian's practice is to have an assistant come into the examination room during the testing. As he performs the test, he tells the assistant the results of the test, and the assistant will record the test results. The medical records do not show a second hyperabduction test being recorded by an assistant. Therefore, the examination results are contrary to the results stated in the initial report for April 26, 2006. In his examination records of April 26, 2006, Dr. Christian noted that there was "R [circled] Visual Acuity Diff." M.M.'s mother was present during the examination and observed Dr. Christian testing M.M.'s vision on April 26, 2006. Dr. Christian testified that he first tested M.M.'s vision on May 24, 2011. His testimony is not credited. Dr. Christian's practice is to put findings of the previous chiropractic examination on the report of the examination that he is currently conducting so that a comparison could be made. The examination report of April 26, 2006, and May 24, 2006, are the same with the exception of notations on the May 24, 2006, report of 5/23 near the present complaints section and the section where areas of muscle spasms on the spine are noted. In his follow-up report dated May 24, 2006, Dr. Christian wrote: "Certainly today I see evidence of her continuing to have some alterations of visual acuity . . .". Dr. Christian testified that he had incorrectly included the term "continuing" in this statement. Dr. Christian's testimony is not credited. His statement that the alterations of visual acuity were continuing comports with M.M.'s mother's testimony that the first visual testing was done on April 26, 2006, and the examination report of April 26, 2006. Based on the examination reports for April 26, 2006, and May 24, 2006, there is no indication of what tests Dr. Christian used to test M.M.'s vision nor is there any indication of the exact nature of the problem with the right eye. Dr. Christian's initial report does not mention the visual acuity difference. His follow-up report of May 24, 2006, does not indicate the difference that M.M. is experiencing with her right eye. In his examination records of June 14, 2006, and July 25, 2006, Dr. Christian notes: " R [circled] side vision distance diff." In his final report of July 25, 2006, Dr. Christian noted as a current symptom, "[r]ight sided visual alteration with peripheral." He listed as a diagnostic impression: "Concussion with residual affecting peripheral visual field on the right, persistent." However, contrary to his final report, Dr. Christian testified at final hearing that M.M.'s problem with her peripheral vision had improved. On April 26, 2006, Dr. Christian's treatment plan included the following treatment for M.M. three times a week for four weeks: intersegmental traction, hot pack, and neuromuscular release for the full spine; inferential, alternating cervical to dorsal and dorsal to lumbar; full spine massage; and full spine aqua treatment. The therapist assistant was to determine which treatment modalities and areas to treat at each treatment session. Dr. Christian signed each of the daily treatment notes. On April 26, 2006, Dr. Christian referred M.M. to Dr. Kalin. According to Dr. Christian, Dr. Kalin had experience in emergency rooms treating patients who had sustained trauma. Dr. Christian wanted Dr. Kalin to look at the two lacerations that M.M. had sustained. However, there were no outward signs of infection of the lacerations, and the lacerations had healed. Dr. Christian also wanted to determine if there was any post concussion symptoms. Dr. Kalin evaluated M.M. on May 1, 2006. His initial diagnosis was that she had a "cervical musculoskeletal ligamentous strain" and a "[s]ubacute lumbosacral musculoskeletal ligamentous strain." His examination did not reveal any abnormality with M.M.'s vision. He did find that the lacerations may leave permanent scarring. In his interim report dated May 24, 2006, Dr. Christian stated: "Dr. Kalin was not able to mention the fact that she [M.M.] struck her head or had laceration and dizziness with nausea and vomiting following the impact." This statement is contrary to what Dr. Kalin stated in his report. Dr. Christian further noted in his report that he would follow- up with Dr. Kalin to see if Dr. Kalin had an addendum as to whether there is additional follow-up for post-concussion symptomology. In his report of May 1, 2006, Dr. Kalin did not make any findings of a concussion or post-concussion syndrome. On May 25, 2006, a staff member of CPS sent the following request to Dr. Kalin: Dr. Kalin, Dr. Christian asked if you could please make an addendum [sic] to your report on [M.M.] for her concussion-post concussion syndrome. Thanks! Kimberly Dr. Kalin replied: "pt had no symptoms of headache or memory/concentration when I saw her." No mention was made in Dr. Christian's interim report dated May 25, 2006, that Dr. Kalin did not find any evidence of post-concussion syndrome. On May 1, 2006, Dr. Christian wrote a prescription for hydrotherapy for M.M. for three times a week for four weeks. M.M. received treatment at CPS on May 1, 2006. M.M. indicated to the therapist that on a scale of one to ten that she rated her low back pain and low back stiffness as a four and her neck stiffness as a five. The therapist noted that there was cervical and lumbar tenderness. M.M.'s treatment on May 1, 2006, consisted of hot therapy and hydrotherapy to the cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas, and intersegmental traction to the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar areas. X-rays of M.M.'s cervical and lumbar spine were ordered. The radiologist who read the X-rays had the impression that M.M. had a cervical muscle spasm and a lumbar muscle spasm. On May 4, 2006, M.M. received treatment at CPS. She rated her neck stiffness and low back stiffness as a three. There was no notation of any tenderness by the therapist. M.M. received the following treatment in the thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas: hot therapy, intersegmental traction, and hydrotherapy. On May 4, 2006, ultrasound studies were performed on M.M. by Charles W. Hirt, M.D. (Dr. Hirt). Dr. Hirt's impression was that there were findings that showed evidence of a left- sided thoracic outlet syndrome. On May 9, 2006, M.M. returned to CPS for treatment. She rated her neck stiffness and lower back stiffness as a two. The therapist noted that there was tenderness in the cervical and lumbar areas. M.M. was given hot therapy, intersegmental traction, and trigger point therapy in her cervical, thoracic, and lumbar areas. She received myofascial release, massage, and hydrotherapy in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. On May 16, 2006, M.M. was treated at CPS. She rated her neck stiffness as a one and her low back stiffness as a two. The therapist noted tenderness in the lumbar area. The treatment to M.M.'s cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas included intersegmental traction, trigger point therapy, myofascial release, and massage. She was given interferential treatment to her lumbar and sacral areas and hot therapy to her cervical, thoracic, and lumbar areas. On May 18, 2006, M.M. presented for treatment at CPS. She rated her neck and low back stiffness as a one. The therapist did not note any tenderness. M.M. received the following treatment in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas: hot therapy, intersegmental traction, trigger point therapy, myofascial release, and massage. On May 23, 2006, M.M. went to CPS for treatment. She rated her lower back stiffness as zero. The therapist noted tenderness in the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar areas. M.M. was given a massage and myofascial release in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. She received inferential treatment and trigger point therapy in her lumbar and sacral areas and hot therapy and intersegmental traction in her thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. On May 24, 2006, Dr. Christian did a follow-up examination of M.M. M.M. rated the neck and lower back stiffness as zero. Dr. Christian noted in his follow-up report that all the symptoms that he had noted in his initial report of April 26, 2006, had improved. His follow-up report stated: "Cerebellar function tests, as far as assessed are abnormal with a positive Rhomberg test for possible concussion." His follow- up report also stated: "Certainly today, I see evidence of her continuing to have some alterations of visual acuity and a positive Rhomberg, which would be consistent with post concussion syndrome." On May 25, 2006, M.M. returned to CPS for further treatment. She rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. The therapist noted tenderness in M.M.'s cervical and lumbar areas. M.M. was treated with myofascial release and massage in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. She received trigger point therapy in her lumbar and sacral areas and inferential treatment in her thoracic area. She also received intersegmental traction in her thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. M.M. received treatment at CPS on May 30, 2006. Again, she rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. The therapist did not note any tenderness. Hydrotherapy, hot therapy, and intersegmental traction were provided to M.M. in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. She received inferential treatment in her lumbar and sacral areas. On June 13, 2006, M.M. again returned to CPS for treatment. She rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. The therapist noted tenderness in M.M.'s cervical, thoracic, and lumbar areas. M.M. received intersegmental traction, myofascial release, and massage in her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. M.M. was given hot therapy in her thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. She received trigger point therapy in her cervical and thoracic areas. On June 14, 2006, M.M. presented at CPS for a follow- up visit with Dr. Christian. She rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. He reduced her treatment to one per week for the next four to five weeks. In his examination record of June 14, 2006, Dr. Christian noted: " R [circled] side vision distance diff." On June 20, 2006, M.M. returned to CPS for treatment. Again, she rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. The therapist did not note any tenderness. M.M. was given hot therapy and intersegmental traction for her thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. She was given hydrotherapy for her cervical, thoracic, lumbar, and sacral areas. On June 22, 2006, ultrasound studies were done on M.M. by Dr. Hirt. His impression was that she likely had thoracic outlet syndrome on the left side. On May 24, 2006, Dr. Christian referred M.M. to Dr. Davidson for a second opinion for post concussion. Dr. Davidson examined M.M. on June 27, 2006. In his report dated June 27, 2006, Dr. Davidson concluded that she had had a mild concussion, a cervical strain, and a lumbosacral strain. He recommended that her soft tissue therapy be discontinued. Dr. Davidson did not find any abnormalities in M.M.'s vision. On July 25, 2006, M.M. was examined by Dr. Christian. M.M. rated her neck and low back stiffness as zero. Dr. Christian noted the following in his final report dated July 25, 2006. If the patient's symptoms of altered visual field persist and evaluation by an ophthalmologist or a neuro-ophthalmologist may be appropriate. If she begins to have any difficulty with sleep, mood swings, feelings of dizziness or persistent headaches a neuro-psychiatric evaluation for continued post concussion deficits may be appropriate. Dr. Christian discharged M.M. on July 25, 2006, and M.M. was to return for treatment on an as needed basis. Dr. Christian's initial report dated April 26, 2006; interim report dated May 24, 2006; follow-up report dated June 14, 2006; and final report dated July 25, 2006, were dictated by Dr. Christian. The reports were being mailed to someone or some entity based on the note at the end of each report, which stated: "DICTATED BUT NOT PROOFREAD TO AVOID DELAY IN MAILING." At the closing of each report, Dr. Christian stated: "If I can be of further assistance in this regard, please do not hesitate to contact me." It is not clear to whom the reports were directed, but it is clear that the reports were meant to convey the examination, evaluation, and treatment of M.M. to the reader of the report. These reports did not accurately report the examination results of M.M. in at least two instances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Christian violated sections 460.413(1)(m) and 460.413(1)(ff) and rule 64B2-17.0065; finding that Dr. Christian did not violate sections 460.413(1)(n) and 460.413(1)(r); imposing an administrative fine of $2,500; placing Dr. Christian on probation for one year; and requiring Dr. Christian to attend a continuing education course on record-keeping. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN BELYEU KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a medical doctor should be disciplined for the reasons stated in the administrative complaint, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Bernardo G. Bilang, was a licensed medical doctor having been issued license number 0026846 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine (DPR or Board). He has been licensed by the Board since July 19, 1976. Respondent presently practices medicine at 1201 South Highland Avenue, Suite 11, Clearwater, Florida. His specialty, if any, is not of record. Around 10:45 p.m. on February 2, 1986, N.K., a seventy-four year old female, was transported by ambulance to the emergency room of Morton F. Plant Hospital, Inc. (hospital) in Clearwater, Florida. When admitted, she complained of nausea, diarreah, dehydration, vomiting, fatigue and not feeling well. Also, she had experienced some pain in her back. With the exception of the back pain, which had begun more than a day earlier, all other symptoms had begun on February 2. Doctor Linda L. Shaffer was the emergency room physician on duty on the evening of February 2. Doctor Shaffer initially observed that the patient looked "acutely ill." She examined the patient and found her to be coherent and alert but very weak, as evidenced by her lack of grip strength In slurred speech, the patient answered questions very faintly and generally in one word answers. As might be expected, the patient was dehydrated. Her vital signs at 11:00 p.m. here as follows: rectal temperature - 104.6 degrees; blood pressure 152 over 96; respiration - 24; and pulse - 101. She also had tenderness across the middle of the back on both sides but did not have a stiff neck. After a preliminary physical examination and history were completed, and while the patient remained in the emergency room area for a few hours, Dr. Shaffer ordered a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, complete blood count, electrolyte panel, chemical profile, two tests of kidney function, blood cultures, and urinalysis. The patient was then placed on a cardiac monitor, had a foley catheter inserted to obtain a urine speciman, and was given tylenol to reduce her temperature. Also, an IV was started. After finding the chest to be essentially clear and the abdominal examination negative, Dr. Shaffer diagnosed the patient as follows: "fever/dehydration - possible sepsis?" The latter diagnosis (sepsis) meant the patient may have had either a bacterial or viral infection in her blood stream affecting her entire system in a "generalized way." For a seventy-four year old patient, sepsis is a serious condition and can be life threatening if not promptly treated. The normal treatment for sepsis is antibiotics, fluids, medicines to elevate the blood pressure and reduce the temperature, and occasionally the use of steroids. It is noted, however, that a viral infection will not respond to antibiotics. If the use of antibiotics is indicated, they must be started immediately to kill the infection. After concluding her examination, Dr. Shaffer ruled out the threat of cardiac arrest and believed the patient, although "seriously ill," was not suffering from a terminal ailment. Nonetheless, she was concerned with the patient's low white blood cell count (3500) which was indicative of an infection, and one more likely of a viral nature. At the same time, she knew that influenza "was quite prevalent at the time" and might produce symptoms like those experienced by N.K. However, she stuck by her preliminary diagnosis of a possible bacterial infection. Respondent was on call the evening of February 2 for patients such as N.K. who were admitted to the hospital but had no personal physician. 1/ He was telephoned by Dr. Shaffer at 1:20 a.m. on February 3 concerning the patient's status. After being told the patient's symptoms, vital signs, available test results (which did not include the blood cultures, urine culture and chemistry profile) and Dr. Shaffer's preliminary diagnosis respondent requested Dr. Shaffer to admit N.K. to the hospital. He then gave telephonic orders to the nurse regarding N.K.'s future treatment. At that point, responsibility for the patient shifted to respondent. Respondent's first orders at 1:25 a.m. were (a) the patient be given nothing by mouth except medications (b) the IV be continued, (c) she be given atrophine and phenergaan intramuscularly if diarrhea occurred, (d) she be given compazine, if necessary, for nausea and vomiting, and (e) she continue to be given ten grains of tylenol every four hours for her fever. The patient was then transferred from a critical care room to a room where more stabilized patients are kept. According to a nurse on duty that evening, she did not consider N.K. to be a "problem" patient who required extra care or attention. It is noted here that the patient records reflect that respondent initially suspected that N.K. might have the flu, a fairly common ailment in the area at that time. At 1:40 a.m., the patient's vital signs were as follows: blood pressure 124 over 80; respiration rate - 24; and pulse - 92. There is no indication that her temperature was taken at that time but the records indicate that an hour earlier, it had droped to 103.1 degrees. At 2:25 a.m., the patient was moved from an emergency room bed to a semi-private room in the general ward. At 3:05 a.m., N.K.'s temperature was again checked and found to be 103.5 degrees. At 4:00 am., the patient's condition had begun to seriously deteriorate. She manifested signs of being "very lethargic," that is, it was difficult to awaken her, and she appeared to be weaker on her left side. According to Dr. Shaffer, such a localized weakness was indicative of "some process" involving the patient's brain and spinal cord. Also, N.K. still had a rectal temperature reading of 103.5 degrees. At 5:40 am., N.K.'s fingers and toes became cyanotic, that is, they turned blue in color, indicating a lack of circulation. Also, she was confused and her lethargy continued. By then, her respiration rate had increased to 32, almost twice the normal rate. Her blood pressure (138 over 70) began dropping which was a sign of sepsis shock, that is, the peripheral blood vessels were dilating causing the pressure to drop and circulation to be impaired. At 6:05 am., the head nurse, believing there to be an emergency situation, spoke with respondent by telephone. She relayed the previous findings from 5:40 a.m. and noted that the patient's temperature had risen to 104.7 degrees while her blood pressure had dropped to 126 over 70. The nurse did not recall whether she was able to reach respondent immediately or if it took a few minutes for him to return the call. In any event, respondent gave telephonic orders that mandol, a second generation antibiotic, be given to the patient intravenously every six hours, and she be given one gram of solu-cortef, a steroid medication, for shock. Also, he ordered an arterial blood gas analysis and that N.K. be given oxygen by nasal cannula when necessary. Although the telephonic orders were given at 6:05 a.m., the drugs had to be requested and obtained (after mixing) from the hospital pharmacy. In some cases, it takes several hours to receive a drug from the pharmacy, particularly during other than normal daytime hours. The steroid IV was eventually started at 6:30 a.m. but the mandol was never received and administered. When the patient's condition did not improve and actually continued to deteriorate, respondent was telephoned again by a nurse at 6:40 a.m. By then, the patient's entire skin had turned a bluish color indicating very poor circulation. After being briefed by the nurse, including the results of the just received blood gas report, but still without knowing the precise cause of N.K.'s ailment, Dr. Bilang issued a "CMO" order. This means "comfort measures only" and that no aggressive steps, such as resuscitative measures, be taken by hospital personnel to prolong the life of the patient. According to Dr. Shaffer, had resuscitative steps been taken at that time, the patient's chances for survival were around "twenty percent, maybe less." The patient expired at 7:13 a.m. The primary cause of death was listed as meningococcial meningitis, a bacterial infection having a 70% to 80% mortality rate, and a "quite uncommon" infection in a seventy-four year old patient. Laboratory results obtained several days after the patient's death revealed she had gram-negative sepsis. Doctor Bilang arrived at the hospital and pronounced the patient dead at 7:20 a.m. This was the first time respondent had seen and examined the patient. Respondent then dictated a history and physical examination which appear in the patient records. These reports were based on information previously provided by others. On February 21, 1986 respondent dictated a discharge summary which indicated a pre mortem physical finding. This report was also placed in the expired patient's records. Several months later, respondent prepared a second physical examination and history for the patient. This was dictated on July 31, 1986 and again was based on the notes of other persons. However, respondent made the following note at the beginning of the physical examination and history: "Disregard above notes. Patient expired prior to my seeing her in the ward." Two medical experts testified on behalf of the Board. They are Drs. Matthew M. Cohen and Laurence Neufeld, both board certified family practitioners in Tallahassee and Tampa, Florida, respectively. A Shreveport, Louisiana board certified internist, Dr. John M. Brady, presented expert testimony on behalf of respondent. In addition, Dr. Linda L. Shaffer, an experienced physician, testified from her perspective as an emergency room physician at the hospital in question. As might be expected, the experts reached differing conclusions regarding respondent's treatment of the patient. Pertinent findings based on the experts' relevant testimony are made below. There was a consensus among the experts that the emergency room doctor's role is to pass on to the admitting physician all the information the doctor has gathered from the examination and tests. It is then the responsibility of the admitting physician to ask the emergency room doctor appropriate questions concerning the patient, order vital signs to be taken at specified intervals, and give other directions to the monitoring staff (nurses) concerning steps to be taken in the event of changes in the patient's condition. The experts also concluded that the primary physician, in preparing a history and physical examination of the patient, should not rely on the emergency room doctor's notes and findings but should personally conduct his own physical and history in a more thorough manner. This is especially true when, as here, the emergency room physician is unable to conclusively establish the cause of the patient's illness. In Dr. Cohen's opinion, respondent should have suspected meningitis at the outset of N.K.'s admission. This was because of her lethargy, high fever and back pain, all being symptoms associated with that infection. Doctor Cohen also noted that respondent was cognizant of Dr. Shaffer's preliminary diagnosis of possible sepsis, knew that pneumonia and urinary tract infection were not the causes of the infection, and still had no idea what caused N.K.'s infection. Given these considerations, Dr. Cohen opined that respondent should have ordered further tests to confirm N.K.'s ailment, such as a lumbar puncture (spinal tap), an X-ray of her abdomen, a reexamination of the abdomen or a head scan. Doctor Cohen further suggested that after those tests were completed, it would have been prudent for respondent to "employ a sort of antibiotic recipe for dealing with a septic, elderly person." In other words, he should have used a group of intravenous antibiotics that would cover most of the possible causes for that type of infection. In addition to the foregoing omissions, Dr. Cohen was of the opinion that Dr. Bilang erred further when, after receiving advice from the nurse at 6:05 a.m. and 6:40 a.m. concerning the patient's rapid deterioration in health, he failed to institute aggressive antibiotic therapy and instead prescribed mandol, a drug Dr. Cohen felt was too little, too late. According to Dr. Cohen, respondent compounded his mistakes by issuing a CMO order when the patient did not have a terminal illness and without consulting the patient's family. By engaging in the foregoing conduct, the expert concluded that respondent did not conform with minimally acceptable medical standards in the community. Doctor Cohen next opined that it was inappropriate for respondent to prepare a history and physical after the patient's death and to base those items on information gathered by others. He labeled these matters "false and misleading" and a deviation from the standard expected of a doctor. Doctor Neufeld initially pointed out that respondent erred by failing to start a broad spectrum (third generation) antibiotic regimen when he assumed responsibility for the patient at 1:20 a.m. According to the witness, such a regimen was called for because respondent was aware of the patient's age, high fever, slurred speech, dehydrated condition, the very strong possibility of sepsis, and his own inability to promptly obtain blood cultures from the laboratory to aid in confirming or ruling out various ailments. Further, respondent had no concrete evidence that the patient was suffering from the flu, an illness he initially thought N.K. might have. Even if respondent was unsure if the infection was viral or bacterial, Dr. Neufeld pointed out that respondent nonetheless should have assumed the patient was septic and started an antibiotic regimen until the cultures were received from the laboratory or the fever subsided. Moreover, even if the patient had a viral infection, the antibiotics would not have harmed her. By respondent waiting until 6:05 a.m., and then ordering mandol rather than a stronger drug, Dr. Neufeld opined that respondent fell below the minimum standard of care for community physicians. Doctor Neufeld stated further that respondent deviated from the same standard of care by issuing a CMO order when the patient did not have a terminal illness. Doctor Neufeld echoed Dr. Cohen's sentiments that the prevailing community standards did not call for a CMO order unless the patient was afflicted with a terminal, irreversible illness and only after a physical examination had been performed by the physician. Doctor Neufeld found the physical examination documented by Dr. Bilang on pages 10 and 11 and the accompanying discharge summary on pages 13 and 14 of the patient records to misleading since both erroneously suggested a pre mortem physical finding. Also, Dr. Neufeld opined that the medical records did not justify the course of treatment to the patient. However, the basis for this opinion is not clearly delineated in the record. Doctor Neufeld conceded that though he would have gone to the hospital at 1:20 a.m. to examine the patient, respondent did not violate the standard of care by evaluating the needs of the patient by telephone. Even so, Dr. Neufeld maintained that respondent should have ordered antibiotics after his consultation with Dr. Shaffer. The expert differed in one respect with Dr. Cohen and agreed with respondent that the records, at least at 1:20 am., did not call for a spinal tap or head scan, and respondent's failure to perform those tests at that time was acceptable. Finally, although he acknowledged that an order for a third generation antibiotic regimen at 6:05 a.m. might not have been mixed and ready for patient use by the time the patient expired, Dr. Neufeld opined that respondent still had a duty to use all available measures to keep her alive until the drugs were received. According to Dr. Shaffer, she observed Dr. Bilang on a day to day basis and considered him a "caring, competent, practicing physician." However, she stated that respondent was sometimes too busy" and overextended" himself. As a consequence, she was "concerned" that he was taking care of too many patients at the same time. Although she did not consider herself qualified to render an opinion, she opined that respondent did not deviate from the minimally acceptable standards for Clearwater area physicians when he failed to initially order antibiotics for N.K. at 1:20 a.m. This was because, if a physician was unsure if a patient had a viral syndrome or a bacterial septic condition, he might wait "a little bit of time" to see what course of treatment was required. Further, the decision to order antibiotics is a "judgment call" by a doctor and depends in part on two "iffy" tests, a lumbar puncture and a gram stain of the blood smear. The latter test result was not available until several days after the patient expired. According to Dr. Brady, respondent's course of treatment and overall conduct, with one exception, fell within the minimal acceptable standards of care for physicians. The exception pertained to respondent's issuance of a CMO order. After reviewing the patient's records, Dr. Brady concluded that respondent could not have known the patient was suffering from a bacterial infection since nothing in the physical examination was suggestive of meningococcemia, the organism affecting the patient. Thus, he concluded that the patient's illness was probably not diagnosable until shortly before she died. This was because the patient did not have a stiff neck (nuchal rigidity), purplish skin rash, or signs of shock, which are the normal indications of meningitis, and because the infection is extremely rare and has an incidence rate of only one case per one hundred thousand persons in a given year. Even so, he conceded that if the disease occurs, its physical signs can manifest in a very short period of time and could have begun shortly after the patient was first examined by the emergency room physician around 11:00 p.m. Once respondent recognized the severity of the patient's ailment, and prescribed mandol at 6:05 a.m., Dr. Brady agreed that mandol would not have had any beneficial effect on the patient even if administered immediately after being ordered. Instead, the witness would have ordered a third generation antibiotic which is more effective in treating gram negative rods. While he characterized respondent's choice of mandol as "not the best thing to do", he nonetheless said "it was not an unreasonable thing to do" given the circumstances. The expert next agreed with the Board experts that a CMO order is appropriate only when the patient has a terminal illness and has requested that no life-sustaining measures be used. In this case, he agreed that the patient records did not justify this action. He added, however, that the patient would probably have expired no matter what resuscitative efforts were undertaken. Finally, while Dr. Brady did not think respondent was attempting to falsify his records by copying the notes of others in preparing the post-mortem physical and patient history, he noted that respondent should have indicated on his February 3, 1986 notes that he was copying the records of others. Having evaluated the testimony of the experts, the undersigned has resolved the conflicts in favor of the Board. Accordingly, it is found that respondent fell below the minimum standard of care by failing to initially recognize the patient's septic condition and prescribing a comprehensive antibiotic regimen, by failing to institute the same regimen at 6:05 a.m. after becoming aware of her critical condition, and by issuing a CMO order at 6:40 a.m. when the patient did not have a terminal illness. Further, respondent filed reports on February 3 and 21, 1986 which he knew or should have known were misleading and false, namely, a patient history, physical examination and discharge summary prepared post mortem which suggested that such reports were based on pre mortem findings by respondent. Finally, it is found that the records maintained by respondent were inadequate to justify the issuance of a CMO order since the patient did not have a terminal illness. By stipulation approved by Board order dated October 30, 1987, respondent was reprimanded by the Board, paid a $1,000 fine, was placed on monitored probation for a year, and agreed to take twenty hours of continuing medical education in the area of prescribing medicinal drugs. Official Board records indicate that respondent's license still remains on a probationary status presumably because of the pending proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of the violations discussed in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order, and that respondent's medical license be suspended for two years. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1989.
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Petitioner on the basis of alleged violations of the Medical Practice Act, Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. In an eight-count Amended Administrative Complaint, the Respondent has been charged with four violations of Section 458.331(l)(m), Florida Statutes, and four violations of Section 458.331(l)(t), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is, and has been at all times material to this proceeding, a licensed physician in the State of Florida. His license number is ME0022079. Facts regarding Patient #1 The Respondent provided medical treatment to Patient #1 from April 20, 1987, through April 12, 1988. During the period of that treatment Patient #1 was approximately 92 years old and was diagnosed as having organic brain syndrome. Respondent obtained a brief past medical history of the patient and failed to document the patient's current complaints or review any prior medical records of the patient. On May 26, 1987, Respondent diagnosed the patient with pedal edema and ordered Hygroton 25 mg., but failed to document in the medical records the number of times per day the patient was to take the medication or the dosage for the medication. On June 6, 1987, the patient presented with shortness of breath and a blood pressure of 110/80. Respondent did not perform any tests or examinations to determine the cause of the symptoms. On July 14, 1987, and September 22, 1987, the patient again presented with shortness of breath and pedal edema and Respondent only recorded the lungs as clear and took her blood pressure. Respondent did not perform any other tests or examinations to determine the cause of the symptoms. On October 26, 1987, when the patient presented with shortness of breath, Respondent noted an arrhythmia and blood pressure of 136/82. However, Respondent did not perform any tests or examinations to determine the course of the symptoms. When the patient presented with arrhythmia, the applicable standard of care 5/ required Respondent to perform an EKG, to check her digoxin levels, and monitor her electrolytes and renal functions. Respondent's medical records for the patient did not meet the applicable record-keeping standards 6/ because the records were incomplete, inadequate, and illegible. Specifically, the records did not have diagnoses, did not have a plan of treatment, and did not include thorough examinations or histories, making it impossible to determine the appropriate treatment for the patient. Facts regarding Patient #2 Respondent provided treatment to Patient #2 from July 11, 1978, until September 13, 1988. Patient #2, a male, was seventy-one years old when such treatment began. The patient had a history of gastric ulcers. Nevertheless, Respondent prescribed nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medications which exacerbate or increase difficulties with gastric ulcers and bleeding without obtaining a complete history or conducting a full examination. Respondent's medical records did not document whether Respondent assessed the risk to the patient, discussed the risk with the patient, or made any determinations that the risks outweighed the benefits for the patient. In 1978, the patient presented with a chronic cough and chronic bronchitis. However, Respondent did not perform any chest x-rays to determine the origin of the cough or to rule out lung carcinoma. Over the years, the cough persisted and in 1982-1983, the patient experienced shortness of breath and increased ankle edema. Respondent prescribed diuretics without determining the etiology of the edema and without conducting renal status or electrolyte monitoring. In 1985, the patient was hospitalized with severe ankle swelling. Respondent did not aggressively treat the possibility of deep vein thrombosis or cellulitis, nor did he treat the patient with anticoagulants to lessen the risk of a blood clot going to the lung. The applicable standard of care required anticoagulant treatment under these circumstances. In 1987, the patient suffered a severe weight loss with the chronic cough. The Respondent's records do not reveal any attempt to make a diagnosis. On December 15, 1987, the patient complained of abdominal problems, which could have related to the steroidal anti-inflammatory medications prescribed. The Respondent's records fail to document any laboratory tests or examinations by Respondent to determine the cause of the complaints. Respondent breached the applicable standard of care by failing to perform an EKG on the patient when he presented with dizziness, light-headedness or syncopal episodes from September 1987, until July 12, 1988. When the patient presented on August 30, 1988, and September 13, 1988, with very serious complaints of precordial chest pain, shortness of breath, and palpitations, a reasonably prudent physician would have suspected that the patient was having a heart attack. Despite the symptoms, Respondent made a psychiatric diagnosis, rather than fully evaluating the heart and cardiac status. Respondent's medical records for the patient did not comply with the applicable record-keeping standards in that they did not contain thorough examinations or histories, and did not have diagnoses or plans of treatment for the patient. Facts regarding Patient #3 Respondent provided care to Patient #3 from November 17, 1987, until May 16, 1989. Patient #3, a female, was eighty-five years old when such treatment began. Respondent should have been aware from the patient's initial presentation, that the patient did not qualify to reside in an adult congregate living facility and should have taken steps to have her admitted to a skilled nursing facility. Respondent's failure to do so is a breach of the applicable standard of care. Respondent's initial examination of the patient was limited and Respondent failed to conduct an EKG to reveal the origin of the patient's pedal edema or irregular heartbeat. Respondent also failed to diagnose, treat, or refer the patient for a consult to evaluate her vision and hearing loss. Even though the diagnosis was not made in the Respondent's records, it is apparent from the medications prescribed by Respondent that the patient was being treated for congestive heart failure. She also had pedal edema, shortness of breath, and cardiac arrhythmia. Respondent failed to perform or conduct the appropriate tests and examinations to make a diagnosis of the patient's condition or to provide effective treatment. The patient had frequent episodes of high blood pressure for which Respondent prescribed diuretics. Respondent's prescribing of Tenormin violated the applicable standard of care and subjected the patient to serious cardiac risks. Respondent's medical records for the patient were illegible for the most part and in many instances omitted information about the diagnosis and course of treatment. For these reasons the records failed to comply with applicable record-keeping standards. Facts regarding Patient #4 Respondent provided treatment to Patient #4 from April 1985 until January 5, 1988. Patient #4, a male, was seventy-four years old when such treatment began. When the patient originally presented to Respondent, he was on cardiac medications, had complaints of possible arrhythmias, and had a history of organic brain syndrome and tardive dyskinesia. Respondent was required by the applicable standard of care to evaluate the patient's cardiac condition, renal status, and potassium level. Respondent breached the standard of care by failing to conduct these evaluations and examinations. On October 1, 1985, the patient presented with back pain. Rather than conducting a physical exam to determine the source of the pain, Respondent violated the standard of care and treated the pain symptomatically. The patient was prescribed an anti-psychotic drug, Mellaril, and throughout Respondent's care exhibited side effects, including falls with resulting abrasions. Respondent failed to discontinue the drug or take appropriate measures to determine the extent of the patient's condition and implement a course of treatment. On July 23, 1987, Respondent prescribed an amount of Dalmane considered excessive for geriatric patients. These inappropriate prescriptions constitute a departure from the applicable standard of care. Respondent's medical records for the patient were replete with omissions of physical exams, diagnoses, and plans of care, and were inadequate as to patient history and justification for course of treatment. For these reasons the records failed to comply with applicable record-keeping standards. Facts regarding prior discipline Respondent has been the subject of prior disciplinary action by the Board of Medicine. The prior disciplinary action was based on deficiencies in Respondent's record-keeping. The prior disciplinary action does not appear to have improved Respondent's record-keeping in any significant way.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine issue a final order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of four counts of violations of Section 458.331(l)(m), Florida Statutes, and four counts of violations of Section 458.331(l)(t), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and Imposing administrative penalties consisting of all of the following: (a) an administrative fine in the total amount of $4,000.00 (representing a $500.00 fine for each of the eight counts); (b) a one-year period of suspension of the Respondent's license; and (c) a one-year period of probation following the suspension, during which probation period the Respondent shall be required to have his records reviewed by a supervising physician approved by the Board, such supervising physician to provide quarterly reports to the Board regarding the sufficiency of the Respondent's record-keeping. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February 1995.
The Issue Whether Disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice medicine, number ME 0028355, issued by the State of Florida, based on the alleged violations of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes, as contained in the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this complaint, Respondent was a licensed physician having been issued license number ME 0028355 by the State of Florida. This case represents Respondent's second disciplinary action. By a Final Order dated February 24, 1987, the Board of Medicine, in the case of Department of Professional Regulation vs. Robert Gonzalez, Jr., M.D., DOAH Case No. 85-1692, DPR Case No. 0033796, reprimanded Respondent, suspended Respondent's license for a minimum period of one year, and ordered a five year probationary period, and a $14,000 fine. The Final Order took effect upon filing and pertains to similar offenses at issue in the present case. (Adopts Petitioner's Proposed Finding of Fact (PFOF) 1) The present case arose from a review of hospital records and Respondent's patient records for seventeen patients who were hospitalized by Respondent at Pembroke Pines General Hospitals in Pembroke Pines, Florida in 1982 and 1983. However, none of the incidents giving rise to the complaint in the instant case occurred subsequent to the Final Order referenced in Finding of Fact 1 and all occurred during or shortly after the same timeframe as covered in the earlier offenses. (Adopts and expands Petitioner's PFOF 2). On August 4, 1982, Respondent admitted patient C.M. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital, who was assigned medical records number 6893 by Pembroke Pines General Hospital. The admitting diagnosis was acute respiratory tract infection, acute flu syndrome, acute laryngo/pharyngitis and possible pneumonitis. The patient was hospitalized for a period of two days. During the hospitalization of patient C.M., Respondent ordered the following tests which were performed on patient C.M.: two chest x-rays, "mono" screen, throat culture, blood serum levels (special 12), electrolytes, urinalysis, complete blood count (C.R.C.) and Platelet counts. Respondent discharged C.M. from Pembroke Pines General Hospital with the following diagnoses on August 7; 1982: acute flu syndrome, acute respiratory tract infection, and acute pharyngitis due to staphylococcus aureus. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 3) Pharyngitis is an inflammatory reaction of the throat. Although Respondent diagnosed patient C.M. as suffering from acute pharyngitis due to staphylococcus aureus, there was inadequate laboratory data to justify this diagnosis. The diagnosis should have been predicated upon the results of a sputum (secretions coughed out of the lungs) culture and sensitivity test. However, the results of the culture and sensitivity test were negative for the throat. Therefore, this diagnosis was incorrect. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 4). Pneumonitis is an infection of the lungs. The standards of the medical profession require that it be based on positive x-ray findings. In the case of patient C.M., there was no justification for Respondent's diagnosis of pneumonitis because both of the chest x-rays taken pursuant to Respondent's order were normal. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 5) Although Respondent diagnosed patient C.M. as suffering from acute flu syndrome, there was no justification for this diagnosis either. In fact, there was no justification for the admission of the patient to Pembroke Pines General Hospital. It is contra-indicated to hospitalize a sixteen-year-old male suffering from an upper respiratory infection because of the danger of developing a nasocomal infection, which is an infection that is produced as a result of exposure to bacteria in the hospital. By hospitalizing C.M. unnecessarily, Respondent placed patient C.M. at undue risk. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 6) In the year 1983, Respondent admitted patient F.L. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital on three occasions. The patient was assigned medical records number 4141 by Pembroke Pines General Hospital. The admission date for the hospitalizations were February 20, 1983, July 8; 1983, and August 31, 1983. There were no problems with the July 8, 1983, hospitalization of patient F.L. (With the elimination of subordinate and unnecessary material, this FOF adopts Petitioner's PFOF 7). On February 20, 1983, Respondent admitted patient F.L. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital with an admission diagnosis of cephalgia and uncontrolled hypertension. The patient was hospitalized for a period of three days. During this three-day period, the following tests were performed on patient F.L., pursuant to Respondent's orders: an intraveneous pyelogram (IVP) and voiding cystogram, chest x-ray, three "E.K.G.s", an SMA-18 (blood serum levels for eighteen different substances), a CRC, an echocardiogram, a 24-hour urinalysis for total protein, serum electrophoresis, a twenty-four hour urinalysis for catecholamine and methanephrine, a CT scan of the brain, a sinus series x-ray and cervical spine x-ray, an upper GI series, small bowel study, a cardiac isoenzyme profile and a plasma renin study. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 8) A voiding cystogram is a test used to check on the condition of the prostate. There was no indication in the records of patient F.L. of any prostate problem or complaint. Hence, there was no justification for the voiding cystogram which Respondent ordered for patient F.L. The upper G.I. series with small bowel follow-through, would be indicated if there is suspected small bowel obstruction or small bowel involvement. In Respondent's records for patient F.L., and the records pertaining to the hospitalization of F.L. at Pembroke Pines General Hospitals there is no indication that patient F.L. complained of or suffered from gastro-intestinal complaints. Therefore, the upper G.I. series with small bowel follow-through Respondent ordered was not justified. Additionally, the patient was admitted with cephalgia (headaches), and sinus x-rays and cervical spine x-rays were ordered. Sinus x-rays and/or cervical spine x-rays would be indicated where there was a history or indication of involvement of the sinus or cervical spine. Respondent's records for patient F.L. do not document any indication of involvement of the cervical spine and provide no history of sinus trouble. Accordingly, the cervical spine and sinus x-rays ordered by Respondent were neither indicated nor justified for patient F.L. C.P.K. enzymes are enzymes released into the bloodstream with damage of certain tissues in the body. Respondent ordered a cardiac isoenzyme profile to determine whether there was evidence of elevated C.P.K. enzymes and, therefore evidence of acute myocardial damage in patient F.L. However, patient F.L. displayed no symptoms which would justify performing this test. (With minor modifications to clarify the - finding and to conform to the record, FOF 9-11 adopt Petitioner's PFOF 9) On February 23, 1983, Respondent discharged patient F.L. with the following diagnoses: Cephalgia due to the presence of uncontrolled hypertension-diastolic, hyperuricemia, essential hypertension, neck pain secondary to cervical degenerative arthritis and chronic sinusitus condition, left maxilla. There was no justification in the records for patient F.L. which would establish uncontrolled hypertension, as a diagnosis, although Respondent's office records for patient F.L. do document the presence of hypertension in this patient and that numerous therapies were utilized unsuccessfully to control that hypertension. (With minor modifications to clarify the finding and to conform to the record, FOF 12 adopts Petitioner's PFOF 10) On August 31, 193, Respondent admitted patient F.L. for what Respondent described as a "mass of the left hemi- thorax" and labile hypertension. The mass was, in fact, a keloid or excess scar tissue which measured 2 centimeters at its greatest dimension. The records for patient F.L. provided a history of two previous resections of the same keloid. It constituted excessive, expensive and unnecessary hospitalization for Respondent to admit patient F.L. for removal of such a keloid, when that keloid could have been removed in the Respondent's office under local anesthesia. Also as a result of Respondent's decision to unnecessarily hospitalize patient F.L. for removal of a keloid, unnecessary pre-operative testing also was performed. This testing included a chest x-ray, an SKG, a complete blood count, an SMA 18, a urinalysis, and prothrombin dime or clotting tests. Respondent knew when he hospitalized patient F.L. for the surgical procedure of removal of a keloid that these pre-operative tests would be routinely performed. This constitutes inappropriate treatment. Since the history clearly indicated that the keloid, if removed, almost certainly would have reoccurred unless a plastic surgeon provided follow-up treatment to prevent the reformation of the keloid, its excision was unjustified. Accordingly, there was no justification for the admission of patient F.L. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital in August 1983. (Accepts, with modifications to reflect the record as a whole, Petitioner's PFOF 11-12). On September 2, 1983, Respondent discharged patient F.L. with the following diagnoses: keloid anterior chest wall, labile hypertension and anxiety reaction. Labile hypertension is hypertension that fluctuates erratically. This diagnosis was not supported by the hospital record for F.L. All blood pressure readings for the record for F.L., were constantly normal. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 13) On April 5, 1983, Respondent admitted patient J.G. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital for acute low back syndrome and weakness of the right extremities. Patient J.G. was assigned medical records number 2693 by Pembroke Pines General Hospital. Respondent hospitalized patient J.G. for a period of three days. During this hospitalization of patient J.G., Respondent provided no significant therapy which would justify hospitalization. Respondent's treatment of Patient J.G. during hospitalization included orders for Robaxin, a muscle relaxant, Riopan Plus, an antacid, Paraon forte, a muscle relaxant, and Ducolax suppositories and Peri-colase capsules for constipation. Additionally, the patient was treated with traction for the three-day period. The patient was given pelvic traction of twenty pounds- with alternating periods of two hours with traction and two hours without traction. In order to be effective or beneficial, the traction should have been given over a much longer period of time. Finally, Respondent treated patient J.G. with K-pads or heat pads around the clock. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 14). On April 6; 1983, patient J.G. was seen by an orthopedic consultant, pursuant to Respondent's request. The consultant's impression of the patient's condition was of cervical spondylosis. The consultant's recommended plan of treatment included bed rest and oral anti-inflammatories. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 15). Respondent's entire work-up and evaluation of patient J.G.; including the orthopedic consultation, could have been performed as an outpatient. There was no justification for the admission of patient J.G. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 16). On October 10, 1982, Respondent admitted patient E.R. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital for acute cephalgia and photophobia. Patient E.R. was assigned medical records number 4910 by Pembroke Pines General Hospital. On admission, Respondent recorded a long-standing history of the patient suffering from headaches and chronic migraine syndrome. There was no justification for Respondent to admit patient E.B. for headaches, or for evaluation of these headaches. Respondent's migraine headaches might reasonably have been addressed by an initial referral to a neurologist on an outpatient basis. This was not done. (With elimination of subordinate and unnecessary material and as modified to more closely conform to the record as a whole, this FOF covers Petitioner's PFOF 17.) During the hospitalization of E.R., Respondent ordered a number of tests including two electrocardiograms, a CT scan of the brain, chest x-ray; sinus x-ray; mastoids x-rays; x-rays of the sella turcica and cervical spines, a bilateral mammogram, a CT scan of pituitary gland, a tomogram of the sella turcica, a platelet count, serum protein electrophoresis, CEA-EIA Enzyme Immunoassay, an SMA 12, Vitamin B12 and Folate serum levels, and progesterone levels. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 18). The testing ordered by Respondent for E.R. was excessive. For example, Respondent ordered a CT scan of the brain which adequately views the sinuses and the sella turcica. Therefore the further x-rays of the sinuses, mastoids and sella turcica and a tomagram of the sella turcica, were unnecessary and excessive. No other indicators, i.e. vision disturbances, independently justified Respondent's ordering the tomagrams. A C.E.A.-E.I.A. Enzyme Immunoassay was ordered, despite the fact that it was not indicated by either the patient history or the recorded physical examination results. A C.E.A.- E.I.A. Enzyme Immunoassay is a test for cancer of the stomach. (With elimination of cumulative and subordinate material, adopts Petitioner's PFOF 19). On May 8, 1983, Respondent admitted patient E.P. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital for evaluation and treatment of a gastrointestinal disorder, weakness and shortness of breath. E.P. was assigned medical records number 4924. Respondent ordered the following testing which was performed on patient E.P.: two CBCs, SMA-18, two urinalyses, CT scan of kidneys, barium enema, a GI series and small bowel follow-through, an intraveneous pyelogram a voiding cytourethrogram a platelet count, serum protein electrophoresis, a urine culture and a stool culture. There was no indication for Respondent to order the upper G.I. series and small bowel follow-through for patient E.P. The records demonstrate insufficient justification for the admission of patient E.P. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital on May 8, 1983; the final discharge diagnoses show hospitalization was unnecessary. On May 12, 1983, Respondent discharged patient E.P. from Pembroke Pines General Hospital with the following diagnosis: gastrointestinal disorder due to diverticulosis of the colon gastritis, and anxiety state reaction. Of these diagnoses, only the final diagnosis is possibly correct. Although an air contrast barium enema showed a few tiny scattered diverticuli within the distribution of the left colon, there was no support for Respondent's assertion that the diverticuli were the cause of a gastrointestinal disorder. The diagnosis of gastritis refers to an irritation of the stomach. This diagnosis is not supported either by the results of the upper G.I. series which were normal nor by x-rays of the stomach, which were also normal. (With modifications to more accurately reflect the record as a whole, this FOF accepts Petitioner's PFOF 21-23). On April 20, 1983, Respondent admitted O.A. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital. O.A. was assigned medical records number 5800. Petitioner established no violations by Respondent with regard to this patient. (Covers Petitioner's PFOF 24). On September 20; 1982, Respondent admitted patient R.R. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital. Patient R.R. was assigned medical records number 5940. Petitioner established no violations by Respondent with regard to this patient. (Covers Petitioner's PFOF 25). On April 12, 1983, Respondent admitted to Pembroke Pines General Hospital a patient who was assigned medical records number 9235. The patient was admitted for acute abdominal pain on the right lower side. The patient was suffering from a hematoma, a collection of blood in the tissue. Most probably the patient had developed a hematoma of the rectus muscle as a result of coughing, because the patient's history revealed a severe upper respiratory infection accompanied by a cough. A surgical consultation prior to hospital admission would have revealed this condition and rendered hospital admission unnecessary; because the standards of the medical profession indicate that the hematoma should have been treated conservatively (i.e. no treatment was indicated). No testing should have been necessary, if a consultation had been sought. However, Respondent hospitalized the patient, ordered a chest x- ray, a pelvic sonogram and a barium enema. Neither the barium enema nor the pelvic sonogram would have been indicated if the patient had been seen by a consultant prior to ordering the tests. The patient was ultimately discharged on April 14, 1983 therefore, the hospitalization was unnecessary. (Adopts, with clarifying modification, Petitioner's PFOF 26-27). On March 29, 1983, Respondent admitted patient R.S. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital. Patient R.S. was assigned medical records number 9479 at Pembroke Pines General Hospital. No evidence was presented by Petitioner as to the propriety or necessity for the admission or the testing performed during the hospitalization of the discharge diagnoses. (With elimination of unnecessary material, this FOF adopts Petitioner's PFOF 28). On October 10, 1982, Respondent admitted patient K.G. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital. The patient was assigned medical records number 9540 by Pembroke Pines General Hospital. This twenty-three year old female was admitted with diagnoses of gastro-intestinal disorder and menstrual period disorder. The patient remained in the hospital for a period of three days. During the hospitalization, Respondent ordered the following tests: chest x-rays of sella turcica, a barium enema, pelvic sonogram; an EKG, an upper G.I. series with small bowel follow-through- a urinalysis, a platelet count, serum glucose levels (four); SMA 12, urine culture and colony count, progesterone levels, S Follicle- stimulating hormone levels and total estrogen levels. The x-rays of the sella turcica would be indicated where a pituitary tumor is suspected, but there was no indication that a pituitary disorder was suspected other than a vague reference to a menstrual disorder (which was never described in the records for patient K.G.). Therefore, this test was unnecessary. Although a barium enema was ordered, there was no description of pain or any disorder of the bowel and no indication of bowel changes which would indicate any disease of the colon. Therefore, the barium enema was not justified. Although the records reflect at least vague indications for ordering the upper GI series, the small bowel follow-through was not justified. Additionally, one isolated estrogen level was ordered. This was inappropriate because the test results would only be meaningful if a series of estrogen levels were obtained to determine the response curve of the ovaries. Therefore, "inappropriate" in this case means "unnecessary." The hospital admission of patient K.G. also was not appropriate. The entire evaluation could have been carried out by a gynecologist on an outpatient basis. No initial, pre-hospitalization referral to a gynecologist was reflected in Respondent's records. The patient was discharged on October 13, 1982, with the following diagnoses: abnormal menstrual periods due to left ovary cyst and abnormal pain due to mild gastritis associated with mild anxiety stage reaction. On his discharge summary for patient K.G., Respondent noted "all this information was given to the patient and was advised the patient to be seen by gynecologist for further result." Respondent's records further corroborated that the hospitalization was unjustified and unnecessary. (Covers Petitioner's PFOF 29-31) On August 4, 1982, Respondent admitted patient L.M. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital for treatment of "acute phlebitis". The patient was assigned medical records number 6965 by Pembroke Pines General Hospital. The patient was hospitalized for a period of thirteen days. Phlebitis is an inflammatory reaction of the vein(s). It is very important that the diagnosis be correct; because, with phlebitis, emboli or clots can break off and travel through the blood to the lungs. It is diagnosed clinically by history and by physical examination. On physical examination, the symptoms of phlebitis include the presence of swelling in the involved leg and the positive "Homan's sign." "Homan's sign" is the term used to describe the pain present from an inflamed deep vein, which pain is experienced when the leg is extended straight out and the foot is dorsiflexed or pushed back towards the leg placing stress on the calf muscle. Radiographically a venogram may be used to confirm or rule out the existence of phlebitis. A venogram is a test involving the injection of dye into the veins of the foot followed by an x-ray examination of those vessels. The records for patient L.M. do not contain adequate documentation of a physical examination of patient L.M. to establish the diagnosis of phlebitis. Thus, the patient may have had phlebitis, there were no adequate descriptions of the status of the right leg recorded in the patient records for L.M. Specifically, there is no mention of Homan's sign and there was no mention of any measurement of the patient's calves to determine whether there was swelling in the involved leg. Without a more thorough physical examination, Respondent should have performed a venogram to confirm the diagnosis. This was not done with patient L.M. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 32-34). While patient L.M. was hospitalized, Respondent treated the patient's unconfirmed phlebitis with Heparin (an anti-coagulent) intravenously. The patient remained on Heparin until August 15; 1982. On August 15, 1982, Respondent additionally ordered Coumadin, which is also an anti-coagulent, to be given to patient L.M. Respondent ordered Coumadin 5 mg. to be given by mouth at 6:00 p.m. (to be started on August 15, 1982)), and at 10:00 a.m. (to be started on August 16, 1982). Respondent's order provided that if the P.T. (prothrombin time) was twenty-five seconds, to hold the Coumadin. The normal prothrombin time is in the range of eleven to thirteen seconds. The dose of Coumadin given was inadequate to anti-coagulate the patient. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 35). On the day prior to discharge of L.M., Respondent wrote the following order: "If (patient) is below 20-tomorrow- and over 11.0. (patient) may be discharge(d)..." For the Coumadin to be effective (i.e. in order to have an adequate anti-coagulant effect from the Coumadin), the prothrombin time should have been above twenty prior to discharge. The prothrombin time on discharge was 12.9 seconds. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 36). From the hospital records for patient L.M. and the Doctor's orders for that patient there is adequate basis for the expert testimony that Respondent does not understand the therapeutic effect of Coumadin or its dosages. (Covers Petitioner's PFOF 37). On August 17, 1982; Respondent discharged patient L.M. from Pembroke Pines General Hospital with the following diagnoses: acute phlebitis of the right leg, anxiety stage reaction and migraine syndrome headaches. As discussed previously, the diagnosis of phlebitis cannot be substantiated from the records. Additionally, the records contain no documentation for the diagnosis of migraine syndrome headaches. (With the elimination of unnecessary material, this FOF adopts Petitioner's PFOF 38). On August 9, 1982, Respondent admitted patient M.A. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital for abdominal pain and a gastrointestinal disorder. This patient was assigned number 7448. The documentation of the history and physical examination for patient M.A. was significantly lacking. Patient M.A. was hospitalized for a period of three days. During that three-day period of hospitalization, the following tests were performed on M.A. pursuant to Respondent's orders: an E.K.G., a chest x-ray, an abdominal sonogram, a barium enema, a CRC, a urinalysis, a coagulation test and platelet count, fasting and non-fasting glucose levels (a total of six) SMA 12, a routine stool culture and a colonoscopy. All of the testing performed on patient M.A. could have been performed on an out-patient basis. There was no justification for admission of M.A. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital on August 9; 1982, or for the length of stay. Additionally, Respondent ordered the abdominal sonogram on patient M.A. without any indication for the test, which was unnecessary. This abdominal sonogram was used to view the liver, gallbladder and pancreas. However, there was no indication that M.A. experienced any problems with these organs. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 39-40). On admission, Respondent ordered that Diabenese 500 mg. (a glycogenic drug which will reduce the blood glucose levels and is normally used in the treatment of diabetes) be given by mouth daily. Additionally, Respondent ordered that the patient be given insulin on a sliding scale. Insulin is also normally used in the treatment of diabetes. However, diabetes was not listed as a diagnosis on discharge. The hospital chart provides no documentation for the use of Diabenese or the insulin. All glucose levels taken on this patient were within normal limits during the August 1982 hospitalization, and these eliminate any justification for the use of Diabenese or insulin for diabetes unrecorded. (As modified for clarity and to add the inference drawn by the undersigned from the evidence, this FOF adopts Petitioner's PFOF 41). On August 12; 1982, Respondent discharged patient M.A. from Pembroke Pines General Hospital with the following diagnoses: gastrointestinal disorder, abdominal pain secondary to several small diverticula of the left side of the colon, villous adenoma of the sigmoid colon, sinus bradycardia condition and essential hypertension. Several of Respondent's discharge diagnoses were either incorrect or not documented in the records for patient M.A. Sinus bradycardia is a very slow pulse rate. The pulses recorded for patient M.A. during hospitalization were 80, 68, 64, 68, 74 and 70 beats per minute, and were all within normal ranges. On one E.K.G. a notation was made that the pulse rate was slow. However, given the persistently normal pulse rates throughout the patient chart, the diagnosis of sinus bradycardia was incorrect. Additionally, Respondent's diagnosis of essential hypertension was incorrect. Essential hypertension means that type of hypertension for which there is no known cause. All of the blood pressure readings present in the hospital chart for M.A. were normal. Furthermore, the patient was taking no anti-hypertensive agents. Therefore, Respondent's diagnosis of essential hypertension in patient M.A. was also incorrect. Only one of Respondent's discharge diagnoses for patient M.A. was justified by use records for that patient, that of villous adenoma of sigmoid colon. This diagnosis was initially made by a consultant. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 42- 44). On March 22, 1983, Respondent admitted patient E.S. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital for abdominal pain with possible biliary disorders. The patient was assigned number 7917 and was hospitalized for a period of fourteen days. During that hospitalization, the following tests were performed on patient E.S., pursuant to Respondent's orders: an EKG, cervical spine x-rays; a voiding cystourethrogram and intravenous pyelogram, gallbladder sonogram; chest x-ray, an echocardiogram, a barium enema, an upper G.I. series, an oral cholestogram, small bowel series, sonogram of the thyroid glands an air contrast barium enema, a CRC, urinalysis, platelet count, glucose levels (a total of nine), SMA 12, a glucose tolerance test, an SMA 8, which included a serum glucose level, two routine stool cultures, a Thyroid profile, a two-hour post prandial blood sugar, 24 hour urine creatinine levels, insulin levels, by radioimmunoassay, and a Parathyroid hormone study. Much of the testing performed on E.S. during the hospitalization was excessive or unnecessary. Those tests that were indicated could have been performed on an out-patient basis. The insulin level by radioimmunoassay is indicated where secreting tumors of the pancreas are suspected. There was no indication in the records of patient E.S. that such a tumor was present. The intraveneous pyelogram is indicated where kidney disease is suspected. There was no indication in E.S.'s records that kidney disease was suspected or present. A sonogram of the thyroid is indicated where there is a palpable mass of the thyroid. In the records for patient E.S. there is no record of a palpable mass. In the records for patient E.S., the thyroid was described as mildly to moderately enlarged. However, there was no description of a mass or venous distention, and the carotid pulses are present. Therefore, it would appear unlikely that a mass was present. Accordingly, there was no indication for a sonogram of the thyroid gland. After performing a sonogram of the gall bladder (for which there was no indication) which yielded normal findings, Respondent ordered a cholecystogram. This latter test involves the oral consumption of a dye which is then excreted into the gallbladder so that the gallbladder can be viewed by x-ray. The test is used to determine if there are any filling defects in the gallbladder. In view of the normal gallbladder sonogram which had already been performed on patient E.S., it was excessive to additionally order the cholecystogram. There was no indication for performing a small bowel series on this patient. It was excessive to order and perform nine glucose levels where all of the levels obtained were within normal ranges. Respondent performed no real therapy on patient E.S. during the above-described hospitalization. The hospitalization was for diagnostic purposes. On April 5, 1983, Respondent discharged patient E.S. from Pembroke Pines General Hospital with the following diagnoses: diverticulosis of the sigmoid and descending colon, borderline diabetes mellitus, hyperuricemia, enlarged thyroid gland with hypofunctioning, diverticulum of the bladder and essential hypertension. The diagnosis "borderline diabetes mellitus," wads not justified by the patient's chart since all glucose levels found in the patient's chart were within normal ranges. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 45-47). On September 17, 1982, and on May 10, 1983, Respondent admitted patient A.W. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital. The patient was assigned medical records number 2966 by Pembroke Pines General Hospital. Petitioner established no violations with regard to this patient. (Covers Petitioner's PFOF 48). On October 6, 1982, Respondent admitted A.P. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital for a possible angina attack and a possible myocardial injury attack. Patient A.P. was assigned medical records number 8000 by Pembroke Pines General Hospital. Despite the fact that angina was suspected, Respondent failed to obtain a cardiac consultation during the October 1982 hospitalization of A.P. During the hospitalization of patient A.P., four chest x-rays and one CT Scan of the chest were performed pursuant to Respondent's orders. These tests revealed two areas of increased density in the left chest which were characterized as "masses." The recommendation made by the radiologists who reviewed the x-rays and the CT Scan was that further evaluation was necessary. Despite this recommendation, no further evaluation was performed in the hospital and no plan of follow-up or referral was included in the discharge summary prepared by Respondent. The importance of such documentation on "follow-up" is that it shows that the physician is aware of the problem and assures that the patient will be properly managed. From the records for A.P., it is impossible to determine whether or not Respondent planned proper management of the "masses" after discharge of the patient. (As modified to conform to the record as a whole- this FOF accepts Petitioner's PFOF 49-50). On October 23, 1982, Respondent discharged patient A.P. from Pembroke Pines General Hospital with several discharge diagnoses including the diagnosis of sliding hiatus[sic] hernia with gastroesophageal reflux. This diagnosis was not supported by the records for the patient. The hiatus is the opening in the diaphragm through which the esophagus passes into the stomach and should fit very snugly. In the case of a hiatal hernia, due to the increase of intra- abdominal pressure, a portion of the stomach slips through that opening and slides back and forth. Most commonly, if the patient is lying down, and particularly if the patient has had a sizable food intake immediately prior to lying down, the weight of the food will carry the stomach up into the abdomen. This is the disorder which Respondent diagnosed in patient A.P. The disorder is properly diagnosed by x-ray, specifically an upper G.I. series, Respondent did not order one. Respondent did order an upper abdominal sonogram and chest x- rays, neither of which would or did verify the existence of a sliding hiatal hernia with gastroesophageal reflux. Accordingly, Respondent's diagnosis was not substantiated. (As modified for clarity and to include the inferences of the undersigned, this FOF adopts Petitioner's PFOF -51). On July 1, 1983, Respondent admitted patient T.S. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital. Patient T.S. was assigned medical records number 9478 by Pembroke Pines General Hospital. The patient was admitted for acute right renal attack and remained in the hospital for a period of six days. On the patient's history, Respondent noted that his impression diagnosis was sinus bradycardia as a secondary problem. Respondent's evaluation of the cardiac status of the patient included ordering the following tests: three E.K.G.'s all of which were abnormal, indicating a previous myocardial infraction of indeterminate age, and a cardiac profile. In Respondent's Discharge for patient T.S., Respondent wrote: On admission, the patient was seen and examined by the ER physician, and after examination was accomplished the patient was admitted to the Telemetry Unit due to the previous history of organic heart disorder and having cardiac arrythmias. The patient was also complaining of chest pain at this time... Despite the above information, Respondent failed to obtain a cardiac "consult" for patient T.S. Furthermore, the cardiac status for the patient was never adequately evaluated. This does not meet the prevailing standards of the medical profession. (Adopts and expands Petitioner's PFOF 52-53). On July 2; 1983, an intraveneous pyelogram (IVP) was performed on patient T.S. pursuant to Respondent's order. The IVP revealed distal right ureteral calculus (or a kidney stone), which was the cause of the patient's renal (kidney) attack. Once the diagnosis of renal calculus was established, patient T.S. should have been discharged. Any remaining pain could be controlled with oral medication. However, instead of discharging the patient, Respondent kept the patient in the hospital for five extra days without adequate justification in the records. (Adopts and expands Petitioner's PFOF 54-55). While patient T.S. was hospitalized, Respondent ordered the following unnecessary or excessive testing: Lanoxin serum levels, quinidine serum levels, and a second IVP. The Lanoxin and quinidine levels would be indicated where it was necessary to monitor the levels of those drugs in the blood. However, the chart for patient T.S. contained no documentation that either quinidine or lanoxin were being administered to the patient, and, therefore, these tests were inappropriate. The second IVP was excessive testing because the first IVP provided all of the information sought by the second IVP, and the diagnosis was established on the original IVP. The hospitalization of patient T.S. was excessive in length and probably should have been no more that two days. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 56-57). On October 29, 1982, Respondent admitted patient D.S. to Pembroke Pines General Hospital for a hypertensive crisis and cardiomegaly. Petitioner established no violations with regardo this patient; who was assigned records number 0905. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 5). In general, the unrefuted expert testimony supports a finding that with respect to all of the records previously described, excluding patients O.A., R.R., R.S., A.W., and D.S., the admission notes and discharge summaries were not coherent. The undersigned accepts the expert testimony of Dr. Ehrlich that a large part of this lack of coherency is probably due to Respondent's inability to communicate in English with proficiency and fluency. However, the undersigned finds upon the expert opinion testimony of both Dr. Handworker and Dr. Ehrlich that these records of Respondent were additionally medically deficient as reflected in the foregoing findings of fact, in that Respondent's records failed to include pertinent necessary historical data that would be indicated, and Respondent failed, in his discharge summaries, specifically, to address the need for follow-up care. (Adopts, with modifications for clarity, Petitioner's PFOF 59). The refuted expert testimony is that with reference to two patients, M.A. and L.M., Respondent's records were not sufficient to justify the treatment of the patient. With respect to patient M.A., there was a significant lack of documented history and physical examination. With respect to patient L.M.; there was inadequate documentation of the clinical history and physical examination results, or of pertinent laboratory testing (venogram) to show that the patient, in fact, had phlebitis. Therefore, there was inadequate documentation for administering anti-coagulants to this patient. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 60). The unrefuted expert testimony is based only upon review of records. Neither testifying physician treated any patient referenced. In the case of at least one patient, the name is difficult even to determine. However, it is clear that in many instances; Respondent's records contained inadequate information to justify admission of the patients to the hospital, particularly with respect to patients C.M. (6893), F.L. (4144), J.G. (2693), E.R. (4910), E.P. (4924), 9235, K.G. (9540), M.A. (7448), and E.S. (7917). In many instances; Respondent's records were inadequate to justify many of the diagnoses which were made by Respondent. Specifically, the records for patient C.M. (6893), F.L. (4144), E.P. (4924), L.M. (6965); M.A. (7448), and E.S. (7917), did not contain justification for many of the diagnoses made by Respondent. In many instances, the records were not adequate to justify all of the testing performed, particularly those records for F.L. (4144), E.R. (4910), Patient No. 9235, K.G. (9540), M.A. (7448), E.S. (7917) and T.S. (9478). In two instances; with respect to patients M.A. (7448) and T.S. (9478); Respondent's records were inadequate to justify the length of the hospital stay. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 61). In many instances, Respondent unnecessarily admitted patients. By admitting patients unnecessarily and for excessive periods of time, Respondent benefited from the daily charge which he could assess for seeing the patient while hospitalized and it is possible to infer therefrom that this amounts to exploitation of patients C.M. (6893), F.L. (4144), J.G. (2693), E.R. (4910), E.P. (4024), Patient No. 9235, K.G. (9540), M.A. (7448), and E.S. (7917) for the financial gain of the Respondent. However, without some further evidence of malicious intent above and beyond mere incompetency, the undersigned views the evidence insufficient to draw such an inference. (For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner's PFOF 62 is rejected). Then Respondent unnecessarily or excessively tested patients [Specifically, patients F.L. (4144), E.R. (4910), E.P. (4924); Patient No. 9235, K.G. (9540), M.A. (7448), E.S. (7917) and T.S. (9478)], the patients or their insurance companies were required to pay the hospital for these tests which should not have been performed. However, without some evidence of conspiracy or something more than mere incompetency, the undersigned does not view the evidence as sufficient to draw such an inference. Without more than appears in this record, it is not logical to assume that Dr. Gonzalez benignly set out to profit Pembroke Pines General Hospital out of the "goodness" or "badness" of his heart. Further, the very fact that he fairly consistently avoided consultations with specialists suggests that this Respondent was not intending to enrich any third parties. (For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner's PFOF 63 is rejected). Respondent failed with respect to all of the above-named patients (excluding R.R., D.S., A.W., R.S., and O.A.) to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized as acceptable by a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar conditions and circumstances when he: admitted patients without justification; unnecessarily and inappropriately ordered tests for the patients which were not indicated by the patient's symptomatology; incorrectly diagnosed and conditions of patients he treated; inadequately documented the need for admission to the hospital and testing, inadequately documented the justification for his diagnoses and inadequately documented follow-up care; inappropriately prescribed Coumadin for patient L.M.; and excessively hospitalized two patients. (Adopts Petitioner's first PFOF 64). Respondents for the reasons previously enumerated failed to practice medicine within the prevailing standards of practice in the community. (Adopts Petitioner's second PFOF 64). Diagnoses are of great significance in a patient's care. They impact on the future well-being of the patient. Respondent, with respect to the records reflected above, failed to demonstrate adequate diagnostic ability. (Adopts Petitioner's PFOF 65).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(n) and (t), Florida Statutes (Counts One and Two),and not guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(1) and (o)(Counts Three and Four), and suspending Respondent's license to practice medicine for a minimum of three years, with reinstatement conditioned upon proof of attendance and successful completion of courses selected by the Board of Medicine related to diagnosis and necessary record keeping. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of July, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Stephanie A. Daniel Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Robert A. Gonzalez, Jr. 1900 North Univeristy Drive Suite 110 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33024 Van Poole Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Soled Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Respondent, Michael Davis, was licensed as a Doctor of Chiropractic in Florida. Respondent treated Karen D. Moss from December 14, 1984 to January 25, 1985 and pursuant to his treatment, maintained certain records of that treatment. Ms. Moss first met the Respondent when she was going to massage school. In December, 1984, she was involved in a serious automobile accident and, when she failed to feel better afterwards, was referred to him by a co-worker, Ms. Madison. When Ms. Moss first went to Dr. Davis, she had already seen another physician for approximately four weeks and was dissatisfied with the treatment rendered by him. At the time of her first visit with Respondent, her right knee was swollen and felt like it needed to be cracked. Her neck could not be turned and her back was always stiff. She had sharp pains in her neck and constant pain in her right shoulder. Respondent, as a part of his treatment, prescribed massage by Ms. Madison and took one set of x-rays of his patient. He also, in the course of his treatment, used an ultra-sound machine which Ms. Moss could not describe, but even after going to see Respondent for several weeks, three to four times a week, she concluded he was not giving her what she needed and decided to seek yet a third doctor. When she terminated her visits to Dr. Davis, in her opinion, she was not only not improved, but even felt worse. At the time of her last visit with Dr. Davis, on January 25, 1985, she told him she was switching to another physician. At this time, Dr. Davis did not tell her that she had reached maximum medical improvement and recommended, to the contrary, that she continue to come see him. Ms. Madison, who recalls that several weeks after Ms. Moss began treatment with the Respondent, she left him advising Ms. Madison that she was not getting any better. When Ms. Moss first visited Dr. Davis, she filled out a form for him listing her complaints and her history as she knew it. She contends that she listed her back, neck, and right leg injury on the form but review of the form she filled out does not reflect any knee injury though constant knee pain is listed. At the time she filled the form out, she was emotionally unstable and merely wanted to get treatment. She was in pain and did not take a lot of time in filling out the form. To this day, two to three years later, though she has improved and credits this improvement to the treatment she received from other physicians, she still suffers from some of the complaints she had when she was a patient of Dr. Davis. Ms. Moss's records were reviewed by Dr. Robert S. Butler, a chiropractic physician in practice in Miami Shores, who examined them as an expert for the Board of Chiropractic Examiners. In his review, Dr. Butler found no record of a comprehensive medical examination being completed on Ms. Moss or that Dr. Davis took an adequate personal history. The initial examination on December 14, 1984, was not described adequately on any records and the case history form filled out by the patient does not appear to contain any personal entries by the Respondent. His entries appear to include only what appears in the narrative summary produced subsequent to the taking of the history. Any form filled out by a patient should be the basis for the doctor to use to inquire further of the patient in taking a case history. This was not done here by Dr. Davis except very briefly on the first page of the form and it cannot be determined from looking at that who put the entries there. Dr. Butler cannot say, therefore, that the physical examination supposedly accomplished by Dr. Davis was comprehensive as billed to the insurance company by the doctor. After reviewing the doctor's records on Ms. Moss and cross referencing them with each other, Dr. Butler at first found some of them to be repetitious but on closer examination, it appears that the dates do not coincide. There are also several discrepancies which, in and of itself, is not uncommon. In this case, however, the records are so full of discrepancies as to be beyond the common experience. His review of Respondent's progress notes failed to reveal any specificity. Assuming that the records Dr. Butler looked at were contemporaneous with treatment, they are not adequate for a prudent chiropractic physician's minimum standards and he was unable to determine a proper relationship between the diagnosis done by the Respondent and the billings submitted to the insurance company for services reportedly rendered. Dr. Butler was also concerned that the narrative report prepared on the computer for the insurance company contains much information not documented elsewhere in the records, such as blood pressure, pelvic findings, and recitations of procedures done. He is also concerned over an indication of weakness on the part of the patient without evidence of muscle testing. This type of record keeping is not customary and is, in his opinion, not good practice. Even Dr. Brown, Respondent's expert, indicated that when he keeps records on his patients, he marks down almost every test result he receives. Admittedly, he does not necessarily put in all negative findings, but very definitely lists all positive findings. He utilizes a sheet of conditions on which he checks off those the existence of which is shown and it is from this form, along with others, that he prepares his narrative summary. He agrees in essence with Dr. Butler that it is not acceptable practice for a physician to write a report to an insurance company indicating that a patient has reached maximum medical improvement when this conclusions is based on matters outside the patient record. Here, Dr. Butler concluded that the records completed on Ms. Moss by the Respondent are sufficient with regard to format but not as to content. He would not put in narrative form matters which are not documented in the backup forms and the evidence here, the records kept by Respondent, reflect many conclusions in the narrative submitted to the insurance company which are not backed up by test results recorded on exam forms. In light of the fact that both experts agree that Respondent's records were inadequate, it is so found. Dr. Butler examined the records that were furnished to the Department's investigator by Dr. Davis after some substantial reluctance and obfuscation on his part was overcome. In response, Dr. Davis contends that at the time the records were sought of him, he did not produce all of the records he had on Ms. Moss because of the nature and manner in which the subpoena was served and because the subpoena only asked for certain documentation. He contends, however, that he offered his entire file to the investigator, Ms. Pagett, who copied only certain records therefrom indicating that was all she needed. Review of the documentation submitted at the hearing, however, which was all that was submitted by either party, and which was examined by Dr. Butler, leads to the inescapable finding that the records kept by Respondent are minimal at best and appear to fall short of the minimum standards set for the chiropractic profession. Dr. Butler's testimony satisfies the Petitioner's requirement to go forward with the evidence and Respondent has failed to produce any evidence to counter the conclusions drawn by Dr. Butler which are adopted herein as to the sufficiency of the records. The Administrative Complaint alleges that on February 26, 1985, Respondent filed a report with Ms. Moss's insurance company indicating she had reached maximum medical improvement. Dr. Davis admits this was the case but contends that in his professional judgement, she had in fact reached that status at that time and there was nothing more that he could do for her to increase or improve her physical condition. Dr. Butler, concluded after evaluation of the records, that maximum medical improvement had not been reached and from the records, he cannot determine what standards the Respondent applied to reach the conclusion that he had. The patient still had symptoms which needed treatment and in light of the injuries sustained by Ms. Moss, the likelihood is slight that she would have reached maximum medical improvement within the six week period that Dr. Davis was treating her. Dr. Butler concedes that a physician has the obligation to report maximum medical improvement status when that status is reached, but here, he feels, the determination was premature. This no more than a professional difference of opinion, however. Dr. James E. Brown, a chiropractor practicing in Palm Beach Gardens also reviewed the records kept by Respondent on Ms. Moss and as a result of his review concluded differently. He is of the opinion that the Respondent's records on Ms. Moss are adequate and within standards. He feels they would support a conclusion of maximum medical improvement as well. In this regard, Dr. Brown states that the achievement of maximum medical improvement is not based merely on a period of time but on the condition of the patient's body. In the instant case, maximum medical improvement was achieved in a very short time under the Respondent's care. The patient was indicated as being pain free when she left Respondent's care and one does not properly continue to treat patients whose condition is as it was described in Respondent's records. In short, Maximum medical improvement can be reached when a patient is not completely healed and still has a continuing condition. He agrees with Dr. Butler to the effect that definition of the term "maximum medical improvement" is subject to varied interpretations by different physicians and he admits that even if the records show that a patient is pain free, if the patient still has stiffness, continued treatment would be given if there were indications that the patient was still in need of it. Here, neither Dr. Butler nor Dr. Brown examined Ms. Moss. Both relied solely upon the written records kept by Dr. Davis. Ms. Moss, however, still maintains that when she left Dr. Davis's treatment, she was still in pain and, in fact left, because she felt his treatment was not benefiting her. By itself, that might well mean she had reached maximum medical improvement because the experts both agree that an individual may still have pain but have reached the maximum improvement. However, Ms. Moss also relates that when she went to another doctor who continued to treat her, she did improve rapidly as a result of that treatment and it is found, therefore, that Dr. Davis's report of Maximum medical improvement upon Ms. Moss's leaving his care, was, for whatever reason, premature. During August, 1985, Dr. Davis also treated Teresa L'Heureux who had been injured in an automobile accident. As a part of the treatment of Ms. L'Heureux, Dr. Davis issued three prescriptions for a drug, Flexoril. The first two, those written on August 30, 1985 and September 20, 1985, were on prescription pads bearing the printed name of Dr. Sultana and the doctor's rubber stamp signature. The third prescription, on October 12, 1985, was a phone-in prescription which does not bear the name of any physician. Respondent contends that he wrote these prescriptions at the order of Dr. Sultana who had seen the patient prior to the day the prescriptions were issued and directed him to issue them using her prescription pad and a rubber stamp of her signature. Dr. Sultana, on the other hand, denies ever having seen Ms. L'Heureux as a patient; denies having written the prescriptions; denies having signed her name to them; and denies having authorized Respondent or anyone else to stamp them with her signature. What is more, she does not recall having ever called in the third prescription. Dr. Sultana admits to having discussed the matter with Detective Brown who was conducting an investigation into the matter and having told him that she does not stamp her prescriptions. She does not recall admitting to Detective Brown that she had a stamp. In fact, she does not have a stamp of her signature, has never used one, and denies ever having told Respondent to utilize a rubber stamp of her signature in writing prescriptions. Dr. Sultana did some work with the Respondent and served as his mentor in the field of psychiatry. She admits that, as Respondent claims, if it were true that she had called in prescriptions without having seen a patient and were to have allowed Respondent to affix her stamped signature to a prescription for a controlled drug, she could be in severe difficulty with licensing authority. However, she contends she is not denying it for that purpose but because she did not do what Respondent alleges she did, and her testimony, contradicted only by the attacks of the Respondent and his assertion that she did allow him to use her prescription pad as alleged, is accepted. Further, the note taken from what appears to be patient records bearing her apparent signature and ostensibly relating to Ms. L'Heureux, is an obvious forgery in that the note refers to another patient and has been excised from records improperly with an inaccurate date and name placed thereon. Comparison of the handwritten signature of Dr. Sultana on the note with that on the stamped prescriptions and the computer printout indicates that the signatures are dissimilar. It is concluded, therefore, that the stamp signature is not that of Dr. sultana but a forgery instead. Dr. Davis is also alleged to have improperly examined Ms. L'Heureux during a visit she made to his office on December 17, 1985 by, in the course of an examination for a bladder infection, placing his fingers in her vaginal area without first donning rubber gloves and by moving his fingers in and out of her vaginal area making sexually suggestive comments to her while doing so. He is also alleged to have provided unnecessary treatment based on his record of diagnosis and treatment of the patient. Ms. L'Heureux came to see Dr. Davis in October, 1985 after she was involved in a car accident. She had heard his advertisement on the radio and went to see him for relief, During the course of his treatment, he applied heat, electrical muscle stimulation, traction, and adjustments. Ms. L'Heureux claims that on one occasion during a manipulation, while she was laying on her stomach, Dr. Davis placed his hand in between her legs and told her to move. This made her uncomfortable. On another occasion, when he came back into the room after being absent for a moment, he commented that something smelled good. Neither of these actions is considered actionable, however, absent any further evidence of impropriety. On one visit, however, she complained to the Respondent of having urinary problems. She had brought the matter to the attention of the Respondent's technician previously and had been advised to provide a urine sample. When the Respondent came into the area where she was waiting, she mentioned it to him and he had her go back into the examining room where he advised her to take off her pants and examined her. At this time, there was no other female present in the building. During the course of the examination, without using gloves, he pushed with his hands on her lower abdomen and then inserted his fingers inside her. She claims that while doing this he asked her how long it took her to climax and advised her of different ways of climaxing. When he was finished with the examination, he gave her a prescription for flexoril on Dr. Sultana's prescription pad and let her out the door. Ms. L'Heureux indicates that she had never been to a chiropractor before this series of treatments with Dr. Davis and therefore did not know what was appropriate for him to do. She does know, however, that she never met Dr. Sultana. During the course of Ms. L'Heureux' treatment, she saw Dr. Davis every day for the first three weeks and then for three weeks thereafter, every other day. Starting with the seventh week, for two months, she saw him every third or fourth day, returning to be treated by him even after the visit during which he conducted the pelvic examination. She finds it difficult to believe that she saw Dr. Davis for as many times as he billed her for, but she cannot dispute it. Her attorney, when she went to see him referred her to another chiropractor. She continued to visit Dr. Davis even after he did the inappropriate vaginal examination because she had no money and Respondent agreed to wait for her insurance company to pay. He was guiding her with regard to timing and kept telling her not to worry about the fee - that the insurance company would pay - and in fact, he was the one who referred her to an attorney. After she left him to seek the services of another chiropractor, he billed her for a total of $1,996.00 of which the insurance company paid only $600.00. Dr. Davis is suing her for the balance. Dr. Butler examined Ms. L'Heureux' records as well as those of Ms. Moss. At no place in Ms. L'Heureux', except for the narrative billing sent to the insurance company, is there any mention of testing for a urine problem. No lab reports are contained in the records and as a result, the records are deficient in that regard. The results should be reported to the patient at the next visit unless something is extremely wrong, in which case, the patient should be notified immediately. Dr. Butler examined those records of Ms. L'Heureux made available to him and was of the opinion that there was nothing in them to justify the diagnosis made by Respondent much less to justify the billings. He did contend, however, that the use of a medical doctor's signature stamp on a prescription pad would be totally improper for a chiropractor and Dr. Davis, who denies the vaginal examination ever took place, stipulates that a vaginal exam, such as alleged herein, would be an inappropriate diagnostic procedure for a chiropractor. Dr. Davis' reputation regarding his relationship with his patients is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, Ms. Madison, who has known and worked with him for several years, considers him to be a considerate individual who shows concern for his patients who seem to like him. At no time, while she was working for him, did he ever show any sexual interest in any patients and in fact was quite reserved. Others, such as Mr. Mackhanlall, agree. On the other hand, some, like Dr. Kastein, with whom Respondent had a business disagreement, think little of him, his professional capabilities, his ethics, and his personality. Dr. Davis contends that he interviewed and examined Ms. Moss, as alleged in her testimony but asserts, contra to her statement, that he took a personal history and x-rays of her. He claims he made up a chart as to the type 4of manipulation to be done and on each of the periodic visits she made to his office, made progress notes which, though minimal themselves, served to refresh his memory at the end of each day when he dictated into a computed program log, more extensive progress notes on each of the forty or so patients he saw that day. Most of the information placed into the computer in this fashion was from memory, however, and not from his hand-kept progress notes. This is not a system designed to generate much confidence in either his notes or his credibility. Respondent also relates that toward the end of January, 1985, Ms. Moss indicated that she had no more dizziness and in fact, felt better though she still had some stiffness. Finally, she came in and told him she was totally free of dizziness and pain and on January 25, 1985, said she was "ok" and feeling fine. A complete examination which he made that day, he claims, showed normal motion. Based on this examination, he concluded that she had reached maximum medical improvement and so indicated to her insurance company. In March, 1985, he was asked to submit a report to the insurance company which he prepared, based on the computer printout of his daily progress notes. At that time, he had received no information from Dr. Alden, the healer to whom Ms. Moss went after severing her relationship with Respondent, to the effect that she was treating Ms. Moss and no records were requested of him by the insurance company. When the DPR investigator contacted him, he claims he gave her what was requested; no more and no less. As to Ms. L'Heureux, he relates that when he initially examined her he gave her a complete orthopedic and neurological examination. Based on his diagnosis, he prescribed traction, ultra-sound and x-rays. Respondent avers that in August, 1985, Ms. L'Heureux indicated she was having pain and wanted to see Dr. Sultana. He apparently set this up because, he claims, shortly thereafter, Ms. L'Heureux indicated she wanted the prescription Dr. Sultana said she would get. He claims he called Dr. Sultana who directed him to give her the prescription for Flexoril using the stamp signature and pad in her desk drawer. The second prescription was also approved by Dr. Sultana according to Respondent, and he continued to treat Ms. L'Heureux until her attorney told her to see an orthopedic surgeon rather than a chiropractor. Dr. Davis categorically denied ever having conducted any vaginal examination of Ms. L'Heureux and claims that on the day in question, after she had deposited the urine specimen for analysis with his technician, she left the building and that was the end of that visit. Dr. Sultana denies ever having given permission to write prescription on her pad and denies having a stamp of her signature. Having evaluated the testimony of Dr. Davis in this regard, vis a vis the testimony of Ms. L'Heureux, Ms. Moss, and Dr. Sultana, it is clear that Dr. Davis's testimony is the less credible. Evaluating the witnesses and considering the relative probabilities, it is clear that the complainants are the more credible and there is no indication that any of them stands to gain anything by initiating unfounded complaints against him. It is therefore, found that, as to the writing of the prescriptions, Dr. Davis had no authority to write them utilizing Dr. Sultana's pad and a rubber stamp of her signature. As to the alleged incident with Ms. L'Heureux involving the improper pelvic examination, it is found that it did occur as alleged in light of the deposition testimony of Ms. Johnson, a former patient who indicated Respondent, in May, 1983, conducted a pelvic examination on her without first securing her consent. Turning, then to the ultimate issue of the sufficiency of the medical records kept on both patients in question here, Dr. Butler is convinced that the records are inadequate. Dr. Brown to a lesser degree agrees. Consequently, it is found that the records have been shown to be inadequate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a chiropractic physician in Florida be revoked and he be fined a total of $8,000.00, but that so much of the penalty as calls for revocation of the license be suspended for two years under such terms and conditions as are prescribed by the Board of Chiropractic Examiners. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of June, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward H. Reise, Esquire Suite F 207 11173 N. Kendall Dr. Miami, Florida 33176-0917 Michael Davis, pro se 645 South Military Trail No. 9 West Palm Beach, Florida 33415 Erskine C. Rogers, III, Esquire 2875 South Ocean Blvd., Suite 200 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe St. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe St. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Pat Guilford, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Chiropractic 130 North Monroe St. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4108 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties hereto: By the Petitioner Petitioner's counsel, notwithstanding, the oral comments made by the Hearing Officer at the conclusion of the hearing regarding the format of the Proposed Finding of Fact, failed to number the paragraphs to facilitate identification herein. This has therefore been accomplished by the undersigned. Findings that at all times in issue, Davis licensed as a chiropractor in Florida, Findings of Fact's 1-29 relate to the 2nd Administrative Complaint. Findings of Fact's 30-46 relate to the first. The remainder go to the issue of the credibility of the Respondent as a witness and relate to both. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as immaterial except as to the fact that after leaving Respondent's treatment, the patient was seen and treated by an osteopathic physician. 3-5. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the last two sentences which are irrelevant. 7-9. Accepted and incorporated herein. 10. Rejected as not a Finding of Fact. 11-14. Rejected as not Findings of Fact but mere comment on the evidence. The ultimate finding that Respondent conducted an examination of S.J. is accepted. Irrelevant and cumulative. Rejected as an improper finding of fact. 18-20. Irrelevant. Rejected as a comment on the evidence and not a finding of fact. Accepted and incorporated except for the last sentence which is comment on the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. 23-25. Rejected as a summary of the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected. Rejected as a summary of evidence and not a Finding of Fact. 28-29. Rejected as a comment on the quality of the evidence, not a Finding of Fact. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted except for the last sentence which is a comment on the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as irrelevant as a Finding of Fact. 34-38. Rejected as a summary of the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. 39-43. Rejected as a summary of the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. Accepted as to medical justification - Rejected as to nature. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as a comment on the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. 47-48. Rejected as irrelevant. 49-50. Cumulative. 51. Rejected. For the Respondent Respondent does not identify Findings of Fact. Paragraph numbers start with 6. 7 a. Rejected as a summary of evidence. Accepted. Rejected as a summary of the witness's testimony. 9 a. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as a summary of the witness's testimony. 11 a. Accepted. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as a comment on the evidence. d-g. Rejected as a summary of the evidence - not a Finding of Fact. 13 a-c. Rejected as a summary of the evidence. 15 a. Rejected as contra to the evidence. b-c. Irrelevant. 17 a. Accepted. Irrelevant. No evidence before the Hearing Officer. Not supported by evidence of record. e-f. Irrelevant. 19 a. Accepted that Sx 3 was a called in prescription. b. Rejected as comment on the evidence. c-f. Rejected as a summary of the evidence. Not proven. Accepted 21 a-b. Irrelevant c-e. Rejected as a summary of evidence and not a Finding of Fact.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Robin L. Cannizzaro, D.V.M. (Respondent), committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated July 13, 2009, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency with the duty to regulate the practice of veterinary medicine in Florida pursuant to Chapters 455 and 474, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent was a licensed veterinarian in Florida fully authorized to practice veterinary medicine. Respondent has been licensed since 1991 and holds license number VM 5903. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent’s address has been 26139 Halsey Road, Brooksville, Florida. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Diane Weigandt was the owner of the cat known in this record as “Maddie.” Maddie was a young cat, and Ms. Weigandt took her to Respondent’s office on or about April 7, 2008. Ms. Weigandt wanted to have Maddie spayed, but another veterinarian had declined to do so because the preoperative blood work indicated an elevated liver enzyme (ALT). During the course of the visit with Respondent, it was determined that Maddie should have a blood draw to test, among other things, Maddie’s ALT. It was expected that, if the enzyme were within or close to a normal range, Maddie could have the procedure. Respondent decided a draw from Maddie’s jugular vein was needed based upon the volume of the sample required to perform the tests. The selected site of the blood draw is not in dispute. The site of the draw did, however, cause Maddie to react uncooperatively. In order to make the blood draw, Respondent determined that Maddie would have to be restrained. It is not uncommon for cats to resist this procedure. Most pets, in fact, are not cooperative with jugular blood draws. During the first attempt to draw the blood, Respondent’s assistant held Maddie by the scruff of her neck on her side with her legs pinned. This position did not contain the struggling feline. As Maddie struggled to avoid the blood draw, Respondent made several attempts, using four different syringes, to acquire the sample. Approximately half-way through the procedure, Respondent’s assistant taped Maddie’s legs together so that they were further restrained. Between each attempt to draw blood, Maddie was afforded a break. “Break” meaning a brief intermission from the struggle that ensued each time Respondent attempted to draw blood. After approximately 20 minutes, Respondent obtained a small sample, but Maddie collapsed at the end of the blood draw. Respondent quickly performed CPR and was able to revive Maddie and get her stabilized within a short period of time. At the conclusion of the visit, Respondent referred Ms. Weigandt to a specialist to deal with Maddie. Respondent advised Ms. Weigandt that another doctor needed to rule out a pulmonary or cardiac medical condition for Maddie’s collapse. Had Maddie not appeared stable, Respondent would not have sent the cat on her way. When Ms. Weigandt presented at the second veterinarian’s office, Respondent faxed the results of the blood draw taken earlier to the second veterinarian. Ms. Weigandt was advised that another blood draw would be necessary as the specimen from Respondent’s office was compromised. It is not disputed that the second veterinarian advised Ms. Weigandt that Respondent’s blood draw was inadequate for the purposes needed. Respondent acknowledged that the blood draw was hemolyzed, but averred that most of the tests were nevertheless valid. The compromised blood draw could have resulted from a number of conditions. First, due to the numerous attempts to draw blood, a hematoma appeared at the draw site. A hematoma is a collection of blood outside the blood vessel, either in the subcutaneous tissue or in the muscle surrounding the vein. When blood is drawn through a hematoma, there can be a breakdown of the red blood cells. Additionally, myoglobin or muscle fluid from the muscle surrounding the vein may also contaminate the sample. Finally, if the draw is done after the animal has eaten (a non-fasting draw), the sample may be lipemic. Lipemic refers to fat appearing in the blood that will show up anywhere from two to six hours after eating. Any of the conditions noted can adversely affect a blood draw and leave the sample compromised. In the instant case, approximately half of the tests performed on Maddie’s sample drawn by Respondent were deemed inaccurate or insufficient for medical purposes. After consideration of the circumstances and effectiveness of Respondent’s blood draw for Maddie, Ms. Weigandt challenged the credit card payment she made to Respondent for the blood testing. Admitting no error in treatment or procedure, Respondent allowed the challenge and voluntarily withdrew the charge. Respondent believed this was a gesture of goodwill and not an admission of any wrong-doing. Subsequently, Ms. Weigandt requested that Respondent provide her copies of Maddie’s medical records. To that end, Respondent gave Ms. Weigandt the option of having the records faxed to her new veterinarian at no charge or picking up a copy of the records for which she would be expected to pay a fee. Ms. Weigandt chose the latter option, as she wanted to keep a personal copy of her pets’ records. As it turned out, Ms. Weigandt was, in effect, seeking the records for all of her pets/patients for whom Respondent had provided services. The seven pets’ records were maintained under Ms. Weigandt’s name and were copied and provided to the owner/client. Respondent charged Ms. Weigandt $55.00 for 55 pages of records. The form verification of completeness executed by Respondent’s assistant provided that the records for Maddie constituted 32 pages. In this case, Respondent kept a file for Ms. Weigandt’s pets based upon the owner’s name and information. Within the single file, Respondent maintained pet data identified by pet name with treatment notes, medications, and other pertinent information. Respondent maintained the record for the seven pets owned by Ms. Weigandt and kept notes for office visits, telephone consultations, and other matters identified by pet name. Pertinent to this case, Respondent’s notation for Maddie for the date of the blood draw indicated “WNL.” The specifics of Maddie’s temperature, heart rate or respiration were not stated. “WNL” is short-hand for “within normal limits.” Data for Maddie’s weight, considered a basic “vital,” was not provided. Instead, Respondent’s note provided, “seems undersized for age.” The process Respondent used to attempt a blood draw from Maddie’s jugular vein is within the standard of care for such procedures. As to both the site of the draw and the restraint used to obtain a sample, Respondent’s conduct was within a standard of care to be expected given the combative nature of the patient. In all likelihood, given the totality of the situation, Maddie experienced a vagal bradycardia that was quickly and appropriately addressed by Respondent. Maddie was resuscitated in an appropriate manner and stabilized before being released. As to the medical records retained by Respondent, it is determined that such records did not contain the data and information expected and required by the standard in Florida. Pertinent information concerning Maddie’s pre-procedure condition was not noted. Finally, as to the charges imposed for the copying of Maddie’s medical record, it is determined that, pursuant to the rule, Respondent was allowed to charge $26.75 for Maddie’s record. Ms. Weigandt requested and obtained records for six other animals. Presumably, the $55.00 charged for such records covered not fewer than 23 pages of records. Assuming Respondent was entitled to charge $1.00 for each of those pages, Respondent would have been authorized to charge $49.75 for the records.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Veterinary Medicine enter a final order finding that Respondent failed to keep appropriate records as alleged in Count Two of the Administrative Complaint, imposing a penalty of reprimand and the costs of investigation, and dismissing all other counts of the Administrative Complaint as unfounded. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 2010.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, a physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology, committed medical malpractice in delivering a baby and/or failed to maintain medical records justifying the course of the mother's treatment; if so, whether Petitioner should impose discipline on Respondent's medical license within the applicable penalty guidelines or take some other action.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Mark N. Scheinberg, M.D., was licensed to practice medicine in the state of Florida. He is board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology. Petitioner Department of Health (the "Department") has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed physicians such as Dr. Scheinberg. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the physician has committed a disciplinable offense. Here, the Department alleges that Dr. Scheinberg committed two such offenses——namely, medical malpractice and failure to keep records justifying the course of treatment——in connection with the vacuum-assisted vaginal delivery of an infant born to Patient L.G. on February 2, 2005, at West Boca Medical Center. The crux of this case (though not the sole issue) is whether, as the Department contends, the standard of care required Dr. Scheinberg to perform a Caesarean section ("C- section") on L.G. due to the passage of time, instead of allowing her to continue to labor for approximately 13 hours and, ultimately, deliver vaginally. The events giving rise to this dispute began on February 1, 2005, at around 11:00 a.m., when L.G., whose pregnancy was at term, checked into the hospital after having experienced ruptured membranes. At 12:30 p.m. that day, L.G. signed a form bearing the title "Authorization for Medical and/or Surgical Treatment," which manifested her consent to a vaginal delivery or C-section together with, among other things, "such additional operations or procedures as [her physicians might] deem necessary." Immediately above L.G.'s signature on the form is an affirmation: "The above procedures, with their attendant risks, benefits and possible complications and alternatives, have been explained to me " The evidence is not clear as to when, exactly, Dr. Scheinberg first saw L.G., but that fact is unimportant. The medical records reflect that at 8:30 p.m. on February 1, 2005, Dr. Scheinberg gave a telephone order to initiate an IV push of the antibiotic Ampicillin; therefore, he had taken charge of L.G.'s care by that time. The nurses' notes indicate that at 10:00 p.m., L.G.'s cervix had dilated to "rim" or approximately nine centimeters—— meaning that the dilation was complete, or nearly so. At this time, and throughout the duration of L.G.'s labor, an external fetal heart monitor was in place to detect and record the baby's heartbeats and the mother's uterine contractions. An intrauterine pressure catheter ("IUPC")——a device that precisely measures the force of uterine contractions——was not inserted into L.G.'s uterus at any time during this event. The Department argues (although it did not allege in the Complaint) that, at some point during L.G.'s labor, the standard of care required Dr. Scheinberg either to place an IUPC or perform a C-section. Pet. Prop. Rec. Order at 10, ¶36. The Department's expert witness, Dr. John Busowski, testified unequivocally and unconditionally, however, that the standard of care does not require the use of an IUPC. T. 36. The undersigned credits this evidence and finds that Dr. Scheinberg's nonuse of an IUPC did not breach the standard of care. Dr. Scheinberg conducted a physical at around 2:00 a.m. on February 2, 2005, which included taking L.G.'s complete history and performing a vaginal examination. L.G.'s cervix remained dilated to approximately nine centimeters, and her labor had not substantially progressed for about four hours. Dr. Scheinberg noted in L.G.'s chart that the baby was in the posterior position at 2:00 a.m. The Department argues, based on Dr. Busowski's testimony, that as of 2:00 a.m., the standard of care required [Dr. Scheinberg to] choose one of the following options: (1) watch the patient for a few more hours to allow for progress; (2) place an IUPC to determine the adequacy of Patient L.G.'s contractions; (3) start Pitocin without the placement of an IUPC; or (4) perform a C- section. Pet. Prop. Rec. Order at 9-10, ¶ 32. The Department contends that Dr. Scheinberg breached the standard of care by choosing "simply to watch the patient for approximately 10 more hours"—— which was tantamount to "choosing to do nothing." Id. at 10, ¶¶ 33-34. In fact, Dr. Scheinberg chose to watch the patient, which was, according to Dr. Busowski, within the standard of care. Obviously, at 2:00 in the morning on February 2, 2005, Dr. Scheinberg did not choose to wait for 10 more hours, because at that point he (unlike the parties to this litigation) did not know what was about to happen. The nurses' notes reflect that L.G. was under close observation throughout the early morning hours, and that Dr. Scheinberg was following the situation. At 4:30 a.m., L.G. was set up to push and at 4:45 a.m. was pushing well. At 6:15 a.m., the notes indicate that Dr. Scheinberg was aware of the mother's attempts to push. At 6:45 a.m., he reviewed the strips from the fetal heart monitor. At 7:45 a.m., he was present and aware of L.G.'s status. From 7:00 a.m. until 8:00 a.m., no contractions were identifiable on the external monitor. At 8:00 a.m., however, L.G. was comfortable and pushing well. She stopped pushing at 8:30 a.m., but remained comfortable. Dr. Scheinberg then ordered the administration of Pitocin, a medicine which is used to strengthen contractions and hasten delivery. Although the Department faults Dr. Scheinberg for giving L.G. Pitocin at this relatively late stage of her labor, Dr. Busowski (the Department's expert witness) admitted being unable to say "that Dr. Scheinberg should have started Pitocin earlier " T. 72. The Department therefore has no clear evidential basis for second-guessing Dr. Scheinberg's professional judgment in this particular, and neither does the undersigned. At 9:10 a.m., L.G. resumed pushing. The baby's fetal heart tones (heartbeats) were stable. L.G. continued pushing, with her family present, until around 11:00 a.m., at which time Dr. Scheinberg discussed the situation with the patient and her family. Dr. Scheinberg explained to L.G. or her husband the risks of, and alternatives to, performing a vacuum-assisted vaginal delivery. Either L.G. or her husband gave verbal consent to the use of a vacuum device to assist in the delivery. Between 11:00 a.m. and 11:10 a.m., the fetal heart monitor detected some variable decelerations, meaning a decrease in heart rate that could be a sign of fetal distress. Dr. Scheinberg delivered the baby at 11:23 a.m., using a vacuum device to help pull the infant out of the birth canal. In his post-operative notes, Dr. Scheinberg wrote that his "pre-operative diagnosis" was "+3 station — prolonged second stage 2½ hrs." As a "post-operative diagnosis," Dr. Scheinberg recorded, "same + tight cord." He reported the following "findings": "tight cord cut on perineum[;] mec[onium] aspirated on perineum."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Dr. Scheinberg not guilty of the charges set forth in the Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2011.
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of charges set forth in a three-count Administrative Complaint. The Administrative Complaint charges the Respondent with violations of paragraphs (m), (q), and (t) of Section 458.331(1) Florida Statutes.1
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent, Donald A. Tobkin, M.D., has been licensed, and continues to be licensed, to practice medicine in the State of Florida. His license number is 30942.5 Sometime during the month of December 2004, the Police Department of Hollywood, Florida, (HPD) received information from a confidential informant that the Respondent was soliciting drug-prescribing business and was writing inappropriate and excessive prescriptions for controlled substances. On the basis of that information, the HPD initiated an undercover operation to investigate the information received from the confidential informant. As part of the undercover investigation, on the evening of January 20, 2005, at approximately 9:56pm, an HPD female detective named Nicole Coffin made a telephone call to the Respondent's telephone. The Respondent answered the telephone and identified himself by name. Detective Coffin pretended to be a person named Melissa Beech. She pretended to be a person who was seeking to obtain OxyContin, which is a Schedule II controlled substance. During the entire undercover investigation, Detective Coffin pretended to be a drug-seeker while interacting with the Respondent. On the telephone she told the Respondent that she wanted a prescription for OxyContin and also told the Respondent that a girl somewhere on Federal Highway had given her the Respondent's card and had told her she could call the Respondent if she needed a prescription. Detective Coffin, in her role as Melissa Beech, did not initially describe any medical complaint to the Respondent; she just said she wanted a prescription for OxyContin. In response to the request for a prescription for OxyContin, the Respondent told the make-believe drug-seeker that he could provide the requested prescription, but that they would have to have a "medical reason" for such a prescription. The Respondent then asked the make-believe drug-seeker if she had ever been in an automobile accident. The make-believe drug-seeker answered "yes," because that is the answer she thought would provide a basis for a "medical reason." The Respondent then proceeded to ask the make-believe drug-seeker a long series of leading questions which, if answered "yes," could provide the appearance of a "medical reason" for the requested prescription for OxyContin. This series of questions was for the purpose of establishing a contrived "medical reason" for the prescription sought by the make-believe drug-seeker. There never was, and there never appeared to be, any real "medical reason" for the prescription sought by the make-believe drug-seeker. The sole purpose for the many questions asked by the Respondent, and for the Respondent's written notations related to those questions, was to create the illusion, or the false impression, that there was a "medical reason' for the prescription when, in fact, there was no such reason. The detective who was pretending to be a drug-seeker answered "yes" to all of the leading questions asked by the Respondent. She answered "yes," even when that was not a truthful answer, because she was trying to give the answers she thought the Respondent wanted to hear.6 The Respondent's leading questions included questions asking about such things as whether the make-believe drug-seeker had ever had an automobile accident, whether she had suffered a herniated disk as a result of that accident, whether she had had an MRI, whether she had had any subsequent accidents, whether she had tried any other drugs to relieve pain, whether she had used Oxycontin in the past, and whether in the past the Oxycontin had relieved her pain. During the course of the first telephone conversation between Detective Coffin and the Respondent a number of significant matters were not discussed. The Respondent did not discuss the possibility of surgical treatments to treat the back pain described in response to the Respondent's questions. The Respondent did not discuss the necessity of reviewing the MRI or X-rays that supposedly would confirm the "herniated disc" he had inquired about. The Respondent did not discuss the necessity of obtaining future MRIs, X-rays, or other diagnostic tests to evaluate the "severe back pain" supposedly described by Detective Coffin in her role as Melissa Beech. The Respondent did not mention that she would need to have any follow-up visits with the Respondent. During the course of the first conversation between Detective Coffin and the Respondent, she told the Respondent that she had previously been obtaining Oxycontin "off the street" and that she was seeking a prescription from the Respondent because her street source had "dried up." She also told him that she had previously taken Valium and Percocet. During the course of the first telephone conversation Detective Coffin, pretending to be a drug-seeker, told the Respondent that she suffered from back pain as a result of the make-believe automobile accidents. She did not say that she was currently experiencing pain at the time of that telephone conversation. During the first telephone conversation the Respondent did not ask the make-believe drug-seeker any questions about her menstrual cycle, about whether she was pregnant, or about whether she had had any prior pregnancies or had ever had any children. However, in his written notes the Respondent included notations that purport to be answers to those unasked questions. Similarly, the Respondent did not ask the make-believe drug-seeker any questions about her consumption of alcohol, but included in his notes notations that purport to memorialize the answer to that unasked question. The Respondent's "history" notes also report that he warned the make-believe drug-seeker that OxyContin tablets should not be crushed or broken, even though he did not include any such warning in his telephone conversation with the make-believe drug-seeker. During the first telephone conversation, Detective Coffin was never asked about, and never provided any information about, whether other physicians had either prescribed OxyContin for her or had refused to prescribe OxyContin for her. The only prior sources of OxyContin she mentioned to the Respondent were non-prescription illegal sources on the street. The Respondent never discussed with Detective Coffin the possibility or necessity of a more structured medical treatment plan for addiction. The Respondent never discussed with Detective Coffin the possibility or necessity of a more structured medical treatment plan to treat a complaint of "severe pain." During the course of the first telephone conversation, the Respondent agreed to provide a prescription to the make- believe drug-seeker for a total of sixty-two 80-milligram OxyContin tablets. It was agreed that the make-believe drug- seeker would pay $100.00 for the first prescription and that the Respondent would provide similar prescriptions in the future for $50.00 per prescription. Towards the end of the first telephone conversation the Respondent told the make-believe drug-seeker that he had another matter to attend to and that she should call him later to arrange the time and place for the two of them to meet later that same evening. During the course of the first telephone conversation, which lasted for approximately 14 minutes, the Respondent made written notes of the answers given by the make-believe drug-seeker. Those notes were prepared in such a manner as to resemble the types of notes customarily made by physicians who are making a medical record of information elicited from a patient. A number of the details recorded in the Respondent's notes of the first telephone conversation were inconsistent with the information provided by the make-believe drug-seeker. Specifically, those notes contained a significant amount of information that was never uttered by the make-believe drug- seeker. The fictitious and false history details memorialized in the Respondent's notes are intentional falsehoods. Later that evening, at approximately 12:20am on January 21, 2005, Detective Coffin, still pretending to be the drug-seeking person named Melissa Beech, placed a second telephone call to the Respondent. She spoke with the Respondent for about three minutes on this occasion. Most of the second conversation consisted of providing the Respondent with information about the location where Detective Coffin would be waiting for him and information about where the Respondent should park when he arrived. Law enforcement officers of the HPD attempted to record both of the telephone conversations between the Respondent and Detective Coffin. Both of those attempts were unsuccessful. There is no recording of either of the telephone conversations. Sometime later that evening, during the early morning hours of January 21, 2005, the Respondent met the make-believe drug-seeker at the motel or efficiency apartment. He entered the room where the make-believe drug-seeker was pretending to be staying. Prior to his arrival, two cameras had been concealed in the room by the HPD police officers. During the entire time the Respondent was in the room the two cameras were attempting to record everything he said and everything he did, as well as everything said or done by the detective pretending to be the drug-seeking person named Melissa Beech. After entering the room, the Respondent spoke with the make-believe drug-seeker and asked her additional questions related to her request for a prescription for OxyContin. He made some written notes that purported to be summaries of her answers. During the course of the meeting with the make-believe drug-seeker the Respondent provided her with a document titled "Patient's Acknowledgement," which she signed, but did not read. That document contained information about the patient-physician relationship, about what was expected of the patient, and also memorialized the patient's informed consent to the treatment she was requesting from the Respondent. The Respondent also conducted a brief physical examination of the make-believe patient and made written notes that purported to be a memorialization of what he had observed during the course of his examination. The Respondent's examination of the make-believe drug-seeker included the following: check of pulse and blood pressure, check of reflex responses at several joints, and check of chest sounds with stethoscope. The Respondent performed a deep tendon reflex test on Detective Coffin by striking her wrists, elbows, and knees with a medical hammer. Detective Coffin's feet remained on the floor during this test. A deep tendon reflex test cannot be performed properly with the subject's feet touching the floor. Such a test performed in such a manner will not produce reliable results. The Respondent indicated in his written notes that he had examined Detective Coffin's head, eyes, ears, nose, and throat. However, the Respondent did not perform any examination at all of Detective Coffin's head, ears, nose, or throat. The Respondent perhaps performed a partial examination of Detective Coffin's eyes, but did not perform an adequate examination of her eyes. The Respondent indicated in his written notes that Detective Coffin's pupils were equal, round, and reactive to light and accommodation. However, the Respondent did not conduct any examination of Detective Coffin's eyes that was sufficient to support a conclusion that they were equal, round, and reactive to light and accommodation. The Respondent included in his written notes that Detective Coffin's chest and lungs were clear to auscultation and percussion. The Respondent did not examine Detective Coffin in a manner that could determine whether her chest and lungs were clear to auscultation and percussion. Therefore, the Respondent did not have any basis for writing that the detective's chest and lungs were clear to auscultation and percussion. The Respondent included in his written notes an observation that Detective Coffin's abdomen was soft. The Respondent never touched or otherwise examined Detective Coffin's abdomen. The Respondent had no factual basis for writing that Detective Coffin's abdomen was soft. In his written notes the Respondent indicated that Detective Coffin experienced pain upon lifting her leg thirty degrees. Detective Coffin never raised either leg in the Respondent's presence and never complained of pain in his presence. There was no factual basis for the subject notation. The Respondent never conducted a Rhomberg examination on Detective Coffin, but he included in his written notes an observation that a Rhomberg test was negative. There was no factual basis for such a notation. The Respondent included in his written notes an observation that he had examined Detective Coffin's gait. However, the Respondent never performed an adequate and sufficient examination of Detective Coffin's gait. The Respondent did not conduct a range of motion test of Detective Coffin. The Respondent never asked Detective Coffin to lift her leg towards her chest. Nor did he ask her to touch her toes. The Respondent never asked her to manipulate her body in any way. At no time during the encounter between Detective Coffin and the Respondent did Detective Coffin state that she was experiencing pain. At no time during that encounter did she behave or move in any manner that would suggest she was experiencing pain. To the contrary, Detective Coffin crossed and uncrossed her legs, alternatively slouched and sat up straight in her chair, and made other movements that would indicate to a reasonable prudent physician that she was not experiencing any pain at all. The Respondent never discussed with Detective Coffin the necessity of obtaining further MRIs, X-rays, or other forms of diagnostic testing. He never discussed any need to obtain and review any prior medical records. The Respondent never asked Detective Coffin to sign a medical records release document that would have authorized the Respondent to obtain prior medical records. The Respondent's written notations regarding his examination of the make-believe drug-seeker contain false information because, among other things, the notations contain the results of tests and examinations the Respondent did not perform. Such false notations are intentional falsehoods. The Respondent never discussed with Detective Coffin the need for a follow-up appointment. The Respondent never asked Detective Coffin for any form of identification. Under the circumstances presented in this case, a reasonable prudent physician would have performed a range of motion test and a leg-raising test, neither of which were performed by the Respondent. Under the circumstances presented in this case, a reasonably prudent physician would have established a treatment plan that would have included a schedule for follow-up visits, a review of prior medical records, and plans for future diagnostic tests. The Respondent did not establish any type of treatment plan. The prescription provided to Detective Coffin was inappropriate, unjustified, and excessive because the physical examination was inadequate, the medical record was falsified, and the patient never exhibited any sign of being in pain. Under the circumstances presented in this case, the Respondent's act of providing a prescription to a total stranger with no medical justification for doing so was an action taken other than in the course of the Respondent's professional practice. Ultimately, the Respondent wrote and delivered a prescription to the make-believe patient. The prescription was for sixty-two 80-milligram tablets of OxyContin. This was a 31- day supply if the OxyContin was taken as directed; one tablet every 12 hours. The Respondent wrote several warnings at the bottom of the prescription document. The warnings included such things as the fact that OxyContin impairs driving ability and may cause drowsiness, loss of balance, and/or loss of coordination. The Respondent also wrote on the prescription: "Must swallow whole and do not crush or break." Other law enforcement officers of the HPD were listening to and observing the events inside the room. Shortly after the Respondent handed the prescription to the make-believe patient and received the one hundred dollars from her, other law enforcement officers rushed into the room, arrested the Respondent, and seized various items of the Respondent's personal property, including the medical record he had been preparing regarding his care and treatment of the make-believe patient. With regard to obtaining information about the characteristics of, and the proper use of, specific drugs, medical doctors customarily rely on the information contained in the Physician Desk Reference (PDR) and on the information contained in the manufacturer's package insert that often accompanies a drug. The package insert for OxyContin includes the following information: (Following an initial caption reading WARNING) OxyContin Tablets are a controlled-release oral formulation of oxycodone hydrochloride indicated for the management of moderate to severe pain when a continuous, around-the- clock analgesic is needed for an extended period of time. * * * (Following caption reading CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY) Oxycodone is a pure agonist opioid whose principal therapeutic action is analgesia. *** With pure opioid agonist analgesics, there is no defined maximum dose; the ceiling to analgesic effectiveness is imposed only by side effects, the more serious of which may include somnolence and respiratory depression. * * * As with all opioids, the minimum effective plasma concentration for analgesia will vary widely among patients, especially among patients who have been previously treated with potent agonist opioids. As a result, patients must be treated with individualized titration of dosage to the desired effect. The minimum effective analgesic concentration of oxycodone for any individual patient may increase over time due to an increase in pain, the development of a new pain syndrome and/or the development of analgesic tolerance. * * * OxyContin Tablets are associated with typical opioid-related adverse experiences. There is a general relationship between increasing oxycodone plasma concentration and increasing frequency of dose-related opioid adverse experiences such as nausea, vomiting, CNS effects, and respiratory depression. In opioid-tolerant patients, the situation is altered by the development of tolerance to opioid-related side effects, and the relationship is not clinically relevant. As with all opioids, the dose must be individualized . . . because the effective analgesic dose for some patients will be too high to be tolerated by other patients. (Following caption reading WARNINGS) OxyContin 80 mg and 160 mg Tablets ARE FOR USE IN OPIOID-TOLERANT PATIENTS ONLY. These tablet strengths may cause fatal respiratory depression when administered to patients not previously exposed to opioids. * * * Concerns about abuse, addiction, and diversion should not prevent the proper management of pain. The development of addiction to opioid analgesics in properly managed patients with pain has been reported to be rare. However, data are not available to establish the true incidence of addiction in chronic pain patients.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case to the following effect: Dismissing Counts One and Two of the Administrative Complaint; Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of having violated Section 458.331(1)(q), Florida Statutes, as charged in Count Three of the Administrative Complaint; and Imposing a penalty consisting of an administrative fine in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) and the revocation of the Respondent's license to practice medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2006.
