Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding Respondent, HOWARD P. HAUSER, was eligible for licensure and licensed in this state by the Florida Department of Insurance as a Life and Health Insurance Agent; General Lines Insurance Agent - Property, Casualty, Surety, and Miscellaneous Lines; and Legal Expense Insurance Agent. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent was the registered agent and an officer or director of Hauser and Associates Insurance Agency, Incorporated of 7770 Davie Road Extension, Hollywood, Florida. Beginning on or about January 1, 1986, and continuing through August 31, 1987, Respondent represented to one of his clients that he had obtained insurance coverage for that client's three restaurants. This representation of coverage was false. Respondent received from the client insurance premium payments of $56,550.00, more or less, for the insurance of the client's three restaurants. These funds were obtained by Respondent under false pretenses. Respondent provided the mortgagee of one of the restaurants owned by his client with a document purporting to be a certificate of insurance on that restaurant from Scotsdale Insurance Company insuring the restaurant for the period December 11, 1985, to December 11, 1986. Respondent further provided the mortgagee with a declaration sheet stating that Protective Insurance Company would insure the restaurant from January 1, 1987, to January 1, 1990. Respondent falsified these declaration sheets. Respondent's client suffered no loss, other than the loss of his premium dollars, because of Respondent's misrepresentations as to coverage. Respondent was charged with one count of Grand Theft of the Second Degree, a second degree felony, based on the dealings with his client. Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of Grand Theft of the Second Degree. The Circuit Court, in and for Broward County, Florida, placed Respondent on probation for a period of three years and withheld adjudication of guilt. As a condition of the Order of Probation, the court required that Respondent make restitution to his client in the amount of $56,550.00 and further required that $15,000.00 be paid toward restitution on October 24, 1988, the date Respondent entered his plea of nolo contendere and the date the court entered the Order of Probation. Respondent made a restitution payment of $15,000.00 on October 24, 1988. Respondent has been licensed by Petitioner since April 1972. Although Petitioner has received other complaints about Respondent, no formal action has been previously taken against him. Respondent has been a good citizen, except for this misconduct, and a good family man. Respondent regrets his misconduct. Respondent timely requested a formal hearing after the Administrative Complaint was served upon him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order which revokes all licenses issued by the Department of Insurance to Respondent, Howard Paul Hauser. DONE and ENTERED this 21st of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1989. APPENDIX The proposed findings addressed as follows: of fact submitted on behalf of Petitioner are 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2. Addressed in paragraph 2. 3. Addressed in paragraph 6. 4. Addressed in paragraph 3. 5. Addressed in paragraph 4. 6. Addressed in paragraphs 3-4. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 9. Addressed in paragraph 6. Addressed in paragraph 6. Rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 7. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in part in paragraph 7. Rejected in part as being speculative. Rejected as being a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert G. Gough, Esquire, (at the hearing) and Charles Christopher Anderson, Esquire, (on the proposed recommended order) Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Gary D. Weiner, Esquire, Glendale Federal Building Suite 209 901 Southeast 17th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioners’ Interim Rate Request (IRR) for an increase should be granted.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the agency of state government responsible for the implementation and administration of the Medicaid Program in the State of Florida. AHCA is authorized to audit Medicaid Cost Reports submitted by Medicaid Providers participating in the Medicaid Program. Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud are licensed nursing homes in Florida that participate in the Medicaid Program as institutional Medicaid Providers. On May 23, 2007, Avante at Jacksonville entered into a settlement agreement with the representative of the estate of one of its former residents, D. P. The settlement agreement provided, among other things, that Avante at Jacksonville would pay $350,000.00 as settlement for all claims. Avante at Jacksonville paid the personal representative the sum of $350,000.00. By letter dated July 16, 2007, Avante at Jacksonville requested an IRR effective August 1, 2007, pursuant to the Plan Section IV J.2., for additional costs incurred from self-insured losses as a result of paying the $350,000.00 to settle the lawsuit. Avante at Jacksonville submitted supporting documentation, including a copy of the settlement agreement, and indicated, among other things, that the costs exceeded $5,000.00 and that the increase in cost was projected at $2.77/day, exceeding one percent of the current Medicaid per diem rate. At all times pertinent hereto, the policy held by Avante at Jacksonville was a commercial general and professional liability insurance policy. The policy had $10,000.00 per occurrence and $50,627.00 general aggregate liability limits. The policy was a typical insurance policy representative of what other facilities in the nursing home industry purchased in Florida. The policy limits were typical limits in the nursing home industry in Florida. By letter dated July 18, 2007, AHCA denied the IRR on the basis that the IRR failed to satisfy the requirements of Section IV J. of the Plan, necessary and proper for granting the request. Avante at Jacksonville contested the denial and timely requested a hearing. Subsequently, Avante at Jacksonville became concerned that, perhaps, the incorrect provision of the Plan had been cited in its IRR. As a result, a second IRR was submitted for the same costs. By letter dated October 22, 2007, Avante at Jacksonville made a second request for an IRR, this time pursuant to the Plan Section IV J.3., for the same additional costs incurred from the self-insured losses as a result of paying the $350,000.00 settlement. The same supporting documentation was included. Avante at Jacksonville was of the opinion that the Plan Section IV J.3. specifically dealt with the costs of general and professional liability insurance. By letter dated October 30, 2007, AHCA denied the second request for an IRR, indicating that the first request was denied based on “all sub-sections of Section IV J of the Plan”; that the second request failed to satisfy the requirements of the Plan Section IV J.3. and all sections and sub-sections of the Plan “necessary and proper for granting [the] request.” Avante at Jacksonville contested the denial and timely requested a hearing. On October 19, 2007, Avante at St. Cloud entered a settlement agreement with the personal representative of the estate of one of its former residents, G. M. The settlement agreement provided, among other things, that Avante at St. Cloud would pay $90,000.00 as settlement for all claims. Avante at St. Cloud paid the personal representative the sum of $90,000.00. By letter dated December 10, 2007, Avante at St. Cloud requested an IRR effective November 1, 2007, pursuant to the Plan Section IV J, for additional costs incurred as a result of paying the $90,000.00 to settle the lawsuit. Avante at St. Cloud submitted supporting documentation, including a copy of the settlement agreement, and indicated, among other things, that the increase in cost was projected at $2.02/day, exceeding one percent of the current Medicaid per diem rate. At all times pertinent hereto, the policy held by Avante at St. Cloud was a commercial general and professional liability insurance policy. The policy had $10,000.00 per occurrence and $50,000.00 general aggregate liability limits. The policy was a typical insurance policy representative of what other facilities in the nursing home industry purchased in Florida. The policy limits were typical limits in the nursing home industry in Florida. By letter dated December 12, 2007, AHCA denied the IRR on the basis that the IRR failed to satisfy the requirements of “Section IV J of the Plan necessary and proper for granting [the] request.” Avante at St. Cloud contested the denial and timely requested a hearing. Insurance Policies and the Nursing Home Industry in Florida Typically, nursing homes in Florida carry low limit general and professional liability insurance policies. The premiums of the policies exceed the policy limits. For example, the premium for a policy of Avante at Jacksonville to cover the $350,000.00 settlement would have been approximately $425,000.00 and for a policy of Avante at St. Cloud to cover the $90,000.00 settlement would have been approximately $200,000.00. Also, the policies have a funded reserve feature wherein, if the reserve is depleted through the payment of a claim, the nursing home is required to recapitalize the reserve or purchase a new policy. That is, if a policy paid a settlement up to the policy limits, the nursing home would have to recapitalize the policy for the amount of the claim paid under the policy and would have to fund the loss, which is the amount in excess of the policy limits, out-of-pocket. Florida’s Medicaid Reimbursement Plan for Nursing Homes The applicable version of the Plan is Version XXXI. AHCA has incorporated the Plan in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-6.010. AHCA uses the Plan in conjunction with the Provider Reimbursement Manual (CMS-PUB.15-1)3 to calculate reimbursement rates of nursing homes and long-term care facilities. The calculation of reimbursement rates uses a cost- based, prospective methodology, using the prior year’s costs to establish the current period per diem rates. Inflation factors, target ceilings, and limitations are applied to reach a per patient, per day per diem rate that is specific to each nursing home. Reimbursement rates for nursing homes and long-term care facilities are typically set semi-annually, effective on January 1 and July 1 of each year. The most recent Medicaid cost report is used to calculate a facility’s reimbursement rate and consists of various components, including operating costs, the direct patient care costs, the indirect patient care costs, and property costs. The Plan allows for the immediate inclusion of costs in the per diem rate to Medicaid Providers under very limited circumstances through the IRR process. The interim rate’s purpose is to compensate for the shortfalls of a prospective reimbursement system and to allow a Medicaid Provider to increase its rate for sudden, unforeseen, dramatic costs beyond the Provider’s control that are of an on-going nature. Importantly, the interim rate change adjusts the Medicaid Provider’s individual target rate ceiling to allow those costs to flow ultimately through to the per diem paid, which increases the amount of the Provider’s overall reimbursement. In order for a cost to qualify under an interim rate request, the cost must be an allowable cost and meet the criteria of Section IV J of the Plan. The Plan provides in pertinent part: IV. Standards * * * J. The following provisions apply to interim changes in component reimbursement rates, other than through the routine semi- annual rate setting process. * * * Interim rate changes reflecting increased costs occurring as a result of patient or operating changes shall be considered only if such changes were made to comply with existing State or Federal rules, laws, or standards, and if the change in cost to the provider is at least $5000 and would cause a change of 1 percent or more in the provider’s current total per diem rate. If new State or Federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure and certification requirements, or new interpretations of existing laws, rules, regulations, or licensure and certification requirements require providers to make changes that result in increased or decreased patient care, operating, or capital costs, requests for component interim rates shall be considered for each provider based on the budget submitted by the provider. All providers’ budgets submitted shall be reviewed by the Agency [AHCA] and shall be the basis for establishing reasonable cost parameters. In cases where new State or Federal requirements are imposed that affect all providers, appropriate adjustments shall be made to the class ceilings to account for changes in costs caused by the new requirements effective as of the date of the new requirements or implementation of the new requirements, whichever is later. Interim rate adjustments shall be granted to reflect increases in the cost of general or professional liability insurance for nursing homes if the change in cost to the provider is at least $5000 and would cause change of 1 percent or more in the provider’s current total per diem. CMS-PUB.15-1 provides in pertinent part: 2160. Losses Arising From Other Than Sale of Assets A. General.—A provider participating in the Medicare program is expected to follow sound and prudent management practices, including the maintenance of an adequate insurance program to protect itself against likely losses, particularly losses so great that the provider’s financial stability would be threatened. Where a provider chooses not to maintain adequate insurance protection against such losses, through the purchase of insurance, the maintenance of a self- insurance program described in §2161B, or other alternative programs described in §2162, it cannot expect the Medicare program to indemnify it for its failure to do so. Where a provider chooses not to file a claim for losses covered by insurance, the costs incurred by the provider as a result of such losses may not be included in allowable costs. * * * 2160.2 Liability Losses.—Liability damages paid by the provider, either imposed by law or assumed by contract, which should reasonably have been covered by liability insurance, are not allowable. Insurance against a provider’s liability for such payments to others would include, for example, automobile liability insurance; professional liability (malpractice, negligence, etc.); owners, landlord and tenants liability; and workers’ compensation. Any settlement negotiated by the provider or award resulting from a court or jury decision of damages paid by the provider in excess of the limits of the provider’s policy, as well as the reasonable cost of any legal assistance connected with the settlement or award are includable in allowable costs, provided the provider submits evidence to the satisfaction of the intermediary that the insurance coverage carried by the provider at the time of the loss reflected the decision of prudent management. Also, the reasonable cost of insurance protection, as well as any losses incurred because of the application of the customary deductible feature of the policy, are includable in allowable costs. As to whether a cost is allowable, the authority to which AHCA would look is first to the Plan, then to CMS-PUB.15- 1, and then to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). As to reimbursement issues, AHCA would look to the same sources in the same order for the answer. The insurance liability limit levels maintained by Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud reflect sound and prudent management practices. Claims that resulted in the settlements of Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud, i.e., wrongful death and/or negligence, are the type of claims covered under the general and professional liability policies carried by Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud. Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud both had a general and professional liability insurance policy in full force and effect at the time the wrongful death and/or negligence claims were made that resulted in the settlement agreements. Neither Avante at Jacksonville nor Avante at St. Cloud filed a claim with their insurance carrier, even though they could have, for the liability losses incurred as a result of the settlements. Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud both chose not to file a claim with their respective insurance carrier for the liability losses incurred as a result of the settlements. AHCA did not look beyond the Plan in making its determination that neither Avante at Jacksonville nor Avante at St. Cloud should be granted an IRR. Wesley Hagler, AHCA’s Regulatory Analyst Supervisor, testified as an expert in Medicaid cost reimbursement. He testified that settlement agreements are a one time cost and are not considered on-going operating costs for purposes of Section IV J.2. of the Plan. Mr. Hagler’s testimony is found to be credible. Mr. Hagler testified that settlement agreements and defense costs are not considered general and professional liability insurance for purposes of Section IV J.3. of the Plan. To the contrary, Stanley William Swindling, Jr., an expert in health care accounting and Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, testified that general and professional liability insurance costs include premiums, settlements, losses, co-insurance, deductibles, and defense costs. Mr. Swindling’s testimony is found to be more credible than Mr. Hagler’s testimony, and, therefore, a finding of fact is made that general and professional liability insurance costs include premiums, settlements, losses, co-insurance, deductibles, and defense costs.4 Neither Avante at Jacksonville nor Avante at St. Cloud submitted any documentation with their IRRs to indicate a specific law, statute, or rule, either state or federal, with which they were required to comply, resulted in an increase in costs. Neither Avante at Jacksonville nor Avante at St. Cloud experienced an increase in the premiums for the general and professional liability insurance policies. Neither Avante at Jacksonville nor Avante at St. Cloud submitted documentation with its IRRs to indicate that the premiums of its general and professional liability insurance increased. Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud could only meet the $5,000.00 threshold and the one percent increase in total per diem under the Plan, Sections IV J.2. or J.3. by basing its calculations on the settlement costs. Looking to the Plan in conjunction with CMS-PUB.15-1 to determine reimbursement costs, CMS-PUB.15-1 at Section 2160A provides generally that, when a provider chooses not to file a claim for losses covered by insurance, the costs incurred by the provider, as a result of such losses, are not allowable costs; however, Section 2160.2 specifically includes settlement dollars in excess of the limits of the policy as allowable costs, provided the evidence submitted by the provider to the intermediary (AHCA) shows to the satisfaction of the intermediary that the insurance coverage at the time of the loss reflected the decision of prudent management. The policy coverage for Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud set the policy limits for each facility at $10,000.00 for each occurrence. Applying the specific section addressing settlement negotiations, the loss covered by insurance would have been $10,000.00 for each facility and the losses in excess of the policy limits--$340,000.00 for Avante at Jacksonville and $80,000.00 for Avante at St. Cloud—would have been allowable costs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order denying the interim rate requests for an increase for Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2008. 1/ The corrected case-style.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents offered and sold securities in Florida, in violation of the registration requirements of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes; offered and sold securities in Florida while Respondents were unregistered, in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; or committed fraud in the offer, sale, or purchase of securities in Florida, in violation of Section 517.301(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is the penalty to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent James A. Torchia (Respondent) held a valid life and health insurance license. Respondent was the president and owner of Respondent Empire Insurance, Inc. (Empire Insurance), a now-dissolved Florida corporation. Empire Insurance was in the insurance business, and Respondent was its sole registered insurance agent. At no material time has Respondent or Empire Insurance held any license or registration to engage in the sale or offer for sale of securities in Florida. At no material time were the investments described below sold and offered for sale by Respondent or Empire Insurance registered as securities in Florida. These cases involve viaticated life insurance policies. A life insurance policy is viaticated when the policy owner, also known as the viator, enters into a viatical settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the viator sells the policy and death benefits to the purchaser for an amount less than the death benefit--the closer the viator is perceived to be to death, the greater the discount from the face amount of the death benefit. The viatical industry emerged to provide dying insureds, prior to death, a means by which to sell their life insurance policies to obtain cash to enjoy during their remaining lives. As this industry matured, brokers and dealers, respectively, arranged for the sale of, and bought and resold, life insurance policies of dying insureds. Prior to the death of the viator, these viaticated life insurance policies, or interests in such policies, may be sold and resold several times. In these cases, viators sold their life insurance policies to Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. (FinFed). Having raised money from investors, American Benefit Services (ABS) then paid FinFed, which assigned viaticated policies, or interests in the policies, to various trusts. The trusts held the legal title to the policies, and the trust beneficiaries, who are the investors from whom ABS had obtained the funds to pay FinFed, held equitable title to the policies. Sometimes in these cases, a broker or dealer, such as William Page and Associates, intervened between the viator and FinFed. At some point, though, ABS obtained money from investors to acquire policies, but did not pay the money to FinFed to purchase viaticated life insurance policies. The FinFed and ABS investment program eventually became a Ponzi scheme, in which investor payouts were derived largely, if not exclusively, from the investments of other investors. ABS typically acquired funds through the promotional efforts of insurance agents, such as Respondent and Empire Insurance. Using literature provided by ABS, these agents often sold these investments to insurance clients. As was typical, Respondent and Empire Insurance advertised the types of claims described below by publishing large display ads that ran in Florida newspapers. Among the ABS literature is a Participation Disclosure (Disclosure), which describes the investment. The Disclosure addresses the investor as a "Participant" and the investment as a "Participation." The Disclosure contains a Participation Agreement (Agreement), which provides that the parties agree to the Disclosure and states whether the investor has chosen the Growth Plan or Income Plan, which are described below; a Disbursement Letter of Instruction, which is described below; and a Letter of Instruction to Trust, which is described below. The agent obtains the investor's signature to all three of these documents when the investor delivers his check, payable to the escrow agent, to purchase the investment. The Disclosure states that the investments offer a “High Return”: “Guaranteed Return on Participation 42% at Maturity.” The Disclosure adds that the investments are “Low Risk”: “Secured by a Guaranteed Insurance Industry Receivable”; “Secured by $300,000 State Insurance Guarantee Fund”; “Short Term Participation (Maturity Expectation 36 Months)”; “Principal Liquid After One Year With No Surrender Charge”; “State Regulated Participation”; “All Transactions By Independent Trust & Escrow Agents”; and “If policy fails to mature at 36 months, participant may elect full return of principal plus 15% simple interest.” The Disclosure describes two alternative investments: the Growth Plan and Income Plan. For the Growth Plan, the Disclosure states: “At maturity, Participant receives principal plus 42%, creating maximum growth of funds.” For the Income Plan, the Disclosure states: “If income is desired, participation can be structured with monthly income plans.” Different rates of return for the Growth and Income plans are set forth below. For investors choosing the Income Plan, ABS applied only 70 percent of the investment to the purchase of viaticated life insurance policies. ABS reserved the remaining 30 percent as the source of money to "repay" the investor the income that he was due to receive under the Income Plan, which, as noted below, paid a total yield of 29.6 percent over three years. The Disclosure states that ABS places all investor funds in attorneys’ trust accounts, pursuant to arrangements with two “bonded and insured” “financial escrow agents.” At another point in the document, the Disclosure states that the investor funds are deposited “directly” with a “financial escrow agent,” pursuant to the participant’s Disbursement Letter of Instruction. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction identifies a Florida attorney as the “financial escrow agent,” who receives the investor’s funds and disburses them, “to the order of [FinFed) or to the source of the [viaticated insurance] benefits and/or its designees.” This disbursement takes place only after the attorney receives “[a] copy of the irrevocable, absolute assignment, executed in favor of Participant and recorded with the trust account as indicated on the assignment of [viaticated insurance] benefits, and setting out the ownership percentage of said [viaticated insurance] benefits”; a “medical overview” of the insured indicative of not more than 36 months’ life expectancy; confirmation that the policy is in full force and effect and has been in force beyond the period during which the insurer may contest coverage; and a copy of the shipping airbill confirming that the assignment was sent to the investor. The Disclosure states that the investor will direct a trust company to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. When the life insurance policy matures on the death of the viator, the insurer pays the death benefits to the trust company, which pays these proceeds to the investor, in accordance with his interest in the trust. Accordingly, the Letter of Instruction to Trust directs FinFed, as the trust company, to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. The Letter of Instruction to Trust provides that the viaticated insurance benefits obtained with the investor's investment shall be assigned to this trust, and, at maturity, FinFed shall pay the investor a specified sum upon the death of the viator and the trustee's receipt of the death benefit from the insurer. The Disclosure provides that, at anytime from 12 to 36 months after the execution of the Disclosure, the investor has the option to request ABS to return his investment, without interest. At 36 months, if the viator has not yet died, the investor has the right to receive the return of his investment, plus 15 percent (five percent annually). The Disclosure states that ABS will pay all costs and fees to maintain the policy and that all policies are based on a life expectancy for the viator of no more than 36 months. Also, the Disclosure assures that ABS will invest only in policies that are issued by insurers that are rated "A" or better by A.M. Best "at the time that the Participant's deposit is confirmed." The Disclosure mentions that the trust company will name the investor as an irrevocable assignee of the policy benefits. The irrevocable assignment of policy benefits mentioned in the Disclosure and the Disbursement Letter of Instruction is an anomaly because it does not conform to the documentary scheme described above. After the investor pays the escrow agent and executes the documents described above, FinFed executes the “Irrevocable Absolute Assignment of Viaticated Insurance Benefits.” This assignment is from the trustee, as grantor, to the investor, as grantee, and applies to a specified percentage of a specific life insurance policy, whose death benefit is disclosed on the assignment. The assignment includes the "right to receive any viaticated insurance benefit payable under the Trusts [sic] guaranteed receivables of assigned viaticated insurance benefits from the noted insurance company; [and the] right to assign any and all rights received under this Trust irrevocable absolute assignment." On its face, the assignment assigns the trust corpus-- i.e., the insurance policy or an interest in an insurance policy--to the trust beneficiary. Doing so would dissolve the trust and defeat the purpose of the other documents, which provide for the trust to hold the policy and, upon the death of the viator, to pay the policy proceeds in accordance with the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The assignment bears an ornate border and the corporate seal of FinFed. Probably, FinFed intended the assignment to impress the investors with the "reality" of their investment, as the decorated intangible of an "irrevocable" interest in an actual insurance policy may seem more impressive than the unadorned intangible of a beneficial interest in a trust that holds an insurance policy. Or possibly, the FinFed/ABS principals and professionals elected not to invest much time or effort in the details of the transactional documentation of a Ponzi scheme. What was true then is truer now. Obviously, in those cases in which no policy existed, the investor paid his money before any policy had been selected for him. However, this appears to have been the process contemplated by the ABS literature, even in those cases in which a policy did exist. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction and correspondence from Respondent, Empire Insurance, or Empire Financial Consultant to ABS reveal that FinFed did not assign a policy, or part of a policy, to an investor until after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In some cases, Respondent or Empire Insurance requested ABS to obtain for an investor a policy whose insured had special characteristics or a investment plan with a maturity shorter than 36 months. FinFed and ABS undertook other tasks after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In addition to matching a viator with an investor, based on the investor's expressed investment objectives, FinFed paid the premiums on the viaticated policies until the viator died and checked on the health of the viator. Also, if the viator did not die within three years and the investor elected to obtain a return of his investment, plus 15 percent, ABS, as a broker, resold the investor's investment to generate the 15 percent return that had been guaranteed to the investor. Similarly, ABS would sell the investment of investors who wanted their money back prior to three years. The escrow agent also assumed an important duty--in retrospect, the most important duty--after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents; the escrow agent was to verify the existence of the viaticated policy. Respondent and Empire Insurance sold beneficial interests in trusts holding viaticated life insurance policies in 50 separate transactions. These investors invested a total of $1.5 million, nearly all of which has been lost. Respondent and Empire Insurance earned commissions of about $120,000 on these sales. Petitioner proved that Respondent and Empire Insurance made the following sales. Net worths appear for those investors for whom Respondent recorded net worths; for most, he just wrote "sufficient" on the form. Unless otherwise indicated, the yield was 42 percent for the Growth Plan. In all cases, investors paid money for their investments. In all cases, FinFed and ABS assigned parts of policies to the trusts, even of investors investing relatively large amounts. On March 21, 1998, Phillip A. Allan, a Florida resident, paid $69,247.53 for the Growth Plan. On March 26, 1998, Monica Bracone, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $900,000, paid $8000 for the Growth Plan. On April 2, 1998, Alan G. and Judy LeFort, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on June 8, 1998, the LeForts paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In the second transaction, the yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement notes a 36-month life expectancy of the viator. The different yields based on life expectancies are set forth below, but, as noted above, the standard yield was 42 percent, and, as noted below, this was based on a 36-month life expectancy, so Respondent miscalculated the investment return or misdocumented the investment on the LeForts' second transaction. On April 29, 1998, Doron and Barbara Sterling, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on August 14, 1998, the Sterlings paid $100,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield for the second transaction is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement notes that the Sterlings were seeking a viator with a life expectancy of only 30 months. When transmitting the closing documents for the second Sterling transaction, Respondent, writing ABS on Empire Insurance letterhead, stated in part: This guy has already invested with us (15,000) [sic]. He gave me this application but wants a 30 month term. Since he has invested, he did some research and has asked that he be put on a low T-cell count and the viator to be an IV drug user. I know it is another favor but this guy is a close friend and has the potential to put at least another 500,000 [sic]. If you can not [sic] do it, then I understand. You have done a lot for me and I always try to bring in good quality business. If this inventory is not available, the client has requested that we return the funds . . . In a third transaction, on February 24, 1999, the Sterlings paid $71,973 for the Growth Plan. The yield is only 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects the typical 36-month life expectancy for the viator. Although the investors would not have received this document, Respondent completed an ABS form entitled, "New Business Transmittal," and checked the box, "Life Expectancy 2 years or less (28%). The other boxes are: "Life Expectancy 2 1/2 years or less (35%)" and "Life Expectancy 3 years or less (42%)." On May 4, 1998, Hector Alvero and Idelma Guillen, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $6000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on October 29, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a third transaction, on November 30, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. For this investment, Ms. Guillen requested an "IV drug user," according to Respondent in a letter dated December 1, 1998, on Empire Financial Consultants letterhead. This is the first use of the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants, not Empire Insurance, and all letters after that date are on the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants. In a fourth transaction, on January 29, 1999, Ms. Guillen paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On April 23, 1998, Bonnie P. Jensen, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $120,000, paid $65,884.14 for the Growth Plan. Her yield was 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 20, 1998, Michael J. Mosack, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $70,600 for the Income Plan. He was to receive monthly distributions of $580.10 for three years. The total yield, including monthly distributions, is $20,883.48, which is about 29.6 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 27, 1998, Lewis and Fernande G. Iachance, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On June 3, 1998, Sidney Yospe, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $1,500,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 30-month life expectancy. On June 12, 1998, Bernard Aptheker, with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 10, 1998, Irene M. and Herman Kutschenreuter, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 9, 1998, Daniel and Mary Spinosa, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 5, 1998, Pauline J. and Anthony Torchia, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000 and the parents of Respondent, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 29, 1998, Christopher D. Bailey, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction on the same day, Mr. Bailey paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. Petitioner submitted documents concerning a purported purchase by Lauren W. Kramer on July 21, 1998, but they were marked "VOID" and do not appear to be valid. On July 22, 1998, Laura M. and Kenneth D. Braun, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $150,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan, as Respondent completed the Participation Agreement. However, the agreement calls for them to receive $205.42 monthly for 36 months and receive a total yield, including monthly payments, of 29.6 percent, so it appears that the Brauns bought the Income Plan. In a second transaction, also on July 22, 1998, the Brauns paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Roy R. Worrall, a Florida resident, paid $100,000 for the Income Plan. The Participation Agreement provides that he will receive monthly payments of $821.66 and a total yield of 29.6 percent. On July 16, 1998, Earl and Rosemary Gilmore, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on February 12, 1999, the Gilmores paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of two years or less. On July 14, 1998, David M. Bobrow, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $700,000 on one form and $70,000 on another form, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction, on the same day, Mr. Bobrow paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 27, 1998, Cecilia and Harold Lopatin, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 30, 1998, Ada R. Davis, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Income Plan. Her total yield, including monthly payments of $246.50 for three years, is 29.6 percent. In a second transaction, on the same day, Ms. Davis paid $30,000 for the Income Plan on the same terms as the first purchase. On July 27, 1998, Joseph F. and Adelaide A. O'Keefe, Florida residents with a net worth of $300,000, paid $12,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 5, 1998, Thurley E. Margeson, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 19, 1998, Stephanie Segaria, a Florida resident, paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 26, 1998, Roy and Glenda Raines, Florida residents, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of 30 months or less. In a second transaction, on the same day, the Raineses paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy, although, again, the New Business Transmittal notes the life expectancy of 30 months or less. On November 24, 1998, Dan W. Lipford, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan in two transactions. In a third transaction, on January 13, 1999, Mr. Lipford paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 1, 1998, Mary E. Friebes, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 4, 1998, Allan Hidalgo, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 17, 1998, Paul E. and Rose E. Frechette, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including monthly payments of $205.41 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 26, 1998, Theodore and Tillie F. Friedman, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 19, 1999, Robert S. and Karen M. Devos, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Arthur Hecker, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $410.83 for 36 months, is 29.6 percent. On February 11, 1999, Michael Galotola, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on the same day, Michael and Anna Galotola paid $12,500 for the Growth Plan. On November 3, 1998, Lee Chamberlain, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 23, 1998, Herbert L. Pasqual, a Florida resident, paid $200,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $1643.33 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 1, 1998, Charles R. and Maryann Schuyler, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. Respondent and Empire Insurance were never aware of the fraud being perpetrated by FinFed and ABS at anytime during the 38 transactions mentioned above. Respondent attempted to verify with third parties the existence of the viaticated insurance policies. When ABS presented its program to 30-40 potential agents, including Respondent, ABS presented these persons an opinion letter from ABS's attorney, stating that the investment was not a security, under Florida law. Respondent also contacted Petitioner's predecessor agency and asked if these transactions involving viaticated life insurance policies constituted the sale of securities. An agency employee informed Respondent that these transactions did not constitute the sale of securities.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order: Finding James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., not guilty of violating Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes; Finding James A. Torchia guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; Finding Empire Insurance, Inc., guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes, except for transactions closed on or after December 1, 1998; Directing James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., to cease and desist from further violations of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $120,000 against James A. Torchia. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Fred H. Wilsen Senior Attorney Office of Financial Institutions and Securities Regulation South Tower, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1799 Barry S. Mittelberg Mittelberg & Nicosia, P.A. 8100 North University Drive, Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33321
The Issue The issue for consideration is whether Respondent's licenses and eligibility for licensure as a life agent, a life and health agent, a general lines agent, a health agent and a dental health care contract salesman in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters in issue herein, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of insurance agents and regulation of the insurance industry in this state. Respondent, Michael Charles Peppe was and is currently licensed and eligible for licensure in Florida as a life insurance agent, a life and health insurance agent, a general lines agent and a health insurance agent. He was an officer and director of M. Peppe Agency, Inc., a Florida corporation. During the period in issue herein, Respondent's agency had a brokerage agreement with William Sanner and Mary Lou Sanner who were employed as sub- agents. Constance Abraham, an 85 year old widow first met William Sanner when she moved to Ft. Lauderdale, some 20 or so year ago. They were neighbors in the same apartment building. At that time she was insured with Mutual of Omaha and her policy was transferred to him, an agent for that company, for service. Over the years she purchased quite a bit of other insurance from him. They were all different kinds of health insurance policies and over time, she estimates, she purchased somewhere around 50 policies. During the period between 1985 and 1991, Mrs. Abraham purchased numerous health policies for both herself and her son through Mr. and Mrs. Sanner, though she does not recall ever having dealt with Mrs. Sanner. Records disclose that her coverage was placed with nine different companies and provided coverage in such areas as Medicare Supplement, nursing home insurance, cancer insurance, and hospital expense - indemnity insurance. Over the years approximately 60 policies were issued through Respondent's agency to either Mrs. Abraham or her son. The applications were taken by Sanner who would collect the initial premiums and forward both to Respondent's agency for processing to the various insurers. Some policies were signed by Sanner as agent of record and some were signed by Respondent in that capacity. Only a few were signed by Mrs. Sanner. Mrs. Abraham claims she didn't realize how much health insurance she had. Mr. Sanner would come to her apartment and talk to her about a new policy and she would abide by his advice. Her purchases amounted to approximately $20,000.00 per year in premiums which she would pay by check to Mr. Sanner. At no time did she ever deal with or meet the Respondent, Mr. Peppe. She did not question Sanner deeply about why he was selling her so much insurance. Whenever she asked about a new policy, he would usually have what appeared to he to be a good reason for it such as something was lacking in her coverage. Even when she recognized he was selling her duplicate coverage, he told her it was a good idea to have more. At no time did he or anyone else tell her she had too much insurance. Mrs. Abraham claims to know nothing about insurance herself. However, she was cognizant of the nature of the policies she had, utilizing without prompting the terms, "indemnity", "supplemental", and "accident." Mr. Sanner would come to her home at least once a month She trusted him to help her with her health insurance and would talk with him whenever a policy came up for renewal. On some occasions he would recommend she renew and on others would recommend she drop that policy in favor of another. At no time was she aware, however, of the fact that she was duplicating policies. She also claims she never had to tell Mr. Sanner what she wanted from her coverage. He always seemed to know and would handle not only the purchase of her policies but also the filing of her claims. She can recall no instance where she asked for any coverage and he tried to talk her out of it. Mrs. Abraham denies she was the person who complained to the Department. It was her daughter who noticed what was going on and took matters into her own hands. At no time did either Sanner or the Respondent attempt to contact her after the complaint was filed. Mrs. Abraham and her husband had four children. Her son, Lewis, who is somewhat retarded, lives with her and she also purchased some policies for him. Over the years she has had many occasions to file claims under her policies. It is important to her that she have protection to provide full time care if necessary because she has no family locally to provide that care for her. She had coverage that provided nursing care, a private room in the hospital, and some policies which provided for extended or nursing home care. She recognizes that such care is expensive and wanted enough policies to give her total coverage without out of pocket expense if the care was needed. She keeps track of the policies she has on her personal computer and has been doing so for some six or seven years. She apparently is sufficiently computer literate that she knows what she has and what she is doing. Mrs. Abraham owns a condominium at the Galt Ocean Mile apartment in Ft. Lauderdale. The $20,000.00 figure in policy premiums she mentioned were for her policies only. Those for her son were extra. She has sufficient income from stocks and bonds to pay her premiums, pay her mortgage, and still live comfortably. Her son has his own income from a trust fund and his own investments. At one point in time, when Mrs. Abraham had some recurring health problems and was in and out of hospitals regularly, she received in benefits far more than her actual expenses and made a tidy profit. Nonetheless, she adamantly disclaims she purchased the policies she had for that purpose claiming instead that she wanted merely that both she and her son be able to pay for the best medical care possible in the event it is needed. To that end, Lewis Abraham has filed very few claims against his carriers. Most, if not all, of the companies which provided the coverage for Mrs. Abraham and her son have limits on the amount of total coverage any one policy holder can have in any line of insurance. The limit is cumulative and not limited to policies with a specific company. Taken together, the policies in force for Mrs. Abraham in some cases exceeded that limit and had the insurers been made aware of the totality of her coverage, their policies would not have been issued. This information was not furnished to the companies, however, by either Sanner or Respondent. In addition, on many of the policies the mental condition of a policy holder must be disclosed if that person is retarded or not fully competent. Respondent did not know of Lewis' condition though Mr. Sanner was fully aware of it both as it related to his retardation and his drop foot. On none of the policy applications relating to him, however, was either ever mentioned. Some companies indicated that if Lewis's mental and physical condition had been properly disclosed on the application, they either would not have issued the coverage or, at least, would have referred the matter to the underwriter for further evaluation and a determination as to whether to issue the policy and if so, at what premium. Even more, Lewis' physical and mental condition may have caused the company to decline payment of a claim within two years of issuance of any policy actually written. Respondent received monthly statements from the various insurers with whom his agency did business detailing the transactions for that month. Commissions on each sale were paid by the insurers to Respondent's agency and thereafter, pursuant to an agreement between Respondent and Sanner, the commissions were divided. The commissions paid to Respondent's company by the insurers on all these policies amount to in excess of $18,000.00. Respondent asserts that Mrs. Abraham knew exactly what she was doing and was, in effect, conducting if not a scam, at least an improper business activity through the knowing purchase of duplicative policies and redundant coverage. This well may be true, but even if it is, Mr. Sanner was a knowing accomplice and participant. In addition, while it is accepted that Respondent might not know the status of every policy purchased through his agency or the total activity with any particular client, when his name appears as signatory on policy applications forwarded to a company for whom he accepts or solicits business, as here, it is hard to find he did not have at least a working familiarity with the business written by his sub-agents . This finding is supported by the analysis done of Respondent's pertinent activities here by Milton O. Bedingfield, a 39 year insurance agent and broker for 10 companies, a Certified Life Underwriter, and an expert in life and health insurance. Mr. Bedingfield concluded, after a review of all the policies written for the Abrahams through Respondent's agency, there was a gross oversale of policies and repeated omissions of pertinent information on policy applications. He found a duplication of benefits and overlapping coverage, all without legitimate purpose, especially for an 85 year old woman. Since the average hospital stay is less than 2 weeks, she would not likely benefit from her insurance for the stay. He could not see where Mrs. Abraham would get back in benefits what she has paid in premiums. In Mr. Bedingfield's opinion, this is the worst case of oversale he has seen in his 39 years in the insurance business. He contends the agent stands in almost a fiduciary capacity to his clients - especially the aged who rely on their agent to properly advise them on adequate coverage. There is often an element of fear involved that the unscrupulous agent can profit from. Here, he feels, Respondent's practice falls far short of the state's standard of acceptability on the sale of Medicare Supplemental insurance. On balance, however, Mr. Bedingfield does not know if all the policies he saw stayed in force throughout the period of the policy. Many could have lapsed or been cancelled. In all fairness, as well, where insurance is brokered, as here, the ultimate placing agent normally does not meet the client but must rely on what he is told by the offering agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent in this case, Michael C. Peppe, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2708 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. & 22. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by evidence or record except for the fact that Respondent sign and processed applications and premium payments and received a financial benefit from the sales. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted so far as it relates Ms. Abraham was well informed and aware of her coverage. Not established, but insufficient evidence of actionable misconduct. Accepted. - 6. Not proper Findings of Fact but more Conclusions of Law. Accepted. Not a proper Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Cowdrey 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner became employed by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Weights, on November 5, 1982. Upon being accepted for employment Petitioner completed and submitted to proper authorities the forms necessary to be covered by the State's group health insurance program and authorized the appropriate deductions from his salary to cover the premiums. On several occasions, he and his wife inquired through the Department of Transportation regarding their failure to receive an insurance card. Each time they were told the insurance card would be forthcoming and only administrative delays in processing the application were causing the delay. During this time no deductions were being taken from Petitioner's pay. In June, 1983 Petitioner incurred two doctor bills for his wife and son (Exhibit 1) in the total amount of $50, of which he paid $10 with the remainder forwarded to Blue Cross and Blue Shield who administers the state's health insurance plan. Blue Cross and Blue Shield had no record of Petitioner's insurance and the claim was denied. Petitioner paid the additional $40 charges. Although evidence was not submitted to show why Petitioner's application was not properly processed or what finally got this application back on track, the proper steps were finally taken and Petitioner was credited with having been covered with health insurance in accordance with his application from December 1982 and billed for premiums due from that date. This resulted in the assessment by the state of $436.14 for back premiums. Since he was not on the Blue Cross register in June 1983, Petitioner contests the assessment as a condition to remaining a participating member in the state health insurance program.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Respondent's license as a viatical settlement provider in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated June 29, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Department of Insurance (Department), was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of viatical settlement providers and the regulation of the viatical settlement industry in this state. The Respondent, Accelerated Benefits Corporation (ABC), was licensed as a viatical settlement provider in Florida. Pursuant to an investigative subpoena issued by the Department, in November and December 1999, investigators of the Department examined the records of the Respondent, as well as other viatical settlement providers operating within the state, looking into the viatical settlement industry's practices in Florida. As a part of the investigation, Janice S. Davis, an examiner/analyst with the Department, copied records of the Respondent relating to at least six individual viatical settlement transactions in which the Respondent was involved. These files relate to Counts 5 through 7 and 9 through 11 of the Administrative complaint. Ms. Davis also obtained from the Respondent the information regarding the location of several other cases, the files for which had been confiscated by the Statewide Prosecutor as a part of an ongoing investigation into the viatical settlement industry, and subsequently obtained copies of those files from the office of the Statewide Prosecutor. Those files relate to Counts 1 through 4 and 8 of the Administrative Complaint. As outlined in Count Five of the Administrative Complaint, in May 1998, D.K. applied to The United States Life Insurance Company (US Life) for a $250,000 life insurance policy. As a part of the policy application, D.K. stated that he had not consulted with any physician or other practitioner within the five years prior to the application. On July 29, 1998, Life Benefit Services (LBS), a viatical settlement broker used by ABC, obtained a "Confidential Application Form" completed by D.K. which revealed that sometime in 1982, D.K. had been diagnosed as HIV positive. LBS prepared a "Policy Summary Sheet" regarding D.K.'s application on which it noted that D.K. had been diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. LBS also had records from D.K.'s physician reflecting that D.K. had been under a doctor's care during the preceding five years. The policy was issued to D.K. on or about August 1, 1998. Notwithstanding the information it had on hand, LBS brokered the sale of the instant policy to ABC. On or about August 25, 1998, D.K. and the Respondent entered into a contract which called for the Respondent to purchase D.K.'s $250,000 life insurance policy for $25,000. At that point, the policy was still contestable. As a part of the transaction, the Respondent gave D.K. written instructions not to contact his insurance company until advised to do so by ABC. The Respondent also had D.K. sign an addendum to the purchase contract in which he agreed to not advise US Life that he had sold his policy and acknowledged his recognition that his life insurance policy was still contestable. D.K. was also asked and agreed to sign an undated change of ownership form for use by ABC at the expiration of the period of contestability. While the policy was still contestable, an employee of the Respondent, Jennifer Grinstead, paid the annual premium on the policy out of her personal checking account. This served to conceal the fact that D.K. had sold the policy to the Respondent. Ms. Grinstead was reimbursed for the premium payment by American Title Company of Orlando. American Title was the Respondent's trustee. The Respondent did not report any of the information it had regarding D.K.'s actual health history to US Life or the Department. A review of the documentation related to this transaction reflected that the Respondent purchased the policy rights from D.K. after it knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that D.K. had made material misrepresentations regarding his health to US Life, and nonetheless attempted to conceal those misrepresentation from US Life. With regard to Count Six, the evidence of record indicates that on May 4, 1997, W.E. applied for a $45,000 life insurance policy from Life USA Insurance Company (Life USA). On the application form he signed and submitted, W.E. specifically stated he had not received any medical or surgical advice or treatment within the preceding five years, had not been advised by a medical doctor that he had AIDS or ARC, and was not, at the time, taking any medication. Based on the representations made by W.E., the policy was issued on November 12, 1997. Notwithstanding the representations made by W.E. to Life USA, W.E. also advised United Viatical Settlements (UVS), the settlement broker used by the Respondent, on December 17, 1997, through a corollary application form, that he had been diagnosed with HIV "a few years ago," and several different other forms utilized by the Respondent reflect that the Respondent knew W.E. had AIDS or HIV, and was under a doctor's treatment for the condition during the preceding five years. Nonetheless, UVS brokered the sale of this policy to the Respondent. In late December 1997, at which time the policy was still contestable, the Respondent entered into a contract with W.E. for the purchase of the $45,000 policy for $4,914.25. As a part of the sales procedure, the Respondent issued to W.E. instructions not to contact his insurance company until instructed to do so by the Respondent's representative, and it also had W.E. sign an addendum to the purchase agreement in which W.E. acknowledged that the policy in issue was still contestable. W.E. was also asked to agree not to inform Life USA of the sale of the policy to the Respondent and to sign an undated change of ownership form for use by the Respondent to transfer ownership when the contestability period had expired. The arrangement between the Respondent and W.E. called for Jennifer Grinstead to pay the annual premium on the policy for W.E. from her personal account and to receive reimbursement for those payments from American Title Company, the Respondent's trustee. This arrangement served to conceal from Life USA the fact that W.E. had sold the policy to the Respondent. The Respondent did not report the fact that it had knowledge of W.E.'s medical condition to the Department. The evidence of record reflects that at the time of the purchase of W.E.'s policy, the Respondent knew or should have known that W.E. had made material misrepresentations regarding his medical state to Life USA on his application for life insurance from that company, and it thereafter took actions which served to conceal those material misrepresentations from the company. In the Case of Count Seven, on April 26, 1997, A.T. applied for a life insurance policy from Lincoln Benefit Life (Lincoln) in the amount of $48,000. On the application form, A.T. specifically stated that he had not been under medical observation or treatment within the preceding five years, and that he had not been diagnosed as having AIDS or ARC, or tested positively for HIV. The policy was issued by the company on or about June 2, 1997. Notwithstanding those representations, on January 14, 1998, Medical Escrow Society, a viatical broker used by the Respondent in its dealing with Lincoln, received an application form from A.T. on which A.T. indicated he had tested positive for HIV on August 8, 1989, had been diagnosed with AIDS ON August 10, 1994, and was under the care of a physician. Medical Escrow Society nonetheless brokered the sale of the policy to the Respondent. Shortly after the contestability period on this policy expired. On June 25, 1999, the owner of the policy, Ralph Cahall, entered into a contract with the Respondent whereby the Respondent bought Cahall's interest in the proceeds for $29,238.72. At the Respondent's request, ownership of the policy was changed from Cahall to American Title Company of Orlando, the Respondent's trustee without either Lincoln or the Department being informed of the transfer. The file relating to this policy indicates that the Respondent brought about the transfer from Cahall after it knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that A.T. had made material misrepresentations regarding his health on the application to Lincoln, and that the Respondent, though it did not report what it knew to the Department, also thereafter undertook a course of action which was designed to conceal that information from Lincoln. With regard to Count Nine, the evidence indicates that on or about September 30, 1996, R.M. submitted an application for a $100,000 life insurance policy to Interstate Assurance Company (Interstate). On the application, R.M. indicated he had not been diagnosed with an immune system disorder within the preceding ten years, and the policy was issued on October 9, 1996. Notwithstanding that representation, on July 18, 1997, R.M. completed an application form for Benefits America, a broker used by the Respondent with regard to this policy, in which he stated he had been tested positive for HIV on February 11, 1994. A "Policy Acquisition Worksheet" utilized by the Respondent on or about July 22, 1997, when R.M. was dealing with Benefits America regarding the viatication of his life insurance policy, reflects that the company was aware at that time that R.M. had been diagnosed with HIV in 1994. Even with that knowledge, the Respondent went through with the viatication, and on July 31, 1997, while the policy was still within the contestability period, bought the policy for $15,430. On August 4, 1997, R.M. executed an addendum to the purchase agreement at the behest of the Respondent, wherein he recognized the policy was still contestable and agreed, among other things, not to contact his insurance company or tell them he had sold the policy to a viatical settlement provider. He also was asked to sign, and signed, an undated change of ownership agreement for use by the Respondent at the end of the contestability period. Jennifer Grinstead, an employee of the Respondent, paid R.M.'s annual premium on the policy during the contestibility period out of her personal checking account. This action, when done in conjunction with R.M.'s failure to advise the insurance company of the sale, served to conceal the transfer of ownership from R.M. to the Respondent. Ms. Grinstead was reimbursed for the premium payments by the Respondent's trustee. The Respondent did not report to Interstate or to the Department that R.M. had made material misrepresentations regarding his health in procuring the issuance of the policy even though it knew or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have known that the material misrepresentations had been made. As to Count Ten, on May 12, 1997, J.R. submitted an application to Interstate for a life insurance policy on his life in the amount of $980,000. On his application, J.R. indicated he had not been diagnosed with an immune system disorder within the preceding ten years, had not been treated by a member of the medical profession in the preceding five years, and was not, at the time, on medication or undergoing treatment or therapy. The policy was issued on May 19, 1997. Notwithstanding those representations, on July 9, 1997, J.R. filled out an application form for the Respondent's broker for this transaction, Life Benefit Services, on which he indicated he had been diagnosed as HIV positive in May 1996. A "Mortality Profile" provided to the Respondent by AVS indicated that J.R. was first diagnosed as being HIV positive in August 1995, nine months or so earlier than he admitted, and that he had been undergoing treatment by a doctor and receiving medications well within the five years preceding the application. On August 20, 1997, J.R. entered into a contract with the Respondent calling for the sale of this insurance policy to ABC for a net sum of $107,800. At this point, the policy was still contestable. At that time, the Respondent instructed J.R. in writing not to contact his insurance company until told to do so by the Respondent's representative. The Respondent also had J.R. sign an addendum to the purchase agreement in which he acknowledged the policy was still contestable, that he would not inform Interstate of the sale, and that he would sign an undated change of ownership form for use by ABC when the contestability period expired. Notwithstanding that the Respondent knew of the material misrepresentations made by J.R. as to his health when he procured the policy, it did not report what it knew to the Department, and took steps to insure Interstate was not informed of what was going on. With regard to Count Eleven, on May 16, 1996, the same J.R. applied to Massachusetts General Life Insurance Company, later, Conseco Life Insurance Company (Conseco), for a $99,900 life insurance policy. On his application, J.R. stated he had never had any medical tests or any known indication of diseases, conditions, or physical disorders which were not mentioned on the form. AIDS, ARC, and HIV positive were not mentioned on the form, and if known to have been present, should have been noted. About a year and three months later, on July 9, 1997, J.R. submitted an application form to Life Benefit Services, the broker used by ABC on this policy, on which he stated he had tested positive for HIV in May of 1996. By letter dated July 28, 1997, Life Benefit Services advised ABC that J.R. was terminally ill and had been on medication and undergoing treatment by a physician within the preceding five years. In addition to this information, the Respondent had available to it the information regarding J.R.'s condition discovered as a result of the purchase of the Interstate policy. Notwithstanding this knowledge, on September 17, 1997, while the policy was still contestable, ABC purchased the Conseco policy from J.R. for the net sum of $13,986. By letter dated September 17, 1997, the Respondent advised J.R. not to contact his insurance company until instructed to do so by Ms. Holman, the Respondent's Director of Contracts, and requested he execute an addendum acknowledging those instructions and that the Conseco policy was still contestable. He was also asked to agree to sign an undated change of ownership assignment for use by ABC after the contestability period had expired. While the policy remained contestable, the annual premiums due from J.R. were paid from her personal checking account by Ms. Grinstead, an ABC employee, who was reimbursed therefor by American Title, ABC's trustee. None of the above information was reported by the Respondent to Conseco or the Department even though it knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that J.R. had made material misrepresentations regarding his physical health in his application for life insurance to Massachusetts General Life Insurance company, and it appears the Respondent attempted to conceal those misrepresentations from Conseco.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing Counts One through Four and Eight of the Administrative Complaint, but finding the Respondent guilty of Counts Five though Seven and Nine through Eleven of the Complaint, and both revoking its license and its eligibility for licensure as a viatical settlement provider in Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael H. Davidson, Esquire Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Mark K. Logan, Esquire Smith, Ballard & Logan, P.A. 403 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 624.11(1); 626.611(4), (7), (9), and (13); 626.21(2), (3), and (6); and 626.9541(1)(z), Florida Statutes (2005),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for investigating possible violations of the Florida Insurance Code. Respondent, at all times relevant to this case, was licensed as a customer representative (license number A306050) by the Department of Financial Services. Respondent has been employed by Direct General Insurance Agency, Inc. (hereinafter "Direct"), a Tennessee corporation doing business in Florida as Florida No Fault Insurance, for over 20 years. Respondent's duties include meeting with potential customers, writing policies, taking payments, doing renewals, changing policies, and endorsements, etc. She generally meets with between six and eight customers each day, on average. Most customers presenting themselves to Respondent want only the basic coverage necessary to lawfully operate their vehicles. In the industry, this is commonly called "tag insurance." The normal pattern followed by Respondent when meeting with customers is to obtain general information from the customer, put that information into her computer, ask the person what kind of coverage they want, and then print out a quote and the insurance documents. Whether the customer asks for it or not, Respondent generally provides a quote for tag insurance plus some other ancillary coverage, e.g., Travel Protection Plan (which is called "rental insurance"), Accident Medical Protection Plan (called "hospital insurance"), and others. She also generally provides customers an opportunity to obtain a pre-paid Visa card through the agency. After printing out the insurance documents, Respondent would normally go over the documents with the customer. The review would be somewhat superficial, and she would not explain each section unless the customer asked her questions. She admits that sometimes insurance forms are confusing and that most customers would not have the necessary background or knowledge to formulate questions about the coverage. Respondent is under pressure from her employer to offer and sell as many ancillary insurance products as possible. She does not receive a commission on various products she sells, but failure to sell such products is deemed unacceptable by her employer. While she has no direct financial incentive to sell additional coverages to customers, she knows her employer expects her to offer those coverages. In February 2005 Respondent sold insurance to Noweta Sanchez. Sanchez had previously purchased insurance from Direct. Sanchez told Respondent she wanted the minimal insurance necessary to legally operate her newly purchased automobile. Respondent, in turn, provided a quote for tag insurance, but also included hospital and rental insurance in the quote. Sanchez looked at the insurance forms, but did not read them; she was in a hurry and relied on Respondent to provide only what she asked for. Respondent did not prevent Sanchez from reading the forms, but did not offer any unsolicited explanations about them either. Sanchez signed or initialed the documents in 26 separate places. Respondent says she then went over a handwritten summary of the coverage (the "pen sheet") with Sanchez. Sanchez has no recollection of seeing the pen sheet even though her signature appears at the bottom of the page. At the time she met with Respondent, Sanchez was unable to afford anything but tag insurance. That is all Sanchez believed she had purchased until she was contacted by an agent of Petitioner. Sanchez then attempted to have her policy cancelled and her money refunded, but was told that her window of opportunity for cancellation had closed. Sanchez’ testimony was credible as to her interaction with Respondent. In December 2004, Respondent sold insurance to Amber Battle. Battle was approximately 19 years old at the time, and had chosen Respondent after making inquiries from several agencies and getting the best quote from Respondent’s agency via telephone. Battle told Respondent’s agency that she wanted tag insurance only. When Battle met personally with Respondent, the written insurance quote she received was higher than what she had been quoted on the telephone. She did not read (and probably would not have understood) the insurance documents that she signed. She simply signed and initialed each page where Respondent indicated. Battle signed or initialed the documents in 29 separate places. Battle trusted Respondent to provide only the insurance she requested. After printing the insurance documents, Respondent went over the pen sheet with Battle. However, Battle has no recollection of seeing the pen sheet even though she signed it at the bottom. The Battle pen sheet includes a phrase which has an asterisk, and is circled and underlined. It says "FLA. TAG INS. ONLY." Also, under her signature there is another asterisk and the phrase "NO Bodily Injury." At the time she obtained insurance coverage from Respondent, Battle was employed and had health insurance coverage. Battle had no need for hospital coverage along with her tag insurance. Battle's testimony was credible as to her interaction with Respondent. In January 2005, Respondent sold insurance to Colleen Bailey, a married woman. Bailey came to Respondent seeking insurance on two cars, a Durango and a Grand Am. The Durango was used primarily by her husband as a work vehicle. She sought full coverage on the Durango and tag insurance on the Grand Am. The Baileys self-insure themselves for medical care. They opt not to purchase health insurance, but rather pay cash whenever health care is necessary. It was not Bailey's intention to purchase hospital coverage along with her auto insurance. After providing background information to Respondent, Bailey was presented the insurance documents for signing. Bailey was not prevented from reviewing them, but did not understand "this insurance stuff" so reading them wouldn't have helped her. Bailey signed or initialed the documents in 25 separate places. Bailey simply relied on Respondent to provide only what she asked for. Respondent prepared a pen sheet for Bailey which summarizes the purchased insurance. Bailey has no recollection of seeing the pen sheet even though her signature appears on it. Her testimony was credible as to her interaction with Respondent. Respondent has a general routine she goes through with each client, but she deviates from the routine at times. Part and parcel to the routine is the offering of ancillary insurance products. Such products are generally included in every quote she gives a customer even when the customer specifically requests only the minimum coverage. Respondent is aware that most of her customers do not fully understand insurance matters. She knows that most customers do not fully review the written insurance documents. She is cognizant that the purchase of insurance is confusing to many of her customers. Thus, she is at an advantage when dealing with her customers. The documents relating to Optional Travel Protection and Accident Medical Protection plans are clearly labeled. A person of normal intelligence would be able to read the labels and probably ascertain that such plans were optional coverages. However, such person would need to be able to distinguish and differentiate between the minimal insurance coverage documentation and the documents addressing additional coverage. Moreover, such person would probably need to anticipate the inclusion of ancillary products in order to parse them out of the confusing and overwhelming insurance documents. While she never prohibits the customer from fully reviewing the written documents, she does not encourage them to do so either. Likewise, while she will respond to all questions asked by a customer, she does not offer unsolicited information that might help the customer understand better what they are receiving. It is unlikely the three customers who appeared in this matter took the time or made the effort to read all the documents they signed in order to determine exactly what coverage to which they were agreeing. Rather, they seemed to rely on Respondent to give them what they asked for. Respondent, however, intentionally provided them more than they asked for, leaving it to them to distinguish the coverages.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services suspending the license of Respondent for a period of 60 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether proposed rule 4-141.020 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background These cases arose after respondent, Department of Insurance (DOI), published in the Florida Administrative Weekly its notice of intent to adopt new rules 4-141.020 and 4-141-021, Florida Administrative Code. The first rule prescribes procedures for the withdrawal and surrender of a certificate of authority, or the discontinuance of writing insurance in the state. The second rule specifies procedures for implementing the moratorium phaseout process in Section 627.7013, Florida Statutes. By agreement by the parties, rule 4-141.021 is no longer in dispute. Contending that rule 4-141.020 is invalid for numerous reasons, petitioners, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF&G) and Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company (FGIC), filed their petition to determine invalidity of proposed rules on February 25, 1994. Generally, the petition alleges that the rule as a whole conflicts with other statutory and constitutional provisions, as well as the authorizing statute. It further alleges that subsections (3), (5), (8), and (9)(b) of the rule conflict with the authorizing statutes, and that paragraph (9)(b) is also arbitrary, capricious and vague. Petitioner, Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Salem (Holyoke), filed its petition to determine invalidity of proposed rules on February 25, 1994. The petition generally alleges that the rule as a whole conflicts with the law being implemented and is arbitrary and capricious. More specifically, the petition alleges that subsections (2)(b), (5), (6)(e)4., (7)(a), (7)(b), (8), (9), (9)(a), and (9)(b) contravene statutory provisions, and that the rule as a whole violates the due process, equal protection, commerce, and impairment of contract clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Parties Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the laws of the state governing insurance companies. Petitioners USF&G and FGIC are foreign insurers authorized to transact insurance in the State of Florida, including personal lines and residential insurance. USF&G and FGIC filed a notice to withdraw from homeowners multi-peril lines of insurance on July 7, 1993, in accordance with Subsection 624.430(1), Florida Statutes. Under that law, petitioners were required to give ninety days notice to the DOI before discontinuing those lines of insurance. The ninety-day notice period would have expired on October 5, 1993. Due to various emergency rules adopted by DOI and newly enacted legislation, the notice to withdraw never became effective. Because the proposed rule would affect their right to discontinue writing certain lines of insurance, petitioners are substantially affected by rule 4-141.020. Petitioner Holyoke is a mutual insurance company that writes business in all the New England states, New York and Florida. As of December 31, 1994, Holyoke had 4,027 homeowner policies and 1,541 dwelling fire policies outstanding in the State of Florida. Some of these property and insurance contracts were entered into prior to the enactment of Section 627.7013, Florida Statutes, which provides for a phaseout of a moratorium imposed by the legislature on the cancellation or nonrenewal of certain policies. On March 11, 1993, Holyoke filed a notice of withdrawal from all lines and kinds of insurance in the State and of the surrender of its certificate of authority pursuant to Section 624.430, Florida Statutes. Its plan was to withdraw over six months, giving all policyholders six months notice before nonrenewing policies over a twelve month period. Due to various emergency rules and statutes, Holyoke has been unable to cease doing business in the state. Since rule 4-141.020 would regulate Holyoke with regard to withdrawing from the homeowners multi-peril insurance market, it is substantially affected by the proposed rule. Events Leading to the Adoption of the Rule Following Hurricane Andrew's landfall in South Florida on August 24, 1992, the insurance industry suffered catastrophic casualty losses which totaled around $15 billion. Many insurance companies announced they were either withdrawing from the state altogether, were withdrawing from the homeowners' line of business, or were cancelling or nonrenewing substantial blocks of policyholders. Beginning on August 31, 1992, the DOI began to issue a string of emergency rules designed to limit cancellations and nonrenewals of insurance policies. None of these rules, however, purported to regulate the withdrawal of insurers from the state or from particular lines of insurance. During this same time period, the DOI adopted two emergency rules establishing procedures for insurers wishing to withdraw from any property lines in Florida. These emergency rules pertaining to insurer withdrawals expired on May 12, 1993, and no authority to restrict withdrawals retroactively has been authorized by the legislature. On May 18, 1993, the DOI imposed emergency rule ER 93-18 which represented its response to market stabilization in homeowners insurance lines. The rule imposed a moratorium on the nonrenewal and cancellation of homeowners insurance policies. The rule did not purport to regulate insurer withdrawals under Section 624.430, Florida Statutes, which governs the surrender of certificates of authority or discontinuance of writing certain lines of insurance in the state. Effective June 8, 1993, the legislature enacted Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida, which essentially codified a DOI emergency rule and imposed a moratorium on cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies from May 19, 1993, until November 14, 1993. The law was specifically confined to imposing a time-limited moratorium on only the "cancellation and nonrenewal of residential property coverages." Just prior to the expiration of the moratorium, the legislature enacted Section 627.7013, Florida Statutes, which provided for a "phaseout" of the moratorium imposed in Chapter 93-401. The statute provides for the extension of the moratorium on nonrenewal or cancellation of personal lines property insurance imposed by Chapter 93-401, limits unrestricted nonrenewals to five percent per year, and is to remain in effect until November 14, 1996. The statute makes no reference to withdrawals by insurers. Indeed, its purposes, as stated in subsection (1) of the statute, "are to provide for a phaseout of the moratorium (on cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies) and to require advance planning and approval for programs of exposure reduction." It is especially noteworthy that during the same legislative special session in which section 627.7013 was enacted, the legislature considered and rejected legislation that would have created a new section 624.431 granting DOI the authority to condition and prevent withdrawals by insurers. Thus, the legislature rejected a statute which would have provided the DOI with the same authority included in the proposed rule. There is no clear expression in section 627.7013 that the legislature intended the law to operate in a retroactive manner. Because the statute imposes new obligations on insurers, it must be presumed that the legislature intended it to operate prospectively. In contrast, and in response to Hurricane Andrew, when the legislature adopted Chapter 92-345, Laws of Florida, in its December 1992 special session, subsection (2) of section 1 of that law contained specific language that "this section shall take effect upon becoming a law and shall apply retroactively to August 24, 1992." On February 4, 1994, the DOI published notice of its intent to adopt new rules 4-141.020 and 4-141.021. However, the latter rule is no longer in issue. Rule 4-141.020, which is sometimes referred to as the "withdrawal rule," generally sets forth the procedures for withdrawal, surrender of certificate of authority, or discontinuance of writing insurance in the state under section 624.430. More specifically, it provides definitions of various terms [paragraph 2)], provides a DOI interpretation of section 624.430 (paragraphs (3) and (5)], prescribes procedures for withdrawals and reduction of insurance (paragraphs (6)-(8)], and sets out DOI policy regarding the relationship of reduction in business to the moratorium phaseout in section 627.7013 [paragraph (9)]. Sections 624.308(1) and 624.6012, Florida Statutes, are cited as the specific authority for adopting the rule while Sections 624.430, 624.6011, 624.6012 and 627.7013, Florida Statutes, are identified as the law implemented. Prior to Hurricane Andrew, if an insurer wished to (a) discontinue the writing of any one or more multiple kinds of insurance, (b) withdraw from the state, or (c) surrender its certificate of authority, it would simply provide to the DOI notice of its intent to do so as required by section 624.430. As long as the notice complied with the statutory requirements, the withdrawal was self- executing, and DOI did not require specific approval or impose further conditions on the insurer. Thus, before this controversy arose, DOI took the position that the only duty or power granted to it under the section was a ministerial one of altering the certificate of authority to reflect the insurer's withdrawal from certain lines of insurance or, in the case of complete withdrawal from the state, to cancel the insurer's certificate of authority. It has never adopted any permanent rule construing the statute in any other fashion. Although section 624.430 has not been amended by the legislature since it was enacted in 1963, under the proposed rule, section 627.7013 is interpreted as restricting the right of an insurer to withdraw from the state entirely or from a line of insurance. Indeed, the rule provides that section 627.7013 takes precedence over section 624.430, and unless an insurer had filed its notice of withdrawal prior to August 24, 1992, insurers are severely limited in their ability to discontinue lines of business or withdraw from the state through at least November 14, 1996. The Petitions, Stipulation and Proposed Final Orders Because the initial petitions, prehearing stipulation, and proposed final orders sometimes speak to different issues, and some of the allegations are either unclear or not precisely pled, it is necessary to comment on these matters before making findings as to the validity of the rule. Since the initial petitions frame the issues in these cases, and DOI counsel has objected to expanding the issues through stipulation or otherwise, the undersigned has limited the issues to those raised in the initial petitions and deemed all others to be untimely raised. Further, where a party has framed an allegation in its complaint, but failed to argue that issue in its proposed order, that allegation has been deemed to be abandoned. Finally, where allegations are nonspecific and speak to the rule as a whole, and the undersigned is unable to determine the language in the rule being challenged, those allegations have been disregarded. In their initial petition, USF&G and FGIC first contend that the rule as a whole is invalid because it conflicts with, extends or modifies sections 624.430, 627.7013 and "other existing (but unnamed) statutory authority," and it violates the Florida and U. S. Constitutions by interpreting section 627.7013 as taking precedence over section 624.430. In actuality, only subsection (9), and not the entire rule, speaks to this issue and thus the broad allegation has been narrowed in this respect. They have also alleged that the rule in its entirety is invalid because it conflicts with, extends or modifies the "authorizing statute" in that it purports to require filings and information not authorized by statute. Because these alleged illegal filing requirements are found in paragraph (6)(e), the undersigned has considered only that provision as subject to attack. USF&G and FGIC also allege that subsections (3), (5), (8) and (9)(b) are invalid because they conflict with, extend or modify the "authorizing statute." Finally, they allege that paragraph (9)(b) is invalid on the additional grounds that the language is arbitrary, capricious, and vague. Since the reference to paragraph (9)(b) appears to have been in error, and petitioners actually intended to challenge paragraph (9)(a), the undersigned will address the latter provision. In summary, then, and notwithstanding the broad allegations in the petition, only parts, and not the whole, of the rule have been placed in question by these petitioners. Because the proposed final order of USF&G and FGIC fails to address subsections (5) and (6)(e), the undersigned has deemed those allegations to be abandoned. Finally, the proposed order raises for the first time a contention that subsection (4) is invalid. This contention has been disregarded as being untimely raised. In its initial petition, Holyoke first contends that the rule in its entirety is invalid "because it would enlarge, contravene, and modify the specific provisions of law that it purportedly implements and because it would be arbitrary and capricious." It then goes on to plead that subsections (2)(b), (5), (6)(e)4., (7)(a), (7)(b), (8), (9), (9)(a), and (9)(b) are invalid on the ground they conflict with, extend, or modify other statutory provisions. Since no specific factual allegations have been made regarding the arbitrary and capricious nature of the rule, and there are no statutory allegations regarding the remaining parts of the rule, the undersigned will treat the petition as challenging only these paragraphs for the single ground stated. Finally, Holyoke alleges that the rule in its entirety violates the due process, equal protection, commerce, and impairment of contract clauses in the State and U. S. Constitutions. In its proposed order, Holyoke has further contended that the above paragraphs are also invalid on the grounds they are arbitrary and capricous, vague, fail to establish adequate standards and vest unbridled discretion in the agency. Because the latter three grounds were never raised in the initial petition and, as noted above, there are no specific allegations regarding the arbitrary and capricous nature of the cited paragraphs, these grounds have been disregarded as being untimely raised. Is the Rule Invalid? a. Rule 4-141.020(9) Petitioners' chief concern is the DOI's interpretation, as expressed in subsection (9) of the rule, that section 627.7013 takes precedence over section 624.430 "as to all attempted or desired reductions" affecting personal lines residential policies. Because "reductions" are broadly defined in paragraph (2)(b) of the rule as including the discontinuance of one or mulitiple lines of business, the withdrawal from the state, and the surrender of a certificate authority, subsection (9) effectively prevents an insurer from exercising its rights under section 624.430 until November 14, 1996, when the phaseout statute expires. Since the vitality of much of the rule turns on the validity of subsection (9), the multiple allegations concerning this provision will be addressed first. The exact language in subsection (9) is as follows: (9) Relationship of Reduction to Moratorium Phaseout. The department interprets Section 627.7013(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes, relating to certain applications for reduction filed prior to August 24, 1992, as indicating a legislative intent that as to all attempted or desired reductions affecting "Florida per- sonal lines residential policies" (hereinafter "residential policies"), other than those in which such reduction notice was filed prior to August 24, 1992, Section 627.7013 applies and takes precedence over Section 624.430, and prohibits or limits such reductions affecting residential policies, where there is any relation- ship between the reduction sought, and the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. Subparagraph (2)(a)4. of section 627.7013 provides the principal statutory support for the rule and reads as follows: 4. Notwithstanding any provisions of this section to the contrary, this section does not apply to any insurer that, prior to August 24, 1992, filed notice of its intent to dis- continue its writings in this state under s. 624.430, and for which a finding has been made by the department, the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Management Services, or a court that such notice satisfied all re- quirements of s. 624.430. As explained at hearing by the author of the rule, "by implication" or "negative inference" the DOI construed the above statutory language as manifesting an intent on the part of the legislature to make all types of withdrawals, and not just the cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property policies, subject to the moratorium phaseout statute. In other words, DOI posits that the legislative exemption from the moratorium phaseout statute of an insurer who filed, prior to August 24, 1992, a notice of its intent to discontinue writings, supports the broad negative inference that section 627.7013 prohibits an insurer not only from "discontinuing its writing" of one or more lines of business after August 24, 1992, but also from withdrawing from the state and surrendering its certificate of authority. In making this interpretation of section 627.7013 in its rule, the DOI ignored the distinctions between "discontinuance of lines of insurance" versus "withdrawal from the state" versus "surrendering a certificate of authority." Section 627.7013 refers only to "discontinue," as opposed to a total withdrawal coupled with a surrender of a certificate. Whatever negative inference might be drawn from subparagraph (2)(a)4. regarding the discontinuance of a line of insurance before August 24, 1992, as opposed to after that date, it cannot be extended to prohibit an insurer's total withdrawal from Florida and the surrender of its certificate of authority. Such an interpretation is not only contrary to the plain language in sections 624.430 and 627.7013, but also subsection 624.416(1), which recognizes an insurer's right to surrender its certificate of authority. To this extent, then, the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Assuming that the statute is a proper source of authority for imposing restrictions on discontinuing lines of insurance by virtue of the words "discontinue its writings" in subparagraph (2)(a)4., petitioners argue further that DOI has used the rule to interpret the statute so as to have it apply in a retroactive manner to insurance contracts in existence prior to the enactment of the statute. It is undisputed that all petitioners had insurance contracts in existence as of the date of the enactment of the law, and that the rule operates in a retroactive manner by applying to all notices of withdrawal filed prior to the enactment of section 627.7013 but after August 24, 1992. In resolving this issue, the undersigned cannot find, and respondent has not credibly reported, any clear expression in the statute that the legislature intended to apply the statute retroactively. At the same time, the statute affects petitioners' substantive rights by imposing new obligations or duties in connection with their right to withdraw under section 624.430, and thus it is deemed to be substantive in nature. Because the rule has the effect of imposing retroactive obligations and duties on petitioners in contravention of section 627.7013, subsection (9) is found to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. b. Rule 4-141.020(2)(b) Proposed rule 4-141.020(2)(b) defines the terms "reduce presence in Florida," "reduce," and "reduction" as follows: (b) "Reduce presence in Florida," "Reduce," and "Reduction," as used in this rule are inclusive terms meant to collectively refer to any and all of the following actions as may be desired or taken by an insurer: to surrender its Florida certificate of authority; to withdraw from Florida; or to discontinue the writing of any one or multiple lines or kinds of insurance in Florida. Holyoke contends that the foregoing language is invalid because the term "reduction" is defined as including a total withdrawal from all lines of insurance in Florida and the surrender of a certificate of authority, and thus it contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415, 624.416 and 627.7013. 34. Sections 624.430, 624.6011, 624.6012 and 627.7013 are cited by DOI as the source of authority for the definition. There is nothing in section 624.6011, which classifies insurance into seven "kinds of insurance," nor section 624.6012, which defines the term "lines of insurance," authorizing the broad and sweeping definition of the word "reduction." Similarly, section 627.7013(2)(b) authorizes the DOI to "adopt rules to implement this subsection," but subsection (2) deals only with "the cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies that were in force on November 14, 1993, and were subject to the moratorium." Section 624.430 does speak in general terms to "(a)ny insurer desiring to surrender its certificate of authority, withdraw from this state, or discontinue the writing of any one or multiple kinds of insurance in this state," but in the context of this rule, which seeks to prevent all types of withdrawals under the authority of section 627.7013, the rule clearly contravenes the law being implemented. Therefore, paragraph (2)(b) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. c. Rule 4-141.020(3) Proposed rule 4-141.020(3) reads as follows: (3) Actions Having the Substantial Effect of a Withdrawal or Discontinuance of Writing Insurance in this State. Reductions subject to Section 624.430, Florida Statutes, include any action or actions the reasonably forseeable substantial effect of which is, or will be when the action is completed, to have discon- tinued the writing of a kind or line of insurance or to have withdrawn from Florida. "Substantial effect" means that, for example, the continuance of a token amount of writing in Florida will not prevent a conclusion that a reduction subject to Section 624.430 has or will occur. Furthermore, it is not determinative of the existence of a reduction requiring notice under Section 624.430, that the action is taken in a single step, or by a series of steps over time, if the reasonably forseeable effect of the action or actions is or will to be to (sic) have substantially effected a reduction. The application of Section 624.430 does not depend upon the insurer's subjective statement of desire or intent as to the effect of its actions. In their petition, USF&G and FGIC contended this part of the rule impermissibly "conflicts with, modifies or extends the authorizing statutes in that the rule adopts a 'reasonably forseeable substantial effect' test for determining whether a proposed action is subject to Section 624.430, Florida Statutes." While petitioners have addressed other somewhat similar provisions in paragraph (9)(a), no argument has been made in their proposed order as to subsection (3), and the undersigned has accordingly assumed the issue to be abandoned. d. Rule 4-141.020(5) Proposed rule 4-141.020(5) prescribes the following time limitations in which an insurer can take no action after filing a notice of reduction with DOI: (5) Notice to Precede Action to Reduce Presence in Florida. An insurer shall take no action in furtherance of a reduction, prior to the expir- ation of 90 days after the receipt by the depart- ment of the notice required by Section 624.430. Prohibited actions include sending any notice of cancellation or termination, or notice of intent to cancel or terminate, to any policyholder, agent, managing general agent, reinsurer, or other person or entity. In their petition, USF&G and FGIC have alleged that the proposed rule conflicts with, modifies or extends "the authorizing statute in that it prohibits an insurer from taking action in furtherance of the proposed reduction prior to the expiration of the 90-day period under section 624.430, Florida Statutes." Holyoke makes the same allegation and contends the rule contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415 and 624.416. The record is not clear on the exact manner in which section 624.430 operates. It may be reasonably inferred, however, that once a notice of withdrawal is filed, the insurer may then begin notifying customers and other interested persons that it will withdraw at the end of the ninety-day statutory time period. By restricting insurers from taking this action in contravention of the terms of section 624.430, and there being no other valid source of authority, subsection (5) is found to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. e. Rule 4-141.020(6)(e)4. Paragraph (6)(e) describes the content of the notice to be given to DOI when providing a notice of reduction. Subparagraph 4. therein requires the following information to be provided in the notice of reduction: 4. Insurers shall also provide the department with the following information in the notice: A listing of all lines of insurance the insurer than has in force in Florida which will be affected by the reduction, and for each line, a statement of the approximate number of policies and dollars of premium then in force in Florida and which will be affected by the desired reduction. A description of what notice and treatment will be given by the insurer to its affected Florida policyholders concerning the reduction; and what steps will be taken by the insurer regarding processing of any outstanding covered claims of such policyholders while and after the insurer accomplishes its reduction. A description of projected impact of the reduction upon the insurer's Florida agent and agency force, if any. In addition to any other information related to the impact on agents, the insurer shall state the number of affected agents and give a brief description of what they are being told. Holyoke claims that this portion of the rule is invalid because it requires an insurer "to provide excessive information" in contravention of sections 624.430, 624.415 and 624.416. Since the proposed rule is based upon the premise that the DOI has the authority under section 627.7013 to restrict the ability of insurers to withdraw in any fashion, and such statutory authority has been found to be lacking in the laws being implemented, the rule is deemed to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground it modifies or extends sections 624.430 and 627.7013. f. Rule 4-141.020(7)(a) and (b) These paragraphs describe the DOI's responsibilities once an insurer files a notice of reduction. They read as follows: (7) Department Action Upon Receipt of Notice. Subsequent to receiving the initial filing the department will request the insurer to provide further information, or will conduct such other investigation as is necessary to determine whether the initial information provided is accurate and whether the proposed action will have the effects projected by the insurer. Reduction Tolled During Certain Investi- gations. The department shall inform the insurer by (sic) that the proposed reduction would be in violation of, or cause a violation of, any provision of the Insurance Code or rule of the department, and thereafter the insurer shall not effect the reduction and shall terminate any action then under way towards accomplishment of the reduction, until such time as the department's allegation is determined under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and such appeals as may be taken by either party are concluded. Like so many other parts of the rule, Holyoke contends here that the foregoing language is invalid because it contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415, and 624.416. Since the proposed rule purports to place new restrictions on insurers seeking to withdraw, and it has no source of statutory authority, the above language is found to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground it extends or modifies sections 624.430 and 624.7013. g. Rule 4-141.020(8) This provision provides that no surrender of a certificate is effective until approved by DOI. The specific language in the subsection reads as follows: (8) Certificate of Authority Surrender Effected by Department Order. No surrender or attempted surrender of a certificate of authority is effective until accepted by order of the department. USF&G and FGIC contend the rule conflicts with, modifies or extends section 624.430 since that statute requires an insurer to provide notice that it intends to surrend a certificate of authority, but does not require it to obtain DOI approval to do so. In its petition, Holyoke has alleged that the foregoing language contravenes not only section 624.430, but also sections 624.415 and 624.416. As noted in finding of fact 17, until the enactment of section 627.7013, DOI has always taken the position that a notice of withdrawal did not require specific agency approval. Rather, DOI has said that the only power or duty granted it under section 624.430 was a ministerial one of altering the certificate of authority to reflect the insurer's withdrawal from certain lines of insurance or, in the case of complete withdrawal from the state, to cancel the insurer's certificate of authority. Since section 624.430 has not been amended, and section 627.7013 does not enlarge DOI's rights with regard to a notice of withdrawal filed by an insurer, the paragraph is found to in conflict with both sections 624.430 and 627.7013. Therefore, it is deemed to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. h. Rule 4-141.020(9)(a) This paragraph generally provides that any reductions in residential policies proposed by an insurer must be unrelated, directly or indirectly, to a reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The rather lengthy rule reads as follows: Reduction Must be Unrelated to Risk of Loss From Hurricane Exposure. Pursuant to Section 627.7013, where the reduction affects residential policies, the proposed reduction must be unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The department notes that Section 627.7013 does not in any way qualify or limit the requirement that the reduction be unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The department interprets the word "unrelated," as used in Section 627.7013, in the context of the exigent circumstances motivating the enactment of the statute, and the remedial nature of the statute, as requiring a liberal, wide-reaching definition, so that the reduction must be completely unrelated, directly and indirectly, to reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure. As stated in subsection (3), above, the department is not bound by the reason facially asserted for the reduction. If the reduction is related in part to reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure, the reduction is prohibited unless authorized as type one, two, or three relief, under Rule 4-141.021, notwith- standing that some other reason is in good faith also part of the reason for seeking the reduction. The objective effect of the propose (sic) reduction in reducing hurricane exposure is given more weight than the insurer's subjective motivations, in determining whether the reduction is unrelated to risk of hurricane exposure. Subjective motivation is relevant primarily only where the objective effect is equivocal. Factors which will be given great weight in evaluating whether a desired reduction is related to risk of hurricane loss are: Would the reduction in Florida be accompanied by reduction action by the insurer in other states? If so, would a disproportionate amount of the impact be in areas of the country especially subject to risk of loss from hurricane? How much of the reduction in Florida would be in residential policy exposures as compared to exposures in other lines of insurance in Florida? If the insurer is discontinuing writing only some lines of insurance are the lines being discontinued especially subject to risk of loss from hurricane, as compared to the lines not being discontinued? Does the insurer have a significant con- centration of residential policies and exposure to risk of loss from hurricane exposure under residential policies in Florida? Would the desired reduction significantly reduce the insurer's exposure to risk of loss from hurricane exposure under residential policies in Florida? Holyoke argues that the paragraph contravenes sections 624.430, 624.416 and 627.7013 by stating that any "reduction" must be "unrelated to risk of loss from hurricane exposure" and that "unrelated" means "completely unrelated, directly and indirectly, to reduction of risk of loss from hurricane exposure." At the same time, USF&G and FGIC contend the rule is invalid since it "improperly" defines the term "unrelated" to permit the DOI to apply a subjective "effects" test "using illegal, arbitrary, capricious, and vague factors which fail to establish adequate standards for agency action and which exceed the agency's delegated authority." Although several statutes are cited as being the law implemented, section 627.7013 is the principal source of authority for the rule. Subparagraph (2)(a)1. of the statute provides in relevant part that (t)his subparagraph does not prohibit any cancellations or nonrenewals of such policies for any other lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. The statutory language unequivocally reserves to insurers the right to cancel or nonrenew policies "for any other lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure." To the extent the rule authorizes DOI to prohibit nonrenewals or cancellations if they are related in part to reduction of hurricane exposure, even if other reasons are in good faith and are part of the reason for seeking the cancellations or nonrenewals, the language contravenes the statute. The rule further provides that if the effect of a reduction in exposure is to avoid hurricane exposure, the nonrenewal or cancellation can be denied even if the insurer has given a lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure. Since it can be reasonably inferred that the ultimate effect of every withdrawal is to reduce to zero the insurer's risk of loss from hurricane exposure, the "effects" test strips the statute of its clear mandate that insurers maintain the right to cancel or nonrenew policies "for any other lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane exposure." For this additional reason, the rule contravenes the statute. Next, while there is some evidential support as to DOI's theory in adopting the rule as a whole, there is no factual basis in the record to support the rationale for the language in paragraph (9)(a). As such, it is deemed to be arbitrary and capricious. Finally, in applying the six factors that would be given "great weight" in evaluating whether a desired reduction is related to risk of hurricane loss, the DOI acknowledges that there are no criteria or guidelines to follow in weighing these objective effects. Indeed, the DOI author admitted he had insufficient experience to fashion more specific guidelines. Even so, the language is not so vague as to confuse a person of reasonable knowledge, nor can it be said that the rule fails to establish adequate standards for agency action which exceed the agency's delegated authority. i. Rule 4-141.020(9)(b) The final provision under challenge is found in paragraph (9)(b) which reads as follows: (b) If the department determines that any proposed reduction violates Section 627.7013, the insurer shall not proceed with the reduction as it affects residential policies, and shall file an application under Rule 4-141.021 which implements Section 627.7013. The reduction in residential policies shall be limited to the extent of relief granted the insurer by the department under Section 627.7013 and Rule 4-141.021. Holyoke contends that this language is invalid because it contravenes sections 624.430, 624.415 and 624.416. Although the allegation is imprecise, it is assumed that petitioner contends the rule impermissibly broadens the definition of the word "reduction" to include an insurer's withdrawal from the state or the surrender of a certificate of authority. Because the undersigned has previously found that the DOI clearly lacks statutory authority under section 627.7013 to limit withdrawals from the state or the surrender of a certificate of authority, and the broad definition of "reduction" in paragraph (2)(b) has been deemed to be invalid, it is found that the language in the rule conflicts with sections 624.430 and 627.7013 and is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. D. Constitutional Claims Even if the rule is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority, Holyoke nonetheless contends the rule is invalid because it violates the Florida and United States Constitutions in several respects. USF&G and FGIC join in this claim. Due process and takings clause Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . ." USF&G, FGIC and Holyoke contend the proposed rule violates this provision and its federal counterpart, the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Holyoke's presence in the state may be characterized as small. Therefore, the absence of economies of scale assures continuing operating losses for the company. Indeed, in 1993 and 1994, Holyoke suffered operational losses in the state of $822,071 and $736,000, respectively, without the landfall of a hurricane. The rule bars Holyoke from withdrawing totally from Florida and surrendering its certificate of authority as it wishes to do. In Holyoke's case, every dollar of risk required to be underwritten in Florida requires that it forego writing business in another state, or increase its surplus-to-writings ratio, thereby increasing the financial risk assumed. The prospect of continuing losses in Florida impacts Holyoke in two ways. First, it suffers a drain on its surplus to the extent of the forced losses. Second, given the relationship between surplus and writing capacity, the loss of surplus caused by the operating losses results in its inability to write business in another state upon the lost surplus. USF&G is now in the process of downsizing its firm. In 1991, it was on the verge of insolvency having suffered losses of $600 million in that year alone. Based on marketing studies performed after 1991, the company has reshaped its corporate strategy and has subsequently withdrawn entirely from two states (Texas and Louisiana), and has withdrawn all personal lines from nine states. In addition, USF&G has made selected withdrawals for particular lines in many other states, and has pared its total employees from 12,500 to 6,000. The proposed rule prevents it from meeting its corporate objective of filing with DOI a notice of withdrawal for personal homeowners multiperil insurance. Equal protection clause Section 2 of Article I of the Florida Constitution provides in part that "(a)ll natural persons are equal before the law." Under the proposed rule, Holyoke must continue to do business in the personal lines market of the state indefinitely, or at least until November 1996. Holyoke contends this is to the detriment of residents of other states in which it writes business, and that the rule favors Florida residents over residents of other states for an illegitimate purpose. Commerce clause The federal commerce clause limits the power of the states to interfere with interstate commerce. Holyoke contends that the interstate allocation of capital and surplus constitutes interstate commerce, and because the proposed rule seeks to regulate its decision as to how to allocate capital and surplus, it violates the commerce clause. Impairment of contracts Article I, section 10 of the Florida Constitution provides that "(n)o . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." All three petitioners contend that section 627.7013, as interpreted by the proposed rule, violates the impairment of contract clauses of both the Florida and United States Constitutions. All petitioners had insurance contracts in existence at the time section 627.7013 was enacted and the rule proposed. Prior to that time, petitioners' rights with respect to those contracts were set forth in section 624.430. The DOI's interpretation of section 627.7013, as expressed in its rule, prohibits the insurers from exercising these pre-existing contractual rights, including the right to withdraw. To this extent, an impairment has occurred. By prohibiting an insurer from withdrawing from the state, DOI's impairment of those rights can be deemed to be substantial. Petitioners operate in a heavily regulated industry. At the same time, according to the findings and purposes of section 627.7013, that legislation was prompted by Hurricane Andrew's "enormous monetary impact to insurers," proposals by insurers to make "substantial cancellation or nonrenewal of their homeowner's insurance policyholders," and the legislature's "compelling state interest in maintaining an orderly market for personal lines residential property insurance."
