The Issue The issue in this case is whether Venice Hospital, Inc., (Venice) meets the statutory and rule criteria for a Certificate of Need (CON) to operate an open heart surgery program, and therefore, whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) should approve its CON Application Number 5715.
Findings Of Fact The Parties 1. Venice is a 342 bed general hospital located in Venice, Florida, which is in south Sarasota County and is a part of the Department's Service District There are no subdistricts in District 8 for open heart surgery. The majority of patients served by Venice are from 50-55 years of age or older, and 22%-25% of patients admitted to Venice have a primary diagnosis of heart disease. If patients with heart disease as a secondary diagnosis are considered along with those who have this as their primary diagnosis, the total represents over 40% of all patients admitted at Venice. Of the cardiac catheterization patients treated at Venice in 1988, 78% were Medicare patients. Venice is a Medicaid provider, projecting 1.6% of its total revenue from Medicaid. It has a critical care center with 32 beds capable of invasive monitoring, multi-infusion of medications, pacemakers, Swans Ganz catheters, and care of post- catheterization patients. A separate 8-bed unit has been designated for use by open heart patients, with the same monitoring capability as the remainder of the unit. Memorial is an acute care hospital located in Sarasota, Florida, and is governed by the Sarasota County Public Hospital Board, which is elected to provide health care services to all residents of Sarasota County. It provides a full range of services, including an open heart surgery program, and is the largest provider of services to medically indigent and Medicaid patients in Sarasota County. Medical Center is a 208 bed not-for-profit hospital located in Punta Gorda, Florida, which has provided cardiac catheterization since 1985, and has been approved to initiate an open heart surgery program which is scheduled to open in late 1989. It has a 5% Medicaid payor mix. The primary service area for Medical Center is Charlotte County. Its secondary service area includes south Sarasota County. Both Memorial and Medical Center are also located in District 8, with Venice located between these facilities. Venice is approximately 35 miles to the north of Medical Center, and about 25 miles to the south of Memorial. There are two existing open heart programs in District 8, one at Memorial and the other at Southwest Regional Medical Center in Ft. Myers. In addition, there are two approved, but not yet operational, open heart programs, one at Medical Center and the other at Lee Memorial in Ft. Myers. The Department is the state agency which is responsible for administering Sections 381.701 through 381.715, Florida Statutes, the "Health Facility and Services Development Act", under which applications for Certificates of Need (CON) are filed, reviewed, and either granted or denied by the Department. The Application On or about September 27, 1988, Venice filed an application with the Department for a CON to implement an open heart surgery program at its hospital in Venice, Florida, with a capital expenditure of $665,500. This application was designated as CON Application Number 5715. The Department reviewed this application, and in October, 1988, forwarded an omissions letter to Venice. Venice responded to the omissions letter, and addressed not only the items noted by the Department in its omissions letter, but also provided additional materials, information, and corrections not requested in the omissions letter. Effective on November 14, 1988, the Department deemed Venice's application complete. A public hearing was held on this application at the request of Memorial on November 18, 1988. Thereafter, the Department reviewed and considered all material received from the applicant, as well as the information received at the public hearing, and prepared its State Agency Action Report (SAAR) noticing its intent to grant CON 5715. Memorial and Medical Center timely filed petitions to challenge the Department's notice of intent to issue this CON. Venice is relying upon its application which was deemed complete and reviewed by the Department in its SAAR, and not upon its original application that was filed prior to the omissions letter. Additionally, the applicant is not relying upon a "not normal circumstance" justification for its application, but rather urges that it meets the statutory and rule criteria for the issuance of this CON. The Department's CON Manual HRSM 235-1, dated October 1, 1988, is irrelevant to this proceeding since it has not been adopted by, or incorporated in, a rule, and was not applied in the batching cycle in which Venice's application was filed, or in the subsequent batch. It has not yet been applied to any hospital CON application. Therefore, the matters contained within this Manual concerning what is a permissible response to an omissions letter have not been considered. As part of its originally filed application, Venice included a document prepared by Ernst & Whinney entitled, "Audited Financial Statements and Other Financial Information, Venice Hospital, Inc., June 30, 1987." Through a clerical error in the copying process, page one of this twenty-four page document was omitted. At the time it filed its omissions response, Venice included this missing first page which is signed on behalf of Ernst & Whinney, and which states that the examinations contained therein were made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. It expresses the opinion that these financial statements present fairly the financial position of the applicant. An auditor's opinion letter is an essential part of the audited financial statement which must be included with the CON application. However, Venice provided this inadvertently missing page prior to its application being deemed complete. Thus, it was available to, and was reviewed by, the Department in the preparation of the SAAR on this application. Venice's application did raise concerns which it was seeking to address concerning availability and accessibility by addressing the current practice of transferring patients requiring open heart surgery to other facilities. Patient costs for such transport, as well as patient risk, inconvenience and comfort for the patient and family members, were all referenced in the application. Additionally, testimony at the public hearing held on November 18, 1988, which the Department considered in the preparation of its SAAR, dealt with concerns and problems arising from patient transport, including delay, risks to the patient from ambulance or helicopter transfers, and adverse effects which may occur on quality of care through this practice which is inconsistent with the concept of a continuum of care. The SAAR specifically notes that Venice contends its proposal will improve geographic access in its immediate service area, and that from July, 1987 through June, 1988, it transferred 144 of its cardiac patients from its facility for open heart surgery and an additional 125 were transferred for angioplasty procedures. The application did not specifically address or identify any adverse impact which its approval would have on existing providers. However, evidence on this issue is admissible at hearing since it is relevant to the issue of the standing of Memorial and Medical Center, and also because it is relevant to establish whether approval of this application would be consistent with statutory and rule review criteria, and provisions of the Local Health Plan that require assessment of any such impact. The SAAR notes that Venice did contend that approval of this CON will not affect the economy or quality of existing services in the District. Stipulations The parties stipulated that: The project is financially feasible in the short term; Venice has a record of providing quality care and this record is not an issue in this case; Other than for open heart services, other facilities are adequate and available to act as alternatives; The size and cost of construction for Venice's proposal are appropriate; Open heart surgery programs currently exist within a two hour drive time under average driving conditions for at least 90% of the District's population; The type and cost of equipment in the application are reasonable; If approved, Venice will provide the services required by Rule 10- 5.011(1)(f)3a and 3b, Florida Administrative Code, and does provide the services shown at paragraph 3c of said Rule. State Health Plan Objective 4.2 of the State Health Plan applicable to this application is to "maintain an average of 350 open heart surgery procedures per program in each district through 1990." (Emphasis Supplied.) The goal set forth in the State Plan relative to open heart surgery programs is to ensure the appropriate availability of such services at reasonable costs. Venice's application is not consistent with Objective 4.2. If Venice's application were to be approved, there would be five programs in the District. The number of procedures projected for 1990 is 1683, and if 1683 is divided by 5 programs, the result is an average of only 337 procedures per program. The two existing providers in District 8 are currently performing over 1600 procedures annually, and as is discussed below, it does not appear that Venice itself will be able to achieve an acceptable level of service at any time established by the record in this case. Approval of this application will also significantly and adversely impact the ability of the two approved programs to achieve an acceptable level of service. In the State Health Plan narrative, it is recognized that "quality of patient care is a primary concern in open heart surgery programs due to the potential consequences to the patient of poorly trained and/or skilled staff.11 In order to ensure quality, and in recognition of the relationship between the volume of open heart surgery procedures and quality, the State Plan references the Department's requirement, set forth by Rule, that a minimum of 200 adult procedures be performed within 3 years of initiation of an open heart program. The narrative also notes that a broad range of services must be provided to fulfill the requirements of an open heart surgery program. Venice's application is partially consistent with these narrative statements in the State Health Plan since the parties have stipulated that it has a record of providing quality care, and it offers a complete range of services with departments within the hospital where a broad range of diagnostic techniques and expertise are available. However, it was not established that a minimum of 200 adult open heart surgical procedures will be performed at Venice within three years of initiation of this program. Local Health Plan Even though an applicant does not include within its application every element in a Local Health Plan which is relevant to its application, the Department itself will look at the applicable Local Plan to determine if an application is consistent therewith. The applicable District 8 Health Plan recommends that "existing facilities should be afforded the opportunity for expansion before developing a new cardiac surgical center." However, if a numeric need for an additional program is shown, and if existing facilities do not seek to expand their existing programs to meet such need, an application for a new program would not be inconsistent with this portion of the Local Health Plan. Under the facts of this case where there are no competing applications from hospitals with existing open heart surgery programs, and where a numeric need for one additional program in District 8 is projected by the Department's need methodology, Venice's application is consistent with this recommendation. The Local Plan also recommends that preference be given to applications for new or expanded programs which clearly document the impact of the proposed new service on existing providers in the District and adjacent Districts. As found above, Venice did not specifically address any adverse impact its proposal would have on existing providers, and therefore, its application is not consistent with this recommendation. The Department's Need Methodology and the "35O Rule" Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)8, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the Department's methodology for calculating the numeric need for additional open heart surgery programs It provides a formula by which the number of open heart procedures for the horizon year, in this case 1990, are to be estimated. Pursuant to the formula, there are projected to be 1683 open heart surgery procedures performed in 1990 in District 8. This number of projected procedures is then divided by 350 procedures in order to determine the number of programs which will be needed. See Rule l0-5.011(1)(f)11b. Using this methodology, the Department has identified the need for 4.8, rounded to 5, programs in the District in the horizon year. Since there are currently 2 existing and 2 approved programs in District 8, the Department and Venice have concluded that there is a projected numeric need for Venice's additional program in 1990. There is a direct relationship between the volume of open heart surgery procedures performed at a facility and the quality of care provided at such facility, with lower mortality rates generally at hospitals with higher volumes than those with low volumes. Therefore, in addition to its numeric need calculation, the Department has also developed a "350 standard" to address patient safety and quality of care concerns by ensuring that each existing and approved open heart surgery program achieves a volume sufficient to assure quality and efficiency prior to approval of a new program. Rule 10- 5.011(1)(f)11aI, Florida Administrative Code, prohibits the establishment of new open heart surgery programs unless: the service volume of each existing and approved open heart surgery program within the service area is operating at and is expected to continue to operate at a minimum of 350 adult open heart cases per year. Memorial and Medical Center urge an interpretation and application of the 350 standard in a manner which would require each existing and approved program to actually operate at the level of 350 cases per year. Since approved programs are not yet operational, and therefore cannot operate at the 350 level, they argue that the intent of this standard, as set forth in the above-cited Rule, is to preclude the approval of any additional programs while there are approved programs, or existing programs which are not meeting the 350 standard. To the contrary, the Department and Venice urge that the 350 standard be applied by averaging the actual number of cases at existing programs, and the number of cases which are reasonably projected to be performed at approved programs. Under this interpretation, as long as the average between cases which are performed at existing, and which are reasonably projected to be performed at approved programs exceeds 350, then the further approval of an additional program is not prohibited. Having considered the testimony and evidence presented by the parties, and in particular the testimony of Eugene Nelson and Elizabeth Dudek, which is found to be more credible, consistent, and reasonable than the testimony of Michael Carroll and Harold Luft, it is found that the Department's interpretation and application of the 350 standard is reasonable and consistent with the terms of Rule 10- 5.011(1)(f)11aI. It is also noted that if the interpretation urged by Memorial and Medical Center were to be followed, it is inexplicable how there could presently be two approved, but not operational, open heart programs in District 8. The Department has consistently applied this 350 standard since its adoption in 1983 by averaging caseloads at existing programs and reasonably projected caseloads for approved programs. To interpret this standard as urged by Memorial and Medical Center would impose a moratorium on new open heart surgery programs while there is an already approved, but not operational, program in a District, or while a newly operational program has not yet attained the 350 standard. There is no basis for this prohibitory interpretation which would not only reduce competition, but would also be inconsistent with sound health planning and the State Health Plan Objective 4.2, as discussed above. Quality of Care Venice is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Facilities for special care units, and it has been stipulated that it has a record of providing quality care in its existing programs and departments. On average, hospitals performing greater than 200 open heart procedures per year have superior surgical outcomes than hospitals doing less than 200 procedures. Mortality rates are significantly lower at hospitals performing more than 200 procedures annually than at those performing less. It was established that there is a direct relationship between volume of open heart surgical procedures and quality of care at facilities with open heart surgery programs. Therefore, the existence of more open heart programs than are truly needed in an area may result in some existing programs not achieving sufficient volume to assure patient safety and quality of care. Certainly, not every hospital should have an open heart program, but as long as there is sufficient volume to assure quality, the competition among programs will encourage quality care, and result in an overall increase in the quality of care provided at all departments in a hospital with an open heart program. Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)5d, Florida Administrative Code, was adopted by the Department in order to set forth the minimum volume deemed necessary to assure quality of care, and provides, in part: There shall be a minimum of 200 adult open heart procedures performed annually, within 3 years after initiation of service, in any institution in which open heart surgery is performed for adults. Although Venice urges that it will be able to meet this threshold level within three years, it failed to establish by competent substantial evidence that it would actually attract the patients necessary to perform either the number of open heart procedures projected in its application, or this minimum number of 200 procedures required by the Department to assure quality of care in its third year of operation, given the current pattern of physician referrals in the area, its market share in relation to those of Memorial and Medical Center, and actual utilization levels for the existing District 8 programs at Memorial and Southwest Regional Medical Center, as is more fully discussed below. Without the assurance of sufficient volume to meet the 200 procedure threshold established by the Department by Rule, the validity of which is not at issue in this case, Venice has failed to show that it will be able to achieve and maintain a patient volume in its proposed program which will assure quality of care in its proposed open heart surgery program. Availability and Access While the addition of the Venice program would obviously increase the availability of services in the District, open heart surgery services are already reasonably available in District 8, especially in view of there being two approved programs which will become operational before 1990, the horizon year in this case, in addition to the two existing programs. The two hour travel time standard is already being met in District 8, as stipulated to by the parties. Geographic accessibility will not be appreciably or significantly increased by this proposal since Venice's facility lies approximately midway between Memorial and Medical, which are sixty miles apart. There is significant excess capacity in existing and approved open heart surgery programs in District 8 during most of the year, especially at Memorial. Therefore, there is ready access to, and availability of open heart surgery services to patients in the District. Venice did not establish that approval of its application would enhance access to open heart surgery services for the medically indigent. Despite its assertion in its application that its program would be available to the underserved, there is no definite commitment to serve charity care patients as a percentage of total patient days or of total revenue. Venice has proposed to serve Medicaid patients at the level of 1.5% of total patient days, but Medicaid patients are currently receiving services through existing programs at substantially higher levels of commitment. The applicant has reserved the right to refuse non-emergency care to indigents. While it was established that unstable patients who have to be transferred from one hospital to another face increased risks, and that members of the medical staff at Venice feel that there are unacceptable delays in transferring patients who need open heart surgery from Venice to other facilities due to an asserted lack of available beds, it was not shown that such delays have actually jeopardized the safety of patients or resulted in a reduction in the quality of care received by patients to an unacceptable level. A delay in transferring a patient from one facility to another of from 6 to 8 hours is reasonable, and in line with experience nationally. The anecdotal evidence presented by Venice on this point was not competent and substantial, and in fact shows that the number of delays exceeding 8 hours has increased only slightly from 1986 to 1988, a condition that may be addressed in any event when the two approved programs become operational. Additionally, the applicant never formally shared any concerns about transfer delays with existing facilities in an effort to reduce such delays or to document extreme cases of delay. Transfer delays are exacerbated by seasonal increases in population in District 8, but there continues to be a reasonable likelihood that patient transfers can be accommodated, even during seasonal population increases, without adverse impacts to patient care. However, a large majority of open heart surgery cases are non- emergency that can be scheduled for surgery within 6 to 48 hours after diagnosis without any compromise in patient care. Emergency patients are given priority, and there are sufficient available beds to accommodate emergency patients, regardless of seasonal delays. Recent studies have shown that even emergency patients benefit from a delay of up to 24 hours in order to stabilize their condition rather than rushing them to surgery. In any event, such seasonal delays do not establish that there is a lack of available beds in District 8 which would require the approval of this application, especially with two approved programs already in the District which will become operational by 1990. Alternatives Considered Venice did not fully explore alternatives, including less costly alternatives, to a new program at its facility, such as a joint or shared program with an existing provider. In fact, a consultant retained by Venice recommended on September 8, 1988, that Venice pursue a joint program with Memorial, but Venice never approached Memorial to ascertain if its administrators or medical staff would be interested in such a joint effort, even though these two hospitals have previously cooperated in providing joint services in obstetrics, shared nursing services, and jointly provided emergency services to the Town of North Port. Memorial previously loaned Venice 24 nursing full time equivalent positions (FTE) to fully staff a 35 bed unit at Venice during a critical nursing shortage. There are existing or approved open heart surgery programs at Tampa General Hospital, Manatee Memorial Hospital in Bradenton, Memorial, Medical Center, and Southwest Regional Medical Center in Ft. Myers. In addition, there are additional approved programs at HCA Blake Memorial Hospital in Bradenton and at Lee Memorial in Ft. Myers. Venice did not consider these existing and approved programs as alternatives to its proposed new program. It was not established that Venice has attempted, or proposed to establish a joint open heart surgery program with any of these facilities, or to secure staff privileges for its cardiologists at Memorial, or any of these other hospitals. Regionalization of health care services for open heart surgery patients is being encouraged and reviewed by the Medicare program. Under this concept, primary care hospitals would treat common diagnoses and offer common treatments, while regional referral hospitals would provide specialized care and offer more complex services referred to as tertiary level services. Open heart surgery is a specialized, tertiary care service. Venice did not consider regionalization or establish why it would not be appropriate in District 8. Personnel Availability and Costs There has been a long-term shortage of nurses, particularly in intensive care and open heart surgery, which even Venice's expert in nursing administration recognized and acknowledged. This shortage is present in Sarasota County not merely for nursing staff, but also for technical support staff, and is particularly acute in operating room and critical care personnel. While Venice does have nursing staff with open heart surgery experience, it would have to recruit additional nurses to fully staff this new program. It is not always possible to fill open heart surgery or critical care nursing positions with trained personnel. Memorial presently has 32 registered nursing vacancies, including 5 open heart surgery and 3 open heart critical care RN positions, despite a full-time nurse recruiter and an aggressive recruiting program. Because of this critical shortage, Memorial has been forced to use "traveler" or temporary nurses in its open heart surgery unit. In contrast to Venice's lack of actual experience in attracting and training open heart surgery and critical care nurses, Memorial established that in Sarasota County, it takes 6 to 8 months and costs $15,000 to $16,000 to train open heart surgery nurses, and 6 to 8 weeks to- train open heart critical care nurses. Venice will compete with Memorial and Medical Center in attracting open heart surgery nursing and technical staff. There has been a recent instance of a nurse leaving Venice to join Memorial, being trained as an open heart surgery nurse at Memorial, and then leaving to return to Venice. With the limited pool of available, trained open heart surgery nurses, and in view of the two approved open heart surgery programs in District 8 which need to be staffed and become operational prior to 1990, the implementation of the Venice program will have an adverse impact on the ability of existing and approved programs to attract and maintain trained open heart surgery nursing and technical staff, and can reasonably be expected to increase personnel costs for these providers. Venice proposes to add two cardiovascular surgeons to its medical staff prior to opening its open heart surgery program, and to retain a consulting firm to assist in recruiting these physicians. However, the consulting firm contacted by Venice has not agreed to accept this recruiting assignment. Memorial has been trying to recruit an additional open heart surgeon for over a year, without success. Venice has been trying to recruit a neurosurgeon, neurologist or cardiologist for almost a year, without success. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that Venice will have difficulty recruiting two cardiovascular surgeons in less that one year. The salaries and benefits in Venice's application are generally reasonable, including the proposed salary for a perfusionist, although it did slightly underproject open heart surgery nursing salaries. However, its estimate of the number of additional positions, or FTE, which would be required throughout the hospital to accommodate the workload resulting from an open heart surgery program is incomplete. For example, an additional 3.5 FTE that would be needed for the clinical lab and donor center is not reflected in the application, although the costs associated therewith are included. Venice does have a record of successfully staffing critical care services, such as its open heart catheterization and thoracic surgery programs, without attracting staff from other hospitals in the District. It does propose to have a training program for open heart surgery personnel, and has an affiliation with nurse training programs at four universities. Financial Feasibility In its application, Venice projects that it will perform 125 open heart surgery procedures in its first year of operation, 175 in its second year, and 211 in its third year of operation. However, it is specifically found that these projections are not reasonable, based upon the testimony and evidence received. The testimony and exhibits prepared by Mark Richardson and Michael Carroll, who were accepted as experts in health planning, as well as the testimony offered by Rick Knapp, an expert in health care finance, was more credible and persuasive than, and outweighs the testimony and exhibits prepared by Eugene Nelson, an expert in health care planning, Dr. Henry W. Zaretsky, an expert in health care economics and planning, and Michael Rolph, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance and accounting. Initially, Venice relies upon the Department's Rule for determining the numeric need for additional programs, discussed above, and divides the Department's number of projected procedures in District 8 (1683) by 350 to arrive at the need for an additional program in 1990 by rounding 4.8 up to 5. However, Venice has conducted no analysis of market share or physician referral patterns to test the reliability of this projected need. Thus, this projection of numeric need is made in a vacuum, without any reference to the actual number of procedures already being performed, or actual market shares and referral patterns which are critical to an understanding of patient and physician preferences which have existed, and are likely to continue to be experienced, in the future. Venice's administration and members of its medical staff consider Memorial's open heart surgery program to be excellent and convenient to Venice's patients. It is unlikely that all five of Venice's cardiologists will refer all of their open heart surgery patients to Venice, and in fact, a member of Venice's medical staff who supports this application testified that he would only refer about half of his patients to Venice. Since most open heart patients are referred, and since there is no apparent dissatisfaction with the quality of Memorial's program, existing market share and referral patterns would likely continue and should have been considered in any meaningful analysis presented by the applicant. For the July, 1990 horizon in District 8, the Department's numeric need methodology projects that there will be 1683 open heart surgery procedures. With referral patterns in place and two existing providers with operational and well regarded programs, it is unlikely that Venice will have an automatic, equal share of the District's pool of open heart patients, or even that it will perform the 125 procedures in its first year, and 175 procedures shown on its pro forma for the second year of operation. In fact, the two existing providers, Memorial and Southwest Regional Medical Center, already performed 1637 procedures in 1988, leaving fewer than 50 procedures projected through the Department's numeric need methodology for the two already approved programs and Venice, if it were to be approved. Memorial has been performing over 600 procedures per year from 1986 through 1988, and has the capacity to perform up to 1,000 procedures annually. Thus, the existing and approved programs have more than sufficient capacity to absorb growth in open heart surgery volumes which are being projected. A second method Venice uses to justify its projected number of open heart procedures is to quantify the population of Venice's service area, and then apply the Department's open heart surgery use rate to that population. This assumes that virtually all of Sarasota County's population growth will occur in the south county area, which is an inaccurate assumption, and also assumes that Venice will capture all of the open heart surgeries in its service area, which is unreasonable given existing market shares and referral patterns. Memorial presently has a 42% market share of District 8 open heart surgery patients. To perform 200 procedures in its third year of operation, Venice would have to capture an 83% market share, and there is no basis to find that it would be successful in attracting this unreasonably high market share in its primary service area. In fact, Venice projects that it will only achieve a 45% and 61% market share in the first and second year of operation, respectively. Applying these percentages, Venice will perform 99 procedures in its first year, not 125, and 140 in its second year, not 175. It must be noted that Venice's consultant, which had recommended that it explore a joint or shared program with Memorial, had projected market shares of only 29% in the first year, 35% in the second year, and 45% in year three. Using these figures, Venice would only perform 63 procedures in its first year of operation, 81 in the second year, and 102 in the third. Given this level of operation in its second year of operation (81 procedures), the Venice program would lose $334,000 in its second year, and therefore, not be financially feasible. The third method used by the applicant to support its projection of the number of procedures it will perform, which is the basis of its assertion of financial feasibility, is based upon its assessment of cardiac catheterization volumes and applies a conversion factor to determine the number of open heart surgery procedures that will result. This analysis again assumes that it would receive a 100% market share, and does not take into account referral patterns and satisfaction with existing programs. In addition, while the growth of Venice's cardiac cath volume has stabilized, and may even be decreasing, this analysis incorrectly uses a l5%-16% annual growth rate in cardiac caths through 1990, which is unrealistic and not supported by the record. Venice relies upon the expert testimony of Eugene Nelson to establish that the use rate for open heart surgery has been increasing since 1985, and will continue to increase. The use rate increased over 53% between 1985 and 1988, and Nelson projects a continued 15.3% annual increase in the use rate through 1991. Under his projections the use rate per 100,000 population will be 235.79 in 1990, and 257.97 in 1991. Nelson's projected continued annual increase in the use rate of over 15%, and the use rates he projects for 1990 and 1991, are unreasonable. He has ignored the fact that annual increases in the use rate have been steadily decreasing from 17.5% between 1985 and 1986, to 13% between 1987 and 1988, as testified to be all health planners, and as even he acknowledged. Applying this decrease in the annual use rate increase, it would be increasing only 9% in 1990, and this would result in a total of 2108 procedures that could be projected to be performed in 1990. With the two existing programs in District 8 already performing 1600 procedures, a figure that will reasonably grow by 1990, there will be less than 444 procedures for the two already approved programs and Venice, if it were to be approved. Given this fact, which is even acknowledged by Venice, it is unlikely that Venice will be able to reach its projected number of cases in its first two years of operation in order to achieve financial feasibility. As recognized by Harold Urschel, Jr., M.D., who was called by Venice as an expert in cardiovascular surgery and open heart surgery programs, for the next five years open heart surgery volumes nationally will be "stable", although they "probably" will go up some. Open heart use rates have plateaued on a national level, with an average national use rate of l80~per 100,000 population. This use rate compares favorably with the Department's current use rate of 183 for District 8, and further questions the reasonableness of Nelson's projected use rates of almost 236 and 258 in 1990 and 1991, respectively. These use rates have stabilized and shown a marked decrease in their rates of increase due to the development of acceptable alternatives to open heart surgery, and close review of the necessity of this treatment by third party payors. As testified to by Nelson, there is a danger that an excess of open heart surgery programs in an area will exacerbate an already stabilized or flattened use rate, and may cause it to decline. He cited both the Miami and Jacksonville areas as examples of Districts in which there appear to be an excess of programs, with a resulting decline in the District's use rate, and inability of a substantial number of programs to even achieve the requisite level of 200 procedures per year to maintain quality of care. When it comes to open heart surgery programs, more is not necessarily better and may actually result in less, according to Nelson. Even applying Nelson's inflated use rate of 236 per 100,000 population in 1990 to the Venice service area population, the applicant will not achieve its projected number of procedures when the market share of 29% in 1990 predicted by Venice's consultant is considered. Applying its consultant's projected market shares, Venice will realize only 81 procedures in the first year, 98 in year two, and 126 procedures in the third year. Since Venice's pro forma bases its assessment of financial feasibility upon its projections of 125 procedures in year one, and 175 in year two, and since the applicant has not established the reasonableness of these projections, the long- term financial feasibility of this project has not been shown. Further, Venice has also failed to establish that it can reasonably be expected to achieve the level of 200 procedures in its third year, and therefore, it has also failed to show that it can achieve that minimum level which the Department, by Rule, requires to ensure quality of care. In other respects, the assumptions used by Venice in its pro forma are reasonable, including its 2% inflation factor for income, bad debt, payor mix and utilization by class of pay, projected charges, expenses, and depreciation. Effect on Competition and Costs There will not be a significant difference between the charges proposed by Venice and the actual charges at Memorial. The applicant projects that 80% of its open heart surgery will be reimbursed through Medicare, which reimburses on a fixed fee basis to which hospital charges have no direct relevance. Therefore, there would be no appreciable impact on costs in the health care community if this application is approved. As previously discussed, there would be greater competition among existing and approved programs in District 8 for trained open heart surgery and critical care nurses, which are in short supply. While Venice has projected open heart surgery nurses' salaries at a somewhat unrealistically low level, it can reasonably be expected that greater competition for trained personnel who are in short supply will eventually result in higher salaries and health care costs. If this application is approved, the cost to transport patients who require open heart surgery from Venice to another facility would be eliminated. This would mean that patients could avoid a $235 to $250 ambulance charge for transfer to Memorial, a $450 charge for ambulance transport to Tampa General, or a $1,000 to $1,300 helicopter charge for transport to Tampa General Hospital. This savings is not significant when compared to total charges for open heart surgery procedures. Impact on Existing and Approved Programs As discussed above, approval of the Venice application will adversely affect the ability of existing providers to attract and retain trained open heart surgery and critical care RNs due to the already existing shortage of personnel to fill these positions, and the fact that two already approved programs will become operational prior to Venice's program, if it were to be approved. Although Memorial has the capacity to perform 1,000 open heart surgery procedures annually, Venice's expert, Eugene Nelson, projects that if the Venice program is approved, Memorial will experience only a 12% growth between 1988 to 1991, and will only perform 771 cases in 1991. Curiously, he then concludes that this represents no impact on Memorial. The proposed primary service area for the Venice program and Memorial's primary service area completely overlap, and they are, therefore, competing for the same open heart surgery patients. Venice has been referring 85%-87% of its patients who require open heart surgery to Memorial. If Venice had its own open heart surgery program, the need for transfer and referral would be obviated. In the second year of operation, Venice projects on its pro forma that it will perform 175 cases. Using its own projection of 85%, 149 to 150 of these cases would have been transferred to Memorial, but for the Venice program. If the more realistic number of 81 procedures in the second year of operation for the Venice program is used, 69 cases which would have otherwise been transferred to Memorial would stay at Venice. Rick Knapp, who was accepted as an expert in health care finance, provided a reasonable estimate of financial impact upon Memorial, given these projected losses in patient referrals. He concluded that Memorial would experience a net income reduction of approximately $1.4 million if Venice's projection of 175 cases in its second year is correct, and Memorial lost 149 to 150 referrals. Even Michael Rolph, who was called as an expert in health care finance by Venice, testified that Memorial would loose $2 million in net revenue if it lost 100 open heart surgery patients. If the more realistic figure of 81 cases in the second year were used, there would also be a net income loss for Memorial, but more importantly for purposes of this case, it was established through Knapp's testimony that Venice's program would lose $334,000, and not be financially feasible. It is, of course, recognized that Memorial would still experience a growth in its absolute number of open heart procedures due to population increases and increases in the use rate. However, any such increase in the absolute number of procedures performed at Memorial through growth does not obviate the fact that the total number of procedures it would have performed will be significantly reduced by the loss of referrals from Venice, if this application is approved. This is particularly noteworthy given its excess capacity. Memorial's most recent annual gross income was $160 million, with an operating margin (profit) of between $3.5 and $3.9 million. Therefore, losses which would result from the Venice program would not threaten the financial viability of Memorial, but would be significant in terms of its open heart surgery program. Jerry Sommerville, an expert in hospital finance, estimated that 9% of Medical Center's open heart surgery cases would come from the Venice area, which is included in Medical Center's secondary service area. If these cases are lost to Medical Center with the opening of the Venice program, Medical Center's projected 150 cases in 1990 would be reduced by 13.5, and in 1991 its projection of 200 cases would be reduced by 18. These reductions would result in a net revenue loss for Medical Center of $254,000 with a gross marginal loss of $62,800 in 1990, and a net revenue loss of $329,500 with a gross marginal loss of $95,200 in 1991. This represents a significant reduction in income for this open heart surgery program in its first years of operation. Medical Center's most recent annual profit margin was approximately $1 million.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order which: (l) Denies Memorial's Motion for Summary Adjudication; Dismisses Medical Center as a party due to a lack of standing; and Denies Venice's CON Application Number 5715. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1989. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NOS. 89-1412 & 89-1413) Rulings on the Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Findings 6, 17. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Findings 6, 9. Rejected as a conclusion of law. 7-8. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 12. Adopted in Finding 15; Rejected in Finding 16. Adopted in Finding 17. Rejected in Finding 41, as otherwise as irrelevant. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings 41, 42. Rejected as irrelevant. 15-18. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 42. 19. Adopted in Finding 43. 20-21. Rejected in Finding 43. Adopted in Finding 38. Adopted and Rejected in Finding 53. Adopted and Rejected in Finding 57. Rejected in Finding 57. Rejected in Finding 55. Adopted and Rejected in Findings 55, 56. Adopted in Finding 57. Rejected in Finding 57. Adopted and Rejected in Finding 57. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Findings 12, 20 and 39; Rejected in Findings 53, 55 and 56. Adopted in part in Finding 27, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected in Finding 44. Adopted in Finding 44. Adopted in Finding 37; Rejected in Findings 38-47. Rejected in Finding 41. Rejected in Finding 25. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected in Finding 26. Adopted in Finding 21. Adopted in Finding 43. Adopted in Finding 34, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected in Finding 24. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Finding 11. Adopted in Finding 35. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings 34, 35. 50-54. Adopted in Finding 48. 55-61. Adopted in Finding 11. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 31. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 35. Adopted in Finding 36; Rejected in Finding 35 and otherwise as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 36; Rejected in Finding 33. Adopted in Finding 35. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 36. Adopted in Finding 31. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as unnecessary. 73-75. Rejected in Finding 27 and otherwise as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding 27. Adopted in Finding 22. Rejected in Finding 27 and otherwise as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 51. 80-81. Rejected in Findings 28, 29. 82-85. Rejected in Finding 49 and otherwise as irrelevant. 86. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 87-94. Rejected in Finding 49 and otherwise as irrelevant. 95. Adopted in Finding 22. 96-97. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary, and simply a summation of and argument on the evidence. 98. Adopted in Finding 11; Rejected in Finding 24. Rulings on the Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 6. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 17. Adopted in Finding 17. 7-9. Adopted in Finding 18. 10. Adopted in Findings 18, 22. 11-12. Adopted in Finding 22. 13-14. Rejected in Finding 20. 15-17. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 18. Adopted in Finding 18. 19. Adopted in Finding 22; Rejected in Finding 20. 20. Adopted in Finding 30. 21. Adopted in part in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 22-23. Adopted in Findings 15, 16. 24. Adopted in Findings 4, 25. 25. Adopted in Findings 25, 39. 26. Adopted in Finding 26. 27-34. Adopted in Finding 27. 35. Adopted in Findings 22, 23 and 24. 36. Adopted in Findings 28, 29. 37. Rejected as unnecessary. 38-43. Adopted in Findings 28, 29. 44. Adopted in Findings 31, 32. 45. Rejected as unnecessary. 46-49. Adopted in Finding 34. 50. Adopted in Finding 24. 51. Adopted in Findings 24, 37. 52-55. Adopted in Finding 38. 56. Adopted in Finding 39. 57-61. Adopted in Finding 40. 62-64. Adopted in Finding 41. 65-66. Adopted in Findings 42, 43. 67. Adopted in Finding 44. 68-69. Adopted in Finding 46. 70. Adopted in Finding 47. 71. Rejected in Finding 48. 72. Adopted in Finding 40. 73. Adopted in Finding 47. 74-75. Adopted in Finding 49. 76. Adopted in Findings 55, 57. 77. Adopted in Findings 50, 52. 78. Adopted in Findings 31, 50 and 52. 79-82. Adopted in Finding 32. 83. Adopted in Findings 33, 50 and 52. 84. Adopted in Finding 33. 85. Adopted in Finding 32. 86-87. Adopted in Findings 33, 50 and 52. 88. Adopted in Findings 28, 29. 89. Adopted in Findings 24 through 27. 90. Adopted in Finding 6. 91-92. Rejected in Finding 7. 93. Adopted and Rejected in Finding 8. 94. Rejected in Finding 14 and otherwise as unnecessary. 95. Adopted in Findings 15, 16. 96. Rejected in Findings 14, 15. 97-99. Adopted and Rejected in Findings 12, 13. 100. Rejected in Finding 9. 101. Adopted in Findings 6, 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore C. Eastmoore, Esquire A. Lamar Matthews, Jr., Esquire P. O. Box 3258 Sarasota, FL 33577 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire The Perkins House 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Charles A. Stampelos, Esquire P. O. Box 2174 Tallahassee, FL 32316 Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Fort Knox Executive Center 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308 Kenneth F. Hoffman, Esquire P. O. Box 6507 Tallahassee, FL 32314 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Gregory Coler, Secretary 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the second and third sentences of Rule 59C-1.033(7)(c), Florida Administrative Code, are invalid? If so, whether they may be severed from the remainder of the Rule?
Findings Of Fact Subparagraph (7)(c) of the Rule states: Regardless of whether need for a new adult open heart surgery program is shown in paragraph (b) above, a new adult open heart surgery program will not normally be approved for a district if the approval would reduce the 12 month total at an existing adult open heart surgery program in the district below 350 open heart surgery operations. In determining whether this condition applies, the Agency will calculate (Uc x Px)(OP + 1). If the result is less than 350, no additional open heart surgery program shall normally be approved. (Emphasis supplied to indicate the challenged portion of the Rule.) The first sentence sets forth the objective and intent of subparagraph (7)(c) of the Rule: unless there are "not normal circumstances," a new open heart surgery program will not be approved in a district if the approval would reduce the volume below 350 procedures annually at any existing OHS provider in the district. This is the intent and objective of the sentence despite the use of the word "an" to modify the term "existing adult open heart surgery program in the district" used toward the end of the sentence. As was testified by the Agency representative: [T]he entire notion of the rule, the entire intent of the rule is that existing providers maintain the 350 level. I mean, [there's] no question about that, so that has to be considered. (Tr. 3287). Indeed, intent that it is desirable for individual existing OHS providers to perform 350 procedures in 12-month periods is expressed elsewhere in the Rule. And that goal is so desirable, in fact, that new programs in a district are not under normal circumstances to be approved if the 350 level has not been met recently by an existing provider in the district: (7) Adult Open Heart Surgery Program Need Determination. (a) A new adult open heart surgery program shall not normally be approved in the district if any of the following conditions exist: * * * One or more of the operational adult open heart surgery programs in the district that were operational for at least 12 months as of 3 months prior to the beginning date of the quarter of the publication of the fixed need pool performed less than 350 adult open heart surgery operations during the 12 months ending 3 months prior to the beginning date of the quarter of the publication of the fixed need pool; . . . Rule 59C-1.033, F.A.C., (e.s.). Given the clear intent of the Rule as a whole and of the first sentence of subparagraph (7)(c), the formula in the challenged portion of the Rule (the "formula"), should be used to measure and determine whether the approval of a new OHS program would reduce the annual volume of OHS procedures at any existing OHS provider below 350. Under the formula, adult open heart surgeries are projected for each service district. The resulting number is divided by the number of existing OHS programs plus one new OHS program. If calculation results in a number less than 350, the third sentence of the subparagraph purports to carry out the intent of the first sentence of subparagraph (7)(c), that is, "no additional open heart surgery program shall normally be approved." For example, assume 3000 OHS are projected for a service district with five existing programs. Under the formula, 3000 would be divided by six (the existing five plus the proposed program). The result is 500, and the operation of the subparagraph does not prohibit a new OHS program. If, on the other hand, a volume for the district of 3000 were projected and there were eight existing providers, the addition of a ninth program would bring the average below 350 and, by operation of the third sentence, prohibit the approval of a new program. The challenged portion of the Rule, however, does not necessarily implement the objective of the first sentence of subparagraph (7)(c). The calculations in the challenged portion do not determine whether the volume at any specific provider would fall below 350 as the result of a new program. Instead, the calculations measure only the "average" volumes at existing programs plus one new one. A program operating slightly above 350 (such as CRMC), with the addition of a new program (such as the one proposed by Venice) in close enough proximity that their primary service areas significantly overlap, could drop below 350, even though the number of OHS procedures in the district is calculated district-wide to increase and even though the average calculated by the formula exceeds 350. Such a result increases in likelihood when one of the providers in the district (such as Memorial) is projected to have volume significantly above 350. Illustrations of the ineffectiveness of the challenged portion for achieving the clear objective set forth in the first sentence of subpararaph (7)(c) are in CRMC Exhibit no. 58. For example, in 1997, existing OHS providers in District 8 had an average volume of 716. That year CRMC performed only 369 OHS procedures. Had Venice commenced an OHS program in 1997, adverse impact analysis and service area overlap as used by Mr. Baehr in this proceeding show that CRMC would have dropped below 350 procedures in 1997, while the district average would have remained well above 350 despite the addition of a new program.
The Issue Whether the Certificate of Need application (CON 9239) of Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Brandon Regional Hospital ("Brandon") to establish an open heart surgery program at its hospital facility in Hillsborough County should be granted?
Findings Of Fact District 6 District 6 is one of eleven health service planning districts in Florida set up by the "Health Facility and Services Development Act," Sections 408.031-408.045, Florida Statutes. See Section 408.031, Florida Statutes. The district is comprised of five counties: Hillsborough, Manatee, Polk, Hardee, and Highlands. Section 408.032(5), Florida Statutes. Of the five counties, three have providers of adult open heart surgery services: Hillsborough with three providers, Manatee with two, and Polk with one. There are in District 6 at present, therefore, a total of six existing providers. Existing Providers Hillsborough County The three providers of open heart surgery services ("OHS") in Hillsborough County are Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc., d/b/a Tampa General Hospital ("Tampa General"), St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. ("St. Joseph's"), and University Community Hospital, Inc., d/b/a University Community Hospital ("UCH"). For the most part, Interstate 75 runs in a northerly and southerly direction dividing Hillsborough County roughly in half. If the interstate is considered to be a line dividing the eastern half of the county from the western, all three existing providers are in the western half of the county within the incorporated area of the county's major population center, the City of Tampa. Tampa General Opened approximately a century ago, Tampa General has been at its present location in the City of Tampa on Davis Island at the north end of Tampa Bay since 1927. The mission of Tampa General is three-fold. First, it provides a range of care (from simple to complex) for the west central region of the state. Second, it supports both the teaching and research activities of the University of South Florida College of Medicine. Finally and perhaps most importantly, it serves as the "health care safety net" for the people of Hillsborough County. Evidence of its status as the safety net for those its serves is its Case Mix Index for Medicare patients: 2.01. At such a level, "the case mix at Tampa General is one of the highest in the nation in Medicare population." (Tr. 2452). In keeping with its mission of being the county's health care safety net, Tampa General is a full-service acute care hospital. It also provides services unique to the county and the Tampa Bay area: a Level I trauma center, a regional burn center and adult solid organ transplant programs. Tampa General is licensed for 877 beds. Of these, 723 are for acute care, 31 are designated skilled nursing beds, 59 are comprehensive rehabilitation beds, 22 are psychiatry beds, and 42 are neonatal intensive care beds (18 Level II and 24 Level III). Of the 723 acute care beds, 160 are set aside for cardiac care, although they may be occupied from time-to-time by non-cardiac care patients. Tampa General is a statutory teaching hospital. It has an affiliation with the University of South Florida College of Medicine. It offers 13 residency programs, serving approximately 200 medical residents. Tampa General offers diagnostic and interventional cardiac catheterization services in four laboratories dedicated to such services. It has four operating rooms dedicated to open heart surgery. The range of open heart surgery services provided by Tampa General includes heart transplants. Care of the open heart patient immediately after surgery is in a dedicated cardiovascular intensive care unit of 18 beds. Following stay in the intensive care unit, the patient is cared for in either a 10-bed intermediate care unit or a 30- bed telemetry unit. Tampa General's full-service open heart surgery program provides high quality of care. St. Joseph's Founded by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegheny, New York, St. Joseph's is an acute care hospital located on Martin Luther King Boulevard in an "inner city kind of area" (Tr. 1586) of the City of Tampa near the geographic center of Hillsborough County. On the hospital campus sit three separate buildings: the main hospital, consisting of 559 beds; across the street, St. Joseph's Women's Hospital, a 197-bed facility dedicated to the care of women; and, opened in 1998, Tampa Children's Hospital, a 120-bed free-standing facility that offers pediatric services and Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care services. In addition to the women's and pediatric facilities, and consistent with the full-service nature of the hospital, St. Joseph's provides behavioral health and oncology services, and most pertinent to this proceeding, open heart surgery and related cardiovascular services. Designated as a Level 2 trauma center, St. Joseph's has a large and active emergency department. There were 90,211 visits to the Emergency Room in 1999, alone. Of the patients admitted annually, fifty-five percent are admitted through the Emergency Room. The formal mission of St. Joseph's organization is to take care of and improve the health of the community it serves. Another aspect of the mission passed down from its religious founders is to take care of the "marginalized, . . . the people that in many senses cannot take care of themselves, [those to whom] society has . . . closed [its] eyes . . .". (Tr. 1584). In keeping with its mission, it is St. Joseph's policy to provide care to anyone who seeks its hospital services without regard to ability to pay. In 1999, the hospital provided $33 million in charity care, as that term is defined by AHCA. In total, St. Joseph's provided $121 million in unfunded care during the same year. Not surprisingly, St. Joseph's is also a disproportionate Medicaid provider. The only hospital in the district that provides both adult and pediatric open heart surgery services, St. Joseph's has three dedicated OHS surgical suites, a 14-bed unit dedicated to cardiovascular intensive care for its adult OHS patients, a 12-bed coronary care unit and 86 progressive care beds, all with telemetry capability. St. Joseph's provides high quality of care in its OHS. UCH University Community Hospital, Inc., is a private, not-for-profit corporation. It operates two hospital facilities: the main hospital ("UCH") a 431-bed hospital on Fletcher Avenue in north Tampa, and a second 120-bed hospital in Carrollwood. UCH is accredited by the JCAHO "with commendation," the highest rating available. It provides patient care regardless of ability to pay. UCH's cardiac surgery program is called the "Pepin Heart & Vascular Institute," after Art Pepin, "a 14-year heart transplant recipient [and] . . . the oldest heart transplant recipient in the nation alive today." (Tr. 2841). A Temple Terrace resident, Mr. Pepin also helped to fund the start of the institute. Its service area for tertiary services, including OHS, includes all of Hillsborough County, and extends into south Pasco County and Polk County. The Pepin Institute has excellent facilities and equipment. It has three dedicated OHS operating suites, three fully-equipped "state-of-the-art" cardiac catheterization laboratories equipped with special PTCA or angioplasty devices, and several cardiology care units specifically for OHS/PTCA services. Immediately following surgery, OHS patients go to a dedicated 8-bed cardiovascular intensive care unit. From there patients proceed to a dedicated 20-bed progressive care unit ("PCU"), comprised of all private rooms. There is also a 24-bed PCU dedicated to PTCA patients. There is another 22-bed interventional unit that serves as an overflow unit for patients receiving PTCA or cardiac catheterization. UCH has a 22-bed medical cardiology unit for chest pain observation, congestive heart failure, and other cardiac disorders. Staffing these units requires about 110 experienced, full-time employees. UCH has a special "chest pain" Emergency Room with specially-trained cardiac nurses and defined protocols for the treatment of chest pain and heart attacks. UCH offers a free van service for its UCH patients and their families that operates around the clock. As in the case of the other two existing providers of OHS services in Hillsborough Counties, UCH provides a full range of cardiovascular services at high quality. Manatee County The two existing providers of adult open heart surgery services in Manatee County are Manatee Memorial Hospital, Inc., and Blake Medical Center, Inc. Neither are parties in this proceeding. Although Manatee Memorial filed a petition for formal administrative hearing seeking to overturn the preliminary decision of the Agency, the petition was withdrawn before the case reached hearing. Polk County The existing provider of adult open heart surgery services in Polk County is Lakeland Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("Lakeland"). Licensed for 851 beds, Lakeland is a large, not-for- profit, tertiary regional hospital. In 1999, Lakeland admitted approximately 30,000 patients. In fiscal 1999, there were about 105,000 visits to Lakeland's Emergency Room. Lakeland provides a wide range of acute care services, including OHS and diagnostic and therapeutic cardiac catheterization. It draws its OHS patients from the Lakeland urban area, the rest of Polk County, eastern Hillsborough County (particularly from Plant City), and some of the surrounding counties. Lakeland has a high quality OHS program that provides high quality of care to its patients. It has two dedicated OHS surgical suites and a third surgical suite equipped and ready for OHS procedures on an as-needed basis. Its volume for the last few years has been relatively flat. Lakeland offers interventional radiology services, a trauma center, a high-risk obstetrics service, oncology, neonatal intensive care, pediatric intensive care, radiation therapy, alcohol and chemical dependency, and behavioral sciences services. Lakeland treats all patients without regard to their ability to pay, and provides a substantial amount of charity care, amounting in fiscal year 1999 to $20 million. The Applicant Brandon Regional Hospital ("Brandon") is a 255-bed hospital located in Brandon, Florida, an unincorporated area of Hillsborough County east of Interstate 75. Included among Brandon's 255 beds are 218 acute care beds, 15 hospital-based skilled nursing unit beds, 14 tertiary Level II neonatal intensive care unit ("NICU") beds, and 8 tertiary Level III NICU beds. Brandon offers a wide array of medical specialties and services to its patients including cardiology; internal medicine; critical care medicine; family practice; nephrology; pulmonary medicine; oncology/hematology; infectious disease; neurology; psychiatry; endocrinology; gastroenterology; physical medicine; rehabilitation; radiation oncology; pathology; respiratory therapy; and anesthesiology. Brandon operates a mature cardiology program which includes inpatient diagnostic cardiac catheterization, outpatient diagnostic cardiac catheterization, electrocardiography, stress testing, and echocardiography. The Brandon medical staff includes 22 Board-certified cardiologists who practice both interventional and invasive cardiology. Board certification is a prerequisite to maintaining cardiology staff privileges at Brandon. Brandon's inpatient diagnostic cardiac catheterization program was initiated in 1989 and has performed in excess of 800 inpatient diagnostic cardiac catheterization procedures per year since 1996. Brandon's daily census has increased from 159 to 187 for the period 1997 to 1999 commensurate with the burgeoning population growth in Brandon's primary service area. Brandon's Emergency Room is the third busiest in Hillsborough County and has more visits than Tampa General's Emergency Room. From 1997- 1999, Brandon's Emergency Room visits increased from 43,000 to 53,000 per year and at the time of hearing were expected to increase an additional 5-6 percent during the year 2000. Brandon has also recently expanded many services to accommodate the growing health care needs of the Brandon community. For example, Brandon doubled the square footage of its Emergency Room and added 17 treatment rooms. It has also implemented an outpatient diagnostic and rehabilitation center, increased the number of labor, delivery and recovery suites, and created a high-risk ante-partum observation unit. Brandon was recently approved for 5 additional tertiary Level II NICU beds and 3 additional tertiary Level III NICU beds which increased Brandon's Level II/III NICU bed complement to 22 beds. Brandon is a Level 5 hospital within HCA's internal ranking system, which is the company's highest facility level in terms of service, revenue, and patient service area population. Brandon has been ranked as one of the Nation's top 100 hospitals by HCIA/Mercer, Inc., based on Brandon's clinical and financial performance. The Proposal On September 15, 1999, Brandon submitted to AHCA CON Application 9239, its third application for an open heart surgery program in the past few years. (CON 9085 and 9169, the two earlier applications, were both denied.) The second of the three, CON 9169, sought approval on the basis of the same two "not normal" circumstances alleged by Brandon to justify approval in this proceeding. CON 9239 addresses the Agency's January 2002 planning horizon. Brandon proposes to construct two dedicated cardiovascular operating rooms ("CV-OR"), a six-bed dedicated cardiovascular intensive care unit ("CVICU"), a pump room and sterile prep room all located in close proximity on Brandon's first floor. The costs, methods of construction, and design of Brandon's proposed CV-OR, CVICU, pump room, and sterile prep room are reasonable. As a condition of CON approval, Brandon will contribute $100,000 per year for five years to the Hillsborough County Health Care Program for use in providing health care to the homeless, indigent, and other needy residents of Hillsborough County. The administration at Brandon is committed to establishing an adult open heart surgery program. The proposal is supported by the medical and nursing staff. It is also supported by the Brandon community. The Brandon Community in East Hillsborough County Brandon, Florida, is a large unincorporated community in Hillsborough County, east of Interstate 75. The Brandon area is one of the fastest growing in the state. In the last ten years alone, the area's population has increased from approximately 90,000 to 160,000. An incorporated Brandon municipality (depending on the boundaries of the incorporation) has the potential to be the eighth largest city in Florida. The Brandon community's population is projected to further increase by at least 50,000 over the next five to ten years. Brandon Regional Hospital's primary service area not only encompasses the Brandon community, but further extends throughout Hillsborough County to a populous of nearly 285,000 persons. The population of Brandon's primary service area is projected to increase to 309,000 by the year 2004, of which approximately 32,000 are anticipated to be over the age of 65, making Brandon's population "young" relative to much of the rest of the State. The community of Brandon has attracted several new large housing developments which are likely to accelerate its projected growth. According to the Hillsborough County City- County Planning Commission, six of the eleven largest subdivisions of single-family homes permitted in 1998 are located nearby. For example, the infrastructure is in place for an 8,000-acre housing development east of Brandon which consists of 7,500 homes and is projected to bring in 30,000 people over the next 5-10 years. Two other large housing developments will bring an additional 5,000-10,000 persons to the Brandon area. The community of Brandon is also an attractive area for relocating businesses. Recent additions to the Brandon area include, among others, CitiGroup Corporation, Atlantic Lucent Technologies, Household Finance, Ford Motor Credit, and Progressive Insurance. CitiGroup Corporation alone supplemented the area's population with approximately 5,000 persons. The community of Brandon has experienced growth in the development of health care facilities with 5 new assisted living facilities and one additional assisted living facility under construction. The average age of the residents of these facilities is much higher than of the Brandon area as a whole. Existing Providers' Distance from Brandon's PSA Brandon's primary service area ("PSA") is comprised of 12 zip code areas "in and around Brandon, essentially eastern Hillsborough County." (Tr. 1071). Using the center of each zip code in Brandon's primary service area as the location for each resident of the zip code area, the residents of Brandon's PSA are an average of 15 miles from Tampa General, 16.4 miles from St. Joseph's, 17.3 miles from UCH and 24.6 miles from Lakeland Regional Medical Center. In contrast, they are only 7.7 miles from Brandon Regional Hospital. Using the same methodology, the residents of Brandon's PSA are an average of more than 40 miles from Blake Medical Center (44.9 miles) and Manatee Memorial (41 miles). Numeric Need Publication Rule 59C-1.033, Florida Administrative Code (the "Open Heart Surgery Program Rule" or the "Rule") specifies a methodology for determining numeric need for new open heart surgery programs in health planning districts. The methodology is set forth in section (7) of the Rule. Part of the methodology is a formula. See subsection (b) of Section (7) of the Rule. Using the formula, the Agency calculated numeric need in the District for the January 2002 Planning Horizon. The calculation yielded a result of 3.27 additional programs needed to serve the District by January 1, 2002. But calculation of numeric need under the formula is not all that is entailed in the complete methodology for determining numeric need. Numeric need is also determined by taking other factors into consideration. The Agency is to determine net need based on the formula "[p]rovided that the provisions of paragraphs (7)(a) and (7) (c) do not apply." Rule 59C-1.033(b), Florida Administrative Code. Paragraph (7)(a) states, "[a] new adult open heart surgery program shall not normally be approved in the district" if the following condition (among others) exists: 2. One or more of the operational adult open heart surgery programs in the district that were operational for at least 12 months as of 3 months prior to the beginning date of the quarter of the publication of the fixed need pool performed less than 350 adult open heart surgery operations during the 12 months ending 3 months prior to the beginning date of the quarter of the publication of the fixed need pool; . . . Rule 59C-1.033(7)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Both Blake Medical Center and Manatee Memorial Hospital in Manatee County were operational and performed less that 350 adult open heart surgery operations in the qualifying time periods described by subparagraph (7)(a)2., of the Rule. (Blake reported 221 open heart admissions for the 12-month period ending March 31, 1999; Manatee Memorial for the same period reported 319). Because of the sub-350 volume of the two providers, the Rule's methodology yielded a numeric need of "0" new open heart surgery programs in District 6 for the January 2002 Planning Horizon. In other words, the numeric need of 3.27 determined by calculation pursuant to the formula prior to consideration of the programs described in (7)(a)2.1, was "zeroed out" by operation of the Rule. Accordingly, a numeric need of zero for the district in the applicable planning horizon was published on behalf of the Agency in the January 29, 1999, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly. No Impact on Manatee County Providers In 1998, only one resident of Brandon's PSA received an open heart surgery procedure in Manatee County. For the same period only two residents from Brandon's PSA received an angioplasty procedure in Manatee County. These three residents received the services at Manatee Memorial. Of the two Manatee County programs, Manatee Memorial consistently has a higher volume of open heart surgery cases and according to the latest data available at the time of hearing has "hit the mark" (Tr. 1546) of 350 procedures annually. Very few residents from other District 6 counties receive cardiac services in Manatee County. Similarly, very few Manatee county residents migrate from Manatee County to another District 6 hospital to receive cardiac services. In 1998, only 19 of a total 1,209 combined open heart and angioplasty procedures performed at either Blake or Manatee Memorial originated in the other District 6 counties and only two were from the Brandon area. Among the 6,739 Manatee County residents discharged from a Florida hospital in calendar year 1998 following any cardiovascular procedure (MDC-5), only 58(0.9 percent) utilized one of the other providers in District 6, and none were discharged from Brandon. Among the 643 open heart surgeries performed on Manatee County residents in 1998, only 17 cases were seen at one of the District 6 open heart programs outside of Manatee County. There is, therefore, practically no patient exchange between Manatee County and the remainder of the District. In sum, there is virtually no cardiac patient overlap between Manatee County and Brandon's primary service area. The development of an open heart surgery program at Brandon will have no appreciable or meaningful impact on the Manatee County providers. CON 9169 In CON 9169, Brandon applied for an open heart surgery program on the basis of special circumstances due to no impact on low volume providers in Manatee County. The application was denied by AHCA. The State Agency Action Report ("SAAR") on CON 9169, dated June 17, 1999, in a section of the SAAR denominated "Special Circumstances," found the application to demonstrate "that a program at Brandon would not impact the two Manatee hospitals . . .". (UCH Ex. No. 6, p. 5). The "Special Circumstances" section of the SAAR on CON 9169, however, does not conclude that the lack of impact constitutes special circumstances. In follow-up to the finding of the application's demonstration of no impact to the Manatee County, the SAAR turned to impact on the non-Manatee County providers in District The SAAR on CON 9169 states, "it is apparent that a new program in Brandon would impact existing providers [those in Hillsborough and Polk Counties] in the absence of significant open heart surgery growth." Id. In reference to Brandon's argument in support of special circumstances based on the lack of impact to the Manatee County providers, the CON 9169 SAAR states: [T]he applicant notes the open heart need formula should be applied to District 6 excluding Manatee County, which would result in the need for several programs. This argument ignores the provision of the rule that specifies that the need cannot exceed one. (UCH No. 6, p. 7). The Special Circumstances Section of the SAAR on CON 9169 does not deal directly with whether lack of impact to the Manatee County providers is a special circumstance justifying one additional program. Instead, the Agency disposes of Brandon's argument in the "Summary" section of the SAAR. There AHCA found Brandon's special circumstances argument to fail because "no impact on low volume providers" is not among those special circumstances traditionally or previously recognized in case law and by the Agency: To demonstrate need under special circumstances, the applicant should demonstrate one or more of the following reasons: access problems to open heart surgery; capacity limits of existing providers; denial of access based on payment source or lack thereof; patients are seeking care outside the district for service; improvement of care to underserved population groups; and/or cost savings to the consumer. The applicant did not provide any documentation in support of these reasons. (UCH No. 6, p. 29). Following reference to the Agency's publication of zero need in District 6, moreover, the SAAR reiterated that [t]he implementation of another program in Hillsborough County is expected to significantly [a]ffect existing programs, in particular Tampa General Hospital, an important indigent care provider. (Id.) Typical "not normal circumstances" that support approval of a new program were described at hearing by one health planner as consisting of a significant "gap" in the current health care delivery system of that service. Typical Not Normal Circumstances Just as in CON 9169, none of the typical "not normal" circumstances" recognized in case law and with which the Agency has previous experience are present in this case. The six existing OHS programs in District 6 have unused capacity, are available, and are adequate to meet the projected OHS demand in District 6, in Hillsborough County ("County"), and in Brandon's proposed primary service area ("PSA"). All three County OHS providers are less than 17 miles from Brandon. There are, therefore, no major service geographic gaps in the availability of OHS services. Existing providers in District 6 have unused capacity to meet OHS projected demand in January 2002. OHS volume for District 6 will increase by only 179 surgeries. This is modest growth, and can easily be absorbed by the existing providers. In fact, existing OHS providers have previously handled more volume than what is projected for 2002. In 1995, 3,313 OHS procedures were generated at the six OHS programs. Yet, only 3,245 procedures are projected for 2002. The demand in 1995 was greater than what is projected for 2002. Neither population growth nor demographic characteristics of Brandon's PSA demonstrate that existing programs cannot meet demand. The greatest users of OHS services are the elderly. In 1999, the percentage in District 6 was similar to the Florida average; 18.25 percent for District 6, 18.38 percent for the state. The elderly percentage in Hillsborough County was less: 13.21 percent. The elderly component in Brandon's PSA was less still: 10.44 percent. In 2004, about 18.5 percent of Florida and District 6 residents are projected to be elderly. In contrast, only 10.5 percent of PSA residents are expected to be elderly. Brandon's PSA is "one of the younger defined population segments that you could find in the State of Florida" (Tr. 2892) and likely to remain so. Brandon's PSA will experience limited growth in OHS volume. Between 1999 - 2002, OHS volume will grow by only 36. The annual growth thereafter is only 13 surgeries. This is "very modest" growth and is among the "lowest numbers" of incremental growth in the State. Existing OHS providers can easily absorb this minimal growth. Brandon's PSA, is not an underserved area . . . there is excellent access to existing providers and . . . the market in this service area is already quite competitive. There is not a single competitor that dominates. In fact, the four existing providers [in Hillsborough and Polk Counties] compete quite vigorously. (Tr. 2897). Existing OHS programs in District 6 provide very good quality of care. The surgeons at the programs are excellent. Dr. Gandhi, testifying in support of Brandon's application, testified that he was very comfortable in referring his patients for OHS services to St. Joseph and Tampa General, having, in fact, been comfortable with his father having had OHS at Tampa General. Likewise, Dr. Vijay and his group, also supporters of the Brandon application, split time between Bayonet Point and Tampa General. Dr. Vijay is very proud to be associated with the OHS program at Tampa General. Lakeland also operates a high quality OHS program. In its application, Brandon did not challenge the quality of care at the existing OHS programs in District 6. Nor did Brandon at hearing advance as reasons for supporting its application, capacity constraints, inability of existing providers to absorb incremental growth in OHS volume or failure of existing providers to meet the needs of the residents of Brandon's primary service area. The Agency, in its preliminary decision on the application, agreed that typical "not normal" circumstances in this case are not present. Included among these circumstances are those related to lack of "geographic access." The Agency's OHS Rule includes a geographic access standard of two hours. It is undisputed that all District 6 residents have access to OHS services at multiple OHS providers in the District and outside the District within two hours. The travel time from Brandon to UCH or Tampa General, moreover, is usually less than 30 minutes anytime during the day, including peak travel time. Travel time from Brandon to St. Joseph's is about 30 minutes. There are times, however, when travel time exceeds 30 minutes. There have been incidents when traffic congestion has prevented emergency transport of Brandon patients suffering myocardial infarcts from reaching nearby open heart surgery providers within the 30 minutes by ground ambulance. Delays in travel are not a problem in most OHS cases. In the great majority, procedures are elective and scheduled in advance. OHS procedures are routinely scheduled days, if not weeks, after determining that the procedure is necessary. This high percentage of elective procedures is attributed to better management of patients, better technology, and improved stabilizing medications. The advent of drugs such as thrombolytic therapy, calcium channel blockers, beta blockers, and anti-platelet medications have vastly improved stabilization of patients who present at Emergency Rooms with myocardial infarctions. In its application, Brandon did not raise outmigration as a not-normal circumstance to support its proposal and with good reason. Hillsborough County residents generally do not leave District 6 for OHS. In fact, over 96 percent of County residents receive OHS services at a District 6 provider. Lack of out-migration shows two significant facts: (a) existing OHS programs are perceived to be reasonably accessible; and (2) County residents are satisfied with the quality of OHS services they receive in the County. This 96 percent retention rate is even more impressive considering there are many OHS programs and options available to County residents within a two-hour travel time. In contrast, there are two low-volume OHS providers in Manatee County, one of them being Blake. Unlike Hillsborough County residents, only 78 percent of Manatee County residents remain in District 6 for OHS services. Such outmigration shows that these residents prefer to bypass closer programs, and travel further distances, to receive OHS services at high-volume facility in District 8, which they regard as offering a higher quality of service. In its Application, Brandon does not raise economic access as a "not normal" circumstance. In fact, Brandon concedes that the demand for OHS services by Medicaid and indigent patients is very limited because Brandon's PSA is an affluent area. Brandon does not "condition" its application on serving a specific number or percentage of Medicaid or indigent patients. There are no financial barriers to accessing OHS services in District 6. All OHS providers in Hillsborough County and LRMC provide services to Medicaid and indigent patients, as needed. Approving Brandon is not needed to improve service or care to Medicaid or indigent patient populations. Tampa General is the "safety net" provider for health care services to all County residents. Tampa General is an OHS provider geographically accessible to Brandon's PSA. Tampa General actively services the PSA now for OHS. Brandon did not demonstrate cost savings to the patient population of its PSA if it were approved. Approving Brandon is not needed to improve cost savings to the patient population. Brandon based its OHS and PTCA charges on the average charge for PSA residents who are serviced at the existing OHS providers. While that approach is acceptable, Brandon does not propose a charge structure which is uniquely advantageous for patients. Restated, patients would not financially benefit if Brandon were approved. Tertiary Service Open Heart Surgery is defined as a tertiary service by rule. A "tertiary health service" is defined in Section 408.032(17), Florida Statutes, as follows: health service, which, due to its high level of intensity, complexity, specialized or limited applicability, and cost, should be limited to, and concentrated in, a limited number of hospitals to ensure the quality, availability, and cost- effectiveness of such service. As a tertiary service, OHS is necessarily a referral service. Most hospitals, lacking OHS capability, transfer their patients to providers of the service. One might expect providers of open heart surgery in Florida in light of OHS' status as a tertiary service to be limited to regional centers of excellence. The reality of the six hospitals that provide open heart surgery services in District 6 defies this health-planning expectation. While each of the six provides OHS services of high quality, they are not "regional" centers since all are in the same health planning district. Rather than each being a regional center, the six together comprise more localized providers that are dispersed throughout a region, quite the opposite of a center for an entire region. Brandon's Allegations of Special Circumstances. Brandon presents two special circumstances for approval of its application. The first is that consideration of the low-volume Manatee County providers should not operate to "zero out" the numeric need calculated by the formula. The second relates to transfers and occasional problems with transfers for Brandon patients in need of emergency open heart services. "Time is Muscle" Lack of blood flow to the heart during a myocardial infarction ("MI") results in loss of myocardium (heart muscle). The longer the blood flow is disrupted or diminished, the more myocardium is lost. The more myocardium lost, the more likely the patient will die or, should the patient survive, suffer severe reduction in quality of life. The key to good patient outcome when a patient is experiencing an acute MI is prompt evaluation and rapid treatment upon presentation at the hospital. Restoration of blood flow to the heart (revascularization) is the goal of the treating physician once it is recognized that a patient is suffering an MI. If revascularization is not commenced within 2 hours of the onset of an acute MI, an MI patient's potential for recovery is greatly diminished. The need for prompt revascularization for a patient suffering an MI is summed up in the phrase "time is muscle," a phrase accepted as a maxim by cardiologists and cardiothoracic surgeons. Recent advances in modern medicine and technology have improved the ability to stabilize and treat patients with acute MIs and other cardiac traumas. The three primary treatment modalities available to a patient suffering from an MI are: 1) thrombolytics; 2) angioplasty and stent placement; and, 3) open heart surgery. Because of the advancement of the effectiveness of thrombolytics, thrombolytic therapy has become the standard of care for treating MIs. Thrombolytic therapy is the administration of medication to dissolve blood clots. Administered intravenously, thrombolytic medication begins working within minutes to dissolve the clot causing the acute MI and therefore halt the damage done by an MI to myocardium. The protocols to administer thrombolysis are similar among hospitals. If a patient presents with chest pain and the E.R. physician identifies evidence of an active heart attack, thrombolysis is normally administered. If the E.R. physician is uncertain, a cardiologist is quickly contacted to evaluate the patient. Achieving good outcomes in cases of myocardial infarctions requires prompt consultation with the patient, competent clinical assessment, and quick administration of appropriate treatment. The ability to timely evaluate patient conditions for MI, and timely administer thrombolytic therapy, is measured and evaluated nationally by the National Registry of Myocardial Infarction. The National Registry makes the measurement according to a standard known as "door-to-needle" time. This standard measures the time between the patient's presentation at the E.R. and the time the patient is initially administered thrombolytic medication by injection intravenously. Patients often begin to respond to thrombolysis within 10-15 minutes. Consistent with the maxim, "time is muscle," the shorter the door-to-needle time, the better the chance of the patient's successful recovery. The effectiveness of thrombolysis continues to increase. For example, the advent of a drug called Reapro blocks platelet activity, and has increased the efficacy rate of thrombolysis to at least 85 percent. As one would expect, then, thrombolytic therapy is the primary method of revascularization available to patients at Brandon. Due to the lack of open heart surgery backup, moreover, Brandon is precluded by Agency rule from offering angioplasty in all but the most extreme cases: those in which it is determined that a patient will not survive a transfer. While Brandon has protocols, authority, and equipment to perform angioplasty when a patient is not expected to survive a transfer, physicians are reluctant to perform angioplasty without open heart backup because of complications that can develop that require open heart surgery. Angioplasty, therefore, is not usually a treatment modality available to the MI patient at Brandon. Although the care of choice for MI treatment, thrombolytics are not always effective. To the knowledge of the cardiologists who testified in this proceeding, there is not published data on the percentage of patients for whom thrombolytics are not effective. But from the cardiologists who offered their opinions on the percentage in the proceeding, it can be safely found that the percentage is at least 10 percent. Thrombolytics are not ordered for these patients because they are inappropriate in the patients' individual cases. Among the contraindications for thrombolytics are bleeding disorders, recent surgery, high blood pressure, and gastrointestinal bleeding. Of the patients ineligible for thrombolytics, a subset, approximately half, are also ineligible for angioplasty. The other half are eligible for angioplasty. Under the most conservative projections, then at least 1 in 20 patients suffering an MI would benefit from timely angioplasty intervention for which open heart surgery back-up is required in all but the rarest of cases. In 1997, 351 people presented to Brandon's Emergency Room suffering from an acute MI. In 1998, the number of MIs increased to 427. In 1999, 428 patients presented to Brandon's Emergency Room suffering from an acute MI. At least 120 (10 percent) of the total 1206 MI patients presenting to Brandon's Emergency Room from 1997 to 1999 would have been ineligible for thrombolytics as a means of revascularization. Of these, half would have been ineligible for angioplasty while the other half would have been eligible. Sixty, therefore, is the minimum number of patients from 1997 to 1999 who would have benefited from angioplasty at Brandon using the most conservative estimate. Transfers of Emergency Patients Those patients who presented at Brandon's Emergency Room with acute MI and who could not be stabilized with thrombolytic therapy had to be transferred to one of the nearby providers of open heart surgery. In 1998, Brandon transferred an additional 190 patients who did not receive a diagnostic catheterization procedure at Brandon for either angioplasty or open heart surgery. For the first 9 months of 1999, 114 such transfers were made. Thus, in 1998 alone, Brandon transferred a total of 516 cardiac patients to existing providers for the provision of angioplasty or open heart surgery, more than any other provider in the District. In 1999, Brandon made 497 such transfers. Not all of these were emergency transfers, of course. But in the three years between 1997 and 1999 at least 60 patients were in need of emergency transfers who would benefit from angioplasty with open heart backup. Of those Brandon patients determined to be in need of urgent angioplasty or open heart surgery, all must be transferred to existing providers either by ambulance or by helicopter. Ambulance transfer is accomplished through ambulances maintained by the Hillsborough County Fire Department. Due to the cardiac patient's acuity level, ambulance transfer of such patients necessitates the use of ambulances equipped with Advanced Life Support Systems (ALS) in order to monitor the patient's heart functions and to treat the patient should the patient's condition deteriorate. Hillsborough County operates 18 ambulances. All have ALS capability. Patients with less serious medical problems are sometimes transported by private ambulances equipped with Basic Life Support Systems (BLS) that lack the equipment to appropriately care for the cardiac patient. But, private ambulances are not an option to transport critically ill cardiac patients because they are only equipped with BLS capability. Private ambulances, moreover, do not make interfacility transports of cardiac patients between Hillsborough County hospitals. There are many demands on the ambulance transfer system in Hillsborough County. Hillsborough County's 18 ALS ambulances cover in excess of 960 square miles. Of these 18 ambulances, only three routinely operate within the Brandon area. Hillsborough County ambulances respond to 911 calls before requests for interfacility transfers of cardiac patients and are extremely busy responding to automobile accidents, especially when it rains. As a result, Hillsborough County ambulances are not always available on a timely basis when needed to perform an interfacility transfer of a cardiac patient. At times, due to inordinate delay caused by traffic congestion, inter-facility ambulance transport, even if the ambulance is appropriately equipped, is not an option for cardiac patients urgently in need of angioplasty or open heart surgery. It has happened, for example, that an ambulance has appeared at the hospital 8 hours after a request for transport. Some cardiac surgeons will not utilize ground transport as a means of transporting urgent open heart and angioplasty cases. Expeditious helicopter transport in Hillsborough County is available as an alternative to ground transport. But, it too, from time-to-time, is problematic for patients in urgent need of angioplasty or open heart surgery. Tampa General operates two helicopters through AeroMed, only one of which is located in Hillsborough County. AeroMed's two helicopters are not exclusively devoted to cardiac patients. They are also utilized for the transfer of emergency medical and trauma patients, further taxing the availability of AeroMed helicopters to transfer patients in need of immediate open heart surgery or angioplasty. BayCare operates the only other helicopter transport service serving Hillsborough County. BayCare maintains several helicopters, only one of which is located in Hillsborough County at St. Joseph's. BayCare helicopters are not equipped with intra-aortic balloon pump capability, thereby limiting their use in transporting the more complicated cardiac patients. Helicopter transport is not only a traumatic experience for the patient, but time consuming. Once a request has been made by Brandon to transport a patient in need of urgent intervention, it routinely takes two and a half hours, with instances of up to four hours, to effectuate a helicopter transfer. At the patient's beside, AeroMed personnel must remove the patient's existing monitors, IVS, and drips, and refit the patient with AeroMed's equipment in preparation for flight. In more complicated cases requiring the use of an intra-aortic balloon pump, the patient's balloon pump placed at Brandon must be removed and substituted with the balloon pump utilized by AeroMed. Further delays may be experienced at the receiving facility. The national average of the time from presentation to commencement of the procedure is reported to be two hours. In most instances at UCH, it is probably 90 minutes although "[t]here are of course instances where it would be much faster . . .". (Tr. 3212). On the other hand, there are additional delays from time-to-time. "[P]erhaps the longest circumstance would be when all the labs are full . . . or . . . even worse . . . if all the staff has just left for the day and they are almost home, to then turn them around and bring them all back." (Id.) Specific Cases Involving Transfers Delays in the transfer process were detailed at hearing by Brandon cardiologists with regard to specific Brandon patients. In cases in which "time is muscle," delay is critical except for one subset of such cases: that in which, no matter what procedure is available and no matter how timely that procedure can be provided, the patient cannot be saved. Craig Randall Martin, M.D., Board-certified in Internal Medicine and Cardiovascular Disease, and an expert in cardiology, wrote to AHCA in support of the application by detailing two "examples of patients who were in an extreme situation that required emergent, immediate intervention . . . [intervention that could not be provided] at Brandon Hospital." (Tr. 408). One of these concerned a man in his early sixties who was a patient at Brandon the night and morning of October 13 and 14, 1998. It represents one of the rare cases in which an emergency angioplasty was performed at Brandon even though the hospital does not have open heart backup. The patient had presented to the Emergency Room at approximately 11:00 p.m., on October 13 with complaints of chest pain. Although the patient had a history of prior infarctions, PTCA procedures, and onset diabetes, was obese, a smoker and had suffered a stroke, initial evaluation, including EKG and blood tests, did not reveal an MI. The patient was observed and treated for what was probably angina. With the subsiding of the chest pain, he was appropriately admitted at 2:30 a.m. to a non- intensive cardiac telemetry bed in the hospital. At 3:00 a.m., he was observed to be stable. A few hours or so later, the patient developed severe chest pain. The telemetry unit indicated a very slow heart rate. Transferred to the intensive care unit, his blood pressure was observed to be very low. Aware of the seriousness of the patient's condition, hospital personnel called Dr. Martin. Dr. Martin arrived on the scene and determined the patient to be in cardiogenic shock, an extreme situation. In such a state, a patient has a survival rate of 15 to 20 percent, unless revascularization occurs promptly. If revascularization is timely, the survival rate doubles to 40 percent. Coincident with the cardiogenic shock, the patient was suffering a complete heart block with a number of blood clots in the right coronary artery. The patient's condition, to say the least, was grave. Dr. Martin described the action taken at Brandon: . . . I immediately called in the cardiac catheterization team and moved the patient to the catheterization laboratory. * * * Somewhere around 7:30 in the morning, I put a temporary pacemaker in, performed a diagnostic catheterization that showed that one of his arteries was completely clotted. He, even with the pacemaker giving him an adequate heart rate, and even with the use of intravenous medication for his blood pressure, . . . was still in cardiogenic shock. * * * And I placed an intra-aortic balloon pump . . ., a special pump that fits in the aorta and pumps in synchrony with the heart and supports the blood pressure and circulation of the muscle. That still did not alleviate the situation . . . an excellent indication to do a salvage angioplasty on this patient. I performed the angioplasty. It was not completely successful. The patient had a respiratory arrest. He required intubation, required to be put on a ventilator for support. And it became apparent to me that I did not have the means to save this patient at [Brandon]. I put a call to the . . . cardiac surgeon of choice . . . . [Because the surgeon was on vacation], [h]is associate [who happened to be in the operating room at UCH] called me back immediately . . . and said ["]Yes, I'll take your patient. Send him to me immediately, I will postpone my current case in order to take care of your patient.["] At that point, we called for helicopter transport, and there were great delays in obtaining [the] transport. The patient was finally transferred to University Community Hospital, had surgery, was unsuccessful and died later that afternoon. (Tr. 409-412). By great delays in the transport, Dr. Martin referred to inability to obtain prompt helicopter transport. University Community Hospital, the receiving hospital, was not able to find a helicopter. Dr. Martin, therefore, requested Tampa General (a third hospital uninvolved from the point of being either the transferring or the receiving hospital) to send one of its two helicopters to transfer the patient from Brandon to UCH. Dr. Martin described Tampa General's response: They balked. And I did not know they balked until an hour later. And I promptly called them back, got that person on the telephone, we had a heated discussion. And after that person checked with their supervisor, the helicopter was finally sent. There was at least an hour-and-a-half delay in obtaining a helicopter transport on this patient that particular morning that was unnecessary. And that is critical when you have a patient in this condition. (Tr. 413, emphasis supplied.) In the case of this patient, however, the delay in the transport from Brandon to the UCH cardiovascular surgery table, in all likelihood, was not critical to outcome. During the emergency angioplasty procedure at Brandon, some of the clot causing the infarction was dislodged. It moved so as to create a "no-flow state down the right coronary artery. In other words, . . ., it cut off[] the microcirculation . . . [so that] there is no place for the blood . . . to get out of the artery. And that's a devastating, deadly problem." (Tr. 2721). This "embolization, an unfortunate happenstance [at times] with angioplasty", id., probably sealed the patient's fate, that is, death. It is very likely that the patient with or without surgery, timely or not, would not have survived cardiogenic shock, complete heart block, and the circumstance of no circulation in the right coronary artery that occurred during the angioplasty procedure. Adithy Kumar Gandhi, M.D., is Board-certified in Internal Medicine and Cardiology. Employed by the Brandon Cardiology Group, a three-member group in Brandon, Dr. Gandhi was accepted as an expert in the field of cardiology in this proceeding. Dr. Gandhi testified about two patients in whose cases delays occurred in transferring them to St. Joseph’s. He also testified about a third case in which it took two hours to transfer the patient by helicopter to Tampa General. The first case involves an elderly woman. She had multiple-risk factors for coronary disease including a family history of cardiac disease and a personal history of “chest pain.” (Tr. 2299). The patient presented at Brandon’s Emergency Room on March 17, 1999 at around 2:30 p.m. Seen by the E.R. physician about 30 minutes later, she was placed in a monitored telemetry bed. She was determined to be stable. During the next two days, despite family and personal history pointing to a potentially serious situation, the patient refused to submit to cardiac catheterization at Brandon as recommended by Dr. Gandhi. She maintained her refusal despite results from a stress test that showed abnormal left ventricular systolic function. Finally, on March 20, after a meeting with family members and Dr. Gandhi, the patient consented to the cath procedure. The procedure was scheduled for March 22. During the procedure, it was discovered that a major artery of the heart was 80 percent blocked. This condition is known as the “widow-maker,” because the prognosis for the patient is so poor. Dr. Gandhi determined that “the patient needed open heart surgery and . . . to be transferred immediately to a tertiary hospital.” (Tr. 2305-6). He described that action he took to obtain an immediate transfer as follows: I talked to the surgeon up at St. Joseph’s and I informed him I have had difficulties transferring patients to St. Joseph’s the same day. [I asked him to] do me a favor and transfer the patient out of Brandon Hospital as soon as possible by helicopter. The surgeon promised me that he would take care of that. (Tr. 2261). The assurance, however, failed. The patient was not transferred that day. That night, while still at Brandon, complications developed for the patient. The complications demanded that an intra-aortic balloon pump be inserted in order to increase the blood flow to the heart. After Dr. Gandhi’s partner inserted the pump, he, too, contacted the surgeon at St. Joseph’s to arrange an immediate transfer for open heart surgery. But the patient was not transferred until early the next morning. Dr. Gandhi’s frustration at the delay for this critically ill patient in need of immediate open heart surgery is evident from the following testimony: So the patient had approximately 18 hours of delay of getting to the hospital with bypass capabilities even though the surgeon knew that she had a widow-maker, he had promised me that he would make those transfer arrangements, even though St. Joseph’s Hospital knew that the patient needed to be transferred, even though I was promised that the patient would be at a tertiary hospital for bypass capabilities. (Tr. 2262). Rod Randall, M.D., is a cardiologist whose practice is primarily at St. Joseph’s. He had active privileges at Brandon until 1998 when he “switched to courtesy privileges,” (Tr. 1735) at Brandon. He reviewed the medical records of the first patient about whom Dr. Gandhi testified. A review of the patient’s medical records disclosed no adverse outcome due to the patient’s transfer. To the contrary, the patient was reasonably stable at the time of transfer. Nonetheless, it would have been in the patient’s best interest to have been transferred prior to the catheterization procedure at Brandon. As Dr. Randall explained, [W]e typically cath people that we feel are going to have a probability of coronary artery disease. That is, you don’t tend to cath someone that [for whom] you don’t expect to find disease . . . . If you are going to cath this patient, [who] is in a higher risk category being an elderly female with . . . diminished injection fraction . . . why put the patient through two procedures. I would have to do a diagnostic catheterization at one center and do some type of intervention at another center. So, I would opt to transfer that patient to a tertiary care center and do the diagnostic catheterization there. (Tr. 1764, 1765). Furthermore, regardless of what procedure had been performed, the significant left main blockage that existed prior to the patient’s presentation at Brandon E.R. meant that the likely outcome would be death. The second of the patients Dr. Gandhi transferred to St. Joseph’s was a 74-year-old woman. Dr. Gandhi performed “a heart catheterization at 5:00 on Friday.” (Tr. 2267). The cath revealed a 90 percent blockage of the major artery of the heart, another widow-maker. Again, Dr. Gandhi recommended bypass surgery and contacted a surgeon at St. Joseph’s. The transfer, however, was not immediate. “Finally, at approximately 11:00 the patient went to St. Joseph’s Hospital. That night she was operated on . . . ”. (Tr. 2267). If Brandon had had open heart surgery capability, “[t]hat would have increased her chances of survival.” No competent evidence was admitted that showed the outcome, however, and as Dr. Randall pointed out, the medical records of the patient do not reveal the outcome. The patient who was transferred to Tampa General (the third of Dr. Ghandhi's patients) had presented at Brandon’s ER on February 15, 2000. Fifty-six years old and a heavy smoker with a family history of heart disease, she complained of severe chest pain. She received thrombolysis and was stabilized. She had presented with a myocardial infarction but it was complicated by congestive heart failure. After waiting three days for the myocardial infarction to subside, Dr. Gandhi performed cardiac catheterization. The patient “was surviving on only one blood vessel in the heart, the other two vessels were 100 percent blocked. She arrested on the table.” (Tr. 2271). After Dr. Gandhi revived her, he made arrangements for her transfer by helicopter. The transfer was done by helicopter for two reasons: traffic problems and because she had an intra-aortic balloon pump and there are a limited number of ambulances with intra- aortic balloon pump maintenance capability. If Brandon had had the ability to conduct open heart surgery, the patient would have had a better likelihood of successful outcome: “the surgeon would have taken the patient straight to the operating room. That patient would not have had a second arrest as she did at Tampa General.” (Tr. 2273). Marc Bloom, M.D., is a cardiothoracic surgeon. He performs open-heart surgery at UCH, where he is the chief of cardiac surgery. He reviewed the records of this 54-year-old woman. The records reflect that, in fact, upon presentation at Brandon’s E.R., the patient’s heart failure was very serious: She had an echocardiogram done that . . . showed a 20 percent ejection fraction . . . I mean when you talk severe, this would be classified as a severe cardiac compromise with this 20 percent ejection fraction. (Tr. 2712). Once stabilized, the patient should have been transferred for cardiac catheterization to a hospital with open- heart surgery instead of having cardiac cath at Brandon. It is true that delay in the transfer once arrangements were made was a problem. The greater problem for the patient, however, was in her management at Brandon. It was very likely that open heart surgery would be required in her case. She should have been transferred prior to the catheterization as soon as became known the degree to which her heart was compromised, that is, once the results of the echocardiogram were known. Adam J. Cohen, M.D., is a cardiologist with Diagnostic Consultative Cardiology, a group located in Brandon that provides cardiology services in Hillsborough County. Dr. Cohen provided evidence of five patients who presented at Brandon and whose treatments were delayed because of the need for a transfer. The first of these patients was a 76-year old male who presented to Brandon’s ER on April 6, 1999. Dr. Cohen considered him to be suffering “a complicated myocardial infarction.” (Brandon Ex. 45, p. 43) Cardiac catheterization conducted by Dr. Cohen showed “severe multi-vessel coronary disease, cardiogenic shock, severely impaired [left ventricular] function for which an intra-aortic balloon pump was placed . . .”. (Id.) During the placement of the pump, the patient stopped breathing and lost pulse. He was intubated and stabilized. A helicopter transfer was requested. There was only one helicopter equipped to conduct the transfer. Unfortunately, “the same day . . . there was a mass casualty event within the City of Tampa when the Gannet Power Plant blew up . . .”. (Brandon Ex. 45, p. 44). An appropriate helicopter could not be secured. Dr. Cohen did not learn of the unavailability of helicopter transport for an hour after the request was made. Eventually, the patient was transferred by ambulance to UCH. There, he received angioplasty and “stenting of the right coronary artery times two.” (Id., at p. 47.) After a slow recovery, he was discharged on April 19. In light of the patient’s complex cardiac condition, he received a good outcome. This patient is an example of another patient who should have been transferred sooner from Brandon since Brandon does not have open heart surgery capability. The second of Dr. Cohen’s patients presented at Brandon’s E.R. at 10:30 p.m. on June 14, 1999. He was 64 years old with no risk factors for coronary disease other than high blood pressure. He was evaluated and diagnosed with “a large and acute myocardial infarction” Two hours later, the therapy was considered a failure because there was no evidence that the area of the heart that was blocked had been reperfused. Dr. Cohen recommended transfer to UCH for a salvage angioplasty. The call for a helicopter was made at 12:58 a.m. (early the morning of June 15) and the helicopter arrived 40 minutes later. At UCH, the patient received angioplasty procedure and stenting of two coronary arteries. He suffered “[m]oderately impaired heart function, which is reflective of myocardial damage.” (Brandon Ex. 45, p. 58). If salvage angioplasty with open heart backup had been available at Brandon, the patient would have received it much more quickly and timely. Whether the damage done to the patient’s heart during the episode could have been avoided by prompt angioplasty at Brandon is something Dr. Cohen did not know. As he put it, “I will never know, nor will anyone else know.” (Brandon Ex. 45, p. 60). The patient later developed cardiogenic shock and repeated ventricular tachycardia, requiring numerous medical interventions. Because of the interventions and mechanical trauma, he required surgery for repair of his right femoral artery. The patient recently showed an injection fraction of 45 percent below the minimum for normal of 50 percent. The third patient was a 51-year-old male who had undergone bypass surgery 19 years earlier. After persistent recurrent anginal symptoms with shortness of breath and diaphoresis, he presented at Brandon’s E.R. at 1:00 p.m. complaining of heavy chest pain. Thrombolytic therapy was commenced. Dr. Cohen described what followed: [H]he had an episode of heart block, ventricular fibrillation, losing consciousness, for which he received ACLS efforts, being defibrillated, shocked, times three, numerous medications, to convert him to sinus rhythm. He was placed on IV anti- arrhythmics consisting of amiodarone. The repeat EKG showed a worsening of progression of his EKG changes one hour after the initiation of the TPA. Based on that information, his clinical scenario and his previous history, I advised him to be transferred to University Hospital for a salvage angioplasty. (Brandon Ex. 45, p. 62). Transfer was requested at 1:55 p.m. The patient departed Brandon by helicopter at 2:20 p.m. The patient received the angioplasty at UCH. Asked how the patient would have benefited from angioplasty at Brandon without having to have been transferred, Dr. Cohen answered: In a more timely fashion, he would have received an angioplasty to the culprit lesion involved. There would have been much less occlusive time of that artery and thereby, by inference, there would have been greater salvage of myocardium that had been at risk. (Brandon Ex. 45, p. 65). The patient, having had bypass surgery in his early thirties, had a reduced life expectancy and impaired heart function before his presentation at Brandon in June of 1999. The time taken for the transfer of the patient to UCH was not inordinate. The transfer was accomplished with relative and expected dispatch. Nonetheless, the delay between realization at Brandon of the need for a salvage angioplasty and actual receipt of the procedure after a transfer to UCH increased the potential for lost myocardium. The lack of open heart services at Brandon resulted in reduced life expectancy for a patient whose life expectancy already had been diminished by the early onset of heart disease. The fourth patient of Dr. Cohen’s presented to Brandon’s E.R. at 8:30, the morning of August 29, 1999. A fifty-four-year-old male, he had been having chest pain for a month and had ignored it. An EKG showed a complete heart block with atrial fibrillation and change consistent with acute myocardial infarction. Thrombolytic therapy was administered. He continued to have symptoms including increased episodes of ventricular arrhythmias. He required dopamine for blood pressure support due to his clinical instability and the lack of effectiveness of the thrombolytics. The patient refused a transfer and catheterization at first. Ultimately, he was convinced to undergo an angioplasty. The patient was transferred by helicopter to UCH. The patient was having a “giant ventricular infarct . . . a very difficult situation to take care of . . . and the majority of [such] patients succumb to [the] disease . . .”. (Tr. 2703). The cardiologist was unable to open the blockage via angioplasty. Dr. Bloom was called in but the patient refused surgical intervention. After interaction with his family the patient consented. Dr. Bloom conducted open heart surgery. The patient had a difficult post-operative course with arrythmias because “[h]e had so much dead heart in his right ventricle . . .”. (Id.) The patient received an excellent outcome in that he was seen in Dr. Bloom’s office with 40 percent injection fraction. Dr. Bloom “was just amazed to see him back in the office . . . and amazed that this man is alive.” (Tr. 2704). Most of the delay in receiving treatment was due to the patient’s reluctance to undergo angioplasty and then open heart surgery. The fifth patient of Dr. Cohen’s presented at Brandon’s E.R. on March 22, 2000. He was 44 years old with no prior cardiac history but with numerous risk factors. He had a sudden onset of chest discomfort. Lab values showed an elevation consistent with myocardial injury. He also had an abnormal EKG. Dr. Cohen performed a cardiac cath on March 23, 2000. The procedure showed a totally occluded left anterior descending artery, one of the three major arteries serving the heart. Had open heart capability been available at Brandon, he would have undergone angioplasty and stenting immediately. As it was, the patient had to be transferred to UCH. A transfer was requested at 10:25 that morning and the patient left Brandon’s cath lab at 11:53. Daniel D. Lorch, M.D., is a specialist in pulmonary medicine who was accepted as an expert in internal medicine, pulmonary medicine and critical care medicine, consistent with his practice in a “five-man pulmonary internal medicine critical care group.” (Brandon Ex. 42, p. 4). Dr. Lorch produced medical records for one patient that he testified about during his deposition. The patient had presented to Brandon’s E.R. with an MI. He was transferred to UCH by helicopter for care. Dr. Lorch supports Brandon’s application. As he put it during his deposition: [Brandon] is an extremely busy community hospital and we are in a very rapidly growing area. The hospital is quite busy and we have a large number of cardiac patients here and it is not infrequently that a situation comes up where there are acute cardiac events that need to be transferred out. (Brandon Ex. 42, p. 20). Transfers Following Diagnostic Cardiac Catheterization Brandon transfers a high number cardiac patients for the provision of angioplasty or open heart surgery in addition to those transferred under emergency conditions. In 1996, Brandon performed 828 diagnostic cardiac catheterization procedures. Of this number, 170 patients were transferred to existing providers for open heart surgery and 170 patients for angioplasty. In 1997, Brandon performed 863 diagnostic catheterizations of which 180 were transferred for open heart surgery and 159 for angioplasty. During 1998, 165 patients were transferred for open heart surgery and 161 for angioplasty out of 816 diagnostic catheterization procedures. For the first nine months of 1999, Brandon performed 639 diagnostic catheterizations of which 102 were transferred to existing providers for open heart surgery and 112 for angioplasty. A significant number of patients are transferred from Brandon for open heart surgery services. These transfers are consistent with the norm in Florida. After all, open heart surgery is a tertiary service. Patients are routinely transferred from most Florida hospitals to tertiary hospitals for OHS and PCTA. The large majority of Florida hospitals do not have OHS programs; yet, these hospitals receive patients who need OHS or PTCA. Transfers, although the norm, are not without consequence for some patients who are candidates for OHS or PCTA. If Brandon had open heart and angioplasty capability, many of the 1220 patients determined to be in need of angioplasty or open heart surgery following a diagnostic catheterization procedure at Brandon could have received these procedures at Brandon, thereby avoiding the inevitable delay and stress occasioned by transfer. Moreover, diagnostic catheterizations and angioplasties are often performed sequentially. Therefore, Brandon patients determined to be in need of angioplasty following a diagnostic catheterization would have had access to immediate angioplasty during the same procedure thus reducing the likelihood of a less than optimal outcome as the result of an additional delay for transfer. Adverse Impact on Existing Providers Competition There is active competition and available patient choices now in Brandon's PSA. As described, there are many OHS programs currently accessible to and substantially serving Brandon's PSA. There is substantial competition now among OHS providers so as to provide choices to PSA residents. There are no financial benefits or cost savings accruing to the patient population if Brandon is approved. Brandon does not propose lower charges than the existing OHS providers. Balanced Budget Act The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 has had a profound negative financial impact on hospitals throughout the country. The Act resulted in a significant reduction in the amount of Medicare payments made to hospitals for services rendered to Medicare recipients. During the first five years of the Act's implementation, Florida hospitals will experience a $3.6 billion reduction in Medicare revenues. Lakeland will receive $17 million less, St.Joseph's will receive $44 million less, and Tampa General will receive $53 million less. The impact of the Act has placed most hospitals in vulnerable financial positions. It has seriously affected the bottom line of all hospitals. Large urban teaching hospitals, such as TGH, have felt the greatest negative impact, due to the Act's impact on disproportionate share reimbursement and graduate medical education payment. The Act's impact upon Petitioners render them materially more vulnerable to the loss of OHS/PTCA revenues to Brandon than they would have been in the absence of the Act. Adverse Impact on Tampa General Tampa General is the "safety net provider" for Hillsborough County. Tampa General is a Medicaid disproportionate share provider. In fiscal year 1999, the hospital provided $58 million in charity care, as that term is defined by AHCA. Tampa General plays a unique, essential role in Hillsborough County and throughout West Central Florida in terms of provision of health care. Its regional role is of particular importance with respect to Level I trauma services, provision of burn care, specialized Level III neonatal and perinatal intensive care services, and adult organ transplant services. These services are not available elsewhere in western or central Florida. In fiscal year 1999, Tampa General experienced a net loss of $12.6 million in providing the services referenced above. It is obligated under contract with the State of Florida to continue to provide those services. Tampa General is a statutory teaching hospital. In fiscal year 1999, it provided unfunded graduate medical education in the amount of $19 million. Since 1998, Tampa General has consistently experienced losses resulting from its operations, as follows: FY 1998-$29 million, FY 1999-$27 million; FY 2000 (5 months)-$10 million. The hospital’s financial condition is not the result of material mismanagement. Rather, its financial condition is a function of its substantial provision of charity and Medicaid services, the impact of the Act, reduced managed care revenues, and significant increases in expense. Tampa General’s essential role in the community and its distressed financial condition have not gone unnoticed. The Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce established in February of 2000 an Emergency Task Force to assess the hospital's role in the community, and the need for supplemental funding to enable it to maintain its financial viability. Tampa General requires supplemental funding on a continuing basis in order to begin to restore it to a position of financial stability, while continuing to provide essential community services, indigent care, and graduate medical education. It will require ongoing supplemental funding of $20- 25 million annually to avoid triggering the default provision under its bond covenants. As of the close of hearing, the 2000 session of the Florida Legislature had adjourned. The Legislature appropriated approximately $22.9 million for Tampa General. It is, of course, uncertain as to what funding, if any, the Legislature will appropriate to the hospital in future years, as the terms which constitute the appropriations must be revisited by the Legislature on an annual basis. Tampa General has prepared internal financial projections for its fiscal years 2000-2002. It projects annual operating losses, as follows: FY 2000-$20.1 million; FY 2001- $20.6 million; FY 2002-$31.9 million. While its projections anticipate certain "strategic initiatives" that will enhance its financial condition, including continued supplemental legislative funding, the success and/or availability of those initiatives are not "guaranteed" to be successful. If the Brandon program is approved, Tampa General will lose 93 OHS cases and 107 angioplasty cases during Brandon's second year of operation. That loss of cases will result in a $1.4 million annual reduction in TGH's net income, a material adverse impact given Tampa General’s financial condition. OHS services provide a positive contribution to Tampa General's financial operations. Those services constitute a core piece of Tampa General's business. The anticipated loss of income resulting from Brandon's program pose a threat to the hospital’s ability to provide essential community services. Adverse Impact on UCH UCH operated at a financial break-even in its fiscal year 1999. In the first five months of its fiscal year 2000, the hospital has experienced a small loss. This financial distress is primarily attributed to less Medicare reimbursement due to the Act and less reimbursement from managed care. UCH's reimbursement for OHS services provides a good example of the financial challenges facing hospitals. In 1999, UCH's net income per OHS case was reduced 33 percent from 1998. Also in 1999, UCH received OHS reimbursement of only 32 percent of its charges. UCH would be substantially and adversely impacted by approval of Brandon's proposal. As described, UCH currently is a substantial provider of OHS and angioplasty services to residents of Brandon's PSA. There are many cardiologists on staff at Brandon who also actively practice at UCH. UCH is very accessible from Brandon's PSA. UCH reasonably projects to lose the following volumes in the first three years of operation of the proposed program: a loss of 78-93 OHS procedures, a loss of 24-39 balloon angioplasties, and a loss of 97-115 stent angioplasties. Converting this volume loss to financial terms, UCH will suffer the following financial losses as a direct and immediate result of Brandon being approved: about $1.1 million in the first year, and about $1.2 million in the second year, and about $1.3 million in the third year. As stated, UCH is currently operating at about a financial break-even point. The impact of the Balanced Budget Act, reduced managed care reimbursement, and UCH's commitment to serve all patients regardless of ability to pay has a profound negative financial impact on UCH. A recurring loss of more than $1 million dollars per year due to Brandon's new program will cause substantial and adverse impact on UCH. Adverse Impact on St. Joseph’s If Brandon's application is approved, St. Joseph’s will lose 47 OHS cases and 105 PTCA cases during Brandon's second year. That loss of cases will result in a $732,000 annual reduction in SJH's net income. That loss represents a material impact to SJH. Between 1997 and 2000, St. Joseph’s has experienced a pattern of significant deterioration in its financial performance. Its net revenue per adjusted admission had been reduced by 12 percent, while its costs have increased significantly. St. Joseph's net income from operations has deteriorated as follows: FYE 6/30/97-$31 million; FYE 12/31/98- $24 million; FYE 12/31/99-$13.8 million. A net operating income of $13.8 million is not much money relative to St Joseph's size, the age of its physical plant, and its need for capital to maintain and improve its facilities in order to remain competitive. St. Joseph’s offers a number of health care services to the community for which it does not receive reimbursement. Unreimbursed services include providing hospital admissions and services to patients of a free clinic staffed by volunteer members of SJH's medical staff, free immunization programs to low-income children, and a parish nurse program, among others. St. Joseph’s evaluates such programs annually to determine whether it has the financial resources to continue to offer them. During the past two years, the hospital has been forced to eliminate two of its free community programs, due to its deteriorating financial condition. St. Joseph’s anticipates that it will have to eliminate additional unreimbursed community services if it experiences an annual reduction in net income of $730,000. Adverse Impact to LRMC The approval of Brandon will have an impact on Lakeland. Lakeland will suffer a financial loss of about $253,000 annually. This projection is based on calculated contribution margins of OHS and PTCA/stent procedures performed at the hospital. A loss of $253,000 per year is a material loss at Lakeland, particularly in light of its slim operating margin and the very substantial losses it has experienced and will continue to experience as a result of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. In addition to the projected loss of OHS and other procedures based upon Brandon's application, Lakeland may experience additional lost cases from areas such as Bartow and Mulberry from which it draws patients to its open heart/cardiology program. Lakeland will also suffer material adverse impacts to its OHS program due to the negative effect of Brandon's program on its ability to recruit and retain nurses and other highly skilled employees needed to staff its program. The approval of Brandon will also result in higher costs at existing providers such as Lakeland as they seek to compete for a limited pool of experienced people by responding to sign-on bonuses and by reliance on extensive temporary nursing agencies and pools. Nursing Staff/Recruitment The staffing patterns and salaries for Brandon's projected 40.1 full-time equivalent employees to staff its open heart surgery program are reasonable and appropriate. Filling the positions will not be without some difficulty. There is a shortage for skilled nursing and other personnel needed for OHS programs nationally, in Florida and in District 6. The shortage has been felt in Hillsborough County. For example, it has become increasingly difficult to fill vacancies that occur in critical nursing positions in the coronary intensive care unit and in telemetry units at Tampa General. Tampa General's expenses for nursing positions have "increased tremendously." (Tr. 2622). To keep its program going, the hospital has hired "travelers . . . short-term employment, registered nurses that come from different agencies, . . . with [the hospital] a minimum of 12 weeks." (Tr. 2622). In fact, all hospitals in the Tampa Bay area utilize pool staff and contract staff to fill vacancies that appear from time-to- time. Use of contract staff has not diminished quality of care at the hospitals, although "they would not be assigned to the sickest patients." (Tr. 2176). Another technique for dealing with the shortage is to have existing full-time staff work overtime at overtime pay rates. St. Joseph's and Lakeland have done so. As a result, they have substantially exceeded their budgeted salary expenses in recent months. It will be difficult for Brandon to hire surgical RNs, other open heart surgery personnel and critical care nurses necessary to staff its OHS program. The difficulty, however, is not insurmountable. To meet the difficulty, Brandon will move members of its present staff with cardiac and open heart experience into its open heart program. It will also train some existing personnel in conjunction with the staff and personnel at Bayonet Point. In addition to drawing on the existing pool of nurses, Brandon can utilize HCA's internal nationwide staffing data base to transfer staff from other HCA facilities to staff Brandon's open heart program. Approximately 18 percent of the nurses hired at Brandon already come from other HCA facilities. The nursing shortage has been in existence for about a decade. During this time, other open heart programs have come on line and have been able to staff the programs adequately. Lakeland, in District 6, has demonstrated its ability to recruit and train open heart surgery personnel. Brandon, itself, has been successful, despite the on- going shortage, in appropriately staffing its recent additions of tertiary level NICU beds, an expanded Emergency Room, labor and delivery and recovery suites, and new high-risk, ante-partum observation unit. Brandon has begun to offer sign-on bonuses to compete for experienced nurses. Several employees who staff the Lakeland, UCH and Tampa General programs live in Brandon. These bonuses are temptations for them to leave the programs for Brandon. Other highly skilled, experienced individuals who already work at existing programs may be lost to Brandon's program as well simply as the natural result of the addition of a new program. In the end, Brandon will be able to staff its program, but it will make it more difficult for all of the programs in Hillsborough County and for Lakeland to meet their staffing needs as well as producing a financial impact on existing providers. Financial Feasibility Short-Term Brandon needs $4.2 million to fund implementation of the program. Its parent corporation, HCA will provide financing of up to $4.5 million for implementation. The $4.2 million in start-up costs projected by Brandon does not include the cost of a second cath lab or the costs to upgrade the equipment in the existing cath lab. Itemization of the funds necessary for improvement of the existing cath lab and the addition of the second cath lab were not included in Brandon's pro formas. It is the Agency's position that addition of a cath lab (and by inference, upgrade to an existing lab) requires only a letter of exemption as projects separate from an open heart surgery program even when proposed in support of the program. (See UCH No. 7, p. 83). The position is not inconsistent with cardiac catheterization programs as subject to requirements in law separate from those to which an open heart surgery program is subject. Brandon, through HCA, has the ability to fund the start-up costs of the project. It is financially feasible in the short-term. Long-Term Open heart surgery programs (inclusive of angioplasty and stent procedures, as well as other open heart surgery procedures) generally are very profitable. They are among the most profitable of programs conducted by hospitals. Brandon's projected charges for open heart, angioplasty, and stent procedures are based on the average charges to patients residing in Brandon's PSA inflated at 2 percent per year. The inflation rate is consistent with HCFA's August 1, 2000, Rule implementing a 2.3 percent Medicare reimbursement increase. Brandon's projected payor mix is reasonably based on the existing open heart, angioplasty, and stent patients within its PSA. Brandon also estimated conservatively that it would collect only 45 to 50 percent of its charges from third-party payors. To determine expenses, Brandon utilized Bayonet Point's accounting system. It provided a level of detail that could not be obtained otherwise. "For patients within Brandon's primary service area, . . . that information is not provided by existing providers in the area that's available for any public consumption." (Tr. 1002). While perhaps the most detailed data available, Bayonet Point data was far from an ideal model for Brandon. Bayonet Point performs about 1,500 OHS cases per year. It achieves economies of scale that will not be achievable at Brandon in the foreseeable future. There is a relationship between volume and cost efficiency. The higher the volume, the greater the cost efficiency. Brandon's volume is projected to be much lower than Bayonet Point's. To make up for the imperfection of use of Bayonet Point as an "expenses" proxy, Brandon's financial expert in opining that the project was feasible in the long-term, considered two factors with regard to expenses. First, it included its projected $1.8 million in salary expenses as a separate line item over and above the salary expenses contained in the Bayonet Point data. (This amounted to a "double" counting of salary expenses.) Second, it recognized HCA's ability to obtain competitive pricing with respect to equipment and services for its affiliated hospitals, Brandon being one of them. Brandon projected utilization of 249 and 279 cases in its second and third year of operations. These projections are reasonable. (See the testimony of Mr. Balsano on rebuttal and Brandon Ex. 74). Comparison of Agency Action in CONs 9169 and 9239 Brandon's application in this case, CON 9239, was filed within a six-month period of the filing of an earlier application, CON 9169. The Agency found the two applications to be similar. Indeed, the facts and circumstances at issue in the two applications other than the updating of the financial and volume numbers are similar. So is the argument made in favor of the applications. Yet, the first application was denied by the Agency while the second received preliminary approval. The difference in the Agency's action taken on the later application (the one with which this case is concerned), i.e., approval, versus the action taken on the earlier, denial, was explained by Scott Hopes, the Chief of the Bureau of Certificate of Need at the time the later application was considered: The [later] Brandon application . . ., which is what we're addressing here today, included more substantial information from providers, both cardiologists, internists, family practitioners and surgeons with specific case examples by patient age [and] other demographics, the diagnoses, outcomes, how delays impacted outcomes, what permanent impact those adverse outcomes left the patient in, where earlier . . . there weren't as many specifics. (Tr. 1536, 1537). A comparison of the application in CON 9169 and the record in this case bears out Mr. Hopes' assessment that there is a significant difference between the two applications. Comparison of the Agency Action with the District 9 Application During the same batching cycle in which CON 9239 was considered, five open heart surgery applications were considered from health care providers in District 9. Unlike Brandon's application, these were all denied. In the District 9 SAAR, the Agency found that transfers are an inherent part of OHS as a tertiary service. The Agency concluded that, "[O]pen heart surgery is a tertiary service and patients are routinely transferred between hospitals for this procedure." (UCH Ex. 7, pp. 51-54). In particular, the Agency recognized Boca Raton's claim that it had provided "extensive discussion of the quality implications of attempting to deal with cardiac emergencies through transfer to other facilities." (UCH Ex. 7, p. 52). Unlike the specific information referred to by Mr. Hopes in his testimony quoted, above, however, the foundation for Boca Raton's argument is a 1999 study published in the periodical Circulation, entitled "Relationship Between Delay in Performing Direct Coronary Angioplasty and Early Clinical Outcomes." (UCH Ex. 7, p. 21). This publication was cited by the Agency in its SAAR on the application in this case. Nonetheless, a fundamental difference remains between this case and the District 9 applications, including Boca Raton's. The application in this case is distinguished by the specific information to which Mr. Hopes alluded in his testimony, quoted above.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting the application of Galencare, Inc., d/b/a Brandon Regional Hospital for open heart surgery, CON 9239. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Thomas W. Konrad, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 North Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 James C. Hauser, Esquire Metz, Hauser & Husband, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 505 Post Office Box 10909 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John H. Parker, Jr., Esquire Jonathan L. Rue, Esquire Sarah E. Evans, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs 1500 Marquis Two Tower 285 Peachtree Center Avenue, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP The Perkins House, Suite 200 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether there is need for a new Pediatric Heart Transplant and/or Pediatric Heart and Lung Transplant program in Organ Transplant Service Area (OTSA) 3; and, if so, whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 10471 (heart) and/or 10472 (heart and lung), filed by The Nemours Foundation, d/b/a Nemours Children’s Hospital (Nemours or NCH), to establish a Pediatric Heart Transplant and/or Pediatric Heart and Lung Transplant program, satisfy the applicable statutory and rule review criteria for award of a CON.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Applicant, Nemours Nemours Children’s Hospital is a licensed Class II specialty children’s hospital located in Orange County, Health Planning District 7, Subdistrict 7-2, OTSA 3, which is owned and operated by The Nemours Foundation. Nemours is licensed for 100 beds, including 73 acute care, nine comprehensive medical rehabilitation, two Level II neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), and 16 Level III NICU beds, and is a licensed provider of pediatric inpatient cardiac catheterization and pediatric open-heart surgery. As the primary beneficiary of the Alfred I. duPont Testamentary Trust established in the will of Alfred duPont, the Foundation was incorporated in Florida in 1936. The Foundation set out to provide children and families medical care and services, its mission being “[t]o provide leadership, institutions, and services to restore and improve the health of children through care and programs not readily available, with one high standard of quality and distinction regardless of the recipient’s financial status.” Foundation assets reached $5.5 billion, by the end of 2015. The Foundation has funded $1.5 billion of care to Florida’s pediatric population through subspecialty pediatric services, research, education, and advocacy. Nemours has established a pediatric care presence throughout the State of Florida. Nemours operates over 40 outpatient clinics throughout Florida that offer primary care, specialty care, urgent care, and cardiac care services to pediatric patients in central Florida, Jacksonville, and the panhandle region. Nemours also provides hospital care to pediatric inpatients at Nemours Children’s Hospital in Orlando, as well as through affiliations with Wolfson’s Children’s Hospital in Jacksonville, West Florida Hospital in Pensacola, and numerous hospital partners in central Florida. The resources Nemours offers in the greater Orlando area are especially significant with 17 Primary Care Clinics, five Urgent Care Clinics, 10 Specialty Care Clinics, nine Nemours Hospital partners, and, of course, NCH itself. These clinics are located throughout OTSA 3 where Nemours determined access to pediatric care was lacking, including Orlando, Melbourne, Daytona Beach, Titusville, Kissimmee, Lake Mary, and Sanford, as well as neighboring Lakeland. The clinics are fully staffed with hundreds of Nemours-employed physicians who live in the clinic communities. Through these satellite locations, as well as the Nemours CareConnect telemedicine platform, Nemours is able to bring access to its world-class subspecialists located at NCH to children throughout the State of Florida who otherwise would not have access to such care. Nemours was established to provide state of the art medical care to children through its integrated model. Nemours’ development has been and continues to be driven by its mission and objective to be a top-tier, world-class pediatric healthcare system. NCH is the first completely new “green field” children’s hospital in the United States in over 40 years, allowing Nemours to integrate cutting-edge technology and a patient-centered approach throughout. Nemours has created a unique integrated model of care that addresses the needs of the child across the whole continuum, connecting policy and prevention, to the highest levels of specialized care for the most complex pediatric patients. From its inception, Nemours envisioned the development of a comprehensive cardiothoracic transplant program as proposed by the CON applications at issue in this proceeding. NCH is located in the Lake Nona area, just east of downtown Orlando in a development known as Medical City. Medical City is comprised of a new VA Hospital, the University of Central Florida (UCF) College of Medicine and School of Biomedical Sciences, the University of Florida (UF) Research and Academic Center, the Sanford Burnham Medical Research Institute, and a CON-approved hospital, which is a joint venture between UCF and AHCA, which will serve as UCF’s teaching hospital. Medical City is intended to bring together life scientists and research that uses extraordinarily advanced technology. Co- location in an integrated environment allows providers and innovators of healthcare, “the brightest minds,” so to speak, to interact and to share ideas to advance healthcare and wellness efforts. Agency for Health Care Administration AHCA is the state health-planning agency that is charged with administration of the CON program as set forth in sections 408.031-408.0455, Florida Statutes. Context of the Nemours Applications Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.044, AHCA requires applicants to obtain separate CONs for the establishment of each adult or pediatric organ transplantation program, including: heart, kidney, liver, bone marrow, lung, lung and heart, pancreas and islet cells, and intestine transplantations. “Transplantation” is “the surgical grafting or implanting in its entirety or in part one or more tissues or organs taken from another person.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.065. Heart transplantation, lung transplantation, and heart/lung transplantation are all defined by rule 59C-1.002(41) as “tertiary health services,” meaning “a health service which, due to its high level of intensity, complexity, specialized or limited applicability, and cost, should be limited to, and concentrated in, a limited number of hospitals to ensure the quality, availability, and cost effectiveness of such service.” AHCA rules define a “pediatric patient” as “a patient under the age of 15 years.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.044(2)(c). AHCA rules divide Florida into four OTSAs, corresponding generally with the northern, western central, eastern central, and southern regions of the state. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.044(2)(f). The programs at issue in this proceeding will be located in OTSA 3, which is comprised of Brevard, Indian River, Lake, Martin, Okeechobee, Orange, Osceola, Seminole, and Volusia Counties. Currently, there are no providers of PHT in OTSA 3, and there are no approved PHLT programs statewide. The incidence of PHT in Florida, as compared to other types of solid organ transplants, is relatively small. The chart below sets forth the number of pediatric (ages 0-14) heart transplant discharges by year for the four existing Florida PHT programs during Calendar Years (CY) 2013 through 2016, and the 12-month period ending June 2017: HOSPITAL HEART TRANSPLANT CY 2013 CY 2014 CY 2015 CY 2016 12 MONTHS ENDING JUNE 2017 All Children’s Hospital 7 14 9 8 7 UF Health Shands Hospital 6 8 15 15 9 Memorial Regional Hospital 5 5 5 7 4 Jackson Health System 2 2 1 4 1 Total 20 29 30 34 21 The above historic data demonstrates that the incidence of PHT statewide is relatively rare, and does fluctuate from program to program and from year to year. As can be seen, the most recent available 12-month data reflects that only 21 PHTs were performed during that time, for an average program volume of only 5.25 cases. Florida has more existing and approved PHT programs than every other state in the country except California, which has more than double the pediatric population of Florida. And like Florida, two of the California programs are extremely low- volume programs. Additionally, evidence regarding the number of PHLT patients demonstrated just how rare this procedure is. From 2013 to 2016, there was an annual average of only four PHLTs nationally, with only one actual transplant on a Floridian. Nemours’ health planner stated that although Nemours projected in its application that it would perform one heart/lung procedure each year, it is a “very low-volume service,” and Nemours in actuality expects that there will be years with zero volume of PHLT. The CON Applications Nemours filed its applications for heart transplantation, heart/lung transplantation, and lung transplantation in the second Other Beds and Programs Batching Cycle of 2016. Nemours is proposing the development of a comprehensive cardiothoracic transplant program, which will be the only such program in Florida. This will be achieved by combining three types of transplant services (heart, lung, and heart/lung) in one comprehensive cardiothoracic transplant program. Each application was conditioned on the development of all three transplantation programs. Nemours is located in OTSA 3, where there is currently no PHT provider, PLT provider, or PHLT provider. There are, however, three providers of pediatric open-heart surgery and pediatric cardiac catheterization, and a large, growing pediatric population. Unlike any other facility in Florida, the Nemours Cardiac Center (Cardiac Center) is uniquely organized to treat all forms of congenital heart disease. The Cardiac Center employs a “programmatic approach” to offer the most beneficial environment and the finest care available for pediatric patients. The Cardiac Center, physically located at NCH, throughout Florida, is organized as a single Department of Cardiovascular Services to house Cardiac Surgery, Cardiac Anesthesia, Cardiac Intensive Care Unit (ICU), and Cardiology. Cardiac Center physicians throughout Florida are organized as a single entity with the goal of providing the highest quality, patient-centered care to all patients without the usual barriers created by the departmental “silos.” The entire Cardiac Center clinical team, including nurses and physicians, is dedicated solely to the special challenges of congenital heart abnormalities and makes the care of children with heart disease the life’s work of team members. The fully integrated organizational structure permits the team to take shared responsibility for all aspects of the delivery of quality care to these pediatric patients from admission to discharge. The Cardiac Center holds weekly patient consensus conferences, where all providers, including physicians, nurses, and the patients’ caregivers, participate in case reviews of all inpatients and those patients scheduled for surgery or catheterization. The Cardiac Center is “state of the art” with a designated cardiovascular operating room, a designated cardiovascular lab that includes an electrophysiology lab, and a dedicated comprehensive care unit. In addition, The Foundation has furthered the commitment to the Cardiac Center by funding an additional $35 million expansion to the sixth floor of NCH, adding an additional 31 inpatient beds, an additional operating room, and a comprehensive cardiovascular intensive care unit. Dr. Peter D. Wearden joined Nemours in 2015 as the chief of cardiac surgery, chair of the Department of Cardiovascular Services, and director of the Cardiac Center at Nemours. Dr. Wearden will serve as director of the Comprehensive Cardiothoracic Transplant Program at Nemours and will be instrumental in the development and implementation of the program. Dr. Wearden was recruited from the Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh (CHP), where he served as the surgical director of Heart, Lung, and Heart/Lung Transplantation. He was also the director of the Mechanical Cardiopulmonary Support and Artificial Heart Program. CHP rose to a US News and World Report top 10 program during Dr. Wearden’s tenure. CHP is at the forefront of organ transplantation and is where the first pediatric heart/lung transplantation was performed. Dr. Wearden is a trained cardiothoracic surgeon who completed fellowships in both cardiothoracic surgery (University of Pittsburgh) and Pediatric and Congenital Heart Surgery (Hospital for Sick Children, Toronto, Canada). He is certified by the American Board of Thoracic Surgery and holds additional qualifications in Congenital Heart Surgery from that organization. In his tenure as a board-certified pediatric transplant specialist, he has participated in over 200 pediatric cardiothoracic transplantations, of which he was the lead surgeon in over 70. In addition, he has procured over $20 million in National Institutes of Health research funding since 2004 specific to the development of artificial hearts and lungs for children and their implementation as a live-saving bridge to transplantation. Dr. Wearden was a member of the clinical team that presented to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) panel for approval of the Berlin Heart, the only FDA-approved pediatric heart ventricular assist device (VAD)1/ currently available, and he proctored the first pediatric artificial heart implantation in Japan in 2012. A VAD is referred to as “bridge to transplant” in pediatric patients because the device enables a patient on a waiting list for a donated heart to survive but is a device on which a child could not live out his or her life. Both utilization of VADs and heart transplantation procedures are in the “portfolio of surgical interventions” that can save the life of a child with heart failure. Dr. Wearden is an international leader in the research and development of VADs. Victor Morell, an eminent cardiac surgeon and chief of Pediatric Cardiac Surgery at CHP, testified that Dr. Wearden’s presence in Orlando alone and the work that he will be able to do with VADs and a PHT program will likely save lives. Many of the physicians that comprise the Nemours Cardiac Center transplant team not only have significant transplant experience, but also have experience performing transplants together. These physicians came with Dr. Wearden from CHP, were trained by Dr. Wearden, or otherwise worked with Dr. Wearden at some point in their careers. The physicians recruited to the Nemours transplantation team were trained at or hail from among the most prestigious programs in the country. For example, Dr. Kimberly Baker, a cardiac intensivist, was trained by Dr. Wearden in the CHP ICU. Dr. Constantinos Chrysostomou, Nemours’ director of cardiac intensive care, worked with Dr. Wearden at CHP, and has experience starting the pediatric ICU in Los Angeles at Cedar Sinai Hospital. Dr. Steven Lichtenstein, chief of cardiac anesthesia, held the same position at CHP for 12 years before he was recruited to Nemours. Dr. Karen Bender, a cardiac anesthesiologist, was recruited by Dr. Wearden from the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia – one of the leading programs in the country. Dr. Michael Bingler, a cardiac interventionalist, was at Mercy Children’s Hospital in Kansas City for eight years. Dr. Adam Lowry of the Nemours cardiac intensive care center previously trained at both Texas Children’s Hospital (the number one program in the country) and Stanford. The 11 physicians that comprise the Cardiac Center’s Cardiothoracic Physician Team have collectively participated in 1,146 cardiothoracic transplantations. These physicians came to Nemours to care for the most acute, critically ill patients, including those requiring PHT. In addition to the physician team, the expertise and skill of the non-physician staff in the catheterization lab, the operating room, and the cardiac ICU are crucial to a successful program. Dr. Dawn Tucker is the administrative director of NCH’s Cardiac Center and heads the nursing staff for NCH’s Cardiac Center, which includes 23 registered nurses with transplant experience. Dr. Tucker holds a doctorate of Nursing Practice and was formerly the director of the Heart Center at Mercy Children’s Hospital in Kansas City, where she oversaw the initiation of a PHT program. The average years of experience for total nursing care in cardiac units across the nation is two years. The average years of experience in the Nemours Cardiac Center is eight years. Medical literature shows the greater the years of nursing staff experience, the lower the mortality and morbidity rates. The nursing staff at Nemours, moreover, has extensive experience in dealing not only with pediatric cardiac patients, but with pediatric heart transplants as well. The Cardiac Center’s cardiothoracic nursing staff has over 220 years of collective cardiothoracic transplant experience. Nemours operates a “simulation center” that allows the Cardiac Center to simulate any type of cardiac procedure on a model patient before performing that procedure on an actual patient. The model patient’s “heart” is produced using a three- dimensional printer that creates a replica of the heart based on MRI’s or other medical digital imaging equipment. These replica hearts are printed on-site, using the only FDA-approved software for such use, and are ready for use in the simulation center within a day after medical imaging. Nemours Cardiac Center currently performs what the Society of Thoracic Surgeons has coined “STAT 5” cardiac procedures. STAT 5 cardiac procedures are the most complex; STAT 1 procedures are the least complex. A PHT is a STAT 4 procedure. Since Dr. Wearden’s arrival at the Nemours Cardiac Center, there have been no patient mortalities. The uncontroverted evidence established that Nemours has assembled a high-quality, experienced, and unquestionably capable team of physicians and advanced practitioners for its cardiothoracic transplantation programs and is capable of performing the services proposed in its applications at a high level. UF Health Shands While not a party to this proceeding,2/ UF Health Shands’ (Shands) presence at the final hearing was pervasive. AHCA called numerous witnesses affiliated with Shands in its case-in-chief. The scope of the testimony presented by Shands- affiliated witnesses was circumscribed by Order dated December 13, 2017 (ruling on NCH’s motion in limine) that: At hearing, the Agency may present evidence that the needs of patients within OTSA 3 are being adequately served by providers located outside of OTSA 3, but may not present evidence regarding adverse impact on providers located outside of OTSA 3. Baycare of Se. Pasco, Inc. v. Ag. for Health Care Admin., Case No. 07-3482CON (Fla. DOAH Oct. 28, 2008; Fla. AHCA Jan. 7, 2009). UF Health Shands Hospital is located in Gainesville, Florida. UF Health Shands Children’s Hospital is an embedded hospital within a larger hospital complex. Shands Children’s Hospital has 200 beds and is held out to the public as a children’s hospital. The children’s hospital has 72 Level II and III NICU beds. Unlike Nemours, Shands offers obstetrical services such that babies are delivered at Shands. It also has a dedicated pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) as well as a dedicated pediatric cardiac intensive care unit. The Shands Children’s Hospital has its own separate emergency room and occupies four floors of the building in which it is located. It is separated from the adult services. Shands Children’s Hospital is nationally recognized by U.S. News & World Report as one of the nation’s best children’s hospitals. The children’s hospital has its own leadership, including Dr. Shelley Collins, an associate professor of pediatrics and the associate chief medical officer. As a comprehensive teaching and research institution, Shands Children’s Hospital has virtually every pediatric subspecialty that exists and is also a pediatric trauma center. The children’s hospital typically has 45 to 50 physician residents and 25 to 30 fellows along with medical students. Over $139 million has been awarded to Shands for research activities. As a teaching hospital, Shands is accustomed to caring for the needs of patients and families that come from other parts of the state or beyond. Jean Osbrach, a social work manager at Shands, testified for AHCA. Ms. Osbrach oversees the transplant social workers that provide services to the families with patients at Shands Children’s Hospital. Ms. Osbrach described how the transplant social workers interact with the families facing transplant from the outset of their connection with Shands. They help the families adjust to the child’s illness and deal with the crisis; they provide concrete services; and these social workers help the families by serving as navigators through the system. These social workers are part of the multidisciplinary team of care, and they stay involved with these families for years. Shands is adept at helping families with the issues associated with getting care away from their home cities. Shands has apartments specifically available in close proximity to the children’s hospital and relationships with organizations that can help families that need some financial support for items such as lodging, transportation, and gas. Ms. Osbrach’s ability to empathize with these families is further enhanced because her own daughter was seriously ill when she was younger. Ms. Osbrach testified that, while she was living in Gainesville, she searched out the best options for her child and decided that it was actually in Orlando. Despite the travel distance, she did not hesitate to make those trips in order to get the care her child needed at that time. The Shands Children’s Hospital is affiliated with the Children’s Hospital Association, the Children’s Miracle Network, the March of Dimes, and the Ronald McDonald House Charities. Shands operates ShandsCair, a comprehensive emergency transport system. ShandsCair operates nine ground ambulances of different sizes, five helicopters, and one fixed-wing jet aircraft. ShandsCair does over 7,000 transports a year, including a range of NICU and other pediatric transports. ShandsCair is one of the few services in the country that owns an EC-155 helicopter, which is the largest helicopter used as an air ambulance. This makes it easier to transport patients that require a lot of equipment, including those on extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO). Patients on ECMO can be safely transported by ground and by air by ShandsCair. Shandscair serves as a first responder and also provides facility-to- facility transport. It has been a leader in innovation. The congenital heart program at Shands includes two pediatric heart surgeons, as well as pediatric cardiologists Dr. Jay Fricker and Dr. Bill Pietra, both of whom testified for AHCA. Dr. Fricker did much of his early work and training at the Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, and came to the University of Florida in 1995. He is a professor and chief of the Division of Cardiology in the Department of Pediatrics at Shands. He is also the Gerold L. Schiebler Eminent Scholar Chair in Pediatric Cardiology at UF. He has been involved in the care of pediatric heart transplant patients his entire career. Dr. Bill Pietra received his medical training in Cincinnati and did his early work at several children’s hospitals in Colorado. He came to the University of Florida and Shands in July 2014 and is now the medical director, UF Health Congenital Heart Center. Shands performed its first pediatric heart transplant in 1986. Shands treats the full range of patients with heart disease and performs heart transplants on patients, from infants through adults, with complex congenital heart disease. Shands provides transplants to pediatric patients with both congenital heart defects and acquired heart disease (cardiomyopathy). Shands will accept the most difficult cases, including those that other institutions will not take. Data presented by AHCA dating back to the beginning of 2014 demonstrate that Shands has successfully transplanted numerous patients that were less than six months old at the time of transplantation. This data also demonstrates that Shands serves all of central and north Florida, as well as patients that choose to come to Shands from other states. PHT patients now survive much longer than in the past, and in many cases, well into adulthood. Because Shands cares for both adult and pediatric patients, it has the ability to continue to care for PHT patients as they transition from childhood to adulthood. Managed care companies are now a significant driver of where patients go for transplantation services. Many managed- care companies identify “centers of excellence” as their preferred providers for services such as PHT. Shands is recognized by the three major managed-care companies that identify transplant programs as a center of excellence for PHT services. AHCA’s Preliminary Decision Following AHCA’s review of Nemours’s applications, as well as consideration of comments made at the public hearing held on January 10, 2017, and written statements in support of and in opposition to the proposals, AHCA determined to preliminarily deny the PHT and PHLT applications, and to approve the PLT application. AHCA’s decision was memorialized in three separate SAARs, all dated February 17, 2017. Marisol Fitch, supervisor of AHCA’s CON and commercial-managed care unit, testified for AHCA. Ms. Fitch testified that AHCA does not publish a numeric need for transplant programs, as it does for other categories of services and facilities. Rather, the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate need for the program based on whatever methodology they choose to present to AHCA. In addition to the applicant’s need methodology, AHCA also looks at availability and accessibility of service in the area to determine whether there is an access problem. Finally, an applicant may attempt to demonstrate that “not normal” circumstances exist in its proposed service area sufficient to justify approval. Statutory Review Criteria Section 408.035(1) establishes the statutory review criteria applicable to CON Applications 10471 and 10472. The parties have stipulated that each CON application satisfies the criteria found in section 408.035(1), (d), (f), and (h), Florida Statutes. The only criteria at issue essentially relate to need and access. However, the Agency maintains that section 408.035(1)(c) is in dispute to the extent that center transplant volume as a result of Nemours’ approval would lead to or correlate with negative patient outcomes. AHCA believes that there is no need for the PHT or PHLT programs that Nemours seeks to develop because the needs of the children in the Nemours service area are being met by other providers in the state, principally Shands and Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital. Section 408.035(1)(a) and (b): The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed; and the availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the district of the applicant. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.044(6)(b).3/ The criteria for the evaluation of CON applications, including applications for organ transplantation programs, are set forth at section 408.035 and rule 59C-1.044. However, neither the applicable statutes nor rules have a numeric need methodology that predicts future need for PHT or PHLT programs. Thus, it is up to the applicant to demonstrate need in accordance with rule 59C-1.044. There are four OTSAs in Florida, numbered OTSA 1 through OTSA 4. NCH is located in OSTA 3, which includes the following counties: Seminole, Orange, Osceola, Brevard, Indian River, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, Martin, Lake, and Volusia. (See § 408.032(5), Fla. Stat; Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C- 01.044(2)(f)3.) OTSA 3 also generally corresponds with the pediatric cardiac catheterization and open-heart surgery service areas defined by AHCA rule. (See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C- 1.032(2)(g) and 59C-1.033(2)(h)). Currently, there is no provider of PHT in OTSA 3, but there are three providers of pediatric cardiac catheterization and pediatric open-heart surgery: Orlando Health Arnold Palmer Hospital for Children; Florida Hospital for Children; and Nemours. There are no licensed providers of PHLT anywhere in the State of Florida. There are four existing providers and one approved provider of PHT services in Florida: UF Shands in OTSA 1; Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital in OTSA 2; Jackson Memorial Hospital in OSTA 4; and Memorial Regional Hospital, d/b/a Joe DiMaggio’s Hospital in OTSA 4; and a third approved program in OTSA 4, Nicklaus Children’s Hospital, which received final approval from AHCA in August 2017. As noted above, there is no fixed-need pool published for PHT, PHLT, or PLT programs. Alternatively, AHCA follows rule 59C-1.008(2)(e)2., which requires consideration of population demographics and dynamics; availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; medical treatment trends; and market conditions. To quantify the need for a new PHT program in District 7, OTSA 3, Nemours created and presented a methodology that started with the statewide use rate in its projected first year. Then for the second year, Nemours aggressively increased the use rate to the highest rate in any of the other transplant service areas in the state. Then, in an even more aggressive (and unreasonable) assumption, Nemours projected that it would essentially capture all of the cases in OTSA 3 by the second year of the program. In its application, the assumptions resulted in a projection that Nemours would do four transplants in the first year of operation and eight in the second. These projections fall short of the rule requirement that the applicant project a minimum of 12 transplants per year by the second year of operation. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.044(6)(b)2. At hearing, Nemours updated (increased) those first and second year projections to 7 and 13 cases, respectively. However, these updated projections included one child, aged 15 to 17, in year one, and two in year two. There are several reasons these projections lack credibility. First, as noted, Nemours assumed a near- 100 percent market share based on the highest use rate in the state by just year two. Second, when Nemours prepared its update, it used the most recent calendar year data. However, this was not the most current data. Calendar Year 2016 reflected 34 cases statewide, but that number had dropped to 21 for the most recent 12-month period available at the time of the hearing. Use of this most recent 12-month data would have significantly decreased the Nemours PHT volume projections. In addition, the projection of 13 cases by year two would place Nemours at a higher PHT case volume than three of the four established programs in the state, and would be at a level that is nearly equivalent to the much more established Shands program. This is not credible, especially considering that Nemours also admitted at hearing that only two OTSA 3 residents received pediatric heart transplants in 2016. The existence of unmet need cannot be based solely on the absence of an existing service in the proposed service area. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)3. While Nemours’ own health planner agreed that the absence of a PHT program in OTSA 3 is not itself a basis for finding need, Nemours nevertheless argues that this rule is inapplicable in this proceeding because the title to this subsection of the rule is “Comparative Review” and a portion of this subsection addresses competing applications in the same cycle. As detailed further in the Conclusions of Law section herein, this interpretation is unconvincing and rejected. AHCA interprets this rule provision to apply to those batched applications submitted without the submission of a competing application in the same batching cycle, as with Nemours in this proceeding. Nemours initiated its cardiac catheterization and cardiac surgery program in June/July 2016. In its PHT application, Nemours projected that it would meet or exceed the rule minimum required volumes of 200 cardiac catheterizations and 125 open-heart surgery cases by the end of 2017. Actual volumes achieved by Nemours in CY 2017 were 97 open-heart cases and 196 cardiac catheterizations. The incidence of PHLT is extremely low. During the four calendar years, 2013 through 2016, there were only 16 PHLT transplants performed nationwide. Only one Florida resident received a PHLT during that four-year period, and that was performed in Massachusetts. Also during that four-year period, only three Florida residents were registered for PHLT. There is no evidence in this record as to why two of the three registered Florida residents did not obtain a PHLT. Based on the national use rate for PHLTs from CY 2013 through CY 2016, Nemours projects that it will perform an average of one PHLT per year. Nemours acknowledges that due to the extremely low incidence of PHLTs, there may be some years that no PHLTs are performed at Nemours. Geographic Access There is no evidence of record that families living in central Florida are currently being forced to travel unreasonable distances to obtain PHT services. Indeed, there are five existing or approved programs within the state, with at least two located very reasonably proximate to OTSA 3. According to the analysis of travel distances for PHT patients living in OTSA 3 contained in the Nemours application (Exhibit 15), only some residents located in Brevard and Indian River Counties are not within 120 miles of an existing PHT program. There was agreement that patients that need a PHT are approaching the end-stage of cardiac function, and in the absence of a PHT will very likely die. Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer that the parents of a child living in central Florida and needing a PHT will travel to St. Petersburg or Gainesville for transplant services rather than let their child die because the travel distance is too far. To the contrary, the evidence in this record from witnesses on both sides, as well as common sense, is that families will go as far as necessary to save their child. The notion that there is some pent-up demand for PHT services among central Florida residents (especially when there is no evidence of a single OTSA 3 patient being turned down or unable to access a PHT) is without support in this record. The parents of four pediatric patients testified at the final hearing. Two testified for Nemours. The other two testified for AHCA and were parents of children that received PHTs at Shands. One of the Nemours witnesses was the parent of a child that has not received a transplant. The other received transplant services at Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital in St. Petersburg. The parents of the two Shands patients were representative of the two broad categories of PHT patients. One was a patient with a congenital heart defect that lives in Cocoa Beach (Brevard County). The patient likely had the heart defect since birth, but it was not diagnosed until she was six years old. That patient was asymptomatic at the time of diagnosis but deteriorated over a period of years. While she was first seen at Shands, the family had the time and researched other prominent institutions, including Texas Children’s Hospital, Boston Children’s Hospital, Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, and the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. They did this because, like all of the parents that testified, they “would have gone to the ends of the earth” to save their child. This family researched the volumes and experience of the programs they considered and looked for what they felt was the best program for their child, and ultimately chose Shands. It was clear that they felt Shands was the right choice. Their daughter received her heart transplant at Shands, is doing well, and is now considering what college to attend. Additionally, this family did not find the two hours and 35 minute travel time from their home in Brevard County to Shands to be an impediment, and actually consider Shands as being relatively close to their home. This testimony supports the obvious truism that obtaining the best possible outcome for a sick child is the paramount goal of any parent. The other parent witness called by AHCA has a daughter that, on Christmas Eve in 2008, went from perfectly healthy to near death and being placed on life support within a 24-hour period. As opposed to a congenital heart defect, this patient had cardiomyopathy. This family lives in Windermere, a suburb of Orlando. She acquired a virus that attacked her heart. She was initially treated at Arnold Palmer Children’s Hospital where she had to be placed on ECMO. From there, she was safely airlifted to Shands while still on ECMO where, upon arrival, the receiving team of physicians informed the family that she was one of the most critically ill children they had ever seen. After an 11-hour open-heart surgery, a Berlin Heart was successfully implanted and kept her alive for four months until an appropriate donor heart became available. This patient also had an excellent outcome and is now a student at the University of Florida. The following exchange summarizes how the child’s mother felt about the inconvenience of having to travel from the Orlando area to Gainesville: Q If a family in Orlando told you, or in your city of residence told you that their child was critically ill and they were worried about having to travel and potentially spend time in Gainesville to get care, what would you tell them? A Well, I would tell them to just take it a day at a time and – when your child is critically ill, convenience never really comes into your mind. What comes into your mind is how do I help my child live. And so you will go anywhere. And it’s just an hour and a half, it just doesn’t matter. When you are talking about saving your child, it means nothing. It literally means nothing. It is clear from the testimony of these two parents that nothing about having a gravely ill child is “convenient.” It creates great stress, but it was also clear that having an experienced provider was more important than just geographic proximity. The mothers of the two Shands patients persuasively spoke of their concerns about further diluting the volumes of the existing programs that could result from approval of a sixth pediatric heart transplant program in Florida, particularly when there are two other programs that are not that far from the Orlando area.4/ While transplantation is not an elective service, it is not done on an emergent basis. As noted, the number of families affected is, quite fortunately, very small. While having a child with these issues is never “convenient,” the travel issues that might exist do not outweigh the weight of the evidence that fails to demonstrate a need for approval of either application. The Orlando area, being centrally located in Florida, is reasonably accessible to all of the existing providers. Most appear to go to Shands, which is simply not a substantial distance away. The credible evidence is that families facing these issues are able to deal with the travel inconvenience. In addition, Nemours presented evidence regarding the various locations at which they provide services, ranging from Pensacola to Port St. Lucie. Clearly, Nemours sees itself as providing some cardiac services to patients in these locations, but it would also suggest that patients seen at these locations may be referred to NCH for transplant services, which would mean that some patients would be bypassing closer facilities. As observed by AHCA, for Nemours to posit that it is appropriate for patients to travel from Pensacola or Jacksonville to Orlando while asserting that it is not acceptable for patients in Orlando to go to Gainesville or St. Petersburg is an illogical inconsistency. Financial Access Nemours asserts that approval of its proposed programs will enhance financial access to care. Nemours currently serves patients without regard to ability to pay and will extend these same policies to transplant recipients. Approximately half of Nemours’ projected PHTs are to be provided to Medicaid recipients, the other half to commercially insured patients.5/ However, there was no competent evidence of record that access to PHT or PHLT services was being denied by any of the existing transplant providers because of a patient’s inability to pay. Transplant Rates at Shands In its need methodology, Nemours utilized the use rate from OTSA 1 where Shands is located because it is the highest use rate in the state. Despite this, Nemours then asserted that Shands is not performing as many PHTs as it could or should. The Nemours CON applications are not predicated on any argument that their proposed programs are needed because of poor quality care at any of the existing pediatric transplant programs in Florida. Indeed, Dr. Wearden stated his belief that Shands provides good quality care in its transplant programs, and he respects the Shands lead surgeon, Dr. Mark Bleiweis. As evidence of his respect for the Shands PHT program, Dr. Wearden has referred several transplant patients to Dr. Bleiweis at Shands. Despite that position, Nemours argued that the Shands program is unduly conservative and cautious in its organ selection and may have some “capacity” issues due to a few cited instances of apparent surgeon unavailability. These assertions, made by Nemours witnesses with no first-hand knowledge of the operations of the Shands program, are not persuasive. With regard to whether the Shands program is unduly “cautious,” “conservative,” or “picky,” Nemours relied on a document produced by Shands in discovery. Nemours also relied on data reported by Shands to the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR). The data included a list of all of the organs offered to Shands since the beginning of 2015, the sequencing of the offer of that organ to Shands, whether the organ was transplanted at Shands or elsewhere, the primary and secondary reasons the organ was refused (if refused) and other information. The SRTR exhibit demonstrates that a high number of the organs that are offered are not acceptable for transplant on patients waitlisted at Shands. It also shows that organs that are accepted may have to be examined by many different centers before being deemed potentially acceptable. This demonstrates the extensive level of complexity, nuance, and clinical judgment involved in the decision to accept an organ for transplant in a pediatric patient. Indeed, Dr. Wearden agreed that the decision by a program to accept or turn down an organ involves both clinical expertise and judgment, and that there are many reasons an organ might be turned down, which helps explain why the transplanted percentage of total organs offered nationally is on average, so small. Dr. Wearden chose a few examples of organs that were not taken by Shands to express an opinion that Shands may be unduly conservative in its organ selection. However, this assertion was credibly refuted by Dr. Pietra, a transplant cardiologist and the medical director of the UF Health Congenital Heart Center. Dr. Pietra discussed the complexity of these cases and how simply looking at the SRTR data does not provide enough information to reach Dr. Wearden’s conclusion. An organ that might be acceptable for one patient would not be acceptable for another for a host of reasons. Many more organs are rejected by transplant centers than are accepted. Dr. Pietra credibly opined that being conservative and cautious are important traits for a transplant surgeon, particularly for one that wants the accepted organ to work well for the patient long-term. That does not mean that Shands is rejecting organs when it should have taken them, nor does the SRTR data support the proposition that the Nemours program should be approved because its program may have accepted an organ for a particular patient that Shands might have rejected. Nemours also argues that Shands performs PHTs at a rate lower than the region and the country, and that this should mitigate for the approval of another program. This assertion is predicated on waitlist information reported in the SRTR data. Patients that are placed on the waitlist have different status designations, depending on the severity of their condition. That status may change, up or down, over time. Due to the shortage of organs, until a patient reaches status 1A, he or she is unlikely to be offered an organ. The evidence reflected that Shands puts patients on the PHT organ waitlist at a time earlier than the moment they require the transplant surgery under what is called the “pediatric prerogative.” This helps those patients maintain their status on the list but does not result in organs being provided to less severely ill patients to the detriment of those in greater need. Further, the record evidence supports the finding that Shands waitlists patients because the clinical determination has been made that the child will ultimately require a transplant. This was corroborated by the parent of a Shands PHT patient who testified that when her daughter was placed on the waitlist, Dr. Fricker concluded at that time that her daughter would ultimately need a PHT, even though she was placed on a lower status initially, and it was a few years before the transplant occurred. Transplant surgeon Dr. Victor Morell, of the Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, testified that he waitlists his PHT patients not only when they need the procedure performed immediately, but rather when, in his clinical judgment, he determines the patient will ultimately need a PHT. This testimony supports the finding that there is nothing clinically unusual or inappropriate about how the Shands program waitlists patients. Shands realizes that its philosophy, which is contemplated within and permitted under the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) rules, makes its statistics, both in terms of percent of patients transplanted and waitlist mortality, look worse. While Shands’ waitlist mortality may be higher than expected as reflected in the SRTR data, it is still significantly lower than in the UNOS region or the United States. Shands advocates for its patients by their waitlist practices because it believes it helps secure the best outcomes for its patients. It does not indicate need for a new PHT program. Nemours also suggests that there may be a “capacity” problem at Shands because the organ rejection information provided by Shands shows that, during the 3-year period of CY 2015 through CY 2017, there were seven entries showing as either a primary or secondary reason for organ rejection that the surgeon was unavailable. However, this included both adult and pediatric hearts, and further investigation revealed that in only four instances were there potential PHT recipients at Shands. Of those four hearts that were rejected, two were not accepted by any PHT provider, and the two that were accepted were placed with adult transplant patients, not PHT patients. Shands has two PHT transplant surgeons. In very few instances at Shands, an organ was offered but not accepted because the surgeon was not available for one of several reasons. In one instance, there was another transplant scheduled. A surgeon could be ill, could be gone, or may have just completed another long surgery and be too fatigued to safely perform another. Like Shands, Nemours also has two experienced PHT surgeons. Although Dr. Wearden believes that Nemours would endeavor to not reject an organ for this reason, this ambition ignores reality. He cannot guarantee that the same could not or would not happen at Nemours for the same reasons it occasionally occurs at Shands. As explained by Dr. Pietra, when there are only small to medium volume programs, there is not likely to be a sufficient number of surgeons such that this scenario can be avoided entirely. Not Normal Circumstances In both its heart and heart/lung applications, Nemours articulated the following “not normal circumstances” in seeking approval: Florida does not have any approved pediatric heart/lung transplant programs. Florida's only two approved pediatric lung transplant programs have not performed any lung transplant programs in the last two reporting years according to AHCA reporting data. Significantly, there are no pediatric heart transplant or lung transplant programs in AHCA's Organ Transplant Service Area OTSA 3 in which NCH is located-an area of the State with one the fastest growing and youngest populations. Florida has no other pediatric comprehensive, multi-organ thoracic transplant program. Florida has no other pediatric comprehensive, multi-organ thoracic transplant program that is part of a pediatric specific integrated delivery system such as Nemours offers. NCH offers a unique, dedicated model of cardiothoracic care developed at its Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children (AIDHC) in Wilmington, Delaware and implemented upon the opening of the program at NCH. The key and differentiating element of this Model of Care is a unified team of cardiac clinical and administrative professionals who serve children with cardiac problems in dedicated facilities (the "Cardiac Team"). The Cardiac Team only cares for children with cardiac diagnoses. As such, the Cardiac Team of anesthesiologists, surgeons, cardiologists, nurses, and other support personnel do not "float" to other hospital floors or departments as in a typical hospital setting. This dedicated model of cardiac care allows the Cardiac Team to develop highly specialized knowledge and relationships to provide the best treatment protocols for patients with cardiac conditions. NCH has developed state-of-the art facilities and innovative clinical pathways for the care of the most complex pediatric thoracic patients. NCH has and will bring new opportunities for research in pediatric cardiology, cardiac surgery, and pulmonary medicine, particularly clinical translational and basic research into the linkages between childhood obesity and cardiac conditions. Nemours operates a regional network of clinics in Florida, with primary locations in Pensacola, Jacksonville, and Orlando, that will operate in partnership with NCH for the appropriate regional referral of patients in Florida for pediatric thoracic care. NCH can reduce the out-migration of pediatric, thoracic transplant patients from OTSA 3 to other parts of the State as well as the out-migration of these patients to other out-of-state transplant programs. Similarly, NCH will reduce the outmigration of organs donated in Florida to other states ensuring that Florida recipient patients are first priority for organs donated in Florida. NCH has in place the infrastructure, facilities, and resources to seamlessly add thoracic transplant services to its existing comprehensive cardiac surgery program. Additional needed staff are already being recruited to this program. As a result, the project has minimal incremental cost that will need to be incurred. Total project costs are, therefore, estimated to be $715,425.00. In addition, according to Nemours, an additional “not normal” circumstance has emerged since the filing of the applications: the approval of Nemours’ PLT application in the absence of a PHT program at the facility, which it contends is “a very unusual situation.” Noteworthy about these purported reasons for approval are that: (1) none of them are specifically directed at a unique circumstance relating to a need for another PHT program; and (2) most of them are either a recitation of the fact that there is no existing program in the service area or are about Nemours’ capability to provide these services. They are not directed at whether there is a need for its proposed programs. In fact, the main thrust of Nemours’ case was directed at proof regarding its capabilities. But the flaw in this theme is best demonstrated in the testimony of Dawn Tucker, the last witness called by Nemours. Ms. Tucker is the cardiac program administrative director for Nemours. When asked why she supported the proposed program, she talked about the experience of the team, a desire to care for sick patients, an organization (Nemours) that financially supports the program, and the network of centers that Nemours has in Florida. These factors address why Nemours “wants” these CONs. None of them addresses the threshold issue of whether there is a “need” for these programs in OTSA 3. More specifically, the first, third, and fourth bullet points are all based on the absence of a program in OTSA 3. By rule, that is not a basis for establishing need. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.009(2)(e)3. AHCA appropriately rejected the absence of a program in OTSA 3 as the sole basis upon which need for the proposed projects could be established. The second bullet point relates to the pediatric lung transplant application that is not at issue in this matter. The fifth and sixth bullet points relate to the Nemours integrated model of care. But again, this does not address whether there is a need for the proposed programs. The fact that Nemours has an employed-physician model is not unique or “not normal.” AHCA considered the information regarding the model of care and correctly noted that the model of care does not itself enhance access or improve outcomes. It should be noted that Shands’ doctors are employed by the University of Florida. In addition, the reliance on this model does not guarantee a robust program. This bullet point references the much older and more established Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children in Wilmington, Delaware, that is touted as the model for Nemours. Nemours presented evidence relating to its more established hospital in Delaware that also provides PHT services. However, the PHT program at duPont is a low-volume program, performing only one PHT in 2016. None of the managed- care companies that recognize Shands as a center of excellence also recognizes the duPont Hospital as such. One of the companies--Lifetrac--acknowledges duPont as a “supplemental” program, whereas Shands is one of its “select” programs. This demonstrates that simply having the financial resources of the duPont Foundation or the model of care used by that organization does not guarantee high volumes or success. The “not normal circumstance” bullet points regarding Nemours’ facilities, research, and other infrastructure similarly do not demonstrate need. Otherwise, a hospital could obtain a CON for a new program by spending the money in advance and then demanding approval based upon those expenditures. AHCA recognized that Nemours had recruited some very qualified clinicians, but correctly noted that that does not create or evidence need for the proposed programs. The remaining bullet point asserts that approval of the PHT and PHLT programs could reduce outmigration of both patients and organs. By definition, because neither of these transplant programs exists in OTSA 3, all patients leave OTSA 3 for these services. Again, that alone does not establish need, nor is it automatically a “not normal” circumstance. As discussed herein, Nemours has not demonstrated a sufficient need or an access problem that justifies approval of either application. With regard to the outmigration of organs from Florida, Nemours has argued that Florida is a net exporter of organs and that this is a “not normal” circumstance justifying approval of its application. However, organs harvested in one state are commonly used in another. There is nothing unusual or negative about that fact. Indeed, Dr. Wearden agreed that in his experience, this is a common occurrence. There is a national allocation system through UNOS and this sharing, as explained by Dr. Pietra, facilitates the best match for organs and patients. UNOS divides the country into regions for the purpose of allocation of donor organs, with Florida being one of six states in Region 3. The evidence of record did not establish that approval of the Nemours applications would result in the reduction of organs leaving Florida, or even that such would be a desirable result. Nemours also argued at hearing that approving their applications would increase the number of donor organs that are procured and transplanted in Florida. Nemours suggested that its programs would increase public awareness and implied that it would accept organs for future patients that surgeons at other programs turn down. However, these arguments are purely conjectural and are rejected. No record evidence exists which demonstrates that a Nemours program would increase the supply of organs in Florida. Indeed, Nemours presented no such relevant data or statistical evidence in its applications to demonstrate that this will occur. Finally, Nemours argues that its PHT and PHLT applications should be approved because it does not make sense for AHCA to have approved the PLT program but denied the other two applications. Nemours goes on to note that while there are hospitals in the country that do PHTs but not PLTs, there are no hospitals that do lungs but not hearts. Regardless of whether that is true, Florida law separates these three services into separate CON applications, which are reviewed independently. The wisdom of the rule is not at issue in this proceeding. Regardless of any overlap in the skill sets required to perform these procedures, approval of the pediatric lung transplant application does not determine need for pediatric heart or pediatric heart/lung programs. Nemours failed to establish that “not normal” circumstances currently exist that would warrant approval of either the PHT or PHLT programs. Nor did Nemours credibly demonstrate any other indicators of need for its proposed programs. Section 408.035(1)(c): The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant’s record of providing quality of care. The parties stipulated that Nemours is a quality provider. However, AHCA maintains that this criterion is in dispute to the extent that center transplant volume as a result of Nemours’ approval would lead to or correlate with negative patient outcomes. Nemours failed to demonstrate that it would achieve the volumes it projected unless it takes significant volumes from other Florida providers.6/ Approval of Nemours will not create transplant patients that do not exist or are not currently able to reasonably access services. While Nemours has assembled a team of professionals with varying levels of transplant experience, it has not been demonstrated that it will achieve volume sufficient to reasonably assure quality care.7/ Section 408.035(1)(e): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district. Approval of the Nemours PHT and PHLT programs would unquestionably improve geographic access to those services for the very few residents of OTSA 3 that need them. However, given the extreme rarity of pediatric heart and heart/lung transplants, approval of the Nemours programs would not result in enhanced access for a significant number of patients. Moreover, there was no credible non-hearsay evidence presented at hearing that any resident of OTSA 3 that needed PHT or PHLT services was unable to access those services at one of the existing PHT programs in Florida or, for PHLT, at a facility elsewhere. Based upon persuasive evidence at hearing, there is also clearly a positive relationship between volume and outcomes. As with any complex endeavor, practice makes perfect. In this instance, maintaining a minimum PHT case volume provides experience to the clinicians involved and helps maintain proficiency. According to the credible testimony of Dr. Pietra, programs should perform no fewer than 10 PHTs per year. “If you can stay above 10, then your program is going to be exercised at a minimum amount to keep everybody sort of at a peak performance.” The clear intent of the minimum volume requirement of 12 heart transplants per year contained in rule 59C- 1.044(6)(b)2. is to ensure a sufficient case volume to maintain the proficiency of the transplant surgeons and other clinicians involved in the surgical and post-surgical care of PHT patients. In addition, pediatric transplant programs are measured statistically based on outcomes, such as mortality and morbidity. Because of this, the loss of even one patient in a small program can be devastating to that hospital’s mortality statistics. As such, small programs may become less willing to take more complicated patients. In a perverse sort of way, adding more programs that dilute volumes may decrease, rather than increase, access because of the fear a small program might have for taking more complex patients. Adequate case volume is also important for teaching facilities, such as Shands, to benefit residents of all the OTSAs by being able to train the next generation of transplant physicians. The mothers of the two Shands patients that testified made note of the complexity of their daughters’ conditions and how their cases were used for training purposes. There was no persuasive evidence of record that approval of the Nemours applications would meaningfully and significantly enhance geographic access to transplant services in OTSA 3. The modest improvement in geographic access for the few patients that are to be served by the two programs is not significant enough to justify approval in the absence of demonstrated need. There is no evidence that approval of the Nemours applications will enhance financial access nor that patients are not currently able to access PHT or PHLT services because of payor status. Section 408.035(1)(g): The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost- effectiveness. It is clear that establishing and maintaining a transplant program is expensive. Given the limited pool of patients, the added expense of yet a sixth Florida program is not a cost-effective use of resources. This criterion also relates to the Nemours position that AHCA should approve the PHT and PHLT applications simply because the PLT application was approved, and it would not be cost-effective for Nemours unless the PHT and PHLT applications were also approved. However, each of these applications must rise or fall on its own merit. As of the hearing, Nemours had not yet implemented its PLT program. Given the absence of need for either the PHT or PHLT programs, the cost-effective solution might be for Nemours to reconsider implementation of the PLT program. 408.035(1)(i): The applicant’s past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. AHCA agreed at hearing that Nemours satisfies section 408.035(1)(i). Nonetheless, Nemours provides a very high level of Medicaid services, and projects a high-level volume related to Medicaid patients and charity care patients. As noted, approximately half of the PHTs projected by Nemours will be performed on Medicaid patients. Conformance with this criterion would mitigate toward approval had there been persuasive evidence that Medicaid and medically indigent patients are currently being denied access to PHT and PHLT services. However, no such evidence was presented.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying CON Application Nos. 10471 and 10472 filed by The Nemours Foundation, d/b/a Nemours Children’s Hospital. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2018.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that petitioner's applications for certificates of need to institute cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery services be GRANTED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth F. Hoffman Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones and Gay Post Office Box 1872 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert M. Eisenberg District IV Legal Counsel Post Office Box 2417-F Jacksonville, Florida 32231 Charles Collette Art Forehand, Administrator Assistant General Counsel Office of Community Medical Department of HRS Facilities 1317 Winewood Boulevard Department of HRS Tallahassee, Florida 32301 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether the application made by Plantation General Hospital for certificate of need number 5736 for an open heart surgery program should be granted.
Findings Of Fact General. Procedural background and description of the parties. Plantation General Hospital filed a letter of intent with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) and the local planning agency noticing its intention to file an application for a certificate of need for an adult open heart surgery program on August 28, 1988. Its application for certificate of need No. 5736 was filed on September 28, 1988. On October 10, 1988, the Department notified Plantation of omissions from its application, which were supplemented in a response filed November 14, 1988, and the Department deemed the application complete on November 16, 1988. The Department issued its notice of intent to deny the application on January 30, 1989, and Plantation requested a hearing on that denial. Florida Medical Center, North Ridge General Hospital and Broward General Hospital intervened in the proceeding. Broward General sought to intervene shortly before the hearing was to begin, and its participation was limited. By notice dated May 31, 1989, the Department announced that it had reconsidered its position and would support Plantation's application. Plantation General Hospital is a 264-bed general medical surgical hospital located in the City of Plantation, Broward County, Florida. It is owned by Hospital Development and Services Corporation which in turn is owned by Healthtrust, Inc. It offers acute care services, except for open heart surgery and burn treatment. It does not propose to perform pediatric open heart surgery. It does offer cardiac catheterization and other non-invasive cardiac services such as EKG, stress testing and other procedures. It also has services which would support an open heart surgery program such as radiology, pathology, anesthesiology, neurology, intensive care, and an emergency room. Plantation received a certificate of need in 1984 to operate a cardiac catheterization laboratory, which opened in April of 1985. It now performs a large number of catheterizations, so that there is pressure to offer an open heart surgery program. Diagnostic catheterizations often reveal that a patient could benefit from open heart surgery. Patients prefer to have surgery done at the hospital where the catheterization is done. Conversely, patients often choose a hospital for catheterization that has the capability to perform open heart surgery. Patients having therapeutic catheterization (angioplasty) must be served at a hospital approved to offer open heart surgery. Therapeutic catheterization itself sometimes triggers the need for immediate heart surgery. Plantation is currently constructing a new wing for its obstetrical patients and proposes to convert part of its present obstetric space for use by the open heart surgery program. The proposed open heart area would have a single operating room, a recovery area, a pump room for the heart-lung oxygenator pump, a sub-sterile storage area and a nurses' station. Existing beds near the proposed open heart area are monitored beds which could be converted to cardiovascular intensive care unit beds at a lower cost than would be the case for wholly new construction. That conversion would not require certificate of need review. The project Plantation General proposes involves the renovation of 2,229 square feet at a projected cost of $267,480. Equipment is projected to cost an additional $300,000. Plantation General anticipates the total project cost will be $599,970. Plantation is not a teaching or research hospital and does not propose to offer teaching or research as part of its open heart surgery program. The hospital does not contend that there is an unmet need for indigent open heart health services which its project would fill. It has historically provided some medical service to Medicaid patients and to the medically indigent. Plantation does not contend, however, that the level of its medical services historically provided to the medically indigent, the extent to which it proposes to provide open heart surgery to underserved population groups, or to Medicaid patients enhances its application. These items are neutral factors which have no impact on the need determination. The Intervenors acknowledged that Plantation would provide minimally appropriate open heart services for the indigent. Plantation General's owner, Healthtrust, Inc., has created a limited partnership to become the new owner of its hospital; Hospital Development and Services Corporation will serve as the general partner, and a number of doctors will be limited partners. The partnership offering is closed, and the approvals, transfers, and other activities created by the closing of the partnership are ongoing. It is anticipated that after receipt of all approvals and transfers the partnership will be deemed to have been in effect as of June 1, 1989. Florida Medical Center is a 459 bed acute hospital located in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida. It provides a full array of cardiac services, with the exception of heart transplants. It offers cardiac catheterization services, and was the first hospital to offer open heart surgery in Broward County. North Ridge Medical Center presented no testimony about its size or location because its standing had been stipulated. It provides a full array of cardiac services including cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery, but not heart transplants. North Ridge performs the largest volume of open heart surgery procedures in Broward County. Broward General Hospital is the largest facility of the four facilities operated by the North Broward Hospital District, an independent special taxing district. Broward General has 744 acute care beds, and is located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. It operates an array of cardiac services, including cardiac catheterization, coronary angioplasty, cardiac electrophysiology studies, intra-aortic balloon pumping, and insertion of temporary and permanent pacemakers. Its physical plant consist of one open heart surgery suite, one cardiac catheterization laboratory, and cardiac and progressive care beds. On January 26, 1989, North Broward Hospital District entered into a contract with the Cleveland Clinic Florida which will permit the clinic to provide its cardiac services exclusively at Broward General. Broward General is in the process of expanding its open heart surgery suites from one suite to two, its catheterization labs from one to two, and adding 16 coronary care and 24 progressive care beds. Broward General has 29 staff cardiologists, three of whom are Cleveland Clinic Florida physicians who hold interim privileges. Eight cardiovascular surgeons are on its staff, two of whom are Cleveland Clinic Florida physicians. Statutory Criteria for Evaluating Certificate of Need Applications. Consistency with the state health plan and local health plan. Section 381.705(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department is required to consider The need for the health care services and hospices being proposed in relation to the applicable district plan and state health plan, except in emergency circumstances which pose a threat to the public health. Section 381.705(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Plantation General does not contend that there are emergency circumstances in Broward County which threaten the public health and require approval of its application. Prehearing stipulation, paragraph 12. There is no applicable state health plan because the last plan was specifically drafted to cover the period 1985-87. That last plan does contain a goal stating that it is the state's desire to "ensure the appropriate availability of . . . open heart surgery services at a reasonable cost" and the goal is implemented by an objective, number 4.2, which is "to maintain an average of 350 open heart procedures per program in each district through 1990." This objective is predicated upon the assumption that the Department will interpret subparagraph 11 of Rule 10-5.011(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, infra, to permit a new program if the existing programs, on the average, provide 350 open heart procedures per year. The correctness of that interpretation is discussed in Findings 60 and 61, as well as in the Conclusions of Law. The state health plan also states that applicants proposing cardiac surgery must make those services available to all segments of the population regardless of their ability to pay. Section 381.705(1)(n). The parties stipulated that Plantation has provided medical services to Medicaid patients and to the medically indigent and the extent to which Plantation proposes to provide open heart services is neither an enhancement nor detraction from its application. Currently five facilities in Broward County provide open heart surgery: Broward General, Florida Medical Center, North Ridge, Holy Cross, and Memorial Hospital. There are no facilities which have not yet opened, but which have obtained certificate of need approval for open heart surgery. During the period of July 1987 - June 1988, current providers had the following volume of procedures: Hospital Broward General Number of Procedures 143 Florida Medical Center 382 North Ridge 781 Holy Cross 362 Memorial 478 Total Dividing the number of procedures 2,146 by the five existing providers yeilds an average of 431 procedures per program. The average number of procedures therefore exceeds 350, which is consistent with the provisions of the old state health plan. The local health plan has three criteria which bear upon the application. It requires that the application be consistent with accreditation standards, the hospital must be willing to accept patients from all payor classes, and must comply with the Department's rules. It is stipulated that Plantation General has full accreditation and if approved will obtain accreditation for its open heart surgery program. Plantation accepts Medicare, Medicaid, private pay, and indigent patients. At page 70, its application states that the hospital will provide 2% of its open heart surgery to indigent patients, 67% of its patients will be Medicare patients and 31% will be private pay patients. The hospital has not projected any Medicaid utilization because open heart surgery is typically performed on older patients, and most of those patients will qualify for Medicare rather than Medicaid due to their age. No Medicaid open heart surgery was reported in HRS District X (Broward County) for the year preceding Plantation's application. The application is consistent with the last state health plan and the local health plan. Availability, utilization, geographic accessibility and economic accessibility of facilities in the district. Section 381.705(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Open heart surgery is available to all residents in Broward County within two hours normal driving time; it is therefore geographically accessible. Plantation does not propose to provide a substantial portion of its open heart services to individuals who reside outside of HRS Service District X (Broward County). Plantation does not contend that there is a pool of patients who are denied access to open heart surgery on financial grounds. The increased access to indigents which Plantation would provide is negligible (only about six surgeries per year), and the parties have stipulated that its commitment to provide services to the medically indigent neither enhanced nor detracted from its application. There is no evidence of any waiting list at facilities which provide open heart surgery which would be alleviated by the approval of Plantation General's application. Plantation's argument that service availability has been a problem for some patients at Plantation who need open heart or emergency angioplasty services is rejected. It can provide diagnostic catheterizations but not angioplasty because it lacks open heart surgery certification. With respect to emergency angioplasty, there is an inherent service availability problem when a hospital such as Plantation establishes a catheterization lab, when it is not approved to provide open heart surgery. Angioplasty can have the unfortunate side effect in a small number of cases of triggering an immediate need from open heart surgery. A patient must be immediately transferred, or the open heart surgery must be performed at Plantation, even though it is not approved for that service. Those problems are problems which Plantation knowingly assumed when it began its catheterization lab knowing that it was not approved for open heart surgery. It is not significant that at times of peak demand at Florida Medical Center there may be no beds available for a patient from Plantation who needs open heart surgery. Patients are commonly transferred to Florida Medical Center because it is the nearest hospital to Plantation. More than one half of its patients who were transferred went to Memorial Hospital, however, not Florida Medical Center. There is no evidence that another hospital in Broward County has not had a bed available for a patient from Plantation who needed open heart surgery when Florida Medical Center's unit was full. The issues of efficiency and the extent of utilization raise the question whether there is additional capacity in existing open heart programs which should be used in preference to opening a new program at Plantation General. This is related to the need calculation made in Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)8, Florida Administrative Code, discussed at Finding 60. An efficiency standard of 350 procedures per year is found in Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)11a(I), Florida Administrative Code. That utilization standard is met by all facilities in Broward County except for Broward General, see, Finding 14, supra. It provided only 143 open heart procedures in the year July 1987-June 1988. Broward General has been providing open heart surgery for 16 years and has not yet approached the 350 procedures per year. Broward General is in the process of substantially expanding its cardiac program, through its association with the Cleveland Clinic, and the addition of a second open heart surgery operating room. That expansion could accommodate the volumes Plantation seeks to achieve. Florida Medical Center already has two open heart surgery rooms in operation and is adding a third. Based upon its current volumes and the fact that there is no reasonable likelihood of real future growth in the use rate for open heart surgery, Broward General and Florida Medical Center have existing capacity to serve the demand for surgeries which Plantation projects it would perform during its first two years of operation. North Ridge provides approximately 600 surgeries per year, and utilizes more than one operating room. It also has capacity to contribute to District X (Broward County), especially given the reduced demand in Broward caused by the reduction in Palm Beach County residents coming to Broward County for open heart surgery. Open heart surgery programs in Palm Beach County hospitals have recently come on line, and are providing surgery for Palm Beach County residents who formerly traveled to Broward. There is no evidence that existing open heart surgery programs lack the capacity to sufficiently handle future demand. There is no proof that existing facilities are being over utilized, which is consistent with the prior finding that there is no waiting list at any provider. All candidates for open heart surgery are currently being served. There is little overlap in the medical staffs of Plantation General and Broward General, and Plantation referred no cases to Broward General for open heart surgery in 1987 and only three in 1988, but the additional capacity of Broward General is an important consideration. Part of the reason for the certificate of need process is to control and reduce capital expenditures, and, through that control to indirectly reduce associated labor costs and other ancillary costs which arise from the proliferation of medical services. To the extent that other institutions, especially Broward General, could provide additional surgery through its approved open heart surgery program, restraining an increase in the number of providers will eventually have the effect of directing patients to hospitals with lower utilization. This might not be the case if there were proof that Broward General did not provide quality care, and residents voted with their feet and shunned the program to seek care elsewhere. The parties have stipulated, however, that there are no quality of care problems with any of the existing open heart surgery programs in the county, including Broward General. Efficiency considerations therefore weigh against approval of the Plantation General application. There are no geographic accessibility problems, nor any reason to believe that access to open heart surgery by medically indigent or other underserved populations would be enhanced by the Plantation General proposal. Ability of applicant to provide quality care. Section 381.705(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Plantation General is fully accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals. It provides quality care in the services now available at Plantation General. Plantation intends to implement its open heart surgery program by forming a steering committee to direct its development, with responsibility to assure that the program will comply with all applicable rules and provide high quality services. In an effort to keep the cost of its program low, the Plantation General application has sought to minimize the renovations, expansions, and the equipment attributable to the program. This attempt at cost effectiveness has serious quality of care implications. It will be difficult to provide a quality open heart program operating at a reasonable surgical volume with a single operating room; the application also proposes only to have one oxygenator pump, which is inadequate. Plantation General is likely to encounter difficulty in finding a sufficient number of skilled personnel to provide a quality program. It assessing the adequacy of a single open heart surgery operating room, it is necessary to keep in mind that Plantation will also be providing therapeutic catheterization, or angioplasty, which requires immediate access to open heart surgery as a back up. The volume of angioplasties will affect the hospital's ability to schedule open heart surgery in its single operating room, for angioplasty cannot take place if there is no operating room available for open heart surgery should the patient require it. Plantation projects it will handle between 203 and 271 angioplasties in the first year its open heart surgery program will operate, and between 218 and 291 angioplasties in the second year. The average time for an angioplasty is 3 to 3.5 hours. The open heart surgery team and other staff also must be available on site while angioplasty proceeds in case they are needed. In terms of the staff necessary to perform open heart surgery, the Plantation application indicates that there will be one surgical team. Each team consists of two surgeons, one anesthesiologist, a circulating nurse, a perfusionist to operate the heart-lung oxygenator pump, and two scrub nurses. Plantation did not adequately explain how its staffing projections would enable the open heart surgery service to cover the projected number of surgeries and angioplasties, given the substantial overtime that would have to be incurred if both the open heart and angioplasty programs operate. In order to provide angioplasty coverage, by 1991-92, Plantation's open heart surgery schedule will have to provide 654 to 873 hours of angioplasty back-up coverage, based on a three hour average angioplasty. In turn, this means that 12.5 to 17 hours of such coverage will be necessary each week based upon an average time of 3 hours for each angioplasty. The cardiac surgeons on staff at Plantation will require about 5 1/2 hours to perform open heart surgery without including clean up or set up time. For Plantation's open heart surgery program during its second year of operation, its health care planner, Mr. Nelson, assumes six operations per week during the first three-quarters of the year and eight per week in the last quarter of the year. The normal operating hours for the program will be 8 to 9 hours per day. Thus, for the first three quarters of 1991-92, open heart surgery will occupy the time available in the single operating room at least three days a week. The 4 to 5 angioplasties still must be covered, which will require at least 2 days of the dedicated open heart surgery room's time. By the last quarter of the second year of operation, the open heart surgery suite will be utilized at least 4 days a week for actual surgery, leaving only one day available for the necessary angioplasty back up coverage. Thus, the single operating room proposed will require the hospital surgical staff to regularly work well beyond normal operating hours and will create substantial scheduling problems to accommodate both open heart surgery and angioplasties. What this means is that it is not likely that the configuration for the open heart surgery program proposed by Plantation will work out. Plantation will have to add staff, and probably renovate and equip another operating room. The Intersociety Commission on Heart Disease Resources guidelines recommend that an open heart program have two fully equipped open heart operating rooms, or a designated open heart operating room immediately adjacent to a general surgical suite which also has the necessary equipment in place to provide open heart surgery. Plantation's proposal would violate these guidelines because it has only a single operating room and only enough equipment in to handle one operating room. Plantation's witness, Mr. Webb, did testify that he has worked in two other facilities with only one open heart operating room, that the rooms were not dedicated solely to open heart, and no serious problems were encountered with these programs, but his testimony did not deal with the problems likely to be encountered by Plantation given its projected open heart volumes and likely angioplasty volumes. It may be true that after the open heart surgery program is implemented, additional operating rooms might be added without requiring additional certificate of need review, but it is improper for the institution to low-ball its application projections, on the assumption that it can later make &*an inadequate proposal sufficient by additional capital expenditures for construction or reconfiguration of operating rooms, acquisition of additional equipment or hiring additional staff. Such a piecemeal process defeats the purpose of certificate of need review; it causes a review of selected portions of a program, rather than the program as it will actually operate. Plantation's intention to purchase a single heart-lung oxygenator pump is a serious deficiency. A single pump is likely to suffer occasional mechanical breakdown, and no other pump will be available in an emergency. More importantly, the pump will certainly need routine maintenance, and the heavy schedule of use for the operating suite based upon the projected volumes of open heart and angioplasty cannot be maintained with a single pump. The pump should not be moved from room to room because of the increased risks of contamination caused by movement. With respect to the configuration of the overall unit, the operating suite will have four cardiovascular intensive care unit beds in its open heart surgery area. This is an adequate design, even though most of the cardiovascular intensive care beds will be on the third floor. Plantation General's ability to provide quality care is also questionable based upon the limited partnership it has formed with its doctors. Since the advent of diagnostic related groups (DRGs), the reimbursement to hospitals from federal sources has been limited to a flat fee arrangement. It is in the interest of the hospital to discharge patients as quickly as possible, to maximize the value of that payment. On the other hand, doctors refer, admit and discharge patients from the hospital, hospital administrators do not. Hospitals therefore seek ways to encourage doctors to share the hospital's financial incentives to make a profit within the payment constraints of diagnostic related groups. One way to do this is to have doctors share in the profitability of the hospital. Plantation General has formed a limited partnership with some of its doctors. Those limited partners must be on the active staff of Plantation. The general partner is Hospital Development and Services Corporation, the owner of Plantation General Hospital. The partnership will lease the hospital, and the limited partners will be paid, based on their units of ownership, upon the operating cash flow of the hospitals. If doctors refer more patients to the hospital, the cash flow will be greater and distributions should be larger. This arrangement is fraught with the potential for abuse which is highlighted in the prospectus for the limited partnership, which states: Prospective Payment System. The Social amendments of 1983 established a prospective payment system for Medicare and amended Section 1866(a)(1)(F) of the Social Security Act (the "Act") to specify that hospitals seeking reimbursement under the prospective payment system must enter into agreements with a utilization and quality control peer review organization ("PRO"). Section 1886(f)(2) of the Act specifies that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services may deny payment or require a hospital to take corrective action if a PRO provides the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services with documentation that a hospital has attempted to circumvent the prospective payment system through unnecessary admissions or overutilization. Fraud and Abuse. The Act imposes criminal penalties upon persons who make or receive kickbacks, rebates in connection with the Medicare prog anti-fraud and abuse rules prohibit prov others from soliciting, offering, receiving o directly or indirectly, any remuneration in r either making a referral for a Medicare-covere or item or ordering any covered service Violations of these rules may be punished by up to $25,000 or imprisonment for up to five both. In addition, the Medicare a and Program Protection Act of 1987 makes it a civil offense to violate these prohibitions, punishable by exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The Limited Partners are to receive cash distributions based upon the available cash flow, if any, of the Partnership generated through the provision of services to patients admitted to the Hospital by physicians, some of whom will be Limited Partners. The Limited Partners therefore may receive a greater amount of distributions if physicians admit a greater number of patients to the Hospital. Individual investors share in the Partnership's cash flow only in proportion to their respective investments in the Partnership and not in accordance with the number of referrals or admissions each makes. Arguably, therefore, the investors' sharing of Partnership profits would not be a prohibited kickback or rebate. The Third Circuit United States Court of Appeals has recently held that the fraud and abuse rules are violated if one purpose (as opposed to a primary or sole purpose) of a payment to a provider is to induce referrals. U.S. versus Greber, 760 F. 2d 68 (1985). The Greber case involved the payment of fees for alleged professional services. Although the Greber holding (i.e., the one purpose test) casts an extremely wide net, its application to the present facts is not clear. Although as stated above, the present arrangement, which involves the allocation of cash flow on the basis of ownership interests held, arguably is not objectionable on these grounds, it is clear that as the number of referrals and admissions increase, revenues and, potentially, available cash flow will increase. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the Partnership's activities may be held to violate the anti-fraud and abuse rules and subject the Partnership and the Partners to criminal and civil sanctions. The federal government has announced a policy of scrutinizing and evaluating joint ventures among healthcare providers under the fraud and abuse rules, and this area of the law is in a state of rapid development and change. Because of the changing state of the law and the lack of clear authority, it is not possible to give a more precise analysis of the application of the fraud and abuse provisions to the Partnership. The hospital's limited partnership arrangement is also probably contrary to the Code of Ethics of the American College of Physicians. It states: The physician should avoid any business arrangement that might, because of personal gain, influence his decision in patient care. . . In the case of personal conflicts, the moral edict is clear, the physician must avoid any personal commercial conflicts of interest that might compromise his loyalty in treatment of patients. Collusion with nursing homes, pharmacists, or colleagues for personal financial gain is morally reprehensible. For a physician to own shares in a drug company or in a hospital in which he practices does not constitute an unethical behavior of itself, but it does make him vulnerable to the accusation that his actions are influenced by such ownership. The safest course would be to avoid any such potentially compromising situation. Unfortunately, the application here has the direct effect of promoting compromising situations of this type. Moreover, this type of arrangement has been the subject of a "special fraud alert" from the Office of the Inspector General of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. One of the factors that the Inspector General looks to is "whether investors are chosen because they are in a position to make referrals." Under the prospectus for the Plantation General limited partnership, only medical staff can become limited partners and "physicians expected to make a large number of referrals may be offered greater investment opportunity in the joint venture than those anticipated to make fewer referrals." (Tr. 520) Moreover, "investors may be required to divest their ownership interest if they cease to practice in the service area, for example, if they move, become disabled, or retire." (Id) While it is understandable that the owner of the hospital may find the limited partnership to be an attractive means to bond physicians to its profit motivation, this set-up creates inherent conflicts of interest which have serious implications for quality of care. This innovation should not be condoned through certificate of need approval. Availability of health manpower and the extent to which the proposed services will be accessible to all residents of the District. Section 381.705(1)(h), Florida Statutes. An applicant must demonstrate that there is adequate health manpower to meet the staffing needs of the project. There is a current nursing shortage nationally, and recent graduates from nursing school do not posses the training necessary to perform in an open heart operating room or critical care after surgery. One of the means Plantation proposes to fill its nursing positions is to use agency nurses, nurses provided by pool services from temporary placement agencies. (Tr. 70, Plantation's proposed finding 31). While such nurses may be valuable in other parts of the hospital, these sort of temporary nurses should not be used in an open heart program. Hospitals in general and open heart surgery programs in particular suffer an acute shortage of qualified nursing staff. Florida Medical Center has found it necessary to establish its own training program because it cannot find adequately trained nurses in Southeast Florida, including Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Even North Ridge Hospital, which has a reputation for high staff retention, has a nursing turn-over rate of 20 to 25%. When Delray Hospital in Palm Beach County opened its open heart surgery program its program was under substantial pressure because of its high nursing turn-over rate, its inability to find nurses to cover a 24 hour period of time and nurse "burn out" from excessive overtime. The Broward County nursing shortage contributes substantially to increased health care costs because of the marketing and monetary incentives related to recruiting and retaining nurses. New open heart programs must raid nurses from competing programs, which exerts a upward pressure on nurse salaries. If the Plantation program were to be approved, the existing open heart programs would probably lose nurses, which has an adverse impact on the present system. None of the foregoing should be construed as a reason to deny nurses the economic advantages which arise from a nursing shortage. The issue is whether, taken as a whole, the benefits of the application justifies the upward pressure on health care costs implicit in the approval of an additional program when there is additional capacity in current providers. On balance here, there is inadequate reason to do so. Immediate and long term financial feasibility. Section 381.705(1)(i), Florida Statutes. Many of the elements of financial feasibility are not in dispute. The parties have stipulated that Healthtrust, the parent corporation for Plantation General, has access to $600,000 and will make those funds available if this application is approved. They also stipulated that if one operating room and one pump are adequate and appropriate, the $300,000 in equipment cost shown in Table 3 of the application adequately covers necessary equipment costs; that the 2,229 gross square feet to be renovated, as shown in the line drawing in the application, is adequate for creating the room shown in the drawing,(i.e., one operating room, one recovery room, a pump room, an observation room, a sub-sterile storage area, a scrub area, and a nurses station), and the renovations can be accomplished for $299,970. The parties also stipulated that Plantation General's bad debt projections, policy adjustments and contractual adjustments contained in is pro forma are reasonable if the gross revenue projection is accurate. The salary projections per full- time equivalent found on Table 11 for staff are reasonable but the parties did not agree that the number of positions or the distribution of staff is appropriate. The perfusionist charge is reasonable, and the depreciation cost is correctly stated in the application. The projections of the percentage of utilization by payor class found in the application is reasonable. The areas of contention are the long and short term feasibility of the project based upon Plantation's projected charges, and the accuracy of Plantation's projected expenses. Plantation projects it will perform 184 open heart surgeries in its first year of operation and 312 in the second year. The anticipated average charges are $34,860 in the year beginning July, 1990 and $36,603 in the year beginning July, 1991. These charges were calculated by an outside consultant who has no control over the actual charges which the hospital may establish if the program is implemented. The average charge was predicated upon an examination of Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board data pertaining to the DRGs for open heart surgery reported by the five Broward open heart providers during the third quarter of 1986. The charges ranged from a low of $29,063 at North Ridge to a high of $39,208 at Hollywood Memorial. The projection of average charges is inherently imprecise, but is useful to analyze whether, if Plantation charged patients an amount within the range of the average actual charges within the district, the project would be financially feasible. Plantation does not guarantee that its charges will be no more than the average charges. Its total income will vary based upon the mix of cases and the types of patients it serves. Based on the anticipated charges, Plantation calculated the incremental cost associated with the project. The incremental revenue to the hospital (that is, the revenue generated by the facility with the open heart surgery program as opposed to revenue that will be realized without the program) should be $6,414,240 in the first year and as much as $11,420,136 in the second year. This calculation is necessary in order to determine whether costs would exceed the likely charges, which would clearly affect the financial feasibility of the project. Plantation projected that these costs and deductions from revenue would be $2,919,293 the first year and $5,286,554 in the second year. It is quite likely that Plantation would perform 184 surgeries during the first year and it is reasonable to assume it could achieve the projected 312 surgeries in the second year. Plantation's average charges as set forth in the application may be low. Plantation General's charges are, on balance, about 20% higher than the charges at North Ridge. This would mean that the average charge for Plantation General's first year of operation would be $42,708 rather than $34,860. It might have been better if Plantation General had developed a charge comparison taking into account the cost per adjusted admission by using the case mix index published by the Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board. The failure to use that adjustment is not that significant given the inherent "softness" in the projection of patient charges. Plantation General's projected charges found in Finding 42 are reasonable. What is much more significant is the questionable nature of Plantation General's expenses. The Intervenors have argued that the applicant's cost projections fail to include costs associated with non-revenue producing Departments, such as pharmacy, laboratory, X-ray, nuclear medicine, respiratory therapy, EKG, cardiac catheterization and pathology, dietary and medical records. In essence, the Intervenors claim that the only expenses which are acknowledged by Plantation General are incremental costs from instituting the open heart program, but not the true cost. Plantation General presented the testimony of Mr. Tharpe, who prepared the cost analysis. He testified that he included the cost of supplies, laboratory and all other ancillary areas that provide services to patients by taking the projected income from the open heart surgery program, and comparing it to the projected income of the entire hospital. The actual 1988 hospital revenues were inflated by 5% a year to estimate the hospital's 1990-91 revenue. Open heart revenues would then constitute about 7% of total hospital revenues. He used this percentage to estimate the cost that would be associated with using non-revenue generating departments. This 7% ratio was not applied to fixed overhead cost such as the mortgage costs or the cost of hospital administration, because those costs would be incurred whether or not Plantation operated an open heart program. Neither did he apply the 7% ratio to other cost centers such as the obstetrics or pediatrics departments. In this way, Mr. Tharpe claimed he allocated the cost for all routine and ancillary areas which would provide services to open heart patients. This analysis is unpersuasive. Followed it to its logical conclusion, no new program would ever have to account for its share of the ongoing cost of the hospital imbedded in fixed overhead, such as mortgage, administration, power, or interest charges. It provides a convenient excuse for the hospital to understate expenses and thereby make a new service look more profitable, and therefore more likely to be financially viable in both the short and long terms. A better way to perform cost analysis is to use a step-down cost analysis. This procedure allocates overhead of non-revenue departments to revenue departments to get fully costed figures for delivering services within each hospital department. This step-down cost analysis is a generally accepted accounting procedure and is one required by Medicare. The statistical basis of step-down cost analysis avoids the inherent oversimplification in the assumption that costs are linear, i.e., that all costs and charges have the same relationship to each other within the hospital. Without necessarily accepting Mr. Newman's projection that the fully allocated cost of open heart surgery at Plantation General would be $22,800 per case and not $12,800 per case, the is persuasive that the expense projections of Plantation General are unrealistic, and understated. It is not possible, based on the record made, to determine what the actual expense would be. Due to this failure of proof, it is therefore impossible to determine whether the project is feasible in the long or short term. While open heart surgery is often a very profitable service, in the absence of persuasive evidence on the cost of providing open heart surgery services, it would be inappropriate to assume that the project would be sufficiently profitable that it would be financially feasible in the short or long terms. Needs and circumstances of facilities providing a substantial portion of their services to persons not residing in the service area. Section 381.705(1)(k), Florida Statutes. The prehearing stipulation states that this criteria is an issue, but it really is not. Although other hospitals such as North Ridge and Florida Medical Center provide services to patients from Palm Beach County, the effect of the project on them is not relevant under this criteria. This criteria focuses on the effect of the establishment of a new service at Plantation General on other providers located outside District X, Broward County. There is no proof that it will have any such effect. Probable impact of the proposed project on the cost of providing the service, including the effect on competition. Section 381.705(1)(l), Florida Statutes. The introduction of another provider of open heart surgery will provide the potential for additional price and non-price competition among providers of open heart surgery services. The major purchasers are really not the individuals who have surgery, but the managed care plans, such as HMOs and PPOs, which negotiate with hospitals on behalf of their subscribers. Plantation General currently has contracts with about 25 managed care plans and receives about 30% of its revenue from those plans. This is an indication that the market regards Plantation as a competitive provider. On the other hand, Florida Medical Center, which is its closest competitor geographically, is not actively seeking managed care contracts and has not added any for the last eighteen months. The addition of Plantation General would be consistent with the statutory directive to foster increased competition among health care providers. The Hearing Officer also accepts Dr. Zaretsky's testimony that even if all 184 surgeries which Plantation General projects it will perform during its first year were drawn from Florida Medical Center or, in the alternative, from North Ridge, neither hospital would suffer such a significant loss of revenue which should weigh against the approval of Plantation General's open heart surgery program. The analysis does not end there, however. Plantation General is likely to enter the market for open heart surgery with a substantial market share, a share equal to the number of surgeries it now refers out to existing providers. In that case, Florida Medical Center's number of open heart surgeries will fall below the 350 per year quality standard during both the first and second year of Plantation General's new program. Florida Medical Center will only stay above the 350 surgery standard if it increases its market share substantially, or if Plantation fails to meet its own market share projections. Both are unlikely. Based upon the Department's Rule 10- 5.011(1)(f)11b: No additional open heart surgery programs shall be approved which would reduce the volume of exis heart surgery facilities below 350 o procedures annually for adults . . . . Plantation General's program therefore conflicts with this portion of the Department's rule. Costs and methods of construction. Section 381.705(m), Florida Statutes. Based on the stipulation of the parties, the proposed renovations represent conventional construction methods that are not unreasonable. Neither the cost nor the methods of construction for the renovation of the 2,229 gross square feet have been put in issue. The costs are, however, understated to the extent that they do not provide for adequate construction, i.e., the need for a second operating room. See, Findings 31 and 32, above. Applicants past and proposed provision of services to Medicaid and indigents clients. Section 381.705(1)(n), Florida Statutes. According to the stipulation of the parties, the extent of Plantation General's commitment to make open heart surgery available to Medicaid or medically indigent neither enhances nor detracts from its project. (Stipulation at paragraph 25). Less costly, more efficient alternatives. Section 381.705(2)(a), Florida Statutes. There is no alternative to open heart surgery when it is medically indicated. It is more efficient to deny Plantation General's application and let existing providers absorb whatever increase there may be in the population seeking open heart surgeries. This is especially significant because the proposal would drop Florida Medical Center below the 350 surgeries per year and because Broward General is not currently operating with an existing current volume of 350 adult open heart surgeries per year. See, Rule 10- 5.011(1)(f)11.a.(I), b., Florida Administrative Code. Appropriateness and the efficiency of the existing facilities. Section 381.795(2)(b), Florida Statutes. The existing open heart surgery programs in Broward County have the capacity to perform additional open heart surgeries. See, Findings 20-22 above. The expansion of those facilities, especially in view of Broward General's failure to meet the 350 surgery minimum volume requirement of Rule 10- 5.011(f)11.a.(I), Florida Administrative Code, weighs against approval of the application. The denial of Plantation's application may have an effect on Broward General's number of surgeries, for a limitation on the number of providers should have the effect of directing more surgeries to Broward General. This assumption is inherent in the rule. Alternative to new construction. Section 381.705(2)(c), Florida Statutes. As with the preceding paragraph, the expansion of existing services such as that of Broward General is an alternative to the capital expenditures and related labor costs incident to the opening of an open heart surgery program at Plantation General. Problems facing patients in the absence of this proposal Section 381.705(2)(d), Florida Statutes. There is no evidence of any problem of geographic access, and no evidence that the opening of this program will improve, in any substantial degree, financial access to underserved populations, nor is there evidence of a need for additional programs because the existing programs are at capacity. That, from time to time, Florida Medical Center is unable to admit patients who doctors at Plantation General would like to transfer there does not show that there is a problem obtaining open heart surgery in the service district. Florida Medical Center is not the only other provider of open heart surgery. The problem which patients having catheterization at Plantation General face if they need open heart surgery is inherent in Plantation General's decision to establish the cardiac catheterization program when it did not also have approval for open heart surgery, and cannot be used to bootstrap the present application. Rule Criteria for Evaluating Certificate of Need Applications. Need. Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)2, 8, and 11, Florida Administrative Code. The rule on open heart surgery states, in part that: The department will not normally approve applications for new open heart surgery programs unless the conditions of sub-paragraphs 8. and 11. below, are met. There is no persuasive proof that the situation in Broward County is abnormal, due to an unavailability or inaccessibility to open heart surgery services. There is no over-crowding at existing providers, or some quality of care problem with an existing provider which causes potential patients to shun a program. Neither is there a monopoly in the district which should be broken up to provide consumers of health care choice and generate competition. The only circumstance which might be characterized as abnormal is the recognition that Broward General has had its program for a substantial time but has not yet achieved an annual volume of 200 open heart procedures, the volume which is the ordinary minimum for a quality program. See Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)5d., Florida Administrative Code . There is no testimony that the care offered by Broward General is inadequate, or that it is somehow inaccessible, which accounts for the low number of procedures. The rule provides a mathematical calculation for the need for additional open heart providers in a service area. Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)8., Florida Administrative Code. It calculates a base period: The twelve-month period beginning 14 months prior to the filing of the hospital's letter of intent. This is the period July 1, 1987, through June 30, 1988. During the base period, 2,146 open heart surgeries were performed in Broward County. (See, Finding 14.) The population of the county at the mid-point of this period, January 1, 1988, was 1,198,243 persons. This results in a use rate in Broward County of 179.1 open heart surgeries per 100,000 population. Based upon an anticipated opening of services in July 1990, the county population at that time is projected to be 1,247,226 persons. Multiplying the use rate by the projected population yields a need for 2,233 open heart surgeries in Broward County in 1990. This number is then divided by 350 procedures per facility to assess the number of facilities needed; there is a need for 6.4 open heart programs and there are presently five open heart providers. According to the formula in sub- subparagraph 8 one additional provider may be approved. This need assessment, however, is not controlling. Other portions of the rule place limits on the need for additional programs, even when the need calculation in subparagraph 8 supports adding a provider. Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)11, Florida Administrative Code, states in pertinent part: There shall be no additional open heart surgery programs established unless: The service volume of each existing and approved open heart surgery program within the service area is operating at and is expected to continue to operate at a minimum of 350 adult open heart surgery cases per year..., b. No additional open heart surgery program shall be approved which would reduce the volume of open heart surgery facilities below 350 open heart procedures annually.... The text of the rule requires "each" provider to operate at 350 cases per year before another program is approved. There is no mention of any averaging of the total number of cases under sub-subparagraph 11a in determining whether the requirement is met. Averaging the number of open heart surgeries in each program makes little sense in the context of the entire rule. There would be no need for both sub-subparagraphs 11a(I) and b, for if there is a need in the district, each existing and approved open heart surgery program in a district must be handling 350 procedures on average. The 350 surgery standard in the rule was adopted based upon the National Health Planning Guidelines issued in March, 1978. These guidelines approved recommendations of the Intersociety Commission on Heath Disease Resources, which state: In order to prevent duplication of costly resources which are not fully utilized, the opening of new units should be contingent upon existing units operating and continuing to operate at a level of least 350 procedures per year. Those Guidelines also state that additional open heart surgery services should not be permitted unless existing services are operating at, and will continue to operate at a minimum of 350 surgeries per year. Sub-paragraph 11 of the rule is clear; each provider must operate at a level of 350 cases annually before another applicant will be approved. Plantation General's application fails in two respects: Broward General is currently providing less that 350 surgeries per year, and if Plantation is approved, both Broward General and Florida Medical Center will fall below the 350 standard. Plantation General has failed to prove that any circumstances at Broward General are so abnormal that the "not normal" fail-safe provision of Rule 10-5.011(f)2., Florida Administrative Code, should come into play. Mr. Nelson, the health planner for Plantation General attempted to show that the opening of the program at Plantation should not cause the annual number of surgeries done at Florida Medical Center to fall below 350. That testimony was not as credible as the testimony of Ms. Lamb, or especially the testimony of Dr. Luke. Mr. Nelson's analysis assumed that the open heart surgery use rate would continue to increase at the same rate that it had increased in the past. This is not a reasonable assumption. It is likely that the use rate in Broward County will decline, not increase, for a number of reasons, including the prevention of heart disease through wellness trends, the increased use of alternative therapy such as angioplasties, and the affect that utilization reviews and cost containment measures have had on the number of open heart surgery. Moreover, Broward County has a higher use rate than the state average, which is also substantially higher than the use rate in Palm Beach County, although the populations of both counties are similar. The primary reason for Broward's high use rate has been that until recently Palm Beach County residents had to come to Broward County hospitals for open heart surgery. The opening of open heart surgery programs in Palm Beach County will continue to depress the Broward County use rate. Taken as a whole, the need methodology found in the rule, consisting of the need determination in Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)8, and the further cutoff provisions found in sub-subparagraphs 11a and b show that there is no need for an additional open heart surgery program in Broward County. Service availability. Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)3, Florida Administrative Code. By use of a single operating room, Plantation General's proposed program is not capable of providing 500 open heart operations per year, as required by Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)3d, Florida Administrative Code. Theoretically the program could serve two cases per day, five days a week for 52 weeks a year, and thus handle a total of 520 cases. This ignores, however, the necessity to leave the single operating room available for open heart backup when angioplasty procedures are going on. The hospital projects and should achieve a substantial volume of angioplasty if the open heart program is approved. (See, Finding 26, above.) Even Plantation General, in its proposed recommended order, acknowledged "that it is most unlikely that Plantation could actually do 500 cases per year in a one operating room open heart program." (Proposed Finding 66.) Plantation General argues, however, that it is only necessary that the room have "the capacity to do that many [500] cases." Id. If Plantation had proposed to use the room solely for open heart surgeries, without also having to make its operating room available for its projected volume of angioplasty, Plantation General's argument might prevail. Because Plantation General does propose a substantial volume of angioplasties, the backup time necessary for those cases must be taken into account. The proposal it has made does not meet the rule requirement that its program be capable of providing 500 surgeries per year. Service accessibility. Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)4, Florida Administrative Code. The rule requires that "open heart surgery shall be available to all person in need." Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)4d, Florida Administrative Code. The level of commitment to indigent care in Plantation General's application neither enhances nor detracts from its application. This has been stipulated by all parties. Travel time for surgery is not a problem in Broward County, and the service would meet the requirement for hours of operation. Rule 10- 5.011(1)(f)4a, and b, Florida Administrative Code. The single operating room with a single heart-lung oxygenator pump means that emergency procedures cannot be done within a maximum of 2 hours waiting time. An open heart operation takes more than 5 hours, an angioplasty takes 3 hours or more. Once the operating suite is committed to one of those procedures, no emergency procedure can be performed within 2 hours. The proposal fails to meet Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)4c, Florida Administrative Code. Service quality. Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)5, Florida Administrative Code. The application meets the requirements of Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)5a that the hospital be accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals. It has not met the requirement of Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)5b that "any applicant proposing to establish an open heart surgery program must document that adequate numbers of properly trained personnel will be available to perform in the following capacities...." The application only states that the necessary personnel will be available (Application, at 21-22), but does not reveal how Plantation General proposes to staff its program, especially with experienced nurses. Similarly, another subportion of the rule on service quality requires that "any hospital proposing or operating an open heart surgical program shall have a written plan specifying projected caseloads and projected space, support, equipment and supply needs for the open heart surgical procedures and patients." Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)5e, Florida Administrative Code. No such plan was included in its application; instead Planation proposes to draft its plan following the approval of its certificate of need. (Application at 22). This is improper, for the adequacy of the plan cannot be analyzed as the application is being considered. This is especially significant in terms of a plan for operating the program with a single heart-lung oxygenator pump. How the hospital expects to operate the program with no second pump for emergencies, or for use while the first pump is under ordinary maintenance is a significant deficiency. The application therefore fails to meet this portion of the rule. Cost effectiveness. Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)6, Florida Administrative Code. It is likely that the charges made by Plantation General will be in line with those from other competitive providers of open heart surgery in the Broward County area. Market forces would prevent Plantation from charging more than the going rate. There is insufficient evidence, based on Plantation General's present charge structure, to find that its charges would be appreciably below the cost of other providers. There is no undertaking in its application to charge no more than the $34,860 per case found in Table 8 of its application. (Application page 71). The application meets Rule 10- 5.011(1)(f)6b, Florida Administrative Code. Consistency with state and local health plans. Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)7, Florida Administrative Code. The plan is consistent with the state and local health plans. See, Finding 16, above.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the application of Plantation General for certificate of need No. 5736 to implement an open heart surgery program in HRS District X be denied. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of June, 1990. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX Rulings on findings proposed by the Petitioner, Plantation General Hospital. 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14, with a correction for the number of procedures at Memorial Hospital. To the extent necessary, adopted in Findings of Fact 12 and 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 67. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as subordinate to other findings. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Rejected for the reasons stated in Findings of Fact 18 and 19. Discussed in Findings of Fact 20 through 23. Rejected because there is no service availability problem and the economic access of Plantation would add as minimal. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected as argument. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 32. Rejected, the proposal to have only one heart-lung pump is a serious deficiency, especially due to the failure to have developed as part of the application the written plan required by Rule 10-5.011(1)(f)5d, Florida Administrative Code. To the extent necessary, discussed in Finding of Fact 34. Rejected for the reasons stated in Findings of Fact 37 and 38. Rejected for the reasons stated in Findings of Fact 37 and 38. The testimony of Ms. Levine that staff could be hired without substantial difficulty is rejected. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary, the prior application is not at issue. It is true and no competing service would be required to shut down its operations do to the inability to hire skilled nurses. Otherwise rejected for the reasons found in Findings of Fact 37 and 38. Rejected, the salaries are reasonable, but the new program is likely to raid other programs and cause an upward pressure on salaries as explained in Finding of Fact 39. To the extent necessary, discussed in Finding of Fact 37, especially as related to hiring recent nursing graduates or using agency nurses. Rejected as unnecessary, see Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as unnecessary. Sentences 1 and 2 adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Dr. Lukes' testimony with respect to intending to spend 5 million dollars on the open heart program is not persuasive. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. (As amended), generally adopted in Findings of Fact 42 and 44. The 184 surgeries is adopted in Finding of Fact 42; Plantation's evidence with respect to likely charges is accepted in Findings of Fact 42 and 46. The Intervenors' argument has been accepted, see Findings of Fact 47 and 48. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 48. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 48. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 48. Discussed in Finding of Fact 48, but rejected. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected because the question is not whether the intervenors proved that the proposed program is not financially feasible. The question is whether Plantation General proved that the program is financially feasible, and its proof is not persuasive. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 49. Accepted in Finding of Fact 50. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. Generally accepted in Finding of Fact 50. Rejected; the testimony of Mr. Knapp has not been accepted on Doctor Zaretsky's cost analysis. Rejected, see Finding of Fact 35. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 52. To the extent necessary, covered in Finding of Fact 53. Sentence 1, adopted in Finding of Fact 54. The remainder rejected as unnecessary. Discussed in Finding of Fact 54. Discussed in Findings of Fact 20 through 22 and 55 and 56. Adopted in Finding of Fact 57. Rejected because there is insufficient proof patients would face serious problems in obtaining open heart surgery if Plantation's program is not approved. See Finding of Fact 19. Not an issue. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 64. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 66. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 67, although Plantation would exceed 200 cases per year within 3 years of instituting service. Rejected, see Findings of Fact 20-23. Adopted as modified in Finding of Fact 68. Adopted in Finding of Fact 69. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14, final sentence rejected as unnecessary. The averaging technique is rejected, see Finding of Fact 61. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact It is not clear what factors were used by Hollywood Memorial to justify its open heart program. It is a major indigent care provider, which Plantation General is not. Rejected, see Findings of Fact 56 and 63. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 63. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact Dr. Luke's testimony about the reduction in use rates was persuasive. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, it is not likely that the use rate in Broward County will continue to grow, or that a use rate for western Broward County should be separately calculated or analyzed. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 63. Rejected for the reasons stated in Finding of Fact 63. Rejected because the drop below 350 is significant according to the text of the rule and is not entitled to more than "slight" weight; other factors also weigh against the application. Rejected as unnecessary. Rulings of findings proposed by North Ridge General Hospital. 1-3. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted throughout the Findings of Fact. Adopted in the preliminary statement. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as a restatement of the rule. Rejected as a restatement of the rule. Rejected as a restatement of the rule. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. Rejected as a statement of argument. Rejected as a statement of argument.' Rejected as unnecessary, see also Finding of Fact 63. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as inconsistent with the Department's current view of law. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 62. Rejected as unnecessary. The projection of 184 cases is adopted in Finding of Fact 42. The use rate is discussed in Finding of Fact 63. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary, see Finding of Fact 63. The testimony of Dr. Luke on the point was the most persuasive. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, see Finding of Fact 60. Rejected as unnecessary. Discussed in Finding of Fact 63. 31-56. Generally discussed in Finding of Fact 60 as it relates to the proper calculation of need under the rule. See also Finding of Fact 51 concerning Florida Medical Center falling below 350 surgeries. Discussed in Finding of Fact 15. Discussed in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Discussed in Finding of Fact 64. Generally adopted in Findings of Fact 20 through 22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10 and 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Stipulated by the parties. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. The quality of care was stipulated by the parties. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 75-90. Rejected as unnecessary. The question of demand is resolved in Finding of Fact 19. While cardiologists at the hospital may wish to provide angioplasty, which requires open heart surgery, that desire is not relevant. See Finding of Fact 18. Similarly, the testimony of Dr. Honderick that a facility which offers cardiac catheterization should have the ability to render surgical intervention in case of a complication is not relevant. Plantation General knew when it establishes a catheterization lab, without open heart approval, that such problems would occur. The hospital cannot bootstrap these problems into a justification for open heart surgery. They were problems that the hospital knowingly assumed. 91-98. Addressed in Findings of Fact 26 through 31. 99 Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 100. Rejected as unnecessary. 101. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. 102. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 103. Adopted in Finding of Fact 67. 104. Rejected as unnecessary. 105. Addressed in Finding of Fact 66. 106. Addressed in Findings of Fact 37 and 38. 107. Addressed in Finding of Fact 31. 108-111. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. 112. Adopted as modified in Finding of Fact 37. 113. Adopted as modified in Finding of Fact 37. 114. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42 and 43. 115. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42 and 43. 116. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. 117. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. 118. Rejected as unnecessary. 119. Rejected as unnecessary. 120. Adopted as modified in Finding of Fact 46. 121-131. Discussed in Findings of Fact 46 and 50. 132. Adopted in Finding of Fact 59. 133. Discussed in Finding of Fact 59. 134. Discussed in Finding of Fact 59. 135. Rejected as unnecessary. 136. Addressed in Finding of Fact 59. Rulings on findings proposed by Florida Medical Center. Covered in preliminary statement. Covered in Finding of Fact 12. Covered in Finding of Fact 1 Discussed in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 17 and 18. To the extent appropriate, discussed in Findings of Fact 19 and 21. Covered in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. 10-13. Discussed, to the extent appropriate, in Finding of Fact 46. Rejected because although true, the magnitude of the income resulting from those DRGs was not explained sufficiently. The matter of charges is more significant in determining financial feasibility than efficiency here. Implicit in Findings of Fact 44 and 46. Implicit in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17, but the second sentence is rejected as unnecessary in view of the stipulation. Generally adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 32 and 64. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18 and 23. Implicit in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37 and 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Rejected as unnecessary. The legal expense would be minimal. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Generally adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Discussed in Finding of Fact 48. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 63. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. It is stipulated that Florida Medical Center has standing. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Addressed in Finding of Fact 58. Adopted in Finding of Fact 49. Adopted in Finding of Fact 49. Adopted in Finding of Fact 49. Discussed in Finding of Fact 59. Discussed in Finding of Fact 64. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 67. Adopted in Finding of Fact 67. Discussed in Finding of Fact 60. The division by 350 is implicit in the structure of the rule to determine the number of programs. The use rate proposed by Mr. Nelson has been rejected. The appropriate calculation is found at Finding of Fact 60. Adopted in Finding of Fact 63. Adopted in Finding of Fact 63. Adopted in Finding of Fact 63. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. Adopted in Finding of Fact 61. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Findings of Fact 60 and 63. COPIES FURNISHED: Jay Adams, Esquire 1519 Big Sky Way Tallahassee, FL 32301 Richard C. Bellak, Esquire FOWLER, WHITE, GILLEN, BOGGS, VILLAREAL & BANKER, P.A. 101 North Monroe Street Suite 910 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308 Eric B. Tilton, Esquire 214B East Virginia Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Michael J. Cherniga, Esquire ROBERTS, BAGGETT, LAFACE & RICHARD 101 East College Avenue Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Jack M. Skelding, Esquire PARKER, SKELDING, LABASKY & CORRY 318 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue Whether there is a need for a new Pediatric Heart Transplant (PHT) program in Organ Transplant Service Area (OTSA) 3, and, if so, whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 10518, filed by Orlando Health, Inc., d/b/a Arnold Palmer Medical Center (APMC), to establish a PHT program, satisfies the applicable statutory and rule review criteria for award of a CON to establish a PHT program at the Arnold Palmer Hospital for Children (APH).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties Orlando Health, Inc., d/b/a Arnold Palmer Medical Center OH was originally formed by two community physicians 100 years ago as a 20-bed hospital in downtown Orlando. Today, OH is a large not-for-profit healthcare system with more than 3,300 beds serving Central Florida and beyond. Comprised of nine wholly-owned or affiliated hospitals and rehabilitation centers, OH serves as the region’s only Level One Trauma Center and Pediatric Trauma Center, and is a statutory teaching hospital system offering graduate medical education and clinical research in both specialty and community hospitals. OH has been actively involved in clinical research since the beginning of its graduate medical education and residency programs in the 1950s. OH’s primary service area includes approximately 2.2 million people, with a greater service area of Central Florida, which encompasses more than three million people today and is rapidly growing. OH experiences about 100,000 inpatient admissions and 1.5 million ambulatory visits each year. OH has 24,000 employees, including 2,000 physicians and 8,000 nurses. OH has long been recognized as the safety net provider for the Central Florida region. APMC is comprised of two hospitals, APH and Winnie Palmer Hospital for Women and Babies (WPH). APMC was founded on the premise that the close integration of specialty inpatient pediatrics and obstetrics services improves quality and outcomes. APMC is the single largest acute care facility in the nation dedicated to women and children. APH has achieved national ranking as a Top 50 Children’s Hospital by U.S. News and World Report, based on quality data metrics that focus on process, structure, and outcomes, for the past eight consecutive years for key programs, including pediatric cardiology. Since 2015, APH has been the only pediatric hospital in Florida to receive the Top Hospital award from Leapfrog, an achievement based on evaluation of numerous quality metrics, including outcomes data over time. APH has been a Magnet-designated facility since 2013. APH’s primary service area covers 25 counties. APH’s pediatric trauma center and dedicated pediatric emergency department receive approximately 55,000 visits per year. The Heart Center at APH (the Heart Center) is nationally ranked among the top pediatric cardiac programs in the country for its outcomes in complex congenital heart surgery. Dr. William DeCampli, APH’s chief of Pediatric Cardiac Surgery, and Dr. David Nykanen, APH’s chief of Cardiology, serve as the medical directors of the Heart Center. Dr. DeCampli and Dr. Nykanen will continue to serve as the medical directors of the Heart Center following implementation of APH’s proposed PHT program. The Heart Center is on the third floor of APH in the “corner pocket” of the hospital. It is intentionally designed so that the pediatric cardiovascular intensive care unit (CVICU), cardiovascular operating suite, and cardiac catheterization suite are in close proximity to each other, to promote the integration of care between the units and to ensure the safe transition of pediatric patients. APH’s 20-bed CVICU is more advanced than the intensive care units of most pediatric cardiac programs across the country. APH established a freestanding dedicated CVICU in January 2005, and was one of the first in the nation to do so. APH CVICU clinical staff are dedicated to the CVICU and specifically trained to care for the special needs of pediatric cardiac patients. Unlike many other pediatric cardiac programs in the country, APH’s CVICU has 24/7/365 attending physician in- house coverage which leads to better access for patients and better outcomes. APH’s commitment to this continuous on-site physician presence reflects a standard that all pediatric cardiac programs aspire to, but few have achieved. APH has three employed pediatric cardiac anesthesiologists providing 24/7/365 in-house coverage, rare among pediatric cardiac programs. The specialty of pediatric cardiac anesthesia is distinct from the specialty of general pediatric anesthesia. Pediatric cardiac anesthesiologists specialize in the complex defects and anatomy of the cardiovascular system in patients with congenital heart disease (CHD) for whom anesthesia and sedation poses heightened risk. Pediatric cardiac anesthesiologists provide anesthesia for cardiac procedures as well as for any non-cardiac procedures the CHD patient may require. APH is the highest ranked program in Florida in outcomes for the most complex category of congenital heart surgery. In 2007, the Heart Center’s surgical team published more than three times the number of investigational papers than the state’s leading academic pediatric cardiac surgery program. Nationally, APH has the highest neonate population with the lowest mortality rate. APH has a state-of-the-art echocardiography (echo) program with the entire infrastructure necessary for PHT. Echo is essential at every stage of diagnosing, treating, and evaluating the response to therapies and interventions in pediatric cardiac care, including PHT. Dr. Riddle, an echocardiologist at APH, has extensive experience in diagnosing and evaluating complex congenital heart anomalies, including patients requiring PHT. APH’s echo program is comprised of multiple components: the facility, the equipment, the physicians, the sonographers, the protocols, and the quality. APH’s echo lab is the “mission control center” for the program, with four large screens that enable clinicians to watch and discuss echos as they are being performed, and to review echos in meticulous detail, sometimes spending hours looking at complex echos. APH’s culture is the tremendous differentiator among pediatric cardiac programs. APH’s goal is to know every aspect of a patient’s care and anatomy, and APH clinicians, with the full support of administration, spend significant time doing that. All APH sonographers are certified and APH has weekly didactic sessions for sonographers, along with quality improvement and quality review sessions. All APH echo readers are dedicated echo physicians, with extensive training, who also are involved in constant didactic lectures and immersion in quality improvement measures. APH’s director of echo, Dr. Craig Fleishman, is nationally recognized and serves as the chair of the Scientific Sessions of the American Society of Echocardiography, the national governing and education body for echo. APH is the only pediatric heart program in Central Florida to achieve accreditation from the American Society of Echocardiography in transthoracic, transesophageal, and fetal echo. APH is highly skilled at diagnosing complex congenital heart anomalies, including those in fetuses when the patient’s heart may be no larger than a grape. APH’s echo surgical correlations, in which the echo gradients are compared to actual measurements during surgery, are “phenomenal.” Similar correlations occur in coordination with the APH cardiac catheterization lab. APH has used printed 3D heart modeling, but printed 3D modeling includes only data obtained from a computerized tomography (CT) scan or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) , and does not show all of the finer complex structures of the heart and valves; thus, it has limited utility in evaluating treatment options for complex CHD. However, APH is implementing a virtual reality 3D modeling system that combines data from echo, CT, and MRI data, and even surgical images, to create a complete virtual 3D model of the heart that includes the fine details, including valve attachments. Unlike a printed 3D model, which once cut open, no longer represents the heart and cannot be put back together for further evaluation, virtual 3D modeling enables clinicians to evaluate multiple potential interventions and observe responses and to repeat as many times as may be necessary, using the same model. APMC has a large maternal fetal medicine program staffed by seven employed perinatologists specializing in high- risk pregnancies. The program is expected to have 10 employed perinatologists by the end of 2018. Agency for Health Care Administration AHCA is the state health-planning agency charged with administration of the CON program as set forth in sections 408.31-408.0455, Florida Statutes. Context of the Arnold Palmer Application Approximately one in 100 babies are born with CHD. The majority of these disorders can be treated, at least initially, with reconstructive surgery. The earlier a congenital heart defect can be repaired, the better the chances the patient has to not only survive but to grow normally in infancy and thrive. However, some children with CHD have a severity level such that current methods of reconstructive surgery are not adequate to produce what might be called a cure. Treatment of such cases is called “palliation.” As a result of medical and surgical advances in palliation, children are now surviving complex CHD in numbers that previously were not thought possible. However, in the most severe cases, the palliation is fairly short-term. Many children who receive palliative surgery ultimately will progress to end-stage heart failure despite having had multiple operations and extensive medical management, as their heart will eventually begin to have decreased function due to the underlying anomaly. Prior to the advances in palliative care, many children born with complex CHD simply did not survive long enough to receive a PHT. Today, the number of children who face heart failure later in life, rather than earlier, is increasing. Successful palliation has resulted in significantly more CHD patients requiring PHT at age 10, 15, or 20, rather than as infants or young children. Another category of children requiring PHT are those who do not have CHD, but who have an acquired problem known as cardiomyopathy. Children with cardiomyopathy may present in heart failure at any time and at any age, having gone from a state of completely normal function--exercising, growing, doing well in school--to within two or three days having end stage heart failure. About half of these children recover with medication and intensive care--which APH does extremely well on a regular basis. But those who do not recover will require a PHT. Patients with CHD tend to be more medically and surgically complex and higher risk than patients with cardiomyopathy with respect to PHT. On a percentage basis, and because of advancements in palliation, there are more CHD patients and fewer cardiomyopathies in the teenage cohort requiring PHT today than there were 10 years ago. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.044, AHCA requires applicants to obtain separate CONs for the establishment of each adult or pediatric organ transplantation program, including: heart, kidney, liver, bone marrow, lung, lung and heart, pancreas and islet cells, and intestine transplantations. “Transplantation” is “the surgical grafting or implanting in its entirety or in part one or more tissues or organs taken from another person.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A- 3.065. Heart transplantation is defined by rule 59C-1.002(41) as a “tertiary health service,” meaning “a health service which, due to its high level of intensity, complexity, specialized or limited applicability, and cost, should be limited to, and concentrated in, a limited number of hospitals to ensure the quality, availability, and cost effectiveness of such service.” AHCA rules define a “pediatric patient” as “a patient under the age of 15 years.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C- 1.044(2)(c). AHCA rules divide Florida into four OTSAs, corresponding generally with the northern, western central, eastern central, and southern regions of the state. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.044(2)(f). If approved, the proposed program at issue in this proceeding would be located in OTSA 3, which is comprised of Brevard, Indian River, Lake, Martin, Okeechobee, Orange, Osceola, Seminole, and Volusia Counties. Currently, there are no providers of PHT in OSTA 3. However, that does not mean that OTSA 3 residents lack access to these transplant services. In fact, the unrefuted evidence demonstrated that pediatric residents of OTSA 3 have received transplants at Shands, by way of example. At hearing, APMC agreed that OTSA 3 residents are accessing these services at existing providers in Florida, with APH referring a few of these patients on average to Shands every year for these services. The incidence of PHT in Florida, as compared to other types of solid organ transplants, is relatively small. The chart below sets forth the number of pediatric (aged 0-14) heart transplant discharges by year for the four existing Florida PHT programs during the reporting period from June 30, 2013, to June 30, 2017: HOSPITAL HEART TRANSPLANT FY 12/13 FY 13/14 FY 14/15 FY 15/16 FY 16/17 UF Health Shands Hospital 13 4 17 12 9 John Hopkins All Children’s Hospital 6 13 10 9 7 Memorial Regional Hospital 5 3 4 11 4 Jackson Memorial Hospital 1 2 1 3 1 TOTAL 25 22 32 35 21 The above historic data demonstrates that the incidence of PHT statewide is relatively rare and does fluctuate from program to program and from year to year. As seen above, only 21 PHTs were performed statewide during the 12-month period July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2017, for an average program volume of only 5.25 cases for the four existing programs. There are four existing and one CON-approved PHT programs in Florida. This is more than every state in the country except California, which also has five programs but more than double the pediatric population of Florida. And three of the California programs have a volume of five per year or less. Texas, another geographically large state with over 1.4 million more children than Florida, has only two centers. The number of PHTs is also impacted by a national shortage in donor hearts. Unfortunately, there are not enough donor hearts to meet the demand for pediatric heart patients in the United States. While the total number of PHTs in the United States increased between 2012 and 2015, it has more recently declined from 2015 to 2017. Based on population, the number of PHTs in Florida is higher than the national average. Thus, while fortunately its incidence is rare, Florida residents in need of PHT are currently able to access this life-saving procedure. Arnold Palmer’s “Readiness” to Implement a PHT Program APH has over 14 years of experience performing complex congenital heart surgery and has met the majority of the demand for complex pediatric cardiac surgery in Central Florida for the past 25 years. In that time, APH has performed thousands of heart operations and achieved extraordinary outcomes, which are most dramatically apparent in the highest acuity levels. APH is the largest pediatric cardiac surgical program in Central Florida. Because WPH and APH are regional centers of excellence for neonatal and pediatric cardiac care, APH has a large proportion of complex, single-ventricle patients in its existing pediatric cardiac program. In turn, approximately 70 percent of the patients who ultimately require PHT have complex, single-ventricle physiologies. In addition, APH is a regional referral center for patients presenting with cardiomyopathies that may require PHT services. APH voluntarily participates in the Society for Thoracic Surgeons (STS) National Congenital Heart Surgery Database (the “STS database”). The STS is the official organ for the collegial development of the field of thoracic and cardiac surgery, both adult and pediatric. There are over 75,000 physician and institutional members of the STS. The STS maintains the largest worldwide data collection of multiple variables and data points pertaining to every cardiac surgery performed by its members. The data is rigorously analyzed to measure the actual and risk-adjusted expected performance and quality of each member facility, and to support quality improvement projects, as well as original research in the field. The STS is a national organization, and its publishing arm, the Annals of Thoracic Surgery, is one of the top-ranked journals in the world. Once a year, the STS updates a running, four-year cumulative tally of outcomes for each participating institution in the country and publishes a one-page report summarizing the facility’s performance.1/ The STS stratifies cardiac surgical cases by “STAT” level, which is a measure of acuity, complexity and risk.2/ STAT 1 is the simplest kind of congenital heart defect that generally requires a straightforward surgical repair, while STAT 5 reflects complex, high-acuity, and high- risk conditions and surgeries. The STS public report contains four columns. The first lists the STAT levels. The second column lists the facility’s number of deaths divided by the number of patients operated on at that facility within the given STAT category. The third column, “Expected” reflects the STS’ expectation of mortality within the reporting institution’s program based on the relative acuity of the cases performed at that institution and if the reporting hospital performs consistent with the national average for that STAT level. The data in the third column reflects the very high acuity level of APH’s CHD patient population, i.e., the risk factors for the patient not surviving their congenital heart defect and surgery. The fourth column, “Observed/Expected” (the “O/E ratio”), divides the program’s actual mortality by its expected mortality. The O/E ratio is widely accepted as the standard metric for evaluating performance in pediatric cardiac programs because in contrast to reporting raw mortality, the STS O/E ratio is risk-adjusted using multivariable regression models which enable the STS to risk adjust each institution’s mortality and compare it against the national norm; i.e., to produce a model containing every case that every program did within the four-year time period measured. An O/E ratio of less than one means the facility is doing better than the overall STS database. For STAT 2 cases, APH’s O/E ratio is 0.58, meaning that APH has achieved close to one-half the mortality that STS expects APH to have for APH’s STAT 2 cases. Even more impressive, however, is APH’s STAT 5 O/E ratio of 0.24. The analysis conducted by the STS shows that, statistically speaking, a patient in the highest risk STAT 5 category has a four-fold less risk of dying after an operation at APH than at an average pediatric cardiac surgery program in the country. APH has consistently achieved outstanding outcomes in its pediatric cardiac program, on a national basis, for more than a decade. AHCA has recognized APH as first in the state for overall pediatric heart surgery mortality. Mechanical cardiopulmonary support or cardiac extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) (referred to as “CPS” within the APH pediatric cardiac program) is a very short-term method of sustaining life when a patient has rapid onset end- stage heart failure.3/ To place a patient on CPS, the cardiac surgeon makes an incision in the base of the neck to expose the main artery to the brain and the main vein draining from the brain. The vessels are controlled by the surgeon and opened, and cannulas are inserted into the vessels and advanced into the heart, or if the chest is open, may be placed directly into the heart, then sutured into place and connected to a heart-lung machine. Often the procedure is done while a baby is sustaining a cardiac arrest. CPS is not the preferred intervention for patients in heart failure who require PHT. Complications from CPS develop exponentially with each 24 hours on the circuit. Thus, CPS can be a contraindication for PHT. Complications from CPS include bleeding from fresh suture lines in the heart, arteries, pericardium, or chest wall; bleeding in the brain, or at IV line locations; and clotting caused by the CPS lines, which can be devastating if the clot travels to the brain, kidneys, bowel, or heart. There also is significant risk in moving a patient on CPS. Particularly in neonates, the movement of a cannula by even a few millimeters can obstruct circulation, or cause thrombus or ventilator issues. CPS thus is not a sustainable method for bridging a patient to PHT, when the majority of patients face long periods on a waitlist. The proper method for bridging to PHT is the use of ventricular assist device (VAD) therapy, relatively recently approved for use in pediatric patients. A VAD is a device that does not mechanically process or oxygenate the blood, and does not require transfusion, and, thus, provides far more stable and longer-term maintenance of life while a patient waits for PHT. In contrast to CPS, which cannot safely be used more than a few days to, at most, two weeks, a heart failure patient may safely remain on a VAD for months in the hospital while they await a donor heart. The ability to implement VAD therapy enhances quality of care for patients and increases a patient’s eligibility for PHT. Currently, the standard of care is that hospitals that do not provide PHT should not provide VAD therapy. Consequently, patients at APH with rapid onset heart failure do not have access to VAD therapy and must be placed on CPS. There is no question that OH has built a mature, high quality pediatric cardiac program at APH over the past 14 years. The organization has the demonstrated experience and success in complex reconstructive heart surgery and medical management of patients with heart disease. With the additional staffing described below, APH would be able to successfully implement a PHT program, assuming need for such a program is demonstrated. The Arnold Palmer Application APMC is proposing to establish a PHT program in Orlando, which is located in OTSA 3. The application was conditioned on APMC promoting and fostering outreach activities for pediatric cardiology services, which will include the provision of pediatric general cardiology outpatient services at satellite locations within OTSA 3. This condition is not intended to include any outreach activities beyond establishing outpatient clinics in OTSA 3. There is currently no PHT provider in OTSA 3. There are, however, three providers of pediatric open-heart surgery and pediatric cardiac catheterization within the OTSA. APMC proposes that Dr. William DeCampli and Dr. David Nykanen, who currently staff its pediatric cardiac program, would also staff the proposed transplant program. However, neither has worked in a transplant program in over 14 years. APMC acknowledges its need to recruit additional nurses to staff the program. It also concedes that it might recruit nurses without transplant experience, who may need to obtain necessary training at a different facility. Additionally, APMC has not yet recruited a physician specializing in pediatric heart failure, which the applicant agrees is necessary to implement the program. At hearing, much of APMC’s case focused on its readiness and desire to offer a full spectrum of services to cardiac patients at its hospital. This is reflected in the testimony of Sharon Mawa, a nurse operations manager in APMC’s CVICU: And I feel Arnold Palmer is ready. We—it’s all encompassed. When you have a heart program, you—you want to do it all . . . . And the only piece that we are unable to provide, that we’re—that we haven’t been ready for, and I feel like we’re ready for now, is heart transplant. And I think to do a heart program well, you should be able to do all of it for that patient. However, as detailed further below, such arguments do not demonstrate community need for the proposed service, but instead represent an institutional desire to expand the facility’s service lines. A public hearing was held in Orlando on January 8, 2018, pertaining to APMC’s PHT application. APMC participated in support of the application at this hearing. About one year earlier, on January 10, 2017, a public hearing was held in Orlando pertaining to a CON application to establish a PHT program submitted by Nemours Children’s Hospital (Nemours), which is also located in Orlando. OH/APMC participated at that hearing in opposition to the Nemours application. OH/APMC submitted written opposition to the Nemours PHT program at that time, urging the Agency to deny Nemours’ proposal. OH/APMC’s 2017 opposition to the Nemours PHT application included argument related to access and need for the service in OTSA 3. OH/APMC’s written opposition to the proposed Nemours program included letters of opposition authored by Dr. DeCampli and Dr. Nykanen. In urging the denial of the Nemours’ PHT application, Dr. Nykanen told AHCA: For the past 14 years at Arnold Palmer Hospital for Children we have referred our patients requiring advanced heart failure management, including cardiac transplantation, predominantly to Shands Children’s Hospital. We have been the largest referral source of these patients in the region over the past decade. Many of our patients have had the opportunity to be evaluated as outpatients, which is always preferable. The management of this patient population is medically intense but surgery is rarely an emergency. The geographic proximity of Gainesville to our region is not a significant barrier with respect to transport from one facility to the other. The availability of organs for transplantation mandates the time from assessment to surgery which is measured in weeks to months. The Shands team has been readily accessible to us day or night and I am aware of no financial or programmatic barriers to providing this specialized care to our patients. We have been pleased with the outcomes achieved. (emphasis added). In December 2017, several months after opposing Nemours’ PHT proposal, APMC submitted its own PHT application to AHCA. UF Health Shands UF Health-Shands Hospital (Shands), as an existing provider of PHT in OTSA 1, participated extensively in this proceeding notwithstanding its acknowledged lack of standing to formally intervene.4/ Shands is located in Gainesville, Florida and is the sole provider of PHT in OTSA 1. OTSA 1 extends from Pensacola to Jacksonville, south to Gainesville and west to Hernando County. AHCA called numerous witnesses affiliated with Shands in its case-in-chief. The scope of the testimony presented by Shands-affiliated witnesses was circumscribed by Order dated June 18, 2018 (ruling on APMC’s motion in limine), that: At hearing, the Agency may present evidence that the needs of patients within OTSA 3 are being adequately served by providers located outside of OTSA 3, but may not present evidence regarding adverse impact on providers located outside of OTSA 3. Baycare of Se. Pasco, Inc. v. Ag. for Health Care Admin., Case No. 07-3482CON (Fla. DOAH Oct. 28, 2008; Fla. AHCA Jan. 7, 2009). Shands is located in Gainesville, Florida. Shands Children’s Hospital (SCH) is an embedded hospital within a larger academic health center. SCH has 202 beds and is held out to the public as a children’s hospital. SCH occupies multiple floors of the building in which it is located, and the children’s services are separated from the adult services. SCH has its own separate entrance and emergency department. SCH is nationally recognized by the U.S. News and World Report as one of the nation’s best children’s hospitals. SCH has its own leadership, including Dr. Shelley Collins, an associate professor of Pediatrics and the associate chief medical officer of SCH who was called as a witness by the Agency. As a comprehensive teaching and research institution, SCH has between 140 to 150 pediatric specialists who are credentialed. It has every pediatric subspecialty that exists and is also a pediatric trauma center. In the area of academics and training, SCH has over 180 faculty members and approximately 50 residents, and 25 to 30 fellows in addition to medical students. SCH has 72 Level II and III Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) beds. It also has a dedicated 24-bed pediatric intensive care unit, as well as a dedicated 23-bed pediatric cardiac intensive care unit, both of which are staffed 24/7 by pediatric intensive care physicians, pediatric intensive care nurses, and respiratory therapists. As a tertiary teaching hospital located in Gainesville, Shands is accustomed to caring for the needs of patients and families that come from other parts of the state or beyond. Jean Osbrach, a social work manager at Shands, testified for the Agency. Ms. Osbrach oversees the transplant social workers that provide services to the families of patients at SCH. Ms. Osbrach described how the transplant social workers interact with the families facing transplant from the outset of their connection with Shands. They help the families adjust to the child’s illness and deal with the crisis; they provide concrete services; and help the families by serving as navigators through the system. These social workers are part of the multi-disciplinary team of care, and they stay involved with these families for years. Shands is adept at helping families with the issues associated with receiving care away from their home cities. Shands has relationships with organizations that can help families that need financial support for items such as lodging, transportation, and gas. Shands has 20 to 25 apartments in close proximity to the hospital that are specifically available for families of transplant patients. Shands also coordinates with the nearby Ronald McDonald House to secure lodging for the families of out-of-town patients. Ms. Osbrach’s ability to empathize with these families is further amplified because her own daughter was seriously ill when she was younger. As Ms. Osbrach testified, while she was living in Gainesville, she searched out the best option for her child and decided that that was actually in Orlando. She did not hesitate to make those trips in order to get the highest level of care and expertise her child needed at that time. SCH accepts all patients, including pediatric heart transplant patients, regardless of their financial status or ability to pay. At final hearing, both Ms. Osbrach and Dr. Pietra testified at length about the different funding sources and other resources and assistance that are available to families from lower social economic circumstances that have a child who may need a transplant. SCH is affiliated with the Children’s Hospital Association, the Children’s Miracle Network, the March of Dimes, and the Ronald McDonald House Charities. Both Shands and APMC witnesses agreed that the quality of care rendered by SCH is excellent. ShandsCair Shands operates ShandsCair, a comprehensive emergency transport system. ShandsCair operates nine ground ambulances of different sizes, five helicopters, and one fixed wing jet aircraft. It owns all of the helicopters and ambulances so it never has to wait on a third-party vendor. ShandsCair performs approximately 7,000 ground and air transports a year. ShandsCair selects the “best of the best” to serve on its flight teams. ShandsCair has been a leader in innovation, implementing a number of state-of-the-art therapies during transport, such as inhaled nitrous oxide and hypothermic for neonates that are at high risk for brain injury. ShandsCair is one of just three programs in the country that owns an EC-155 helicopter, which is the largest helicopter used as an air ambulance. This helicopter is quite large, fast, and has a range of approximately 530 miles one way. This makes it easier to transport patients that require a significant amount of equipment, including those on ECMO. The EC-155 has room for multiple patients and the ability to transport patients on ventricular assist devices, ventilators, and other larger medical equipment. The Orlando area is well within the operational range of both ShandsCair’s ground and air transport assets. Transporting Pediatric Patients on ECMO In its CON application, one of the reasons APMC contended that its application should be approved is that it is too dangerous to transport patients on ECMO. Timothy Bantle, a certified respiratory therapist and the manager of the ECMO program at Shands, was called as a witness by the Agency. The ECMO program at Shands was established in 1991, and Shands has supported over 500 patients on ECMO. When Mr. Bantle began working in the Shands ECMO program in 2008, all ECMO patients at Shands were supported by an ECMO machine that utilized a roller head pump. In addition to the machine’s bulky size and weight, there was an inherent risk of the occlusion pressure causing a rupture. In 2014, Shands began using a newer, much smaller CARDIOHELP ECMO machine. In addition to weighing at most 20 pounds, the CARDIOHELP ECMO machine utilizes a centrifugal pump, instead of a roller head pump, which eliminates the risk of circuit ruptures. The technology in the CARDIOHELP ECMO machines is outstanding, and it is much easier to manage patients on the newer machines than the older machines. Shands now has nine of the newer and far more compact CARDIOHELP ECMO machines. Shands uses the CARDIOHELP ECMO machine for both veno-arterial (VA) and veno-venous (VV) ECMO and for every patient population, including infants. In the current fiscal year, Shands has had 67 patients on the CARDIOHELP ECMO machine. Shands has safely transported both adult and pediatric patients on ECMO. When transporting a patient on ECMO, the transport team includes a physician, an ECMO primer, a nurse, and a respiratory therapist. In addition to being highly trained, the transport team discusses the specifics of each patient en route, including discussing the situation with the referring doctor so they arrive fully prepared. Mr. Bantle persuasively testified that a properly trained team, using the newer CARDIOHELP ECMO machine, can transport these patients safely. ShandsCair has safely transported numerous pediatric patients on VA- and VV-ECMO by both ground and air, including pediatric heart transplant candidates. The newer CARDIOHELP ECMO equipment makes transport of ECMO patients much easier. ShandsCair has flown simultaneous, same day ECMO transports to the Grand Cayman Islands and to Miami. Transporting ECMO patients on the CARDIOHELP ECMO machine has become so routine that Dr. Weiss does not go on those flights. ShandsCair has also safely transported small infants on VA-ECMO, including a three-kilogram infant who was recently transported from Nemours on VA-ECMO, and after arrival at Shands was transitioned to a VAD and is now awaiting a heart transplant. The testimony of Dr. Weiss and Mr. Bantle regarding Shands’ ability to safely transport pediatric patients on ECMO was substantiated by the testimony of Drs. Fricker, Pietra, and Collins. The overwhelming evidence established that ShandsCair can safely transfer pediatric patients, including infants, on ECMO by both ground and by air. Shands’ Pediatric Heart Program The congenital heart program at Shands includes two pediatric heart surgeons, and a number of pediatric cardiologists, including Dr. Jay Fricker and Dr. Bill Pietra, both of whom testified for the Agency. Dr. Fricker did much of his early work and training at the Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, and came to the University of Florida in 1995. He is a professor and chief of the Division of Cardiology in the Department of Pediatrics. He is also the Gerold L. Schiebler Eminent Scholar Chair in Pediatric Cardiology at UF. He has been involved in the care of pediatric heart transplant patients his entire career. Dr. Bill Pietra received his medical training in Cincinnati and then went to Denver, specifically to do transplant training under Dr. Mach Boucek, who was one of the pioneers in pediatric infant transplant. He came to the University of Florida and Shands in August 2014, and he is now the medical director for the UF Health Congenital Heart Center. Shands performed its first PHT in 1986. Shands provides transplants to pediatric patients with both complex congenital conditions and cardiomyopathy patients. Shands takes the most difficult PHT cases, including those that other transplant centers will not take. PHT patients are referred to Shands from throughout the state, with many patients coming from central and north Florida. Every patient that is referred for transplant evaluation is seen and evaluated by Shands. While transplantation is not an elective service, it also is very rarely done on an emergent basis. Some conditions are diagnosed well in advance of the need for a transplant. It is not uncommon for a patient to be seen by a Shands physician for a number of years before needing a transplant. Pediatric transplant patients now survive much longer, and frequently well into adulthood. Unlike APH, Shands has the ability to continue to care for those patients as they transition from childhood to becoming adults. The Congenital Heart Center at Shands has a good relationship with APH. Physicians at APH have not only referred patients to Shands for transplant evaluation, they have also specifically recommended Shands to parents of children in need of a heart transplant. Shands operates a transplant clinic at Wolfson Children’s Hospital in Jacksonville. Approximately once a month a Shands transplant physician, a transplant coordinator, and nurses will go to Wolfson to evaluate patients with PHT issues. Wolfson personnel, such as ECHO techs and nurses, are also involved. Before APH filed its CON application, Dr. Pietra twice asked Dr. Nykanen about the possibility of Shands establishing a similar joint clinic at APH. Dr. Nykanen replied by stating he would need to confer with his colleagues, but never otherwise responded to these inquiries. Dr. Pietra testified that he would not be opposed to a joint venture clinic with APMC. Managed care companies are now a significant driver of where patients go for transplantation services. Managed care companies identify “centers of excellence” as their preferred providers for services such as pediatric heart transplantation. Shands is recognized by a majority of the major managed care companies that identify pediatric transplant programs as a center of excellence. In addition, the congenital heart surgery program at Shands has a three-star rating, which is the highest rating possible, and one that only 10 percent of such programs achieve. The quality of care provided by the PHT program at Shands is superb. The most recent Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients data for Shands, for pediatric transplants performed between February 1, 2014, and December 31, 2016, is excellent. There is no credible evidence of record that any pediatric patient in OTSA 3 was denied access or unable to access an existing transplant program. To the contrary, the evidence established that UF Health Shands and ShandsCair are currently serving the needs of OTSA 3 residents who need a PHT. The APMC CON application was not predicated on any argument that a new program is needed because of poor quality care at any of the existing pediatric transplant programs in Florida. Rather, Dr. Nykanen, the co-director of The Heart Center at APH, testified that Shands provides outstanding medical care, and that he has been “happy with the care” received by the patients he has referred to Shands for PHT. At hearing, APMC witnesses suggested that the Shands program is unduly conservative in accepting donor hearts from beyond 500 miles, and may have some “capacity” issues in its pediatric cardiac intensive care unit (CICU). These statements, made by persons with no first-hand knowledge of the operations of the Shands program, are not persuasive. APMC called Cassandra Smith-Fields as an expert witness. Ms. Smith-Fields is the administrative director for the transplant program and dialysis services at Phoenix Children’s Hospital. Phoenix Children’s Hospital is the only PHT center in Arizona. Notably, two states bordering Arizona, Nevada and New Mexico, do not have PHT centers. Ms. Smith- Fields noted that the volume of transplants at Shands had recently declined from 18 to 11. However, in 2016, by volume, Phoenix Children’s Hospital was the second largest pediatric heart transplant center in the country with 24 transplants, but in 2017, its volume had dropped to 14. Ms. Smith-Fields agreed that “you have to always be careful drawing inferences from numbers that are low in any matter.” Ms. Smith-Fields testified that based upon her review of Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients data for Shands, Shands did not appear to be aggressive in terms of accepting donor hearts beyond 500 miles. However, that criticism was based upon a one-year period when Shands’ PHT volume was lower than normal, and during which Shands was able to obtain donor hearts from within a 500-mile radius. Stephan Moore, director of the solid organ transplant and VAD programs at Shands, prepared an exhibit, which showed the location (by state and distance) of Shands donor hearts and lungs recovered from March 2, 2014, through March 18, 2018. This exhibit showed numerous trips by Shands beyond 500 miles to retrieve a donor organ, including trips to Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, and Ohio. During this four-year period, 27.6 percent of the organs recovered by Shands came from within Florida, and the remaining 72.3 percent were obtained from out of state. This data not only refutes Ms. Smith-Fields’ testimony on this issue, it also again illustrates why, due to the variability of PHT heart program volumes and availability of donor hearts, one should be extremely cautious in drawing conclusions based upon a single year of data. In addition, Dr. Pietra testified about the complexity of these cases and how an organ that might be acceptable for one patient would not be acceptable for another, for a host of reasons. Consequently, being conservative and cautious in choosing the right heart for each patient are good and important traits for a pediatric heart transplant program, particularly for one that wants the organ to work well for the patient long- term. Dr. Elise Riddle, a cardiologist practicing at APMC, testified that she was aware of instances when there had been a delay in obtaining a bed at Shands for a patient being referred for transplant services. However, Dr. Pietra testified that Shands has never refused a patient because a bed was not available, and that any delay would have been at most a matter of hours. In addition, Dr. Collins, who regularly reviews the throughput numbers of Shands CICU, testified that there was no need to expand the size of the unit. APMC did not question Dr. Collins about the unit’s occupancy rate, nor did it make any attempt to otherwise obtain that information. Dr. Riddle also testified that she had not been informed when a former patient had returned to the Orlando area following a successful PHT at Shands. However, Dr. Pietra testified at length about how Shands coordinates care with the patient’s primary care doctor and referring cardiologist post discharge, and works to develop a team to assist with follow care. Dr. Pietra testified: But we try to, again, develop a team and the team has to include like a local physician and usually a family practice or a pediatrician as the captain. If the patient’s got that, you feel a lot better about having a patient leave the local area and return to their hometown, as you say, so that they can be seen kind of in conjunction or collaboration with us in their hometown. If they have a referring cardiologist, that makes it that much easier sometimes to have a more sophisticated follow up done if needed. But again, the patient belongs to the transplant program in the long run, and so you are going to continue to offer them follow-up care basically for life. Since coming to Shands in August 2014, Dr. Pietra has updated many of the program’s protocols, including the protocols for immunosuppression, frequency of follow-up visits, and what is included in follow-up visits. Dr. Pietra has also initiated more written contracts between a prospective patient’s parents and the program, which make it very clear what the expectations are for the family. Two parents, one of whom lives in Clermont (one hour and 40 minute drive from Gainesville) and one of whom lives in Cocoa Beach (two hours and 35 minute drive from Gainesville) testified that their child had received a PHT at Shands in Gainesville, and that there were no issues with follow-up care for their children post-transplant. Volume/Outcome Relationship in Pediatric Heart Transplantation At the final hearing, experts for both sides agreed that there is a positive relationship between PHT volume and outcomes. In complex, highly specialized areas involving patients with rare diseases or conditions, volume provides experience not only for the surgeons but for the entire team. This is particularly true for pediatric heart transplantation, where higher volume keeps the entire team and ancillary staff functioning at a very high level. Both Dr. Pietra and Ms. Smith-Fields agreed that a minimum of 10 or more PHTs annually is a good standard for maintaining the proficiency of the entire transplant team. In Calendar Year 2017, there were only 32 PHTs in Florida. Both Dr. Pietra and Dr. Fricker testified about how the statewide volume made it very difficult to justify approving a sixth program in the State, and that the proliferation of programs would result in most of the programs not able to achieve the 10 or more transplants per year goal. Indeed, during the 12-month period of July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017, none of Florida’s four existing PHT programs met the minimum volume standard of 10 PHTs. In addition, PHT programs are measured based on outcomes, and a single fatality in a small program can be devastating to that hospital’s quality metrics. As such, small programs are often less willing to take more complicated patients. Ironically, adding more programs that dilute volumes may decrease rather than increase access because of the fear a small program might have for taking more complex patients. Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital (JHACH) is located in St. Petersburg, OTSA 2, AHCA District 5. According to reported AHCA data, JHACH performed seven PHTs during the 12 months ending June 2017. Several APMC witnesses made references to possible issues with the PHT program at JHACH based upon newspaper articles they had read. Such articles are hearsay, were not specifically identified or discussed by any witness, and accordingly, cannot form the basis of any finding of fact. Only one of APMC’s witnesses, Dr. Riddle, had any personal knowledge about JHACH, and she has not worked there or been involved in the care of any patients there since February 2016. The only APMC witness who actually looked at any data for JHACH, Ms. Smith-Fields, testified that JHACH had no deaths on its waiting list, that it was aggressive in retrieving donor hearts beyond 500 miles, and that had transplanted two patients during the first four months of this calendar year. When the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) identifies a program as having deficient outcomes, it will send a peer review team to thoroughly assess the program. If necessary, CMS will enter a systems improvement agreement, which may include the appointment of a quality administrator to help the program improve its operations. There was no evidence presented that CMS had taken any such steps with JHACH. As discussed above, it was uncontroverted that there is a positive correlation between volumes and outcomes, and that a minimum of 10 transplants a year is an important volume threshold in order to maintain a high-quality program. With Florida already having five existing and approved programs, it is currently not possible for all five programs to achieve 10 transplants a year. Approving a new program in the State based upon rumors about the status of an existing program would in all likelihood only reduce the average volume even further below the 10 transplants per year standard, and lead to poorer outcomes. AHCA’s Preliminary Decision Following AHCA’s review of APMC’s application, as well as consideration of comments made at the public hearing held on January 8, 2018, and written statements in support of and in opposition to the proposals, AHCA determined to preliminarily deny CON application 10518. AHCA’s decision was memorialized in a SAAR dated February 16, 2018. Marisol Fitch, supervisor of AHCA’s CON and commercial-managed care unit, testified for AHCA. Ms. Fitch testified that AHCA does not publish a numeric need for transplant programs, as it does for other categories of services and facilities. Rather, the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate need for the program. In addition to need methodologies presented by an applicant, AHCA also looks at availability and accessibility of services in the area to determine whether there is an access problem. Additionally, an applicant may attempt to demonstrate that “not normal” circumstances exist in the proposed service area sufficient to justify approval. Statutory Review Criteria Section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes, establishes the statutory review criteria applicable to CON Application No. 10518. The parties have stipulated that APMC’s CON application satisfies the criteria found in section 408.035(1)(f) and (h). The Agency believes that there is no need for the PHT program that APMC seeks to develop, because the needs of the children in the APMC service area are being met by other providers in the State, principally Shands and JHACH. Section 408.035(1)(a) and (b): The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed, and the availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the district of the applicant. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.044(6)(b)5/ The criteria for the evaluation of CON applications, including applications for organ transplantation programs, are set forth at section 408.035 and rule 59C-1.044. However, neither the applicable statutes nor rules have a numeric need methodology that predicts future need for PHT programs. Thus, it is up to the applicant to demonstrate need in accordance with section 408.035 and rule 59C-1.044. There are four OTSAs in Florida, numbered OTSA 1 through OTSA 4. APMC is located in OSTA 3, which includes the following counties: Seminole, Orange, Osceola, Brevard, Indian River, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, Martin, Lake, and Volusia Counties. (See § 408.032(5), Fla. Stat; Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.044(2)(f)3.). OTSA 3 also generally corresponds with the pediatric cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery service areas defined by AHCA rule. (See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C- 1.032(2)(g) and 59C-1.033(2)(h)). Currently, there is no provider of PHT in OTSA 3, but there are three providers of pediatric cardiac catheterization and pediatric open-heart surgery: APH, Florida Hospital for Children, and Nemours. There are four existing providers and one approved provider of PHT services in Florida: Shands in OTSA 1; JHACH in OTSA 2; Jackson Memorial Hospital in OTSA 4; and Memorial Regional Hospital, d/b/a Joe DiMaggio’s Hospital in OTSA 4; and an approved program in OTSA 4, Nicklaus Children’s Hospital, which received final approval from AHCA in August 2017. APMC’s Need Methodology 1: Ratio of Pediatric Cardiac Surgery Volume to PHT Case Volume To quantify need for a new PHT program in AHCA District 7, OTSA 3, APMC presented two “need methodologies.” According to the applicant, there is an observed correlation between a PHT center’s volume of congenital heart surgery and its PHT case volume. It should be noted that consistent with the rest of the application--which was focused on APH’s capabilities rather than community need for the service--both methodologies were designed to support the assertion that APMC could potentially attain a volume of 12 transplants by year two of operation. While APMC’s ability to generate 12 transplant cases is pertinent under rule 59C-1.044(6)(b), it is not indicative of unmet community need for this service. For example, if APMC retains or diverts patients who would otherwise have had access to these services through an existing provider, then they may be improving convenience whilst failing to satisfy any unmet community need. The first numeric methodology advanced by APMC in support of its proposal relied on an assumed correlation or a ratio between open-heart surgery cases and PHTs performed by the four existing PHT programs in Florida for calendar year 2016. The applicant then assumed that it would perform the mean rate experienced by the existing programs, in its second year of operation. When applied to APMC’s forecasted cardiac surgeries during the second year of operation (167), it arrived at a projected PHT volume of 11.7 by year two of operation. There are several issues with this methodology. The 11.7 projection is still below the threshold 12 transplants required under rule 59C-1.044(6)(b). The methodology also relied on figures for the 0-17 age cohort. APMC did not apply either methodology considering only 0-14 age data.6/ Additionally, APMC failed to demonstrate that there is any statistically predictive link between the two variables. The data presented in APMC’s application suggests that the correlation is weak, at best. For example, Bates page 0053 of the application reports Shands as having performed 140 pediatric cardiac surgeries and 15 pediatric heart transplants in 2016, while Memorial Regional Hospital performed more surgeries at 170, but less than half the transplants at seven for the same year. While APMC attempts to control for this variability by utilizing averages, such variability itself calls the causal relationship into question. Indeed, APMC’s own cardiac surgeon did not believe cardiac surgery volume and PHT volume to be directly related. An additional problem with APMC’s first methodology is that many of the numbers relied upon to reach its calculated forecast of 11.7 appear to be inflated. The 7 percent average, which APMC applies to its own facility, is not an accurate reflection of the true average rate among the four existing centers for 2016. While the 2016 transplant volume used represented the statewide total, APMC considered only the cardiac surgery volume reported by these four centers. Stated differently, APMC calculated a ratio considering the entire universe of one variable but not the other. The actual total number of cardiac surgeries performed statewide for 2016 for aged 0-14 was 1,216, not 491, as utilized as the denominator in calculating the ratio. As Ms. Fitch testified, when one uses the 1,216 surgeries in the formula, the ratio would be roughly 2.8 percent, not the 6.9 percent used by APMC. Then, applying APMC’s proffered number of 167 cardiac surgeries as representing its facility, the forecast would be about five PHTs, not 11.7. APMC only considered the open-heart surgeries performed at the four PHT hospitals, but certainly, the PHT patients, if they had open-heart surgery at all, may have had such surgeries at other facilities. As a pediatric OHS provider, APH is itself a good example of this, having provided 99 pediatric open-heart surgeries in 2016 that were not considered in the denominator of the formula. APMC’s Need Methodology 2: Ratio of PHT Volume to Common Indicators for PHT. APMC’s second need methodology is based on the identification of the International Classification of Disease (ICD) ICD-10 codes that are the most common indicators for PHT, taking into account acuity and based on APH’s actual experience. Starting with an analysis of ICD-9 codes and updating to ICD-10 codes as the most currently available model, APMC attempted to correlate the ICD-10 codes with the incidence of PHT in Florida hospitals using data from the AHCA inpatient database. This analysis produced an average ratio of the “most frequent indicators” to PHT cases, of 0.187. APMC then identified the volume of patients within OTSA 3 discharged under the top “most frequent” ICD-10 code indicators for PHT. Applying a conversion rate of 0.100 to this potential pool of PHT patients results in a forecast of 8.2 potential PHT cases in year 1 of APH’s PHT program. Holding constant the baseline potential patient volume in OTSA 3 and applying a conversion rate of 0.180 to years two and three resulted in a forecast of 14.8 PHT cases in OTSA 3 in years two and three. As with the previous methodology, this methodology is rejected, both as being an unreasonable basis for forecasting 12 PHTs by year 2, and as not being indicative of community need in OTSA 3 for this service. APMC presented no evidence that a link between the identified diagnosis codes and an eventual PHT exists or is predictive for any individual or group of individuals. Indeed, its health planner admitted that no statistical analysis was undertaken to test the validity of a causal relationship between these variables. Further, it is unconvincing that the average performance of the four existing long-established transplant programs over three recent calendar years is a reliable predictor of the prospective future performance of a new program by its second year of operation. This methodology, similar to the first, examined the age-range 0-17, even though rule 59C- 1.044 defines a pediatric patient as one aged 0-14. In considering the numbers of patients who presented at the four hospitals with one of the selected ICD-10 codes compared to the number of transplants, APMC acknowledged the variability in the ratios among the years and between the providers. This is evident from a review of the figures in the chart on Bates page 0055 of the APMC application. For example, according to the table, from 2014 to 2015, the number of inpatients with one of the ICD-10 codes decreased by one at Shands, but the number of PHTs performed over this same period doubled from 10 to 20. Such variability in the ratios suggests that there is no predictive link, and that it is instead other variables that affect PHT volume. Additionally, while this methodology considers diagnoses of patients actually treated in the four transplant hospitals to come up with a ratio, it then relies on average ICD volume of three Orlando hospitals instead of its own volume, without explanation. If APMC applied the ratio to its own ICD-10 volume of 138, as appears on Bates page 0056, without adding the other hospitals, its projected transplant volume would be 24.8 by year two, which is higher than any existing provider in the state. Or, if APMC applied only its own average ICD-10 volume over 2014-2016 of 46, it would result in a projected volume of 8.3 transplants at year two. While APMC’s approach is the one that gets it closest to a projected case volume of 12, it appears arbitrary and lacks credibility. Pediatric Population Growth in OTSA 3. In its application, and at hearing, APMC repeatedly referenced the growing pediatric population in central Florida as a factor supporting approval of its application. For example, APMC pointed out that OTSA 3 experienced the fastest growth rate for the 0-17 age cohort among all of the OTSAs for 2014, 2015, and 2016, and has a very robust projected annual growth rate of 2.7 percent through 2022. Moreover, each of the 10 counties in OTSA 3 is projected to experience rapid growth in the pediatric population, with the most dramatic growth rates in Orange, Osceola, and St. Lucie counties, at 10.3 percent, 12.4 percent, and 9.0 percent respectively. While the projected growth of the pediatric population in OTSA 3 is significant, such growth does not, in itself, demonstrate unmet demand or need for the project. Any increased demand for PHT due to population growth was not quantified by APMC in its application or at hearing, as APMC elected not to utilize a population and use rate analysis as a need methodology. No evidence of population demographics was presented to substantiate APMC’s transplant volume projections. On this issue, the following exchange from Dr. Nykanen’s deposition is informative: Q. When you referred to population information, is it your position that population demographics or population changes are in part a reason for the need for this project? A. As the population of Central Florida and as the population of this district increases the demand for cardiac services increases. So to the extent that you are serving more people, then I would agree, yes, that’s part of the – that’s part of the equation. Is it the tipping point? No. We don’t – we didn’t – nowhere in my discussions with Dr. DeCampli or administration was there the thought that, hey, the population is growing here so we need to provide this service. I think that the – it was more a question of, our program has grown to such a position that we need to provide this service in order to be able to be a quality program offering what we believe to be quality care for our patients. The fact that there are more people here is really not driving the need for it. That doesn’t drive the need, but it just – it does state that there may be more demand. That’s kind of the way that I feel about that. The above exchange, besides downplaying population growth as a significant argument for a PHT program, also reiterates the theme of APMC’s application and entire case, which is a focus on APMC and its institutional desire to expand the services it can provide to its patients. Another argument made by APMC in its application and at hearing is that approval of its program could reduce outmigration of PHT patients. By definition, because there is no existing PHT program in OTSA 3, all patients leave OTSA 3 for this service. However, that alone does not establish need for a new program. As discussed herein, APMC has not demonstrated a sufficient need or an access problem that justifies approval of its application. Outmigration of Donor Hearts There are four Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) in Florida, geographically distributed so that there is one OPO centrally located in each of the four OTSAs. The OPO in OTSA 3 has done well in procuring donor hearts notwithstanding the lack of a PHT program in its region. The establishment of a PHT program within an OPO region is known to positively correlate with an increase in the number of donor hearts that the OPO is able to procure. The number of hearts procured in Florida varies annually. In 2016, Florida OPOs procured 30 donor organs. Over 50 percent of the hearts procured in Florida leave the state. However, donor hearts also migrate into the state. With regard to the outmigration of organs from Florida, APMC has suggested that since Florida is a net exporter of organs, this is an additional reason for approval. However, organs harvested in one state are commonly used in another. There is nothing unusual or negative about that fact. There is a national allocation system through the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) and this sharing, as explained by Dr. Pietra, facilitates the best match for organs and patients. UNOS divides the country into regions for the purpose of allocation of donor organs, with Florida being one of six states in Region 3. The evidence of record did not establish that approval of the APMC application would result in the reduction of organs leaving Florida, or even that such would be a desirable result. APMC also argues that approving its application would increase the number of donor organs that are both procured and transplanted within Florida. Specifically, the applicant suggested that its proposed program would increase public awareness of the need for donor hearts; and, by doing so, increase the supply of donor hearts. However, no record evidence was produced in an effort to demonstrate that the proposed program would increase the supply of organs in Florida. In fact, an APH pediatric cardiologist testified that it is unlikely that adding the proposed PHT program would impact the availability or supply of organs. Rule 59C-1.044(6)(b) Volume Standards Rule 59C-1.044(6)(b) includes additional criteria that must be demonstrated by an applicant. Subsection (6)(b)4. provides that an application for PHT include documentation that the annual duplicated cardiac catheterization patient caseload was at or exceeded 200, and that the duplicated cardiac open heart surgery caseload was at or exceeded 125 for the calendar year preceding the CON application deadline. Cardiac programs in Florida report their open-heart surgery volumes quarterly to a local health council, and the Agency publishes the calendar year totals. In the applicable baseline calendar year of 2016, APH’s duplicated OHS case volume for patients aged 0-14 was 139 OHS cases, satisfying the minimum OHS volume requirement.7/8/ APH also met the catheterization volume threshold by performing 227 cardiac catheterizations for patients aged 0-14 in the baseline 2016 calendar year. Geographic Access There is no evidence of record that families living in Central Florida are currently being forced to travel unreasonable distances to obtain PHT services. Indeed, there are five existing or approved programs within the state, with at least two located very reasonably proximate to OTSA 3. There was agreement that patients that need a PHT are approaching the end-stage of cardiac function, and in the absence of a PHT will very likely die. Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer that the parents of a child living in central Florida and needing a PHT will travel to St. Petersburg, Gainesville, or OTSA 4 for transplant services rather than let their child die because the travel distance is too far. To the contrary, the evidence in this record, as well as common sense, is that families will go as far as necessary to save their child. The notion that there is some pent-up demand for PHT services among central Florida residents (especially when there is no evidence of a single instance of an OTSA 3 patient being turned down or unable to access a PHT) is without support in this record. The parents of two pediatric patients that received PHT at Shands testified on behalf of the Agency at the final hearing.9/ Their testimony substantiated AHCA’s position that residents of the greater Orlando area have reasonable access to PHT services. One of the testifying parents lives in Brevard County, which is directly east of Orlando. Her daughter likely had a heart defect since birth, but it was not diagnosed until she was six years old. That patient was asymptomatic at the time of diagnosis but deteriorated over a period of years. When she was first seen at Shands, her condition was not emergent and the family had the time and researched other prominent institutions, including Texas Children’s Hospital, Boston Children’s Hospital, Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, and the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. Their goal was to find a program that did a good volume of transplants with above average survival rates. After doing this research, they chose Shands. Their daughter received her heart transplant at Shands, is doing well, and is now considering where to go to college. This family did not find the distance to be a problem. This parent also persuasively spoke of her concerns about further diluting the volumes of the existing programs that could result from approval of a sixth PHT program in Florida. This parent also observed that because of the shortage of donors, adding more transplant centers does not necessarily mean there will be more PHTs performed. The other lay witness is the parent of a very young boy who went from appearing to be perfectly healthy to almost dying, and being placed on life support within a 24-hour period. This family lives in Clermont, which is near Orlando. Shortly after her son’s two-month old check-up, the witness took her son to the local hospital thinking he had a urinary tract infection. The hospital sent him to APH for evaluation. As soon as he arrived there, he went into respiratory distress. An echocardiogram was done and showed he had a severely enlarged heart. APH recommended that he be transferred to Shands. Before being transferred, the mother spoke with her sister who coincidentally is a nurse in Chicago who works on the transplant floor. She also highly recommended Shands. Her son was safely transported to Shands by ShandsCair just over 24 hours after being first admitted to APH. When they arrived at Shands, both Dr. Bleiweiss and Dr. Fricker gave the parents their cell numbers and were always there to answer any questions. The infant was placed on a Berlin heart machine until an appropriate donor heart became available. This patient was able to undergo a transplant approximately three weeks after admission, and also had an excellent outcome. This mother testified that the distance to Shands was not a problem, that the social workers and nurses were always available to help, and that follow-up care at Shands has not been an issue. In fact, the patient is now able to have his labs done in Orlando. It is also notable that this patient’s transfer was uneventful and that the patient had no difficulties in being immediately admitted to Shands’ CICU. It is clear from the testimony of these parents that nothing about having a gravely ill child is “convenient.” But it was also clear that for both of these families, having an experienced provider care for their child was much more important to them than geographic proximity. The following exchange summarizes how the young boy’s mother felt about the inconvenience of having to travel from Clermont to Gainesville: Q If you want to hypothetically encounter a family who expressed to you a concern that their child needed a transplant, they resided in Orlando or the Orlando area, but they were concerned about having to travel to Gainesville to receive that service, what would you say to them? A That’s where they need to be and that everything will fall in place, but the most important thing is the care that your child needs. While transplantation is not an elective service, it is not done on an emergent basis. As noted, the number of families affected is, quite fortunately, very small. While having a child with these issues is never “convenient,” the travel issues that might exist do not outweigh the weight of the evidence that fails to demonstrate a need for approval of the APMC application. The Orlando area, being centrally located in Florida, is reasonably accessible to all of the existing providers. Most appear to go to Shands, which is simply not a substantial distance away. The credible evidence is that families facing these issues are able to deal with the travel issues. The testimony of the two parents supports the Agency’s position that obtaining the best possible outcome for the child is the parents’ primary motivation in choosing a PHT program. Financial Access APMC asserts that approval of its proposed program will enhance financial access to care. APMC currently serves patients without regard to ability to pay and will extend these same policies to PHT recipients. APMC’s application indicates that Medicaid/Medicaid HMO will account for 26.8 percent of total patient days in years one and two of the proposal. Self- pay is expected to account for 9.0 percent of patient days in years one and two. However, there was no competent evidence of record that access to PHT services was being denied by any of the existing transplant providers because of a patient’s inability to pay. Not Normal Circumstances APMC alleged the existence of “not normal circumstances” in support of its application. They are categorized as “‘not normal’ circumstances relating to access to PHT for residents of OTSA 3,” and can be summarized as follows: APMC has the one of the largest NICUs under one roof in the country, resulting in a disproportionate volume of newborns at [APH] with complex forms of congenital heart disease; There are patients at APMC who are placed on ECMO or other heart-assist devices after surgery who are too sick to be transferred from APMC to another facility to receive transplant; Forcing patients to accept the high and potentially fatal risks of transport on ECMO presents a major access issue; Post-transplant follow-up care for patients is life-long and can be time- critical, and the ability to provide 24/7 rapid access to specialized transplant urgent care is medically optimal. The first argument related to the size of APMC’s NICU, does not speak to community need. Regardless of how many newborns APH sees, if the needs of these newborns are currently being met by existing programs, then it is difficult to see how this circumstance bears upon need or accessibility to this service. Additionally, to the extent that APMC suggests that the size of its NICU will correlate with a similarly large number of PHT patients, the proposition is unsupported by the record evidence. In fact, APMC admits that its pediatric cardiac surgery program is at the border of the lowest tercile of STS programs by volume. If APH’s NICU yields only a modest to medium cardiac surgery volume, there is no reason to conclude that this NICU will, by virtue of its size alone, yield a high PHT volume. Next, APMC argued that it has had patients who could have potentially benefitted from transplant but who did not receive such services due to their being too sick or otherwise unable to transfer. It is noteworthy that APMC did not identify these patients or provide data in any fashion to bolster this claim. The application referenced 33 NICU patients on ECMO in four years, but APMC conceded that most of these are babies on respiratory or “VV ECMO,” who eventually wean off. The application also references 11 CVICU patients placed on bypass at APMC in the last four years, but no testimony was presented as to the actual number of patients alleged to be unable to transfer. APMC did not maintain at hearing that any of its pediatric patients have died as a result of being unable to transfer to a transplant facility. In fact, any incidence of children being too sick or acute to transfer outside the OH system to a transplant facility appears to be a product of APH clinical decision-making about appropriateness for transplant referral, rather than that such patients were refused at a transplant center or could not have been transferred at an earlier time. At his deposition, Dr. Nykanen discussed the issue: I think that I do agree that patients— pediatric patients in Central Florida can get a heart transplant. And I have sent patients—my patients to Gainesville for a transplant because I felt at least in the patient’s [sic] that they’ve transplanted I can support that I’m doing the right thing for my patient. In answering that question, there are patients that I do not refer for transplant because I just feel that they are not a candidate for traveling for a transplant, medically a candidate for traveling without— for a transplant. So the term reasonable is—is it reasonably accessible. It is accessible, indeed, for the majority of the patients that I feel need a heart transplant. They can travel and get a transplant. However, for some patients it’s not an option for them. Either due to their medical complexity, risks that I consider with transport, and rarely family situation. APMC emphasized the risks of moving pediatric cardiac patients while on ECMO. However, as noted earlier, the credible testimony of witnesses presented by the Agency was that while there are always risks inherent with the treatment of critically ill children, with modern advancements in technology, these transports are done routinely and safely. It is also significant that while APMC cited various risks associated with ECMO transports and underscored the danger to the patient, no APMC witness could point to a single example of a patient that died due to complications with ECMO during a transport. The Agency in its preliminary decision noted that the application lacked any data illustrating mortality or negative outcomes related to pediatric ECMO transports, and no such evidence was forthcoming at hearing. APMC presented no evidence demonstrating that children of OTSA 3 who are transplanted at an existing provider are denied or otherwise unable to access follow-up care. The two mothers that testified for the Agency both stated that they have not had issues accessing follow-up care at Shands. APMC relies instead in its application on theoretical claims about emergent complications that could arise and the challenges of accessing a center. However, these arguments are unconvincing. Both parties agreed that transplant centers can and do work with a patient’s local providers so that patients can receive urgent medical care closer to home and then return to their transplant center as necessary. Dr. Pietra testified that Shands works with primary physicians and providers post- transplant. Shands has developed a thorough protocol for all of its patients, which includes frequent follow-ups. Additionally, Ms. Smith-Fields agreed that at her facility in Arizona (the only PHT provider in that state) the program coordinates with providers local to patients to ensure rapid acute care is accessible, if needed. APMC’s cardiologist, Dr. Riddle, testified that APH does provide acute care and other necessary care to children post-PHT, and that it competently does so. APMC maintained at hearing that post-transplant care is life-long, and that in the event of an emergent situation, immediate access is critical. However, the evidence indicates that existing transplant centers plan for these events. There are more frequent follow-up visits to a transplant center during the period immediately following the transplant. Both Dr. DeCampli and Dr. Riddle testified that organ rejection is more likely to occur during the first year after transplant. Additionally, diagnostic testing can often detect signs of rejection in advance, to allow a transplant center to respond before an acute episode occurs. Indeed, one of the functions of echocardiograms is to scan the heart and detect abnormalities or episodes of rejection. The record reflects that transplant centers, such as Shands, are capable of properly and safely monitoring these patients and dealing with issues of rejection. The evidence in this record does not support the proposition that geographic distance to existing centers is a barrier to patients receiving necessary follow-up care. Orlando Health’s Prior Position APMC’s claim that there is an accessibility issue or a need for PHT services in OTSA 3 is further undermined by its own contrary position on these issues just a few months prior to the submission of its application. In January 2017, OH and APH presented written opposition to Nemours Children’s Hospital’s attempt to establish a PHT program in Orlando. APH also presented oral argument from Drs. Nykanen and DeCampli in opposition to the proposed Nemours PHT program being approved by the Agency. The written statement of opposition, identified on its face to be on behalf of OH and APH for Children, unequivocally advanced the position that PHT services are not needed in OTSA 3, and that they are reasonably available to residents of the service area: Nothing supports the theory in the [Nemours] applications that the proposed services are unique or not otherwise available, or that there is a need for them among the population. * * * Specifically, CON application no. 10471 [Nemours’ PHT application] does not provide any facts that would lead the Agency to conclude that existing pediatric heart transplant services are not reasonably available to residents of the service area. For example, the data shown in CON application no. 10471, Exhibit 15, p. 75, does not reflect time travel distances; existing providers are within the typical two hour drive time standard accepted by health planning experts and the Agency for tertiary services. The personal letter authored by Dr. Nykanen and included as part of the APH opposition was unequivocal and specific in its conclusion that access to these services for residents of OTSA 3 is not a problem. Dr. Nykanen stood by his statement in this proceeding, testifying in his deposition: So we would—we would do anything for our child. I’d travel around the world, you know, halfway around the world if I thought that something would benefit my child. So geographic proximity in that sense probably doesn’t matter. And it doesn’t matter. If I’m an outpatient and I can get in my car and I can go to Gainesville. * * * And I don’t think that it—I honestly don’t think that a two-hour drive is that much of a barrier. It’s a pain and it’s inconvenient. * * * So I think what I intended with that statement and believe it to be true today is that if my child needed a transplant and I could travel to Gainesville and I could get there, I’ll do it, as a family. Is that an inconvenience, yes. Is it a huge barrier, probably not. Because if it, in the balance of things, meant that my child would survive or not, then I would do it. I’d go to London, England if I had to. APMC attempted to justify its prior position as mere concern about the inexperience of the Nemours cardiac program. However, this is contradicted by the record evidence in this case. Dr. Nykanen testified that, at the time of the Nemours public hearing, his expressed position was that there was not a need for PHT services in central Florida. The unambiguous statements by APMC opposing a local competitor’s attempt to establish the same health service that it now claims the children of central Florida need, further undermines the credibility of APMC’s current position, and underscores APMC’s focus on its own interests. The prior position taken by APMC with respect to need and accessibility in OTSA 3 was made with the intent that it be received and considered by the Agency in its decision on the Nemours application. AHCA witness, Marisol Fitch, found this clinical and health planning testimony to be persuasive, and APMC’s prior position that need and accessibility do not support approval of a new PHT program are in line with the record evidence. The glaring inconsistency in APMC’s past and current assertions calls into serious question the credibility of the general, theoretical, and unsubstantiated access problems that are alleged in APMC’s application. Section 408.035(1)(c): The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant’s record of providing quality of care; Section 408.035(1)(d): The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation; and Rule 59C-1.044(3-4). Quality in the delivery of health care is APMC’s first and foremost strategic imperative. APMC defines “quality” as the simultaneous achievement of excellence in three areas: patient outcomes, patient experience, and patient access. APMC is very deliberate in its approach to metric- driven performance in quality and safety. APMC is the highest- rated system in all of Central Florida within the CMS rating system, which analyzes data for 66 quality improvement metrics. Similarly, APMC is the highest ranked Truven-rated health care system in Central Florida, and is ranked first among the over 30 hospitals analyzed and ranked by Vizient Southeast. The metrics analyzed by these rating organizations include, but are not limited to, mortality rates, readmission rates, cost containment, patient experience scores, emergency department wait times, and infection rates. Through deliberate focus and a compulsive commitment to quality, the APH Heart Center has performed at the highest levels with respect to quality of care and patient outcomes for well over a decade. For its part, the Agency does not dispute that the applicant is a quality provider. However, AHCA does maintain that approval of an unneeded sixth provider of PHT services in Florida could lead to or correlate with negative patient outcomes. Given the relatively low PHT volumes statewide, and agreement that volume is positively correlated with quality and outcome in transplantation, splitting state volume among six providers could negatively impact the quality of this service, as it concerns the residents of OTSA 3 and Florida more broadly. This service is defined by Florida law as a tertiary service of limited concentration. Indeed, APMC agrees that there should not be a PHT program in every hospital, particularly since organs are a limited resource. APMC failed to credibly demonstrate that it would achieve the PHT volumes it projected unless it diverts significant volumes from other Florida providers. Approval of a new program will not create transplant patients that do not exist or are not currently able to reasonably access services. The applicant has not demonstrated that it will achieve volume sufficient to reasonably assure quality care. Rule 59C-1.044(4) requires that applicants meet certain staffing requirements, including: “The program shall employ a transplant physician, and a transplant surgeon, if applicable, as defined by the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) June 1994.” The applicant concedes that it still needs to hire a transplant surgeon and a cardiologist specializing in heart failure, to staff the proposed program. While APH has had difficulty recruiting and retaining a bone marrow transplant physician to implement the bone marrow program approved in 2014, given its outstanding reputation for quality it is likely that APMC would ultimately be successful in recruiting a PHT surgeon and an advanced heart failure cardiologist. Section 408.035(1)(e): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district. Approval of APMC’s proposed program would likely improve physical access to PHT services for the very few residents of OTSA 3 that need them. Generally speaking, adding an access point for a service will make that service more convenient and geographically proximate for some. However, given the rarity of PHTs, approval of the APMC program would not result in enhanced access for a significant number of patients. Moreover, there was no credible evidence presented at hearing that any resident of OTSA 3 that needed PHT services was unable to access those services at one of the existing PHT programs in Florida. Based upon persuasive record evidence, there is also clearly a positive relationship between PHT volume and outcomes. As with any complex endeavor, practice makes perfect. In this instance, maintaining a minimum PHT case volume provides experience to the clinicians involved and helps maintain proficiency. According to the credible testimony of Dr. Pietra, maintaining a volume of no fewer than 10 PHTs per year is critical, “because your relative risk for the next patient that you do is at its lowest” if you stay above that volume. The clear intent of the minimum volume requirement of 12 heart transplants per year contained in rule 59C- 1.044(6)(b)2. is to ensure a sufficient case volume to maintain the proficiency of the transplant surgeons and other clinicians involved in the surgical and post-surgical care of PHT patients. In the 12 months ending in June 2016, there were only 35 PHT’s performed in Florida. By the end of June 2017, that number had dropped to 21, with none of the four operational PHT programs meeting the 10-case minimum volume. And when the approved PHT program at Nicklaus Children’s Hospital becomes operational, the per-program volume of PHTs is likely to drop even further. Given the lack of demonstrated need for a sixth program, and low volume of PHT’s statewide, the undersigned is unable to recommend approval of the APMC program knowing that it would further dilute the pool of PHT patients, potentially adversely affecting the quality of care available at the existing programs. Adequate case volume is also important for teaching facilities, such as Shands, to benefit residents of all the OTSAs by being able to train the next generation of transplant physicians. There was no persuasive evidence of record that approval of APMC’s application would meaningfully and significantly enhance geographic access to transplant services in OTSA 3. The modest improvement in geographic access for the few patients that are to be served by the program is not significant enough to justify approval in the absence of demonstrated need. There is no evidence that approval of the APMC application will enhance financial access, or that patients are not currently able to access PHT services because of payor status. Section 408.035(1)(g): The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost- effectiveness. It is clear that establishing and maintaining a transplant program is expensive and entails a significant investment of resources. Given the limited pool of patients, the added expense of yet a sixth Florida program is not a cost- effective use of resources. Section 408.035(1)(i): The applicant’s past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. OH is the designated safety net provider for the Central Florida region. In 2016, OH provided approximately $437 million in unreimbursed charity care. OH’s commitment to provide health care services to its entire community without regard to ability to pay continues today. Fifty-five percent of the patients served by APH are Medicaid beneficiaries, and 5-7 percent are self-pay or uninsured. If approved, OH’s mission and role as a safety net provider would extend to its proposed PHT program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying CON Application No. 10518 filed by Orlando Health, Inc., d/b/a Arnold Palmer Medical Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 2018.
