The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' application for site plan approval for a proposed renovation and addition to their restaurant should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this local land use dispute, Petitioners, Ypapanti and Sevasti Alexiou, who operate a restaurant under the name of Frenchy's Rockaway Grill, have appealed a decision by the Community Development Board (Board) to deny an application to renovate and expand their restaurant located at 7 Rockaway Street, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The Board, which is made up of seven local residents, acts as the local planning agency for Respondent, City of Clearwater (City). Although the City staff supports the project, the City is technically opposed to the application since the Board failed to approve the project by a 3-3 tie vote. In denying the application, the Board rejected the City staff's recommendation that the application be approved. Intervenor, Hunter Hotel Company, owns and operates a hotel known as Clearwater Beach Hotel which is contiguous to, and south of, Petitioners' property. It objects to the application on the grounds that "the criteria for the flexible development approval were not met nor proved, [and] that the relief requested [by Petitioners] is of such a magnitude that it is not warranted and cannot be allowed under the Code." As further clarified by Intervenor, the City's parking shortage in the Beach area is the "core issue on this appeal." Until the City solves the parking problem, Intervenor suggests that there should be a moratorium on development in the Beach area. Petitioners own and operate a popular and successful one-story restaurant and bar on a 0.38-acre lot at 7 Rockaway Street, Clearwater Beach, which fronts directly on the Gulf of Mexico. The property is zoned as a part of the City's Tourist District and is bounded by the Gulf of Mexico on the west, a municipal parking lot to the north, a motel on the east, and the Clearwater Beach Hotel on the south. Due to the small size of their lot, Petitioners seek to vertically expand their restaurant by adding a second story consisting of 3,487 square feet, including an approximately 2,300 square foot open deck and 1,200 square feet of enclosed area. Both sections will accommodate bar patrons and diners. Petitioners also intend to remove and replace a 945 square foot storage room attached to the south side of the building which is structurally unsound. To accomplish these changes, Petitioners will need "flexibility" in meeting setback and parking requirements. Because more than 95 percent of the City is now "built out," and very little land is vacant, the City has adopted comprehensive infill criteria for non-conforming structures, such as Petitioners' restaurant. The criteria which apply to Petitioners' project are found in Section 2- 803C. of the City of Clearwater Redevelopment Code (Code) and allow flexibility in promoting redevelopment and infill throughout the City, including the Clearwater Beach area. As pointed out by City staff, infill projects are often used on Clearwater Beach because there are so many non-conforming structures in that area. In determining whether a project should be given flexibility as an infill project, the City evaluates the proposed project against its infill criteria. Strict compliance with all criteria is not required, but rather the criteria are weighed or balanced collectively. If a project cannot meet a "significant number of [criteria], or a significant one in a meaningful way," then an applicant "would have problems [with gaining approval]." Once a project qualifies as an infill project, an applicant may then use flexible development standards for setbacks, height, size, and minimum off-street parking. In this case, Petitioners seek flexibility for setback and off-street parking requirements. As noted earlier, the main concern raised by Intervenor centers around item 9. of the criteria, which reads as follow: 9. Adequate off-street parking in the immediate vicinity according to the shared parking formula in Division 14 of Article 3 will be available to avoid on-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development. Intervenor contends that this criterion was not satisfied, and thus the project cannot qualify as an infill project. In addition, in its Proposed Final Order, the City contends that Petitioners have failed to satisfy items 1. and 5., which read as follows: The development or redevelopment of the parcel proposed for development is otherwise impractical without deviations from the use, intensity and development standards; 5. Suitable sites for development or redevelopment of the uses or mix of uses within the comprehensive infill redevelopment project are not otherwise available in the City of Clearwater. Table 2-803 of the Code establishes minimum off- street parking requirements of 7 to 15 parking spaces per 1,000 square feet for restaurants in the Tourist District. Therefore, a restaurant of Petitioners' size (that was not an infill project) would be required to have at least 47 off- street parking spaces. In actuality, Petitioners have only 13, due to a variance having been previously granted. Since Petitioners intend to add around 3,400 square feet through the second floor addition, the Code would normally require a minimum of 24 additional parking spaces, or a total of 71. However, these off-street standards do not apply to infill projects. Instead, another provision in Table 2-803 of the Code provides that minimum off-street parking for infill projects shall be "[d]etermined by the community development coordinator based on the specific use and/or ITE [Institute of Transportation Engineers] Manual standards." Therefore, using the guidelines in the foregoing provision, the community development coordinator determines the number of additional off-street parking spaces, if any, that an infill project will require. Because the City staff concluded that a parking study would assist it in analyzing the specific use of the property, it requested that Petitioners perform a parking study. The study was conducted by Robert Pergolizzi, a certified planner, who has performed a number of parking studies during his career. The Code does not describe any criteria for a parking study for an infill project. Therefore, the staff looked at other sections of the Code in arriving at a methodology to be used for the study. More specifically, it first considered Section 2-803J.6.a., which provides in part that off-street parking requirements can be relaxed if "the physical characteristics of the proposed building are such that the likely uses of the property will require fewer parking spaces per floor area than otherwise required." Because the restaurant sits directly on the beach, the staff believed that the primary destination of many of the customers was the beach, and not the restaurant, and that the visit to the restaurant was a side trip by the customers. Thus, the parking study methodology was designed, in part, to confirm or disaffirm that assumption. Section 2-803J.6.c. also provides flexibility in off-street parking requirements if "adequate parking is available on a shared basis as determined by all existing land uses within 1,000 feet of the parcel proposed for development, or parking is available through any existing or planned and committed parking facilities." The staff used this section of the Code to determine that 1,000 feet was an appropriate distance to analyze available parking for a restaurant. Therefore, Pergolizzi was directed by the staff to analyze available parking within 1,000 feet of the restaurant. Pergolizzi conducted his study on August 25 and 26, 2000, the Friday and Saturday which preceded the Labor Day holiday weekend. It is undisputed, and the parties have stipulated, that Pergolozzi conducted the study entirely consistent with the agreed methodology. The study confirmed that the primary destination of 49 percent of the restaurant's customers was the beach, and not the restaurant. In other words, the expansion would not affect the parking demand generated by almost one-half of the customers. The study also confirmed that there was available parking within 1,000 feet of the restaurant to accommodate not only the existing business, but the proposed expansion as well. As noted above, Table 2-803 of the Code required that the community development coordinator determine the minimum off-street parking after consideration of the specific proposed use and/or the ITE Manual standards. Here, the City staff looked at the specific use, the ITE Manual standards, and the parking study to determine the minimum off-street parking required for the restaurant. It concluded that there was available parking within 1,000 feet of the restaurant and that no additional parking spaces were required. The community development coordinator concurred with the results of the study and analysis and likewise determined that the minimum off-street parking for the project were the existing 13 spaces. This determination was wholly consistent with the requirements of the Code. In recommending to the Board that the project should be given flexibility as an infill project, the staff's report contained the following conclusion: The proposal is in compliance with the standards and criteria for flexible development approval, with maximum development potential, requirements of the Comprehensive Infill Redevelopment Projects, and with all applicable standards of the Community Development Code. A more detailed analysis of how each of the ten criteria were satisfied is found in Petitioners' Exhibits 9 and 14 received in evidence. At the hearing on March 27, 2001, the City's assistant planning director also established that the proposed expansion and renovation complied with all applicable standards of the Code. Intervenor's expert witness, Gail Easley, a certified planner, questioned whether the methodology used by Pergolizzi complied with the Code. More specifically, she contended that the City was required to determine minimum off- street parking for infill projects in the manner described in Section 2-803C.9. That section provides that "[a]dequate off- street parking in the immediate vicinity according to the shared parking formula in Division 14 of Article 3 will be available to avoid on-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development." If this contention were true, however, it would render meaningless the provision in Section 2-803C.8., which provides that "[f]lexibility in regard to lot width, required setbacks, height and off-street parking are justified by the benefits to community character in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development and the City of Clearwater as a whole." In other words, there would be no flexibility for off-street parking as permitted by that section. This would be contrary to the very purpose of infill projects. Witness Easley's interpretation is also inconsistent with Table 2-803, which states that "minimum off-street parking will be determined by the community development coordinator based on the specific use and/or ITE Manual standards." Under her interpretation of the Code, the community development coordinator would have no right to determine minimum off-street parking for infill projects based on the specific use and/or ITE Manual standards, despite clear language in the Code to the contrary. More importantly, the criteria in Section 2-803C., including item 9., are used to determine whether a project should be considered an infill redevelopment project under the Code. Item 9. is simply one of those criteria, and it does not establish minimum off-street parking requirements for an infill project. Witness Easley also opined that it was inappropriate for the parking study to consider on-street parking. However, the Code does not prohibit the community development coordinator from requesting a parking study which includes on- street parking. It only requires that he consider the specific use and/or ITE manual standards when determining off- street parking for an infill project. Other contentions that the methodology was flawed, including a concern about the date and time of the study and the use of 1,000 feet as a measuring stick for available parking, have been considered and found to be without merit. A contention was also made that certain other infill criteria were not met. However, there was no evidence to support these contentions, and the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that all criteria have been satisfied, and that Petitioners qualify as an infill project. The undersigned has also considered the testimony of the owners of two competing restaurants who object to the project. While they contended that the lack of parking motivated their opposition to the application, it is fair to infer from their testimony that they object mainly because they fear that Petitioners may capture some of their business through an expansion of their restaurant. Finally, in its Proposed Final Order, the City has contended that Petitioners have failed to satisfy a general standard contained in Section 3-913A.6., which requires that an applicant ensure that: [t]he design of the proposed development minimizes adverse effects, including visual, acoustic and olfactory and hours of operation impacts, on adjacent properties. Given the modifications agreed to by Petitioners in the following Finding of Fact, the requirements of this section have been met. In the nature of an affirmative defense, Petitioners have raised the issue of equitable estoppel and contend that Intervenor should be estopped from opposing the application. The facts underlying this argument are as follows. On November 21, 2000, the Board heard testimony and considered the application for the first time. At that meeting, Intervenor's counsel represented to the Board that "my client's concern is not the parking. My client's concern is because of proximity of noise and light intrusion." In light of these concerns, counsel for Petitioners and Intervenor reached an agreement wherein Petitioners agreed to limit the addition to the northern one-half of the existing building, construct an 8-foot concrete block wall on the south property line between the restaurant and the hotel, close the upstairs addition at 10:00 p.m. on week nights and 11:00 p.m. on Fridays and Saturdays, place no outside speakers and allow no live music on the upstairs addition, and direct upstairs lighting away from the hotel. With these accommodations, counsel for the hotel represented to the Board that "if [the Board] approve[s] this, you have addressed our primary areas of concern." After the close of public comments, the Board voted to approve the application by a 3-2 vote. Because four votes are required to approve an application, and one member was absent from the meeting, the matter was continued to the next meeting on December 12, 2000. By letter sent to Petitioners' counsel on December 5, 2000, Intervenor's counsel identified the "commitments at the preceding hearing, which [Petitioners were] willing to make to the Clearwater Beach Hotel." Upon receipt of that letter, Petitioners advised the City by letter that they were in agreement with Intervenor's counsel that "these are the conditions agreed to at the last CDB meeting, which shall be binding upon my client." Notwithstanding earlier representations, by letter dated December 7, 2000, counsel for Intervenor indicated that "the owners of Clearwater Beach Hotel have instructed us to object to the pending application. Upon further review, prompted by the renderings, the magnitude of this project is simply too great for the size of the property." The letter further stated that it was to be considered "as withdrawal of our prior letter and position of 'no objection,'" and that Intervenor would attend the December 12 hearing "to formally object." Petitioners have further contended that Board member William Johnson had ex parte communications with some of his neighbors concerning the merits of this application, and this constituted a departure from the essential requirements of the law. Section 4-206D.2. of the Code provides that "no member of the community development board or the city commission shall engage in any ex parte communications with any person in regard to the substance of a quasi-judicial matter which is to be considered by the board or commission, as the case may be." If such communications occur, Section 4-206D.3.a. requires that a member disclose these communications at the meeting. There is no record of any disclosure being made. At the first Board meeting on November 21, 2000, member Johnson had moved for approval of the application. Without any explanation, at the second meeting on December 12, 2000, he voted against the application. Member Johnson did not testify at hearing to confirm or deny Petitioners' allegation of wrongdoing. However, witness Pergolizzi testified that he spoke with member Johnson just after the December 12 meeting, at which time member Johnson allegedly admitted that he had such conversations with his neighbors and was sorry for his change of vote. But the out-of-court statements of member Johnson are hearsay in nature, do not supplement or explain any other competent evidence on this issue, and they cannot form the basis for a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact Respondent TCI has more than 70 homes completed or under construction in furtherance of plans to build 141 single family residences as part of Tymber Creek Phase I, a development in Volusia County. The development site is partially bounded by the Little Tomoka River, a natural body of water which is navigable in fact. The site of the construction respondent DER proposes to permit is home to wildlife of various kinds, including woodpeckers, great horned owls, herons, mussels, manatees, snakes, turtles and alligators. At the present time, boat traffic on the Little Tomoka River is negligible. The dock TCI proposes to build would have a total area of 120 square feet and would not impede the flow of the river. It would protrude over the water no more than five feet along the bank of the river at a point where the river widens, described by some of the witnesses as a lagoon, and would not constitute a hazard to navigation. With respect to the dock, the foot bridges, the boat ramp and the removal of the agreed upon portion of unauthorized fill, the permit DER proposes to issue would be before the fact. According to DER's appraisal of TCI's original, revised permit application, which was received in evidence as DER's exhibit No. 5, TCI made revised application, on November 29, 1977, for "after-the-fact approval for the placement of approximately 3500 cubic yards of fill After TCI had filled, it constructed parking and recreational facilities. In evaluating TCI's application, Steve Beeman, a DER employee, described the site in January of 1978: Approximately 1.6 acres of filled flood plain is presently covered by a sports complex including tennis courts, swimming pool and recreation building and an asphalt parking lot. An additional 3000 square feet has been filled and paved (asphalt was applied after receipt of DER cease and desist notice) for [access to] a [proposed] boatramp and parking area, and approximately 14,000 square feet of swamps have been filled in the construction of a 1800+ feet "natural trial". DER's exhibit No. 5. By letter dated February 22, 1978, respondent DER notified respondent TCI of its intent to deny TCI's initial application, as revised. Among the reasons DER gave for its intended denial were expected violations of various water quality standards, including a prohibition against oils and greases in concentrations greater than 15 mg. per liter ("or that no visible oil, defined as iridescence, be present to cause taste or odors, or interfere with other beneficial uses.") DER's exhibit No. 4. Rule 17-3.05(2)(r) , Florida Administrative Code. This water quality standard violation was anticipated because of "the [projected] focussing of stormwater runoff into the Little Tomoka River, across paved surfaces, which are high in petroleum based pollutants." DER's exhibit No. 5. In its notice of intent to issue a permit, DER proposes to authorize TCI "to realign (straighten) existing boatramp access road." DER's exhibit No. Mr. Wheeler's letter to Mr. Shirah of April 6, 1978, DER's exhibit No. 2, describes the proposed access road change as part of "discussions and agreements concerning resolution of the initial unauthorized fill and subsequent after-the- fact application." A drawing attached to this letter indicates that the contemplated alteration of the roadway would decrease the amount of paved surface to some unspecified extent. Another part of these "discussions and agreements concerned removal of some 1900 cubic yards of fill. Most of the fill designated for removal had been placed with the idea of creating a dry pathway through the marshy area separating the Little Tomoka River from an asphalt parking area. So placed, the fill dirt acts as a dike, preventing the preexisting communication between the waters of the Little Tomoka River and the waters of the adjacent marsh. At the hearing, Mr. Wheeler testified that, if revised in accordance with DER's exhibit No. 2, TCI's project would pose no threat to water quality, but he conceded that the effects of gasoline boat motors were not considered. An increase in beat traffic would likely result in an increase in oils and greases in the waters of the Little Tomoka River.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent DER, deny the permit is proposed to issue to respondent TCI in letters to petitioners dated April 7, 1978. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Segundo J. Fernandez, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida Judson I. Woods, Jr., 32301 Esquire Post Office Box 1916 Ormond Beach, Florida 32074 Tymber Creek, Inc. c/o Stan Shirah Route 40 Twin River Drive Ormond Beach, Florida 32074
Findings Of Fact John Taylor, III, Petitioner, owns property located at 1200 South Missouri Avenue in the City of Clearwater which is zoned CC (commercial center). The subject property consists of a mall and movie theater. On or about April 17, 1986, Michael Johnson, on behalf of Petitioner, applied for a variance to allow two message signs on the subject property and also to allow total message signage of 256 square feet. Without a variance, the subject property can have only one message sign which cannot exceed 192 square feet. The property presently has one message sign and total message signage of 176 square feet located on its marquee. At a meeting of the Development Code Adjustment Board on May 8, 1986, Petitioner's variance application was denied. The parties stipulated that Fusco Corporation is the manager of the mall located on Petitioner's property and further that Fusco is the owner of all improvements on the property. Further, Cineplex-Odeon has leased the theater located on the subject property and has renovated and expanded it from two to five movie theaters. Finally, Michael Johnson was employed by Cineplex-Odeon to install the changeable message sign which is the subject of this variance. The second message sign which is sought by this variance would be located 350 feet from Missouri Avenue, which runs north and south in front of the subject property. Specifically, it will be located in the front wall of the theaters next to the ticket counter, and will be 16 feet long by 4.4 feet high. The sign would actually be a display case, 6 inches deep, with five individual poster display cases, which would be used to display coming attraction posters. Each display case would have a hinged glass door, through which the poster could be seen. Coming attraction posters are 2 feet long by 3.3 feet high. The 6 inch depth of the display case extends equally into, and protrudes out of, the front wall of the theater. Petitioner has not established that a hardship would exist if this variance is not approved. Coming attraction posters can be, and in fact are, displayed in the theater lobby. During the renovation of the theater, the front wall could have been removed and a window installed to allow viewing of the lobby posters from outside the theater. Finally, the existing sign on the property could be used to advertise coming attractions, as well as movies which are currently playing. The display case for which this variance is sought on behalf of Petitioner is a "changeable message sign," as that term is used in Section 134.011(a), Land Development Code, since it would be a graphic communication or device which would be primarily used to convey information or advertise and would also be prominently visible from outside the theater.
Findings Of Fact In 1984 Lieselotte Wirschint and her husband purchased the subject property located at Lots 14 and 15, Bidwell Oak Wood Additions otherwise identified as 606-608 North Ft. Harrison Avenues, Clearwater, Florida. This purchase was conditioned on their obtaining approval of a special exception for an automotive repair shop on the subject property. The Wirschints intended to relocate their business known as International Automotive, Inc.a Petitioner herein, to the subject property. As of February 6, 1986, ownership of said property is in the name of Petitioner. The subject property is in a "CO" zoning district (general commercial). An automotive service facility is not a permitted use in a "CO" zoned are,; and therefore conditional use approval must be obtained. Petitioner applied for conditional use approval on or about February 11, 1986 and on March 4, 1986 the Planning and Zoning Board disapproved Petitioner's application for conditional use approval. Paula Harvey, Planning Directors recommended disapproval because her review of the application indicated the proposed use would be incompatible with the surrounding neighborhood; traffic engineering concerns about an apparent lack of adequate parking on site, and her concern about noise that would be caused by the proposed use. The neighborhood around the subject property consists of mixed uses. To the west and south are residential uses, to the north there is a similar auto service facility, and across Ft. Harrison Avenue there is an auto tire store. There are also commercial office and special care properties, a funeral home and a school in the surrounding neighborhood. No buffer exists between the residential areas and the subject property. The City of Clearwater requires an auto service facility to have four parking spaces for each service bays plus one parking space for every two employees. The service bays themselves do not count as a parking space. Although a rough sketch of the site was provided to city staff by Peter E. Mangano on behalf of Petitioner, it was not a part of Petitioner's application and was not provided to Paula Harvey or the Planning and Zoning Board. No plans or specifications were formally submitted with this application. In any event, the rough sketch shows only ten parking spaces and three service bays. Petitioner has two employees. With three service bays and two employees, the Petitioner would have to provide thirteen parking spaces to comply with Respondent's parking space requirements. Thus, Petitioner has not demonstrated that its application or supplemental rough sketch provides the required spaces for parking. Petitioner proposes to construct a concrete structure on the subject property, with concrete floor. Air wrenches would be used in the proposed business, and service bay doors will normally be open between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Fridays when the business would be open. Petitioner obtained a "special exception" in 1984 to operate an auto service facility on this site and an extension was granted until October 25, 1985. However, Petitioner never acted under the "special exception" and it expired prior to this application for conditioned use approval. The current Land Development Code for the City of Clearwater took effect October 13, 1985 and has replaced the category of "special exception" with "conditional use," for which the Petitioner applied on or about February 11, 1986.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security illegally rejected Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive.
Findings Of Fact Fred Boozer, Sr., (Boozer), the Petitioner, owns Boozer Properties, a family business which includes a building at 2235 South Babcock Street, Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. The building is currently occupied by staff of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security (LES) and other tenants. In south Brevard, LES staff also occupies another building in Palm Bay. Because of staff expansion and the need to co-locate its offices, LES issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Lease No. 540:0904 on January 28, 1992. The RFP had been previously advertised but was successfully challenged on issues unrelated to the issues in this proceeding. The January 1992 RFP sought approximately 11,474 to 11,818 square feet of office space. The RFP also specified that 95 off-street parking spaces be provided for the exclusive use of LES employees and clients. The spaces were to be suitably paved and lined, and under the control of the bidder. The RFP advertised a pre-proposal conference on February 4, 1992. No bidder attended, and no objections to the RFP were filed. Six responses were received on the February 28th deadline, one of which was immediately determined to be nonresponsive. The remaining bid proposals were evaluated, and Boozer's bid, offering his Babcock Street site, and 95 parking spaces, received the highest points from the evaluation committee. During a recent LES bidding process for office space in West Palm Beach, a problem arose with a bidder's ability to provide the required parking spaces. Cognizant of this, the LES leasing manager contacted the City of Melbourne to determine whether the apparent bid winner, Boozer, could meet his obligation to provide 95 spaces. The written response dated March 20, 1992, from Dominic Mauriello, a Melbourne city planner, provides his estimation that, for the various uses in the Babcock Street building, 207 parking spaces would be required. The memo states that a site plan on file at the city planning office reflects that there are 165 spaces. The site plan attached to Boozer's bid proposal submitted to LES indicates that 175 spaces are available. LES staff person, Lynne Mobley, telephoned Fred Boozer on March 24, 1992, informing him of the memorandum from the city. He responded with a request that he be allowed twenty-four hours to provide additional information. By March 27, 1992, the LES leasing office had not received further information from Boozer. The RFP had advertised a 30-day deadline for the bid award, which deadline fell on a weekend. The agency considered that it needed to make the award on Friday, the 27th. After contacting the City of Palm Bay to assure that the next highest rated response could deliver the requisite parking spaces, a letter was sent notifying Woodlake S.W. No. 1, Ltd., (Woodlake) of its award. In a letter dated March 27, 1992, LES notified Boozer that its bid was determined nonresponsive based on the outcome of investigation and consultation with the city regarding his inability to produce the required 95 exclusive spaces. In the meantime, Fred Boozer had contacted Peggy Bray, the City's Planning and Zoning Administrator, who provided an amended estimation stating that 190 spaces would be required for the Babcock Street site, and that the site currently includes 184 parking spaces. Ms. Bray's letter, dated March 27, 1992, states that in order to provide 95 spaces for the Department of Labor, 1800 square feet of office space would need to remain vacant. The Bray letter was immediately sent by facsimile transmission to LES, and was received the afternoon of March 27th, after the award and rejection notices were sent. Boozer's building is approximately 39,000 square feet. Several tenants are month to month lessees, and another tenant is expected to move prior to the beginning of the LES lease term. Boozer is willing to keep vacant the 1800 square feet and contemplated that necessity when he submitted his bid proposal. He did not include this agreement in his written bid response, but neither did LES specifically ask, either in the bid form or at the time of the committee's site walk-through prior to the bid award. Boozer contends that he responded on the bid proposal that he would provide 95 exclusive spaces and he remains willing to provide those spaces. At hearing, Boozer disclosed that 20 additional parking spaces are located adjacent to the subject property and are available for use by HRS' County Health Services, another tenant in the Babcock Street building. The spaces would reduce by 20 the spaces required by the city code, but their existence was not disclosed in the bid proposal as they are not part of the attached site plan. Boozer's onsite parking spaces range from one-half to one foot short of the eleven-feet width required by the city code. No evidence was presented with regard to any pending or contemplated enforcement action, and LES did not base its decision on this defect. LES did base its decision on a good-faith reliance on the communication by a member of the City of Melbourne planning staff. Even when that initial communication was corrected by the planning administrator, the number of spaces available were still less than needed for LES purposes and to comply with the City's code. LES did not anticipate, nor was it informed prior to bid award, of Boozer's ability and willingness to keep space vacant to comply with his commitment to provide 95 parking spaces to LES.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner's protest of intended bid award. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2372BID The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. Adopted in paragraphs 4 and 9. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Rejected as unnecessary. The testimony of Ms. Mobley is that she did not receive the message. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraphs 8 and 9. Adopted in paragraphs 10 and 13. Rejected as unnecessary. 10-13. Adopted in paragraph 11. Rejected as unsubstantiated by competent evidence. Adopted by implication in paragraph 5. Rejected as irrelevant, except as to Intervenor's spaces, which is adopted in paragraph 8. 1718. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in paragraph 3. 2. Adopted in paragraph 1. 3. Adopted in paragraph 2. 4-5. Adopted in paragraph 4. 6-7. Adopted in paragraph 5. 8. Adopted in paragraph 6. 9. Adopted in paragraph 7. 10-11. Adopted in paragraph 8. 12. Adopted in paragraph 10. 13. Adopted in paragraph 12. 14. Adopted in paragraph 9. Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-2. Adopted in substance in paragraph 3. 3. Rejected as unnecessary. 4-5. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 9. 15-16. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Preliminary Statement. 19-28. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard M. Swerbilow, Esquire Post Office Box 541271 Merritt Island, FL 32954-1271 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, FL 32399-2189 Jack Spira, Esquire 5205 Babcock Street N.E. Palm Bay, FL 32905 Alan Taylor Elizabethan Development Corporation 245 Avenue O S.W. Winter Haven, FL 33880 Frank Scruggs, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent Department acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally or dishonestly in making a decision to award Central Florida Legal Services, Inc., the Intervenor, a bid concerning a proposed contract to enter into Lease No. 800:0045. Embodied within that general issue are questions involving whether the Petitioner, Robert Allan Weinberg's (Weinberg) response to the Department's Invitation to Bid (ITB) was responsive, was the lowest and best bid and whether the Intervenor's bid was responsive to the ITB and was the lowest and best bid. Finally, it must be determined whether the Department properly evaluated the bid proposals in accordance with legally-acceptable, competitive bidding principles, in an honest and non-arbitrary fashion.
Findings Of Fact This dispute arose upon the Department electing to seek office space for personnel of its District 12, in Daytona Beach, Florida. After considering the type and nature of the facilities it needed, the Department ultimately published a set of specifications for the desired facility in an ITB. The ITB included detailed instructions for preparation and submittal of bids and a relevant form. A pre-bid conference was conducted and thereafter, three vendors submitted bids. One proposal was determined by the Department to be non- responsive because the amount of space contained in the bid proposed by that vendor did not meet the Department's specifications contained in the ITB. That agency decision was not contested. The bid submitted by the Intervenor, as well as the Petitioner, were both determined to be responsive by the Department. After evaluating the proposals based upon criteria contained in the ITB, the Department ultimately determined that the lowest, best and most responsive bid was that submitted by the Intervenor. It notified the bidders of its decision to award the subject bid to the Intervenor, and the Petitioner filed a protest. A formal written protest was timely filed, initiating this proceeding. The issues raised by the parties, concerning the relative responsiveness of the two bids, revolve around the question of adequate parking, the status of existing tenants in the buildings, a consideration required by the terms of the ITB, the question of adequacy of "dry and measurable" space, the question of "location" (including building appearance, appearance of the property, the character of the neighborhood, security issues, design or layout of the proposed space, and provision for future expansion). Petitioner's Responsiveness The Petitioner's response to the ITB is deficient in terms of provisions for parking, as well as concerning the disclosure of the status of existing tenants in the Petitioner's building. The parking facilities offered by the Petitioner do not meet the requirements of the ITB. The ITB requires that 60 parking spaces be available for the exclusive use of the Department. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Item 21 in evidence (the ITB) provides: For this facility, the Department has determined that a minimum of 60 parking spaces are required to meet its needs. Its parking is to be provided as part of a lease cost to the department. The lessor will grant to the lessee an exclusive right to use 60 parking spaces. Lessor shall submit with this bid submittal a letter certifying that the lessor agrees to the requested number of parking spaces on site, states the number of parking spaces per square foot of space as required by the local zoning jurisdiction and provides a site plan of the parking lot identifying the number of parking spaces assigned to specific other tenants. The purpose of this submittal is to assure parking spaces conform to local jurisdiction requirements of number and size, and that the number of parking spaces requested in this invitation can be achieved without infringing on or combining with the parking requirement of other tenants (emphasis contained in original document). The Petitioner's bid submittal does not show spaces assigned to specific other tenants, as required by the ITB, and does not state the number of parking spaces per square foot of space required by the local zoning jurisdiction, which is the City of Daytona Beach, Florida. The Petitioner proposes to house the Department in two sections of an existing building. Those sections are presently occupied by other tenants. Other space within the building is also presently occupied and will continue to be occupied, even if the Department decides to lease the Petitioner's space at issue. The Petitioner's site plan shows that it has 92 spaces available to serve tenants in that building located on the building site. In addition to those spaces, the Petitioner proposes to use eight (8) additional spaces located off-site. Certain space in the Petitioner's proposed building is presently leased to the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). That lease will remain in effect even if the Petitioner leases the space at issue to the Department. Under that HRS lease, 29 spaces are committed to HRS on an exclusive basis, with six (6) other spaces on a non-exclusive basis. There is additional office space in the building presently occupied by private businesses, which totals 4,470 square feet. Under the City of Daytona Beach Code, the parking requirement for 4,470 square feet of commercial office space, in a building the size of the Petitioner's is 16 spaces. The eight (8) parking spaces off the building site, proposed to be used by the Petitioner, are adjacent to and serve an existing building that also houses a private business. That building has 16 total parking spaces, including the eight (8) which the Petitioner is proposing to allocate to the agency, if the bid is awarded. The building contains 3,900 square feet. Under the City of Daytona Beach Code, it must have a minimum of 14 parking spaces for that square footage. If the Petitioner leased space to the Respondent, its total parking space requirement to serve all of its tenants, including the proposed office space, under the City of Daytona Beach Code, would be 125 spaces. Eighty-nine (89) of those spaces would be for the exclusive use of the Respondent and HRS. The Petitioner's site plan, however, reveals that only 108 spaces are available, including the spaces at the off-site location. Additionally, the existing parking spaces of the Petitioner, designed to serve handicapped persons, do not conform to the current City of Daytona Beach Code. Handicapped parking spaces are required by that Code to be 12 feet wide, with an additional five feet provided for access of handicapped persons. In order to meet this dimensional requirement, the Petitioner's need for parking spaces to accommodate all tenants, will increase by four (4) spaces. He will need a total of 129 spaces to accommodate all tenants, including the Department, should the bid be awarded. He has only 108 spaces available. Mr. Weinberg testified on behalf of the Petitioner, to the effect that the parking lot could be re-configured in order to gain 13 more spaces. This did not include the four additional spaces that would be needed to properly accommodate the handicapped parking spaces to the requirements of the City of Daytona Beach Code. The Petitioner's bid submittal plan, however, does not reflect any site plan involving re-configuration of the parking area. Moreover, it was not established that the reconfiguration proposed by the Petitioner can be accomplished under the mandates of the City of Daytona Beach Code. If it could, the Petitioner would still not have sufficient spaces to meet the requirements in the ITB, as well as the requirements of existing tenant leases and code requirements, concerning parking spaces for relevant amounts of building square footage allocated to the various tenants. The Petitioner's bid also does not meet the criteria of the ITB containing the status of existing tenants. The ITB requires that vendors provide information regarding the rights of existing tenants, including written documentation regarding their status, as that relates to the availability and the time of availability of the space proposed in the bid. The ITB provides, in pertinent part: Existing tenants: If the offered space or any portion thereof (including parking areas) is at present occupied or will be covered by an active lease(s) at the stated availability date, written documentation by the tenant indicating acknowledg- ment of the lessor's bid and ability to vacate premises by the proposed date or earlier to allow lessor's renovation work to be completed must be included with the bid submittal. If the existing tenants are on a month-to-month lease, the bidder must provide a letter of explanation of this condition. There are two existing tenants in the space which the Petitioner has proposed to lease to the Department. The Petitioner offered no written documentation from either tenant indicating acknowledgment of the bid and lessee's ability to vacate the premises. The only information which the Petitioner provided was for one of those tenants and that was not signed nor acknowledged by the tenant. No information was provided, as required by the ITB, as to the other tenant. Intervenor's Responsiveness The Petitioner maintains that the Intervenor's proposed office space was not "dry and measurable" at the time the bid was submitted by the Intervenor. The Petitioner also contends that the Intervenor's bid does not meet the parking facility requirements of the ITB. The criteria in the ITB require a definition of "dry and measurable" space available and also contain provisions allowing the vendor time to complete the facility through renovation, etc., subsequent to the bid submittal, but prior to the occupancy time specified in the ITB. The ITB provides, on page 2 in the second paragraph: Space to be made available: 07-01-95 or within 182 days after notification of bid award, whichever occurs last. Under the heading, "Handicap Standards and Alterations", at page 4 of the ITB, the ITB provides: Lessor agrees that the demised premises now conform, or that, prior to lessee's occupancy, said premises shall, at the lessor's expense, be brought into conformance with the require- ments of Section 553.48, F.S., providing requirements for the physical handicapped and the requirement of public law 101-336, July 26, 1990, known as the "American With Disabil- ities Act of 1990.". . . The proposed space must be in an existing building or a building which is to be complete by July 1, 1995, and is 50 percent complete on the bid deadline submission. To be considered as existing, the entire space must be dry, fully enclosed, and capable of being physically measured, to determine net rentable square footage, at the time of bid submittal. Reno- vations to bring the facility into compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local codes and regulations and/or to meet with desired arrangements are permitted, if carried out in accordance with prescribed procedures: Bids offering multi-story or multi-level buildings must have all stories serviced by an elevator which meets the requirements of DCA accessibility manual . . . (emphasis in original). The Intervenor's proposal meets these requirements. The facility proposed by the intervenor is in an existing building. "Dry and measurable" means that the facility has exterior walls and a roof and is at least enclosed enough as to not to become wet or to be wide open to the elements. The Intervenor's proposed building has exterior walls and a roof and is enclosed with windows and doors secured so that it would not get wet or be open. There is ample space within the Intervenor's existing building to determine the net rentable square footage and to ensure that the square footage being offered meets the bid specifications. In fact, measurement was undertaken by the Intervenor's representative, including its architect, and the space and site plans were made available to representatives of the Department, who were in a position to make the same measurements when they conducted a site visit of the premises. The only part of the facility that was not dry and measurable at the time of bid submission was a proposed new elevator, and entrance space related to the elevator, which the Petitioner has proposed to construct in order to meet the "Americans with Disabilities Act" requirements. The elevator and related space needed to accommodate entrances into the second floor of the building by the elevator were not dry and measurable at the time of bid submission and were not required to be by the terms of the ITB. The express provisions of the ITB allow vendors to renovate facilities in order to meet government regulations "prior to lessee's occupancy." The vendor is not required to have the space ready for occupancy until July 1, 1995, or 182 days after notice of award, whichever is later. The Intervenor has committed to complying with these requirements of the ITB and will be subject to a penalty if it does not, should the bid be awarded. Thus, if the vendor is offering a multi-story building, it is not required to have a handicapped accessible elevator already in place and operating at the time of bid submission. It simply must be installed prior to the lessee's occupancy. Therefore, under the terms of the ITB referenced above, the elevator-related space would not be required to be part of the dry and measurable space computation submitted with the bid. The Department agreed at the pre-bid conference that the 60 exclusive parking spaces it would require, as specified in the ITB, would meet the ITB criteria if within 1,000 feet of the building. In response to this criteria, the Intervenor offered most of the required spaces at the site of its building. It also offered to make spaces available at three other locations as alternatives. It offered to make 48 of the 50 spaces it has on its own building site exclusively available to the Department and also offered 21 parking spaces on "Lot B" or "Parcel B", as delineated in its bid. This lot is within 1,000 feet of the Intervenor's building, which was offered in the bid, and is approximately 350 feet away. It can accommodate the 21 parking spaces, but will necessitate a variance from zoning requirements, in order to place 21 spaces on Lot B. The ITB allows bidders 30 days from the date of any award to deal with such zoning issues and resolving any zoning problems. If this lot is used, the Intervenor will seek a variance in order to be able to put the 21 spaces on the lot. The Intervenor does not yet have the variance, but there is no evidence of record that would establish that it cannot be obtained from the City zoning authority. The Intervenor has an option to lease Lot B, where the 21 parking spaces would be located, and, therefore, has sufficient control of it. Another alternative offered by the Intervenor is designated as "Lot A" or "Parcel A" in its bid. This lot is across an existing municipal parking lot from the Intervenor's facility being offered. It includes 69 parking spaces and is within 1,000 feet of the Intervenor's building. The Intervenor has secured this facility through an option to purchase. The only remaining step in order to purchase the lot would be for the Intervenor's board, responsible for the operation of its programs, including the building, to execute the option it has already entered into. This also constitutes sufficient control over the property to comply with the terms of the ITB. This parking lot and the spaces thereon meet the requirements of the ITB. The third nearby lot, available to the Intervenor, is designated as "Parcel D" or "Lot D" on the Intervenor's bid documents. Additional spaces could be made available on this lot. It is 1,070 feet away from the Intervenor's building, however, and thus does not meet the 1,000-foot requirement set by the Department at the bidders' conference, in its interpretation of the specification concerning parking. The demonstrated availability of the other parking areas and spaces, however, establishes that the Intervenor has sufficient parking available, within the required distance, to meet the terms of the ITB. Moreover, the Intervenor's building will house the office of the Intervenor, as well as the office of the Respondent/Department. The Intervenor's building is located directly adjacent to a free municipal parking lot. This lot would be available to employees of the Intervenor, as well as Intervenor's visitors, and as well as to employees of the Department and the Department's visitors, who, for whatever reason, might not use the exclusive dedicated parking spaces. Because it is in a downtown development area, the Intervenor is not required, under the City of Daytona Beach Zoning Code, to provide any parking for its building. Bid Evaluations The Department received bid responses from the two parties and proceeded to evaluate them. The part of the evaluation based upon prices bid by the vendors was conducted by Department personnel in Tallahassee. The part of the evaluation based upon more subjective factors was conducted by three Department employees in Daytona Beach, who ultimately have to work in the facilities that the Department acquires through this procurement process. The price evaluation was undertaken with the assistance of a representative of the Department of Management Services, who is familiar with statutory and rule requirements for a proper evaluation of bids. Price was apportioned 40 of the total 100 points available in the bid evaluation process. The price evaluation resulted in the Petitioner receiving 40 points because it had the lowest price of the two subject bids. The Intervenor received 33 points for the price criterion. The three Department employees designated to evaluate the other aspects of the bid proposals conducted site visits at each of the vendors' facilities. During the site visits, the evaluators walked through the parking lots and counted the spaces, checked the exit door locations, inquired about heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning facilities and equipment, evaluated the condition of the buildings and how they were being maintained, checked security lighting and other security issues, checked on placement of the lobbies and how offices would be positioned, observed the availability of natural lighting and surveyed neighborhood conditions. Each evaluator then conducted evaluations based upon factors other than cost, without consulting each other. They used an evaluation form that relates to various criteria which come directly from the ITB. Upon completion of the evaluations, the completed forms were forwarded to the Tallahassee office of the Department. The evaluation criteria allow three categories of evaluation under the general heading of "location". Ten points are allowed as a maximum in the category of "availability and frequency of public transportation within the proximity of the space being offered." The evaluators gave the Petitioner five, six and five points, respectively, for its response to this category. They gave the Intervenor seven, six and five points. Both facilities have public bus stops near the building which provide good access to public transportation. The Intervenor's facility is located within a few blocks of the transit transfer station, which offers the advantage that bus passengers will be able to get to the Intervenor's facility without the need of a transfer which could save them considerable time. The Department of Juvenile Justice is the type of state agency which has a great deal of business with clients and their family members of a lower-income status, who might frequently have to rely on public transportation. Nine (9) points are allowed in the evaluation criteria for the category of "appearance of the building property and neighborhood of the property being offered," under the general heading of "location". The Petitioner was accorded three, five and four points, respectively, for its response to this category. The Intervenor was given nine, eight and seven points. This is admittedly a subjective criteria. The appearance of a facility and its surrounding area can make a difference in the morale and productivity of the working staff, as well as the attitude of visitors to the facility. The Intervenor's building is in a renovated, historic structure located in the historic preservation section of the downtown area of Daytona Beach. It has a great deal of aesthetic appeal and has been the subject of several newspaper articles noting the attractiveness and functionality of the renovation. The Petitioner's structure, on the other hand, although well-landscaped and maintained, is a metal, prefabricated building, not as aesthetically interesting or pleasing. It is also located adjacent to higher crime areas in the City. The evaluation criteria allow for four points for the category of "security issues posed by the building and surrounding area" under the category of "location". The evaluators scored the Petitioner's response at two, two and one points for this subject. They scored the Intervenor's bid three, three and two points for the same category. It is apparent that the Petitioner's facility is located in an area which is somewhat crime-prone. While the evidence does not reflect any criminal activity on the Petitioner's site itself, at least one evaluator was intimately and personally familiar with the neighborhood and the criminal problems occurring there. This familiarity was confirmed by Department personnel from police reports showing the area to be a high-crime area. Under the "facility" heading, the evaluation criteria and form allows points for four different categories. It allows 15 points for the category of "susceptibility of the design and space being offered to good utilization by differing segments of the Department." The evaluators gave the Petitioner seven, five and six points for their three evaluations of this response. They scored the Intervenor's submittal at 15, 12 and 10 points. The Intervenor's proposal offers a building that has windows on all four sides with abundant natural lighting, good visibility, and contiguous space. The Intervenor's facility can be very easily renovated into appropriate space for the different segments of the Department. The Petitioner's facility, on the other hand, has few windows, offers limited natural lighting and is not easily visible from the street. Additionally, the Petitioner offered divided space within its building so that some segments of the Department's work force would be physically separated from one another, with access between the two divided areas of office space being only obtainable by going outside the building and then in another door of another part of the building. The evaluation form also allows 10 points for the category of "susceptibility of the building parking area and property as a whole for future expansion." The Petitioner received a score of three, five and five points for this category by the evaluators. The Intervenor's response received seven, eight and three points for the same category. The Petitioner's facility offers no opportunity for expansion unless existing lessees leave the building. There is no room for additional parking for expansion purposes. The Intervenor's facility has space on the first floor not being leased at all at the present time and a portion of the third floor could be enclosed to provide additional space. Further, since the only other tenant is the lessor, there is a prospect that the lessor itself might move to other facilities in order to accommodate Department expansion. Lot A offers considerably more parking spaces than the Department or other tenants of the Intervenor's building need. Furthermore, the Intervenor's facility is located adjacent to a free, municipal parking lot which is only moderately used. Under the same general heading of "facility", the evaluation form and criteria allows ten points for the category of "having all the square footage in a single building will earn more points than square footage offered in more than one building." The Petitioner is offering space in a single building. However, the Petitioner's space would be divided so that the Department's office space would not all be contiguous, and personnel would have to go from one side of the building to the offices on the other side of the building only by going outside the building. This is functionally akin to space being in more than one building. Thus, the Petitioner's proposal would have some of the disadvantages of being like a proposal for more than one building. Workers would not be as readily able to assist one another in dealing with work loads or as easily undertaking many of the work activities requiring them to communicate with each other in each other's physical presence as easily as in a contiguous set of offices located in a single building. It is true that the Petitioner is proposing all of its space in one building. Thus, it meets the ITB criteria in this regard. It also can be argued as the Department evaluators found, that because the space functions akin to being in separate buildings, because of the separation of the offered office spaces, it should be evaluated as being somewhat analogous to space located in two separate buildings. Thus, although both bids were responsive to the ITB in terms of offering space physically and technically within a single building, it was not arbitrary for the evaluators to accord more weight to the Intervenor's response, since all of the office offered by the Intervenor is contiguous space in the same building. However, even if the evaluators had or should have ranked both bids equally under this "single building criteria", that alone would not alter the evaluators' result that the Intervenor's bid and facility was the best response to the agency's needs expressed in the ITB. The evaluation criteria and form also allows a maximum of two points to be accorded to the category of "if space is offered in more than one building, are the buildings connected by overhangs and sidewalks," under the heading of "facility". The space offered by both bidders, the Petitioner and the Intervenor, is clearly in a single building. All of the evaluators gave both parties an equal two points for this category which shows a lack of arbitrariness in the bid evaluation process. When the evaluation was complete, the Intervenor was accorded scores of 86, 82 and 72 points by the three evaluators. Two of the evaluators rated the Intervenor significantly higher, and the third favored the Petitioner's proposal by a single point. The total score given the Petitioner, taking into account its lower price, was 67, 71 and 73 points by the three evaluators. The total score accorded the parties by the three evaluators shows that the Intervenor's proposal was accorded a substantial advantage by two of the three evaluators. The evaluator scores were independently determined but were still generally consistent with each other. They were based upon logic and not merely upon a review of plans, figures, and written responses but also upon a detailed view of the two properties, parking spaces, and the like. Thus, it is determined that the scoring was consistent, logical, and not shown to be unreasonable under the circumstances. Based upon the scores by the evaluators, the Department determined that the Intervenor's bid was the lowest, best and most responsive and elected to award the lease to the Intervenor. There has been no preponderant proof offered to show that the decision or any of the evaluation decisions on individual categories, leading up to the ultimate score and decision to award, were fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal, or dishonest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Juvenile Justice dismissing the Petitioner's formal protest because the Petitioner lacks standing to initiate the subject proceeding and because the Petitioner has failed to establish that the determination to award a contract to the Intervenor was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1736BID Respondent's and Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact The proposed findings of fact of these two parties are accepted to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the findings of fact made by the Hearing Officer. Certain proposed findings of fact accepted as true are immaterial to the resolution of the issues presented. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact A-F. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter, and as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record. Accepted. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive. J.(1-3) Rejected, as not being entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record, and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. K-L. Rejected, as not being entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record, and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. M. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive. N.(1-6- Subparts) Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record, and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record, and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Mr. Robert Allan Weinberg RW Custom Builders, Inc. 955 Orange Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Scott C. Wright, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 G. Steven Pfeiffer, Esquire APGAR, PELHAM, ET AL. 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a development order (Resolution No. 233- 1991) issued by Monroe County on June 26, 1991, to Key Largo Associates, Ltd., is inconsistent with Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Regulations, and/or whether it violates a Joint Stipulation of Settlement previously executed by the Department of Community Affairs ("DCA"), Monroe County (the "County"), and Key Largo Associates, Ltd.'s predecessor in title.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: DCA is the State Land Planning Agency charged with the responsibility to administer the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Monroe County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and is responsible for issuing development orders for development in unincorporated Monroe County. The County issued the Development Order which is the subject of this proceeding. Most of Monroe County, including the subject property, is within the Florida Keys Area of Critical Concern as designated in Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes. Development orders issued by a local government agency for an area of critical state concern are subject to review by DCA pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes. On April 8, 1985, DCA, Monroe County, and I. D. Properties, the previous owner of the subject property, executed a Joint Stipulation of Settlement regarding DCA's challenge to a prior development order for the subject property. That Joint Stipulation of Settlement required the preservation of certain tropical hammock on the site including Paradise Tree hammock. After executing the Joint Stipulation of Settlement, I. D. Properties quitclaimed its interest in the site to Key Largo Associates, Ltd. Key Largo Associates, Ltd. proceeded to seek approval from Monroe County to develop the property inconsistent with the terms of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement. Those efforts resulted in the Development Order which is the subject of this case. The County Commission issued the Development Order granting a major conditional use permit for the Project to Key Largo Associates, Ltd., after being ordered to do so by the Circuit Court for Monroe County. The Development Order purports to authorize the complete elimination of existing tropical hammock on the site including the Paradise Tree hammock. The Development Order is inconsistent with the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and the Land Development Regulations adopted thereunder. In addition, the Development Order is contrary to the terms of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order which sustains the appeal filed by the Department of Community Affairs and which rescinds the issuance of Monroe County Resolution No. 233- 1991. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of August 1993. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrell K. Arline Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Betty J. Steffens, Esquire McFarlain, Wiley, Cassedy & Jones Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2174 Blackwater Associates Partnership 7225 S.W. 108th Terrace Miami, Florida 33156 Ray Parker Parker Real Estate 2028 North Dixie Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33305 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 G. Steven Pfeiffer General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 David K. Coburn, Secretary FLWAC Exec. Office of the Governor 311 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether a certain development order (permit) issued by Monroe County to George and Judy Sands, as owners, and PG Construction, Inc., as contractor, for the construction of a single family dwelling unit is consistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations.
Findings Of Fact The parties Respondents, George and Judy Sands (Sands), are the owners of Lot 15, Tropical Coral Reef Estates, Plantation Key, Monroe County, Florida; a property located within that part of Monroe County designated as an area of critical state concern, and upon which they have received a development order (permit) from Monroe County to construct a single family dwelling unit. Respondent, PG Construction, Inc., is the contractor that applied for the permit on behalf of the Sands. Respondent, Monroe County (Monroe County), is a local government within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern designated by Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for the implementation of, and the issuance of development orders that are consistent with, the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations, as approved and adopted in Chapters 9J-14 and 28-20, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner, Department of Community Affairs (Department), is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and all rules promulgated there-under. Sections 380.031(18) and 380.032(1), Florida Statutes. Here, the Department has filed a timely appeal to the issuance of the subject permit, and contends that construction of the dwelling unit is inconsistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations since it would exceed allowable density limitations. Background The subject property is approximately .45 acres, and was purchased by the Sands in January 1990. At the time of purchase, the property supported a concrete block residence, two bedrooms and one bath, of approximately 900 square feet and a wood-frame residence, two bedrooms and one bath, of approximately 625 square feet. Both buildings were constructed in 1948 and were, pertinent to this case, used by the Sands' predecessor in title as a principal residence prior to and as of the effective date of the Monroe County land development regulations (September 15, 1986). Following their acquisition of the property, the Sands undertook to upgrade both structures with the intention of offering use of the residences to employees of their business, which was located across the street from the property. 2/ Ultimately, however, the Sands decided to replace, rather than remodel, the wood-frame residence, and employed David de Haas-Grosseck (de Haas), a consultant and designer of residential properties, who was of the opinion that such replacement was permissible under the provisions of Section 9.5-268, Monroe County land development regulations (MCLDR), discussed infra, to attend the necessary details. 3/ On February 5, 1991, de Haas, on behalf of the Sands, filed an application with Monroe County for a building permit to construct a modular single family residence upon the property. Thereafter, the County advised de Haas that since the wood-frame structure was to be removed a demolition permit would also be required. Accordingly, on February 11, 1991, de Haas applied for a demolition permit to remove such structure. The demolition permit (permit number 9130002904) was issued by the County on February 11, 1991, and rendered to the Department on February 13, 1991. The building permit (permit number 9130002861) was issued by the County on February 25, 1991, and rendered to the Department on February 27, 1991. Under existing law, such permits were not effective until expiration of the time within which the Department was authorized to appeal their issuance, to-wit: 45 days after they were rendered to the Department. The Sands, having been expressly so advised by de Haas, were acutely aware of the limitations on their building permit. Consequently, the Sands requested a waiver of the Department's appeal period. By letter of March 21, 1991, the Department denied such request and stated: Dear Mr. Sands: Monroe County issued you permit number 913-2861 on February 25, 1991. The DCA received the permit on February 27, 1991. Therefore, the Department's 45-day appeal period expires on April 13, 1991. Subsequent to the issuance of the permit by the County, you requested a waiver of the DCA's appeal period. At this time, the Department declines to issue you the waiver. Changes or additional information may be needed to meet County Code requirements. Our concerns include that the proposed development exceeds the allowable density in a SS zoning district. DCA staff will continue to review your plans and the permit, which may warrant action by the Department . . . . Notwithstanding the Sands' express knowledge that their building permit was not effective, as well as express advice from the Department that it had concerns regarding the propriety of such development, the Sands, following the expiration of the Department's appeal period on their demolition permit, demolished the wood-frame structure on or about April 4, 1991. Thereafter, by petition filed with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission on April 12, 1991, the Department timely challenged the propriety of Monroe County's decision to issue the building permit. 4/ The Sands, notwithstanding express knowledge that their building permit was not effective pending the Department's appeal, proceeded to construct the modular unit on the property. Such unit is approximately 650 square feet in size, excluding the two enclosed screen porches which measure 10' X 20' each, and complies with current building code requirements. The Sands' decision to construct such unit pending appeal was voluntary, and they proceeded with such construction at their own risk considering the nature of this proceeding. Consistency of the building permit with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations The Sands property is located within what the Monroe County land development regulations (MCLDR) define as a sparsely settled residential land use district. The purpose of such district is stated in Section 9.5-209, MCLDR, to be as follows: . . . to establish areas of low density residential development where the predominate character is native or open space lands. Consistent with the purpose of such land use district, the Monroe County land development regulations permit, as of right, only the following uses: Detached residential dwellings; Beekeeping; Home occupations -- Special use permit requiring a public hearing; Accessory uses. Section 9.5-238(a), MCLDR. Moreover, consistent with the purpose of the district, the density or intensity of development is limited by Section 9.5-261, MCLDR. Pertinent to this case, 9.5-261, MCLDR, addresses the issue of land use intensity or density, and provides: No structure or land in Monroe County shall hereafter be developed, used or occupied at an intensity or density greater than the standards set out in this division. . . . And, Section 9.5-262, MCLDR, establishes the maximum residential density in a sparsely settled residential land use district at .5 dwelling units per acre. Accordingly, a minimum of two acres is required under the Monroe County land development regulations to permit, as of right, one detached residential dwelling. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 9.5-262, MCLDR, the Monroe County land development regulations provide an exception to the density limitations otherwise imposed by such section for certain dwelling units existent on the effective date of the regulations. Pertinent to this case, Section 9.5-268, MCLDR, provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9.5-262 . . . the owners of land upon which a dwelling unit . . . used as a principal residence prior to the effective date of the plan was lawful on the effective date of this chapter shall be entitled to a density allocation of one (1) dwelling unit for each such unit in existence on the effective date of this chapter. Here, the Department and Monroe County disagree as to the proper interpretation of the foregoing provision. The Department interprets such provision to apply only to the owner of such residence on the effective date of the plan. Under such interpretation, the density benefits offered by Section 9.5-268, MCLDR, would be lost where, as here, such owner sold the property. In contrast, Monroe County interprets such provision to essentially establish an allowable density on the effective date of the plan, and to accord subsequent owners the benefit of such increased density allocation. 5/ Such interpretation, while not the only possible interpretation, is not inconsistent with the comprehensive plan or clearly erroneous, and therefore permissible. 6/ Accordingly, the subject permit is consistent with the Monroe County comprehensive plan and land development regulations. 7/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order affirming Monroe County's decision to issue building permit number 9130002861, and dismissing the appeal filed by the Department of Community Affairs. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of June 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June 1992.
Findings Of Fact Ramchandra Jakhotia and Rashmi Jakhotia, his wife, acquired the King Cole Motel at 401 East Shore Drive, Clearwater, Florida in 1983 and have owned the property since that time. At the time of acquisition and for some time prior thereto the property included a commercial marina with 22 slips. In 1985 the City of Clearwater revised its Development Code effective October 13, 1985 and, incident thereto, effective July 7, 1988, enacted Section 114.05, Live-Aboard Vessels as Ordinance 4597, Clearwater City Code. That enactment provided, in part, that: Prohibited; exceptions: It shall be unlawful for any person to moor any live-aboard vessel at any location within or upon the navigable waters in the City for any period of time in excess of seventy-two (72) hours, except as follows: At a marina facility for which conditional use approval has been obtained, or a marina facility in existence as of October 13, 1985 for which conditional use approval would otherwise be required;... In January 1986 a survey was taken of all marinas within the City of Clearwater to determine the number of live aboard vessels coming within the purview of the revised Development Code. At this survey eight live aboard vessels were occupying berths at the King Cole Motel marina and this was the number determined to be grandfathered for which no conditional use approval would be required. In 1988 King Cole Motel applied for conditional authorization to utilize 14 additional berths for live aboard vessels. This conditional use was approved subject to the applicant installing a pump-out facility and meeting the parking requirements. Although the parking requirements for a commercial marina, i.e., 0.5 parking space per slip, is the same as the parking requirement at marinas for live aboard vessels, the latter generally place a greater demand on parking spaces than does non-live aboard vessels. To change the approved use from commercial marina without live aboards to live aboards is a change in the use and requires conditional use approval. Before conditional use approval can be granted the applicant must comply with all code requirements, such as required parking spaces, at the time of the change in use. At the time Appellant acquired the King Cole Motel the 22 commercial slips were grandfathered as an authorized use without any parking being provided. Accordingly, as a 22-slip commercial marina Appellant did not have to provide parking. When the eight slips used for live aboards were counted in 1986 they too were grandfathered in without the need for parking spaces. However, when Appellant applied in 1988 for authorization to use 14 other slips for live aboard vessels, the code required the applicant to provide seven parking spaces. To his credit Appellant obtained the use of seven parking spaces down the road from the marina but those spaces were not contiguous to Appellants' marina as required by the code. Therefore, Appellants' use of the additional slips for live aboards did not meet the parking requirement in his conditional use approval. In 1992 Appellant applied for a variance of the seven parking spaces required to allow the use of these additional slips by live aboard vessels. This hearing was held before the Development Code Adjustment Board on February 11, 1993 and it is from the denial of this variance that this appeal is taken. The Board denied the variance requested because the Appellant failed to demonstrate that the standards established by Section 45.24 Land Development Code were met. In these proceedings Appellant presented no additional evidence to support the variances requested than was submitted to the Board.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Kayla and Eric Douglas in DOAH Case No. 89-6367 failed to appear or send a qualified representative on their behalf to formal hearing, and, accordingly, their petition is subject to dismissal, pursuant to Rule 221- 6.022 F.A.C. Applicant Ratkovic owns two adjacent rectangular-shaped pieces of property, Lots #5 and #6, located at 19 Magnolia Drive, within the city limits of St. Augustine, Florida. These lots are bounded on the north by Oceanway Street, a dirt road, and on the east by Magnolia Drive. The Ratkovic house is located on the lot which directly abuts Magnolia Drive (Lot #6). Lot #5 is immediately to the east of Lot.#6 and is separated from it by a ten-foot wide alleyway. Oceanway Street deadends into Salt Run, a Class III Water of the State, which is next to Lot #5. Lot #5 is 55 feet wide in a north-south direction and 82.5 feet long in an east-west direction. Lot #5 is completely within the landward extent of Salt Run. Lot #5 may be cnaracterized as a flat, intertidal sand beach and DER's jurisdiction with respect to it extends to the ordinary mean high water line. Salt Run is an embayment off of the Atlantic Ocean which, with the help of a concrete artificial groin, forms a cove in the vicinity of the proposed project. Water flow in the cove is serene enough to allow a tidal marsh to grow along parts of the shoreline of the cove, but there are still two areas of the cove in which no vegetation grows: waterward of Applicant's property and waterward of the property of Petitioners Steger (DOAH Case No. 89-6366). The Steger property is several lots south of the Applicant's property. Marine vegetation grows in the southeast quadrant of Lot #5 and to the north of Lot #5. The proposed project involves the placement of 19 pilings on 4'8" centers along the northern lot line of Lot #5. The proposed pilings would run on a line in the middle of the unvegetated area, approximately halfway between the two areas of tidal marsh growth, out to the waterward edge of Lot #5. 7. The Applicant desires a dock for Lot #5 and has already availed himself of the general permit provisions of Rule 17-312.808 F.A.C. The dock has not been constructed because he has been unable to obtain local approval for its construction. Respondents assert as a legal proposition that a 1,000 square foot (6 foot wide) piling-supported dock, if built on Lot #5, would be exempt from the requirement of obtaining a DER dredge and fill permit such as the one at issue here, and because of Respondents' assertion, it is one of Petitioners' concerns in this proceeding that the Applicant not be permitted to do by indirection that which he has been prohibited by local government (but not DER) from doing directly. However, that dock permit and those peripheral legal propositions need not be resolved in this proceeding for the reasons set out infra. The Applicant intends that the proposed pilings at issue here will serve as the northern support structure of his proposed dock, if local approval is eventually granted for the dock. However, without such local approval of his proposed dock, the Applicant's proposed pilings would still serve as a barrier to vehicular traffic which presently has unrestricted access across the beach and across his private property, Lot #5. The Applicant represented that he wants to install the pilings with or without the dock approval so as to prevent late night driving of cars on his beachfront property. Salt Run is full of docks, and this vicinity of Salt Run is the only area totally unobstructed by docks. This vicinity also has the only bottom area in Salt Run not encrusted with oyster or other bivalve shells. The only water quality standard to be impacted by the proposed project is turbidity. Turbidity results from the resuspension of bottom material and will occur briefly during the placement of the pilings. At the proposed project site, the bottom material is sand, which when resuspended, rapidly falls to the bottom and therefore has little environmental impact under the circumstances of this application. However, turbidity controls have been required by Specific Condition 4 of the DER Draft Permit. The foregoing factors assure that water quality standards will not be violated by the proposed pilings. The testimony of DER's agency representative, Jeremy Tyler, who was accepted as an expert in oceanography and the impacts of dredge and fill projects to wetlands and water quality, is accepted that because the proposed pilings will be located on a flat, intertidal sand beach, and because installation of the pilings requires appropriate turbidity controls, the placement of the proposed pilings will not generate turbidity sufficient to impact the tidal marsh, and, accordingly, their placement will not adversely affect the conservation of fish, wildlife, or their habitats. Similarly, it is found that fishing, marine productivity,- and the current conditions and relative value of functions being performed by the tidal marsh will not be adversely affected by the proposed project. The proposed project will not have any effects upon the public health, safety, or welfare, the property of others, or significant historical or archaeological resources. It will be permanent. The proposed project will not adversely affect the flow of water at the proposed site and will not cause harmful erosion or shoaling. Depending upon the time of the month, the time of the year, and the height of the tide, water could wash up to the landward side of Lot #5, or could leave the lot high and dry. Oceanway Street, the dirt road adjacent to the Applicant's property on the north, has historically been used by the neighbors and general public to drive down to Salt Run. These persons have used the cleared area between the tidal marsh sections described supra for wading, swimming, throwing of cast nets, and launching of boats and windsurfing boards. Because it is within the city limits, the area is also very attractive to those who just wish to stroll up the beach on a north-south tangent. In gaining access to the water of Salt Run, some persons have not differentiated between Lot #5, which is private property, and Oceanway Street. One reason for this lack of discernment seems to be that nearby Ingram Street, also a public access, is in such disrepair that prudent persons avoid it. Also, Applicant either built on Lot #6 or moved into the house on that lot only within the last few years, and while Lot #6 was formerly unoccupied, the neighbors and the public were free to walk dogs, moor and launch boats, and enjoy virtually all recreational activities in public areas and on Lot #5 with impunity. In essence, Lot #5 has been treated as a public beach. In the recent past, the Applicant's attempts to "run off" persons who have utilized his property in these ways have caused bad feelings in the neighborhood. Also, Lot #5 has been inadvertently used for recreation some of the time that it is covered with water, and this seems to be the source of some persons' confusion over where the Applicant's right to "run off" the public begins and ends; however, the evidence is insufficient to establish a public easement across Lot #5. If the proposed piling project were constructed, beach walkers, swimmers, or waders approaching one of the piles (and if local approval is obtained, ultimately the dock) might have to alter their course to avoid a collision. The 4'8" gap between pilings would allow this, but in the event a dock is installed, it might be more prudent to avoid the area altogether. Cast netters would have to alter their net throws so that their backswing or release would not intersect the position of a proposed piling and so that their nets would land along the line of the proposed pilings instead of on the pilings or dock. This could be done. Boaters and windsurfers, after placement of the proposed pilings, would have a far narrower area within which to launch and land their boats and boards. However, this narrowing would not preclude such launching or landing. Boats often start and end their journeys at docks, which, from a boat hull's perspective, are nothing more than a row of pilings. Windsurfing boards are approximately two feet at their widest. When a windsurfer capsizes in open water, he typically rights his board and starts anew. Here, if windsurfers do not wish to launch in the clear area remaining to the north of the last piling, which they could easily do, they would be able to walk their boards out to the last piling and start as they would in open water. The proposed pilings will make it more difficult to launch or land a windsurfing board, but it would not preclude such use of the water. There is also a public boat ramp at Lighthouse Park, the northern boundary of which is four blocks to the south and three blocks to the west of the proposed project site. Boaters or windsurfers who did not choose to use the end of Oceanway Street to obtain access to Salt Run would be able to use that location.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order Dismissing the Petition in DOAH Case No. 89-6367; Denying the Petitions in DOAH Case Nos. 89-6363, 89-6364, 89-6365, 89-6366, and 89-6368; and Granting the dredge and fill permit application as specifically conditioned by the Department of Environmental Regulation's Intent to Grant. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of June, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NOS. 89-6363, 89-6364, 89-6365 89-6366, 89-6367, 89-6368 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioners Stegers' PFOF filed May 22, 1990: Paragraph 1: Sentences 1, 3, and 4: Accepted as fact, however, the degree of obstruction, the significance of recreational values within the applicable statutory balancing test, and the legal implications of that balance as contained in the Recommended Order more accurately reflect the record as a whole. Sentence 2: Accepted as modified to more accurately reflect the record as a whole. Sentence 5: Rejected as unproved. See what was proved and what was speculated in FOF 9 and 11 and COL 11. Paragraph 2: Rejected as not proved. Respondent DER's PFOF filed May 22, 1990: 1-16 Accepted as modified to more accurately reflect the credible, competent, substantial evidence of record as a whole. To date, no other PFOF have been filed. COPIES FURNISHED: Judson and Annelle West 4 Lighthouse Avenue Anastasia Island St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Virginia Quill Myers Mary Susanna Myers 322 Ponce de Leon Avenue Anastasia Island St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Ronald Asner 37 Magnolia Drive Anastasia Island St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Dan and Sue Steger 25 Magnolia Drive Anastasia Island St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Kayla K. and Eric Douglas 69 Lighthouse Avenue Anastasia Island St. Augustine, Florida Mary H. Acebal 32084 E. V. Acebal 10 Lighthouse Avenue Anastasia Island St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Mr. Jack Ratkovic Post Office Box 4482 St. Augustine, Florida 32085 William H. Congdon Assistant General Counsel, DER Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
