The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a financial company that owns and services student loans. Petitioner is a black female. She was employed in Respondent’s Florida Loan Servicing Center (Service Center) on two separate occasions. The first time she worked for Respondent from September 1989 until September 1990. During that time, Petitioner did not experience anything that she felt was racial discrimination at the Service Center. Petitioner left her initial period of employment with Respondent by resigning and moving to South Florida. Petitioner subsequently returned to Panama City, Florida. Initially, she worked for the Bay County School Board. Thereafter, from July 2001 to November 2001, she returned to work as a Loan Origination Representative (LOR) for Respondent through a temporary agency, Kelly Services. In August 2001, Petitioner received a training evaluation, which indicated that Petitioner was meeting all expectations. In November 2001, Petitioner converted to a regular employee position with Respondent. Petitioner received her 90-day initial review in February 2002. According to her written evaluation, Petitioner needed to improve in two areas: (a) successfully meeting the goals established during the 90-day initial review period; and (b) demonstrating initiative and resourcefulness in work performance. The evaluation states as follows in relevant part: A discussion was held with Millie regarding her productivity for application and phone call processing during the review period. At that time, Millie was placed on a verbal warning for her performance. She currently averages 3.65 applications per hour. The department standard is 5 applications per hour. Millie also currently averages 6.66 calls per hour for the review period. The department standard is 8 calls per hour. Pursuant to this evaluation, Respondent extended Petitioner's 90-day initial review period for a 30-day period in which Petitioner was required to perform according to Respondent's standards. The evaluation advised Petitioner that failure to meet standards might result in further disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment. In March 2002, Respondent selected Petitioner to represent the National Team for Private Credit Originations. This designation required Petitioner to undergo two days of additional training. Respondent has well-disseminated policies prohibiting discrimination and harassment on the basis of race. These policies are available to employees through Respondent’s Employee Reference Manual and Code of Business Conduct. Respondent’s internal website also contains employee-related information such as policies, notices and the company’s equal employment opportunity and anti-harassment policies. Further, Respondent distributes an annual affirmation of its anti- discrimination and anti-harassment/anti-retaliation policies via e-mail. Petitioner knew of Respondent’s commitment to diversity. Petitioner became aware of Respondent’s equal employment opportunity and anti-harassment/anti-retaliation policies immediately upon being employed with Respondent. In November 2001, Petitioner received Respondent’s Employee Reference Manual, Respondent's Code of Business Conduct, and a copy of Respondent’s annual reaffirmation of its anti- harassment/anti-retaliation policies. The annual reaffirmation outlined the procedure an employee should follow to report discrimination or harassment, and provided several avenues for reporting such conduct. Petitioner was also aware that Respondent had an internal website with employee information. Respondent’s anti-harassment policy prohibits retaliation against employees who report harassment. The policy also protects employees who participate in an investigation of a claim of harassment. Petitioner knew individuals in Respondent’s Human Resources Department. For example, when Petitioner first interviewed for a job with Respondent, she met Joni Reich, Respondent’s vice president of human resources. From July 2002 to November 2002, Petitioner’s immediate supervisor was Paul Wunstell. Mr. Wunstell was Respondent's supervisor of Private Credit Originations. In early July 2002, Bobby Wiley, Respondent’s human resources director for the Service Center was counseling an employee for performance issues when the employee made an internal discrimination complaint. The employee stated that a supervisor had made a racially discriminatory comment about the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday. The employee told Mr. Wiley that Petitioner could confirm the racially derogatory comment. On July 19, 2002, Petitioner was asked to go to the human resources department. Upon her arrival, Petitioner met Mr. Wiley for the first time. Mr. Wiley directed Petitioner to a conference room. Mr. Wiley explained that he had asked Petitioner to meet with him because he was investigating a discrimination complaint made by another employee about a supervisor who might have said something derogatory about the Martin Luther King, Jr., holiday. He explained that he had been told that Petitioner might have some knowledge about these events. Several times, Mr. Wiley asked Petitioner whether she knew of any racial discrimination at the Service Center and whether she had heard a supervisor make a racially derogatory comment. Petitioner denied being aware of any race discrimination at Respondent's facility. Petitioner stated that she did not want to talk to Mr. Wiley. Although Petitioner understood that she was required to report discrimination, she did not provide Mr. Wiley any information supporting or corroborating the complaint that he was investigating. During the meeting, Petitioner appeared nervous. She told Mr. Wiley that she was uncomfortable meeting with him. Mr. Wiley replied that their conversation would be confidential, “between the two of them,” or words to that effect. Petitioner mistakenly interpreted Mr. Wiley’s comment to mean that he would do nothing with any information provided by Petitioner and that he simply wanted to “contain” or cover up the issue of possible discrimination. Petitioner did not ask Mr. Wiley to clarify what he meant by his statement that their conversation would be “between the two of them.” During his meeting with Petitioner, Mr. Wiley conducted himself in a professional manner. However, because he was eating ice cream when he met with Petitioner and did not have a note pad, Petitioner mistakenly thought he did not take allegations of discrimination seriously. Mr. Wiley was eating an ice cream bar that had been distributed around the human resources department immediately before Petitioner came to see him. The conversation between Mr. Wiley and Petitioner lasted approximately ten minutes. Mr. Wiley thanked Petitioner for meeting with him. Mr. Wiley stated that he was glad to hear there was no discrimination at Respondent’s facility because Respondent would not tolerate discrimination. Petitioner then left the conference room. After the July 19, 2002, meeting, Petitioner never contacted Mr. Wiley to complain of discrimination or retaliation. Additionally, Petitioner’s supervisor, Mr. Wunstall, never knew about Mr. Wiley’s meeting with Petitioner. On or about July 1, 2002, Respondent advised all employees serving as LORs that they would be required to attend a training class on July 13, 2002. The purpose of the class was to ensure the proper handling of Laureate School Accounts for Private Credit Originations. Each employee needed an active Laureate computer ID and password in order to participate in the hands-on training. As instructed, Petitioner immediately advised Respondent that she did not have access to the Laureate software on her computer. On July 8, 2002, Respondent sent Petitioner an e-mail regarding her Laureate computer password. After receiving the password, Petitioner still could not gain the appropriate computer access. On July 9, 2002, Petitioner informed Respondent that she did not have the Laureate software installed on her personal computer. Respondent then made arrangements for Petitioner to test her password on another computer. Respondent also arranged to have the Laureate icon placed on Petitioner's computer. On July 23, 2002, Petitioner wrote a letter to Ms. Reich complaining about her meeting with Mr. Wiley. The letter stated that, although she had not told Mr. Wiley about it, Petitioner thought there was racial discrimination at the Service Center. Petitioner’s letter indicated that she wanted to make a statement concerning discrimination against blacks. In the letter, Petitioner requested information on Respondent’s policies and procedures to report such discrimination. Mr. Wunstell never knew that Petitioner had sent a letter to Ms. Reich complaining about racial discrimination. On July 29, 2002, Petitioner allegedly fainted at work due to panic attacks. Respondent's staff called an ambulance that took Petitioner to the hospital. Petitioner claims she was absent from work for three consecutive days without calling her supervisor and without being terminated for abandoning her job. On August 2, 2002, Petitioner received a letter from Ms. Reich. In the letter, Ms. Reich apologized for Mr. Wiley's failure to handle the meeting with Petitioner in a manner that Petitioner felt was appropriate. Ms. Reich told Petitioner that Respondent viewed discrimination complaints seriously and she included a copy of the anti-harassment policy, which outlined procedures for reporting harassment or discrimination. Ms. Reich explained several avenues to report discrimination. Ms. Reich’s letter also indicated that she and senior director of human resources, Joyce Shaw, would be in Florida within the next two weeks. In the letter, Ms. Reich asked Petitioner to meet with them to discuss her concerns and to promptly address any alleged discrimination. On August 12, 2002, Petitioner received an e-mail from Ms. Shaw to schedule a meeting on August 19, 2002. The text of the e-mail did not state the reason why Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich wanted to meet with Petitioner, but Petitioner knew the reason for the meeting. The e-mail asked Petitioner to contact Ms. Shaw either on her cellular telephone or by e-mail to schedule the meeting. Mr. Wunstell did not have the capability to access Petitioner’s e-mail messages and there is no evidence that he saw Ms. Shaw’s e-mail. On August 19, 2002, Petitioner met with Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich for approximately one hour. Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich listened to Petitioner’s concerns. They were pleasant to Petitioner during the meeting. During the August 19, 2002, meeting, Petitioner first complained that Mr. Wiley had been disrespectful or inattentive during their July 19, 2002, meeting. Petitioner also told Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich about her feelings that black employees were treated differently in the workplace. This was the first time that Petitioner discussed her race discrimination concerns with anyone who worked for Respondent. When pressed for more specific information, Petitioner stated that: (a) she felt black employees received different training than non-black employees; and (b) black employees’ questions were not answered as promptly or as thoroughly as the questions of non-black employees. Petitioner did not provide Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich with specific examples of racially discriminatory behavior or the names of any minority employees who Petitioner felt experienced discrimination. That same day, after the meeting with Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich, Petitioner provided Ms. Shaw with several e-mails about the Laureate computer training. The e-mails did not illustrate any mistreatment of Petitioner. During the August 19, 2002, meeting, Petitioner told Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich that she was experiencing panic attacks. Ms. Reich suggested that Petitioner take advantage of Respondent’s employee assistance program for the alleged panic attacks. Ms. Reich and Ms. Shaw told Petitioner that they would look into her concerns. They did not tell her they would contact her again in the future. Instead, Ms. Reich gave her business card to Petitioner in case she needed to contact Ms. Reich in the future. After the August 19, 2002 meeting, Petitioner did not contact Ms. Reich or Ms. Shaw again during her employment with Respondent. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that she complained to Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich about the following: (a) supervisor Melanie Childree's reference to the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday as "spook day"; (b) three employees telling an African American manager not to go to the "master cube," which Petitioner felt was a racial reference to "slave talk"; (c) a hearsay statement from a student's mother who called another employee at the Service Center to accuse a white customer service representative of calling her daughter "stupid nigger"; and (d) where a black supervisor was married to a white woman, one employee allegedly said he was "going to string [the black supervisor] up for messing with our women." Apparently all of these alleged incidents occurred before Petitioner's July 19, 2002, meeting with Mr. Wiley. The most persuasive evidence regarding these allegations is that Petitioner did not report them to Ms. Shaw or Ms. Reich or anyone else in Respondent's chain of command. Instead, the complaints that Petitioner shared with Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich on August 19, 2002, were non-specific generalizations. Moreover, Mr. Wunstell was never aware of Petitioner’s meeting with Ms. Reich and Ms. Shaw to complain about discrimination. Petitioner does not know what steps, if any, Ms. Shaw and Ms. Reich took after their meeting to look into her concerns. At the hearing, Ms. Shaw testified that she investigated Petitioner’s concerns and found them to be unfounded. First, Ms. Shaw reviewed the e-mails provided by Petitioner but did not find anything inappropriate in their contents. Second, Ms. Shaw interviewed the director in charge of Petitioner’s department, Ann Nelson. Ms. Nelson explained that the process by which employee questions were answered made it unlikely that employees could be singled out due to their race. According to Ms. Nelson, all employee questions were directed to a central telephone helpline staffed by supervisors or senior employees who randomly responded to calls. Ms. Shaw correctly concluded that it would be difficult for racially discriminatory behavior to occur in such context. Third, Ms. Nelson assured Ms. Shaw that training was the same for all employees. Student loans are heavily regulated by federal law and thus, the manner in which employees handle borrowers is regulated, making Petitioner’s concerns about unequal employee training unfounded. Finally, Ms. Shaw spoke to the person in charge at the Service Center, Renee Mang, to determine if Ms. Mang was aware of any racial discrimination concerns at the facility. Ms. Mang, whose office was in close proximity to Petitioner’s cubicle, indicated that she was not aware of any racially discriminatory behavior in the workplace and that no one had complained to her about discrimination. After the investigation, Ms. Shaw was unable to corroborate Petitioner’s racial discrimination allegations. On or about September 30, 2002, Respondent gave Petitioner a verbal warning regarding her phone quality control average. The department's expected call productivity average was 8 calls per hour at the minimum level of customer service. From July 1, 2002, to September 25, 2002, Petitioner's average was 7.5 calls per hour. Once again, Petitioner was given 30 days to meet the department's performance goal of at least 9 calls per hour at Petitioner's level of customer service. On October 8, 2002, while employed with Respondent, Petitioner applied for full-time employment with the Bay County School Board. Petitioner applied for employment in the school system because she felt a lot was going on at Respondent’s facility and her mental health counselor suggested she look for employment elsewhere. Petitioner had followed Ms. Reich’s suggestion and enrolled in mental health counseling through Respondent’s employee assistance program. Respondent accommodated Petitioner by adjusting her work schedule and allowing her to report for work late on the days she had appointments with her mental health counselor. For example, on or about October 24, 2002, Respondent requested an adjustment in her work schedule so she could attend a mental health counseling session. Respondent accommodated Petitioner's request. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that Respondent adjusted the work schedule of a white female LOR to match the work schedule of her husband who also worked for Respondent. The husband's work schedule required him to work until 7:30 p.m. every day. According to Petitioner, the schedule adjustment resulted in the white female employee having no work to perform for 30 minutes per day after the phones shut down at 7:00 p.m. However, there is no evidence that Petitioner or any other employee ever made a similar request for a work schedule accommodation under similar circumstances. On October 29, 2002, Petitioner suffered a workers’ compensation accident. A telephone headpiece flicked off and hit Petitioner across the face, resulting in an uncomfortable feeling and a small chip on her tooth. On October 30, 2002, Petitioner reported the accident to Respondent’s Benefits Specialist, Kristi Scott and requested to see a dentist. From that time on, Petitioner and Ms. Scott communicated directly with each other regarding treatment for Petitioner’s injury. Ms. Scott kept Petitioner updated on her progress locating a dentist that would accept Petitioner as a patient for a workers' compensation claim. Mr. Wunstell was not involved in arranging for treatment for Petitioner’s injury. Petitioner was not required to channel her communications with Ms. Scott through Mr. Wunstell. On October 31, 2002, Ms. Scott sent Petitioner an e-mail stating that Ms. Scott had been unable to locate a dentist who would see Petitioner as a workers' compensation patient. Ms. Scott's e-mail directed Petitioner to see any dentist of her choice to treat her injury. Ms. Scott told Petitioner that Respondent would reimburse her for any out-of- pocket expenses that resulted from her dental visit. Petitioner did not suffer immobilization as a result of the injury to her mouth and she did not have to undergo treatment as a result of her injury. Petitioner did not feel her condition was an emergency. In fact, she did not see a dentist immediately because neither her regular dentist nor other dentists considered her mouth injury an emergency. Following the October 29, 2002, mouth injury, Petitioner continued working. She worked full days the rest of the week: October 30, 2002, through November 1, 2002. On Monday, November 4, 2002, Petitioner did not show up for work. Instead, that morning Petitioner drove herself to her mental health counseling session. After her counseling session, around noon, Petitioner called Mr. Wunstell from home. During this telephone conversation Petitioner told Mr. Wunstell that she had seen a doctor in the morning. She also told Mr. Wunstell that her mouth was in severe pain, and she was trying to find a dentist who would see her. At the time of Petitioner's conversation with Ms. Wunstell, Petitioner had made appointments with two dentists. Petitioner typically worked until 7 p.m. During their noon telephone conversation, Mr. Wunstell specifically asked Petitioner whether she was planning to return to work that day. Petitioner responded that she would be returning to work later that day. Petitioner did not tell him that she was unable to work, nor did she request time off work. Petitioner alleges that she told Mr. Wunstell during their November 4, 2002, telephone conversation that her neck was bothering her, that she needed to see a doctor, in addition to a dentist, that she was unable to work and that she asked Mr. Wunstell to have Ms. Scott call her at home. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner did not mention any of these things during her telephone conversation with Mr. Wunstell. Petitioner made no effort to obtain Ms. Scott’s telephone number. After her November 4, 2002, call to Mr. Wunstell, Petitioner made no effort to contact Ms. Scott directly regarding her workers' compensation injury, despite the fact that Petitioner and Ms. Scott had been communicating directly about the injury until that time. Petitioner did not show up for work the rest of the week of November 4, 2002. She did not call Mr. Wunstell or anyone else at Respondent’s office during the week of November 4, 2002, to inform them of her condition or her expected return to work date. Respondent has a job abandonment policy. An employee who is absent from work for three consecutive days without notifying his/her immediate supervisor will be considered to have voluntarily resigned or abandoned his/her job. Respondent’s job abandonment policy applies to all employees, including those who are injured on the job. When an employee is a no call/no show for three consecutive days, the job abandonment policy is applied in a fairly automatic manner. The employee’s immediate supervisor does not call the employee at home. Instead, the supervisor contacts Teresa Jones in the human resources department, indicates that the employee has been a “no call/no show” for three consecutive days, and directs the human resources department to send a termination letter. This type of transaction is handled by lower-ranking human resources department employees at the Service Center, and neither Mr. Wiley nor Ms. Shaw participated in the process of sending out termination letters. When Petitioner did not come to work and failed to contact Mr. Wunstell after their November 4, 2002, conversation, Mr. Wunstell instructed Ms. Jones to send Petitioner a letter informing of her termination for job abandonment. There is no evidence that Ms. Shaw, Ms. Reich or Mr. Wiley influenced Mr. Wunstell’s decision to request that Respondent send Petitioner a termination letter pursuant to the job abandonment policy. By letter dated November 8, 2002, Respondent informed Petitioner that, pursuant to the company’s job abandonment policy, she was deemed to have voluntarily abandoned her job by being absent for three consecutive days without contacting her supervisor after November 4, 2002. Respondent’s letter encouraged Petitioner to contact Ms. Jones if she had any questions regarding Respondent’s letter. Also attached to the termination letter was an Exit Interview questionnaire and postage pre-paid envelope. The questionnaire asked Petitioner to explain why she had resigned her employment. Petitioner did not return the questionnaire and made no effort to contact Respondent to protest, contest, or clarify her employment status. After receiving the November 8, 2002, letter, Petitioner did not file a petition for unemployment compensation benefits. Instead, on November 17, 2002, exactly two weeks after the last day She came to work for Respondent, Petitioner began working with the Bay County School District. Mr. Wunstell did not apply Respondent’s job abandonment policy to Petitioner for retaliatory reasons because he did not know of her alleged protected activity. Mr. Wunstell may not have terminated Petitioner in July 2002 when she was absent for three days. However, Mr. Wunstell has otherwise consistently and non-discriminatorily enforced the job abandonment policy and has terminated numerous employees pursuant to the job abandonment policy. There is no evidence that Respondent applied its job abandonment policy differently to Petitioner than it did to other employees. During the year 2002 and the first few months of 2003, Respondent terminated 28 employees pursuant to its job abandonment policy. Of these 28 employees, 25 were white, and none had complained about discrimination or participated in a discrimination investigation. Except for Petitioner's three-day absence in July 2002, there is no evidence of any other employee who violated Respondent’s job abandonment policy by being absent from work for three consecutive days without calling and who was not terminated. In January 2003, almost two months after her separation from Respondent, Petitioner wrote a letter to Al Lord, Respondent’s CEO. The letter incorrectly alleged that Respondent had not provided assistance in obtaining dental treatment for Petitioner’s on-the-job tooth injury. The letter for the first time informed Respondent that Petitioner felt she was involuntarily terminated. Unlike Petitioner’s testimony at the final hearing, the letter to Mr. Lord did not allege that Petitioner had told Mr. Wunstell on November 4, 2002, that she needed to see both a dentist and a doctor for her injury. Likewise, the letter did not allege that Petitioner asked Mr. Wunstell to have Ms. Scott call her at home. On February 11, 2003, Petitioner received a letter from Ms. Shaw. The letter informed Petitioner that she had looked into the allegations contained in the letter to Mr. Lord and had found them to be unsupported and inaccurate. Ms. Shaw's letter concluded as follows: (a) Respondent non-discriminatorily and consistently enforced its job abandonment policy; and (b) Respondent had assisted Petitioner in obtaining treatment for her dental injury. Finally, the letter questioned why, if she had not intended to voluntarily quit her job, Petitioner had made no effort to contact Respondent upon receipt of her November 8, 2002, termination letter. On March 15, 2003, Petitioner wrote a letter to Ms. Shaw. In the letter, Petitioner did not allege that she had told Mr. Wunstell on November 4, 2002, that she needed to see a doctor, in addition to a dentist, as a result of her mouth injury. Petitioner’s letter also did not state that she had asked Mr. Wunstell to tell Ms. Scott to call her at home regarding an appointment with a doctor. Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the FCHR on June 2, 2003. During the processing of her charge of discrimination, Petitioner complained that Respondent had improperly withheld from her last payroll check a portion of her pay for 66 hours of accrued, unused vacation time. This was the first time Respondent learned of this allegation. Although Petitioner believed that Mr. Wunstell had given instructions for Respondent to withhold a portion of her vacation pay, she never contacted Mr. Wunstell or Respondent’s human resources department to report or challenge this incorrect deduction. When, after the filing of the charge, Respondent received information about the incorrect deduction, it immediately investigated and reimbursed Petitioner for the incorrect deduction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Millie Carlisle 105 Detroit Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Luisette Gierbolini, Esquire Zinober & McCrea, P.A. Post Office Box 1378 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 800 Tampa, Florida 33601-1378 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner received notice of the August 19, 2005, administrative hearing, and if not, whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. In the fall of 2004, Petitioner's cousin, Barry Walker, worked for Respondent as a cook. Mr. Walker recommended that Respondent hire Petitioner as a dishwasher. James Pigneri, Respondent's owner, interviewed Petitioner and decided to hire him as a dishwasher on a trial basis. Petitioner began washing dishes for Respondent in September 2004. In October 2004, Petitioner began a 90-day probationary period as Respondent's dishwasher. At that time, PMI Employee Leasing (PMI) became Petitioner's co-employer. PMI has a contractual relationship with Respondent. Through this contract, PMI assumes responsibility for Respondent's human resource issues, payroll needs, employee benefits, and workers’ compensation coverage. On October 10, 2004, Petitioner signed an acknowledgement that he had received a copy of PMI's employee handbook, which included PMI's policies on discrimination, harassment, or other civil rights violations. The handbook states that employees must immediately notify PMI for certain workplace claims, including but not limited to, claims involving release from work, labor relation problems, and discrimination. The handbook requires employees to inform PMI within 48 hours if employment ceases for any reason. PMI's discrimination and harassment policies provide employees with a toll-free telephone number. When an employee makes a complaint or files a grievance, PMI performs an investigation and takes any corrective action that is required. The cook-line in Respondent's kitchen consist of work stations for all sauté and grill cooks. The cook-line runs parallel to a row of glass windows between the kitchen and the dining room and around the corner between the kitchen and the outside deck. Customers in the dining room and on the deck can see all of the cooks preparing food at the work stations along the cook-line. On the evening of December 18, 2004, Respondent's business was crowded with customers in the dining room and on the deck. On December 18, 2004, Petitioner was working in Respondent's kitchen. Sometime during the dinner shift, Petitioner was standing on the cook-line near the windows, talking to a cook named Bob. Petitioner was discussing a scar on his body. During the discussion, Petitioner raised his shirt, exposing his chest, arm, and armpit. The cook named Bob told Petitioner to put his shirt down. Erin Pigneri, a white male, is the son of Respondent's owner, James Pignari. As one of Respondent's certified food managers, Erin Pigneri must be vigilant about compliance with health code regulations when he works as Respondent's shift manager. Erin Pigneri has authority to recommend that employees be fired, but his father, James Pigneri, makes the final employment decision. On December 18, 2004, Erin Pigneri, was working as Respondent's manager and was in charge of the restaurant because his father was not working that night. When Erin Pigneri saw Petitioner with his shirt raised up, he yelled out for Petitioner put his shirt back on and to get off the cook-line. Erin Pigneri was alarmed to see Petitioner with his shirt off on the cook-line because customers could see Petitioner and because Petitioner's action violated the health code. Petitioner's reaction was immediately insubordinate. Petitioner told Erin Pigneri that he could not speak to Petitioner in that tone of voice. Erin Pigneri had to tell Petitioner several times to put his shirt on, explaining that Petitioner was committing a major health-code violation. When Petitioner walked up to Erin Pigneri, the two men began to confront each other using profanity but no racial slurs. Erin Pigneri finally told Petitioner that, "I'm a 35- year-old man and no 19-year-old punk is going to talk to me in that manner and if you don't like it, you can leave." Erin Pigneri did not use a racial slur or tell Petitioner to "paint yourself white." After the confrontation, Erin Pigneri left the kitchen. Petitioner went back to work, completing his shift without further incident. Petitioner did not have further conversation with Erin Pigneri on the evening of December 18, 2004. Erin Pigneri did not discuss Petitioner or the shirt incident with any of the waiters or any other staff members that night. On Monday evening, December 20, 2004, Erin Pigneri was in the restaurant when Petitioner and his cousin, Mr. Walker, came to work. Petitioner was dressed in nicer clothes than he usually wore to work. Mr. Walker approached Erin and James Pigneri, telling them that they needed to have a meeting. Erin and James Pigneri followed Petitioner and Mr. Walker into the kitchen. The conversation began with Mr. Walker complaining that he understood some racist things were going on at the restaurant. Mr. Walker wanted talk about Erin Pigneri's alleged use of the "N" word. Erin Pigneri did not understand Mr. Walker's concern because Mr. Walker had been at work on the cook-line during the December 18, 2004, shirt incident. According to Petitioner's testimony at the hearing, Mr. Walker had talked to a waiter over the weekend. The waiter was Mr. Walker's girlfriend. Petitioner testified that the waiter/girlfriend told Mr. Walker that she heard Erin Pigneri use the "N" word in reference to Petitioner after Erin Pigneri left the kitchen after the shirt incident on December 18, 2004. Petitioner testified that neither he nor Mr. Walker had first- hand knowledge of Erin Pigneri's alleged use the "N" word in the dining room. Neither Mr. Walker nor the waiter provided testimony at the hearing. Accordingly, this hearsay evidence is not competent evidence that Erin Pigneri used a racial slur in the dining room after the "shirt incident." During the meeting on December 20, 2004, Erin Pigneri explained to Petitioner and Mr. Walker that the incident on December 18, 2004, involved Petitioner's insubordination and not racism. Mr. Walker wanted to know why Erin Pigneri had not fired Petitioner on Saturday night if he had been insubordinate. Erin Pigneri told Mr. Walker that he would have fired Petitioner but he did not want Respondent to lose Mr. Walker as an employee. Apparently, it is relatively easy to replace a dishwasher but not easy to replace a cook like Mr. Walker. Erin Pigneri asked Mr. Walker and another African- American who worked in the kitchen whether they had ever heard him make derogatory racial slurs. There is no persuasive evidence that Erin Pigneri ever made such comments even though Petitioner occasionally, and in a joking manner, called Erin Pigneri slang names like Cracker, Dago, and Guinea. Petitioner was present when Mr. Walker and Erin Pigneri discussed the alleged racial slurs. Petitioner's only contribution to the conversation was to repeatedly ask whether he was fired. Erin Pigneri never told Petitioner he was fired. After hearing Mr. Walker's concern and Erin Pigneri's explanation, James Pigneri specifically told Petitioner that he was not fired. James Pigneri told Petitioner that he needed to talk to Erin Pigneri and that they needed to work things out, man-to-man. After the meeting, Mr. Walker began his work for the evening shift on December 20, 2004. Petitioner walked around talking on his cell phone, telling his mother that he had been fired and she needed to pick him up. James Pigneri told Petitioner again that he was not fired, that Petitioner should go talk to Erin Pigneri, and that Erin Pigneri was waiting to talk to Petitioner. Erin Pigneri waited in his office for Petitioner to come in to see him. Petitioner never took advantage of that opportunity. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that James Pigneri made an alleged racial slur in reference to Petitioner at some unidentified point in time. According to Petitioner, he learned about the alleged racial slur second-hand from a cook named Bob. Bob did not testify at the hearing; therefore, there is no competent evidence that James Pigneri ever made a racial slur in reference to Petitioner or any other employee. Contrary to PMI's reporting procedures, Petitioner never called or informed PMI that he had been harassed, discriminated against, fired, terminated, or ceased working for Respondent for any reason. On December 22, 2004, PMI correctly concluded that Petitioner had voluntarily terminated or abandoned his employment. When Petitioner filed his Employment Complaint of Discrimination on January 11, 2005, Petitioner listed his address as 6526 Lance Street, Panama City, Florida, which is his mother's residence. On April 18, 2005, FCHR sent the Determination: No Cause to Petitioner at 6501 Pridgen Street, Panama City, Florida, which is the address of one of Petitioner's friends. When Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief on May 25, 2005, Petitioner listed his address the same as his mother's home. FCHR transmitted the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings, indicating that Petitioner's address of record was the same as his friend's home. Therefore, the June 9, 2005, Notice of Hearing, and the July 12, 2005, Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing were sent to Petitioner at his friend's address. During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that between January 2005 and August 2005, he lived back and forth between his mother's and his friend's residences. When he lived with his friend, Petitioner did not check his mail at his mother's home every day. However, Petitioner admitted that he received the June 9, 2005, Notice of Hearing, scheduling the hearing for July 18, 2005, and the July 12, 2005, Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing for August 19, 2005. Petitioner testified that he knew the first hearing was rescheduled to take place on August 19, 2005. According to Petitioner, he misplaced the "papers" identifying the location of the hearing at the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims in Panama City, Florida. Petitioner asserts that he went to the county courthouse on August 19, 2005, based on his erroneous belief that the hearing was to take place at that location. After determining that there was no administrative hearing scheduled at the county courthouse on August 19, 2005, Petitioner did not attempt to call FCHR or the Division of Administrative Hearings. On December 1, 2005, the undersigned sent Petitioner a Notice of Hearing, scheduling the hearing after remand for January 25, 2005. The December 1, 2005, Notice of Hearing was sent to Petitioner at his mother's and his friend's addresses. The copy of the notice sent to his friend's home was returned as undeliverable. During the hearing on January 25, 2005, Petitioner testified that he used one of the earlier notices (dated June 9, 2005, and/or July 12, 2005) to locate the hearing site for that day. This was necessary because Petitioner had misplaced the December 1, 2005, Notice of Hearing. All three notices have listed the hearing site as the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims, 2401 State Avenue, Panama City, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary R. Wheeler, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod Pope & Weaver, P.A. Post Office Box 550770 Jacksonville, Florida 32255-0770 Marlow Williams 6526 Lance Street Panama City, Florida 32404
The Issue The issues are whether the Respondents committed unlawful employment practices against Petitioner, and if so, to what relief is she entitled.
Findings Of Fact In the spring of 1994, Respondent CSD began operating a residential detention program for juvenile offenders pursuant to a contract with the Department of Juvenile Justice. The purpose of the program, commonly known as Hamilton House, was to provide redirection to the lives of its youthful residents/clients. Hamilton House had 48 beds divided between two dormitories. Respondent CSD assigned each resident to the appropriate dormitory, level six or level eight, depending on the type of security and rehabilitative services required. The program included an educational program as well as facilities for vocational and recreational activities. Respondent CSD employed Petitioner, a 51 year-old white female, as a resident advisor at Hamilton House from March 24, 1994 through June 30, 1996. Petitioner initially worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift in the level six dormitory. At times she served as the acting shift supervisor though she was not paid a supervisor's wages. When Petitioner began working for Respondent CSD, she lived with her elderly mother, Lotus Musgrove, whose colon cancer was in remission. At that time, Mrs. Musgrove was able to live independently and did not need a caretaker. On April 24, 1994, some of the clients managed to gain access to a bottle containing an alcoholic beverage. Petitioner and other employees received a verbal warning for failing to adequately monitor the behavior and movement of the clients. A training letter was placed in each employee's personnel file. In May of 1995, Respondent CSD hired Bobby Williams, Sr., as a resident advisor in the level eight dormitory. Mr. Williams is a black male. He eventually assumed the position of shift supervisor for the entire facility. There is no evidence that Petitioner sought this full-time position or a similar supervisory position at any time during her employment with Respondent CSD. In October of 1995, some of the clients accused Petitioner and another staff member of inappropriate conduct including, but not limited to, furnishing them with prohibited magazines and movies. As a result of the allegations, Respondent CSD suspended Petitioner and her co-worker without pay on October 18, 1995. By letter dated October 20, 1995, Respondent CSD advised Petitioner in writing that there was insufficient evidence of misconduct to warrant termination of her employment. However, the letter stated that Petitioner had violated company policy and procedure by allowing a youth to leave his room for extended periods after curfew. Respondent CSD paid Petitioner and her co- worker for the time they were suspended during the internal investigation. Respondent CSD subsequently reassigned Petitioner and her co-worker to work in a different dormitory and on a different shift. The change in time and location of their work shift was necessary to ensure there was no contact between them and the clients who had accused them of improper conduct. Petitioner was assigned to work the 3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. shift in the level eight dormitory. In a written statement dated October 23, 1995, Petitioner objected to the change in her shift. She preferred to continue working the 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. shift. She asserted that, during the day, she took care of her 78 year-old mother who had cancer. Respondent CSD did not immediately honor Petitioner's request. On or about November 24, 1995, Petitioner voluntarily purchased some supplies in the amount of $20.98 from a retail store. The supplies included the following: hand sprayers, cotton swabs, hydrogen peroxide, rubbing alcohol, highlighters, marker, Sharpies, and other miscellaneous items. Petitioner requested reimbursement from Respondent CSD because she intended to use the supplies at work. Respondent CSD declined to reimburse Petitioner for the supplies. There is no evidence that Respondent CSD ever authorized the purchase of the supplies. On December 11, 1995, a resident in the level eight dormitory attempted to discard a container of contraband tobacco. Petitioner detected his effort and responded appropriately. She received a letter of commendation for exemplary action which was placed in her personnel file. On January 23, 1996, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Juvenile Justice made a formal and final determination that "[i]t is inconclusive that staff members Julie Toughton and Alice Musgrove engaged in improper conduct with clients." On or about February 1, 1996, Petitioner took a box of pens and pencils from a client's desk. The client became upset and exhibited inappropriate behavior toward Petitioner. As a result of the client's tantrum, Petitioner took token-economy points from the client. Petitioner filed a written complaint dated February 4, 1996, with Respondent CSD after learning that one of her supervisors, Mike Myers, changed the client's point sheet. Petitioner's February 4, 1996, statement also asserted that Supervisor Myers was mishandling clients' mail. She complained that he was logging clients' mail and making the clients read their personnel mail to him. According to Petitioner, handling client mail was the responsibility of "line staff." On one occasion in February 1996, Petitioner was 30 minutes late reporting to her assigned duty station in the dormitory. She spent that time in the administration building because she refused to work with one of her co-workers. Supervisor Myers was responsible for changing Petitioner's time sheet to reflect a 30-minute deduction in regular time. On another occasion in February 1996, Petitioner and other employees worked two hours of overtime due to a crisis situation with one of the clients. Petitioner elected to "bank" the overtime rather than receive time-and-one-half of overtime pay. The other employees chose to receive overtime pay. Petitioner was off from work on February 22-23, 1996. When Petitioner arrived at work on February 24, 1996, her time sheet was not with the time sheets of other employees. Petitioner's time sheet was locked in a supervisor's office until February 26, 1996, because the supervisor was not at work. There is no indication in the record whether Petitioner's time sheet was locked up inadvertently or due to a dispute over Petitioner's wages. On March 1, 1996, Petitioner filed a written grievance with Respondent CSD regarding her pay. She claimed that Supervisor Myers was harassing her and discriminating against her by changing her time sheet without her knowledge. Specifically, Petitioner complained that Mr. Myers cheated her out of 30 minutes of regular time on one occasion and two hours of overtime on another occasion. She complained that her time sheet was locked in a supervisor's office for four days. On March 4, 1996, the Program Director, Dale Edwards, agreed that Petitioner should not be penalized for one-half hour of regular pay because she was in the administration building during the disputed time. Additionally, Mr. Edwards directed Supervisor Myers not to change an employee's time sheet without prior approval. He also requested that Petitioner furnish documentation that the company owed her for the two hours of overtime. Mr. Edwards was under the mistaken impression that the dispute over Petitioner's time sheet had been resolved. In March of 1996, Petitioner was working the midnight shift in dormitory eight consistent with her written request dated October 23, 1995. On March 18, 1996 and March 27, 1996, Petitioner made written requests for a change to the 7:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. shift. Petitioner specifically wanted to replace a Ms. Aikens on the morning shift. Respondent CSD did not honor Petitioner's request. However, there is no evidence showing that Ms. Aiken's position was ever filled, and if so, whether Respondent CSD selected a person of a different race or a younger to file the position. Petitioner was absent from work between April 8, 1996, and April 16, 1996, on April 22, 1996, and on April 29, 1996, due to illness and/or medical appointments. While she was absent, her inner-office mail box became so full that the mail had to be removed. The administrative manager gave Petitioner's mail to her supervisor. On April 23, 1996, Supervisor Myers completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal for the period March 14, 1995 through March 14, 1996. Petitioner disagreed with the determination that she had difficulty communicating with others. Petitioner's mental health counselor, Christine Clark, sent Mr. Edwards an unsolicited letter dated April 23, 1996. According to the letter, Ms. Clark was treating Petitioner for family/employment related stress reduction. The letter states as follows in pertinent part: Due to the demands of her home environment, caretaking of her elderly mother who is dying from colon cancer, I am recommending that Ms. Musgrove be reassigned new working hours, namely a day schedule of approximately 8:00 AM until 5:00 PM in order to effectively and efficiently facilitate the evening and night care of her mother. In addition, Ms. Musgrove appears to have unresolved issues regarding her personnel file and salary still due to her for 30 minutes or .5 hour pay as well as two hours uncompensated work from several weeks ago. I personally read your approval for this compensation but apparently this has still not yet been indicated on her pay check. There also remain the allegations of her misconduct charges that appears not to be fully resolved. As an employee she does have the legal right to have these fully addressed and challenged. From my understanding that although the misconduct charges have been dropped, there are still areas that compromise Ms. Musgrove's reputation as a resident advisor. Mr. Edwards did not disclose the contents of Ms. Clark's letter to any employee of Respondent CSD other than his superiors, who advised him to get a release from Petitioner before responding to the letter. After receiving Ms. Clark's letter, Mr. Edwards had a telephone conversation with Petitioner's mother because Petitioner was not at work or at home. During the conversation, Mr. Edwards inquired about the mother's health. Mr. Edwards learned that Mrs. Musgrove's cancer had been in remission since 1993 and that she no longer required assistance with daily living activities. Mr. Edwards did not disclose any information regarding Petitioner's employment status, medical condition, or personal business to Mrs. Musgrove. Petitioner's sister placed an unsolicited telephone call to Mr. Edwards several days after he talked to Mrs. Musgrove. The purpose of the call was to thank Mr. Edwards for his concern over Mrs. Musgrove's health. During the telephone call, Mr. Edwards and Petitioner's sister did not exchange any information relating to Petitioner's employment, medical condition, or personal business. On April 29, 1996, all staff at Hamilton House received a memorandum advising them as follows, in pertinent part: As a result of the recent competitive bid conducted by District 3, Department of Juvenile Justice, Gator Human Services has been awarded the contract to operate the Hamilton County Youth Treatment Complex starting July 1, 1996. The memorandum also included information regarding the transfer of operations to the new service provider. Respondent CSD advised employees that, if requested, it would supply Gator Human Services the name, position title, hire date, and current salary of each employee of record. Respondent CSD stated that no other information would be given to the new organization without the consent of the employee. On May 1, 1996, Mr. Edwards wrote two memoranda regarding Petitioner's pay. First, Mr. Edwards directed the administrative manager to pay Petitioner for .5 hours of regular wages out of the company's petty cash fund and to get a receipt for the payment. Second, he directed the resident life manager to allow Petitioner to leave work two hours early (with pay) at a time of her choosing within the next work week. Petitioner could not "bank" the time indefinitely because Respondent CSD's contract was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1996. Mr. Edwards phoned Petitioner at home on May 2, 1996, to request a written release so that he could respond to Ms. Clark's letter. Petitioner wrote that release on May 3, 1996. The release gave Mr. Edwards permission to disclose confidential information to Ms. Clark. On May 3, 1996, Petitioner signed a written acknowledgment that receipt of $4.06 in payment for .5 regular hours would end the issue of the .5 regular hours owed to her. On May 10, 1996, Respondent Gator informed the staff at Hamilton House of the procedure for handling applications for employment with Respondent Gator's new program, Tiger Success Center. Applications were due on or before May 28, 1996. Interviews were to be scheduled between May 28, 1996, and June 7, 1996. Applicants would be advised of the final selections and employment offers by June 14, 1996. Respondent Gator requested that each applicant take a copy of their most recent performance appraisal to their employment interview. By letter dated May 13, 1996, Mr. Edwards responded to Ms. Clark's inquiry. First, he explained that questions regarding Petitioner's compensation had been resolved. Second, he stated that letters from the Department of Juvenile Justice and from the Office of the Inspector General had been added to Petitioner's personnel file, clearing her of all misconduct allegations. Third, he explained that the day shift would be the least desirable shift in terms of stress reduction because the activity level of the residents is highest during the day. Mr. Edwards also revealed that Petitioner's mother was treated successfully for cancer in 1993 and that her current health failed to support the need for a change in Petitioner's shift. Finally, Mr. Edwards noted that he had to consider the needs of the residents and other staff. A copy of Ms. Clark's inquiry and Mr. Edwards' response were placed in Petitioner's personnel file. Neither of the documents were disclosed to unauthorized persons. On May 22, 1996, the employees at Hamilton House received another memorandum advising them that after June 30, 1996, Respondent CSD would no longer operate the facility. The employees were encouraged to apply for employment with the new organization. Petitioner was scheduled for an employment interview on May 30, 1996. However, the interview was rescheduled because she was unable to keep the appointment. Petitioner's application for employment with Respondent Gator is dated May 31, 1996. She also furnished Respondent Gator with copies of three performance appraisals. Petitioner's signature on the application authorized Respondent Gator to make inquiries of references and former employers regarding her general character and past performance. There is no evidence that Respondent Gator ever made any such inquiries about Petitioner. A panel of three people representing Respondent Gator interviewed Petitioner. The panel asked her the same questions that they asked other applicants. Petitioner was very negative and critical of the existing program and Respondent CSD during her interview. After the interview, each member of the interview panel tallied their score sheets independently. All three agreed that Petitioner should not be given further consideration for employment with Respondent Gator because of her negative attitude and low interview scores. On June 13, 1996, Petitioner received a memorandum from Respondent Gator stating that the company was unable to offer her a position of employment. That same day, Respondent Gator offered employment to every other Hamilton House staff applicant except one black male, Mr. Humphrey. Respondent Gator hired a black female, Latasha Bristol, who worked in the level eight dormitory with Petitioner. Ms. Bristol is younger than Petitioner. However, she was not hired to replace Petitioner. Respondent Gator hired Ms. Bristol to work in the level six dormitory. Respondent Gator offered an employment position to a white female, Lucy Oxendine. Ms. Oxendine was over 60 years old at the time. She declined to accept a job with Respondent Gator for personal reasons. Mr. Edwards was hired by Respondent Gator to continue as program director after July 1, 1996. However, neither he nor any other employee of Respondent CSD shared any information about Petitioner with Respondent Gator or had any input into Respondent Gator's decision not to hire Petitioner. Respondent Gator based its decision not to employ Petitioner solely on the results of her interview which was very negative. On June 14, 1996, the staff at Hamilton House received a memorandum stating that anyone interested in accepting employment with Respondent Gator must sign up on June 19, 1996. On June 14, 1996, Petitioner's doctor faxed a medical excuse to Respondent CSD stating that Petitioner could not return to work for an undetermined period of time. The document indicates that Petitioner's diagnosis involved anxiety, depression, and work-related stress. The doctor commented that Petitioner was the primary caretaker of her mother who was terminally ill with cancer. The doctor's June 14, 1996, fax was received by Respondent CSD in the administrative manager's office. It was on her desk for a brief period of time before it was delivered to Mr. Edwards. There is no credible evidence that any employee of Respondent CSD disclosed the contents of the fax to unauthorized persons. Petitioner's doctor did not give her permission to return to work until after July 1, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that FCHR enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's Charges of Discrimination against both Respondent CSD and Respondent Gator. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: H. B. Stivers, Esquire Levine and Stivers 245 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Faye Musgrove Post Office Box 657 Live Oak, Florida 32064 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner was not re-employed as a "mechanic-carpenter" by the Respondent school board based upon the Petitioner's age.
Findings Of Fact James W. Jones was employed from 1983 to 1993, as a mechanic-carpenter by the school board. In early 1993 he traveled to the Bicentennial Youth Park (BYP) to deliver supplies from his shop to Mr. Evans, the teacher assigned to the BYP. At that time Mr. Evans informed Jones of an upcoming opening at the BYP for a carpenters position and asked him if he would be interested in filling the position. The Petitioner replied that he would be interested. The position in question was posted and advertised as two part-time carpenter positions. Mr. Jones did not wish a part-time position and eventually the administration of BYP gained authorization and funding for a temporary, full-time position at the BYP. Mr. Jones, had been trying to leave the facilities maintenance department because of personality conflicts with his supervisor, Buel Lee. He consequently accepted the temporary, full-time position at the BYP on April 23, 1993. Prior to accepting the temporary position at BYP, the Petitioner was informed by Mr. Al Evans, Billy Wiesneski, and Terry Ellis that the position was temporary and would only last as long as funding for the position was available. In fact, Mr. Jones signed a letter, dated May 3, 1993, confirming his understanding that the position at BYP was temporary and that its duration was dependent upon the duration of funding allocated by the school board. He signed that letter in the presence of Mr. Ellis and Mr. Lee on May 4, 1993.1 Additionally, Mr. Jones admits that he signed a Notice of Personnel Action form on April 23, 1993, describing the job as temporary from April 23, 1993, to June 30, 1993, and stating that "annual re-appointment will be based on availability of project funds. . .". Mr. Jones also told a co-worker, John Driggers, that he knew the position could end in a year but that he was going to take the position anyway because by that time he would have the 10 years of service required to be vested in the pension plan. Mr. Driggers was also aware that Mr. Jones wished to transfer out of the facilities maintenance department at that time. In summary, although Mr. Jones denies that he knew the position was temporary, that is not the case, as shown by the preponderant evidence discussed in the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact on this subject matter. In any event, the only issue properly before the Division and the undersigned Judge, is whether Jones was not hired into a mechanic-carpenter position in the facilities maintenance department at a later date because of his age. His knowledge regarding the temporary nature of the position at the BYP is wholly irrelevant to a decision in this case because of the issues pled and noticed to the opposing party in the Petition. In any event, after voluntarily accepting that position he knew to be temporary, the funding finally ran out on March 31, 1994.2 Because funding no longer existed to support the carpenter position at BYP, the Petitioner was not re-appointed to that position and therefore his employment with the Volusia County School Board ended on March 31, 1994. Subsequently, on May 20, 1994, a mechanic-carpenter position became available in a the facilities maintenance department under the supervision of Buel Lee, for whom Jones had worked prior to taking the position at BYP. The Petitioner applied for that position. He was interviewed by Mr. Lee and considered for employment as a new applicant who had never before worked for the Respondent, as opposed to a laid-off employee under the applicable collective bargaining agreement arrangement concerning re-hire of laid-off personnel. The Petitioner was not entitled to preference in hiring normally given to laid-off employees because he had not been "laid-off." The lay-off provision in the collective bargaining agreement defines "lay-off" as "the separation of employee for lack of work or funds without any fault or delinquency on the employee's part." The lay-off provision applies only to employees who have been given an appointment for a definite duration and the funding for the position is cut by the government before the appointment naturally expires by its own terms. Since Jones was simply not re-appointed upon the natural expiration of his appointment, the lay-off provisions would not be applicable to his situation. Jones was not entitled to nor was he given preference over other applicants for the 1994 mechanic-carpenter position based on seniority because he was not the most senior applicant for the position. In fact, under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, he lost all seniority when he terminated from employment or was not re-appointed on March 31, 1994. Therefore, when he applied for the mechanic-carpenter position 1994, he as not entitled to any more consideration than is given to a new applicant. When he applied for that position in 1994, Mr. Lee, the hiring supervisor, interviewed all applicants and made the ultimate decision to hire Walter "Ed" Hayman for the position, instead of the Petitioner. Mr. Lee interviewed every applicant for that position. He treated Jones as a new applicant rather than a laid-off or senior employee, consistent with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. On the other hand, Mr. Lee was required by the collective bargaining agreement to give Hayman preference over Jones since Hayman had worked for the Respondent on an uninterrupted basis since 1991. Lee had received a letter of reference from a Mr. Frye, an independent contractor and Hayman's previous employer, indicating that Hayman had worked as a journeyman for 5 years. Mr. Lee thus believed that Hayman met the qualifications for the job. Lee felt that both Hayman and Jones were skilled in carpentry and did not make his decision based upon his judgment of their respective skills in their profession. Rather, Mr. Lee made a determination that Hayman was the best qualified for the position based on his knowledge of how each of them got along with others in the work place. Mr. Lee knew, and Jones admits, that during the time that he previously worked for Lee, Gary Gallencamp requested that he not have to work beside Jones any longer. Jones admits that in fact he had a lot to do with the reasons Gallencamp did not want to work with him anymore. Lee also knew, and Jones admits, that during the time that he previously worked for Lee, another employee, Ed Owensby, requested that he not have to work with Jones any longer. In fact, he stated that he would be forced to quit if he were required to continue working with Jones. Finally, Mr. Lee called Mr. Evans, Mr. Jones' most recent supervisor, to ask him for a reference regarding Jones' performance at the BYP. Mr. Evans told Mr. Lee that Jones had trouble getting along with the maintenance man, Earl Green, when working at the BYP. Even Jones admits that he had problems with Mr. Green's work. Contrarily, Mr. Lee had observed Hayman getting along well with the co-workers during the time he performed work in conjunction with the facilities maintenance department when he was working for the Respondent as a "grounds man." Therefore, based upon personal experience and the information he received from others, Mr. Lee made the decision to hire Mr. Hayman instead of Mr. Jones. Lee never even considered the ages of Hayman or Jones when making that hiring decision. In fact, Lee himself was approximately 48 or 50 years old when he hired Hayman. Lee does not have a history of hiring younger workers. In fact, the very person Lee hired to replace Jones, when Jones transferred to the BYP, was Mr. Fred Jacobs, who was then aged 57. The only three applicants hired by Lee after Jones transferred to the BYP and before Hayman was hired, were approximately 40 years old. During that time frame, Lee hired Eric Hoffman, who was 43 or 44 years old. Jeff Straker was in his late thirties or forties, and Fred Jacobs was 57. Thus, in their totality, Mr. Lee's hiring practices do not reflect any-age related bias. In addition, neither the Respondent's pay plan, nor its pension plan, set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, are related to age. The Respondent's pay ranges are based upon job classification (i.e., mechanic-carpenter) and years of service. Upon being separated from his employment, Jones was being paid at a level commensurate with 11 years of service. Had he begun his employment with the school board immediately upon completion of his vocational training, he would have been 34 or 35 years old and earned the same salary he was making in March 1994, when he was separated from employment. Likewise the pension plan provides that every employee, regardless of age, vests after having provided 10 years of service.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That for all of the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner has not established that the school board discriminated against him because of his age in making the subject re-hiring decision. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1998.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to a hostile work environment condoned by Respondent due to Petitioner's race and sex in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was previously employed by the Auditor General, Division of Public Assistance Fraud. That program, along with Petitioner, co-workers, and the persons in her chain of command, were later legislatively transferred to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. On January 28, 1999, Petitioner filed a complaint of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR), alleging that the State of Florida, Office of the Auditor General discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Sections 760.01- 760.11, Florida Statutes (1999). Allegedly, the discrimination was based on Petitioner's race (African- American) and sex (female). Petitioner claimed that Respondent's actions created a hostile work environment as a consequence of her race and/or sex. Petitioner has not been demoted, reassigned, or terminated by her employer. Petitioner complained of certain events that occurred in 1994 regarding the assignment of particular cases. She alleged that she was not being fairly treated in the assignment of pending cases. These events, which occurred in 1994, are time-barred from further consideration by virtue of Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes, which requires filing of a complaint within 365 days of occurrence of an alleged violation. On one occasion on an unspecified date during her employment, a co-worker asked Petitioner whether her ponytail was real. On March 11, 1998, Regional Supervisor William Martin, a white male, typed a memorandum for Petitioner. The memorandum was precipitated by a conference between Petitioner and her immediate supervisor in which procedures regarding work hours, breaks, and lunch hours were discussed. Petitioner was told in the course of the conference that some staff members perceived Petitioner as "not playing by the rules." Petitioner responded through the memorandum typed by Martin. The memorandum set forth Petitioner's complaints concerning her work situation, inclusive of her observation that others were committing the same violations of policy of which she was accused with no repercussions occurring to them. Petitioner had the opportunity to review a draft of the memorandum and made corrections to the draft. Petitioner then signed the final version of the memorandum, which included Petitioner's express declination to pursue the matter further, stating that she "wanted my personal concerns and feelings on record." Nowhere in the memorandum does Petitioner allege that she has been treated differently on the basis of her race or her sex. There are two supervisors in Respondent's Jacksonville, Florida, office. Petitioner’s immediate supervisor is Laverne McKinney, an African-American female. The other supervisor in the Jacksonville office is Stan Stephens, a white male. The relationship between Stan Stephens and Petitioner is strained. The strained relationship is not due to racial or sexual discrimination. On one occasion during Petitioner's employment, Stan Stephens asked Laverne McKinney to instruct Petitioner to let him know when Petitioner would not be available to work until 5:00 p.m., so that the office could be properly manned until that time. The request followed an incident when Stephens, who usually leaves the office at 4:30 p.m., was unable to find someone to mind the office when he left. Unknown to Stephens, Petitioner had left early to perform official business for Respondent. On another occasion during Petitioner's employment, while Laverne McKinney was the designated "Acting Regional Supervisor," Stan Stephens called William Martin, a former supervisor at the time, on a travel issue regarding Petitioner. Martin was working in Respondent's Miami, Florida, office at the time and McKinney was away from the Jacksonville Office.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 2001.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Precision Tune Auto Care, on account of his race, or a result of a sexually abusive work environment in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter, an employee of Respondent, is an African-American male. Precision owns and operates five automobile service facilities in northwest Florida. They are generally referred to as the 9th Avenue (Pensacola) facility, the 9-Mile (Pensacola) facility, the Navy Boulevard (Pensacola) facility, the Fort Walton Beach facility, and the Crestview facility. Though there was no direct testimony as to the number of persons employed by Precision, the evidence is persuasive that each facility has a minimum of 4 to 6 full-time employees. Therefore, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish that Respondent employs more than 15 full-time employees at any given time. Petitioner’s Hiring On June 14, 2013, Petitioner started work at Respondent’s 9th Avenue location in Pensacola, Florida, as a lube-tech. When Petitioner was hired, Ms. Abbott was the manager of the 9th Avenue location, having started in that position in April 2013. Petitioner was not hired by Ms. Abbott. Rather, Mr. Geiger interviewed Petitioner and approved his hiring for the 9th Avenue lube-tech position. Prior to his employment at the 9th Avenue facility, Petitioner worked at Respondent’s Navy Boulevard facility. He was there for a single day. The circumstances of his departure were not explained. When Petitioner started work at 9th Avenue, he was provided with employee procedures handbooks issued by Respondent and by Lyons HR, Respondent’s payroll management company. Both handbooks contained policies prohibiting sexual harassment, and provided means for reporting complaints. On June 6, 2013, Petitioner signed written acknowledgement pages for each of the handbooks. Respondent’s employee procedures handbook had been revised in March 2013. The written acknowledgement page signed by Petitioner for Respondent’s employee procedures handbook was for an earlier revision. The evidence was persuasive that the page signed by Petitioner was one of a stack “kept in a drawer” for that purpose, a stack that had not been replaced when the handbook was updated. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Petitioner received the employee procedures handbooks issued by Respondent and Lyons HR. In addition, current handbooks were available at each of Respondent’s facilities for the employees’ use. Petitioner alleged in his Employment Complaint of Discrimination that he was hired at 9th Avenue because it was the only one of Respondent’s locations at which African- Americans were employed, which Petitioner attributed to Ms. Abbott’s alleged desire “to be with a black guy.”1/ The preponderance of the evidence establishes that Respondent employed African-American workers at its other locations, in positions including those of manager and technician. Lube-techs are employed by Respondent to perform oil changes. As they gain experience, they may be assigned to perform simple maintenance work. Technicians are employed by Respondent to perform a range of automotive repairs. Technicians are required to own a set of mechanics’ tools sufficient to perform more complex work, involving mechanical work, repair and replacement of water pumps, power steering pumps and the like. When he was hired as a lube-tech at 9th Avenue, Petitioner had neither the skills nor the tools to perform work as a technician. When he started work, Petitioner was perceived as a very good employee, doing work without being asked, cleaning, and generally doing extra work around the facility. As a result, Petitioner received a raise of 25 cents per hour after six-to-eight weeks on the job. Technician work is desirable because technicians have the ability to earn commissions. Petitioner soon began asking for technician work. His requests were refused. Although Petitioner was allowed to do some extra work, Mr. Geiger believed that he was not ready to be a full-time technician. On August 5, 2013, Morgan Hancock was hired as a technician at 9th Avenue. He had previously been a technician at another Precision facility. Petitioner felt as though he should have been given the opportunity to work as a technician, and there began to be friction between Petitioner and Mr. Hancock. As a result of the perceived slight at his not being promoted to technician, Petitioner began to exhibit a “bad attitude” and his performance began to “slack off.” His willingness to do more undesirable tasks that were expected of all employees, including cleaning, deteriorated over the ensuing weeks. He made several requests to transfer to a technician’s position at other Precision facilities, discussing the matter with both Ms. Abbott and Mr. Geiger. The dates of the verbal requests are unclear, though it appears that one was made on September 5, 2013, and one was made to Mr. Geiger within two weeks prior to Petitioner’s November 20, 2013, termination. The evidence is persuasive that the requests to transfer were denied for a number of non-discriminatory reasons. First, as set forth above, Petitioner did not have sufficient skills or an adequate set of tools to work as a technician. Second, Precision had been cutting back on employees, and there were no positions open at the other facilities for someone of Petitioner’s level of skill and experience. Finally, one of Petitioner’s requests was for a transfer to the Navy Boulevard facility. Petitioner had previously worked there for a short period, and the manager simply did not want him back. There is no evidence to support a finding that Petitioner’s requests for transfer were denied as a result of some racial animus, or as a result of Ms. Abbott’s alleged sexual desire for Petitioner. By the time Petitioner was at the end of his 90-day probationary period, his performance was such that he did not receive a discretionary salary increase. The evidence is persuasive that the decision was based on Petitioner’s increasingly poor job performance and not, as alleged by Petitioner, retaliation by Ms. Abbott for Petitioner’s failure to satisfy her sexual requests. On September 26, 2013, at Petitioner’s request, Ms. Abbott wrote a letter on Precision letterhead stating that Petitioner had worked for Precision since August 6, 2012. Petitioner had, in fact, started work for Precision in June 2013. Petitioner characterized the letter as evidence of Ms. Abbott’s willingness to falsify a document as a means of gaining favor with Petitioner, and as an enticement for Petitioner to provide sexual favors. Ms. Abbott testified, convincingly, that Petitioner asked her to write the letter so he could show one year of Florida residency, and therefore qualify for in-state tuition at George Stone, a technical center in Pensacola, where he wanted to take classes to gain skills to be a technician. She wanted to help him, and so wrote the letter knowing it to be false. Mr. McCoy witnessed Ms. Abbott giving the letter to Petitioner, and testified it was accompanied by no suggestive remarks. Her agreement to write the letter on Petitioner’s behalf was ill-advised, and upon its discovery, she was reprimanded by Mr. Gerhardt. The letter does not, by any means, suggest that Respondent or Ms. Abbott discriminated against Petitioner in any way, or that Ms. Abbott used the letter as an inducement for Petitioner to provide her with sexual favors. On October 7, 2013, Bret Ramsey was hired at 9th Avenue. Mr. Ramsey, who is Caucasian, was a technician who had previously worked at Respondent’s Navy Boulevard location. Mr. Ramsey worked at 9th Avenue for two weeks, at which time he transferred back to Navy Boulevard. Mr. Geiger could not remember the reason for Mr. Ramsey’s transfer, but assumed that Navy Boulevard was in need of an experienced and qualified technician. As to whether Petitioner would have been a suitable candidate for the transfer, Mr. Gerhardt testified credibly that the manager of the Navy Boulevard location would not accept Petitioner due to his past employment there. Mr. Ramsey’s transfer does not support a finding that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race, or that Ms. Abbott was “keeping” Petitioner at 9th Avenue to satisfy her sexual urges. Respondent required its employees to “clock-out” for their lunch hour and leave the premises. By so doing, it was easier to ensure that work hours were not confused with off-duty lunch hours and to “keep payroll straight.” Respondent’s policy was applied evenly to all employees. Ms. Abbott would occasionally buy lunch for all of the employees at 9th Avenue, either when they were busy, or as thanks for their hard work. Petitioner characterized Ms. Abbott’s acts of kindness and gratitude towards the employees of 9th Avenue as “buying me expensive lunches” to induce cooperation with her requests for sexual favors, a characterization that finds no evidentiary support. Petitioner testified that Ms. Abbott would come to work drunk. Aside from the fact that Ms. Abbott’s state of sobriety, or lack thereof, has no bearing on whether Petitioner was subject to racial discrimination or sexual harassment, the evidence was insufficient to support Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner testified that Ms. Abbott cut his hours as retaliation for his failure to submit to her sexual advances. The time records for Petitioner demonstrates that Petitioner worked 40-hours plus overtime on 19 of the 23 weeks that he was employed at 9th Avenue, including five of his last six full weeks of employment. The other four weeks ranged from 35.90 to 38.68 hours per week. Thus, there is nothing to support the assertion that Petitioner’s hours were cut for any reason. Petitioner’s supposition that Ms. Abbott may have altered his time records--which records are managed and kept by Lyons HR--is not persuasive. Petitioner’s Termination On November 18, 2013, Ms. Abbott, after having spent the day cleaning the service pits, instructed employees to place all cars needing service on the facility’s lift racks, and not over the pits. That day, Petitioner pulled a car into position over a pit. Mr. McCoy advised Petitioner that Ms. Abbott had instructed that all cars were to be put on a rack. Petitioner responded to the effect that if Ms. Abbott wanted the car racked, she could rack it herself, sprinkling his response with some choice profanities. His response was loud enough that Ms. Abbott could overhear it through the window between the shop and the reception area. As a result of what Ms. Abbott understandably perceived as insubordination, she prepared a written warning based on the fact that “employee was told multiple times to place vehicles on lifts not over pit [and] refused.” She presented the Discipline/Discharge Form to Petitioner, who refused to sign the form to acknowledge receipt. Mr. McCoy was called in to witness that Petitioner refused to sign the warning. Petitioner became argumentative with Ms. Abbott, who then instructed him to go home for the day. Upon leaving the premises, Petitioner “peeled out” of the parking lot, spraying gravel in the direction of other parked cars. By that time, Ms. Abbott had called Mr. Geiger to discuss the circumstances of the written warning. Mr. Geiger was able to hear the sound of Petitioner’s exit from the premises. That act was taken by Mr. Geiger and Ms. Abbott as a second instance of misconduct warranting discipline. Ms. Abbott discussed the situation regarding Petitioner with Mr. Geiger and Mr. Gerhardt. The decision was made by the three of them, based upon that day’s behavior and Petitioner’s increasingly bad attitude, that Ms. Abbott should terminate Petitioner from employment. November 19, 2013, was a scheduled day off for Petitioner. When Petitioner returned to work on November 20, 2013, he presented Ms. Abbott with a letter in which he requested a transfer to another Precision location. In his letter, he indicated that he had previously discussed a transfer with Ms. Abbott because of “lack of communication, lack of supervision, lack of procedure standards and underlying personality conflicts.” No mention was made of any discriminatory or sexually inappropriate actions on the part of Precision or Ms. Abbott. Petitioner requested that Ms. Abbott sign the transfer request to acknowledge receipt, which she did. Her acknowledgement of receipt of the transfer request does not support a finding that Respondent or Ms. Abbott discriminated against Petitioner. Ms. Abbott advised Petitioner that a transfer was out of the question, and that he was being terminated from employment. Petitioner demanded that she give him a copy of his termination papers. Ms. Abbott advised that he would be faxed his Termination Record by Respondent’s human resources department. Petitioner then left the premises. He was subsequently sent a copy of the Termination Record as stated. Uniform Return When Petitioner left the employ of Respondent, he failed to return the company-issued uniforms, valued at $466.00. On January 6, 2014, after several verbal attempts by Ms. Abbott to recover the uniforms, Mr. Gerhardt sent a certified letter to Petitioner at his address of record. The address to which the letter was mailed, 6881 Twiggs Lane, Pensacola, Florida 32305, is the same address provided to the FCHR by Petitioner in his December 29, 2013 Employment Complaint of Discrimination, and his July 21, 2014 Petition for Relief. Mr. Gerhardt’s letter advised Petitioner that if he did not return the uniforms by January 31, 2014, the matter would be turned over to the state attorney. Petitioner did not return the uniforms and, as promised, the matter was turned over to law enforcement. Respondent has taken legal action to recover uniforms from former employees in the past, including Caucasian former employees. Ultimate Findings of Fact Up to and including the time of his termination, Petitioner did not contact the employee hotline, file a complaint, discuss with co-workers or management, or otherwise claim that he had been the subject of discrimination because of his race, or that Ms. Abbott had acted in a sexually inappropriate way towards him. No witness, other than Petitioner, testified that they ever saw Ms. Abbott dress “provocatively” or in other than standard work attire, ever heard Ms. Abbott tell off-color or racially-charged jokes, or ever heard or observed Ms. Abbott interacting with Petitioner in an inappropriate manner. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that any personnel decisions regarding Petitioner, including those regarding his requests to transfer, his written warning, and his termination, were made due to Petitioner’s race, or in furtherance of any effort to sexually harass or obtain sexual favors from Petitioner. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that any persons who were not members of the Petitioner’s protected class, i.e., African-American, were treated differently from Petitioner, or were not subject to similar personnel policies and practices.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Precision Tune Auto Care, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Reggie Dancy, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-0068. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2014.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent, Lehigh Portland Cement Company/Furniture Division ("Lehigh"), discriminated against the Petitioner on account of her race (white) by discharging her from employment following a verbal altercation with a black co- employee in which the Petitioner allegedly uttered racial slurs directed at or concerning that black co-employee and whether the Petitioner was discriminated against on account of her sex (female) and because of a perceived interracial, personal relationship with another co-employee, who is black.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a former employee of Lehigh. She was discharged by that concern on August 4, 1989 as a disciplinary measure in response to her utterance of racial slurs concerning a black co-worker in the vicinity of the factory floor on Lehigh's premises immediately before the workday began on the date in question. She ultimately filed a charge of discrimination raising the issues and commencing the proceedings referenced in the above Statement of Issues and Preliminary Statement. Lehigh is a furniture manufacturer located in Marianna, Florida. Its plant consists of several large buildings where employees assemble and finish furniture. Lehigh employs somewhat over 400 persons at that factory. On the morning of August 2, 1989, Dorothy Hall and Major Hallmon, both black co-workers of the Petitioner, were having a discussion concerning union business just before the workday commenced on or in the vicinity of the shop floor of Lehigh's factory. Ms. Hall was a shop steward for the union in the paint shop, where the Petitioner was employed. Mr. Hallmon was the chief union steward for Lehigh as a whole. Ms. Hall was expressing concern to Mr. Hallmon about employees in her department or "shop", including the Petitioner, avoiding her, in her capacity as shop steward, and presenting problems directly to Mr. Hallmon when issues or incidents arose which they felt involved the responsibility of their union representatives. Ms. Hall mentioned the Petitioner as one of the employees who had complained about her to Mr. Hallmon. While Ms. Hall was making these comments to Mr. Hallmon, the Petitioner approached them and interrupted their conversation, getting into a verbal altercation with Ms. Hall. Mr. Hallmon attempted to get the Petitioner to cease arguing and yelling. Lehigh's personnel management procedures require that if employees engage in a physical or verbal altercation in their work area, they must cease arguing or fighting and move the disagreement to their supervisor's office for their supervisor to handle with them in an adult manner. Ms. Hall retreated from the confrontation with the Petitioner and walked into the office of George Williams, the supervisor of both of them. The Petitioner then made loud comments which were overheard by a number of co-workers. During their argument, or about the time Ms. Hall walked away in the direction of the supervisor's office, she referred to the Petitioner as a "stupid, white fool" or a "white fool". When the Petitioner walked away from the site of their verbal altercation, a white co-worker, Annette White, told the Petitioner that "Dorothy said she is going to whip your tail" or words to that effect. At this point, the Petitioner responded "I am not afraid of no black ass nigger." The Petitioner's comments were made in a very loud voice and were overheard by a number of co-workers nearby although Ms. Hall, herself, did not hear them nor did Mr. Hallmon. Anne Hamlin, a white woman, who worked in the Petitioner's department, heard the Petitioner say the above-quoted comment. Ms. Hamlin admonished the Petitioner that she should not be calling people by that name. Wilford Pittman, a black man, observed Mr. Hallmon trying to calm the Petitioner during or shortly after her verbal altercation with Ms. Hall. He heard the Petitioner use the word "nigger" and state words to the effect that "I am not scared of that nigger". Odell Harrison, a white man, also heard the Petitioner state "I am not scared of that nigger". Ron Baker, a black man, heard the Petitioner reference Ms. Hall as "a black son of a bitch". The Petitioner, herself, admitted that she stated "I am not afraid of no black ass nigger". The Petitioner immediately joined Ms. Hall in the office of the supervisor after the above incident. Mr. Jack Toole, a crew leader, was also present in the office on that occasion. The argument was renewed once the Petitioner and Ms. Hall were together in the supervisor's office. During the course of their renewed argument, in one of the Petitioner's comments, she used the words "I am white" to which Ms. Hall retorted "No you ain't, your shorts is white". Mr. Toole, who was present during the argument in the supervisor's office, recalls Ms. Hall telling the Petitioner that she was "a white fool for fooling around with Major Hallmon and ruining his life". He also recalls Ms. Hall first coming into the office when he was already present and stating words to the effect that "if we didn't do something about that white woman out there, she would do something with her". Mr. Williams remembers Ms. Hall stating "you make an old fool out of Major". The Petitioner then made a comment to the effect that Ms. Hall should stay home and tend to her "thieving husband" and stay out of other people's business, whereupon Ms. Hall picked up an ashtray as though to strike the Petitioner. Mr. Toole grabbed her arm and took the ashtray from her hand, replacing the ashtray on the desk. The signal to begin work then sounded and Mr. Williams instructed both antagonists to leave his office and begin work. Lehigh has a very specific policy prohibiting racial slurs. That policy provides: Further, it is a stated policy of Lehigh to prevent and prohibit discriminatory conduct in the work environment including statements or actions which could be interpreted as, racially, sexually, religiously or ethnically based, sexual harassment or any other discriminatory harassment or conduct with respect to co-employees, subordinate employees, or supervisors. Any employee who is found to have violated this policy will be subject to discipline, up to and including discharge. This equal employment opportunity policy was posted on all of the company's bulletin boards in the work place in early 1987 and was so maintained and posted forward of that time. Lehigh's management had experienced two disciplinary incidents in the past where two employees, Mr. Cecil Sims and Mr. Coy Jackson, both white, had used the word "nigger", in a conversational context with two black co-employees or in a circumstance where those employees overheard the comment, although it was not uttered in the course of an argument or verbal altercation. Those employees were disciplined by Lehigh for uttering that word, which is found to constitute a "racial slur". Shortly thereafter, during contract negotiations with the union in November of 1988, union representatives informed Lehigh's management that they felt that Lehigh was not enforcing its anti-discrimination policy as vigorously as it should, with the Sims and Jackson incidents used as examples of the union's perception that management's disciplinary practices with regard to the use of this racial slur by employees was too lax. Although Lehigh's management took the view, and still does, that it had taken appropriate disciplinary action in those two prior incidents, Lehigh also agreed with union representatives that such racial slurs constituted a serious offense and agreed that the company would thenceforth enforce its discrimination policy more vigorously. Lehigh's policy, with regard to racial slurs, includes its view that the word "nigger" is one of the most severe or offensive words used to disparage or embarrass a person on account of that person's race. This interpretation of its anti-discrimination policy is a reasonable one because it was established in the record that that word, dating from the time of slavery in America forward to the present time, has been used essentially as a term of disparagement. It is one of the few words in the American vocabulary most likely to demean the person to whom it is directed, to arouse ill will between the person employing the word and the person or persons to whom it is directed, or about whom it is referenced, and even to incite violence between them. It is rational for Lehigh to consider that the use of that racial slur is one of the most severe offenses to which its anti-discrimination policy is directed and designed to prohibit and prevent. In carrying out its disciplinary policy and procedures, Lehigh investigates alleged violations of company rules or policies to find out what occurred and to determine if a rule or policy was, indeed, violated. That customary procedure was performed in the instant case situation. If the management of Lehigh determines that an employee has violated a rule or policy of the company, it evaluates the nature of the offense and views it against the past employment and disciplinary record of the employee to determine what discipline, if any, is appropriate. The management of the company considers the severity of the offense; whether the violation was a willful one; whether it was done with malice; whether the employee under investigation was the aggressor in the incident; the degree of provocation for that employee's behavior; whether the employee expresses or demonstrates any remorse for the occurrence; and the employee's past general work history and disciplinary record. All of these factors are weighed by the company's management in determining what discipline is appropriate. The company customarily has viewed the disciplinary history of an employee as a very significant factor in determining the appropriate discipline to be imposed for a violation of company rules or policies under review as to that employee. In imposing discipline for infractions of company rules or policies, Lehigh employs progressive discipline whenever possible in order to attempt to persuade the employee to change his or her behavior which has resulted in the violation. If an employee exhibits a pattern of rule infractions, especially infractions of the same rule or type of rules, the company imposes a progressively harsher discipline. When considering an employee's past disciplinary record, the company considers only disciplinary violations which have occurred within the past nine months, however. This is because the company's union contract, by which it is bound in terms of its personnel policies and procedures with regard to its union-member employees, contains a provision which requires this restriction. This provision has been applied to all hourly employees of Lehigh for the life of that contract or approximately the past 18 years. It is thus a regular and customary past practice of the company for purposes of the terms of its union contract. The disciplinary measures, which the company imposes for infractions of its rules and policies, range from an oral reprimand (the imposition of which is recorded in the employee's personnel record even if delivered verbally); a written reprimand; suspension from employment for a discreet time period; and permanent discharge from employment. Mr. Albert Berger is the Vice President of Operations for Lehigh. He is responsible for personnel management, among other duties. His personnel management duties include the investigation of alleged infractions of the company's personnel policies and rules, interpreting the company's disciplinary policies and procedures and arriving at decisions about how to discipline employees. Mr. Berger investigated the subject incident involving the Petitioner and Ms. Hall, ultimately determined how to discipline each employee and imposed that discipline. He followed the company's disciplinary policies and procedures in deciding how to discipline the Petitioner and Ms. Hall concerning the incident of August 2, 1989. Upon learning of the incident between those two employees on August 2, 1989, Mr. Berger commenced an investigation of the matter that same day. After making a preliminary inquiry into the matter, he elected to suspend the Petitioner from work sometime on the morning of August 2, 1989, such that she left the company premises under suspension shortly before Noon. He continued his investigation that afternoon, conducting taped interviews with employees and supervisors who had witnessed the altercation. Those witnesses later signed summaries of their statements to Mr. Berger. The Petitioner returned to the factory between 1:00 and 2:00 on the afternoon of August 2, 1989, while Mr. Berger was still concluding his interviews of other employees and supervisors. He gave the Petitioner an opportunity to relate her version of the incident to him. During her taped interview, the Petitioner was very loud and hostile in her demeanor and statements and responses to his questions. She repeatedly employed the term "nigger" with reference to Ms. Hall and her version of the occurrence in question. During the course of the hearing, the Petitioner attempted to explain her behavior during the taped interview with Mr. Berger by insinuating that she was under the influence of alcohol when she exhibited loud and hostile demeanor and comments during the interview, including the use of the term "nigger". She attempted to substantiate this claim by stating that she had consumed several six-packs of beer between the time she left the company premises under suspension shortly before Noon on August 2, 1989 and the time of her interview with Mr. Berger at approximately 2:00 that afternoon. She did not, however, appear drunk or under the influence of alcohol to Mr. Berger when he interviewed her nor did her verbal statements and responses depicted on the tape of that interview justify a finding that she was drunk or under the influence of alcohol at the time of the interview. Moreover, this explanation of her conduct during the interview is self-serving and is thus deemed not credible. Upon concluding his investigation and in the process of determining what, if any, discipline to impose on the two protagonists, Mr. Berger reviewed and considered the employment histories of both the Petitioner and Ms. Hall. Ms. Hall's disciplinary record was a good one. Her most recent disciplinary offense had occurred 13 years before the August 2, 1989 incident. She had been disciplined only one other time, approximately 16 years before the August 2, 1989 incident. Under its union contract, Lehigh was prohibited from considering those two disciplinary incidents in deciding whether and how to impose discipline for the current August 2, 1989 occurrence because those disciplinary infractions occurred more than nine months prior to the August 2, 1989 incident. In addition to the fact that her disciplinary record was a good one with no disciplinary infractions for more than a decade, Ms. Hall readily expressed remorse for her involvement in the incident, apologizing to Mr. Berger and promising to let no such occurrence happen in the future. Because of this and because Lehigh's management, through Mr. Berger, viewed the racial slur "nigger", loudly uttered by the Petitioner, as more egregious than the remark "white fool", "old fool", or "you're not white, your shorts are white", made by Ms. Hall, a lesser discipline was imposed upon Ms. Hall. Mr. Berger imposed a written warning upon Ms. Hall for picking up the ashtray as a threatening gesture directed to the Petitioner and a verbal warning upon her for the above- quoted name calling. This is not a minimal sanction. Written memoranda of both types of discipline are made a part of such an cmployee's personnel record. Concerning the discipline imposed upon the Petitioner, the record establishes that on June 23, 1989, less than two months prior to the incident concerning Ms. Hall, the Petitioner received a three-day suspension for interference with company operations through the use of abusive language directed at another employee. This incident involved the Petitioner painting the words "High Ass" on the door front of a piece of furniture and sending it down the assembly line so that it could be viewed by the co-worker to whom the words were directed. The Petitioner admitted that the words were directed at a black co-worker who was farther down the assembly line. In conjunction with her suspension, Mr. Berger warned her that if she continued to engage in name calling or racial slurs, the consequences for the next such incident would be more severe, including the potential loss of her employment. Mr. Berger concluded and the record establishes that the Petitioner's conduct on August 2, 1989 clearly violated the company's explicit policy against racially-discriminatory conduct in the work place, as that policy is quoted in the above Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's conduct on August 2, 1989, along with the incident leading to her earlier suspension for similar conduct, establishes a pattern of abusive, racially-discriminatory behavior towards her co-workers. Further, the Petitioner was shown to be the aggressor in the incident, interrupting the private conversation between Ms. Hall and Mr. Hallmon, and making statements or comments which incited the ensuing argument and name-calling episode. The Petitioner showed no remorse for her behavior. She was still hostile and inflammatory in her description and reaction to the occurrence concerning Ms. Hall in her interview with Mr. Berger hours later, when she had every reason to believe that her job was at stake with a strong resulting incentive to be conciliatory and remorseful in her reaction and relation of her version of the occurrence to Mr. Berger. Because of these differences in her conduct, her past record, and the severity of her infraction of company policy, as opposed to that of Ms. Hall, and because of Ms. Hall's relative demeanor and reaction to the occurrence and the subsequent summons by Mr. Berger to account for it, Mr. Berger decided, after considering all of the above factors, to convert the Petitioner's suspension to a termination. Discharging the Petitioner for the August 2, 1989 violation in consideration of the above factors related to her conduct, demeanor and past record, as opposed to that of Ms. Hall, was shown to be reasonable, pursuant to Lehigh's customarily-followed "progressive discipline" policy. The differences in severity between the actions of the Petitioner and Ms. Hall, the differences in their personnel histories, the differences in the circumstances of their actions and their demeanor and conduct after the occurrence with regard to it support the differences in the discipline imposed upon them. In attempting to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment and discrimination related to her termination, the Petitioner employed in her case the examples of Coy Jackson, a white employee and crew leader, being disciplined, but not terminated for using the term "nigger" directed at a black co-employee, Rudolph Townsend, and the similar example of Cecil Sims, a department supervisor, who is also a white man, using the term "nigger" in the presence of a black co-employee. Mr. Sims was also not terminated, but was given a lesser level of discipline. Concerning the Jackson and Sims incidents, the record establishes that in 1988, Coy Jackson spoke of Mr. Townsend, the black employee, who had complained of being cold, as follows: "Get that nigger a coat before he freezes to death." Mr. Sims, a supervisor in that same department, investigated that incident. During Mr. Sims' investigation, he questioned the employees involved about the name calling and the use of the words "black" and "nigger". Mr. Sims stated to Mr. Townsend that there were two names "you all" (meaning black people) could be called-"black" or "nigger"-and he then asked Mr. Townsend which he preferred to be called. Mr. Townsend responded that he simply wished to be called by his own name. Mr. Townsend complained about Mr. Sims' comment to him; and Mr. Berger investigated that incident, as well. He ultimately decided to give Mr. Sims a verbal warning concerning it and admonished him that he was never to use the word "nigger" again in any context and that the next incident, when it occurred, would result in his discharge. The discipline imposed on Mr. Sims was based upon the fact that Mr. Sims readily expressed remorse for the incident, that he had a long, unblemished career with Lehigh, and was then near retirement. He had had no prior history of uttering abusive language, name calling, or the use of racial slurs in the work place. Moreover, the incident occurred in Mr. Sims' office in a normal conversational tone; it was not shouted or uttered loudly on the factory floor in the presence of a number of other employees. Mr. Jackson, the crew leader who made the remark concerning the coat, was also given a verbal warning for use of the word "nigger". The imposition of a verbal warning as discipline for Mr. Jackson was directly related to the fact that Mr. Jackson had personally apologized to Mr. Townsend for making the remark even before the occurrence had been related to Mr. Berger and any investigation of the matter instituted. Moreover, he had made the comment quietly to one other employee and did not shout it in the work place before a number of other employees. Further, these two incidents occurred in February of 1988 before Lehigh elected, at the urging of the employees' union, to more vigorously enforce its policy against racial slurs, which vigorous enforcement policy it has uniformly pursued since that time. These incidents were thus not proven to be similar to the incidents involving the Petitioner and her employment and disciplinary record. Neither involved the disciplining of a black employee differently than a white employee. The Petitioner, Mr. Sims and Mr. Jackson are white. The less severe discipline imposed on Mr. Sims and Mr. Jackson was rationally related to the mitigating circumstances described above, rather than to their status as men or white men. It is also noteworthy that several years before the Petitioner's discharge, a white man employed in Lehigh's loading department, in the course of a conversation with a black employee, held up a piece of rope, apparently tied as a hangman's noose, and told the black employee that he would show him what use was made of rope in the white employee's home town. The black employee, at this juncture, hit the white employee with his fist. Mr. Berger investigated that incident, as well. Although it was alleged to him that the white employee had used the term "nigger", Mr. Berger was not able to identify a disinterested witness who would actually establish that the term had been used. In any event, however, Lehigh's management, through Mr. Berger, determined that this was a serious, malicious violation of the company's anti-discrimination policy. He promptly discharged the white employee for this conduct. The black employee, in turn, was also discharged for engaging in violence, which the company has uniformly considered to be one of the most severe violations of its disciplinary rules. Each of those employees was individually disciplined for their respective violations of company policy, based upon the circumstances peculiar to each. Neither of those incidents is similar to the incident for which Lehigh discharged the Petitioner. The discipline imposed on each of them was shown to be consistent with the company's customary anti-discrimination policy. None of the exemplary incidents described above serve to establish that white employees, male or female,(or, for that matter, black employees) have been subjected to a pattern of discriminatory disciplinary measures, including termination. They, likewise, do not show that any of those employee groups were accorded favored treatment. Rather, the facts regarding these incidents show that the company has pursued a pattern of non-discriminatory employee discipline. The employees who were disciplined in these three incidents were not shown to be similarly situated to the Petitioner, in terms of the infraction she committed, her past record, the circumstances surrounding her infraction and the investigation afterward, versus the underlying reasons for the various disciplinary measures imposed on these other employees, related above. During the hearing, the Petitioner first raised the issue of alleged discriminatory treatment because of a perceived close interracial relationship between her and Mr. Hallmon. Accordingly, she amended the Petition, ore tenus, without objection. Mr. Hallmon and the Petitioner had apparently become close friends at the point when he asked her to be his assistant in his position as chief union steward. She accepted the position. Mr. Hallmon indicated that this was because of his concerns about tensions between black and white employees. He wished a white employee to be his assistant to, as he termed it, "balance things out". That association began approximately three years ago. Mr. Hallmon and the Petitioner customarily would spend their lunch period together on frequent occasions to discuss union business. They sometimes met after work, in the parking lot next to the factory, to discuss union business because, as Mr. Hallmon put it, he maintained his union business office in the trunk of his car. The two also met many mornings prior to work for donuts and coffee. Their apparent friendship is corroborated by the fact that Mr. Hallmon elected to urge one of the witnesses to the Petitioner's behavior on August 2, 1989 to conceal her knowledge of it. He stopped Anne Hamlin in the parking lot on the day of the incident and told her that she should say nothing about it. The Petitioner has been engaged in contesting her discharge through the union grievance procedure or the administrative process before the Commission on Human Relations and the Division of Administrative Hearings for more than a year and one-half as of the time of hearing. However, she never had complained prior to the day of hearing that her friendship with Mr. Hallmon or any perceived close, personal interracial relationship between her and Mr. Hallmon had been involved in the reasons for her discharge or any discriminatory treatment she believed had been imposed upon her. Mr. Hallmon contended at the hearing that 80% of the approximately 400 workers at Lehigh had made comments about their relationship but, upon questioning about this testimony, was only able to relate two specific comments which had been made to him concerning his and the Petitioner's relationship. Neither of these comments were made by management-level personnel of Lehigh. Moreover, both the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon, as union representatives, were acquainted with procedures for bringing a grievance to the attention of management, concerning discriminatory treatment, or any other basis for a grievance and yet neither had complained concerning any perceived discriminatory treatment to management. The only instance in which management might have gained any knowledge of their alleged relationship, other than personal observation, was from a conversation between Mr. Hallmon and Mr. Berger on one occasion when Mr. Hallmon asked Mr. Berger whether there was any violation of company policy if two people, black and white, or male or female, have lunch together. Mr. Berger responded by stating, in effect, that it was not any of management's business or anyone else's business concerning which employees had lunch together. Mr. Berger, however, upon learning that Mr. Hallmon had an apparent concern about the perception which management or co-employees might have concerning his and the Petitioner's relationship, did advise him to remember that "...this is the deep south...and I wouldn't want any of these rednecks catching up with you". When asked if he could recall any discussions between management personnel concerning the amount of time Mr. Hallmon and the Petitioner spent together, Mr. Berger answered "no, it's none of our business". Although Mr. Berger had observed the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon together on several occasions, he felt that was none of his business as a manager of the company. Neither body of testimony, appearing at pages 49, 50 and 90 of the transcript nor any other testimony or evidence in this record, establishes that management had any knowledge of any pervasive discriminatory pattern of behavior in the work place by co-workers toward the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon, if such indeed existed, which was not proven. It was also not established that management had any concern with any real or perceived relationship between the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon and it was not demonstrated that it had any effect on the decision to discipline the Petitioner nor on the severity of the discipline imposed. After her termination, the Petitioner attempted to secure employment through the services of Job Services of Florida by application of August 28, 1989. Job Services referred her to Russell Corporation on September 8, 1989 and to Wal-Mart on September 21, 1989. She applied for employment unsuccessfully at both places. These were the only attempts the Petitioner made to obtain employment from the time of her August 2, 1989 termination until the hearing. Her listing, as available for employment, with Job Services of Florida became inactive on November 30, 1989. It was not established that she sought to reactivate that listing until just prior to the hearing. During the period of her unemployment, there were opportunities to seek employment which she did not avail herself of. On the date of the hearing, there were 22 jobs with private employers and 15 jobs with public employers listed with Job Services of Florida for which the Petitioner could have qualified to apply. She contended that she had looked in the help-wanted advertisements in a weekly newspaper for jobs, but there were none for which she was qualified. Local papers published in Jackson, Calhoun and Liberty counties, in the immediate vicinity of the Petitioner's residence in Altha, reveal that there were a number of advertisements for jobs during her unemployment period which she could have qualified to apply for and possibly to secure. The Petitioner's payroll records for 1988 reveal seven pay periods out of 52 when her total hours equaled or exceeded 50 hours. There were seven pay periods when she worked fewer than 40 hours per week. The average hours worked weekly during 1988 were 42.2. The highest gross pay received in 1988 was $375.76 per week, and the lowest weekly gross pay was $98.56. Her weekly gross pay on an average basis for 1988 was, thus, $273.24. The Petitioner worked 36 pay periods in 1989. She worked more than 40 hours in only eight of those weekly pay periods. The time in excess of 40 hours in these eight pay periods varied, with 5.5 hours being the largest number of hours in excess of 40 hours worked for a weekly pay period; and .3 hours was the lowest number of hours in excess of 40 hours worked for a weekly pay period. In 15 of these 36 pay periods, the Petitioner worked fewer than 40 hours. The average hours per pay period for 1989 were, thus, 33.98. She received overtime pay in eight pay periods. Her highest gross salary for any pay period in 1989 was $309.28. Her lowest gross salary for a pay period in 1989 was $51.28. Her average gross pay for 1989 was, thus, $220.72 per week. The average weekly gross pay for the entire period of her employment was $246.12. She earned $6.41 per hour at the time of her discharge. Had she remained employed, this would have increased to $6.63 per hour on December 16, 1989 and to $6.83 on December 16, 1990. She was eligible for two weeks of paid vacation per year since she had been employed for three years, and eight paid holidays per year. Federal income tax, social security, and union dues were withheld from her gross weekly pay. In 1988, income tax withholding totaled $1,022.80; social security totaled $1,066.98; and union dues totaled $110.00. In 1989, federal income tax totaled $513.97; social security totaled $596.76; and union dues totaled $96.00 for the 36 pay periods she worked in 1989. Lehigh was self- insured for health insurance and any amounts exceeding the employee contributions were to be paid by Lehigh. The employees, including the Petitioner, contributed $7.50 per week towards health insurance. Her payroll records reveal, however, that she ceased participating in the employer-provided group health insurance after the seventh pay period of 1989. In arriving at the above Findings of Fact, it has been necessary, to some extent, to reject the testimony of the Petitioner and Mr. Hallmon. This is because the Hearing Officer finds the testimony of other witnesses to the argument between the Petitioner and Ms. Hall and the surrounding circumstances and events to be more credible. The testimony of the other witnesses to these events was accepted because of their basic agreement on the significant circumstances concerning the occurrences in question and the fact that these other witnesses were demonstrated to have no reason to shade the truth concerning the occurrences and the underlying circumstances, including the fact that these witnesses, whose testimony has been accepted as more credible, are of both races involved. The Petitioner, however, is interested in the litigation and admits using the words "black ass nigger" and her tape-recorded statements made the same day of the argument in question are corroborative of the statements, behavior and demeanor on the part of the Petitioner reported by the other witnesses who have been found to be more credible and who are named in the above Findings of Fact. It is found that Mr. Hallmon's close relationship with the Petitioner might have influenced his recollection of the events in question. More significantly, his effort to actually prevent Ms. Hamlin from relating her knowledge about the incident is evidence of a bias in favor of the Petitioner. Moreover, the Petitioner's testimony about alleged recent job-search efforts was impeached because in her deposition taken approximately a week prior to hearing, she repeatedly asserted that the potential jobs at Russell and Wal-Mart were the only ones she had sought, although she maintained at hearing that she had also applied for work at Oglesby Nursery and McDonald's two or three weeks prior to hearing. She offered no explanation of why she did not mention job applications allegedly made less than a month prior to her deposition testimony. It is simply not credible that she would have forgotten those applications if, indeed, they had been made, especially since she was repeatedly asked about that subject matter at her deposition. Thus, her testimony about applying for employment with the two additional employers is deemed not credible.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations finding that the Petitioner, Donna J. Brown, was not discharged in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1989), and was not the victim of a discriminatory employment practice and, therefore, that her Petition be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6596 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-3. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter after determination of the relative credibility of the witnesses. Accepted. 6-9. Accepted. 10-11. Accepted. Accepted, but not material based upon the issues actually pled even by ore tenus amendment at hearing in this proceeding. It has not been established that the employer had knowledge, constructive or otherwise, of any pattern of usage of racial slurs by multiple employees on such a frequent basis, or with any frequency. Thus, it could not have condoned such a pattern of utterance of racial slurs if it was not shown to have known about them, nor was it established that the use of the word "nigger" by fellow employees approximately once or twice a month, as apparently heard by Mr. Hallmon, was made only by white employees. Accepted. Accepted, but not to the extent that this finding establishes a pattern of discrimination against white employees by Mr. Berger or the management of Lehigh. 15-17. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. As delineated in the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, a number of factors were considered in the decision to terminate as opposed to imposing another type or degree of discipline; not consideration of the word "nigger" alone. 20-21. Accepted. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. This finding of fact is not, in itself, materially dispositive of the issues to be adjudicated. Accepted, but not material to resolution of the relevant issues presented for adjudication. Accepted, but not material in this de novo proceeding. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's more detailed findings of fact concerning this subject matter and issue. 26-30. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter, including finding that the Petitioner did not participate in the group health insurance program any longer than the period of time delineated in the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. It has not been established that employment available for purposes of mitigation of damages for lost wages and benefits has to be precisely comparable in circumstances, condition, quality, wages or benefits or any other element in order to be a relevantly considered available job. Rejected, as contrary to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. It has not been established that the Petitioner would work 50 hours, with 10 hours of overtime, for each week which she would have worked since August 2, 1989 had she not been discharged. Such a figure is therefore speculative, rendering the figures contained in this proposed finding, other than the actual wage figures for a 40-hour work week, speculative. The Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter are adhered to and those in this paragraph are rejected as not supported by the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Rejected, as not supported by the preponderant evidence of record in light of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact concerning the liability issue. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-2. Accepted. 3. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by the record. 4-6. Accepted. 7. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely supported by the evidence of record. 8-10. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, except as modified by the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 15-17. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. 20-25. Accepted. 26. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 27-98. Accepted, except as modified by the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and by the Hearing Officer's acceptance of the proposed findings of fact by the Petitioner concerning the hourly wage rates Petitioner would have received with her next scheduled pay raises had she remained employed. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Ben R. Patterson, Esq. PATTERSON & TRAYNHAM 1215 Thomasville Road P.O. Box 4289 Tallahassee, FL 32315-4289 George J. Little, Esq. 134A Constitution Lane P.O. Box 1612 Marianna, FL 32446 John D.C. Newton, III, Esq. AURELL, RADEY, ET AL. Suite 1000, Monroe-Park Tower 101 North Monroe Street P.O. Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to Petitioner's race in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner on October 13, 1997, as a maintenance operator. Six months later he was promoted to the position of Maintenance Technician I. During his employment, Petitioner was one of six technicians. He was the only black technician. Petitioner was initially paid at a rate of $6.00 per hour. He received no pay increase with his first promotion. His yearly evaluation was delayed, but finally received by him on December 7, 1998. His evaluation for 1999 was received by December 23, 1999. His wages had climbed by this time to $8.40 per hour. His evaluations were satisfactory or above. Although Petitioner had been told he would be provided training on the job, he was relegated to the night shift, working by himself. As a consequence, he educated himself on maintenance of Respondent’s facility. In 1999, all technicians were to receive formal training. Another technician, who was white and lower in seniority than Petitioner, was selected for training before Petitioner. When Petitioner brought this to the attention of a supervisor, Petitioner was sent to other training provided by Siemen’s Corporation in Atlanta, Georgia. Petitioner stated he was treated unfairly because he was required to absorb the cost of lodging for the first night in Atlanta, prior to commencement of training. The five other technicians employed by Respondent were being paid a minimum of $11.00 per hour when Petitioner, on or about May 5, 2000, requested an increase from his current $8.40 per hour rate to $10.00 per hour. His supervisor responded that he could not grant the increase. An argument ensued and Petitioner left the office and returned to work. Later that day, Respondent’s human resource officer contacted Petitioner. He informed Petitioner that Petitioner’s employment was terminated due to “insubordination.” On Respondent’s termination form, the reason listed for Petitioner’s termination was insubordination and using “slanders to his senior manager.” The form also listed Petitioner’s absence from work on Saturday, April 29, 2000, as a reason for employment termination. In rebuttal, Petitioner produced a copy of an annual leave slip at final hearing requesting approval of his absence on the date in question. Petitioner had accumulated ample leave to cover the requested time. Respondent’s approving authority failed to approve Petitioner’s absence, but no notification was given to Petitioner. Respondent’s claim of unauthorized absence is effectively rebutted. According to a copy of a letter dated June 19, 2003, and received by DOAH on June 24, 2003, bearing the purported signature of David Anderson, registered agent for Respondent on June 20, 2002, Respondent was reputed to have ceased operation. According to statements contained in the letter, the Bank of America sold Respondent on March 10, 2002, in the “form of rights in collateral.” The letter additionally stated “unliquidated assets” in the bankruptcy were “sold in a Section 363 auction” on May 23, 2002. No direct evidence was presented on behalf of Respondent corroborating the contents of the letter and consequently the letter is not credited. Petitioner produced documentation at the final hearing, specifically a corporation reinstatement form issued by the Florida Department of State, documenting Respondent’s continued existence as of April 22, 2002.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered directing that Respondent to cease the discriminatory employment practice evidenced in this case and awarding Petitioner back pay at the rate of $10.00 per hour for each normal 40-hour work week between May 5, 2000, and the present. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael F. Coppins, Esquire Coppins & Monroe Post Office Box 14447 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4447 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dwight E. Mazion 1713 Calgary Drive Desoto, Texas 75115 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against by Respondent, based upon his race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. As such, he is a member of a protected class. Petitioner was employed as a co-manager at a Delchamps grocery store in Destin, Florida. The Destin store was a high- volume operation. In January 2001, Bruno's, Inc., acquired the Delchamps' Destin store and converted the store to a Bruno's supermarket. Petitioner was retained in the co-manager position while Bruno's conducted a full assessment of the staff and store. Under the Bruno's assessment, the company found several employees, including white employees, underperforming pursuant to Bruno's goals for high volume stores. Petitioner was one of the individuals found to be underperforming at the Destin store. On November 4, 2001, Bruno's moved Petitioner as a co- manager to a lower volume store in Niceville so that he would have a better opportunity to grasp management protocol under the Bruno's umbrella and develop professionally. During the same time period, another employee at the Destin store, Steve Aaron, who is Caucasian, was transferred to another store for the same reason. Petitioner’s duties and work conditions at the new store did not materially change. As before, all managers in the store, including himself, regardless of race, had the same hours, had the same working conditions in the store and closing the store, had the discretionary authority to hire additional staff as needed, and had an opportunity to use their discretionary authority in managing and operating the store. Petitioner’s pay and benefits at the new store, also, did not change. The transfer was abrupt since Petitioner was told to and did report to his new store immediately. The reason for the transfer was not fully explained to him. However, other than to inquire about the reason for the transfer, Petitioner did not complain about or object to the transfer even though he was aware of Bruno’s policy against racial discrimination and the various mechanisms to report such activity. There was no evidence that Petitioner’s transfer was based on Petitioner's race. Neither the abruptness nor the lack of explanation supports a finding that the transfer was based on Petitioner’s race since the transfer was part of Bruno’s review and adjustment process for the stores it had acquired, and other employees who were not members of Petitioner’s protected class were also transferred. Indeed, the evidence showed that employees of all races were and continue to be transferred from one store to another under Bruno's operations for business reasons, such as the reason that precipitated Petitioner’s transfer. Such employee development and training are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the transfer of Petitioner to another store. Petitioner offered no evidence that demonstrated the reason for his transfer was pretextual. Moreover, Petitioner's first complaint based on race regarding his transfer was filed on January 14, 2003, more than a year after his transfer and is therefore time barred. In June 2002, Bruno's Supermarkets received separate complaints from four female employees at the Niceville store that Petitioner had subjected them to unwelcomed touching, rubbing, massaging and/or kissing. The complaining employees were Dawn Lawson, Christina Gore, Donna Ermilio, and Erin Epperson. None of the young women that placed complaints against Petitioner were at risk of losing their job nor did they have anything to gain in placing the complaints against Petitioner. Dawn Lawson was an assistant deli bakery manager and subordinate of Petitioner. She complained that while at work Petitioner would rub her arms, massage her shoulders, and kissed her once while she was on the phone. All the aforementioned was unwelcomed by Ms. Lawson and made her feel uncomfortable. Petitioner did not deny these actions, but thought he was making an effort to comfort Ms. Lawson who was experiencing some personal problems. Ms. Lawson also accused Petitioner of spending an inordinate amount of time in the deli area of the store. However, the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner had been instructed to closely monitor the deli operation because it was below the standards Bruno’s expected of its deli operations. Ms. Lawson also complained that while at work, Petitioner gave her several gifts of alcohol and a card in which Petitioner wrote, "Know you are a very special someone" and drew several ‘X’s and ‘O’s. Petitioner admitted to giving the alcohol and card to Ms. Lawson, but again thought he was being friendly and trying to comfort her. Petitioner denied drawing the ‘X’s and O’s on the card. However, Petitioner’s denial is not credible since the drawing is in the same type of ink as the writing and the letters are similar to the handwritten portions of the card. Additionally, on New Year's Eve, December 31, 2001, Petitioner gave Ms Lawson a miniature bottle of Southern Comfort. Later, Petitioner called Ms. Lawson twice at her home in the early morning between 1:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. Ms. Lawson felt very uncomfortable regarding these calls. Clearly, the kiss, the late night phone calls, and the note violated Bruno’s anti-harassment policy. More importantly, at the same time Petitioner gave Ms. Lawson the Southern Comfort, he gave Erin Epperson, a co- worker of Ms. Lawson, a miniature bottle of alcohol. Petitioner knew Ms. Epperson was 19 years old and under the age at which she could legally possess or drink alcohol. Petitioner denied giving Ms. Epperson any alcohol. However, given the demeanor and candor of the witnesses, Petitioner’s denial is not credible. Providing alcohol to a minor was in violation of state law, could have caused the store to lose its liquor license or incur other penalties, and violated the store's policy of not providing alcohol to minors. This act alone justified Petitioner’s termination. Donna Ermillio, a cashier, utility clerk, and a subordinate of Petitioner similarly complained that while she was at work Petitioner would rub her arms, massage her shoulders, compliment her arms, feet and hands and tell her she was beautiful and too much "of a woman to be as young" as she was. All the aforementioned was unwelcomed by Ms. Ermillio and made her feel uncomfortable. Again, Petitioner thought that he was trying to soothe Ms. Ermilio, who was clearly nervous around him. He noticed others’ hands and feet because he had a friend who was a hand and foot model. However, Ms. Ermilio’s complaints are consistent with the other complaints received by Bruno’s and show a pattern of intrusive behavior on Petitioner’s part. Christina Gore, a cashier, customer service representative, and subordinate of Petitioner complained that Petitioner rubbed her, massaged her, and kissed her while she was at work. All the aforementioned was unwelcomed by Ms. Gore and made her feel uncomfortable. Petitioner admitted kissing Ms. Gore because she had graduated from high school. The kiss occurred after her boyfriend had walked away and Petitioner, jokingly, told Ms. Gore that he couldn't have kissed her while her boyfriend was around. Again, Petitioner’s actions were overly intrusive. In response to these complaints, the company conducted a timely and thorough investigation. The investigation included interviews and statements from Petitioner, Ms. Ermillio, Ms. Lawson, Ms. Gore, and Ms. Epperson. The evidence did not demonstrate any deficiency in the investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, the investigator, the district manager, the store manager, a representative from the legal department, and the human resources director met and reviewed the investigation and evidence. After all the aforementioned parties assessed all the evidence, the team unanimously decided to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Bruno's terminated Petitioner because he violated the company's anti-harassment policy and gave alcohol to a minor employee. There was no evidence that Bruno’s did not consistently apply these policies to other employees in its organization. The only evidence Petitioner presented regarding the consistent application of these policies was that a Danny Johnson allegedly sexually harassed Dawn Lawson and was not terminated and that a Dan Gaston also allegedly sexually harassed "someone." However, Dawn Lawson never complained to the company regarding Danny Johnson and testified that Mr. Johnson had never harassed her. Petitioner had no personal knowledge about Mr. Gaston's alleged harassment and could not provide any details. The human resources director for the store testified that no one had ever made a sexual harassment complaint against Mr. Gaston. Therefore, Petitioner failed to present evidence showing a similarly situated employee that allegedly committed the same acts as Petitioner and was not terminated. Based on the evidence, Petitioner had legitimate, non- pretextual reasons for terminating Petitioner, and this action should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing this action. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert L. Young, Jr. 409 Elaine Avenue Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32548 Dan Burchfield Bruno's Food World 800 Lakeshore Parkway Birmingham, Alabama 35211 Faye R. Rosenberg, Esquire Corporate Counsel Bruno's Food World 800 Lakeshore Parkway Birmingham, Alabama 35211 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on April 22, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male who was employed by Respondent from August 2008 until his termination on or about January 9, 2009. Respondent, Arena Sports Café (Arena), is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Arena is a restaurant/night club which offers the viewing of televised sporting events, and is generally known as a sports bar. Arena is adjacent to The Coliseum, another establishment with the same owners, Trisha Lawrence and Randy Berner. The owners are Caucasian. The Coliseum is an entertainment venue with live and recorded music, dancing, and stage acts. The Coliseum does not serve food, and does not have a kitchen. When hired in August 2008, Petitioner worked as a prep cook as part of the kitchen staff. He performed various duties including preparation of meals in the kitchen as well as preparing food for Respondent’s large salad bar. Petitioner holds a Food Handling Certificate and a Safe Serve Certificate, which he attained through a local college. Petitioner was paid $12.00 per hour, and generally worked a 40-hour work week. At the time Petitioner was hired, the Arena was brand new and very popular. When the Arena opened in August 2008, it featured lunch and dinner seven days per week. Weekends were particularly busy because college and pro football games were televised in the fall. However, the Arena saw a drop in demand for weekday lunches. During the fall of 2008, Anthony Cyr, a Caucasian, was employed by Arena as its general manager. Petitioner was already employed by Respondent when Mr. Cyr began employment there. According to Petitioner, Mr. Cyr used the word “nigger” (the "N" word) in the context of telling a joke on three occasions in October and November 2008. Mr. Cyr used this word in the presence of the kitchen staff, including Petitioner. Petitioner informed Mr. Cyr that this was offensive and objected. Mr. Cyr did not use the "N" word other than these three occasions, and did not use it again after Petitioner objected. Petitioner did not report this incident to anyone, including the owners of Arena. As one of the owners of Arena, Ms. Lawrence would sometimes eat meals at Arena. At some point in January 2009, she voiced her displeasure to Mr. Cyr as to meals which she believed to have been prepared by Petitioner. She was never made aware of Petitioner’s allegations regarding the use of racial slurs by Mr. Cyr. According to Ms. Lawrence, she instructed Mr. Cyr to terminate Petitioner from employment because of his cooking abilities. Mr. Cyr informed Petitioner that his employment was terminated, and informed him that it was due to his job performance. Mr. Cyr also informed Petitioner that the decision to terminate Petitioner was Ms. Lawrence’s, not his. Mr. Cyr’s testimony regarding using the “N” word contradicts Petitioner’s testimony, and is somewhat inconsistent with Ms. Lawrence’s testimony regarding the reason Petitioner was fired. That is, Mr. Cyr denies using the “N” word in front of Petitioner. As for the reason he fired Petitioner, Mr. Cyr testified that it was due to a reduction in business following football season. There is no dispute, however, that Ms. Lawrence was the decisionmaker regarding the decision to fire Petitioner. Regarding the conflicting testimony as to whether Mr. Cyr used the “N” word, the undersigned finds Petitioner’s testimony in this regard to be credible and more persuasive. That is, the undersigned finds that Mr. Cyr did use the “N” word in front of Petitioner in the workplace. As for the reason Petitioner was fired, Ms. Lawrence did acknowledge that business slowed down at Arena around the time she instructed Mr. Cyr to fire Petitioner, and that the salad bar was phased out the month after Petitioner was terminated. However, she insists that she instructed Mr. Cyr to fire Petitioner because of the quality of his cooking. In any event, there does not appear to be a dispute that Mr. Cyr told Petitioner that he was being fired due to job performance issues. At some time after Petitioner was terminated, Mr. Cyr was terminated from Arena because, in Ms. Lawrence’s words, he “was not that great.” When Petitioner was terminated, two Caucasian cooks remained employed at Arena. While Petitioner was not actually replaced, his duties were assumed by the remaining Caucasian staff. Since his termination, Petitioner has worked for approximately three weeks at another eating establishment. Otherwise, he has been unsuccessful finding employment despite his efforts. Respondent employs minorities and non-minorities in positions with both Arena and The Coliseum. The undersigned has reviewed the evidence of record, oral and written, as to the number of minority and non-minority employees and as to whether Respondent hired primarily non-minority persons in the better paying positions. The evidence of record is insufficient to support a finding that Respondent engaged in racially motivated hiring practices. There is no evidence that Petitioner complained to Ms. Lawrence or the other owner of Arena that he was being discriminated against on the basis of race. When he complained to Mr. Cyr, the offending remarks stopped. There was no competent evidence presented that Ms. Lawrence knew of the racial slur used by Mr. Cyr in the workplace in Petitioner’s presence. There is no evidence that Ms. Lawrence’s decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was related in any way to any racial remark used by Mr. Cyr.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: David Glasser, Esquire Glasser & Handel 116 Orange Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Steven deLaroche, Esquire 1005 South Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
