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GREY C. ENGLISH vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 87-001931 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-001931 Latest Update: Sep. 18, 1987

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Grey C. English, has worked for DOT, primarily in its Okeechobee, Florida office, for approximately seven years. At the time in question, he was serving as an HMT II, crew leader, with job duties that included various equipment and machinery maintenance and general road work. In some cases he served as crew leader and in other cases, he was merely a member of the crew. In April, 1986, Mr. English filed a charge of discrimination against DOT before the Florida Commission on Human Relations alleging that he had been passed over for promotion and discriminated against therein because of his race (Black). Part of the allegation involved Mr. R. C. Roberts, who concurred in the selection of another applicant over the Petitioner when he knew there was an irregularity in the selection process. Petitioner presented this evidence in an effort to discredit Mr. Roberts' testimony for Respondent here on the basis of bias, but was unsuccessful. In January 1987, Petitioner and DOT entered into a settlement agreement which disposed of the Petitioner's charge of discrimination without assessing blame, but as a result of which, Petitioner was paid the sum of $2,656.40. This sum was paid by state warrant dated February 13, 1987 which, it is concluded, was received by Petitioner several days later. Attendance documents maintained by DOT reflect that on February 13, 1987, which was a Friday, Petitioner was on authorized leave without pay. On February 16, 1987, the following Monday, he worked 7.3 hours and was authorized leave the remainder of the time. Between Tuesday, February 17 and Thursday, February 19, 1987, Petitioner was present for duty performing safety duties. However, on Friday, February 20, 1987, he was placed on unauthorized leave without pay and remained in that status through March 19, 1987. Michelle L. King, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, relates that on February 19, 1987, when Petitioner came to work, she advised him where his work site would be and with whom he would be working. According to Ms. King, when so advised, Petitioner indicated he would not work with Mr. Mills, apparently one of his prospective co-workers, and walked off the job. Shortly thereafter, Ms. King received a phone call from Petitioner's mother who advised her that Petitioner's grandfather was seriously ill and in the hospital and Petitioner's presence was needed at the hospital to assist in caring for him. When Ms. King immediately went to look for Petitioner, she found him sitting in his car approximately one half block from the DOT yard where she advised him of the message she had received. At this point; Petitioner immediately left the area presumably to go to the hospital. According to Ms. King, he did not ask permission to leave then nor did he ask for any time off during the succeeding days for which he was marked in an unauthorized absence status. During that entire period, however, she did not try to reach him by phone or in person even though she had his phone number on record in the office and knew where he lived. She admits she made no effort to reach Petitioner to tell him his job was in jeopardy because she felt, he had walked off the job and was not, therefore, entitled to that consideration. She merely reported the Petitioner's status to her supervisor, Mr. Lanier, and considered the matter closed. Mr. Lanier indicates he made no effort to contact Petitioner either. Petitioner admits that he was sitting in his car with the mechanic who repaired it; away from the job site, when he was advised of his grandfather's illness. He contends he had left the job earlier that morning because he, himself, was ill, not because he did not want to work with Mr. Mills and he contends that his continued absence from work was occasioned by the need for him to remain with his grandfather in the hospital for the period of time of his absence because there were no other family members available to do so. He contends he stayed with his grandfather, who was ill with and ultimately died of cancer, the entire time. There is no evidence of record, however, to indicate that Petitioner requested or was placed on sick leave when he left work on the morning in question. Petitioner also claims that on one occasion several days after February 19, 1987, he met Ms. Kings, Ms. Chapman, and Mr. Lanier, another supervisor, in a local restaurant during the lunch hour. At that time he told them that he would have to have some time off for a few days because of his grandfather's illness but that he would stay in touch. Petitioner contends that this absence was approved by either Mr. Lanier or Ms. King and he was given no instructions to call in or take any other action regarding his absence. The meeting is confirmed by Mr. Branchaud, a co-worker, who observed Petitioner in a conversation with Mr. Lanier but he cannot say for certain what the specifics of the conversation were. Both Mr. Lanier and Ms. King deny any such meeting took place and this is confirmed by Ms. Chapman. Ms. King and Ms. Chapman, as well as Mr. Lanier, though all employees of DOT, have nothing to gain by telling an untruth or giving perjured testimony regarding the situation involving Petitioner. Consequently, it is found that Mr. English did not get permission from either Mr. Lanier or Ms. King to be absent, and that, therefore, his absence between February 19, 1987 and March 10, 1987 was unexcused. During the period of Petitioner's absence, on March 4, 1987; a DOT official, by certified letter, advised him of his continued absence without approved leave and directed him to report to his duty section by 8:00 am on March 9, 1987 under pain of termination for a failure to comply. The return receipt executed by someone reflecting Mrs. Grey English indicates that the letter was received at Petitioner's home address in Okeechobee on March 11, 1987, one day after the action was taken to terminate him. Petitioner contends that he did not receive that letter and that on the date in question, there was no Mrs. Grey English. He was living at that residence, he contends, with his mother whose name is not English. No other female at that address bore the name Mrs. Grey English. The girl friend who he sometimes identified as his wife was not living at his address at the time the letter was received and did not sign for it in his behalf. Be that as it may, the letter was receipted for by an adult at the Petitioner's address. He did not, however, thereafter comply with the terms of the letter and termination action was taken by DOT on March 10, 1987 when the District Director sent him a letter notifying him of his termination by certified mails return receipt requested. Petitioner, as was stated previously, denies any intention to abandon his position and denies having received any letter of warning. He was, however, fully aware of the department's procedures for obtaining leave authorization and obviously failed to take any of the necessary steps to secure that authorization, instead relying on a purported casual meeting with his supervisor at a restaurant where he supposedly received verbal permission to be absent. This is not persuasive. His credibility, in addition, is somewhat suspect in that he has already demonstrated his willingness to falsify official documentation if it suits his purpose. Petitioner admits that several years prior to the instance in question, he, though not married, filled out certain official documentation for DOT claiming his girlfriend to be his wife for the purpose of putting her on his record as beneficiary of his insurance with the department. He claims he was advised by some official of the department to do this but does not indicate who this individual was. Even if that were the case, he recognized at the time that the lady was not his wife and was nonetheless willing to falsify documentation if it was to his benefit to do so. Consequently, his willingness to be less than candid when it suits his purpose to be so has been established and in this case, the better weight of the evidence establishes clearly that notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary, he walked off the job without authority and made no effort to take any action necessary to preserve his employment status. It is, therefore, concluded that he did abandon his position.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Grey C. English, be terminated from employment with the Department of Transportation effective March 11, 1987. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of September, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1931 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. By the Petitioner 1-2. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 1. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 9. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 9. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 10, except for the last section thereof relating to a restatement of his testimony at the hearing, which is not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected. Petitioner was not terminated for excessive absenteeism. The respondent was considered to have resigned his position with the Department of Transportation and the rules regarding disciplinary termination are not relevant to this situation. 9-12. Irrelevant. 13-17. Rejected as not Finding of Fact. By the Respondent Accepted. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 9. 3-4. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 9. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 10. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 10. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 9. 8-9. Accepted. 10-13. Irrelevant. Rejected as not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Isidro Garcia, Esquire Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc. 572 S.W. 2nd Street Belle Glade, Florida 33430 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ROBERT J. RICHMOND vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 00-004215 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Oct. 11, 2000 Number: 00-004215 Latest Update: Feb. 15, 2001

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Children and Family Services (the "Department"), was overpaid in the amount of $826.82 and should be required to repay that amount to the Department.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: On June 5, 1995, Petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with Respondent to resolve certain disciplinary matters not directly relevant to this case. For purposes of this proceeding, the key element of the settlement agreement was that Petitioner would accept a voluntary demotion. The terms of the settlement agreement provided that Petitioner would retain his current salary status for a period not to exceed five years, though it would exceed the maximum for his new pay grade. On June 7, 1995, the Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC") entered a final order approving the settlement agreement in disposition of Petitioner's complaint. Petitioner did not appeal the final order. Rule 60K-2.004(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that a demoted state employee's base rate of pay may exceed the maximum of the salary range to which the employee has been demoted for a maximum of five years. Petitioner's base rate of pay was allowed to exceed the maximum of his new pay grade for the full five years. During this period, Petitioner benefited from pay grade increases, received a reclassification of his position, and was not promoted. The five-year period ended in June 2000. Respondent's main office in Tallahassee twice per year issues a computer-generated list of employees receiving pay over the maximum of their pay grades. Human resources employees in Respondent's branch offices then examine the list to determine whether these employees' base rate of pay should continue to exceed the maximum. Respondent issued an "Employees Over Maximum" list in September 2000. Rex Duley of the District 8 human resources office examined the approximately 15 listed names of persons working in District 8. Mr. Duley determined that the applicable five-year period for Petitioner's receipt of pay above his grade had expired in June 2000. Mr. Duley prepared a letter, dated September 11, 2000, notifying Petitioner of the overpayments. The letter stated that Petitioner had received $1,316.11 in gross overpayments since June 2000. Respondent subsequently completed the full computation through the Bureau of State Payroll's automated system, and determined that the net overpayment to Petitioner was $826.82. At the hearing, Petitioner did not dispute the amount of the net overpayment. Petitioner testified that he would be able to repay the money at a rate of $25 to $50 per pay period. Instead, Petitioner sought to introduce evidence calling into question the validity of the 1995 settlement agreement. This evidence was deemed irrelevant and was not admitted. The evidence established that Petitioner voluntarily entered the settlement agreement, did not appeal from the PERC final order adopting the settlement agreement, and accepted the benefits of the settlement agreement for a period of five years. The time for contesting that agreement has long passed. Petitioner also questioned Respondent's diligence in discovering the overpayments. Petitioner was well aware of the five-year limitation on the salary arrangement established by the settlement agreement, and was in at least as good a position as Respondent to know that he was being overpaid between June and September 2000. Petitioner accepted the overpayments without questioning them or calling Respondent's attention to them. Petitioner's contention that he is being penalized for Respondent's lax bookkeeping is thus without merit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent repay $50 per pay period to the Department of Children and Family Services beginning with the pay period immediately following entry of a final order in this case and continuing each pay period thereafter until the overpayment is repaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Eugenie Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906-0085 Robert J. Richmond 5411 Loyloa Lane Southwest Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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GLEN W. SELLERS vs LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF`S OFFICE, 06-002414 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tavares, Florida Jul. 10, 2006 Number: 06-002414 Latest Update: Apr. 23, 2007

The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice, to wit: constructively discharging Petitioner on the basis of handicap discrimination without reasonable accommodation.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Lake County Sheriff's Office (LCSO), constitutes an "employer" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Chris Daniels took office as the elected Sheriff of Lake County, Florida, in January 2005. He had been with Respondent LCSO for 18 years. The sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer for Lake County; operates the Lake County Jail for the Board of County Commissioners; and manages security and bailiffs for the Lake County Courthouse. His responsibilities also include providing final approval for staffing levels at the Lake County Jail. In 2005, Petitioner had been employed as a detention officer at the Lake County Jail for 16 years. He is a certified corrections officer. Corrections/detention officers assigned to the inmate housing/security areas at the jail work 12-hour shifts from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. They are assigned to either "A," "B," "C," or "D" Squads. The squads rotate from day to night, and from night to day, shifts every four months. Officers assigned to inmate security are not normally assigned permanent shifts. Petitioner was such an officer. Working on rotating shifts is an essential function of working in the inmate housing area of the jail, as detailed in the job description for corrections officers as follows: . . . ensures a timely transmission of pertinent information and materials to other correctional personnel assigned to the same and/or the next shift. Petitioner understood at the beginning of his employment with LCSO that he was expected to work rotating shifts, and he did, in fact, work rotating shifts until 1996. Other corrections officers assigned to laundry, the jail kitchen, inmate transportation and other administrative functions permanently work days from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, without shift changes. Such positions with permanent day shifts have become available over the years. However, Petitioner last sought such a position in 1997 or 1998. Petitioner was working as a detention/corrections officer for Respondent when he was diagnosed with diabetes in 1996. Petitioner's diabetes causes tingling in his hands and feet, impotence, floaters in his eyes, dizziness, profuse sweating, frequent urination, a weakening immune system and occasional outbreaks of boils. Petitioner’s Exhibit 4 reveals that he takes multiple oral medications and that each kind of medication ideally should be taken at the same time of day, each day, but there are instructions on how to compensate if a dose is missed. With the exception of working rotating shifts, Petitioner was able at all times to perform the essential functions of a corrections officer for Respondent. The Veterans’ Administration pays Petitioner $218.00 per month because it believes his diabetes was induced by Agent Orange he encountered while in Viet Nam. At Petitioner's request, Respondent allowed Petitioner to work a permanent day shift from 1996 to June 30, 2005, when he retired. Petitioner testified he has worked in the past as a military medic and as a physician's assistant in correction facilities, so he is knowledgeable about the horrific, and sometimes fatal, effects of uncontrolled diabetes. Petitioner expected to live a normal life so long as he controlled his diabetes. Petitioner claims to have explained over the years to all his superiors that he needed to consistently take his medications at the same time of day. However, he did not offer any evidence in the present proceeding to explain why he could not take his medications consistently on a 24-hour clock, e.g. during nights, as opposed to during days. There have been periods when he experienced problems with his diabetes while working a permanent day shift. His medications have been adjusted several times since 1996. All witnesses agreed that Petitioner spent 18 months alone in a permanent day position in the third-floor control room. Petitioner claimed that he was assigned this long period of duty on the third-floor as “punishment” for being allowed to permanently work a day shift. He maintained, without any supporting evidence, that being assigned to a single position for more than a few months this way was unusual. However, although Respondent assigned Petitioner to the third-floor control room alone for a duration of 18 months, Respondent also assigned a non-diabetic employee alone there for about one year. Petitioner speculated, again without any supporting evidence, that the non-diabetic employee was also being punished for something. Both Petitioner and the non-diabetic employee experienced being confined to the control room without a restroom. Having to urinate when no other officer could stand- in for them created a hardship on both men. On one occasion, the non-diabetic employee urinated in a garbage can. At the date of hearing, Gary Borders had been with LCSO for 17 years and served as its Chief Deputy.1/ On the date of hearing, and at all times material, Chief Borders’ duties included responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the Lake County Jail and the Lake County Courthouse and for training. Petitioner claims to have frequently protested to many superiors about not having a restroom on the third-floor and not being allowed to bring food in for his diabetes. He also claimed to have specifically asked Chief Borders to be transferred from service on the third-floor, but Chief Borders did not recall more than one vague conversation concerning Petitioner’s complaint about how long Petitioner had been posted there and that he had told Petitioner he, Borders, had no problem with Petitioner’s being transferred elsewhere in the jail. It is not clear when, precisely, this 18 month-period occurred. Because Petitioner was on a permanent day shift from 1996-1997 to 2005 (eight years), and Petitioner testified his 18-month posting on the third-floor was "over" and was from 2003-2005, his time on the third-floor was not affirmatively shown to have occurred within the 365 days immediately preceding the filing of his Charge of Discrimination with FCHR on December 8, 2005. When Sheriff Daniels took office in January 2005, Chief Borders advised him that because the date for the squads to rotate shifts (see Finding of Fact 4) was due to occur on May 1, 2005, the number of persons assigned to permanent shifts was affecting Chief Borders' ability to make assignments. When corrections officers working in inmate housing of the jail are assigned permanent shifts, staff shortages can occur on other shifts. Chief Borders further advised the new sheriff that he, Borders, was receiving additional requests for permanent shifts. While discussing why there were so many employees assigned permanent shifts, and not subject to the standard four months' rollover of the squads from day-to-night and night-to- day shifts, Sheriff Daniels and Chief Borders concluded that LCSO needed a formal method of differentiating between those employees who genuinely needed a permanent day or night shift and those employees who merely wanted a permanent shift assignment. To determine which employees needed a permanent shift as an accommodation for their specific condition or situation, Sheriff Daniels instructed Chief Borders to send a memorandum to the 12-14 employees assigned to permanent shifts, requiring those employees to provide medical evidence of their need for a permanent shift assignment. On March 25, 2005, Chief Borders sent all employees assigned to permanent shifts the following memorandum: There is a requirement for rotating shift work for Detention Deputies, Auxiliary Detention Deputies and Deputy Sheriffs at the Lake County Sheriff's Office. Please ask your physician to review the Job Description for Detention Deputy (or Auxiliary) and ask if you can perform all the job requirements. If you are cross- sworn, also have your physician review the Deputy Sheriff job description and ask if you can perform all of the job requirements for that position. When your job description(s) have been reviewed, bring your physician's letter and all related supporting material (diagnosis, prognosis, treatment notes, test results and any other documents that would assist the agency in evaluating your request) to me so that our agency physician can review them for possible accommodation. Because shift changes will take place on May 1, 2005, you must have your documents to me no later than 5:00 P.M. on Friday, April 15, 2005. If I do not hear back from you by Friday, April 15, 2005 at 5:00 P.M., I will take it that you are available for rotating shift work assignment. The process envisioned by the Sheriff and Chief was that when an employee, who wanted an accommodation, provided the requested information from his own treating physician, that employee's supervisor would pass the information along to LCSO's physician, and an interactive process would begin. As of the date of hearing, LCSO had employees working in modified jobs, including job sharing, and an accommodation had been made for a person in a wheelchair. In 2005, LCSO also fully intended to accommodate those employees who provided proof from their physicians of their need for other accommodations. Petitioner testified that he did not want to repeatedly roll over from day-to-night shifts every four months because past experience had taught him that each time his shift changed, it took him at least two weeks to properly regulate and space his intake of food, liquids, and medications, in such a way that his diabetes was controlled and he felt alert and capable. In response to receiving the March 25, 2005, memorandum, Petitioner presented Chief Borders with a note from Petitioner's primary physician, Dr. Gelin, written on a prescription pad, stating: brittle diabetic pt needs to work day shift only. Petitioner did not present any other written information in response to Respondent LCSO’s detailed request. Petitioner testified that he discussed Dr. Gelin’s note with Chief Borders to the extent that he told Borders that if anyone on behalf of LCSO phoned Dr. Gelin, Dr. Gelin would discuss or fax further information to that person; Chief Borders does not recall this conversation. Chief Borders is a diabetic himself, but he had never heard the term, "brittle diabetic." It is Petitioner's position that because, in Dr. Gelin's private conversations with Petitioner, Dr. Gelin had told Petitioner that “any doctor” should know the sequelae and effects of "brittle diabetes," all Petitioner’s LCSO superiors needed to do was pass on Dr. Gelin’s prescription note to LCSO’s consulting physician in order for Petitioner to be accommodated. Petitioner believed it was his superiors' duty to make Dr. Gelin submit the written materials they wanted. Sheriff Daniels generally distrusted the information that physicians submitted on prescription pads, because, in his experience, when the employee or physician was pressed for details, there was often no supporting information forthcoming. Therefore, he did not believe the information on Petitioner's prescription slip, as described to him by Chief Borders, was sufficient to begin the interactive process with LCSO’s Human Resources Department or its consulting physician. Neither Sheriff Daniels nor Chief Borders presented Petitioner's prescription slip to them. It was decided between the Sheriff and the Chief, that Chief Borders would try to get more detailed information from Petitioner. Petitioner testified that he tried to get more information from his primary physician, Dr. Gelin, but Dr. Gelin would not provide in writing the detailed information requested by LCSO’s March 25, 2005, memorandum. On April 22, 2005, Chief Borders wrote Petitioner that Dr. Gelin's prescription pad note was insufficient and that Petitioner would not be reassigned to a permanent day shift position, stating: I have reviewed the information provided by your physician and find there is insufficient evidence presented to justify a permanent shift assignment. As such, your request is denied. You will rotate day/nights with your assigned shift during the normal rotation. None of the 12-14 employees assigned to permanent shifts, had submitted the requested information, so all of them, including Petitioner, were assigned to a rotating shift. The Sheriff and Chief received no report of complaints from any employee. However, on April 26, 2005, Petitioner received a memo stating that effective May 4, 2005, he would be assigned to "C" squad. "A" Squad, where Petitioner was then assigned, was scheduled to rotate from day shift to night shift on May 1, 2005, and "C" Squad was due to rotate from the night shift to the day shift on the same date. Accordingly, LCSO’s purpose in transferring Petitioner to “C” Squad was to provide him with four more months (until September 1, 2005) to obtain the required medical opinion and detailed supporting documentation from his treating physician. The "A" to "C" Squad change also would have allowed Petitioner to remain on a day shift, without interruption, and allow him an additional four months in which to gather medical information from any appropriate source to support his request to indefinitely remain on a permanent day shift. In fact, Petitioner was regularly seeing Dr. Flores, at the Veterans’ Administration, as well as Dr. Gelin. Dr. Flores coordinated oversight of Petitioner's medical condition with Dr. Gelin, who is Petitioner's private physician. However, Petitioner did not approach Dr. Flores, and he did not go back to Dr. Gelin, until after Petitioner retired. Petitioner had hoped to work another six years before retiring, but on May 13, 2005, while still assigned to the day shift, Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation, hoping that someone in his chain of command would try to talk him out of leaving. He expected his supervisors to "workout" a permanent day shift for him, instead of permitting him to retire.2/ Petitioner's resignation letter stated: Regrettable [sic] I am submitting my letter of resignation effective June 30, 2005. Your recent decision denying me permission to remain on the day shift in spite of my doctor's recommendation to remain on the day shift because of my medical condition (brittle diabetic) has forced me to retire earlier than I had planned to. There is no other way that I can regulate my medication switching from days to nights . . . Respondent never required Petitioner to work the night shift, and he never did work the night shift after 1996-1997. Petitioner gave notice of his retirement in May 2005, rather than work in "C" Squad on the day shift until September 1, 2005, or continue to try to obtain additional medical information that would allow him to indefinitely remain on a permanent day shift. Petitioner elected to retire effective June 30, 2005, because, upon advice of “Retirement” he believed it was more financially beneficial for him to retire in June 2005, rather than wait until January 2006.3/ Since January 1, 2006, Petitioner has been employed managing real property in Florida and Costa Rica. Petitioner testified that when he retired, he could perform all the duties required by his detention/corrections officer job description, and perhaps other duties as well, except for the rotating shifts. He believes, but offered no supporting documentation, that rotating shifts are counter- productive and are on their way out in most jails. He further testified that he could probably even work the rotating shifts required by this employer but he believed that to do so would have put him in a health crisis due to his diabetes and multiple medications.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2007.

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 1210242 U.S.C 12112 CFR (2) 45 CFR 8445 CFR 84.1 Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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LILLIAN ANDERSON vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 09-005433 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Oct. 06, 2009 Number: 09-005433 Latest Update: Mar. 12, 2010

The Issue Whether the Petitioner received a salary overpayment from the Respondent for leave usage to which she was not entitled, as set forth in amended correspondence dated October 2, 2009, and, if so, the amount of any overpayment.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Ms. Anderson was employed by the Department as a full- time Career Service employee until her separation on August 11, 2009. She had one year and four months' service with the State of Florida. As an employee of the Department, Ms. Anderson was paid biweekly. Based on her years of service, Ms. Anderson accrued four hours of annual leave and four hours of sick leave each biweekly pay period. Ms. Anderson used the People First System to complete her timesheets, request approval of leave, and review her leave balances. At issue is the amount of annual and sick leave used by Ms. Anderson during the pay period beginning February 6, 2009 and ending February 19, 2009. Ms. Anderson entered her time in the computerized People First timesheet as follows: February 6, 2009 8 hours' worked February 9, 2009 8 hours' sick leave February 10, 2009 8 hours' sick leave February 11, 2009 3.25 hours' sick leave 4.75 hours' annual leave February 12, 2009 8 hours' personal holiday February 13, 2009 8 hours' annual leave February 16, 2009 7.25 hours' annual leave February 17, 2009 8 hours' worked February 18, 2009 8.75 hours' worked February 19, 2009 4 hours' sick leave 4 hours' annual leave The Pay Period Overview in the People First System for the pertinent time period reflected the following: Beginning balance 2/06/09: 0 hours' annual leave 0 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Accrual 2/19/09: 4 hours' annual leave 4 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Used N/A : (24.00) hours' annual leave (23.25) hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Ending Balance 2/19/09: 0 hours' annual leave 0 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday The Department's Policies and Procedures for Attendance and Leave provides in pertinent part: III. Standards and Procedures * * * Annual Leave Method of Earning Annual Leave * * * Bureau of Personnel 1. Annual leave earned during any period shall be credited to the employee on the last day of that pay period or, in the case of separation, on the last day the employee is on the payroll. * * * Use of Earned Annual Leave Employee 1. Use of annual leave shall not be authorized prior to the time it is earned and credited and shall only be used with the prior approval of the proper authority. * * * Sick Leave Method of Earning Sick Leave * * * Employee * * * 4. Sick leave earned during any pay period shall be credited to the employee on the last day of that pay period, or in the case of separation, on the last day the employee is on the payroll. * * * Use of Earned Sick Leave Employee 1. Use of sick leave shall not be authorized prior to the time it is earned and credited to the employee and shall only be used with the approval of the proper authority. The Department keeps an official record of an employee's leave balances and accruals for each pay period, and it conducts audits of an employee's leave upon separation. The Department performed an audit of Ms. Anderson's leave and created an Employee Leave Record setting out annual and sick leave earned and used by Ms. Anderson up to her date of separation in August 2009. The audit revealed that Ms. Anderson had 20 hours of annual leave and 19.25 of sick leave available as of January 6, 2009, and that she accrued 4 hours of annual leave and 4 hours of sick leave on February 19, 2009, which could be used beginning February 20, 2009. As shown on the People's First timesheet prepared by Ms. Anderson and set out above, Ms. Anderson used 24 hours of annual leave and 23.25 hours of sick leave during the pay period beginning February 6, 2009, and ending February 19, 2009. Ms. Anderson, therefore, used four hours of annual leave and four hours of sick leave to which she was not entitled during the pay period extending from February 6, 2009, to February 19, 2009, and she was paid for these hours in the salary warrant issued February 27, 2009. In calculating the amount of the salary overpayment to Ms. Anderson, the Department made allowance for the one hour's annual leave balance Ms. Anderson had when she separated from the Department. The Department, therefore, calculated the salary overpayment based on seven non-compensable hours, and the balance owed by Ms. Anderson to the Department for the salary overpayment is $66.65.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order requiring Lillian Anderson to remit to the Department of Juvenile Justice the amount of $66.65. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lillian Anderson 3617 Carambola Circle North Coconut, Florida 33066 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100

Florida Laws (4) 110.219120.569120.577.25 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60L-34.004
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HERMAN LEWIS VANN vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-005538 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-005538 Latest Update: Apr. 28, 1989

Findings Of Fact Mr. Vann was employed by the Department as a counselor for its Division of Children Youth and Family. On August 8, 1987, Mr. Vann was involved in an accident in which a truck hit the car he was driving. He had an acute cervical and lumbar sprain of the back and contusions of the right arm and right foot; he had no fractures or dislocations. He received workers' compensation benefits as the result of his injuries. He was treated by an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Pedro Bermann. By January 21, 1988, Dr. Bermann was of the opinion that Mr. Vann had reached maximum medical improvement. On March 27, 1988, Mr. Vann was admitted to the University of Miami Comprehensive Pain and Rehabilitation Center at South Shore Hospital and Medical Center for an intensive treatment program. For two weeks he was treated as an in-patient, for the following two weeks he was treated on an out-patient basis. When Mr. Vann was discharged from the Pain and Rehabilitation Center he had a zero percent impairment rating. When released from that program, Dr. Serge Podrizki wrote a letter stating that Mr. Vann had "successfully completed treatment at our center for a work-related injury and was able to resume full- time employment. He is being discharged with no restrictions according to the guidelines of his job requirements. We would suggest that his driving be limited for at least the first month." Mr. Vann then returned to his work as a counselor for Children Youth and Family on April 25, 1988. Mr. Vann's supervisor wrote a memo to him on May 20, 1988, which reassigned cases to him based on Dr. Podrizki's April 23, 1988 letter. He was not required to drive, which was consistent with Dr. Podrizki's recommendation. Problems with Mr. Vann's job performance resulted in a memo from his supervisor dated May 13, 1988, requiring him to sign in and out each day, to inform his supervisor of doctor's appointments and to provide copies of any doctor's reports to his supervisor. On June 8, 1988, Mr. Vann reported to work but he did not report to work at any time thereafter. Mr. Vann never was authorized to take leave and never provided any doctor's statements justifying his absence from work on the grounds that he was unable to work. Mr. Vann maintains that he was unable to work due to his injuries. The depositions of three doctors who treated Mr. Vann are the only medical evidence in the record. In their opinion, Mr. Vann is able to work. The greater weight of the evidence shows that there is no medical reason why Mr. Vann could not perform the duties of his job as a counselor in June 1988. On June 16, 1988, Vann received a letter advising him that he was not authorized to be absent from work and directing him to report for work. Mr. Vann did not respond to this letter. On September 27, 1988, another letter was sent to Mr. Vann advising him that because he had failed to contact the Department since June 9, 1988, or to report for work since that time, his resignation from the career service had been accepted under Rule 22A- 7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Vann was absent from work without authorized leave for more than three consecutive work days beginning June 8, 1988.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Secretary of the Department of Administration finding that Mr. Vann abandoned his career service position. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX The following are the rulings on proposed findings required by Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 4. Covered in finding of fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 6. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in finding of fact 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in finding of fact 9. Respondent's Proposed Findings Respondent submitted a letter rather than findings of fact. The contention that this proceeding is an attempt to avoid the Department's duties under the workers compensation laws is rejected as unsupported in the record. The medical evidence Respondent refers to in his letter was not submitted at the hearing; the evidence submitted by the Department was persuasive. COPIES FURNISHED: Carmen Dominguez Frick, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite 5424 Miami, Florida 33128 Herman Lewis Vann 671 Northwest 179 Street Miami, Florida 33169 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration Office of the General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 R.S. Power, Esquire Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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MELISSA A. CHENEVERT vs VIRGIL & BROTHERS, INC., 03-004676 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sanford, Florida Dec. 11, 2003 Number: 03-004676 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 2004

The Issue Whether Respondent, Virgil and Brothers, Inc., discriminated against Petitioner, Melissa Chenevert, because of her relationship with disabled persons in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2003).

Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner in 1999 to work as a receptionist/secretary for the front office. One of Petitioner's primary responsibilities was to "man" the front office desk, answer the phones, and to serve as the contact person for personnel working in the field. Petitioner was initially hired as an hourly-compensated employee at 40 hours per week. Approximately one year after her initial employment, Petitioner became a salaried employee. As a salaried employee, Petitioner was eligible for benefits (i.e., vacation time, sick time, and 401K participation). At a later time, Petitioner was put back on hourly compensation because she took excessive time off from work. At that time, Petitioner admitted that she was having personal problems and would try to do better with respect to meeting her responsibilities as an employee. After Petitioner was put back on hourly compensation, she continued as an hourly employee until she was terminated. During Petitioner's employment at Virgil and Brothers, Petitioner's daughter had frequent medical and counseling appointments. Petitioner had to take time off and/or adjust her work schedule to take her daughter to these appointments. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner's mother lived with her. In early March 2000, Petitioner's mother had open-heart surgery and was diagnosed with lymphoma. During the time her mother was ill, Petitioner's mother asked Petitioner if she could take one or two weeks off to take care of her. In or about February 2002, prior to her mother's surgery, Petitioner requested that she be made a part-time employee. The position occupied by Petitioner was a full-time position, and she could not be accommodated with respect to her request to become part-time. Although Petitioner was told that her request to become part-time could not be granted, she began to work as though she were a part-time employee. On many days, particularly in February and March of 2002, Petitioner would leave work early and miss whole days of work. Sometimes when Petitioner left early, she left the front desk unmanned, even though the business was still open. After her request to become a part-time employee was turned down, at some point in or about early 2002, Petitioner requested that Respondent give her a leave of absence. When inquiry was made as to how long a leave of absence she wanted, she was unable to estimate a time. A few days after requesting a leave of absence, Petitioner came to Respondent's office to pick up her paycheck and indicated that she had not reported to work because her mother was in the hospital. Again, Petitioner was asked by Respondent how much time off she was going to need. Petitioner stated that she did not know. Respondent informed Petitioner that her position could not be left open indefinitely without having some idea of when she would be coming back to work. Respondent then fired Petitioner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Melissa A. Chenevert 2646 Fallbrook Drive Oviedo, Florida 32765 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John D. Mahaffey, Jr., Esquire Mahaffey, Leitch & Burgunder 3113 Lawton Road, Suite 225 Orlando, Florida 32803 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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ALFRED GREENBERG vs. DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, 77-000298 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000298 Latest Update: Aug. 12, 1977

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Alfred Greenberg, has held the position of a veterinary aide since approximately November, 1967. During October 1974, he was converted from OPS status to a regular career service employee subject to the normal six month probationary period. By letter dated June 24, 1976, from J. Patrick McCann, Division Director, Petitioner was advised that based on "action by the 1976 legislature, we most regretfully inform you that it will be necessary to abolish your position effective the close of business, June 30, 1976. In lieu of two weeks notice, you will receive two weeks termination pay." (See Respondent's Composite Exhibit Number 1). Within a few days, the Petitioner was converted back to an OPS position receiving the same hourly pay and was advised that he would be offered any vacancy which occurred within the department to which he qualified within the following 12 month period. Petitioner, through his attorney, timely appealed the Respondent's actions essentially contesting his conversion from the career service status to the OPS status and thereby losing social security benefits, retirement benefits and the accrual of vacation and sick leave. He further complained about the manner in which he was served his layoff notice. Specifically, he complained that his letter was hand delivered whereas personnel rules and regulations require that layoff notices etc. be sent by certified mail. In this regard, evidence reveals that by letter dated August 3, 1976, by certified mail, return receipt requested, Petitioner was advised that he was then being provided notice in accordance with the requirement in the department's personnel rules and regulations. Pursuant to emergency rules governing the layoff of career service employees, 22AER76-1, the Petitioner was advised that his position was abolished pursuant to action taken by the 1976 legislature. Evidence adduced during the course of the hearing reveals that the Petitioner's layoff was effected via the procedures as outlined in the above referred emergency rule and he was immediately converted to an OPS position, a position he now holds, at the same rate of pay. Evidence clearly reveals that Petitioner's layoff was effected pursuant to and authorized by the foregoing emergency rule. In view thereof, and in the absence of any evidence which would provide basis for a contrary finding, the action of the Department in effecting the Petitioner's layoff was proper and I shall accordingly recommend that such action be sustained. It is therefore recommended that the action of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, in effecting the layoff of the Petitioner, Alfred Greenberg, pursuant to emergency rule 22AER76-1, as published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on June 11, 1976, and adopted by the Administration Commission that same date, be sustained. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James W. Pritchard, Esquire 1038 Alfred I. DuPont Building 169 East Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131 Mrs. Dorothy B. Roberts Room 443, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

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SHIRLEY B. WALKER vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-005813 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Winter Haven, Florida Oct. 26, 1989 Number: 89-005813 Latest Update: Mar. 01, 1990

Findings Of Fact In September, 1989, Shirley B. Walker (Walker), was a clerk-typist in the Bartow office of the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), District 6, Subdistrict B, Children, Youth and Families, Child Protection Services. Walker was absent on Tuesday, September 5, 1989, and had a friend call her supervisor to say that Walker would not be at work until Friday, September 8, 1989, due to a medical condition. Walker reportedly had been in an altercation with her husband over the Labor Day weekend and had been injured to the extent that her neck was in a brace. The supervisor, Patricia Lawler, asked that the friend give Walker the message that she would need to bring a doctor's excuse with her on her return to work. Walker did not return to work on Friday, September 8, 1989. Walker did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work that day. Since Walker had no home telephone, and the telephone number of a relative that had been given to her supervisor as a means of contacting her at home was obsolete by September 8, Lawler asked office friends of Walker to go to Walker's home during the lunch hour to check on her well-being and find out why she was not at work. When they did, they found no one at home. Walker also did not go to work on Monday through Friday, September 11 through 15, 1989. Again, she did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work. No one at the office knew anything further about Walker or why she was not at work from Friday, September 8 through Friday, September 15, 1989. When Walker began her work at HRS, she was given an employee handbook, part of which clearly states: "If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned." At approximately 4:45 p.m. on Friday, September 15, 1989, Lawler hand- delivered to Walker at Walker's home a letter notifying Walker that she was being terminated from her employment with HRS for the consecutive unexcused and unauthorized absences, which were viewed as an abandonment of her employment and a resignation from the State Career Service. Although Walker asked for a formal administrative hearing on the question whether she had abandoned her position, neither she nor anyone on her behalf appeared at the hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, Shirley B. Walker, abandoned her position and resigned from the State Career Service. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley B. Walker 1050 Golfview Avenue Apartment 803 Bartow, FL 33830 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33614 Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550

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BETTY PIGATT vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-001163 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001163 Latest Update: Oct. 17, 1988

The Issue Whether Petitioner abandoned her position and resigned from the career service.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: Petitioner, Betty Pigatt, was employed by the Division of Driver Licenses, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Respondent) from February 22, 1983 until January 21, 1988. Petitioner injured her lower back in an automobile accident on April 17, 1985. She was previously disabled from a work related injury and was awarded prior temporary total disability benefits. She returned to work on June 5, 1987. Her condition became progressively worse and she again ceased work on June 27, 1987. Petitioner complained of pain in her lower back going down her left leg and into her foot. She had limited ability to stand and sit, and complained of pain and limitation of motion in her neck. Petitioner was treated by Dr. Rosabal who discharged her in late July, 1987. She thereafter was treated by Dr. William Bacon, who has treated her since August 17, 1987. By letter dated September 24, 1987, Petitioner was advised by Respondent's Division Director, James H. Cox, (Cox) that her request for leave without pay was granted beginning September 2 thru November 30, 1987. She was further advised that Respondent "requested that she send a Doctor's statement to Mr. Richard Weaver, Bureau Chief of Field Operations, explaining your medical condition and an approximate date of when you will be able to return to work". (Respondent's Exhibit 1). Petitioner was aware that she was to submit a letter of explanation of her medical condition from her physician. Petitioner failed to submit such a letter. Thereafter, Petitioner requested additional leave without pay and Cox advised Petitioner as follows: Your recent letter requesting additional leave without pay cannot be given favorable consideration until you furnish Mr. Richard Weaver, Bureau Chief of Field Operations, with a statement from your Doctor explaining your medical condition and an approximate date of when you will be able to return to work. Respondent, by its Acting Regional Director, Martha A. Castro, advised Petitioner by letter dated January 21, 1988, that her request for an extension of leave without pay had been denied and she was directed to report for duty at her assigned office at 7:00 a.m., on January 13, 1988. Petitioner did not report to work as directed on either January 13, 14, or 15, 1988. Respondent advised Petitioner by letter dated January 21, 1988, of Fred O. Dickinson, III, Deputy Executive Director of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, that as she had not reported to work for 3 consecutive work days, in accordance with Rule 22A-7.010(2), Florida Administrative Code, she was considered to have abandoned her position and to have resigned effective immediately. Petitioner had received maximum medical improvement and was requested to return to work as of January 13, 1988. (Respondent's Exhibit 6). Petitioner was familiar with her rights and obligations as an employee and was responsible for knowing the contents of the Driver License Examiner's Manual. On page 240 of the Examiner's Manual which was in use during Petitioner's employment is the requirement that leave without pay must be authorized by the Director of the Division of Driver Licenses. Petitioner did not obtain authorized leave without pay from the Director of the Division of Driver Licenses as required.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner abandoned her position and resigned from career service, and denying Petitioner's request that she be reinstated to her position of employment. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-1163 Rulings on Petitioner's proposed factual findings: Adopted as modified, paragraph 1, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 9, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 4, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 5, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 6, R.O. Adopted, last sentence paragraph 6, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 7, R.O. Adopted as modified, paragraph 8, R.O. First sentence adopted and the remainder rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne G. Printy, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Betty Pigatt 1262 Northwest 172nd Terrace Miami, Florida 33169 Michael Alderman, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0555 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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WILLIAM GRIMSLEY vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-001183 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-001183 Latest Update: Aug. 09, 1989

The Issue Whether the Petitioner abandoned his position as a state employee.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issue of abandonment in these proceedings, Petitioner William Grimsley was a Career Service Employee, employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services at Fort Myers, Florida, as a Public Assistance Specialist I. On January 4, 1989, the Petitioner learned that his father's brother had died in Georgia. Petitioner Grimsley requested one day of authorized leave from his supervisor in order to drive his father to the funeral in Colquitt, Georgia. The Petitioner's father was unable to drive himself to Georgia because of his heart condition, and the extreme stress he was under due to the fact that his wife's two children were in critical condition in Shand's hospital in Gainesville, Florida, during this time period. The Petitioner's father had recently suffered a heart attack, and was under doctor's orders not to drive alone for extended periods of time. When the Petitioner requested one day's leave for January 5, 1989, he anticipated that he would be able to return to work on January 9, 1989. The Petitioner was on a four-day work week, and the one day's leave gave him the opportunity to accomplish his task within a four-day time period. After the Petitioner and his father arrived in Georgia, they learned that there had been two other deaths in the family. On Saturday, January 7, 1989, the Petitioner attended his cousin's funeral. On Sunday, January 8, 1989, the Petitioner attended his uncle's funeral. On Monday, January 9, 1989, he attended his great aunt's funeral. As the family lives in a rural and impoverished area in Georgia, the Petitioner did not have access to a telephone until he drove into Bainbridge, Georgia, on January 9, 1989. The Petitioner was without money during his attempts to telephone his office from Bainbridge, Georgia. According to Petitioner, his money was stolen from his wallet by one of his deceased uncle's children during the funeral services. The Petitioner did not tell his father of the incident due to the current tension between his deceased uncle's children and the uncle's widow regarding the disposition of life insurance proceeds. The Petitioner's father was under enough stress, and the Petitioner believed he could contact his office without having to spend money. The Petitioner's attempt to charge the call to his home phone was unsuccessful because there was no one at his home to verify that he was authorized to charge calls to that telephone number. The Petitioner's attempt to place a collect call to his employer was unsuccessful because the Department refused to accept the collect call placed by the Petitioner. The Petitioner then placed a collect call to his mother's home in Fort Myers, Florida. Once his call was accepted, the Petitioner asked to speak to his sister, Iris Hill. Ms. Hill was instructed to contact the Petitioner's supervisor to inform her of the situation in Georgia. The Petitioner had to attend three funerals as opposed to one funeral, and his uncle's widow was in need of his father's assistance. No time frame was given to the Petitioner's sister regarding his anticipated return. His sister assured him that she would contact his supervisor to relay his message. The Petitioner's sister attempted to contact his supervisor by telephone several times, as she had been instructed. However, she was unsuccessful, and did not make contact until after her brother had returned to work on January 12, 1989. During her conversation with the supervisor, Petitioner's sister, Miss Hill, was surprised to learn that the Petitioner had returned to work that morning after driving from Georgia earlier that day. Upon his return to work, the Petitioner was informed that a Notice of Abandonment had been filed, and that he had been separated from his employment with the Department due to his absence without authorized leave for three consecutive work days. The Petitioner did not intend to abandon his position when he remained in Georgia for three additional days in order to assist his father in family matters. The Petitioner reasonably believed his supervisor had been informed of the reasons for his absence on Monday, January 9, 1989, and that he would return to work as soon as possible.

Recommendation Based upon the evidence, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Secretary of the Department of Administration issue a Final Order that Petitioner did not abandon his position in the Career Service System. That the Petitioner be reinstated to his position as a Public Assistance Specialist I with all rights and privileges attendant to that position before the dismissal date of January 11, 1989, and subsequent to that date. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-1183 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #2 and #3. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #4. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #6 and #7 Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #10. Accepted. See HO #11. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Improper summary. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1 and #2. Accepted. See HO #3 and #4. Accepted. See HO #5, #6 and #8. Accepted. See HO #9 and #10. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted that Petitioner arrived at work on January 12, 1989. The rest of paragraph 8 is rejected as improper summary. Rejected. Witness incompetent to make legal conclusion. Rejected. Irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Tucker, Esquire Florida Rural Legal Services 2209 Euclid Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Anthony N. DeLuccia, Jr., Esquire District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Post Office Box 06085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906 R. S. Power, Esquire Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Andrew J. McMullian General Counsel Interim Secretary Department of Health and Department of Administration Rehabilitative Services 435 Carlton Building 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 32399-1550 =================================================================

Florida Laws (4) 110.201110.219120.57120.68
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