The Issue Whether or not Petitioner's response to Respondent's RFP 90 PY is responsive so as to be eligible for an award of "Wagner-Peyser 10% funds."
Findings Of Fact Section 7(b)(2) of the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. s. 49f. is a federal grant source which permits ten percent of the sums allotted by Congress to each state to be used to provide certain services and functions within the discretion of the governors of the respective states. Included among such services are job placement services for groups determined by the Governor of Florida to have special needs as set forth in Subsection 7(b)(2) of the Wagner- Peyser Act. Petitioner Goal Employment is a private-for-profit Florida corporation engaged in the business of finding gainful employment for offenders, i.e., those persons who have been convicted of a crime but who are now out of prison seeking employment. On January 26, 1990, the Respondent, Division of Labor, Employment and Training (LET) of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security (LES), published a request for proposals (RFP) soliciting competitive sealed proposals for job placement programs in accordance with Section 287.057(3) F.S. and the federal grant source, commonly referred to as "Wagner-Peyser 10% funds." The response date and time for this 1990 RFP, a/k/a RFP 90 PY, was 3:00 p.m., March 23, 1990. Petitioner, Goal Employment, filed a timely proposal with Respondent, but the agency found Goal Employment's proposal to be nonresponsive and notified Petitioner of this determination in a letter dated April 4, 1990. That letter set out the grounds of the Respondent agency's determination as follows: This nonresponsiveness is due to failure to have proposed program activities that are legal and allowable, i.e., private for profit entities are not eligible to apply for Wagner-Peyser 7(b) funds. Petitioner had 72 hours from that notification in which to protest. It has been stipulated that Goal Employment's proposal would have been found responsive but for the exclusion of private-for-profit organizations from eligibility. By letter dated April 9, 1990, Petitioner gave written notice of receipt of notification of nonresponsiveness on Saturday, April 7, 1990 "around 10:00 a.m." and of its intent to file formal written protest. Date and time of Respondent's receipt of this letter of intent are not clear, but Respondent has not asserted lack of timeliness. Interim negotiations failed, and on April 17, 1990 Petitioner timely filed a formal written protest, which was "fast-tracked" at the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.53(5) F.S. In the immediate past, the Respondent agency had, indeed, permitted contracting with private-for-profit organizations, and Petitioner corporation had been a successful bidder in Respondent's 1988 and 1989 letting of similar contracts. Therefore, Petitioner's principal and president, Ernest S. Urassa, was thoroughly familiar with how these types of contracts had been bid in the past. Mr. Urassa's familiarity with the earlier agency bid policy and procedure was also the result of his prior employment by the agency. The RFP for 1989 did not prohibit private-for- profit organizations from participating. Goal Employment's contract pursuant to that prior RFP had not been completed as of the date of formal hearing, and at all times material to the 1990 RFP which is at issue in this proceeding, Mr. Urassa and Goal Employment coordinated the 1989 contract's compliance through an agency contract manager, Dan Faughn. On November 8, 1989, before the final draft of the 1990 RFP was finalized, Mr. Faughn informed Mr. Urassa by telephone that for the next program year, that is for the 1990 RFP, the agency would no longer permit private-for-profit company participation in Wagner-Peyser contracting. In response to January 11, 1990 oral inquiries from Mr. Urassa, the Chief of Respondent's Bureau of Job Training, Shelton Kemp, sent Mr. Urassa a January 16, 1990 letter as follows: The program year 1990 Request for Proposals prohibits private-for-profit companies from participating in Wagner-Peyser 7(b) contracting. The Wagner-Peyser Act, Section 7(b)(2), allows the governor of each state to provide, "...services for groups with special needs, carried out pursuant to joint agreements between the employment service and the appropriate private industry council, and chief elected official or officials or other public agencies or private nonprofit organizations,..." [Emphasis supplied] Those involved in the agency RFP process had reached the foregoing position after receiving advice from their General Counsel who, in turn, had relied on legal advice from the Governor's legal staff. Roy Chilcote, Labor Employment and Training Specialist Supervisor in Respondent's Contract Section, participated in the draft of the 1990 Project Year Request for Proposal (RFP 90 PY) which is at issue in these proceedings. Prior to drafting the 1990 RFP, Mr. Chilcote was unable to locate any written issue papers or legal opinions interpreting the following language contained in the Wagner-Peyser legislation: ...the Governor of each such State to provide-- (2) services for groups with specific needs, carried out pursuant to joint agreements between the employment service and the appropriate private industry council and chief elected officials or other public agencies or private nonprofit organizations; [Emphasis supplied] Up until that time, the issue of whether private-for-profit organizations could compete had not resulted in any specific opinion from legal personnel, however it is fair to say that lay personnel of the agency, including Mr. Urassa, who had previously been employed there, had based agency policy and earlier RFP requirements on lay interpretations either of the foregoing statutory language or of the Job Training Partnership Act's (JTPA) pre-amendment language, and that the lay interpretations had always permitted private-for- profit organizations to bid for Wagner-Peyser 10% funds just as they had competed for JTPA funds. Upon his own review of the statutory language, Mr. Chilcote, also a layman, did not share his predecessor's opinion, and he requested legal advice from the agency's General Counsel, and, in turn, received the legal interpretation that private-for-profit organizations were ineligible. Mr. Chilcote received this legal advice in the fall of 1989, and he accordingly drafted the 1990 RFP to preclude private-for-profit entities as bidders for Wagner-Peyser funds. The actual language contained in the 1990 RFP published January 26, 1990, as found on page 2 thereof, is as follows: All governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations (both for profit and not for profit entities) may apply for funds under the JTPA Title I Program. All governmental agencies and not for profit nongovernmental organizations (private for profit entities are not eligible) may apply for funds under the Wagner-Peyser 7(b) program. Documen- tation supporting the legal structure of the proposer must be on file with the Bureau of Job Training before any contract resulting from a response to the RFP can be executed. [Original emphasis] Under the next major heading of the 1990 RFP (page 5 thereof), all potential bidders, including Petitioner, were advised: The Bureau of Job Training conducts a two step proposal review process. The first step is a technical review to determine if a proposal is responsive to the requirements of the RFP and the second step is a programmatic review of the relative merit of that proposal. The following is a description of the specific criteria that the Bureau will use to determine the responsiveness of a proposal. Each of the criteria listed must be satisfactorily addressed for a proposal to be determined responsive. A proposal determined nonresponsive will be given no further consideration. The proposer will be notified in writing of the nonresponsive determination and the reason(s) for the determination. No exception will be made to these requirements. Although the "specific criteria" listed thereafter do not make reference to the ineligibility of for-profit organizations, that contract specification was clearly noted and emphasized under the preceding heading. See, Finding of Fact 14, supra. Before publication of the 1990 RFP, Mr. Chilcote circulated the draft within the agency for comments. It was at this point, November 8, 1989, approximately 10 weeks before the 1990 RFP was published, that Mr. Faughn orally notified Mr. Urassa of its contents, that Mr. Faughn and Mr. Urassa began inquiries concerning the reinterpretation, and that Mr. Faughn and Mr. Urassa commented unfavorably on the new draft RFP because it precluded private-for- profit bidders. See, Finding of Fact 9, supra. The agency's position allowing Wagner-Peyser 7(b) funding for private- for-profit organizations prior to Program Year 1990 was based in part upon its earlier layman's understanding of the Congressional intent underlying the language of Section 7(b)(2). See, Findings of Fact 12-13, supra. In 1990, the agency altered its position so as to begin excluding for-profit organizations from eligibility for Wagner-Peyser money solely due to its reinterpretation of the statute by legal counsel. This reinterpretation was applied to prohibit the agency from contracting for the delivery of services with all private-for-profit organizations and has not been formally adopted as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54 F.S. Petitioner has been aware of this reinterpretation since November 8, 1989 (actual oral notice), was notified of it in writing on January 16, 1990 (Shelton Kemp's letter), and was again notified of it in writing on January 26, 1990 (1990 RFP publication). Petitioner did not file a formal rule challenge directly with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Prior to the March 3, 1990 bid/proposal deadline, the agency held three RFP workshops: February 20, 22, and 23, 1990. At no time during this process was Petitioner led to believe that private-for-profit entities were to compete for the 1990 RFP. Nonetheless, Petitioner, a private-for-profit entity, submitted its proposal timely before the March 23, 1990 bid closing and was rejected as nonresponsive. It thereafter proceeded solely with a bid protest. See, Findings of Fact 3, 4, and 5, supra.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a final order ratifying its previous decision that the Respondent's 1990 bid/proposal is nonresponsive. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2667BID The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1-2, 15 Accepted. Accepted except for what is unnecessary. Accepted except for what is subordinate or cumulative. 5-6 Subordinate and cumulative. 7-10, 19 Accepted. 11-14, 16, 18 Rejected as mere legal argument. 17 Rejected as subordinate. Respondent's PFOF: 1-5 Rejected as mere legal argument. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. Brooks, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David J. Busch, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, The Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Stephen Barron, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security The Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 =================================================================
The Issue This is a license discipline proceeding in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondents on the basis of allegations of misconduct set forth in an Administrative Complaint. The essence of the alleged misconduct is that the Respondents have conducted or advertised the business of a recovery agent without a valid Class "R" Recovery Agency license.
Findings Of Fact Rhonda L. Peroutka has a Class "CC" Private Investigator Intern license, Number CC99-00699, issued by the Petitioner agency. Rhonda L. Peroutka, in her capacity as President of A People Finder, Inc., holds a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency license, Number A97-00289, and a Class "ZA" Organizational Officer Position license, Number ZA97-00405, both issued by the Petitioner agency. Beginning on January 8, 1999, and continuing to the date of the final hearing in this case, the Respondents have been engaged in business activities in the State of Florida that involve the performance of repossessions for consideration. During the period of time mentioned above, the Respondents regularly and frequently entered into contracts with the Superior Bank in New Jersey to repossess motor vehicles in the State of Florida on which the Superior Bank had a lien. Pursuant to those contracts, the Respondents acted in the capacity of an independent contractor of the bank for the purpose of repossessing specific motor vehicles identified by the bank. The contracts between Superior Bank and the Respondents specifically authorized and directed the Respondent, A People Finder, Inc., to repossess a specifically described motor vehicle. Such contracts did not authorize the Respondents to forward or to subcontract the repossession authorization. Nevertheless, the regular practice of the Respondents is to subcontract the repossession work to licensed recovery agencies throughout the State of Florida. The subcontracting licensed recovery agencies perform the actual repossessions of the motor vehicles the Superior Bank seeks to have repossessed. Following a successful recovery of a motor vehicle, the subcontracting licensed recovery agencies bill the Respondents for their services. Thereupon, the Respondents advise Superior Bank of the successful recovery, and the Respondents submit a bill to Superior Bank for repossessing the motor vehicle. The Respondents do not advise Superior Bank that the actual repossession was performed by a subcontractor. The bills submitted by the Respondents to Superior Bank typically list as separate items a repossession fee, an administrative fee, and any miscellaneous costs associated with the repossession, such as the cost of making keys. Superior Bank pays the entire amount of the bill to the Respondents. When Superior Bank pays for a repossession, the entire amount of the payment is deposited into an escrow account controlled by the Respondents. Thereafter, the Respondents pay from the escrow account the amount due to the subcontracting licensed recovery agency, and they pay to A People Finder, Inc., the administrative fee that was charged to Superior Bank. The Respondents agree with the licensed recovery agencies with whom they contract to hold them "harmless from and against any and all claims, damages, losses, and actions including reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from and arising out of your efforts to collect and/or repossess. . . ." However, the Respondents do not carry insurance for the actions of a recovery agency during the course of a repossession. Neither of the Respondents has a recovery agency license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case concluding that the Respondents are guilty of the violations charged and imposing the following penalties: (a) a one-year suspension of all licenses held by the Respondents; (b) an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00 against Respondent, A People Finder, Inc.; and (c) an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00 against Respondent, Rhonda L. Peroutka. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1999.
The Issue The issue in case number 94-6750 is whether Respondent's Class "A" private investigative agency license should be disciplined. The issue in case number 95-1084S is whether Respondent's application for a Class "C" license should be denied.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of State, Division of Licensing (hereinafter referred to as the "Division"), is responsible for, among other things, the licensing of privateinvestigators and private investigative agencies in the State of Florida. Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. In pertinent part, the Division may issue, pursuant to Section 493.611, Florida Statutes, the following classes of licenses: Class "C": private investigator; Class "CC": private investigator intern; and Class "A": private investigative agency. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent, Keith P. Acuff, was licensed by the Division as a private investigator intern. Mr. Acuff holds a Class "CC" license from the Division. Mr. Acuff is also the owner of a private investigative agency known as Chatoyant Executive Protection and Investigative Services (hereinafter referred to as "Chatoyant"). Mr. Acuff holds a Class "A" license from the Division for Chatoyant. License Requirements. In order to qualify for a Class "C" license, an individual must operate for a minimum of twenty-four months as a private investigator intern. Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes. During those twenty-four months, the intern must be sponsored and supervised by an individual holding a Class "C" license. See Sections 493.6101(11) and 493.6116, Florida Statutes. Anyone, regardless of licensure, may hold a Class "A" license. In order for the business to operate as a private investigative agency, however, the agency must be managed by a person holding a Class "C" license. Mr. Acuff's Investigatory Experience. Mr. Acuff first received his Class "CC" license in July of 1990. In October of 1994 Mr. Acuff applied for a Class "C" license. See Petitioner's exhibit 1. The Division denied the application based upon its conclusion that Mr. Acuff had failed to verify that he had accrued twenty-four months of sponsored service as a private investigator intern. Mr. Acuff was first employed by Don Hubbard Investigations. Mr. Acuff had not claimed, nor does the evidence support a finding, that he is entitled to any time toward a Class "C" license for his employment with Don Hubbard Investigations. From the middle of September, 1990, until December, 1991, Mr. Acuff was employed by The Brown Group. Mr. Acuff's sponsor at The Brown Group was Steve Brown. The Division was able to verify from documentation submitted by Mr. Brown that Mr. Acuff was entitled to 12 months of investigatory work while employed at The Brown Group. Mr. Acuff failed to prove that he was entitled to more than 12 months credit for his employment with The Brown Group. Although Mr. Acuff testified that he believes he worked at least 15 months under Mr. Brown's sponsorship, he offered no proof from Mr. Brown to substantiate his testimony. From December 15, 1991, to February 15, 1992, Mr. Acuff was employed by Intercontinental Detective Agency. Mr. Acuff's sponsor at Intercontinental Detective Agency was Sean Mulholland. The Division was able to verify that Mr. Acuff had performed investigatory duties for Mr. Mulholland for 1 month. Mr. Acuff failed to prove that he was entitled to more than 1 month credit for his employment with Intercontinental Detective Agency. Mr. Acuff testified that he believes he worked at least 3 months under Mr. Mulholland's sponsorship but he offered no proof from Mr. Mulholland to substantiate his testimony. Mr. Acuff's testimony that he submitted a Sponsorship Term Addendum completed by Mr. Mulholland to the Division was not credible and, even if it had been credible, was insufficient to constitute substantiation from Mr. Mulholland of Mr. Acuff's work for him. Mr. Acuff's next investigatory work was for MG Detective Agency. Mr. Acuff's sponsor at MG Detective Agency was Michael G. Hatcher. Mr. Hatcher agreed to sponsor Mr. Acuff by executing a Letter of Intent to Sponsor Private Investigator Intern on October 27, 1992. See Respondent's exhibit 2. Cynthia L. Cartwright signed the form agreeing to be an alternative sponsor. Mr. Acuff did not list any time under Mr. Hatcher's sponsorship for credit on his application for Class "C" license. See Petitioner's exhibit 1. The Division was not able to verify that Mr. Acuff had performed any investigatory duties for Mr. Hatcher. Mr. Acuff failed to prove that he was entitled to any credit for his employment with MG Detective Agency. Mr. Acuff testified that he believes he worked at least 3 months under Mr. Hatcher's sponsorship but he offered no proof from Mr. Hatcher to substantiate his testimony. Mr. Acuff claimed on his application for Class "C" license that, upon leaving MG Detective Agency, he worked for Chatoyant from June of 1993 until August 1994. Mr. Acuff claimed that he was sponsored by Ms. Cartwright while employed for Chatoyant. Mr. Acuff also claimed that he performed investigatory work under Ms. Cartwright's sponsorship during the period he worked for Chatoyant for at least 3 and 1/2 months. Initially the Division planned to issue Mr. Acuff a Class "C" license. The Division concluded that Mr. Acuff was entitled to at least 11 months of sponsored investigatory work under Ms. Cartwright's sponsorship. Before the Class "C" license was issued to Mr. Acuff, however, the Division concluded that Mr. Acuff was not entitled to any sponsored time under Ms. Cartwright's sponsorship. The evidence, as discussed, infra, proved that Mr. Acuff is not entitled to any credit for work performed under Ms. Cartwright's sponsorship. Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Acuff provided verification that he had 13 months of sponsored investigatory service. Mr. Acuff is, therefore, 11 months shy of the 24-months of experience required for a Class "C" license. Mr. Acuff's Association with Ms. Cartwright. Mr. Acuff met Ms. Cartwright in late 1992 when he was employed briefly at MG Detective Agency. Ms. Cartwright has held a Class "C" license since 1991. Upon Mr. Acuff's termination of employment at MG Detective Agency, Ms. Cartwright was told by Mr. Acuff and a mutual friend, Carolyn Barber, that he only needed 2 or 3 months to complete the 2 years of internship required for a Class "C" license. Ms. Cartwright was asked if she would sponsor Mr. Acuff and act as the manager of Chatoyant for 2 or 3 months. Ms. Cartwright agreed to Mr. Acuff's request. She did so because Ms. Barber had asked her to and she felt sorry for Mr. Acuff because he had been terminated by MG Detective Agency only needing, Ms. Cartwright thought, 2 or 3 more months of sponsorship. Ms. Cartwright signed a Letter of Intent to Sponsor. The form she signed was blank. The Letter of Intent to Sponsor was subsequently completed, dated April 14, 1993 and filed with the Division. Ms. Cartwright admits she signed a blank form even though she understands that it was improper for her to do so. After agreeing to sponsor Mr. Acuff and act as the manager of Chatoyant, Ms. Cartwright changed her mind. She telephoned the Division's offices in Tallahassee in August of 1993 to ask how she could have her name removed as manager of Chatoyant. Ms. Cartwright was informed that her name did not appear as manager of Chatoyant. In the fall of 1993 Mr. Acuff asked Ms. Cartwright to sign a form terminating her position with Chatoyant. Ms. Cartwright told Mr. Acuff she did not see why she needed to sign a form based upon what she had been told during her conversation with the Division. When Mr. Acuff suggested that the Division might have made a mistake, Ms. Cartwright agreed to sign the form. In January or February of 1994 Ms. Cartwright signed a blank copy of a Termination/Completion of Sponsorship for Private Investigator Intern form. She gave the signed form to Ms. Barber. This form was ultimately completed, Ms. Cartwright's signature was notarized by Mr. Acuff's girlfriend, the form was dated August 30, 1994 and was then filed with the Division as part of Mr. Acuff's application for licensure. See Petitioner's exhibit 6. It was represented on Petitioner's exhibit 6 that Ms. Cartwright had sponsored Mr. Acuff from June 3, 1993 to August 26, 1994. An Employee Action Report was also filed with the Division. Petitioner's exhibit 5. The form indicates that Ms. Cartwright had resigned as manager of Chatoyant as of August 30, 1994. Ms. Cartwright did not sign the form. On October 5, 1994, Ms. Cartwright executed a Termination/Completion of Sponsorship for Private Investigator Intern form attesting that "I did not sponsor Patrick Acuff to my knowledge. I was not aware of Intent to Sponsor." Petitioner's exhibit 7. Ms. Cartwright did not sponsor any investigatory work by Mr. Acuff or act as the manager of Chatoyant. The Administrative Complaint. During the summer of 1994, the Division's office in Jacksonville received a letter questioning how Mr. Acuff could be working for Chatoyant without an appropriate license or manager. Ms. Norma Benvenuto, an investigator for the Division, checked the Division's records and determined that there was no sponsor listed for Chatoyant. Ms. Benvenuto spoke with Mr. Acuff and asked that he come to her office. Mr. Acuff complied. Mr. Acuff informed Ms. Benvenuto that Ms. Cartwright was the sponsor of Chatoyant. When asked for documentation, Mr. Acuff was only able to produce a blank form signed by Ms. Cartwright. Ms. Benvenuto asked Mr. Acuff to bring any documentation that would support his assertion that Ms. Cartwright was the manager of Chatoyant and that they had met to discuss his work during her sponsorship of him. Ms. Benvenuto telephoned Mr. Acuff more than once to remind him to bring the documentation. Mr. Acuff failed to provide any such documentation. Ms. Benvenuto contacted Ms. Cartwright in an effort to verify Mr. Acuff's assertions. Ms. Cartwright denied ever sponsoring Mr. Acuff or every actually performing any duties as the manager of Chatoyant. Ms. Cartwright also admitted that she had initially agreed to sponsor Mr. Acuff but had subsequently changed her mind. On October 20, 1995, the Division entered an Administrative Complaint against Mr. Acuff. The Denial of Mr. Acuff's Application for a Class "C" License. By letter dated December 16, 1994, the Division notified Mr. Acuff that his application for a Class "C" license was denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Division sustaining Counts II and III of the Administrative Complaint against Mr. Acuff in case number 94- 6750, requiring that he pay a fine of $1,000.00 and denying the application for a Class "C" license filed by Mr. Acuff or about August 30, 1994 in case number 95-1084S. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX The Division has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Mr. Acuff did not file a proposed order. The Division's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 Hereby accepted. See 4-5. 2-3 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 22. Accepted in 22, 28 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 25 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 22 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 17 and hereby accepted. See 26 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 16 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 14. Accepted in 13, COPIES FURNISHED: Michele Guy Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Jeffrey Grainger, Esquire 1722 University Boulevard South Jacksonville, Florida 32216 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Don Bell Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, an elected circuit court judge, is entitled to renewed membership or is otherwise entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact The FRS Plan There are two classes of members in the FRS: all officers or employees, except elected officers; and elected officers, including circuit judges. See §§ 121.051(1)(a) and 121.052, Fla. Stat. (2014). The second class is identified as the Elected Officers' Class (EOC). See § 121.052(1), Fla. Stat. Members of the FRS may elect to participate in either the Defined Benefit Retirement Program (Pension Plan) or the Public Employee Optional Retirement Program (Investment Plan). The Investment Plan has a one-year vesting requirement, thus enabling a vested participant to receive a distribution of his or her account at any time after leaving FRS-covered employment. Upon retirement, a vested Pension Plan member receives a monthly benefit for his or her lifetime whereas a vested Investment Plan member receives a lump-sum distribution of accumulated benefits from his or her account. Under both plans, a member must terminate all FRS-covered employment in order to receive a benefit. "Retiree" is defined at least three times in chapter 121, none the same. See §§ 121.021(60), 121.35(5)(h), and 121.4501(2)(k), Fla. Stat. However, as explained in the Conclusions of Law, all Investment Plan retirees are covered by section 121.4501(2)(k), which defines a "retiree" as "a former member of the investment plan who has terminated employment and taken a distribution of vested employee or employer contributions as provided in s. 121.591." In 2009, the Legislature created section 121.122(2), which provides that a "retiree of a state-administered retirement system who is initially reemployed on or after July 1, 2010, is not eligible for renewed membership." See Ch. 2009-209, § 12, Laws of Fla. By virtue of this amendment, FRS retirees who did not become reemployed with a covered employer by July 1, 2010, were ineligible for renewed membership in the FRS. The same bill amended section 121.053 by adding a new subsection (3)(a), which provided that on or after July 1, 2010, a "retiree of a state-administered retirement system who is elected or appointed for the first time to an elective office in a regularly established position with a covered employer may not reenroll in the Florida Retirement System." Id. at § 5. This amendment makes clear that the prohibition in section 121.122(2) applies equally to elected officials. In 2012, the Legislature amended section 121.122(2) to provide that "[a] retiree of a state-administered retirement system who is initially reemployed in a regularly established position on or after July 1, 2010, may not be enrolled as a renewed member." See Ch. 2012-222, § 7, Laws of Fla. The sole purpose of the amendment was to "make it clear that a retiree of the investment plan . . . who is reemployed on or after July 1, 2010, is prohibited from being reenrolled as a renewed member of a state-administered retirement system." Fla. Govt. Oper. Comm., CS/HB 7079 (2012) Staff Analysis, p. 5 (final May 11, 2012)(available at http//www.myfloridahouse.gov).1 Petitioner's Employment History and Retirement Option Petitioner was a member of the FRS while employed as an Assistant State Attorney from January 2, 2001, through September 30, 2003. When first employed, Petitioner was a member of the Pension Plan. Shortly thereafter, the Legislature created the Investment Plan option, and Petitioner was given a deadline of August 31, 2002, to make an election between the two plans. On August 31, 2002, she switched to the Investment Plan. On or about September 30, 2003, Petitioner left the Office of State Attorney for private law practice. In January 2006, she took a complete distribution from her FRS Investment Plan in the amount of $8,154.52. By taking a lump- sum distribution, she became a "retiree." See § 121.4501(2)(k), Fla. Stat. ("Retiree" means a former member of the investment plan who has terminated employment and taken a distribution of vested employee . . . contributions."). She was not employed in an FRS-eligible position between September 30, 2003, and January 8, 2013. On August 14, 2012, Petitioner was elected to the position of Circuit Judge in the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida. On January 8, 2013, Petitioner was commissioned as a Circuit Judge for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida. The Proposed Agency Action In response to her request to enroll in the FRS, by letter dated November 14, 2013, Daniel Beard, who is Director of Policy, Risk Management, and Compliance for the State Board of Administration, advised Petitioner in pertinent part as follows: You retired from the FRS on January 23, 2006 when you requested a distribution of your FRS Investment Plan account. Section 121.4501(2)(k), Florida Statutes, defines a "retiree" as a member of the FRS Investment Plan who has terminated employment and has taken a distribution as provided in Section 121.591. There are no statutory provisions that would allow you to cancel or void your retirement, and there are no statutory provisions that would allow you to repay the distribution in order to be "unretired." Section 121.122, Florida Statutes, states that a retiree of a state-administered retirement system who is initially reemployed in a regularly established position on or after July 1, 2010 is not eligible to enroll in renewed membership and receive additional retirement benefits. This change in law pertained to any retiree of a state-administered retirement system who had not returned to FRS employment prior to July 1, 2010. You were hired by the Office of State Courts on January 8, 2013. Petitioner timely challenged the proposed agency action asserting that she is entitled to participate in the FRS as a compulsory member of the EOC pursuant to part I, chapter 121.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to reenroll in the FRS. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Heartland Private Industry Council (Council), is a thirty- four member council established under an interlocal agreement by five area counties in Central Florida. The counties are Polk, DeSoto, Hardee, Highlands and Okeechobee. The Council's office is located at 300 Parkview Place, Lakeland, Florida. The Council has entered into a contract with petitioner, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Labor, Employment and Training (Division), under which it receives federal grant monies provided by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). As is pertinent here, the Council used the funds to provide summer job training for disadvantaged youths. The Division is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all grant moneys are properly expended. Under federal regulations, the Council was required to engage the services of an independent public accounting firm to perform a financial and compliance audit on its contract expenditures made during the fiscal period July 1, 1985 through June 30, 1986. During the period in question, the Council had total expenditures of approximately $7.9 million. Under the audit program developed by the accounting firm, the firm sampled and reviewed at random various expenditures. Among those reviewed were two checks dated August 23 and October 10, 1985 in the amount of $239 each payable to one Joyce Barber, a JTPA participant from the City of Auburndale. The expenditure was questioned, but not disallowed, on the ground the first check written to Joyce Barber had apparently been stolen and cashed by another person. A second check in the same amount was then issued to Barber. The auditors questioned whether, under these circumstances, the first expenditure was appropriate. In addition, the auditors noted a $13 mathematical error and recommended that amount be disallowed. Other than these two items, which totaled $252, there were no other proposed adjustments in the audit report. The audit report was forwarded by the Council to the Division on or about June 29, 1987. The report itself is not in evidence. The Division then reviewed the audit report and preliminarily concluded that both expenditures ($239 and $13) should be disallowed. After the matter could not be resolved informally, the Division issued proposed agency action in the form of a "Final Determination" on January 4, 1988. That prompted the Council to request a hearing to contest the action. Barber was one of approximately fourteen hundred youth participants during the summer of 1985 who received job training sponsored by the Council. In addition to their training, these youths were compensated by the Council for their services. There were several hundred employers in the five county area who were involved in the project. Because of the sheer number of participants and employers, the Council mailed its checks directly to the participants, including Barber. According to the Council's in-house certified public accountant (CPA), this was a reasonable manner of disbursing the payroll. The CPA also concluded that the Council's internal controls were adequate. After the checks had been mailed, the Council received a complaint that Barber did not receive her $239 check. It then requested that the Sheriff's office investigate the matter. Based upon that investigation, the Council concluded that the check had been stolen and cashed by another person, and it sent a second check to Barber. From this factual setting, it can be reasonably inferred that the money was either stolen or was not received by Barber. The Council could have obtained insurance to cover this type of loss. However, it would not be economically prudent to do so when comparing the money lost to the cost of a policy. The Council did not deny that a $13 mathematical error was made on one expenditure. Therefore, it is found that such an error occurred, and an adjustment in favor of the Division is appropriate. There are no Division or federal regulations governing the loss of grant monies under the circumstances that occurred here. However, the Division bases its disallowance on the theory that the contractor (Council) received no benefit from the first $239 check sent to Barber. The specific regulation which supports this theory was not cited or offered in evidence. Even so, the Council did not show what benefits, if any, it received from the lost moneys.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring respondent to repay $252 in JTPA funds to petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1989.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of violating the law regulating private investigators and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Class "C" Private Investigator License bearing license number is C91-00006. Petitioner's files indicate that this license was issued January 10, 1991. Respondent testified that he has been licensed since December 1990. Despite records indicating that the Class "C" license was issued January 10, 1991, Petitioner, by letter dated May 24, 1991, informed Respondent that his Class "C" license "has been issued and is forthcoming." The May 24 letter adds: File review indicates that you are not currently employed. Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, requires you to either own or be employed by a licensed Class "A" Private Investigative Agency. To work as a private investigator without meeting one of the foregoing conditions is a violation of law and subjects you to administrative action up to and including revocation of your Class "C" license. During 1991, Respondent was employed by A & W Investigations, which holds a Class "A" agency license. However, by July 7, 1991, he had completed his duties for A & W Investigations and was not employed by a Class "A" agency after that date. During the period between the termination of his employment with A & W Investigations and the meeting described below with Petitioner's investigator in October 1991, Respondent performed investigations related to workers' compensation for a company known as FEISCO. Serving as an independent contractor, Respondent also hired and paid James Coady for investigative work that he performed on Respondent's behalf for FEISCO. In August 1991, a new attorney in the area, Darren Young, received a letter from Respondent announcing his availability to serve as a consultant in criminal cases involving allegations of driving under the influence (DUI). Respondent had been employed for a couple of years by the Collier County Sheriff's Office and drew upon his experience in local law enforcement in providing DUI consultation services. Respondent and Mr. Young later met and began a business/social relationship. In October or November, Mr. Young hired Respondent as a DUI consultant in a pending case. Respondent served as an independent contractor, not an employee of Mr. Young. Although Mr. Young did not need Respondent to testify, he paid Respondent for his services. By letter dated September 23, 1991, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had learned that he was no longer employed by A & W Investigations as a Class "C" Private Investigator licensee. The letter contains the same warning as that quoted in the last two sentences of the above-cited May 24 letter. In early October 1991, an investigator of Petitioner met Respondent to discuss informal complaints made by two or three Naples private investigators that Respondent was conducting private investigations without a license. Respondent told the investigator that he was working for a tile company association doing investigations of its members and serving as an expert witness for attorneys in DUI cases. Petitioner's investigator explained that if Respondent intended to do any private investigations, he needed a Class "A" agency license with which to place his Class "C" private investigator's license. At the urging of Petitioner's investigator, Respondent agreed to begin the process of obtaining a Class "A" license, and, on October 3, 1991, Petitioner received Respondent's application for a Class "A" license. On December 26, 1991, Respondent obtained the general liability coverage required for the Class "A" license. By letter dated December 27, 1991, and received by Petitioner on January 6, 1992, Respondent submitted to Petitioner a money order in the amount of $300 in payment of the application fee, proof of liability insurance, and a copy of the fictitious name registration form. The letter states in part: I have contacted your office several times and have been informed that my fingerprints have not returned from FDLE. This is the only thing that I am waiting for before my license can be issued. The 90 days will be up in January and I was wondering if there is some provision that would allow me to start operations before they return. I would appreciate your advice on this matter. Prior to receiving the December 27 letter from Respondent, on January 3, 1992, Petitioner mailed Respondent a letter "to notify you that your application for a Class "A" license had been approved." The letter states that Respondent needed to provide several items "so your license can be issued " The required items were a license fee of $300, certificate of insurance, and proof of filing a fictitious name. On January 8, 1992, Respondent mailed two letters. One was to Petitioner's investigator, stating that Respondent had "received the notice of approval for the issuance of my Agency license" and advising that he had "forwarded all of the required documentation to Tallahassee." The other letter of January 8, 1992, was to Petitioner and accompanies the certificate of liability insurance. The letter states that, on December 30, 1991, Respondent had sent Petitioner the application fee, copy of the fictitious name registration, and copy of the insurance binder. Petitioner received the certificate of liability insurance on January Noting that the certificate was not properly notarized, Petitioner mailed Respondent a letter, on January 15, 1992, advising that the certificate of liability insurance was missing. By letter dated January 16, 1992, Respondent forwarded the certificate of liability insurance with proper notarization. Receiving the letter on January 22, 1992, Petitioner mailed a letter on January 24, 1992, advising Respondent that he had been issued on that date a Class "A" license, which was good from January 24, 1992, through January 24, 1994. Respondent engaged in at least two investigations during December 1991, at which time he clearly knew that he did not have a Class "A" license and needed one for the work in which he was engaged. In one case, he performed two days' surveillance on Kelly Trotta for Ray Trotta on December 6 and 7, 1991. By letter dated December 9, 1991, to Mr. Trotta, Respondent described the investigatory services that he provided and suggested future spot checks in order to avoid "running up the costs of the investigation." In another case, Mr. Young was retained on the day after Thanksgiving 1991 by Lawrence Harrison to provide legal services in connection with pending federal and state litigation. Mr. Young introduced Respondent to Mr. Harrison, who agreed to retain Respondent or allow Mr. Young to retain Respondent, in either case as an independent contractor. According to Respondent's invoice, Mr. Young hired him on December 16, 1991. The following day, Respondent checked corporate records as part of his investigative work and conveyed the information to Mr. Young. In the following days, Respondent researched Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, concerning the state litigation, which involved a legal action brought by Frank Coto against Mr. Harrison for unpaid private investigative services. Respondent drafted a complaint against Mr. Coto to be sent to Petitioner. Still in December, Respondent obtained character information on Mr. Coto and directly communicated it to the client. The complaint against Mr. Coto included allegations that he attempted to extort from Mr. Harrison the balance allegedly owed by Mr. Harrison to Mr. Coto for investigative services rendered. Mr. Harrison sent the complaint, under his signature, to Petitioner, which eventually elected not to prosecute. On January 9 and 10, 1992, according to Respondent's invoice of January 13, 1993, Respondent met with Mr. Harrison. By separate invoice, Respondent requested $1200 for the costs of a trip to Oklahoma in connection with investigative services related to the federal litigation. This sum was paid prior to January 24, 1992, which was when Respondent was to depart. On or about January 18, 1992, Mr. Young terminated his employment with Mr. Harrison. On January 23, 1992, Respondent contacted the FBI and informed them that Mr. Young had proposed a criminal conspiracy with Respondent to kill one or more persons involved with the Harrison matter. Subsequent investigations revealed no basis for criminal prosecution, nor professional discipline, against Mr. Young. The record is insufficient to determine if Respondent's charges were made in good faith. Instead of going himself, Respondent sent Mr. Coady and Mr. Trotta to perform investigative services for Respondent on behalf of Mr. Harrison. They departed either January 24 or 25, 1991, and performed the investigative services. There is no competent evidence as to whether Mr. Coady had a Class "C" license and, if so, when he obtained it. The evidence is unclear as to when Mr. Trotta obtained his Class "C: license, but he obtained or renewed a Class "C" license, possibly as early as January 23, 1994. Respondent allowed Mr. Coady and Mr. Trotta to place their Class "C" licenses, or the Class "C" licenses for which they were applying. The record establishes the date of sponsorship only as to Mr. Trotta. Respondent signed the form on January 5 and it was notarized on January 7, 1992. Respondent used his Class "A" license number, which he obtained by telephone from one of Petitioner's representatives prior to the official issuance of Respondent's Class "A" license. On March 4, 1992, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner advising that his firm was no longer sponsoring Mr. Trotta, Mr. Coady, or a third person, Heidi Trotta. Except for this letter, there is no evidence that Respondent ever employed Ms. Trotta, and Petitioner has failed to prove that anyone by that name was ever so employed by Respondent. The letter states that, as of January 30, 1992, Respondent's firm would no longer be responsible for their actions. The record does not indicate when Mr. Trotta and Mr. Coady were terminated. On August 11, 1992, Petitioner's investigator visited Respondent's office and demanded his files for the Harrison and Trotta investigation, as well as a third investigation known as Sparkman/Hayes. Respondent offered to drive home and get the Trotta and Sparkman/Hayes files, but declined to provide the Harrison file until he received approval from Mr. Harrison's attorney, through whom he claimed to work. Petitioner's investigator told Respondent not to go home and get the two files, but to provide them to the investigator later. Respondent agreed to mail them, but did not. Petitioner's investigator never gave Respondent a deadline, nor did he ever again demand that Respondent give him the files. The failure to produce the Harrison file is not the subject of any allegations in the present case. During the course of the August 11 interview, Petitioner's investigator asked Respondent about Mr. Coto and the complaint that had been filed with Petitioner against him. Respondent initially lied, denying knowing anything about Mr. Coto or the complaint. But Petitioner's investigator showed Respondent a letter that Respondent had sent to Mr. Young, which effectively contradicted these denials. Respondent then admitted to Petitioner's investigator that he had drafted the complaint against Mr. Coto and that it had been intended to "muddy the waters." The intent of Respondent was to undermine Mr. Coto's civil action against Mr. Harrison.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of State enter a final order ordering Respondent to pay an administrative fine of $3550. ENTERED on June 24, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 24, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Attorney Ken Muszynski 850 Fifth Ave. South Naples, FL 33940
Findings Of Fact On August 17, 1989, the Executive Board acting for the Local Elected Officials of the Heartland Employment and Training Consortium, voted to terminate Clifton Thomas, Jr., from his position as Executive Director of the Heartland Private Industry Council. At the time of his termination from employment, Mr. Thomas was being paid the sum of $47,528 per annum. Mr. Thomas' salary was established on an annual basis by the Executive Board. On or about December 1, 1989, Mr. Thomas, acting through his attorney, Mr. Robert McKee, notified E. John Dinkel, III, acting as counsel for the Executive Board, that he intended to file a law suit against the Heartland Employment and Training Consortium and its Executive Board. The complaint to be filed in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa, Division, demanded equitable relief and damages and alleged that Mr. Thomas was fired without justification and "was not accorded due process." Mr. Dinkel, acting as counsel for the Executive Board, was able to obtain agreement from Mr. McKee, acting as counsel for Mr. Thomas, that the complaint would be dropped upon payment of $24,096 to Mr. Thomas. At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Heartland Private Industry Council held on December 14, 1989, the Council voted to concur in a payment of $24,096 to Mr. Thomas to avoid the cost of litigation. It was understood and agreed that a statement would be signed by Mr. Thomas denying any liability or wrongdoing by any of the parties to the action. At a specially convened meeting of the Executive Board of the Heartland Consortium held on December 15, 1989, the Board unanimously agreed to the settlement. On December 21, 1989, a check in the amount of $21,598.40 was issued to Mr. Thomas. This amount represented the agreed upon amount minus a levy from the Internal Revenue Service. The check (#010471) was charged to the pooled administrative funds from allocations through State of JTPA formula monies. In consideration of the above payment, Mr. Thomas gave up his threatened law suit and signed a statement, dated December 22, 1989, denying any wrongdoing on the part of the Executive Board, the Heartland Private Industry Council and any officers or employees of the Board or Council. In the annual audit of the Heartland Private Industry Council conducted by Grant Thornton, Accountants and Management Consultants, the use of JTPA monies to pay the former Executive Director was questioned. The auditor stated: "The use of JTPA funds in settlement of legal claims was determined by Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security to be an unallowable cost under State and Federal law as indicated in a letter to the Council's attorney dated November 6, 1989, therefore this is a questioned cost." On September 30, 1991, the Heartland Private Industry Council received notification from Patricia S. Gilbert, Director, DLET that the costs questioned by the auditor were disallowed. No reason other than that cited by the auditor was given. On October 24, 1991, Heartland Private Industry Council, Inc., notified the Department of Labor of their intent to appeal the disallowed cost. On November 1, 1991, Jack E. Lyons, Executive Director of the Heartland Private Industry Council, wrote a letter to Secretary Scruggs, questioning the applicability of the statutes, both State and Federal, that were cited by the auditor in the statement of questioned costs. At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Heartland Private Industry Council held on April 17, 1992, the Council denied any misapplication of Federal JTPA dollars and voted to not permit the Executive Director to settle the disallowed costs by payment from non-JTPA dollars. The attached documentation styled Index of Exhibits, containing fourteen (14) exhibits is incorporated by reference into the proposed Statement of Facts.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding the payment to Clifton Thomas, Jr., of $24,096 in settlement of his law suit against the Heartland Private Industry Council Inc. to be a nonallowable cost and improperly charged to federally provided funds. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry R. Jackson, Esquire 300 Parkview Place Lakeland, FL 33805 Carolyn Cummings, Esquire Hartman Building, Suite 307-2102 Capitol Circle SE Tallahassee, FL 32399 Frank Scruggs, Secretary 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle SE Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle SE Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Miami-Dade Community College, has adopted a statement of agency policy in violation of Florida law.
Findings Of Fact Prior to August 2, 2002, the Respondent employed the Petitioner, Lonny Ohlfest. At the time of his termination, the Petitioner filed a request for a due process hearing with the Respondent to challenge his termination from employment. The Petitioner challenged the basis for his termination as he wanted to clear his name regarding some unflattering allegations but, equally important, he wanted to keep his job with MDC. The Respondent denied the Petitioner's request for an administrative hearing and found that the Petitioner was not entitled to a hearing. More specifically, the Respondent concluded that since the Petitioner did not have a contract of employment he was not entitled to an administrative hearing. The Petitioner disputed the Respondent's claim and argued that he did have a contract, that he had a reasonable expectation that his employment would continue, and that the Respondent unlawfully refused to afford him regress through the administrative process. When the Petitioner's appeal of his request for an administrative hearing failed, he filed the instant case to challenge the Respondent's policy of not referring administrative cases for formal hearing. The delays in the appeal process explain and support the Petitioner's delay in filing the instant challenge to the agency's alleged rule. To understand the historical perspective of this case, the following findings are made pertinent to the Petitioner's employment with the Respondent: The Petitioner began employment with the MDC on or about April 4, 2001. He was hired as a part-time, hourly worker within the school of allied health technologies. The position he assumed was funded and operated within the "Health Careers Opportunities Program" or HCOP. The HCOP was funded by a federal grant. The monies coming from the grant were renewable each year and ran concurrent with the school's fiscal year (July 1-June 30). All employees paid through the HCOP grant were considered "temporary" as the grant monies were necessary to assure continued employment. In January 2002 the Petitioner was given a full-time position within the HCOP. He was designated "Program Leader/Student Services" for the upcoming summer bridge program. At all times material to this case, all parties knew that absent federal funding the HCOP would not continue to operate. Moreover, the Petitioner knew, or should have known, that his employment with the Respondent would run only until June 30, 2002. Thereafter, it was expected that if and when the federal funding came through, the HCOP employees (including the Petitioner) would continue to work within the scope of the program. At the end of the summer program in 2001, the HCOP employees took leave until the school year started and the funding of the program was assured. Accordingly, after the summer bridge program was completed, the Petitioner expected to be on leave during the summer of 2002 until called back to work. Instead, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner from employment. The 2002 summer bridge program had not finished well for the Petitioner. Amid allegations of sexual harassment (unsubstantiated and not at issue in this proceeding) the Petitioner's working relationship within the HCOP floundered. The Petitioner was aghast that unsubstantiated claims had been reported, he wanted the accusations resolved, he wanted his name cleared, and he was disappointed by the process that failed to timely and fully resolve the issues. When the Petitioner left the campus for what he believed would be the break (similar to the one they had taken the prior year), he was uncertain as to his employment status. In fact, when he left the campus he cleaned out his desk and returned his keys. Nevertheless, on July 26, 2002, Dr. Miller directed the Petitioner to present for work on July 29, 2002. He did not do so. On July 29, 2002, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor directed him to appear for work on July 30, 2002. He did not do so. In fact, the Petitioner did not return to the office until July 31, 2002. The Petitioner did not understand that his attendance was mandatory for the two days that he did not appear for work. When the Petitioner did check in with the HCOP office on the 31st he came to understand the gravity of the situation. As a result of the absences, the Respondent cited the Petitioner with insubordination and terminated his employment with MDC. The Petitioner timely challenged the termination but the Respondent ruled he was not entitled to an administrative review of the decision. The Petitioner filed for, and received, unemployment compensation. The termination was not justified by the standards applicable to that forum. The rules governing unemployment compensation do not, however, govern the administrative process regarding whether or not one's employment constitutes a property interest that is protected by law. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's petition seeking an administrative review, the Respondent declined to afford the Petitioner with a hearing. The Respondent does not forward petitions filed by non- contract employees when such individuals seek to challenge their termination of employment. The Respondent maintains that, as a matter of law, they are not required to forward such petitions for formal review. The Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are not entitled to administrative review when their employment is terminated. Conversely, the Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are entitled to an administrative review when their employment is terminated. The Petitioner was not a full-time, contract employee of the Respondent. The Respondent's policy affords full-time contractual personnel a right to an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, should grant the Petitioner’s application for a Class “C” Private Investigator license and the application he filed as President on behalf of Info, Inc., for a Class “A” Private Investigative Agency license.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner’s Class “C” Application The Petitioner applied for his Class “C” Private Investigator license on April 29, 1996. The application included the Petitioner’s Affidavit of Experience, which represented the following qualifying experience: employment with Telephonic Collections, Inc., from 3/91 to 9/93, during which employment the Petitioner devoted himself full-time to: “credit and asset investigations for recovery of debts; did skip-tracing full-time to locate subjects for debt recovery; utilized collection network and data base information.” Joseph Apter, President of Telephonic Collections, Inc., was listed as the individual who could verify this employment. employment with Telephonic Info, Inc., from 9/93 to 2/96, during which employment the Petitioner devoted himself full-time to: “administrative processing of investigation files; computer data base research and information recovery; computer preparing or reports; administrative dutys [sic] in investigation agency.” Joseph Apter, President of Telephonic Info, Inc., was listed as the individual who could verify this employment. employment as an auxiliary policeman with the City of West Haven, Connecticut, from 1965 to 1967, during which employment the Petitioner devoted himself part-time as follows: “received police training and performed assignments as required.” The Petitioner did not specify how much time was devoted to those duties. Captain Stephen D. Rubelman was listed as the individual who could verify this employment. Processing of the Petitioner’s Applications The Respondent began the process of verifying the information in the Petitioner’s Class “C” application on May 8, 1996, when it had referred the Petitioner’s fingerprint card to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) for a criminal history. The Respondent subsequently began its own verification of the information in the application by telephoning Apter. On June 26, 1996, the Respondent telephoned Apter, who verified the representations in the Petitioner’s application as to his experience with Telephonic Collections. Specifically, Apter stated that Telephonic Collections was a collection agency and that, for two years and five months, “100% of the applicant’s job was skiptracing [sic] individuals with delinquent accounts for the purpose of collecting the money owed to creditor.” Since this experience exceeded minimum requirements, no further verification was considered necessary, and the Respondent awaited the criminal history report from the FDLE. While the Respondent was awaiting the criminal history report from the FDLE, the Petitioner telephoned the Respondent to inquire as to the status of his application. On August 2, 1996, after being told the status, the Petitioner filed an application as president on behalf of Info, Inc., for a Class “A” Private Investigative Agency license. Eventually, on August 27, 1996, the Respondent received the Petitioner’s criminal history report from the FLDE, and it showed no reason not to grant the Petitioner’s applications. But earlier in August, Garry Floyd, an investigator in the Respondent’s Tampa office, learned that the Petitioner had filed applications for licensure. From prior dealings with the Petitioner and Apter, Investigator Floyd was unaware that the Petitioner had any qualifying experience. To the contrary, during a June 1994, investigation Floyd was conducting into unlicensed activities by employees of Telephonic Info, a licensed private investigation agency, the Petitioner emphatically denied that he was conducting investigations for the company. The Petitioner told Floyd that the Petitioner did not know how to conduct an investigation and did not want to know how; he said his role in the company was strictly administrative. Investigator Floyd obtained a copy of the Petitioner’s applications and saw the Petitioner’s representations as to his experience with Telephonic Info as well as Telephonic Collections. Since those representations did not comport with statements the Petitioner made to Floyd in June 1994, and did not comport with Floyd’s understanding as to the nature of the Petitioner’s experience, Floyd recommended on August 13, 1997, that the Respondent allow him to investigate further before approving the Petitioner’s applications and issuing any licenses. During his investigation, Floyd obtained statements from three individuals thought to be former employees of Telephonic Collections to the effect that they had no knowledge of any skip- tracing or other investigative work being conducted by the Petitioner. All three—C.J. Bronstrup, Jason Gillard, and Duncan Tate—thought that the Petitioner’s role was strictly administrative. Investigator Floyd also was aware that Apter’s applications for renewal of his Class “C” and Class “A” licenses had been denied due to what Floyd understood to be a felony conviction. (Although Apter’s testimony on the criminal charges against him was confusing, it would appear that he entered a plea on the felony charge, and adjudication was withheld. There apparently also were unconnected charges of perjury against him, but the disposition of those charges is not clear from Apter’s testimony.) Finally, Investigator Floyd also recalled that Apter once told Floyd that Apter thought he might have the beginnings of Alzheimer’s disease. For these reasons, Investigator Floyd recommended that the Respondent not credit the Petitioner with any qualifying experience from his employment with Telephonic Collections and also recommended that the representations on the application regarding that employment experience be considered fraudulent misrepresentations. When the Petitioner’s experience with Telephonic Collections was called into question, the Respondent attempted to verify the Petitioner’s experience with the City of West Haven Police Department but was unable to contact Stephen Rubelman at the telephone number given in the application. (According to the Respondent’s witness, “the phone rang off the hook.”) Then, on September 26, 1996, the Respondent telephoned the City of West Haven Police Department but was informed that the Respondent’s employment there between 1965 and 1967 was too old to verify. For these reasons, on September 27, 1996, Investigator Floyd recommended that the Respondent deny the Petitioner’s applications. On October 7, 1996, the Respondent mailed the Petitioner a letter giving notice of intent to deny the Petitioner’s applications. The letter was addressed to the Petitioner as president of INFO, Inc., at “13575 - 58 Street North, Clearwater, Florida 34620.” This mailing was returned undelivered on October 14, 1996, and the letter was returned undelivered. On October 15, 1996, the letter was re-sent in another envelope to “Post Office Box 1241, Largo, Florida 34649,” the mailing address on the Class “A” application. But apparently this time the mailing was returned for postage. The envelope was meter-stamped on October 26, and was received by the Petitioner on October 29, 1996. Verification of Petitioner’s Qualifying Experience The Petitioner did not directly dispute the testimony of Investigator Floyd as to what the Petitioner told him during Floyd’s June 1994, investigation. See Finding 5, supra. Instead, the Petitioner testified essentially that he in fact knew how to do skip-tracing and conduct investigations, having been taught and trained by Apter, and that the Petitioner had extensive experience doing skip-tracing and conducting investigations working for Telephonic Collections, which was a debt collection agency. While not directly disputing Floyd’s testimony as to what the Petitioner said to Floyd, the Petitioner alleged that Floyd may have been biased against him (due to his association with Apter) and suggested that Floyd knew or should have known that the Petitioner knew how to do investigation work because Floyd once asked the Petitioner to get some information for him and watched as the Petitioner placed a pretext call. Regardless of Floyd’s alleged bias or pertinent knowledge, it is found that Floyd accurately related what the Petitioner said to him and that the Petitioner’s purpose in making those statements was to avoid any further investigation into whether the Petitioner also was participating in unlicensed investigative activities during his employment by Telephonic Info. Even assuming that the Petitioner did skip-tracing and investigations for Telephonic Collections, it is clear from the testimony that the Petitioner did not do skip-tracing and investigations full-time, 100 percent of the time, as represented in the Class “C” application and as verified by Apter upon telephone inquiry. At final hearing, Apter testified that, when he verified the Petitioner’s experience for the Respondent on June 26, 1996, he did not mean that the Petitioner had no other duties but rather that the Petitioner did no collection work— i.e., the collection employees would take the information the Petitioner developed from his skip-tracing and asset location efforts and telephone the debtors to try to get satisfaction of the debt. Apter conceded that the Petitioner also had administrative duties. It is the Respondent’s policy, when an applicant has employment experience in a full-time job that involves some investigative work or training in addition to other duties, to credit the applicant for a pro rata amount of qualifying experience based on the quantifiable percentage of time devoted to the investigative work or training. It could not be determined from the evidence what percentage of the Petitioner’s work at Telephonic Collections was devoted to skip-tracing and investigation work and how much was administrative. The Petitioner and Apter testified that Apter trained the Petitioner in skip-tracing and investigation work and that the Petitioner did a substantial amount of skip-tracing and investigation work from March 1991, through September 1993; but both conceded that the Petitioner also had administrative duties. Apter did not break down the Petitioner’s time spent between the two. The Petitioner made a rough approximation that 25 percent of his time was spent on administrative matters. Sharon Jones, who worked for both Telephone Collections and Telephone Info, testified that the Petitioner did some skip-tracing work, as well as other duties, between June through September 1993, but she also could not estimate the percentage of time spent between the two. Other witnesses, including Bronstrup and Tate, were not aware that the Petitioner was doing any skip-tracing at all during the times they were working for Telephonic Collections. (Bronstrup worked there for approximately ten weeks between March and June 1993; Tate worked there from February 1993, through the time it became Telephonic Info in September 1993.) In partial response to the testimony of Bronstrup and Tate, the Petitioner suggested that it was not surprising for them not to be aware of the Petitioner’s skip-tracing and other investigative work because much of it was done at the Petitioner’s home after hours and because most of the employees were treated on a “need to know” basis. (The Petitioner also contended that Bronstrup did not spend much time at work for Telephonic Collections, as he also had another part-time job and did some personal investigation work on the side.) But even if it is true that the Petitioner did much of his skip-tracing and other investigative work at home after hours, only the Petitioner and Apter even knew about it, and the amount of time the Petitioner spent doing investigative work at home clearly was not verified. The Petitioner continues to maintain that he stopped doing any skip-tracing or investigative work after Telephonic Collections, the debt collection agency, ceased doing business and became Telephonic Info, the private investigation agency. As for the Petitioner’s experience as a part-time auxiliary policeman with the City of West Haven police department, the application does not give any indication as to how much time, if any, the Petitioner spent doing investigation work or being trained in that work. The Rubelman affidavit introduced in evidence to verify his experience likewise does not give that kind of information. It only states generally that the Petitioner received training in and assisted in police work. It does not indicate that any of the training or work was in investigations. It also indicates that no records of the Petitioner’s employment exist and that Rubelman cannot reconstruct even the months the Petitioner worked, much less what the work consisted of. Although it is not clear, at final hearing it appeared that the Petitioner may have been claiming credit for work he did collecting Telephonic Info’s accounts receivable. However, the amount of any such work was not quantified. It also appeared at final hearing that the Petitioner also was claiming credit for doing background investigations on prospective employees of Telephonic Info. However, the Petitioner also did not quantify the amount of any of this work. Alleged Fraud or Willful Misrepresentation The Petitioner stated in the Affidavit of Experience in his Class “C” application that the “approximate percentage of time devoted to” the qualifying skip-tracing and investigation duties listed for his employment with Telephonic Collections from March 1991 to September 1993 was “full time.” This statement clearly was false. All of the witnesses confirmed that the Petitioner spent at least some time doing administrative work; several thought that was all the Petitioner was doing. The Petitioner conceded in his testimony at final hearing that at least 25 percent of his time was devoted to administrative work, and it is found that the actual percentage probably was much higher. Unlike Apter, the Petitioner made no attempt to explain his false representation, and it is found to be a fraudulent or willful misrepresentation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a final order denying both the Petitioner’s Class “C” license application and his Class “A” license application. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Harry P. Schlenther 12155 Meadowbrook Lane Largo, Florida 33774 Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Sandra B. Mortham, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
