The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to continue to receive benefits under the Florida Teachers' Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a school teacher in the public school system of Broward County, Florida, prior to October 1, 1989. Petitioner had been so employed for approximately 28 years and he was a member of the Florida Teachers' Retirement System. Petitioner was born January 1939 and was, at the time of the formal hearing, 52 years of age. In addition to his employment as a school teacher, Petitioner worked part-time, on weekends, holidays, and during vacations as a longshoreman at Port Everglades. On August 21, 1988, the Petitioner suffered an injury to his left ankle and leg while working as a longshoreman on the docks at Port Everglades. This accident occurred when a piece of equipment backed over Petitioner, breaking his ankle and leg. Two operations by a Dr. Smith followed the accident. Thereafter, Petitioner was treated by Dr. William A. Morris, III, M.D., a family practitioner. Petitioner applied for disability retirement benefits under the Florida Teachers' Retirement System and asserted that the injuries he suffered on the docks rendered him unable to teach. Respondent thereafter received a certification from Dr. Morris expressing the opinion that Petitioner was disabled as a result of his injuries and unable to teach school. Respondent granted Petitioner's application for disability retirement benefits in partial reliance on Dr. Morris's certification of disability. Petitioner's official retirement date was October 1, 1989, and he thereafter began to receive disability retirement benefits from the Florida Teachers' Retirement System. As part of its operations, Respondent receives computer reports from the Florida Auditor General's Office which provides information as to income earned by retirees who receive benefits under the Florida Teachers' Retirement System. From the Auditor General's report, it became apparent to Respondent that Petitioner continued to work as a longshoreman at Port Everglades. The report reflected that Petitioner was receiving income from several shipping companies at the same time he was receiving disability retirement benefits. Mark Sadler, one of Respondent's Retirement Administrators, thereafter requested that Petitioner complete FRS Form FR-13e, entitled "Retirees' Report of Continuing Disability", so that a determination could be made as to Petitioner's continued entitlement to disability retirement benefits. Petitioner gave a negative response to the following question on Form FR13-e: "Since the date of your disability retirement, or the date you last completed a Disability Evaluation Statement, have you ever been employed in any capacity?" This response was not truthful. Respondent also requested that Dr. Morris complete Form FR-13f, entitled "Physician's Report of Re-Examination" to ascertain his opinion as to Petitioner's continued disability. Dr. Morris returned the form, dated May 7, 1991, and expressed the opinion that Petitioner was still totally and permanently disabled. Dr. Morris also wrote Mr. Sadler a letter, dated June 16, 1992, expressing his opinion that Petitioner's condition was essentially unchanged from his previous indications. On July 7, 1992, Mr. Sadler informed Dr. Morris by telephone that it appeared that Petitioner had been gainfully employed as a longshoreman. Dr. Morris had not been aware of that employment and expressed the opinion to Mr. Sadler by telephone that Petitioner could teach if he could perform the duties of a longshoreman. On August 4, 1992, Respondent advised Petitioner in writing that it had determined that Petitioner was no longer entitled to disability retirement benefits. Petitioner contested that decision and requested a formal administrative hearing. This proceeding followed. Respondent thereafter took Petitioner's deposition to determine the extent of his employment as a longshoreman. In that deposition, Petitioner described his job activities and the hours he worked. Petitioner worked as a longshoreman on the docks throughout the time he was receiving disability retirement benefits. He was employed by different shipping companies in several different capacities. He worked as a porter handling luggage, he worked with a crew loading and unloading scrap iron, he worked with a crew loading foodstuffs on passenger ships, and he worked with a crew directing the operator of a gantry crane. He drove a fork lift and served as a supervisor of various crews, a position known as a "header." Prior to his own deposition, Dr. Morris reviewed Petitioner's deposition and became familiar with Petitioner's employment history since his disability retirement. Dr. Morris expressed the opinion that Petitioner was physically capable of performing the tasks required of a school teacher. Petitioner testified that he suffered from pain in his left ankle and leg as a result of the accident and that he has difficulty at times walking or standing. Petitioner was also concerned that he would be inattentive to his students at times because of his discomfort and because of the medication he takes to alleviate that discomfort and to control his diabetes, gout, and arthritis. Petitioner argues that his employment as a longshoreman does not establish that he is able to return to teaching and that he remains disabled. Petitioner presented no medical testimony to support his arguments. Based on Dr. Morris's testimony, Petitioner's arguments are rejected, and it is found that Petitioner is capable of returning to his employment as a teacher.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which adopts the findings of facts contained herein and which terminates Petitioner's disability retirement benefits. DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-5434 The only post-hearing submittal filed by Petitioner was a letter and attachment thereto that contains argument, but not proposed factual findings. Those arguments are contrary to the conclusions reached herein and are rejected. The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Lewis B. Tunnage 450 North West 20th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 2639 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Larry Strong, Acting Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner may purchase retirement credit for the period of time from his suspension date to his reinstatement date as creditable service in the Florida Retirement Service.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Philip J. Cobb, was employed by the Pinellas County Board of County Commissioners (County) in May 1985, as a property manager. As a permanent employee of the County, Petitioner was enrolled as a member of the regular class of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). In order to vest and be eligible to receive retirement benefits under state law, Petitioner needed to complete ten years of creditable service. Petitioner continued to work for the County until he was terminated on August 1, 1992. The reason Respondent terminated Petitioner was because he allegedly failed to support his supervisor and was insubordinate. At the time Petitioner's employment with the County was terminated, he had earned approximately seven years and two months of creditable service and was thirty-four months short of vesting in the FRS. Petitioner challenged his termination by instituting legal proceedings against the County, alleging that his termination was illegally motivated by age discrimination. The lawsuit, Case No. 94-1054-CIV-T-21C, was filed in June 1994, in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, and sought Petitioner's reinstatement to his former position. At the time of his termination, Petitioner was sixty-seven years old, and at the time of this proceeding he was one day shy of being seventy-three years old. After discovery had been undertaken and prior to the case being set for trial, the Court ordered the parties into mediation. During settlement negotiations, the parties specifically discussed the importance of Petitioner purchasing credit in the FRS as necessary for vesting. In light of this consideration, before of the Agreement was finalized, counsel for Petitioner contacted Respondent regarding the cost of Petitioner's purchasing the service credit required to vest in the FRS. In a letter dated November 30, 1995, from Maurice Helms, Chief, Bureau of Retirement Calculations, to counsel for Petitioner, Mr. Helms noted that Petitioner had only 7.25 years of creditable service in the FRS, not the ten years required to vest. Nevertheless, the letter stated, "If [Petitioner] were eligible to purchase the service credit required to vest and then retire, we estimate the cost would be $30,273.69". This projected amount was considered in negotiations and was represented in the settlement amount. In January 1996, as a result of the mediation, Petitioner and the County entered into a Settlement Agreement, Release and Disclaimer (Agreement), in exchange for Petitioner's dismissing his lawsuit. Paragraph Two of the Agreement provides that the County would make a lump sum payment distribution of $64,000.00 to Petitioner. Of the total amount, $34,000.00 was designated as back pay and liquidated damages. The remaining $30,00.00 was for "fees and other costs associated with the above-captioned case." Further, the County agreed to rescind Petitioner's termination, convert the termination to a suspension without pay, and reinstate Petitioner to his former position. Finally, the Agreement included a provision that Petitioner would resign from that position on the date he was reinstated. Paragraph Three of the Agreement provides that the $64,000.00 is not a "mere recital, but is the cash consideration for this Agreement and the full and final release affected thereby." Notwithstanding the provision in the Agreement that the $34,000.00 is for back pay and liquidated damages, Paragraph Three of the Agreement expressly states that the settlement amount paid by the County and accepted by Petitioner was not to compensate Petitioner for back wages, benefits, or other forms of compensation. Rather, the settlement amount was part of the compromise to settle and compromise the matter. In this regard, Paragraph Three of the Agreement provides in pertinent part the following: ...The parties hereto recognize that substantial questions of law and of fact exist as to any possible claim or claims by Cobb for any compensation, back pay, forms of compensation, benefits or damages, liquidated/compensatory or otherwise, interest and any other claim for relief; therefore, [this settlement is being made purely on a compromise basis in order to avoid further trouble, litigation and expense, and the settlement amount is considered to be a part of the compromise, paid by Defendant and accepted by Cobb not to compensate Cobb for back wages, benefits or other forms of compensation, but to settle and compromise the matter relative to the trouble, interference, damage, and expense which would have been and would otherwise continue to be claimed and/or associated therewith]. [Emphasis supplied.] Paragraph Eleven of the Agreement addresses changes in Petitioner's employment status and delineates the method by which the County would accomplish these changes. That paragraph provides the following: The parties hereto further agree that, without any waiver of the sufficiency of the grounds and cause for Cobb's termination, and [in settlement of all claims of Cobb as set forth hereinabove, a personnel action form will be prepared changing Cobb's termination action on July 31, 1992, to a suspension without pay through the date this Agreement is signed. Additionally, a personnel action will be issued reinstating Cobb to paid status effective the date this Agreement is signed.] Cobb agrees to sign and submit the attached letter of resignation, effective the date he signs this Agreement, and further agrees to waive any pay and/or benefits to which he may be entitled from Defendant since July 31, 1992. [Emphasis supplied.] After the Agreement was executed and pursuant to the terms thereof, the County prepared and processed the required paperwork which effectively rescinded Petitioner's termination, changed the termination to a suspension without pay, and reinstated Petitioner to paid status. Petitioner did not return to work with the County, but resigned on the day he was reinstated. Petitioner's resignation was consistent not only with the terms of the Agreement, but with Petitioner's intentions at the time he was being considered for employment by the County. At or near the time Petitioner was initially employed by the County, he indicated to County officials that he was committed to remaining with the County for ten years so that he could vest in the FRS. Based on his understanding of the Agreement, Petitioner did not intend to return to work with the County after the Agreement was executed. Petitioner believed that the County's action of rescinding his termination, changing his status to suspension without pay, and reinstating him provided him with more than the thirty-four months he needed to vest in the FRS. Had Petitioner not been terminated by the County, he would have vested in the FRS in May 1995, and would have thereupon retired. Although the Agreement provided that Petitioner would resign, there is no indication that the County was opposed to Petitioner's returning to work. In fact, one of the negotiators for the County, testified that "I am not sure that Pinellas County didn't want Mr. Cobb to return to employment. We wanted to settle the lawsuit that was pending. " After the Agreement was finalized, in a letter dated February 12, 1996, Petitioner provided Respondent with a copy of the executed Agreement and "copies of personnel actions completed in accordance therewith." The letter requested that Respondent do the following: (1) reinstate Petitioner in FRS in accordance with Section 121.011(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 60S-2.016, Florida Administrative Code; and (2) provide Petitioner "with the amount of his required contributions for retirement credit for his period of suspension up to and including the date of his vesting." Petitioner was prepared to pay into the State Retirement Fund the contribution required to receive retirement credit. On March 5, 1996, Respondent issued a letter to Petitioner denying him the right to make contributions for retirement for the period of suspension without pay, July 31, 1992, through the date of his reinstatement, January 22, 1996. The denial letter stated that the purported "reinstatement" did not occur. As rationale for its position, Respondent found that: (1) after being "reinstated", Petitioner never performed work in a regularly established position and, therefore, was not compensated for services or work performed; (2) the County never intended to reinstate Petitioner "to employment with pay, nor was there an expectation of Petitioner to be "made whole" by the County; and (3) Petitioner and the County never intended to "enter into an employer and employee relationship retroactively for the period in question." Respondent stated that the purported reinstatement of Petitioner "was more in the nature of a ruse or sham to achieve a goal other than gainful employment." Moreover, Respondent believed that "neither the member nor the employer intended to enter into a regular employer and employee relationship." Respondent thus concluded that the reinstatement was not "bona fide" and was solely for the purpose of allowing Petitioner to vest in FRS and obtain retirement benefits. Respondent also objected to the form of Petitioner's reinstatement of employment with the County, declaring that it was not a "bona fide" as signified by his failure to receive back pay for the period of suspension and his failure to enter into an employer-employee relationship with the County for the equivalent of one calendar month. Respondent acknowledged that once Petitioner's termination was changed to a suspension without pay Rule 60S-2.016, Florida Administrative Code, applies to the case. This rule is interpreted by Respondent to require that for reinstatement to occur, an individual must work in a regularly established position for at least one calendar month following the suspension. Respondent admits that the "one calendar month" requirement is not contained in either Section 121.011(3)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), or in Rule 60S-2.016, Florida Administrative Code, both of which govern retirement credit for periods of suspension without pay. Nevertheless, Respondent's interpretation of Rule 60S-2.016, Florida Administrative Code, is that a person must work thirty days after a suspension without pay to be deemed "reinstated". Respondent derives this interpretation by applying language from the rule that governs granting credit for leaves of absence. Respondent's interpretation of "reinstatement," as it relates to members who have been suspended without pay, is not evident from the language of the applicable statute or rule and may be ascertained only upon reviewing individual member files. The Florida Retirement System currently has 600,000 active members and 140,000 retirees, for a total of 740,000 files.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order that awards Petitioner retirement credit for the period of time from his date of suspension to his date of reinstatement subject to his purchasing retirement credit for that period of time. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CARLOYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-647 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. McKee, Esquire Kelly and McKee, P.A. 1718 East Seventh Avenue, Suite 301 Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Paul A. Rowell General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue is whether the correct retirement date was established for Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Scurlock was employed as a secretary by the Public Defender of the 14th Judicial Circuit for 12 to 13 years, in Panama City, Florida. As such, and after becoming vested in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), she accrued certain rights under the FRS. The Division has over 900 employees and administers benefits for more than 700,000 members. The Division is charged with administering the FRS. Ms. Scurlock's performance while employed by the Public Defender deteriorated in 2004. As a result, she was discharged on October 27, 2004. She had been diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis prior to her discharge. She is currently medically unable to engage in gainful employment. Ms. Scurlock does not recall if the Public Defender provided her with information concerning retirement at the time of her discharge. Nevertheless, she was aware of the availability of disability retirement, and during February 2005 she completed Form FR-13, Application for Disability Retirement. She stated in the application that her disability was the result of multiple sclerosis, among other maladies. Ms. Scurlock was assisted in seeking disability retirement by her sister. Ms. Scurlock signed the FR-13 application, and it was sworn before a notary public on February 18, 2005. Ms. Scurlock believes her sister mailed the form. The FR-13 may have been addressed to the Florida Department of Health, but in any event, it was not received by the Division in 2005. Assisted by her sister, Ms. Scurlock telephonically contacted the Division on April 11, 2006, to inquire about her application for disability retirement. At that time, she avowed that the FR-13 had been sent in January 2005 to the Department of Health. Upon being advised that she needed to submit a new form in order to obtain benefits, she did so. An FR-13 was received by the Division on May 24, 2006. Attached to the application was a copy of the application sworn before the notary public on February 18, 2005. The Division found the FR-13 submitted on May 24, 2006, to be complete and sufficient to establish that Ms. Scurlock should be paid disability retirement benefits beginning June 1, 2006. Although Ms. Scurlock may have suffered some cognitive impairment as a result of being afflicted with multiple sclerosis, she was aided by her sister, who apparently has no cognitive impairment, when she first attempted to file in early 2005. Moreover, Ms. Scurlock adequately presented her case at the hearing, and to the extent that cognitive impairment might influence the outcome of this case, it is found that she is not so impaired that she could not timely file an application for disability retirement. For the reasons set forth below, whether she was physically or mentally able to file a FR-13, or whether the state or one of its agents failed to inform her of her rights, has no bearing on the outcome of this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services enter a final order affirming the establishment of June 1, 2006, as the beginning date of entitlement to disability retirement pay in the case of Marilyn Scurlock. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Marilyn Scurlock 3936 Scurlock Lane Panama City, Florida 32409 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2007. Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that the Petitioner submitted a request for extension of employment after reaching age 65 and that the Agency routinely processed said request, which was denied by the Agency. The Petitioner testified that he was over 65 years of age, eligible for retirement benefits, a career service system employee, was in good health, had a fine employment record, and desired to continue work until November 1976. Continuing work until November 1976, according to the Petitioner, would allow him to meet certain financial obligations which he had. He further testified that he had thought that the general policy of the Department of Transportation was to allow such extentions until the January following to an employee's 65th birthday and that he had planned on that additional employment. Without an extention, the Petitioner would retire effective May 28, 1976. The Agency did not controvert these facts, but pointed out that there was no policy regarding retention of personnel until the end of the year in which an employee reached age 65. The Hearing Officer notes that s. 112.051, Florida Statutes, creates the right in a state agency to retire personnel who are members of a merit system or similar tenure system on the basis of age and without specifying charges if the employee has reached age 65 and is eligible for retirement. The right to continue to employ such an employee is discretionary with the Agency. The facts establish that Petitioner is over 65 years of age and eligible for state retirement benefits. Therefore, Petitioner's retention was totally discretionary. There was no evidence that the Agency abused its statutory discretion in denying the Petitioner's request, or discriminated against the Petitioner in any fashion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Agency take no further action on the Petition, and not reconsider the Petitioner's request for retention. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of May, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional retirement benefits for her years of service between September 1966 and December 1974.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a retired member of the FRS. She began working for the Duval County Juvenile Detention Center (DCJDC) in August 1966. However, Petitioner's name was not placed on the payroll until September 1966 because of the time she was absent. As an employee of the DCJDC, Petitioner was a county employee but also a participant in the FRS. She made contributions in the amount of $1,850.78 to the FRS from September 1966 through December 1974. The FRS became non- contributory for all state and county employees in January 1975. Petitioner terminated her employment with Duval County on June 20, 1977. At that time, Petitioner requested a refund of her accumulated contributions to the FRS. Petitioner acknowledged in her request for refund that she waived her interest in FRS for the refunded service. On or about February 22, 1978, Respondent issued Voucher #273254 and Warrant #0364356 made payable to Petitioner in the amount of $1,850.78. Petitioner's testimony that she never received the refund is not credible. On or about October 16, 1981, Petitioner returned to work at DCJDC. After receiving several promotions, Petitioner transferred to a position at the Department of Health. Petitioner terminated her employment at the Department of Health on November 13, 1998. In August 2000, Petitioner filed an Application for Service Retirement. The application includes the following sworn statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. Respondent sent Petitioner an Acknowledgment of Service Retirement Application dated August 10, 2000. The acknowledgment indicated that Petitioner's retirement date was June 2000 and that she could purchase credit for refunded service from September 1966 through December 1974 by paying Respondent $7,918.46. The acknowledgment made it clear that Respondent required written notification if Petitioner did not intend to purchase this service. In March 2001, Petitioner executed an Option Selection for FRS Members. She selected Option 1, which provides her a monthly benefit for her lifetime. In a letter dated March 27, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent that she did not intend to buy back any time. Additionally, she stated as follows: I would like for my retirement application to be accepted/processed as is. The rate quoted was at $517.00. However, if this amount is incorrect, I would like to know as soon as possible. Based upon Petitioner's statement in the letter, Respondent began paying and Petitioner began receiving her retirement benefits effective June 1, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to any additional retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Veronica P. Holt 230 East First Street, Apartment 1313 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Fred E. Hild (Colonel Hild), a deceased member of the Florida Retirement System, was incapacitated at the time he selected his retirement option and through the time that his first benefits check was cashed and, if so, whether his retirement option should be amended retroactively to provide benefits for Petitioner, Lois Hild, his spouse.
Findings Of Fact Colonel Fred Hild, late husband of Lois Hild, served in the Air Force for 25 years before retiring from that service. After retirement from the Air Force and after Valencia Community College opened in Orlando, Florida, Colonel Hild joined the college staff, first as a teacher and then as an administrator. At the time of his retirement from the college, he was assistant to the provost. He worked at the college from 1978 until 1996. His employment at the college was covered by the Florida Retirement System (FRS). With the exception of a year's employment in her family's business, Mrs. Hild never worked outside of her home. She and Colonel Hild were married over 50 years and had a full, active life together. Colonel Hild provided the financial support for the family and, except for routine household expenses when he was away in the Air Force, he handled all of the family's financial affairs. Colonel Hild's family and co-workers acknowledge that he was a remarkable man in many ways, physically vigorous and mentally sharp. His work was always an important aspect of his life; he was well-respected and well-known on the college campus and, because of his long tenure, was very knowledgeable about the history and functioning of the college. As he aged, Colonel Hild slowed down a bit; he had days at work when he was sleepy or grumpy. Most days, though, he was quite normal and sharp. He knew all of the regulations for the college and always went by the rules. On October 12, 1995, at the age of 81 years, Colonel Hild suffered a major cerebrovascular accident (stroke) while at home. The stroke left lasting side effects. For a time after the stroke he lost all short-term memory and could neither read nor write. He became passive and frail. He underwent rehabilitation and improved quite a bit, according to Mrs. Hild, but he was never again the same man. Colonel Hild's son, David, who lived in California, sold his car and possessions and moved in with his parents to help Mrs. Hild provide the care Colonel Hild then required. This care included driving and assistance ambulating in the home neighborhood, where he would sometimes get lost. Colonel Hild was never again able to drive, as he lost part of his peripheral vision and would forget where he was going. He was unable at times to recognize friends or family members. He slept a lot and needed supervision in showering and dressing. He never again was able to assume responsibility for the financial affairs of the family. The Hild's son, Steve, an accountant in Miami, Florida, helped Mrs. Hild with financial planning and paperwork. Before his stroke Colonel Hild had made some plans for retirement. He spoke to co-workers of investments in stocks and bonds, and when the Air Force brought in a survivor's benefit program, he took advantage of that so that his wife would have some benefits when he died. He also spoke to Mrs. Hild of their having retirement benefits from Valencia for ten years. Still, before the stroke Colonel Hild worried about having enough for retirement and his worries increased after the stroke. He insisted on returning to work at the college after his rehabilitation and some recovery. Although they were worried about how he could function, Colonel Hild's wife and sons were reluctant to oppose him when he was so insistent. Dr. Collins, his personal physician for over 20 years, provided certificates authorizing Colonel Hild to return to the college part-time on April 8, 1996, and full time on June 1, 1996. Dr. Collins believed that the duties would be light and that the family and college staff would look out for Colonel Hild. Colonel Hild's son, David, drove him to and from work and made sure Colonel Hild got in the building. The first time they made the drive, Colonel Hild directed his son to the wrong campus of the college. Already thoroughly trained in the paperwork, the secretaries picked up much of the work that Colonel Hild had been doing. For example, they listened to students' problems and tried to work them out with the department chairpersons. For final decisions, the staff referred the problems to the provost, Dr. Kinzer. Colonel Hild's duties on his return to work were light. Because Colonel Hild was very organized and knew so much about the college, he was able to function with the help of his staff. He could review documents prepared for him and would initial or sign the documents, as appropriate, sometimes changing something if it had not been prepared correctly. Some days were better than others; he slept more than he did before his stroke and would sometimes get lost on campus. Because he was so well- known, someone would always help him back to his office. One of the annual responsibilities of Colonel Hild was organizing the graduation processions, making a list of the order of the march and placing posters or signs in the corridors for guidance. He performed this function without complaint in early May 1996. He refused assistance of his staff and, except for a couple of posters on the opposite wall, he managed to get everything done. At the actual graduation night, however, Colonel's Hild's, son, David, had to help him find his way at the end of the ceremony and recessional march. Colonel Hild retired from Valencia Community College on July 31, 1996. In preparation for that retirement he had several contacts with staff in the college's human resources office. Initially, Colonel Hild signed a form on May 30, 1996, applying for retirement and leaving blank the benefit option selection since he had not yet received an estimate of the amounts he would receive under each option. Vicki Nelson, a staff person in the human resources office, had approximately 4 or 5 contacts with Colonel Hild, face-to-face or over the telephone, while preparing paperwork for his retirement. At one point she was concerned that she was having to explain things over again and she suggested to Colonel Hild and to his secretary that maybe he should bring Mrs. Hild in with him. The issue she was trying to explain had something to do with the need to obtain Mrs. Hild's birth certificate if he selected either option 3 or 4. The suggestion was never followed up and ultimately Mrs. Hild's birth certificate was unnecessary. Michael Break is assistant vice-president of human resources at Valencia Community College. In his capacity as director of human resources Dr. Break was involved in preparing Colonel Hild's retirement documents. On June 19, 1996, Dr. Break, Vicki Nelson, and Colonel Hild met to discuss the benefit options and the monthly estimates of each amount. The FRS provides four benefit options to its retirees. Option 1 yields the maximum monthly benefit, but when the retiree dies there is no survivor benefit. Option 2 yields a reduced monthly benefit for 10 years. If the retiree dies before the end of 10 years, the benefit is paid to the survivor for the balance of the 10 years. Option 3 provides a reduced benefit for the joint lifetimes of the member and beneficiary; Option 4 provides a reduced benefit for the lifetimes of the retiree and beneficiary, which benefit is reduced by 33 1/3% upon the death of either. As explained to Colonel Hild, his monthly benefit under option 1 was $2,569.64; under option 2, his benefit was $1,692.72; under option 3 the benefit was $1,546.92; and under option 4, the benefit was $1,856.41, reduced to $1,237.61 upon the death of Colonel or Mrs. Hild. In his discussion with Colonel Hild, Dr. Break pointed out the implications of the various options, including the need to consider such factors as one's health and financial arrangements for a dependent spouse. In response, Colonel Hild mentioned that he had other financial means and this was not the only retirement that he depended on. Although Dr. Break was aware that some people were concerned about Colonel Hild's effectiveness after his return to work, nothing in Colonel Hild's responses to the discussion in the meeting raised red flags to alert Dr. Break that Colonel Hild did not understand. Colonel Hild expressed his opinion that the difference between benefits under option 1 and the remaining options was excessive. In Dr. Break's experience, and as he counsels pre- retirees, sometimes the selection of option 1, with the additional purchase of an annuity or life insurance policy, inures to the greater benefit of an individual's dependents than the other reduced-benefit options under the FRS. When a retiree selects option 1 or 2, there is a section on the option selection form for the spouse to sign in acknowledgment of the option. Colonel Hild brought the form home and gave it to Mrs. Hild to sign one morning before he left for work. When she signed it the form was blank. All she knew was what he told her, that the form was something she had to sign for his retirement. She did not question her husband or even read enough of the form to know that there were 4 options. Mary Ann Swenson has been employed at Valencia Community College for thirteen years, 8 of which have been in the human resources department. Ms. Swenson notarized Colonel Hild's signature on the benefits option form on June 24, 1996, and remembers the occasion. Colonel Hild came to the human resources office to meet with Vicki Nelson, who called Ms. Swenson. At the time that Colonel Hild signed the form, Mrs. Hild's signature was already on it, but her signature did not require a notary. Likewise, option 1 had been checked on the form and, in response to a question by Colonel Hild, Vicki Nelson showed him that he marked option 1 and said, "Yes, you have marked option 1." Colonel Hild signed the form and then Ms. Swenson notarized it. On June 24, 1996, during the approximately 10 minutes that Ms. Swenson spent with Colonel Hild and Vicki Nelson, she had no reason to believe that he was not in complete control of his mental facilities or that he failed to understand and recognize what he was signing. Colonel Hild retired, as planned, the end of July 1996, and his first retirement check arrived approximately August 30, 1996. Mrs. Hild saw the check and had her husband endorse it. She then cashed the check. She understood that by doing so, she was accepting the amount of the check. She saw no problem with this because she assumed that Colonel Hild had opted for what he and she had discussed as the "ten year" provision. Mrs. Hild assumed that the check reflected the number of years he was employed and the amount of money that he was making. The Hild's son, Steve, made the same assumption, as he and Colonel Hild had discussed retirement sometime in the early 1990's and Steve understood that his father would take the 10- year plan with Valencia. Neither Steve nor Mrs. Hild had requested any information from the college or Division of Retirement about the option selected by Colonel Hild or the amount of benefits he would receive once he retired. Colonel Hild died on September 28, 1997. He had received a total of approximately $37,000, or 14 months of benefits under FRS option 1 during his lifetime. Mrs. Hild and Colonel Hild's sons learned of the option 1 selection when the checks stopped coming after Colonel Hild's death and when Mrs. Hild called the college human resources office. It is necessary to glean Colonel Hild's mental capacity and state of mind from the circumstances described by the witnesses in this case, all of whom were candid and credible. From those circumstances it is impossible to find that Colonel Hild was incompetent to make the decision to chose option 1 for his FRS benefits. That decision was entirely consistent with his concern, described by his family and staff at the college, that there be enough money coming in when he retired. Although he plainly was concerned for making financial arrangements for his spouse, he had made some arrangements already with his Air Force retirement and with other assets or investments. Described as strong-willed, disciplined and well- organized, Colonel Hild, in spite of his diminished capacity after his stroke, convinced his family, the college and his long time physician that he should return to work. And he did function in that work prior to retirement, performing by habit those tasks that he had mastered in his long tenure. No one suggests that Colonel Hild was coerced, pressured or hurried into the decision he made. The various staff who met with him on several occasions regarding his retirement believed that he was capable of making his own decision and that he exercised the very option that he intended.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: THAT the Florida Division of Retirement issue its final order denying the relief sought by Petitioner, Lois Hild. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold Lewis, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Julia Smith, Esquire Amundsen and Moore 502 East Park Avenue Post Office Box 1759 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Chief Legal Counsel Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has enough creditable service in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(17)(a), Florida Statutes (2009),1 to be "vested" and, therefore, eligible for a retirement benefit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is not currently an employee of any FRS employer. Petitioner was an employee of several different FRS employers during the 1970's and 1980's. Petitioner proved that he had creditable earnings from three FRS employers. The creditable earnings were from Hillsborough County from October 1977 through April 1978, Pasco County from August 1987 through December 1987, and Hernando County from March 1988 through August 1989. Petitioner has 3.09 years of creditable service in the FRS. The creditable service is not sufficient to vest Petitioner and does not entitle Petitioner to retirement benefits. Petitioner was employed with the City of Largo, Florida, for some time. However, that municipality was not an FRS participating employer during the period of employment. Petitioner worked for the U.S. Postal Service for some time. That agency is not an FRS participating employer. Petitioner was a student on work study at both the University of Florida and Florida State University. Paid student positions at state universities were not positions which were included in the FRS during that time. Petitioner also seeks to purchase his military time of approximately 22 months. Members of the FRS are allowed to purchase certain military service after they vest in the FRS. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has sufficient years of service to vest in the FRS and then purchase military service. Petitioner was employed in some state positions prior to 1975. Until 1975, the FRS was a "contributory" system. Employers withheld contributions to the retirement system from the wages of participating members and forwarded the withheld amounts to the Division. It is undisputed from Petitioner's testimony that no retirement contributions were ever withheld from his wages during the period that FRS was a contributory system.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Timothy Green (Green), was born on April 19, 1941. Green was employed by Manatee County as a Highway Maintenance Technician on March 26, 1966. As a Highway Maintenance Technician, Green cleared ditches, brush and culverts. He also installed storm drainage pipe and operated chain saws and related tools. On September 24, 1984, Green was terminated from his job because of his inability to perform his assigned duties. Green referred to his termination as a "retirement." Having been promoted to Highway Maintenance Technician II, Green was earning $1,016.01 per month gross pay at the time he was terminated. He had accumulated 18.40 years of creditable service under the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Green is unable to read and has had no formal schooling other than the attendance of what he describes as "opportunity classes all his life." Green has not been found by any court to be incompetent to handle his personal affairs and generally paid his personal bills through money orders he purchased at convenience stores. However, Green's mental capabilities and ability to communicate are obviously quite limited, and his more complicated personal affairs were handled by his mother and sister. On September 28, 1984, Green sought out and met with Mr. A1 Chandler, Records Manager for Manatee County, at Chandler's office. Green thought that Manatee County already had "retired" him because of his disability and just wanted to get his retirement benefits. He did not understand the various optional benefits available to him as a member of the FRS. Green was able to communicate to Chandler only that he wanted to get all his money from retirement, or words to that effect. Chandler interpreted those words to mean that Green wanted to withdraw his contributions to the system. Based on his general familiarity with the FRS, Chandler discouraged Green from doing what he believed Green wanted to do (i.e.. withdraw his contributions from the system). Chandler believed intuitively that Green should not withdraw his contributions because he had accumulated 18.40 years of creditable service under the FRS. Chandler understood that Green's years of creditable service would entitle him to favorable benefits upon normal retirement at age 62. He therefore advised Green to wait and not to withdraw the contributions. Green, who never clearly understood the difference between getting his money (or benefits) out of the retirement system and withdrawing his contributions to the retirement system, decided that he did not want to wait as Chandler advised. Accordingly, Chandler gave Green a form to request a refund of his contributions to the FRS, and Green signed the form. The Request For Refund Form FRS-M81 Green signed contains the following information above his signature: TO THE DIVISION OF RETIREMENT: I hereby make application for refund of my accumulated contributions in the Florida Retirement Systems. I do hereby waive for myself, my heirs and assignees all rights, title and interest in the Florida Retirement Systems. However, Green could not read the refund language. He did not think there was any reason to ask Chandler to read it to him, and Chandler did not read it or explain it to him. Neither Chandler nor anyone else fully explained to Green what optional benefits he might be entitled to as a member of the Florida Retirement System other than to wait until normal retirement or withdraw his contributions. Specifically, neither Chandler nor anyone else explained to Green that his request for refund of his accumulated contributions would eliminate his right to apply for disability retirement benefits. In fact, on that same day, September 28, 1984, Green began completing an application for disability retirement benefits. On October 2, 1984, Green's Statement Of Disability By Employer was received by Manatee County's Personnel Office. The form was completed by Green's former immediate supervisors. On October 3, 1984, Green's Request For A Refund Form FRS-M81 was mailed to Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement (Division) by Manatee County. Sometime between October 18, 1984 and November 20, 1984, Green's completed Florida Retirement System Application For Disability Retirement, with his Statement Disability By Employer, was sent to and received by the Division. On October 29, 1984 the Division sent Green the refund of his accumulated contributions totaling $1,686.52. Until Green received the refund, he expected to receive monthly checks. When he received the refund, Green realized for the first time that he would not be receiving monthly checks and that his lump sum check would be in the amount of only $1,686.52. Green never had any actual intent to relinquish his right to apply for disability retirement benefits from the FRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Department of Administration, Division of Retirement: (1) enter a final order granting the Petition For Formal Proceedings in this case and determining that Petitioner, Timothy Green, has not waived his right to apply for disability retirement benefits: and (2) process the application of Petitioner, Timothy Green, for disability retirement benefits. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Office Division of Administrative Hearings 309 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1985.
The Issue Whether the Petitioners are entitled to benefits as joint annuitants of the deceased employee.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are the adult, nondependent children of the deceased, Leonora Chapin. Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of managing the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Leonora Chapin was a vested member of the FRS with over ten years of service as a teacher with the Miami Dade County School District. The exact number of years of her service was not established nor is it dispositive of the issues of this case. In February of 1991, Ms. Chapin became extremely ill. This illness prevented her from returning to work but she did not formally retire. Instead, Ms. Chapin continued as an active member of the FRS until her death, April 14, 1991. At the time of her death, Ms. Chapin had designated "according to will" as her beneficiary to receive benefits, if any, which would be payable at her death. This Personal History Record form is the only record of any designation by the deceased received by the FRS. Based upon the foregoing designation, the Respondent determined that the deceased's two sons would share the deceased's personal contributions to the FRS account. This amount totaled $4,305.17. The Petitioners have disputed this determination and claim they are entitled to benefits as joint annuitants.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying Petitioners' claim for benefits and returning the member's contributions in the amount of $4,305.17. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Robert Chapin 14014 Northwest Passage Unit 240 Marina Del Ray, California 90292 Stuart Chapin 10729 Westminster Avenue Los Angeles, California 90034 Barry M. Brant, C.P.A. Berkowitz, Dick, Pollack & Brant, LLP One Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 150 Fifteenth Floor Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, as a surviving spouse, is entitled to the monthly benefits of his deceased wife pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes (1995). (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1995) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Mrs. Betty Thomas began participation in the Florida Retirement System ("FRS") on December 19, 1970, when the public school system that employed her as a teacher converted its retirement program from the Florida Teachers Retirement Program to the FRS. At the time, Mrs. Thomas had approximately six years of previous service for which she received credit in the FRS. The designated beneficiaries of Mrs. Thomas in 1970 were Mr. Johnny Brown, her husband at the time, and the couple's dependent children, Shauna Jackson, Peguena Brown, and Romina Brown. The three daughters were born, respectively, in 1961, 1962, and 1969. The FRS did not become noncontributory until 1975. By 1972, Mrs. Thomas had received $2,322.75 in three separate refunds representing part of the personal contributions and accrued interest that she made prior to 1975. Mrs. Thomas and Mr. Brown divorced in 1972. Mrs. Thomas met Petitioner sometime in 1975, and the two married in 1990. They remained together until Mrs. Thomas died on September 21, 1996. At the time of her death, Mrs. Thomas was actively employed as an assistant principal with 28.2 years of creditable service in the FRS. If her creditable service had not been reduced by previous refunds of personal contributions, Mrs. Thomas would have held 31.8 years of creditable service. On May 31, 1992, Mrs. Thomas changed her designated beneficiary. She deleted Mr. Johnny Brown, her former husband, and designated her three adult daughters as her beneficiaries using the From M-10 (the "M-10") required by Respondent for such purposes. Mrs. Thomas did not designate Petitioner as a beneficiary. From the time Mrs. Thomas executed the M-10 on May 31, 1992, and thereafter, none of the daughters of Mrs. Thomas qualified as a "joint annuitant" or a "dependent beneficiary" within the meaning of Section 121.021(28). None of the daughters was under age 25, physically or mentally disabled or incapable of self-support, or otherwise financially dependent on Mrs. Thomas for at least one-half of their support. From the time Petitioner married Mrs. Thomas in 1990, Petitioner qualified as a "joint annuitant" within the meaning of Section 121.021(28)(a). He was the spouse of a member of the FRS and is now the surviving spouse. Shortly after the death of Mrs. Thomas on September 21, 1996, Petitioner requested the monthly benefits of his deceased wife. By letter dated November 1, 1996, Respondent advised Petitioner that the "only benefit" available was a refund of personal contributions. In relevant part, the letter stated: Unless one of the beneficiaries qualified as a joint annuitant of the member at the time of death . . ., a refund of retirement contributions is the only benefit payable from this account. (emphasis supplied) Each beneficiary is entitled to an equal portion of the $2,354.05 on deposit and should complete Form FST-11g, APPLICATION OF BENEFICIARY FOR REFUND. (emphasis not supplied) If all the designated beneficiaries wish to disclaim interest in this account, you, as the surviving spouse would qualify as a joint annuitant. You would be eligible to receive the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. The monthly benefit would be payable for your lifetime and is estimated to be $1,617.95 effective October 1, 1996. (emphasis supplied) For you to receive this benefit, we need the following (emphasis supplied): Forms DIS-1 completed by Shauna B. Jackson, Peguena Brown, and Romina Brown. Disclaimer forms must be filed and recorded in Circuit Court within two years of the member's date of death. . . . The daughters of Mrs. Thomas did not disclaim their interest in the personal contributions that remained in the FRS account of their deceased mother. Rather, they applied for a refund. On December 9, 1997, Respondent refunded the remaining personal contributions of Mrs. Thomas to her three daughters. Petitioner continued his attempts to obtain the monthly benefits of his deceased wife. By letters dated January 30 and May 2, 1997, Respondent provided Petitioner with responses substantially the same as the response contained in the letter dated November 1, 1996. On July 17, 1998, Petitioner filed an Application of Beneficiary for Retirement Benefits. Respondent advised Petitioner that the "benefits" had already been paid to the three daughters of Mrs. Thomas, and Respondent requested an administrative hearing. The purpose of the M-10 signed by Mrs. Thomas was to designate beneficiaries of the retirement benefits earned by Mrs. Thomas during her years of service. The M-10 executed by Mrs. Thomas on May 31, 1992, stated, in relevant part: . . . I CHOOSE TO HAVE BENEFITS PAID . . . AS FOLLOWS . . . 3. . . . JOINTLY . . . BENEFITS SHALL BE DIVIDED AND PAYABLE AS INDICATED BELOW. . . . Shauna Brown Jackson Daughter 11/15/61 F Peguena Brown Daughter 12/10/61 F Romina Brown Daughter 3/9/69 F The term "benefits" is not defined in Section 121.021. However, Respondent's own rule, in relevant part, defines the term to mean a "monthly payment." Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(10). (Unless otherwise stated, all references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.) After Mrs. Thomas died on September 21, 1996, Respondent did not pay "benefits" to anyone, as Respondent defines the term "benefit" in Rule 60S-6.001(10). On December 9, 1997, Respondent distributed three lump sum payments totaling $2,354.05, to the designated beneficiaries who were entitled to the personal contributions of Mrs. Thomas pursuant to Section 121.091(7)(b)2. Respondent distributed one lump sum payment of $784.69 to Ms. Romina Brown and two equal lump sum payments of $784.68 to Ms. Peguena Brown and Ms. Shauna Brown. Section 121.091(7)(b)2 authorizes Respondent to pay only the personal contributions of Mrs. Thomas to her designated beneficiaries who do not qualify as joint annuitants within the meaning of Section 121.021(28). However, nothing in Chapter 121 or the evidence of record requires Respondent to withhold monthly benefits from a surviving spouse who is entitled in Section 121.091(8) to receive retirement benefits. The attempt by Mrs. Thomas to designate beneficiaries on the M-10 was, in part, effective and, in part, ineffective. It was an effective attempt to designate the beneficiaries entitled to a refund of her personal contributions. However, it was an ineffective attempt to name a beneficiary entitled to the monthly benefits that accrued independently of any personal contributions. An ineffective attempt to designate a beneficiary who is entitled to monthly benefits fails to name a beneficiary entitled to those benefits. When no beneficiary is named, Petitioner, as the surviving spouse, is the beneficiary designated in Section 121.091(8) who is entitled to the monthly benefits. When Respondent refunded $2,322.75 in personal contributions to Mrs. Thomas in 1972, the refund reduced the monthly benefit from $1,617.95 to $1,279.54. The refund resulted in a reduction in monthly benefit of approximately $338.41. There is no evidence that a $2,354.05 refund of the remaining contributions in 1997 should have any different effect on the monthly benefit. In the absence of some legal reason not to do so, a refund of $2,354.05 in 1997 should reduce the monthly benefit in the same proportion that the previous refunds in 1972 reduced the monthly benefit. The $2,354.05 refund in 1997 should reduce the monthly benefit of $1,279.54, by $341.79, to $937.75. Sections 121.091(7)(e) and (f) authorize a surviving spouse to modify monthly benefits by repaying contributions refunded to the member. Petitioner can restore the monthly benefit either to $1,279.54 or to $1,617.95 by electing to pay either $2,354.05 or $4,676.05 in personal contributions previously refunded plus accrued interest at the statutorily prescribed rate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order awarding to Petitioner, for the remainder of his life, the monthly benefits earned by Mrs. Thomas during 31.8 years of service in an amount that may range from $937.75 to $1,617.95, depending on the amount of personal contributions repaid by Petitioner, and shall include a lump sum payment of all monthly benefits plus accrued interest from October 1, 1996, to the date of the first payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Button, Senior Attorney Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Granville E. Petrie, Esquire 1105 North Duval Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
