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MARK B. MAXEY vs DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 92-002479 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Apr. 23, 1992 Number: 92-002479 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 1992

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is employed as a full-time professional firefighter by the City of Tampa Fire Department. His primary responsibility is the prevention and extinguishment of fires, the protection and saving of life and property, and the enforcement of municipal, county and state fire prevention codes, as well as of any law pertaining to the prevention and control of fires. Petitioner received an associate in arts degree in Business Administration in May 1989 from Hillsborough Community College. In addition, he has earned 90 hours credit towards an associate in science degree from the same accredited post secondary institution. Petitioner's permanent academic record at Hillsborough Community College reveals he has successfully completed the following fire-related courses: SUMMER 1983 SEMESTER CREDITS ENS 1119 EMT AMBULANCE 5 EMS 1119 EMT AMBULANCE LAB 1 FALL 1986 SEMESTER CREDITS FFP 2601 FIRE APPARATUS PRA 3 FFP 1600 FIRE APPARATUS EQ 3 FALL 1990 SEMESTER CREDITS FFP 2420 F/F TACTICS & STRA 3 FFP 2660 RESCUE PRACTICES 3 FFP 2110 FIRE COMPANY MAN AG 3 Although Petitioner has 21 semester hours that the Department has agreed are fire related courses, 9 of these hours were credited to him after his associate in arts degree was conferred upon him in May of 1989. In order for a firefighter to be eligible for supplemental compensation related to an associate degree, he or she must have at least 18 semester hours that are fire related and are part of the firefighter's studies for the degree. Petitioner had only 12 semesters of fire related studies prior to the award of his degree. In order for Petitioner to receive eligibility credits for the full 21 semester hours in the Firefighter's Supplemental Compensation Program, he would have to acquire his second associate degree from Hillsborough Community College.

Recommendation Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner should be denied eligibility for the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program as he did not complete at least 18 semester hours of fire related courses prior to receiving his award of an associate of arts degree. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See HO #4 and #5. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark B. Maxey 6909 N. Glen Avenue Tampa, FL 33614 William C. Childers, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil Deputy General Counsel Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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JAMES E. DALRYMPLE vs DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 92-002150 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Apr. 07, 1992 Number: 92-002150 Latest Update: Aug. 04, 1992

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the bachelor's degree curriculum by which the Petitioner, James E. Dalrymple, earned his degree "includes a major study concentration area readily identifiable and applicable to fire-related subjects," as set out in Section 633.382(2)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (1991), so as to entitle him to the firefighter supplemental compensation for which he has applied.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has a bachelor's degree in Communication Arts awarded by Judson College in Illinois on or about June 11, 1978. Judson College is accredited. The Petitioner's official sealed transcript from Judson College reveals that the Petitioner took no "fire-related" courses to get his degree. He did take courses in language arts and communication arts, such as: "English Language: Uses and Resources"; "Oral Interpretation and Mass Media"; "Language and Society"; "Man and Women"; "Analysis of Literature"; and "Mass Media in Contemporary America." Courses such as these are certainly compatible with and useful for work in the field of firefighting. But they, along with his other general study courses, do not reflect a "major study concentration area readily identifiable and applicable to fire-related subjects."

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Insurance Commissioner, in his capacity as State Fire Marshal, and agency head of the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Division of State Fire Marshal, enter a final order denying the application of the Petitioner, James E. Dalrymple, for firefighters supplemental compensation. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2150 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the Department of Insurance and Treasurer's proposed findings of fact: 1.-5. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 6.-7. Accepted and incorporated. 8. Accepted but conclusion of law. 9.-12. Accepted but unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James E. Dalrymple 2816 Weston Terrace Palm Harbor, Florida 34685 Elizabeth J. Gregovits, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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JOSEPH EDGERTON vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, 09-001917 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Apr. 15, 2009 Number: 09-001917 Latest Update: Sep. 21, 2009

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a firesafety inspector should be denied based on Petitioner's criminal convictions, in the 1980s, on drug related charges.

Findings Of Fact The Denial of Petitioner's Application. On May 23, 2008, Petitioner Joseph Edgerton ("Edgerton") submitted an application to the Department of Financial Services (the "Department" or "DFS") seeking approval to sit for the state certification examination that must be passed to become licensed as a Firesafety Inspector. The next month, DFS verbally notified Edgerton that he would not be permitted to take the certification examination because of his criminal record, which includes two felony convictions, from the 1980s, for drug-related offenses. The Department took the position that each of the crimes of which Edgerton was convicted involved moral turpitude. Edgerton did not dispute the convictions, but he did object to the characterization of his criminal conduct as base and depraved, and he pressed the Department for a formal decision, in writing, on his application. By letter dated March 5, 2009, the Department denied Edgerton's application, "based upon the following factual allegations:"1 On May 22, 1980, you pled [guilty to] and were adjudicated guilty . . . [of] felony possession of cocaine with intent to sell, . . . a crime of moral turpitude, in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida . . . . On April 29, 1988, you pled [guilty to] and were adjudicated guilty [of] felony conspiracy to distribute cocaine, . . . a crime of moral turpitude, in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, . . . were committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons for a term of forty-two (42) months, and upon release were placed on supervised release for a term of thirty-six (36) months. The foregoing allegations of historical fact concerning Edgerton's convictions are true and undisputed. (In contrast, the Department's characterization of the offenses as crimes involving moral turpitude is sharply contested, but that particular dispute is not outcome determinative and need not be decided, for reasons that follow.) The Circumstances Surrounding the Criminal Incidents. Edgerton's state court conviction followed his arrest in late 1979, when he was discovered in an airport to be in possession of five ounces of cocaine. Edgerton testified that the cocaine was for personal use, and that he did not intend to sell or distribute the drug. While Edgerton's testimony in this regard was credible as far as it went, the fact that he pleaded guilty, in 1980, to the charge of possession with intent to sell gives rise to a conflict in the evidence regarding his criminal intent. Even assuming the worst, however, what matters more at present is that Edgerton genuinely accepts responsibility for, and is remorseful about, his very old criminal misconduct, which he readily acknowledges was "stupid" and "wrong." Edgerton further insists (and the undersigned finds that) he "is a different person now," at age 50, than the "kid" who "partied too much" 30 years ago. With regard to the federal conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, Edgerton testified that his role consisted of lending money to another person for use in a narcotics transaction. Edgerton denies having handled, carried, or delivered any drugs, and the undersigned accepts his testimony on this point, which was not contradicted by conflicting evidence. Consistent with his statements concerning the other matter, Edgerton accepts responsibility for this crime while maintaining, credibly, that he is "not the same guy" who committed it and declaring that he "wouldn't do it again." The History of the Applicant Since the Incident. Edgerton committed the subject crimes a long time ago—— nearly 30 years in the case of the trafficking charge and approximately 22 years in reference to the conspiracy charge. Edgerton thus has had ample time fully to restore his reputation and usefulness to society as a law abiding citizen following his felony convictions. There is persuasive evidence that he has done just that. In 1993, Edgerton became licensed by the Florida Department of Health as a paramedic. His license, numbered PMD 13086, was active as of the final hearing in this case. In October 1995, Edgerton received a Certificate of Compliance from the State Fire Marshal authorizing him to work as a firefighter in this state. As of the final hearing in this case, Edgerton continued to be a state-certified firefighter. For more than 15 years, Edgerton has worked without adverse incident as a first responder in the emergency medical and fire rescue fields. He has done so under the constant regulatory supervision of two separate state agencies. These facts demonstrate persuasively (and the undersigned finds) that Edgerton——who has not, as far as the evidence shows, harmed or endangered actual persons served in the past decade-and-a-half—— is, at this time, an honest man whom the public can safely trust, and who will not present a danger in the future, should he become licensed as a Firesafety Inspector. The Restoration of Edgerton's Civil Rights. By Executive Order dated July 2, 1987, the Governor and Cabinet, exercising the governor's constitutional authority to grant clemency, restored all of Edgerton's civil rights, with the exception of the specific authority to possess or own firearms, which were lost by reason of any prior felony convictions. By Executive Order dated September 1, 1993, the Governor and Cabinet restored all of Edgerton's civil rights, with the exception of the specific authority to possess or own firearms, which were lost by reason of his felony conviction in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Ultimate Factual Determinations. The undersigned has determined, based on the greater weight of the evidence, including the circumstances surrounding Edgerton's prior convictions and the persuasive evidence of his full and complete rehabilitation, that Edgerton currently conforms his behavior to societal norms, possesses good moral character, and is otherwise morally fit to serve as a Firesafety Inspector. Edgerton meets all of the requirements for certification as a Firesafety Inspector except one: a passing score on the state certification examination, which DCF has not yet permitted him to take.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a Final Order approving Joseph Edgerton to sit for the firesafety examination, which he must pass to satisfy the last remaining requirement for his certification as a Firesafety Inspector. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2009.

Florida Laws (6) 112.011112.081120.569120.57561.15775.16
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LAKELAND FIREFIGHTERS NO. 2350, IAFF, AFC-CIO vs. CITY OF LAKELAND, 75-000050 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-000050 Latest Update: May 13, 1975

Findings Of Fact The city would not stipulate that it was a public employer as defined by Section 447.002(2), "Florida Statutes, or that petitioner was an employee organization as defined by Section 447.02(10) Florida Statutes. With respect to the former, the hearing officer takes official notice that the City of Lakeland is a municipal corporation with the basic authority of all municipal corporations in Florida, i.e., it has power to tax, pass and enforce ordinances, appropriate funds, hire people to provide services to the residents of the city and perform those functions normally performed by cities. The city appeared to vacillate on the proposition that the Civil Service Board, instead of the city, might be the public employer in this situation. However, subsequent testimony revealed that the Board has no power to expend funds other than those authorized by the city, or to order into effect a pay raise unless the funds to provide such a raise had previously been authorized and approved by the City Commission. The hearing officer also takes official notice of Section 112.191, Florida Statutes, relating to death benefits for firemen which states: "[Tlhe word 'employer' means a state board, commission, department, division, bureau or agency, or a county, municipality or special district." From the foregoing the hearing officer concludes that the city is a public employer as defined in Section 447.002(2), Florida Statutes. With respect to an employee organization as defined in Section 447.002(10), Florida Statutes, testimony was received that Local 2350 is a labor organization and represents or seeks to represent public employees concerning matters relating to their employment relations with the City of Lakeland. Accordingly, the hearing officer concludes that the petitioner is an employee organization as defined in section 447.002(10), Florida Statutes. The city called ten witnesses, nine of whom were from the police force, and the tenth a member of the Civil Service Board. The latter's testimony clearly demonstrated that the Board is not a public employer. Although a considerable amount of time was expended in attacking the registration of petitioner with the Commission as an employee organization, no evidence was presented not known to the Commission at the time Exhibit 3 was executed with one possible exception. That was the fact that a revision of the International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Constitution and By-Laws had been received by petitioner subsequent to his filing the petition and had not been forwarded to PERC. The only difference between the revised edition and its predecessor known to the president of Local 2590 was that the covers had different colors. However, even if substantial changes in the Constitution and By-Laws of IAFF had been made, it is difficult to see how this could have affected the registration. One captain, five lieutenants, and one driver-engineer were called by the City in an attempt to establish collusion, coercion, intimidation or misrepresentation in obtaining the signature cards. Absolutely no evidence discrediting the validity of the cards was produced. Ultimately, evidence was received relative to unit determination. Both parties stipulated that all combat, full-time firefighters below the rank of lieutenant were properly included in the unit and that only firefighting personnel, excluding clerical personnel, dispatchers, and maintenance personnel would be included. There was disagreement regarding the inclusion of lieutenants, captains, deputy chiefs, fire marshals, fire inspectors, fire alarm maintenance superintendents and training officers in the unit, with the petitioner taking the position that they should be included. All parties stipulated that the Fire Chief should be excluded from the unit. Evidence presented regarding these contested positions will be discussed in the descending order of rank in the fire department. The Lakeland Fire Department is organized on quasi-military lines with the forces organized into one combat division comprised of three combat platoons. The three deputy chiefs each command one platoon. They stand 24-hour shifts at the main fire station and are then off for 48 hours. During the time on duty, the Deputy Chief makes all decisions affecting the department when the chief is unavailable. They have authority to transfer personnel from one station to another; they evaluate captains and approve evaluations on lower personnel, make effective recommendations regarding the discharge of employees, promotions, etc. These duties are more fully contained in Exhibit 20. The Fire Marshal carries the same rank as Deputy Chief. He is responsible for fire prevention, arson investigation and fire code enforcement. His is the basic responsibility for modifications of the fire code to keep up with changes in conditions, and he is the senior city official involved in enforcement and application of the fire code. Most of his work requires independent judgement and decision making. He establishes policies applicable throughout the fire department. He is assisted by two fire inspectors and makes effective recommendations respecting their pay, promotion, transfer, etc. The two fire inspectors perform many of the functions assigned to the fire marshal and in carrying out their inspections make recommendations that are effective in changing policies, rules and regulations applicable throughout the department. One of the inspectors carries the rank of captain and the other the rank of lieutenant. If assigned to duties other than inspections, e.g., as a member of a combat team in an emergency, they would be expected to exercise the authority and responsibilities associated with their rank. These duties are more fully contained in Exhibit 19. Captains stand their 24-hour watches at the main fire station with the Deputy Chiefs. In addition to having some responsibilities affecting the entire platoon's readiness posture, captains are in charge of one of the engine companies at the main station. As such they prepare efficiency reports on personnel under them which affects promotions, transfers and assignments. During the absence of the Deputy Chief they are in command of the fire station and make required managerial decisions. During fire fighting operations, as officer in charge of their companies, they are called upon to make decisions subjecting personnel under them to situations of great physical peril. The duties of captains are more fully described in Exhibits 14 and 21. The Fire Alarm Maintenance Supervisor (FAMS) is recognized in the captain's category. He is not an integral part of the combat force which is engaged in fighting fires but has the minimum training required to be used in such capacity if needed. He generally works independently with occasional help assigned to him from the combat platoon. He is responsible for the maintenance of various fire alarms throughout the city and has the basic responsibility for determining where these alarms shall be installed. The FAMS reports directly to the Fire Chief, and the nature of his duties require that he make an independent valuation and judgement decision on practically every problem with which he is confronted. The duties and responsibilities of the FAMS are more fully contained in Exhibit 16. The training officer holds the rank of captain. He has the responsibility of training all fire department personnel in the basic requirements of firefighters and in preparing continuing training schedules to maintain and upgrade these capabilities. In carrying out these duties, he is required to submit reports on the personnel undergoing training which can effect their promotion and retention. In developing training programs and procedures, he effectively formulates policies having direct impact throughout the fire department. The training officer reports directly to the chief. The duties and responsibilities of the training officer are more fully set out in Exhibit 17. Lieutenants are the lowest rank in the officer category in the Lakeland Fire Department whose inclusion in an appropriate bargaining unit is proposed by Petitioner. There are 15 lieutenants and they command the companies not commanded by captains at the main station as well as being in charge of the three outlying stations. They prepare efficiency reports on the people in their company and make effective recommendations regarding personnel actions which affect the promotion, discipline, and salaries of these personnel. As the officer in charge of a combat company engaged in fighting a fire, the lieutenant perforce has the responsibility for making the operational decision on how to employ his company in fighting a particular fire. While there are procedures developed during training programs designed to acquaint these officers with proven solutions to many problems they are likely to encounter, the final decision on which particular solution is most appropriate for the situation at hand ultimately is determined by the exercise of the independent judgment of the officer in charge at the scene. In exercising this judgment, the lieutenant will in many situations have the responsibility for detaching one or more of his company to a firefighting task involving high risk of physical injury. The duties of the lieutenants are more fully described in Exhibits 18 and 22. With respect to all of these disputed categories, they have several common denominators with all combat fire fighters. All stand duties on a 24 hour on - 48 hour off basis; all sleep and eat at the fire station to which they are assigned; and all are covered by the existing Civil Service System adopted by the city. In carrying out their fire fighting assignments they share, in company with all other combat personnel in the platoon, the rigors and dangers with which their profession is afflicted.

USC (1) 29 USC 152 Florida Laws (2) 112.191447.02
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RONALD J. PASTUCH vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER (FIRE MARSHALL), 81-001399 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001399 Latest Update: Sep. 22, 1981

The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent properly denied Petitioner's request to be certified as a fire fighter.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Petitioner, Ronald J. Pastuch, is employed as a fire fighter by the City of Palm Bay. Petitioner was denied certification as a fire fighter by the State Fire Marshal because he has a history of diabetes which is being controlled by insulin medication. Petitioner was hired by the Chief of the Palm Bay Fire Department, David P. Green. Chief Green was unaware of the requirement that candidates for the fire-fighter classification were required to take and pass a physical examination prior to being employed. Chief Green is now aware of the requirement and acknowledged that an applicant in the fire-fighter classification cannot be certified if said applicant has diabetes. (See Respondent's Exhibit No. l.) Several of Petitioner's coworkers appeared and testified that they had acknowledged no inability on the part of Petitioner's on-the-job performance as a fire fighter. (Testimony of Chief David P. Green; Captain Tom Knecht; Captain Arthur Fawcett; Lieutenant Jim R. Green, Training Officer and Shift Manager, and Lieutenant Robert Erario, all employees of the Palm Bay Fire Department.) Dennis "Buddy" Dewar, Chief of the Fire Fighting Standards Commission, was received as an expert herein in the qualifications for certification of a fire fighter. Diabetes Mellitus is not considered a disease, but rather a metabolic disorder. Diabetes is a major contributor to cardiovascular disorders. According to Chief Dewar, diabetes is a bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) and, in his opinion, to certify a diabetic, compounds the existing problems related to a diabetic's cardiovascular disorders. Chief Dewar unequivocally stated that an insulin dependent diabetic, as Petitioner, should not be certified as a fire fighter based on the standards and pertinent rules and regulations which do not permit such an applicant to he certified. Moreover, Chief Dewar noted that the tasks of a fire fighter were demanding, unpredictable and stressful. He, therefore, concluded that an insulin dependent candidate should not be certified due to the stress and uncertainties connected with fire fighting.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's request for State certification as a fire fighter by the State Fire Marshal, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald J. Pastuch Palm Bay Fire Department 175 North West Palm Bay Road Palm Bay, Florida 32905 L. Terrye Coggin, Esquire Department of Insurance Room 428-A, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs RUBEN JEAN, 15-006954PL (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Dec. 08, 2015 Number: 15-006954PL Latest Update: Apr. 13, 2016
Florida Laws (1) 120.68
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TOWN OF PALM BEACH FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL NO. 1866 vs. TOWN OF PALM BEACH, 75-000084 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-000084 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 1975

Findings Of Fact The petition herein was dated January 9, 1975 by Petitioner, and was filed with PERC on January 17, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). The hearing was properly scheduled by notice dated March 26, 1975, and was conducted on April 17, 1975, by agreement of the parties. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2, Tr. 10, 11). The Town of Palm Beach is a public employer within the meaning of Fla. Stat. Section 447.002(2). (Stipulation, Tr. 5, 6). The Town of Palm Beach Association of Firefighters, Local 1866, is an employee organization within the meaning of Fla. Stat. Section 447.002(10). (Stipulation, Tr. 6-8). During the course of the past five years, Petitioner has requested recognition, or has otherwise sought to engage in collective bargaining with the Public Employer on several occasions through written and oral communications. Most recently Petitioner sought recognition through letters dated December 28, 1974, and April 11, 1975. (Tr 85-240, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2). There is no contractual bar to holding an election in this case. (Stipulation, Tr. 9, 10). The parties have not engaged in collective bargaining under the auspices of the Public Employees Relations Act. The parties engaged in collective bargaining in a limited fashion prior to the passage of the Act. Efforts on Petitioner's part to engage in collective bargaining with the public employer began in 1969. (Tr. 85-240, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-23). Registration material delivered by Petitioner to PERC was dated January 7, 1975, and was received by PERC on January 13, 1975. Additional materials were received by PERC on February 10, 1975. PERC acknowledged receipt of the registration material on February 10, 1975. The Public Employer contended at the hearing that registration was not proper because the source of certain funds was not adequately revealed. PERC has previously concluded that registration was complete and proper. (PERC registration File No. 8G-OR-756-1044, TR 11-15, 22-27, 225-238; Hearing Officer's Exhibit 3; Petitioner's Exhibit 4). Petitioner filed the requisite showing of interest with its petition. The Public Employer has asserted that the showing of interest is not adequate, however, no evidence was presented to counter the administrative determination previously made by PERC. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 4; Tr 16, 17; Public Employer's Motion to Dismiss). There are between forty-five and fifty-five persons in the unit proposed by Petitioner. All of the employees within the proposed unit are engaged in firefighting and/or paramedical rescue operations. The employees within the proposed unit work the same twenty-four hours on duty, forty-eight hours off duty shift. They eat and sleep in the same area while on duty, and wear the same or similar uniforms. There is a significant amount of interchange in duties among the employees. Wages and other terms of employment, job and salary classifications are determined for all of the employees within the proposed unit in the same manner. The bargaining history indicates a firm desire on the part of the employees to belong to a unit such as Petitioner proposes. (Tr 148-151,298-345, 369-372). The Public Employer contends that the only appropriate unit would include all public safety employees. No direct testimony was offered in support of this contention. Direct and cross-examination of Petitioner's witnesses indicate that the fire department and other public safety departments do not generally work together. Firefighters do not perform police functions or lifeguard functions. Police and lifeguards do not perform fire department functions. There is no interchange of employees between the departments, although there was evidence presented that transfers between the departments do occur. (Tr 148-151, 298-345, 369-372). Fire lieutenants are the senior officers in charge of each shift at two of the Town's three fire stations. Captains are in charge of shifts at the headquarters fire station. Fire lieutenants have four persons working under them. Fire lieutenants work the same shift as the other firefighters, wear the same uniform with no adornment of any kind, perform the same daily duties such as cleaning equipment, and teaching or participating in classes and training exercises. They perform the same firefighting duties. The fire lieutenant is charged with filling out a log book, checking the roster, answering the radio, preparing training schedules, and filling out fire reports, which duties the other firefighters do not generally perform. The fire lieutenants fill out evaluation reports on personnel who work on their shifts. The personnel are graded numerically from one to ten in approximately twenty categories, e.g., public contact and taking directions. These reports form a part of the procedure through which an employee is granted or denied a merit pay increase or is granted or denied a promotion. If an employee who works under a lieutenant has a grievance, the lieutenant is the person to whom the grievance is first carried. The lieutenant is the person in charge of maintaining order at the fire station and is in charge of any fire operations until a senior officer arrives on the scene. The fire lieutenants report directly to fire captains. The lieutenant takes no direct roll, other than making reports, in hiring, firing, promotion or transferring employees. The lieutenant is not responsible for personnel administration nor for collective bargaining. He takes no roll in formulating or administering the budget. Lieutenants and captains do not perform any functions as a group. Lieutenant Walker indicated that he has never attended a meeting at which lieutenants and captains met as a group. If a lieutenant or a captain is absent from work, other personnel fill the position. Val Williams, a pumper/operator, has served as a captain for as long a period as two months. (Tr 248-296, 302-319, 315-332; Petitioner's Exhibits 24, 25, 26). Fire captains perform generally the same duties and fulfill the same rolls as fire lieutenants. Captains head the shifts at the headquarters stations. In addition to duties performed by lieutenants, captains conduct fire inspections, and serve as the next step in the chain of command above lieutenants. Captains answer directly to the assistant fire chief. (Tr 259-61, 334; Petitioner's Exhibits 24, 25, 26). Assistant fire chiefs are in charge of each shift for all three fire stations. They oversee the operations of each station, and visit each station on at least one occasion during the course of each shift. Assistant fire chiefs answer to the deputy chief; the deputy chief answers to the chief; the chief answers to the town manager. (Tr 265-66, Petitioner's Exhibits 24, 25, 26). Mobile Intensive Care Unit (MICU) attendants and driver/operators, and paramedic specialists work the same shifts and wear the same uniforms as firefighters. Each is paid approximately five percent more than a firefighter who has been employed for the sane period of time. Driver/operators answer fire calls, drive to the fire with a firefighter, and occasionally fight fires. They answer directly to lieutenants. Paramedic specialists answer directly to the deputy fire chief. Paramedic specialists receive extensive training apart from firefighting training. Paramedic specialists answer fire calls, but the testimony was not clear as to whether they are permitted to fight fires. Paramedic specialists do not perform any personnel administration or policy making roll. (Tr 333, 334, 346-358, 373-386). There are one clerk and one mechanic who work with the fire department. They apparently answer to the fire chief. Each works an eight hour day, five days weekly. They do not work directly with firefighters. (Tr 330- 333).

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