The Issue The issue in the case is whether David Bumgarner (Respondent) should be assessed a penalty for an alleged failure to obtain workers' compensation coverage for his employees.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency designated to enforce the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2008),1 which requires that employers in Florida obtain workers' compensation coverage for their employees. The Respondent is a sole proprietor based in North Carolina and doing business as "Builders and Assemblers." On February 25, 2009, Ira Bender, an investigator employed by the Petitioner, observed ten men assembling the iron-and-steel frame for a single story storage building being constructed at 7253 Gasparilla Road, Port Charlotte, Florida. The Respondent was present at the time Mr. Bender observed the workers, and Mr. Bender asked the Respondent about the project. The Respondent advised Mr. Bender that he was the owner of the company constructing the building, that the ten men erecting the building frame were his employees, and that they were being paid $10.00 per hour. Mr. Bender, accompanied by the Respondent, then spoke to each of the ten men at the work site and obtained their names and other relevant information. The Respondent provided to Mr. Bender a copy of a certificate of insurance from "Acord" bearing policy number BNUWC0108275. Mr. Bender reviewed the Petitioner's "Coverage and Compliance Automated System" (CCAS) database and information contained on the National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") website. Both sources are routinely used to monitor and review workers' compensation coverage. Neither the CCAS database nor the NCCI website indicated that the Respondent had workers' compensation coverage valid within Florida for any of the ten employees at the work site or that the Respondent had a valid exemption from coverage for any employee. After discussing the collected information with his supervisor, Mr. Bender issued a Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment dated February 25, 2009. The Respondent subsequently provided a copy of his workers' compensation policy to the Petitioner. The policy information page attached to the policy is an NCCI-issued form identified as "WC 00 00 01 A." The Respondent's policy's information page provides, in relevant part, as follows: 3.A. Workers Compensation Insurance: Part One of the policy applied to the Workers Compensation Law of the states listed here: NC * * * C. Other States Insurance: Part Three of the policy applies to the states, if any listed here: All states and U.S. territories except North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, Wyoming, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin islands, and states designated in Item 3.A. of the Information Page. Administrative rules adopted by the Petitioner and referenced elsewhere herein explicitly state that the coverage identified in the Respondent's policy information page is not valid within the State of Florida. Mr. Bender also issued a Request for Production of Business Records on February 25, 2009. Other than the previously referenced insurance certificate and policy, no further business records were provided to the Petitioner by the Respondent. Mr. Bender subsequently forwarded the case to Lynn Murcia, the Petitioner's penalty calculator. Because the Respondent failed to provide business records sufficient to enable computation of a penalty, Ms. Murcia computed the penalty based on an imputed payroll as provided by Florida law. The NCCI publishes the "SCOPES Manual," which contains a commonly-used system of occupational classifications used to determine workers' compensation requirements. In Florida, the SCOPES Manual has been adopted by incorporation into the Florida Administrative Code. The SCOPES Manual identifies the erection of steel or iron frames for buildings not in excess of two stories under classification code 5059. The Respondent's employees were engaged in such activities, and Ms. Murcia therefore properly classified the Respondent's employees under code 5059. Ms. Murcia utilized the SCOPES classification in determining the imputed payroll applicable to this case and, thereafter, computed the penalty according to a worksheet that has been adopted as an administrative rule by the Petitioner. The worksheet is routinely used to calculate penalties applicable to employers who fail to obtain workers' compensation coverage for employees. Based on Ms. Murcia's calculations, the penalty was identified as $1,764,643.98, as was set forth in an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 31, 2009. Ms. Murcia's calculation of the applicable penalty, including her reliance on the applicable SCOPES classification codes and the imputation of the Respondent's payroll, was not disputed at the hearing. Her testimony has been fully credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order assessing a penalty of $1,764,643.98 against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2009.
The Issue Has Respondent committed an "unlawful employment practice" against Petitioner, pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon a Petition for Relief dated October 13, 1997, referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Florida Commission on Human Relations?
Findings Of Fact Respondent stipulated to jurisdiction, and the evidence demonstrates that by number of employees, Respondent is an "employer" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a freight company which ships and receives living nursery stock by truck through a depot/warehouse. Petitioner was employed there from 1993 until June 16, 1995. In the course of formal hearing, Petitioner waived his Charge of Discrimination on the basis of his national origin (United States citizen). (TR-116). There is no evidence the Respondent employs anyone other than United States citizens. The remainder of Petitioner's allegations were that Respondent failed to accommodate one or more handicaps and subjected Petitioner to disparate treatment from similarly situated black employees. Petitioner also related a series of remarks and one personnel action that he considered to be harassing and abusive due to his handicaps. The "handicaps" that Petitioner testified to were high blood pressure, an undefined heart condition requiring medication, "bad knees," and problems with his back. At formal hearing, no medical physician or health care professional corroborated the foregoing conditions. However, it is undisputed that on or about January 9, 1995, Petitioner presented a physician's excuse to Respondent's Warehouse Supervisor, Jeff Bradner. That physician's excuse stated that Petitioner could return to work on that date, working 10 hours per day, 5 days per week, doing medium lifting, that is, "lifting 30 pounds and frequently lifting and/or carrying objects weighing 25 pounds." The excuse further stated that Petitioner was to avoid squatting, kneeling, and climbing. Mr. Bradner informed Eddie Payne, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, that the foregoing January 9, 1995, medical restrictions were to be observed for Petitioner. Attached to both Petitioner's initial Charge of Discrimination and his later Petition for Review was another physician's letter dated January 29, 1993. It stated, in pertinent part: [Petitioner], patient of record, suffers from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease. These conditions are aggravated by the stress caused by problems he has with his teenage son. Also attached was a March 3, 1994, doctor's letter stating that Petitioner had a spine and knee injury. It contains the same restrictions as the January 9, 1995, letter. Because the 1993 and 1994 letters are part of the record herein, (attached to the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief), I have taken official recognition thereof and find that they supplement or explain Petitioner's oral testimony at formal hearing to the effect that Petitioner was suffering from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease in 1993, and from a knee injury in 1994. However, these letters were not introduced in evidence at formal hearing, and Petitioner did not testify that he ever presented any such written medical confirmations of these conditions to any of Respondent Employer's supervisory personnel. Mr. Payne and Mr. Bradner denied that any oral or written requests for accommodation had been received from Petitioner other than the January 9, 1995, doctor's excuse listing specific restrictions. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, Mr. Payne denied knowing of Petitioner's heart condition. There also is no corroboration of Petitioner's testimony that he orally requested any accommodation specifically because of his high blood pressure or heart condition at any material time. Furthermore, and most importantly, the 1993 letter places no restrictions on Petitioner in the workplace, and the 1994 letter imposes the same restrictions as the 1995 letter, which is in evidence. The only medical condition any of his co-workers ever heard Petitioner complain about was his "bad knees." Upon the record as a whole, it is inferred that Eddie Payne also knew Petitioner complained of "bad knees." At all times material, both before January 9, 1995, and afterwards, Petitioner worked for Respondent as a "checker." Checkers have the most physically non-taxing job in Respondent's operation. They make sure that "wheelers" or "loaders" place unloaded freight on pallets in the correct location in the warehouse and that "loaders" load the correct freight from the warehouse or warehouse dock into the correct truck. In this capacity, the bulk of Petitioner's work was carrying a clipboard, making notations thereon, and orally directing others where to put boxes. Petitioner testified that due to his blood pressure and back condition, he "needed" to sit down for 15 minutes' rest every 20 minutes after January 9, 1995. The evidence as a whole does not indicate that Petitioner clearly enunciated this "need" to any supervisor. Moreover, the credible evidence supports the inference that no one could work effectively as a checker while taking 15 minute breaks as frequently as every 20 minutes, because each truck needed to be loaded or unloaded as a component, so as to avoid shipping errors. Therefore, substituting other checkers every 20 minutes would have adversely affected Respondent's business and would constitute an unreasonable accommodation for Petitioner and undue hardship for the Employer. Either substituting another checker or waiting on Petitioner to rest every 20 minutes would have been unduly costly, burdensome, or substantially disruptive and would have altered the nature of Respondent's business. Prior to January 9, 1995, Petitioner worked at least a 40-50 hour week and was paid by the number of hours he worked. Due to the nature of Respondent's business and the hours when freight was received, Petitioner's usual hours before January 9, 1995, were from approximately 4:00-4:30 p.m. until 9:30 a.m. (17- 18 hours) three days a week, mostly Monday, Tuesday and Thursday. At all times material, both before and after January 9, 1995, only twenty-five percent as much freight came in on Wednesdays and Fridays as came in on the other three work days of each week. Therefore, all employees were not needed for a 17-18 hour day on those days, and employees had the option of working at whatever was available on those days to "make their hours" for pay purposes. At all times material, on Wednesdays and Fridays, all employees who wanted to work took turns digging weeds out of the cracks in the Respondent's paved parking lot with a claw on a broom handle or the edge of a shovel; picking the weeds up with a shovel; and throwing them away. Sometimes a blower was used. In accord with the January 9, 1995, physician's written restrictions, Eddie Payne accommodated Petitioner by assigning him to work from 10:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m., so that Petitioner would only be working 10 hours per day. This assignment had Petitioner working the hours during which the employer needed the most men because those were the hours when the workload was the heaviest. Petitioner complained because Mr. Payne would not let him work his 10 hours from 4:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m., a less busy time, but he complained only because those hours were more convenient for him. Petitioner related that after January 9, 1995, he was made to lift more than 30 pounds of parking lot weeds at a time, with the shovel, after getting on his hands and knees to dig the weeds out, and always in the hot sun, which aggravated his undisclosed heart condition. He also related that he never got to use the blower like other employees. His testimony on this issue is not credible in light of the contrary testimony of all the other witnesses. Even if credible, Petitioner was not forced to do this work. He was permitted to do this "make work" during slow days so that he would earn at least 40 hours per week. Witnesses confirmed that another "make work" project on a single occasion was digging muck out of a ditch. Petitioner testified that he was required to dig more than 30 pounds of muck in each shovelful that he lifted out of the ditch. His description was neither corroborated or refuted, but again, Petitioner was the one who controlled the content of each shovel, and he could have declined to work at that "make work" project. According to Petitioner's time cards, from which information Petitioner received his pay, Petitioner usually worked only 10 hours or less per day after January 9, 1995. Occasionally, he worked more than 10 hours, but less than 11 hours per day. Petitioner and Eddie Payne were fishing buddies outside of work, and on at least one occasion, Eddie Payne treated his subordinates, including Petitioner, to a night-clubbing expedition. Petitioner asserted that on the job, Eddie Payne had used derogatory and profane language to him, on account of his handicaps. Once, when Petitioner wanted to punch-out early, Mr. Payne supposedly said, "Go home if you need to, you crippled old pussy." Once, Mr. Payne allegedly called Petitioner "a crippled old Mother F-----." Mr. Payne denied ever using such language either socially or on the job. Mr. Bradner testified that he had instructed his subordinates against profanity on the job, and related that Mr. Payne had a reputation for not using profanity. No other witness corroborated Petitioner's testimony that any such language had ever been addressed to Petitioner. Petitioner called Matthew Hickox, a co-employee, as a witness. Mr. Hickox related that Petitioner would often "act goofy," by doing a "Quasimodo imitation," twisting his arm, making a face, and dragging one leg behind him. When Petitioner did this, other employees would "make cracks." Petitioner claimed that dragging his leg behind him was evidence of his handicap. Mr. Hickox's opinion was that "disabled don't give you the right to act like a nut and then people not make some comment." Petitioner testified that he had only become entirely disabled since leaving Respondent's employ June 16, 1995. Although Petitioner moved slowly and evidenced pain on rising and sitting, he was able to move around and approach the witness stand at formal hearing. The undersigned observed no twisted arm, facial contortions, or dragging leg. It is inferred from observing the candor and demeanor of all the witnesses, including Petitioner, and from the whole of the evidence, but particularly from Mr. Hickox's testimony, that on such occasions as Petitioner performed his imitation on the job, Mr. Payne or Mr. Bradner may have vehemently ordered Petitioner back to work and warned him to cut out the horseplay. Petitioner claimed to have received only a fifteen-cent per hour raise when other employees received more. According to Petitioner, the other employees, including Mr. Gonzalez, were raised by twenty-five cents per quarter hour for a $1.00 per hour raise. What anyone was being paid before this raise is not in evidence. Since no evidence indicates whether this raise occurred before or after January 9, 1995, when Respondent's management clearly knew of any of Petitioner's restrictions, there was no nexus between the lack of raise and handicap discrimination.2 Petitioner also developed no nexus between this raise and racial discrimination. According to Eddie Payne, Petitioner was a sub-average worker. According to Eddie Payne and Jeff Bradner, they frequently had to instruct Petitioner to resume work. Mr. Bradner related an incident when Petitioner was leaning on a shovel in the parking lot, so Mr. Bradner sarcastically commented, "You're not getting much work done leaning on that shovel," but this motivational comment was not directed at a handicap. No employee testified that any supervisor's instructions to Petitioner, which they observed or overheard, were offensive or otherwise inappropriate. On one occasion, Petitioner was told by Mr. Bradner to stop kicking a "basketball of tape" around; throw it away; and get back to work. No employee other than Petitioner found this instruction offensive. On another occasion, Petitioner was given a written reprimand when a truckload of freight was sent to the wrong location. Petitioner attributed the error to a black "loader" named James Oliver and perceived the reprimand as discriminatory because Mr. Oliver was not reprimanded. Petitioner's superiors reprimanded Petitioner as a formal personnel action instead of Mr. Oliver because they considered Petitioner responsible for the error and resultant costs since Petitioner was in the superior position of checker. Petitioner suffered no loss of pay, hours, or seniority as a result of the reprimand. Petitioner's assertions that he was required to climb tall ladders to change light bulbs in the warehouse, to squat to lift boxes, and to kneel to pull weeds were denied by management witnesses and uncorroborated by Petitioner's witnesses. On one occasion, Petitioner had just come on duty and was having a coke and a cigarette, when Mr. Bradner told him to get to work helping a black loader named "Willie T." unload a truck. On this single occasion, Petitioner may have been asked to lift boxes in excess of 30 pounds, but the boxes also may have weighed as little as 20 pounds. This incident may have occurred before Mr. Bradner knew of Petitioner's medical restrictions on January 9, 1995, but it was probably afterwards. If so, this single incident was contrary to Petitioner's doctor's instructions, but Petitioner admittedly never complained to Mr. Bradner about this one-time incident in terms of "lack of accommodation" for his physical limitations. On the same occasion, Willie T., who already had been loading the truck for three hours, took a coke and cigarette break a half an hour after Petitioner began to help him unload the truck. Willie T. asked Petitioner to join him on his break, which Petitioner did. Mr. Bradner spotted them and instructed Petitioner to return to loading the truck because he felt Petitioner was not entitled to a break after only a half an hour of work, but did feel that Willie T. was entitled to a break after three full hours of work. This was a bona fide business consideration of Respondent. Petitioner failed to establish a nexus of racially discriminatory intent on the basis of this incident. On June 16, 1995, Petitioner was sweeping the warehouse floor, leaving trails of residue behind. Petitioner intended to go back and sweep up the residue, but before he could do so, Mr. Bradner told him that he was leaving trails and that he should do a better job. Petitioner considered this instruction to be demeaning and discriminatory, but he did not reply to Mr. Bradner. Mr. Bradner noted that Petitioner began to do a better job of sweeping, and Mr. Bradner left the area. Petitioner perceived that his co-workers were laughing at the incident and became upset. Petitioner finished sweeping one section of the warehouse and asked Eddie Payne if he could clock-out. He assumed that Eddie Payne knew he was upset because of Mr. Bradner's comment but did not tell him so. Eddie Payne authorized Petitioner to clock-out. Petitioner clocked-out and never returned to work for Respondent
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a Final Order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief on all issues. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1998.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Petitioner, Margie Ann Sims, was unlawfully terminated (by Respondent), Niagara Lockport Industries, Inc., due to her age in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1983).
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. Petitioner is forty eight (48) years old. She commenced work for Respondent, Niagara Wires, a subsidiary of Niagara Lockport Industries, Inc., located in Quincy, Florida during 1965 as an Accounts Payable Clerk. Petitioner was terminated on August 5, 1983, as a result of a reduction in staff and unsatisfactory work performance.1 During Petitioner's job tenure, she held various accounting and secretarial positions. Petitioner's initial duties were that of an accounting clerk and she later progressed to Assistant Chief Accountant. She later served as Corporate Bookkeeper and Secretary. Throughout her employment, her job duties were very broad and encompassed many areas of responsibility including overseeing accounts receivable, billings, payroll, bank statements, journal entries, wire transfers and financial statements. During 1975, Respondent's corporate office was moved to Quincy, Florida and Petitioner handled accounting and secretarial duties for the corporate office, dealt with banks making fund transfers, loan balancing and note arrangements; managed financial consolidation of Respondent's eight companies on a quarterly basis; maintained all pension plan records for Respondent's fourteen pension plans which included calculations of pension benefits, submission of wages and credited service to actuaries in preparation of various pension reports. Petitioner's other duties involved maintenance of company minute books, typing, submission and maintenance of files for all letters of credit issued; keeping patent and trademark files and assisted with telecopy, switchboard and TWX. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). During 1976, Petitioner worked directly for Respondent's corporate secretary/treasurer, Robert Worrall. The assignment occurred as a result of a recommendation by Respondent's manufacturing manager, Don Anderson. Petitioner was considered the best of the three employees available to work for Worrall. Thereafter, several changes were made in Respondent's corporate makeup including the addition of the Lockport Felt Division in 1977. As a result, additional employees were placed in the accounting department and Petitioner's duties became more secretarial and clerical in nature than accounting. This situation remained unchanged until Petitioner's termination in 1983. Although Petitioner worked directly for Worrall, she was also expected to perform secretarial and clerical work for others in the accounting department, specifically including Harry Kurtz, Vice-President of Finance, Bruce Kennedy, Controller and Hank Burnett, Corporate Administrative Manager. While Petitioner's primary responsibility was to complete Worrall's work, she was also expected to perform work for other accountants and fiscal employees in the accounting department as she was the only trained employee in the accounting department available for typing duties. (TR 35, 106, 133-134, 117-119, 138, 142 and 153). Respondent has not maintained a formal policy concerning employee discipline or warnings for salaried employees, as Petitioner. (Testimony of Cairns and Worrall, TR 19, 46-47, 60 and 77). Commencing in 1980, Worrall became unhappy with Petitioner's work performance. This unhappiness took the form of counseling with Petitioner during year-end annual reviews and included the following deficiencies: "away from her work station when needed; too much time spent socializing with others; unwilling to work; pushing work back on Worrall; untimeliness and failing to timely complete work as assigned." (TR 85, 110, 116- 117). Like Worrall, other employees in the accounting department for whom Petitioner worked were dissatisfied with her performance during the years 1980-1983. Harry Kurtz, Vice- President of Finance, experienced problems with Petitioner's work quality including errors in typing and formatting, misspelled words and inaccurate numbers to the point where he did not want her (Petitioner) to perform his (Kurtz) work. He was thus forced to seek assistance from persons outside the accounting department, including Pat Simmons who replaced Petitioner, to perform his work. Kurtz related these problems to Worrall. (TR 128, 129-133, 131 and 136). Bruce Kennedy, Controller, experienced similar problems with Petitioner's work quality. He noted Petitioner frequently misspelled words and transposed numbers. Kennedy experienced problems concerning timeliness and the invalid excuses by Petitioner for failing to complete assigned work as scheduled. (TR 137-139). Based on Petitioner's poor work quality, Kennedy went outside the accounting department to get assistance in performing his clerical and secretarial duties. Kennedy informed Worrall of his dissatisfaction with Petitioner's work. Hank Burnett, Corporate Administrative Manager, also experienced problems with Petitioner's work quality in regards to accuracy and neatness. Burnett related an incident where Petitioner used so much "white-out" to make corrections that numbers on ledger sheets were not legible. Burnett also experienced problems with Petitioner in getting work returned timely. He also found it necessary to go outside the accounting_ department to solicit the assistance of Pat Simmons to perform his work. Burnett related to Worrall his dissatisfaction with Petitioner's performance. (TR 128, 150). Linda Jaudzimas is presently employed with Niagara Wire Weaving Employees Credit Union. She has held that position since approximately May of 1980. During the years 1978 through May of 1980, Jaudzimas was employed as an accounting clerk in the corporate accounting office for Niagara Lockport Industries. During that time period, she worked directly with Petitioner and Worrall. Jaudzimas described Petitioner and Worrall as having a very good work relationship and that Worrall depended upon Petitioner a lot. However, since May of 1980, Jaudzimas had only limited contact with Petitioner The typical degree of contact would be only to "pick up reports; I would get information from pensions for time reporting periods." (TR 54 and 58). Don Anderson is presently employed as the Manufacturing Manager for Respondent. Anderson has been in Respondent's employ since 1971. From 1971 through January 1, 1974, Anderson was Respondent's Chief Accountant. Anderson had no direct knowledge concerning Petitioner's work performance since January of 1974. Anderson corroborated Cairns and Worrall's testimony that Respondent had no formal policy concerning disciplinary action taken against salaried employees, as Petitioner. (TR 60). Respondent conducted informal evaluations of salaried employees, including Petitioner, at the end of each year in conjunction with salary increases. During Petitioner's 1981 work performance evaluation, Worrall discussed his concerns with Petitioner including the fact that she spent too much time talking to other people; that he always had to look for her and she pushed work back on him. Petitioner's time away from her work station and her negative attitude toward the company's insurance program were items of discussion. (TR 17; 84-88). An entire list of Worrall's concerns respecting Petitioner's job performance were placed in her personnel file during the 1981 annual performance review. (Respondent's Exhibit 1). Petitioner recalls Worrall using that list during their meetings. (TR 36). Petitioner's performance did not improve during the following year and Worrall expressed the same concerns to her during her annual work performance review during 1982. (TR 115-116). Petitioner received "good" salary increases during the late 70's however, due to her poor performance from 1980-1982, Worrall recommended that she receive only the minimum cost of living increases for the years 1981, 1982 and 1983. In mid 1983, Respondent made a decision to reorganize its corporate offices by moving the sales office of Niagara Lockport from Quincy to Starkeville, Mississippi and by making a change in the research and development department. Pat Simmons, age 41, was secretary for the vice-present of research and development. Worrall was familiar with Ms. Simmons and her work having seen it first hand. Additionally, she was highly recommended by her then supervisors. Finally, she had performed work considered to be "high quality" by other employees in the accounting department including Kurtz, Kennedy and Burnett. When Simmons became available due to the reorganization, Worrall decided to replace Petitioner with Simmons. Petitioner's job had become primarily secretarial and clerical in nature and Worrall desired a competent executive secretary to replace her. (TR 88 90, 92, 94, 121-122, 127). Petitioner was 45 years of age at the time of her termination. (Respondent's Exhibit 3). Petitioner's duties were assumed by Simmons (95 percent) and Elaine Hall (5 percent) who was retained since she- possessed requisite accounting skills. Hall was able to complete the cash report in two hours, a job that had taken Petitioner the better part of a day to perform. (TR 86). As a result of the reorganization, two other employees, Loretta Hood (mid 30's) and Virginia Jeffcoat (mid 50's) were terminated. Petitioner was terminated in August, 1983 for the reasons that her performance was not satisfactory and a qualified person (Simmons) had become available due to Respondent's corporate reorganization and staff reduction. This was told to Petitioner at the time of her termination. (Respondent's Exhibit 2; TR 68, 93). Subsequent to her termination, Petitioner requested that Worrall write her a letter of recommendation. Worrall complied, however, Petitioner was not pleased and asked him to write a second one giving him an example to follow (Respondent's Exhibit 7). Petitioner wanted a "good" letter of recommendation so that she could easily obtain another job. In writing the recommendation, Worrall followed his policy of not commenting on negatives but merely set out the type of work Petitioner performed. Petitioner was still unsatisfied with Worrall's second letter and she therefore asked the Respondent's President, Malcolm Cairns, to write a letter of recommendation for her. As with Worrall, Petitioner participated in the drafting of the letter for Cairns by providing him with an example. (TR 22, 23 and 70). Cairns did not include anything negative in the letter so that it would be easier for Petitioner to obtain another job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner was not terminated due to her age in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended. Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (1983) and that Petitioner's Petition for Relief be DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven L. Seliger, Esquire 229 E. Washington Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Swift, Currie, NcGhee and Hiers, P.A., by Victor A. Cavanough 771 Spring Street, N.W. Post Office Box 54247 Atlanta, Georgia 30379-2401 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240/ Tallahassee, Florida 32303. Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issues in this case are whether, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment on the basis of her race, or retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity; and whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. ("CSK"), is a law firm having offices throughout the state of Florida. Petitioner Latasha McCleary ("McCleary"), an African-American woman, worked for CSK in its Orlando office as a legal assistant from August 7, 2017, through July 31, 2018. However, because McCleary began taking medical leave on June 6, 2018, and never returned to work, her last day in the office was June 5, 2018. Thus, the period of time in which McCleary actually functioned as a regular CSK employee was ten months. During her tenure with the firm, McCleary provided secretarial and administrative support to several attorneys, including partner Bartley Vickers and associates Jeremy Beasley and Shawn Gibbons. McCleary's direct supervisor was the then office manager, Lilliam Hernandez. CSK regarded McCleary as a valued and high-performing employee. Although, as will be discussed, McCleary complains that she was subjected to unfair criticism during the last weeks of her time in CSK's Orlando office, she was never reprimanded, disciplined, or subjected to an adverse employment action. For the first nine months of her employment, McCleary got along well with the attorneys for whom she worked, including Mr. Vickers, and she has no complaints about their treatment of her during this period. The only noteworthy incident or incidents of relevance to have occurred in this time frame are a secretary's use, on one or perhaps more occasions, of the "n- word" in McCleary's presence. An employee's use of this racial epithet in the workplace is, of course, extremely offensive and inflammatory, to say the least, and, if unchecked, could create a hostile work environment. That did not happen here, however. The legal assistant who made the offensive remark (apparently in the presence of peers only, not supervisors or managers) apologized to McCleary when the latter expressed her discomfort. McCleary never reported the incident(s) in writing to the firm's management, as the Employee Handbook required——a fact from which the undersigned infers that she accepted her co-worker's apology——and the bad behavior stopped. The upshot is that this upsetting incident was resolved informally among the affected employees without initiating an investigation by the firm, and a nascent problem was nipped in the bud. The watershed moment in this case occurred on May 7, 2018, at the beginning of McCleary's tenth month with CSK. An expert witness retained by CSK was scheduled to conduct an on- site inspection that day but failed to appear, forcing a last- minute cancelation which caused opposing counsel to incur travel expenses that CSK had to reimburse. McCleary mistakenly had failed, on the previous business day, to confirm the expert's availability, as the firm's routine required, and thus, she bore some responsibility for the unwanted results. That said, there is no evidence that this situation was other than a relatively minor inconvenience that could be fixed, learned from, and forgotten. When the problem came to light on May 7, 2018, Ms. Hernandez, the office manager, sent an email to McCleary reminding her that the inspection "should have been confirmed" beforehand to avoid a "waste[] [of] time and money." McCleary apologized for making a "human error" and promised it would not happen again. On May 9, 2018, Mr. Vickers, the partner, sent an email to McCleary and Mr. Gibbons, the associate, telling them that "some form of confirmation is needed" "for confirming inspection dates." He added: "This is a mistake that I imagine will not happen again, and I am glad we can move past it and look to the future without these types of issues again." The only thing remarkable about these emails is how unremarkable they are. Two points of interest will be mentioned. First, as just suggested, the tone of each message was neither derogatory nor personal, but measured and professional. There was a touch of criticism, to be sure, as would be expected, but the criticism was constructive in nature, not harsh or angry in tone. Second, McCleary was not the only one called to account. Mr. Vickers's email was directed as much to the associate attorney as to McCleary. The next day, Thursday, May 10, 2018, Mr. Vickers conducted a training meeting for the legal assistants in his group, which McCleary attended. There were a number of topics on the agenda, covering a range of administrative tasks that CSK expected its litigation support staff to carry out. Although Mr. Vickers brought up that week's scheduling snafu as an example of miscommunication-driven consequences, no evidence suggests that McCleary's mistake had prompted the meeting. Further, McCleary was not identified in the meeting as having been at fault or involved in the incident. McCleary, however, complains that she was "singled out" during the meeting, "80% [of which, she maintains,] covered what happened with [her] in regards to the May 7th re-inspection." The greater weight of the evidence does not support her characterization of the training session. According to McCleary, Mr. Vickers, who had been a good boss for the previous nine months, suddenly turned into a tyrant around May 10, 2018. McCleary alleged in an email written a few weeks later, on June 1, 2018, that soon after the canceled inspection, Mr. Vickers had begun asking her "idiotic questions to be sure [she knew] her job," and been constantly micromanaging [her] with multiple emails" accusing her of making numerous mistakes. Yet, although this entire period spans just 18 business days, McCleary produced none of Mr. Vickers's alleged, accusatory emails. The greater weight of the evidence does not support McCleary's allegations concerning Mr. Vickers's treatment of her during the month of May 2018. Sometime near the end of May, McCleary sent out notices of taking deposition duces tecum that did not have the document requests attached. McCleary was not solely to blame for this oversight; the attorney handling the case should have reviewed the papers to make sure that everything was in order before service. Still, as the legal assistant, McCleary should have spotted the omission and brought it to the attorney's attention. On the morning of May 31, 2018, after the problem had been discovered, Mr. Vickers sent an email to McCleary and Mr. Beasley, the associate, admonishing them to "stay focused" when preparing deposition notices for service. Similar to the canceled inspection earlier in the month, the incomplete deposition notices were a problem that CSK obviously would rather have avoided; inattention to detail, moreover, is something any reasonable employer should want to correct. There is no evidence, however, that CSK generally, or Mr. Vickers in particular, made a big deal about this incident. Mr. Vickers told McCleary and the associate that he hoped "it would not happen again"——and that, it seems, would be that. Except it wasn't. Later that day, May 31, 2018, McCleary spoke to the office administrator, Johnson Thomas. During this conversation, McCleary complained about working for Mr. Vickers and asked to be transferred to a different group of attorneys. On Friday, June 1, 2018, McCleary again contacted Mr. Thomas, sending him the email mentioned above. This email was the first written notice that CSK received from McCleary concerning her complaints about Mr. Vickers. In the email, McCleary did not allege racial discrimination, per se, but she did include some language which clearly indicated that such a charge might be forthcoming: "I refuse to subject myself to further retaliation, oppression and disrespect from Mr. Vickers. He is creating a hostile working relationship between us. I cannot concentrate on work and am in need of immediate transfer." (emphasis added). The following Tuesday, June 5, 2018, CSK approved McCleary's request to be transferred, assigning her to the work group headed by partner Melissa Crowley. When the announcement was made, Ms. Crowley sent an email to McCleary stating, "Welcome Latasha! I look forward to working with you." McCleary never reported for duty under Ms. Crowley. Instead, she took a sick day on June 6, 2018, and applied for unpaid medical leave. Despite McCleary's having presented somewhat nonspecific reasons, such as heart palpitations and anxiety, the firm granted McCleary's application and placed her on medical leave through July 11, 2018. In mid-July, McCleary provided CSK with a note from her mental health counselor in support of a request to extend the unpaid medical leave until September 5, 2018. On July 12, 2018, the firm informed McCleary that it would not be able to keep her position open that long without hiring a replacement, but agreed to let her remain on leave until July 31, 2018. CSK made it clear to McCleary that she needed to return to work on August 1, 2018, or face dismissal on grounds of abandonment. McCleary did not return to work on August 1, 2018, and the firm terminated her employment. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that CSK took any actions against McCleary motivated by discriminatory animus, or created (or acquiesced to the creation of) a hostile work environment. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful racial discrimination could be made. There is no persuasive evidence that CSK took any retaliatory action against McCleary for having opposed or sought redress for an unlawful employment practice. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that CSK did not discriminate unlawfully against McCleary on any basis.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding CSK not liable for race discrimination, retaliation, or creating a hostile work environment. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Reshad Favors, Esquire Mosaic Law Firm Tenth Floor 1875 Connecticut Avenue Northwest Washington, DC 20009 (eServed) Robert Alden Swift, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. Tower Place, Suite 750 1900 Summit Tower Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32810 (eServed) Barry A. Postman, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. Second Floor 1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Cheyanne M. Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed with the Florida Department of Transportation since 1971. He is a graduate of the University of West Florida, with a degree in business management. Petitioner is 38 years old, with a physical disability which limits his use of his left hand and arm, and his left leg is shorter than his right. In 1979, Petitioner was employed by Respondent in its right-of-way section, as a Right-of-Way Agent III. In that position, he was responsible for the coordination of the Acquisition, Relocation and Property Management sections of Respondent's District III. One of Petitioner's subordinates was H. E. Walls, who was in charge of the Acquisition section. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was J. F. Culpepper, Assistant Right-of-Way Administrator. In April, 1980, a new Right-of-Way Administrator, J. A. Alfes, was assigned to District III. In 1980, and again in 1981, Petitioner filed charges of discrimination against Respondent with the Florida Commission on Human Relations premised upon Petitioner's aforementioned disability. The 1980 charge was resolved through the entry of a settlement agreement. The charge filed in 1981 was premised upon the same disability, but that charge was ultimately dismissed by the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In January, 1981, a hearing was held in Tallahassee, Florida, on one of the charges of discrimination filed by Petitioner. On the day following that hearing, Petitioner was called into Mr. Alfes' office in Chipley, Florida, and was told that the hearing held in Tallahassee had been several hours of "horse shit." On May 18, 1981, Mr. Alfes advised Petitioner of an impending reorganization of the section in which Petitioner was employed. Subsequently, on June 17, 1981, Mr. Alfes told Petitioner that there would be "consequences" as a result of Petitioner's having filed complaints with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In 1981 a reorganization of functions occurred in all six districts statewide of DOT. This reorganization eliminated one classification of position, Right-of-Way Agent III, which Petitioner had held in District III, and elevated the positions at the head of Acquisition and Relocation sections to the administrator level. At the time this reorganization occurred, Petitioner, as previously mentioned, was a Right-of-Way Agent III, and Herbert Walls headed the Acquisition section. Mr. Alfes, Petitioner's immediate superior, recommended that Petitioner be placed in charge of Relocation, and that Mr. Walls, who had been working in Acquisition, be placed in charge of the Acquisition section in light of his experience in that area since 1978. J. F. Culpepper, who occupied the position on DOT's organization chart to whom the Acquisition section, Relocation section, and Property Management section would report, recommended that the Petitioner be placed in charge of the Acquisition section, based upon his belief that Petitioner was better qualified by reason of his real estate training and college degree. Mr. Walls had only a high school diploma. During the period of his employment with DOT, Petitioner had not handled any complete right-of-way acquisition matters, and had never negotiated for DOT in the acquisition of any right-of-way parcels. Petitioner had, however, attended two relocation seminars while employed by DOT. Mr. Walls had been continually engaged in acquisition work for DOT since at least 1978. DOT's District Engineer, Alan Potter, was the DOT employee ultimately responsible for selecting the heads of the Acquisition and Relocation sections. Mr. Potter concurred with the recommendation that Petitioner be placed in charge of the Relocation section, based upon his belief that it was the most important job involved in right-of-way acquisition, and that it required a very thorough and cautious person. Based upon Mr. Potter's evaluation of Petitioner as possessed of high ability, and being very mature and compassionate, Petitioner was placed in charge of the Relocation section. At the time Petitioner was named as head of Relocation and Mr. Walls was placed as head of Acquisition, the two positions were both classified as Right-of-Way Specialist II's, pay grade 22. Later both were reclassified as Right-of-Way Administrator I's, at pay grade 23. The record in this cause establishes that neither position was more prestigious" than the other, or that either position placed the individual holding it in a more favorable posture for promotion or advancement. Subsequently, in the summer of 1981, the reorganization of DOT was completed, with Mr. Walls having been appointed head of Acquisition, with approximately six subordinates. Petitioner became responsible for Relocation, and shared the supervision of a clerical employee with the head of Property Management. After reorganization, Mr. Alfes relocated Petitioner's office in another building 100 feet away from the main office. Petitioner's office was initially located in a passageway and, as a result, Petitioner was required several times a day to make trips to the main building to obtain files necessary to complete his work. In August of 1983, prior to final hearing in this cause, Mr. Alfes retired, and Petitioner's office was relocated in a more spacious office close to the Acquisition section.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the petition for relief, and denying the relief requested therein. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd of May, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: BEN R. PATTERSON, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 4289 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32315 VERNON L. WHITTIER, JR., ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAYDON BURNS BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 JEAN OWEN, ESQUIRE ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS WOODCREST OFFICE CENTER 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD SUITE 240, BUILDING F TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303 DONALD A. GRIFFIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BUILDING F, SUITE 240 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether Petitioner was terminated from his employment with Respondent because of his race, his alleged disability, and in alleged retaliation for his attempt to file a workers' compensation claim in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. Petitioner also has been diagnosed with obsessive/compulsive disorder and major depression. On March 21, 1997, Petitioner began his employment with Florida Department of Corrections as a substance abuse counselor at Lancaster Correctional Institution. Petitioner's employment status was in career service, probationary status for six months from the date of his employment. A probationary status employee can be terminated without cause. Petitioner's employment as a counselor required him to be present at the institution a reasonable amount of time in order to perform his counseling duties. From March 21, 1997 through September 2, 1997, Petitioner failed to report for work 39 full workdays out of a possible 115 workdays. In addition, Petitioner had five other workdays that he only worked part of the day, with a total of 16 hours of leave used over those days. Sixteen hours is the equivalent of two full workdays missed by Respondent. As a result, Petitioner was absent from work approximately 35 percent of the time. Thirty-five percent absence rate was excessive based on Petitioner's job duties. Most of the leave was without pay because Petitioner had not accumulated enough sick or annual leave to cover his absences. The leave was taken for various reasons, but a large part of the leave was taken when Petitioner was hospitalized due to his mental condition. Petitioner's doctor released him from his hospitalization on August 8, 1997; however, Petitioner did not return to work until August 20, 1997. The last pay period ran from Friday, August 22, 1997 to Thursday, September 4, 1997. Petitioner only worked 20 hours out of 40 the first week and two hours out of 40 the second week. Around September 1, 1997, Petitioner went to the personnel office to inquire about filing a workers' compensation claim based on his disability. The staff person he spoke to did not know the procedure for filing a workers' compensation claim. She told Petitioner she would find out the procedure and asked him to return the next day. Other than Petitioner's speculation about the events following his initial inquiry about filing a workers' compensation claim, other material evidence regarding the events following his initial inquiry and Respondent's response thereto was submitted into evidence. The evidence is insufficient to draw any conclusions of a factual or legal nature regarding Petitioner's workers' compensation claim and his termination. Petitioner was terminated on September 2, 1997, the day following his initial inquiry about workers' compensation. Petitioner received his letter of termination on September 2, 1997. Petitioner was a probationary status employee when he was terminated. Eventually, Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim. The claim was denied by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. In 1997, L.D. "Pete" Turner was the warden at Lancaster Correctional Institution. As warden, Mr. Turner supervised Petitioner. Mr. Turner made the decision to terminate Petitioner due to his excessive absences. Mr. Turner did not terminate Petitioner based on Petitioner's race, his alleged disability, or because of Petitioner's attempt to file a workers' compensation claim. Petitioner was needed at work and he was not there a sufficient amount of time to fulfill his job duties. In fact, there was no competent evidence that there was any connection between Petitioner's termination and/or his race, disability, or desire to file a workers' compensation claim. Petitioner alleged that two employees at the institution were excessively absent but were not terminated. The employees were Doris Jones and Victoria Englehart. Both individuals were career service employees with permanent status. They were not probationary status employees. Doris Jones is an African-American female. Victoria Englehart is a white female. No other evidence was produced at the hearing regarding these two employees, their attendance records, job duties or anything else of a comparative nature. Clearly, the evidence is insufficient to make any comparison between these two employees and Petitioner's employment and termination.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Otis Ware Post Office Box 2155 Trenton, Florida 32693 William J. Thurber, IV, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Azizi M. Dixon, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner corporation's workers' compensation insurance policy was in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, cited below, despite not having a specific Florida endorsement; whether the Department properly issued a Stop Work Order against the Petitioner and whether the proposed penalty of $240,927.55 was properly assessed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, American Coatings, Inc., is a commercial painting corporation based in Tennessee. It has been in business since 1994 in the State of Tennessee, and through a predecessor entity, since 1985. The Petitioner does business in other states, including the State of Florida, and in fact operates in approximately 14 states. It has done so since the year 2000. It has had no workers' compensation claims from any of its Florida work sites during the entire time it has operated in Florida. On February 19, 2008, the Petitioner was painting portions of the premises at "the Estates of Rockledge" in Rockledge, Florida. It had other operations in Florida in the three years prior to February 28, 2008. When the Petitioner applied for workers' compensation coverage in Tennessee, the Petitioner advised its broker and insurance carrier that it maintained operations in Florida. The workers' compensation carrier and agent provided certificates of workers' compensation insurance for the Petitioner's Florida operations which supported its good faith belief that it had valid workers' compensation insurance in Florida. Respondent presented no evidence that Mr. Carswell and the Petitioner have committed fraud, misrepresentation, or omission concerning the obtaining and maintaining of workers' compensation insurance coverage for its Florida operations. There was no attempt to conceal the fact that the Petitioner had insurable operations in Florida. For the three years prior to February 28, 2008, the Petitioner maintained a policy of workers' compensation insurance for all employees, including those employees that performed operations in Florida. A workers' compensation premium was paid for each employee in question for all periods in the three years preceding February 28, 2008. The Respondent is an Agency of the State of Florida responsible for enforcing the various statutory requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, including Sections 440.107 and 440.38, Florida Statutes (2007). Its authority includes Section 440.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which imposes upon all employers in Florida the obligation to secure the payment of workers' compensation. The Respondent is statutorily charged with the obligation to monitor employers operating in Florida, to ensure that statutory employers maintain appropriate workers' compensation coverage on employees. There is no dispute that the Petitioner, is an "employer" for purposes of Sections 440.02(16)(a) and 440.02(17)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2007). It was operating in the construction industry and regularly employed at least one person. Pursuant to the Division's statutory authority, Investigator Eugene Wyatt of the Department's Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Compliance, visited the subject worksite in Brevard County, Florida, where an apartment complex was under construction. Mr. Wyatt inquired at the general contractor's headquarters trailer and was told that a painting subcontractor known as American Coatings was employing workers on the site. Using the Federal Employer Identification Number, Mr. Wyatt checked with the Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) data base and learned that American Coatings, Inc. the Petitioner, which did business in Florida as A.C. Painting, Inc., did not have a record of a Florida workers' compensation coverage policy since December of 2003. Upon inquiry of the general contractor's supervisor at the job site, Mr. Wyatt learned that American Coatings, Inc., had furnished proof of insurance to the general contractor. It was shown as a certificate of liability insurance from American Coatings, in evidence as Department's Exhibit 17. Investigator Wyatt contacted the agent who had produced the Certificate of Insurance and asked if a Florida endorsement had been procured for that policy. He was told that the policy had a "an all states" endorsement. Mr. Wyatt then contacted the underwriter and was told that it was a policy for Tennessee and not for Florida (apparently Tennessee rates and codes applied). The investigator then contacted Benjamin Carswell, the President of the Petitioner. He informed him that in his view the company was not in compliance with the Florida requirement that workers' compensation policies covering Florida work and Florida employees be specifically endorsed for the State of Florida. He stated that he would issue a Stop Work Order, which he did on February 19, 2008. (SWO). The SWO was posted at the worksite and served personally on Mr. Carswell on February 21, 2008. After the Petitioner entered into an installment payment plan as to the penalty, the SWO was ended with an Order of Conditional Release, on February 28, 2008. The Petitioner sent a copy of consolidated insurance policy number WC8263193, by fax to Terrence Phillips, the chief of the Respondent's Orlando compliance office. The information page of this policy showed that only Tennessee was listed in item 3A of the policy. Item 3C stated that the policy was in effect in all other states, however, except for North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and the states listed in item 3A. Item 4 listed various occupational classifications with their codes and the premium rates for each. The codes were for the State of Tennessee. The effect of these terms was that Florida was included in the category for "all other states." Florida Law requires that Florida be listed as a state in item 3A, and requires a policy to utilize Florida class codes, rates, rules, and manuals, in order for an employer to be compliant with workers' compensation coverage requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Investigator Wyatt determined that compliance was deficient and that a penalty should be calculated and assessed. He therefore served a request for production of business records on Mr. Carswell on February 21, 2008. The business records were necessary to construct the payroll amounts and number of employees at issue, so that the penalty, based upon the Petitioner's Florida Payroll, could be calculated. Mr. Carswell believed in good faith, throughout all times pertinent to this matter that his company was compliant with Florida workers' compensation coverage requirements. After compliance was called into question, however, he also obtained an additional workers' compensation insurance policy, apparently obtained on or about February 20, 2008. It showed that coverage was effective, related back to May 1, 2007. Based upon this additional policy, the Petitioner provided Investigator Wyatt with an additional certificate of insurance for this policy. On March 6, 2008, Investigator Wyatt learned that the SWO was a duplicate and had to be substituted. A new SWO was issued as an amended SWO. A Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and an Amended Order of Conditional Release from SWO, under the second SWO number of 08-092-D4, was issued. Investigator Wyatt calculated the penalty by reviewing the business records supplied by the Petitioner and determining what each employee had been paid between February 23 and December 31, 2005; during all of 2006; during all of 2007 and between January 1, and February 22, 2008. Each employee's payroll, for each year or portion thereof, was divided by 100 and multiplied by an actuarial figure known as the "approved manual rate," which is related to the job duties the employee performed. In the case at hand, all the employees were engaged in commercial painting and, therefore, their classification codes were all 5474. Each trade, occupation or profession has a particular code assigned to it by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) and each code has its own rate, the codes and rates being adopted in the Respondent Agency's Rules. The product of one one-hundredth of the gross payroll, and the approved manual rate, constitutes the "evaded premium." In effect this is the insurance premium the employer should have paid during the years it did not actually secure the appropriate payment of workers' compensation for its Florida Employees (proper Florida or Florida-endorsed coverage). Each employee's premium added together was then multiplied by the statutory factor of 1.5 in order to determine the total penalty amount the Respondent seeks to assess. The penalty amount herein was calculated using the correct Florida Approved Manual Rate and class codes. The Respondent established that its calculations indicated that, for the Florida employees of the Petitioner, based upon its Florida payrolls for the three year period in question, the total workers' compensation premium, under the Florida rate, would be in the amount of $160,618.15. Based upon that Florida workers' compensation premium amount, when multiplied by the statutory factor of 1.5 times that amount, the Respondent arrived at a total proposed assessed penalty of $240,927.55. The Petitioner established, through the testimony of Mr. Carswell that, for the time period at issue, for the Florida employees and payroll, the Petitioner had paid workers' compensation premiums of $111,682.21 for the coverage it had in effect. It acknowledges that this was not paid pursuant to Florida rates, rather it was based upon Tennessee rates. It is the position of the Petitioner that the difference in premiums. between the above Florida premium amount, and the premium that the Petitioner actually paid, was $48,935.94. The Petitioner maintains that this differential is what really should be determined to be the unpaid or "evaded" premium, based upon Florida rates, and, if that amount was multiplied by 1.5 then the total penalty actually due should be $73,403.91. An initial penalty payment of $24,092.76 has already been made by the Petitioner. Periodic penalty payments, assessed beginning March 2008, and continuing, have been paid in the amount of $36,139.40. The total penalty already paid by the Petitioner, as of the hearing date, is thus $60,232.16. The Petitioner contends that the actual penalty to be paid should be based upon the differential between the correct total premium due, when using the correct Florida manual rate, and the total premium actually paid by the Petitioner, which, when applied in the above-referenced calculation results in the penalty due of $73,402.91. This would then be reduced by $60,232.17, the amount already paid, for a total remaining amount due of $13,171.75, as of the hearing date.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, finding that the Petitioner failed to fully secure the payment of workers' compensation for its employees in the manner prescribed by the above-referenced authority and that a penalty in the amount of $73,402.91 is due, less a credit of $60,232.16 already paid, and with credit applied to the above amount for penalty payments made since January 28, 2009. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Dietz, Esquire Zimmerman, Kiser & Sutcliffe, P.A. Post Office Box 3000 Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas H. Duffy, Esquire Douglas D. Dolan, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Tracey Beal, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Alex Sink Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent failed to abide by the coverage requirements of the Florida Workers' Compensation Law embodied in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by not obtaining a workers' compensation insurance policy and whether the Petitioner properly assessed a penalty against the Respondent pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Investigator Pangrass conducted a random inspection of a construction site at 9 Pecan Drive Pass, Ocala, Florida, on December 18, 2002. On that occasion he observed several people working, hanging drywall. Investigator Pangrass spoke to one of the workers, Daniel Maloney, and asked him, to identify his employer. Daniel Maloney identified the Respondent as his employer. When Maloney identified him the Respondent was only 10 feet away and the noise level at the site was such that the Respondent could hear himself being identified as the employer. The Respondent did not then deny that he was Daniel Maloney's employer. Daniel Maloney stated he had worked for the Respondent full-time for two months and was paid by the hour. The Respondent told Mr. Pangrass he was unable to complete the work at the job without additional labor. Mr. Maloney assisted the Respondent by "hanging the ceiling." The Respondent offered a hearsay statement of Mr. Maloney, wherein he stated, "I am the employee." The Respondent confirmed that he had a prior employment relationship with Daniel Maloney and that Daniel Maloney wanted to work with the Respondent. Another worker observed by Mr. Pangrass, Desmond Neil, told Investigator Pangrass that he worked for the Respondent part-time and was paid by the hour. The Respondent had used the services of Desmond Neil on prior occasions and stated "we do a job for Holiday the day before." The Respondent told Mr. Pangrass that he was trying to get workers' compensation for Desmond Neil. The Respondent made a statement against his own interest and said he "re-hired" Desmond Neil because Neil could not get a workers' compensation exemption. The Respondent's use of the word "re-hired" is significant because in a prior compliance matter the Respondent had employed Desmond Neil and agreed to terminate Desmond Neil's employment. The Respondent in testimony, changed his version of the facts and said that he re-hired Desmond Neil, but that Neil worked for Charles Brandon. Investigator Pangrass interviewed the Respondent. During this interview the Respondent stated he had labor expenses connected with his business. He testified he was paid by Holiday Builders and then in turn paid Desmond Neil and Daniel Maloney. Charles Brandon did not employ or was not the sole employer of Desmond Neil or Daniel Maloney on December 18, 2002. Investigator Pangrass contacted Mr. Brandon, who stated he knew the Respondent was going to hire helpers. Mr. Brandon was not at the job-site to direct Desmond Neil or Daniel Maloney and could only be reached by phone. The Petitioner's evidence that the Respondent was the employer of Desmond Neil and Daniel Maloney on December 18, 2002, instead of Mr. Brandon or some other person or entity, is the most persuasive and is accepted. The Respondent offered conflicting evidence regarding who provided money to Desmond Neil and Daniel Maloney. The Respondent offered a hearsay statement of Daniel Maloney that Holiday Builders was Daniel Maloney's employer. The Respondent said that when Holiday Builders pays him (the Respondent) he then pays his employees. The Respondent changed his testimony, however, and then said Charles Brandon gave him checks to give to the employees. (Implying that they were Brandon's employees in this version of his story.) The Respondent submitted a signed statement to the Petitioner indicating that he had no employees between 1999 and 2002, in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 10-B. The Respondent recognized the signature on that statement as being his own, but professed not to remember who wrote it or what it said. The Respondent, however, did admit to having at least one employee in 2001, directly contradicting his own statement. The Respondent also testified that the only times he used Desmond Neil's services were the two times Investigator Pangrass stopped by the Respondent's job sites. It is a trifle too coincidental that the only two times the investigator visited the job sites were the only times when the Respondent purportedly used the services of Desmond Neil. This is especially the case since Desmond Neil's testimony and even that of the Respondent himself tend to contradict that statement. Finally, the Respondent admitted that he did not have a workers' compensation policy for any employees. In summary, the evidence adduced by the Petitioner is deemed more consistent and credible and is accepted. It was thus demonstrated that the Respondent had one or more employees at the times pertinent hereto.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation directing that the Respondent stop work and cease his operations until such time as he secures workers' compensation coverage for employees and directing that the Respondent pay a penalty in the amount of $1,100.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: John M. Iriye, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Berisford Champagnie 15508 Southwest 34th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34473 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to a hostile work environment condoned by Respondent due to his sex in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The School Board of Orange County, Florida, (Respondent) is an employer within the definition found in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes. Dexter V. Thomas (Petitioner) was an employee of Respondent, as defined in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes, during the relevant time period. Petitioner timely filed his Charge of Discrimination (Charge) with the Commission, pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Acts of 1992, on August 4, 1995. The Commission failed to make a Cause/No Cause Determination within 180 days of the filing of the Charge. Petitioner filed a form with the Commission on January 27, 1998, seeking to withdraw his Charge and filed a Petition for Relief to proceed to an administrative hearing. Petitioner has not filed a Petition with the Commission. However, the Commission forwarded Petitioner's Charge to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing on February 2, 1999, and this proceeding followed. Petitioner is an adult male and a United States citizen of African-American descent. Petitioner worked as a custodian at Apopka Middle School on the day shift from 1989 until his termination on November 22, 1995. Petitioner testified that he had received good evaluations until the fall of 1994, when a new principal took charge of the school. Shortly thereafter, it was Petitioner's perception that he was being harassed because of certain statements that he made to other school employees about the faculty and staff at Apopka Middle School which he believed to be true. The statements made by Petitioner were defamatory in nature. In addition, they were perceived by other school board employees as threatening to the safety and welfare of staff and students. Due to these statements and his general conduct while working his shift, Petitioner was relieved of duty with pay on September 21, 1995. On October 4, 1995, Petitioner was directed to be examined by a licensed psychiatrist at the expense of the school board. Petitioner refused to be examined by the school board's licensed psychiatrist on the grounds that it was part of the continuing conspiracy to silence him about illegal activities he believed were going on at Apopka Middle School. Petitioner was subsequently terminated by action of the school board on November 22, 1995. None of the testimony and other evidence produced by Petitioner, taken as true, could be construed to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment by employees or supervisors of Respondent. Petitioner failed to offer any credible evidence that he was subjected to any unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, or other conduct of a sexual nature by employees of Respondent. Petitioner appears to have mistakenly checked the "race" box on his Charge of Discrimination. At the hearing, Petitioner did not raise any contentions that he suffered discrimination on the basis of race while in the employ of Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered as follows: The Charge of Discrimination should be dismissed, as Petitioner's request for administrative hearing was not timely filed under Chapter 760.11(4),(6), and (8), Florida Statutes. In the alternative, Petitioner has failed to prove that he was discriminated against on the basis of his sex by being subjected to a hostile work environment and the Petition should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank C. Kruppenbacher, Esquire Orange County School Board Post Office Box 3471 Orlando, Florida 32802-3471 Dexter V. Thomas 3920 Country Club Drive, Number 3 Orlando, Florida 32808 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dennis Smith, Superintendent Orange County School Board Post Office Box 271 Orlando, Florida 32302-3471
Findings Of Fact The Other Eligibility Criteria The Petitioner is a corporation formed in 1984, whose sole stockholder, only Director, and President is Kathleen Weber, a minority person. Respondent, Department of General Services (DGS) concedes that Petitioner corporation meets all eligibility criteria for certification as a Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) except for the number of permanent, full-time employees, which statutory component is the sole focus of the dispute in this cause. Eligibility in this regard hinges on the employment of "25 or fewer permanent full-time employees." Petitioner engages in the provision and installation of plumbing, HVAC ventilation, fire protection, process piping, and potable and waste water systems in the commercial construction field. Permanent, Full-time Employees Ms. Weber claims no part-time employees and considers all employees to be full-time. That is, all employees work, when they work, for a full forty hours per week. However, Ms. Weber classifies her employees, as of date of formal hearing, into two categories of full-time employees: office employees and field employees. Petitioner asserts that the office employees are permanent, while the field employees are not permanent. At the time of the hearing, petitioner had twelve permanent office employees whose positions included Ms. Weber, six project managers, accounting and estimating personnel, and clerical help. Office employees are paid for holidays, sick leave and vacation, and insurance. They are paid a salary on a monthly basis. They are covered by written corporate employment policies. The number of field employees fluctuates between sixty and ninety. Their number and makeup are determined on an "as needed" basis, depending upon the securing by petitioner of a construction contract upon which they can be employed, the size of the "job" and the stage of completion of each job undertaken by Petitioner at any given time. As individuals, these employees do not work on a guaranteed, regular, or predictable basis. The corporation does not have or display any written employment policies concerning them. Sometimes, field employees are hired through a labor company. Usually, as with most non- union construction companies, they are hired upon word of mouth, reputation, and as they present themselves at the job. Field employees are paid only for the hours that they actually work. They may be moved from job to job to accommodate the schedule on each job and to avoid Petitioner laying off personnel that may be needed again soon. Their pay scale ranges from $6.00 to $14.00 an hour with $8.00 being an average. Field employees' wages are set by Bob Pacitti, the head project manager. When a man in the field feels that he is entitled to a raise and asks for it, then a form is filled out by a superintendent who gives it to Bob Pacitti who approves or disapproves the raise. Final approval of a wage increase is made by Ms. Weber. There is no set beginning wage for field employees. Their hourly rate depends on the experience of the worker, the type of work, how badly an employee is needed, add if there is a labor crunch or not. There is no set review period for deciding whether a field employee is entitled to a raise. Field employees are not paid for sick time, holidays, or vacation time. The company designates a field worker, who is called a "foreman" for each job in progress. The "foreman" telephones on a daily basis to the office personnel to inform them of the time worked for all field workers on his particular job/site. After working for the company for one month, field employees are eligible to join the major medical group health insurance plan. The employee is automatically put on the insurance and the company pays the premium for an individual employee. Once an employee has stopped working for two weeks, he is taken off the insurance, retroactive to the last day he worked, and sent a letter indicating that he can assume the insurance premium payment himself through petitioner. Although there is no direct-testimony to that effect, it can be inferred from Ms. Weber's testimony that the health insurance premium for the company is somehow calculated on a regular basis to anticipate at least some number of continuously, employed field employee positions. Two separate payroll ledgers are generated by petitioner: one for field employees and one for office employees. Superintendents Frank Llama and Don De Silva are included in the field employees' weekly computerized payroll but are nonetheless considered by Ms. Weber as permanent employees. The monthly office employee payroll is done by hand. There were about ninety field employees on the last field employee payroll before the date of formal hearing. As of the date of formal hearing, Petitioner was working on twelve projects. The twelve projects have a contract amount ranging from $123,000 to $6,200,000, which may last from a few months to almost two years. The total contract amount for the twelve contracts is in excess of $14,000,000. Each project is assigned one of the six project managers who oversee the job. Frank Llama is a superintendent who is in charge of field operations. He travels from job to job making sure that things are done the way they are supposed to be done Don De Silva performs the same supervisory function, but his work is generally limited to supervision of the air conditioning aspects of the projects. There were thirty-three individual field employees (not counting superintendents Llama and De Silva) who were listed on the applicant's payroll as of 6/19/86 who were also listed on the last payroll for 1986. These employees were continuously employed throughout that time frame. There were twenty-two individual field employees (not counting Llama and De Silva) who were listed on the Petitioner's first payroll for the year 1987 and who were also listed on the last payroll for 1987. Most of these field employees were continuously employed by Petitioner for all or a significant part of that year. There were forty-seven field employees (not counting Llama and De Silva) who were listed on the first payroll for 1988 and who were also listed on the 9/08/88 payroll. Some non-supervisory field employees were employed continuously from one year to the next, and a few were continuously employed for all or the better part of the two or three years. Each had federal income and FICA taxes deducted from his salary while employed by Petitioner. During 1986, 1987, and the first two quarters of 1988, the Petitioner reported the following number of office and field employees on the initial Florida Employer's Quarterly Wage and Tax Report, for Florida Unemployment Compensation purposes: 1986 1987 1988 Jan. 77 74 97 Feb. 1st 91 79 105 March 93 81 107 April 116 96 96 May 2nd 117 98 96 June 108 105 96 July 127 122 August 3rd 100 122 Sept. 106 112 Oct 91 108 Nov. 4th 74 110 Dec. 68 110 Petitioner's gross receipts in the fiscal year ending March 31, 1986, were $5,702,138. Its gross receipts for 1987, $3,466,926. Its gross receipts for 1988, were $3,917,190. Non-Rule Policy Petitioner's initial application for MBE certification was deemed incomplete by DGS. The application did not respond to the question that says, "state-the number of current, full-time, permanent employees ", on page 3 of the Certification Application Form 1704. It did not give the name, home address, home telephone number and length of service for each current, full-time, permanent employee on an attached sheet of paper, also as required by the application form. It did not attach a copy of one or more of the following items: W-4 Social Security form for each current full-time employee. The most current Florida Quarterly Unemployment Report. The most current Federal Annual Unemployment Report. (R-13) Ms. Weber filled out only the questions relating to minority status. By letter dated December 15, 1988, Ms. Weber was requested to provide this information by Lloyd Ringgold, Minority Business Assistance Labor Employment and Training Field Representative of the Minority Business Enterprise Office. By letter dated December 23, 1986, Ms. Weber replied, "Falcon Mechanical, Inc., has 22 full-time, permanent employees. Ms. Weber also included an employee roster showing a list of twenty- two employees. When that employee roster was submitted to the MBE office, twelve of the employees on that roster were paid on a monthly basis and ten were paid on a weekly basis. At the time of the hearing, the applicant no longer employed eight warehouse employees from that roster, who had been paid on a weekly basis. (See Finding of Fact 11). Without needless elaboration, it is found that Mr. Ringgold and Ms. Weber did not have a meeting of the minds when, during an on-site interview, he requested her to define "full-time employee" and "permanent employee." Her responses then are not inconsistent with her testimony at formal hearing nor with the facts as found supra. Petitioner's President clearly always viewed the field employees as a transient, very flexible, changing labor force who were not office personnel and who did not individually work on both a regular and a predictable basis, whether they worked 40 hours a week in stretches or not. DOS personnel, however, did not understand her responses at the interview this way and applied what Mr. Ringgold thought Ms. Weber meant to both of the Petitioner's payroll ledgers to reach the conclusion that Petitioner employed more than twenty-five permanent full-time employees. DOS does not have a duly promulgated rule defining the term "permanent employee" which is a crucial component of the element, "permanent full-time employee," within the statutory MBE criterion "small business' which is here at issue. DOS also has no written statement of its policy with regard to such a definition but it asserts it has an unpublished, not publicly declared definition or method for determining the number of permanent full-time employees. DOS admittedly did not explicate, announce, or publish this method to Petitioner or anyone else. When an agency makes such an assertion, it must explicate and demonstrate the reasonableness of its non-rule policy on a case- by-case basis. MacDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Florida Medical Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 463 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). This is a heavy burden, and the non-rule policy does not have the presumption of validity which is afforded formally promulgated agency rules. Barker v. Board of Medical Examiners, 428 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). From the testimony of Lloyd Ringgold, and the testimony of his supervisor, Marsha Nims, DGS Employment and Training Manager, it was established that DGS uses the information provided by the applicant on the application form, the Employer's Quarterly Wage and Tax (Unemployment) Reports, and other employee records to initially consider whether an applicant employs twenty-five or fewer permanent full-time employees. What formula, if any, is applied at that stage of agency review, other than a general discussion between DOS employees, was not fully explicated at formal hearing. However, after the first stage of review, if the reviewer has a question as to whether an applicant has more than twenty- five permanent full-time employees, DOS then conducts an on-site interview as it did in this case and relies on the applicant's definition of "permanent" and "full-time" employee given in that interview. The reasoning behind this approach by the agency is apparently that someone within DOS believed such an approach to be the fairest method for judging MBE applicants who represent diverse types of businesses, not all of which businesses are susceptible of easy analysis. No non-speculative rationale was advanced for this method of defining "permanent, full-time employee." This method has built-in external inconsistency and subjectivity as between applicants and is subject to manipulation and control by every applicant. Moreover, as the foregoing findings of fact demonstrate, ordinary conversational misunderstandings subject the method to internal inconsistencies in actual practice. The method/policy does nothing to apply presumed agency expertise to a program the agency is mandated by statute to administer. The method also was not demonstrated to conform with any generally recognized MBE or employment planning and reporting considerations. Therefore, DOS failed to explicate its non-rule policy and failed to demonstrate its reasonableness.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's request for certification as a Minority Business Enterprise be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 87-1950 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF 1-3,5. Accepted in substance but not adopted where subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative to the facts as found or never at issue. 4,7. Accepted. 6. Rejected as a FOF: covered in conclusions of law (COL). 8-9. Rejected as mere statements of position or argument. To the extent they address the evidence presented and are contrary, they are rejected for that reason. The non-rule policy is addressed within the RO and FOF made therein that conform to the greater weight of the evidence as a whole. 10-16. Accepted in substance but not adopted as cumulative, subordinate, and unnecessary to the facts as found. 17-18. Rejected as cumulative, subordinate, and unnecessary to the facts as found and portions are also mere argument or statement of position. 19. Accepted as Petitioner's classifications only. The second sentence is modified to conform to the relevant and material evidence as a whole. Respondent's PFOF 1-14. Accepted in whole or in substance except where subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative. A portion of PFOF 3 has been rephrased so as not to constitute an ultimate conclusion of law. Mere recitations of testimony have been rejected as-such. 15-20. Generally accepted; what is rejected is rejected as contrary to the evidence, cumulative in part, and in part as mere recitations of testimony. Further explanation and rulings are contained within the RO itself. 21-23,25. Accepted in substance, modified to clarify or conform more closely to the record evidence as a whole. 24. Accepted in substance but conformed to the greater weight of the evidence as a whole in FOF 15. During year 1987, Respondent does not state that employees Budgett and Ocasio were not employed for a significant number of pay periods and seems to have confused Ruben Ocasio (59415) and Jose Ocasio (59400) throughout the pay periods as well as with regard to the first and last payrolls. In 1988, Figueroa and Zager were not employed for a significant number of pay periods. The Hearing Officer has read composite exhibit 6 with diligence and has conformed the FOF to the evidence, without cumulative verbiage. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald G. Sternstein, Esquire MacFarlain, Sternstein, Wiley & Cassedy, P.A. Suite 600 First Florida Bank Bldg. Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2174 Sandra D. Allen, Esquire Office of General Counsel Department of General Services 200 East Gaines Street Room 452 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955 Ronald W. Thomas Executive Director Department of General Services 133 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955