The Issue Whether Honda of Bay County/Volkswagen of Panama City (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes,1 by discriminating against Maurice Hargrove (Petitioner) because of his disability and race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Maurice Hargrove, is an individual of African-American descent, who resides in Chipley, Florida. Respondent, Honda of Bay County and Volkswagen of Panama City are automobile dealerships located in Panama City, Florida. Petitioner alleges that he was not hired by Respondent because of his race and because of a disability. Petitioner’s alleged disability relates to his wearing a supportive brace on one of his legs at the time he applied for the job position with Respondent. Petitioner first made contact with Respondent’s business after seeing a “now hiring” sign in front of Respondent’s facility in Panama City. According to Petitioner, after seeing the sign, he walked into the building and filled out a job application. Petitioner could not recall when this occurred, but he believed it was sometime prior to Hurricane Michael, which struck the Panama City area in October 2018. Exact time frames and sequence of events as to what happened after Petitioner initially filled out the application are less than clear because Petitioner repeatedly changed his testimony during the final hearing. Nevertheless, the findings set forth below, derived from the combined testimonies of Petitioner and Respondent’s manager, Mr. Boatwright, detail the pertinent facts. Petitioner initially inquired about a job as a service technician working on vehicles at the dealership. When Petitioner met with Respondent’s manager, however, Mr. Boatwright told Petitioner that he did not need a service technician at the time. Further, Petitioner had no prior experience working on vehicles. Mr. Boatwright further informed Petitioner that, although he did not need a service technician, he needed a shuttle driver for the dealership. According to Petitioner, because of his conversation with Mr. Boatwright, he marked through “service tech” on the job application and wrote in “driver.” Mr. Boatwright’s testimony, and sometimes Petitioner’s testimony, was that when Mr. Boatwright first met Petitioner, Mr. Boatwright noticed a brace on Petitioner’s leg and asked Petitioner what was the situation with the brace. Petitioner told Mr. Boatwright that he had injured his leg in a workplace fall for which he received workers’ compensation, but that he was no longer on workers’ compensation. 2 Mr. Boatwright asked Petitioner to obtain a note from a doctor clearing Petitioner to work, to which Petitioner agreed. At some point, Petitioner returned to Respondent’s dealership with a doctor’s note clearing him to work with no restrictions. Mr. Boatwright interviewed Petitioner for the driver position and said he would contact 2 Petitioner’s statements regarding his leg brace were inconsistent. Petitioner testified that he wears a brace on one of his legs for support after surgery for a broken leg. Petitioner also testified that he broke his leg “just walking one day in the neighborhood, and I turned, and it just gave out on me.” According to Mr. Boatwright, Petitioner told him when he was applying for the job that Petitioner had fallen off a ladder when working as a painter and received workers’ compensation for a leg injury. Petitioner did not take issue with this version of the events during his questioning of Mr. Boatwright. Petitioner further testified that he did not remember the year he broke his leg, when he had surgery on his leg, or when his doctor advised him to wear the brace. Regardless of the origin of the leg condition, Petitioner testified that the leg did not restrict him in any way. Petitioner about the job later. Both Petitioner and Mr. Boatwright believed that the interview went well. After interviewing ten candidates for the driver position, Mr. Boatwright believed that, based upon Petitioner’s maturity level as compared to other applicants, Petitioner was the best candidate. After Petitioner was interviewed, Mr. Boatwright’s bosses decided not to fill the driver position, but, instead, decided to have the driving duties shared amongst existing employees. At the final hearing, Mr. Boatwright recalled communicating this to Petitioner, but that if he did not, he offered his apologies. Petitioner first testified that Mr. Boatwright contacted him and told him that he would not be hired, describing a conversation with Mr. Boatwright in which Petitioner expressed his sadness with Mr. Boatwright about not getting the job. Later in the hearing, Petitioner said he did not ever hear back from Mr. Boatwright, and that it was Respondent’s attorney who advised him that Respondent had decided not to fill the driver position. Regardless of when and how Petitioner was informed that the job position was not being filled, Respondent chose not to fill the shuttle driver position. As of the date of the final hearing, well over a year after Petitioner applied for the job, Respondent had still not filled the driver position, opting instead to share driving duties amongst the existing employees. Petitioner presented no evidence that his race played any part in the decision not to hire him. His sole offering on this point was the fact of his race. Petitioner’s disability discrimination claim was based on the facts that Mr. Boatwright noticed the brace on his leg and asked him to get a doctor’s note clearing him to work. Although Petitioner testified late in the hearing that Mr. Boatwright said something to him about not feeling like he would be able to do the job, Petitioner’s statement was made after several accounts of conversations with Mr. Boatwright in which Petitioner never made this allegation. When asked about this new allegation on cross-examination, Petitioner could provide no details, quickly trailed off topic, and asked “Say what?” There was no allegation in his Charge of Discrimination or his Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings that alleges that Mr. Boatwright suggested that Petitioner could not do the driver job. Considering these factors, as well as the inconsistency with Petitioner’s prior recollection that his interview with Mr. Boatwright went well, it is found that Petitioner’s late-asserted allegation that Mr. Boatwright said something to him about feeling that Petitioner could not do the job is untimely and is otherwise not credited. Further, Petitioner testified that his leg did not restrict him in any way, and failed to present evidence that he had a medical condition that substantially impaired any life activity.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S James H. Peterson, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Maurice Hargrove 1672 Sunny Hills Boulevard Chipley, Florida 32428 Russell F. Van Sickle, Esquire Beggs & Lane Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32591 (eServed) Tammy Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner properly secured the payment of workers' compensation benefits for employees by securing proper workers' compensation insurance coverage, as delineated by Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2004) and, if not, what if any penalty for such failure is warranted.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this proceeding is a Florida corporation engaged in the construction industry. Its business domicile is Destin, Florida, and the job site at issue was in the town of Cinco Bayou, Florida. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, specifically Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2004), requiring employers to secure the payment of compensation benefits for employees in the event they have an on- the-job injury. In this proceeding the Respondent has charged that the Petitioner failed to abide by the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, regarding two subcontractors, Scott Williams, d/b/a Vinyl Masters, LLC, (Williams) domiciled in Alburn, Alabama, and J & L Concrete a/k/a Moses Construction, Inc., (J & L) of Liliburn, Georgia. There is no dispute that the Petitioner did not have its own workers' compensation insurance policy as of February 10, 2005. The most recent policy ended July 2, 2003. The Petitioner thus did not itself secure payment of workers' compensation on behalf of Williams or J & L during the period of proposed penalty assessment, September 8, 2004 through February 10, 2005. The Petitioner was the general contractor engaged to perform construction operations at 1028 Anniston Court, Cinco Bayou, Florida (job site), on February 10, 2005, the date of the investigator's inspection visit and investigation. The Petitioner was sub-contracting certain vinyl siding work at that job site to Williams, a subcontractor. The Respondent's investigator, Ralph Taylor, conducted his investigation at the job site and observed four workers installing vinyl siding. Upon investigation he determined that the four workers were employed by Williams in this effort and identified the workers as Juan Oriz, Noe Mendieta, Jose Palma, and Jose Aboyte. Mr. Taylor's investigation revealed that Williams did not have a current workers' compensation exemption applicable to Florida law nor did he have a Florida workers' compensation insurance policy. He determined this by examination of the Respondent's data base, the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS). Williams informed Mr. Taylor, however, that he had obtained a policy of workers' compensation insurance through the Cruchfield Insurance Agency of Birmingham, Alabama. A facsimile of the declaration page from a workers' compensation insurance policy issued by Alabama Home Builders Self Insurance Fund to Vinyl Masters, LLC (Williams) was transmitted to Mr. Taylor by a representative of the Cruchfield Insurance Agency of Birmingham. Florida law requires that an employer who has employees engaged in work in Florida must obtain a Florida policy or endorsement for such employees which employs Florida class codes, rates, rules, and manuals that are in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 440 as well as the Florida Insurance Code. See § 440.10(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2004). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.019(2) requires that in order for an employer to comply with Sections 440.10(1)(g) and 440(38)(7), Florida Statutes, any policy or endorsement used by an employer to prove the fact of workers' compensation coverage for employees engaged in Florida work must be issued by an insurer that holds a valid certificate of authority in the State of Florida. The insurance policy held by Williams did not satisfy the standard. First, the Alabama Home Builders self-insurance fund is not authorized to write insurance in Florida. Secondly, the premium was based on a rate that was less than the Florida premium rate. The policy declaration page shows that Alabama Home Builders insured Vinyl Master effective January 1, 2005, for carpentry operations under class code 5645 at a premium of $20.58 per $100 of payroll. The premium rate using Florida rates for that same class code should have been $38.40 for $100 of payroll. Thus Vinyl Masters/Williams was not in compliance with the coverage law requirements at that job site at the time of the investigation on February 10, 2005. Employers employing on job sites in Florida are required to keep business records that enable the Respondent to determine whether the employer is in compliance with the workers' compensation law. § 440.107(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). Investigator Taylor issued a request for production of business records to Williams on February 10, 2005. That same date the Respondent issued a request for production of business records to the Petitioner. Each request asked the employer to produce, for the preceding three years, documents that reflected payroll, payments to each subcontractor, and proof of insurance. Williams produced no records. The Petitioner produced no records related to employment of Williams or Vinyl Masters. When an employer fails to provide requested business records which the statutes requires it to maintain and to make available to the Respondent Agency, the Respondent is authorized to impute that employer's payroll using "the statewide average weekly wage as defined in Section 440.12(2), multiplied by l.5." § 440.107(7)(e), Fla. Stat. (2004). The statewide average weekly wage for the four quarters beginning June 30, 2004, was $651.38. The Respondent thus could have imputed payroll for the entire three-year period for which it requested business records which were not produced. The Respondent imputed payroll however, for a lesser period, January 11, through February 10, 2005. This corresponds to the one-month period that the four Williams workers had told Investigator Taylor that they had worked "in the area." The amount that the Petitioner would have paid in premium under Section 440.107(7)(e), Florida Statutes (2004), based on payroll imputed from the statewide average weekly wage of $651.38 for work under class code 5651, during the period January 11, through February 10, 2005, multiplied by the statutory multiplier factor of 1.5, yields a penalty amount of $5,629.52. In any event, Williams did not properly secure the payment of compensation for Williams or the four workers in question, named above. Under Section 440.10(1)(b), Florida Statutes, (2004), the Petitioner could became the "statutory employer" of Williams and its workers if Williams, the subcontractor, had not secured the payment of workers' compensation. The credible evidence at hearing reveals, however, that Williams has already entered into a payment agreement with the Respondent to pay the subject penalty, referenced above, concerning Williams' failure to have "Florida-complaint" workers' compensation coverage properly secured for Florida workers and Florida operations. Additionally, the testimony of Mr. Grubbs, the manager for the Petitioner (which is accepted), reveals that the four workers in question only worked three days at most. Moreover, their hourly wage rate was only $15.00 per hour. Therefore, although the Petitioner supplied no business records in advance to the investigator regarding the subcontractor, Williams, which might allow the Respondent to impute payroll based on average weekly wage for calculation for a penalty under the applicable statutory authority; in this de novo proceeding context, the Petitioner did supply sworn testimony and records showing the actual wage rate and time worked for these employees, thus obviating use of the average weekly wage and imputed payroll for penalty calculation. Additionally, the Petitioner showed, through the testimony of Mr. Grubbs, that indeed the Petitioner had a certificate of insurance showing, to the best of Petitioner's knowledge at the time, that Williams had secured the payment of workers' compensation through the Alabama insurance carrier, named above, in accordance with accepted industry practice. Thus the Petitioner was under a good faith, reasonable belief that this subcontractor, Williams, had secured proper payment of workers' compensation coverage at the time the Petitioner engaged Williams as a subcontractor on the job-site in question. In summary, in view of these facts the assessment of penalty to the Petitioner is incorrect. The Investigator, Mr. Taylor's, testimony itself shows that had he known that the workers only worked for three days, the penalty should only be based upon that amount of work or hours applied to the penalty calculation formula. Because Williams has undertaken and agreed to pay the penalty in question for not properly securing workers' compensation coverage, no penalty is justifiably assessed against the Petitioner. If that were done the Respondent, in effect, would be treating both Williams and the Petitioner as employers of the same employees simultaneously, for the same job and occurrence. No evidence justifying this, given the relevant statutory scheme and case law, has been adduced. Subcontractor J & L Concrete In response to the Respondent's request for business records from the Petitioner concerning subcontractor J & L Concrete, the Petitioner produced ledgers showing payments to J & L. The Petitioner contracted with J & L during the period September 8, 2004 through February 10, 2005. During that period it paid J & L $155,413.98 for labor under class code 5403. During this period of time J & L had a workers' compensation policy covering its employees issued by Auto Owners Insurance Company of Lansing, Michigan (Auto Owners). The testimony of Maureen Haxton, a senior underwriter in the workers' compensation underwriting department of Auto Owners, confirmed that a policy endorsement was issued which took effect on July 13, 2004. That endorsement listed the State of Georgia in item 3A but did not list the State of Florida in item 3A. Auto Owners later issued a policy endorsement on May 10, 2005, that added Florida to item 3A, effective on March 18, 2005. The later endorsement issued by Auto Owners was not effective on February 10, 2005, when the SWO was issued to the Petitioner. The penalty sought to be assessed against the Petitioner for work attributable to J & L, based upon Section 440.107(7)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2004), is based on remuneration paid by the Petitioner to J & L for work under class code 5403 for period September 8, 2004 through February 10, 2005. Keith Cowart is an authorized insurance agent for Auto Owners Insurance Company. His agency is located in Lawrenceville, Georgia. He originally issued a workers' compensation policy to J & L in July of 2002 and a current policy is in effect for J & L to and including July 2006 and was in effect during the penalty assessment period. Mr. Cowart testified that had an employee in Florida suffered an injury on or before February 10, 2005, that the employee would have received workers' compensation benefits from Auto Owners and that employees injured in Florida would have received the level of benefits required by Florida law. Cowart indicated in his testimony that there are annual audits of J & L, under their contractual arrangement, by Auto Owners, to determine how much of its payroll is attributable to work conducted in Florida for workers' compensation insurance premium purposes. The J & L payroll is audited annually and J & L is billed a premium rate based upon Florida work and payroll and premium rates for workers' compensation insurance attributable to work done by its employees in the State of Florida. J & L is thus charged a higher premium for employees working in Florida and is obligated to pay that Florida premium rate. J & L previously paid $40,000.00 in payroll for Florida workers on Florida jobs and was billed Florida premium rates for workers' compensation coverage based upon that payroll after an annual audit. It was projected for the year 2005-2006 J & L would owe premiums for at least $70,000.00 of workers' compensation payroll in Florida and had paid premiums due for workers' compensation coverage in the past for Florida job workers based upon Florida premium rates, according to Mr. Cowart. In summary, the evidence, including Mr. Cowart's sworn testimony, establishes that J & L had a workers' compensation policy coverage in effect during the period of alleged non- compliance. Mr. Cowart opined that injured Florida employees during that period of time would have received the benefits authorized by Florida law. He established that J & L was charged Florida premium rates, and pursuant to the audit being conducted in July 2005, would be charged Florida premium rates for workers, jobs performed, and payroll attributable to Florida during the period of time in question in this case. Although the endorsement issued by Auto Owners showing Florida as a listed state in "item 3A," for purposes of the rule cited below, did not take effect until after March 18, 2005, the persuasive evidence, in the form of Mr. Cowart's testimony, shows that J & L had secured workers' compensation coverage which paid Florida- mandated benefits at Florida premium rates for workers at Florida jobs at times pertinent to the SWO. Moreover, the Petitioner required the sub-contractor J & L to provide evidence of workers' compensation coverage and relied on that evidence reasonably and in good faith. It changed its position to its detriment by continuing to work on the job without securing its own appropriate coverage.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Respondent Agency rescinding Stop Work Order number 05-0721-1A issued to the Petitioner on February 10, 2005, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued to the Petitioner on March 30, 2005. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael William Mead, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1329 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549 David C. Hawkins, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was denied promotion to the position of Secretary III with the Respondent in the Environmental Services Department on or about June 10, 1992, on the basis of her race (African- American), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a constitutionally created school district charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools in Brevard County, Florida, and is an employer under the Florida Human Relations Act of 1977, as amended. Petitioner was employed by the Brevard County School District as a Clerk-Typist in the Environmental Services Department during the relevant period of time including April 1992. Petitioner is an African-American, and a member of a protected class. She is the only African-American who is assigned to work in the Environmental Services Department. During April of 1992, Petitioner worked as a Clerk Typist in the Environmental Services Department, and the Secretary III position was held by Sylvana Wall. Subsequent to April of 1992, Sylvana Wall resigned, creating a vacancy in the Secretary III position in the Department. In the interim period from the time Sylvana Wall resigned, and the date the position was filled in July of 1992, Petitioner undertook to perform the duties of the Secretary III position, and in accordance with the applicable collective bargaining agreement, was paid for said period of time in the higher classification. Following creation of the vacancy, a job vacancy announcement was posted and advertised. Applications were received and reviewed by a selection committee composed of Irma Reinpoldt, Department Director, and Michael Rogers, Environmental Engineer. Petitioner submitted application for the vacant position. Subsequently, applicants except Petitioner, were interviewed by the committee, and a decision was made to employ applicant Rhonda Steward, a white female, for the Secretary III position in the Environmental Services Department. Petitioner was not personally interviewed for the Secretary III position by the committee. They based their decision on the fact that Petitioner had been working for the department as a clerk typist for a number of months, and she had also filled in as the Secretary III for several months when the vacancy was created until the position was filled. Both members of the committee knew the Petitioner, her capabilities and qualifications, and considered it "redundant" to interview her. There was no School Board policy, custom, or practice that required the employer to personally interview all applicants for vacancies. The candidate selected, Rhonda Stewart, was fully qualified to fill the Secretary III position. The evidence showed that during the relevant period there were certain conflicts in the Department, not related to race. There was evidence of personality disputes, such as name calling, and unwillingness by Petitioner to do secretarial functions for certain members of the Environmental Services Department, particularly an Environmental Specialist who was dyslexic. In addition, certain co-employees did not get along with the Petitioner and vice versa. However, there was no indication from the sworn testimony that race played a part in the decision made by the Respondent to hire someone else for the position. It was the practice of Respondent that the immediate supervisor and department head determine who was the best qualified for a job vacancy, subject to any review by the Personnel Division. The Petitioner presented no testimony including her own, that she did not get promoted to the Secretary III position because of her race, or that there was disparate treatment of African-Americans by the Respondent in the hiring or promotion of minorities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2650 The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8(in part), 9, 10(in part), 11 Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or as comment on the evidence: paragraphs 8(in part), 10(in part) COPIES FURNISHED: Cislyn Stephenson Emil Stephenson Qualified Representative 2298 September Street Melbourne, Florida 32935 Bill Walker, Esquire School Board of Brevard County 2700 St. Johns Street Melbourne, Florida 32940 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Sydney H. McKenzie General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent County is guilty of an unlawful employment practice pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is female, and within a class protected by Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent County is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claimed that Respondent treated her disparately from male employees on the basis of her gender in the areas of pay during her probationary period, reprimands and discipline, provision of equipment, poor performance evaluations, and training. Petitioner's initial relationship with Respondent was as an independent contractor at Respondent's Sanitary Landfill under a written contract entered into on September 15, 1989. In this capacity, she acted as a "spotter." As an independent contractor, she received $250 per month and salvage rights to whatever material customers brought to the Respondent's Sanitary Landfill. Effective August 14, 1990, the State Division of Personnel and Retirement required Respondent to put all contractual people on the County payroll. Thereafter, Petitioner was paid $350 per month and continued to have salvage rights only at the sufferance of the Respondent. After that date, Petitioner earned retirement and social security benefits. Withholding of federal taxes and deduction of social security benefits were also provided.(P-12). The value of the salvage rights were never calculated by anyone. While she was employed as a "spotter," Petitioner was the only female "spotter." Petitioner was on probation as an employee from August to December 1990. Petitioner was paid $1.442 per hour from August 12, 1990 through October 1990, and $1.63 per hour from October 1990 through December 3, 1990. At that time, her rate of pay was raised to $3.85 per hour. The record contains no evidence of what was paid to any male employee similarly situated during this period. Without proof that similarly situated male spotters were consistently paid better, there is no proof of gender discrimination in pay during Petitioner's probationary period.3 Mark Hawes, a male, was hired as a spotter on June 1, 1993. He was paid $4.35 per hour while on probation. Willie George, also male, was hired as a spotter on October 1, 1993, and was paid $4.4805 per hour while on probation. There is no evidence of how much Petitioner was being paid during this period, so there is no means of assessing disparate treatment in pay, if any, during this period.4 During the period that Petitioner was employed as a "spotter," there was no statute or rule requiring that "spotters" receive formalized training or be certified in any field. During Petitioner's employment, no spotter were provided more than a printed Job Description and on-the-job oral instructions. They were expected to use courtesy and common sense in dealing with the public. Two employees (gender unspecified) who were not spotters were sent to train at a state "school" to become Certified Landfill Operators. A State Rule was enacted after Petitioner was terminated which required that all spotters must have eight hours of specialized training. Thereafter, the Respondent provided such training to spotters. At all times material to any Personnel Citations, Petitioner was a union member, and all benefits of her union's collective bargaining agreement with the Respondent accrued to her. No performance evaluations were submitted in evidence. With the exception of the events related within the following findings of fact, no witness found any fault with Petitioner in the performance of her job description as a "spotter" at Respondent's landfill. (P-1) Wayne Hardee, Director of the Landfill, issued a Personnel Citation against Petitioner early in her employment on the basis of lack of personal hygiene. The citation was later removed from Petitioner's personnel file as an act of good will. On or about January 16, 1994, Petitioner admitted to an immediate supervisor that her carelessness with a hand-held CB radio had resulted in loss of the radio. She offered to pay for the radio. Mr. Hardee did not require her to pay for the radio, but issued a written Personnel Citation to her on January 20, 1994 for her carelessness. This Personnel Citation simultaneously cited Petitioner because Mr. Hardee had received complaints that Petitioner was overly concerned about other spotters doing their jobs. In this Personnel Citation, Mr. Hardee warned Petitioner to do her job without complaining about other employees. Petitioner admitted that she signed this citation and that she did not grieve it through her union. The radio was later recovered, but the citation remained in Petitioner's personnel file. (P-2) On Saturday, July 9, 1994, Petitioner called her union's senior shop steward, Jessie Ellzey, to the landfill to complain about items left at her spotter station. Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner was accusing another employee of putting the items in the wrong place. Petitioner also told Mr. Ellzey that another employee had threatened her. After investigation and interviews the following week, Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Hardee determined that the items had been brought by a landfill customer to the landfill between shift changes. Mr. Hardee's and Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner had unfairly complained about another spotter, Willie George, not doing his job. At least three days and two meetings were involved in this investigation and counseling procedure. Mr. Hardee issued a written Personnel Citation against Petitioner for complaining about a co-employee. (P-3) Petitioner also was suspended without pay for one day and warned that if the problem was not corrected, further disciplinary action would be taken against her. Petitioner did not grieve this citation through her union. Based on all of Mr. Ellzey's credible testimony, due to reputation testimony about Mr. Ellzey's standard operating procedure, and because Petitioner was actually suspended for one day without pay, I reject as not credible Petitioner's testimony that she never knew of this citation in time to grieve it. On August 13, 1994, Ann Harrell, a landfill customer, filed a written complaint of rudeness against Petitioner. (P-9) A written complaint of rudeness by Petitioner was also filed by another customer, Mr. Richburg, at about the same time. Mr. Hardee considered courtesy to customers to be an unstated policy of County government and further perceived rudeness to customers to be an on-going problem in Petitioner's relationship with the public. Due to the foregoing written complaints and many similar oral complaints he had received, Mr. Hardee assigned Petitioner two days' suspension without pay by a written Personnel Citation issued August 15, 1994. The citation also warned Petitioner she would be terminated if there were another complaint about her. Petitioner refused to sign this citation. (P-4) On August 25, 1994, Petitioner grieved the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation through her union. (P-5) A hearing was held in response to Petitioner's grievance. All concerned agree that Mr. Ellzey, the union representative advocating Petitioner's position, and not a representative of management, kept Petitioner from testifying. Chester Humphries testified on Petitioner's behalf at the grievance hearing that he had been unable to hear what Mr. Richburg said but could hear what Petitioner said to Mr. Richburg. From this, Mr. Hardee inferred that Petitioner had raised her voice to Mr. Richburg. Mr. Hardee assessed Petitioner's character witnesses in Petitioner's favor but noted that they knew nothing about the specific incident between Petitioner and Mr. Richburg. Ultimately, Mr. Hardee relied on Mr. Richburg's testimony concerning the incident. (P-6) Mr. Hardee denied Petitioner's grievance and disciplined Petitioner in accord with the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation. Upon advice of her union steward, Petitioner did not appeal the grievance hearing result. It was further agreed that if Petitioner's behavior resulted in no more complaints against her for 30 working days, the August 15, 1994, citation would be removed from her personnel file. Petitioner met this requirement, and the citation was removed from her personnel file. (P-6; P-7). Petitioner's December 13, 1994, charge of discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations listed August 11, 1994, as the last date of alleged discrimination. No witness at formal hearing herein, including Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Humphries, both of whom also had been present at the grievance hearing, confirmed Petitioner's perception that her gender had affected the result of her grievance hearing. Another female employee (not a landfill spotter) currently works in Respondent's administrative offices. That female employee also has had employment disputes with Mr. Hardee which she attributes to his gender bias, but the type of dispute was not clearly specified on this record. Therefore, no similarity to Petitioner's situation can be discerned and no pattern of gender bias was proven on that basis. This female employee is still employed by Respondent. A different female employee (also not a spotter) employed by Respondent's Emergency Medical Services (EMS) was terminated by Mr. Bill Beddow, EMS Director, for failing to timely report (or complain about) her immediate supervisor for "doing something [Mr. Beddow] thought he shouldn't be doing with drugs." The male supervisor resigned for "personal reasons." The female employee was rehired by Mr. Beddow after intercession by her union. This means another female not similarly situated to Petitioner was terminated for not complaining about a male employee's job performance and was then hired back, whereas Petitioner was progressively disciplined with reprimands and suspensions for repetitive unsubstantiated complaints about male employees' job performances. Petitioner seeks to have the conclusion drawn that female employees were disciplined both for reporting and for not reporting male employees' misbehavior. However, the two isolated situations are so dissimilar as to develop no pattern recognizable at law. I accept as credible and unrefuted Petitioner's testimony that all of the complaints she initiated about other employees were oral. However, Petitioner's testimony that she did not complain about other employees' performance of, or failure to perform, their jobs and her assertion that her complaints were only motivated by the requirements of her Job Description to "inspect loads" and "report all problems" was not corroborated by any other witness. Petitioner's testimony that her concerns were directed not at individual employees but at addressing hazardous wastes also was not corroborated by any other witness.5 Petitioner's middle level supervisor acknowledged that Petitioner told him that other employees had improperly handled hazardous materials as well as non-hazardous materials but that he did not cite anyone as a result of Petitioner's complaints about hazardous wastes because it was impossible to prove who was responsible. He counseled all subordinates about each incident whenever he considered counseling appropriate. Otherwise, all witnesses with reason to know the situation generally acknowledged that Petitioner's oral complaints were recurring almost daily and were directed to other employees' job performances rather than hazardous materials. It is the repetitive and personal nature of Petitioner's complaints rather than their being oral that management found offensive. The evidence also generally shows that all employees orally complained about each other and that Petitioner's two immediate supervisors, Felippe McCelroy and Robert Murray, orally reprimanded everybody who complained or who was complained about as they each saw fit within their supervisory discretion on individual occasions. No gender pattern is to be discerned from the foregoing. Only on those occasions that either an oral or written complaint reached Mr. Hardee was anyone written up and/or disciplined. Petitioner complained about not being assigned or provided with one of Respondent employer's trucks when other male employees were provided trucks. With the exception of the following findings related to the Respondent's trucks, there is no relevant evidence in this record concerning employees' use of trucks. All employees were cautioned against carelessness. Tommy Dean, a male employee, dented one of Respondent's trucks. He was not disciplined for careless driving. There is no evidence the dent was caused by Mr. Dean's careless driving. In February 1995, Charles Kennedy, a male spotter, filed a written complaint or incident report. Therein, he claimed that Petitioner had attempted to prohibit his bulldozing landfill material out of the way because Petitioner was trying to remove salvageable items. He further alleged that Petitioner had thrown a jar of grease at him. Petitioner was requested to file a written account of the incident. In her written account, she basically admitted the incident but not any intent to hit Mr. Kennedy with the grease jar. Mr. Kennedy was not disciplined for filing the written complaint/report. Petitioner was not disciplined for the actions complained about by Mr. Kennedy. Instead, as of February 3, 1995, landfill spotters were prohibited from salvaging at the landfill. (P-13) Petitioner desires that the conclusion be drawn that male spotters who complained in writing about other employees were not disciplined for complaining but that Petitioner, a female, was disciplined for making oral complaints. However, it appears Respondent addressed Mr. Kennedy's written complaint in much the same way as it had addressed Petitioner's oral complaint against Willie George, by giving each participant in the dispute a chance to state his or her position, before management decided who should be disciplined. The difference was that Mr. Kennedy was not a chronic complainer and management's investigation revealed some fault on both sides, so a neutral solution was found rather than discipline being imposed. There is no evidence beyond Petitioner's assertion that she was ever asked to do more work or heavier work than male spotters. From this point on, the dates that events occurred or their chronology is not entirely clear from the record. However, approximately April 14, 1995, there was an occasion when Petitioner was asked to move metal pieces in a wheelbarrow-sized pile over a three-hour period. The largest piece weighed 21 pounds. The next day, Petitioner reported a workers' compensation back injury or aggravation. She was then off work until approximately May 11, 1995, when she returned to "light duty." She worked for awhile for only four hours per day. Respondent hired someone to help her. It is disputed whether Petitioner was reinjured or whether Mr. Hardee just sent her home. However, on or about July 8, 1995, Mr. Hardee discussed the situation with "the workers' compensation people," and it was agreed there was not enough light duty work for Petitioner. Three months later, Petitioner returned to full duty. Because a spotter had been hired to do her work, Petitioner was assigned to a variety of jobs. She worked at the dog pound, the recycling building, and even washed Mr. Hardee's truck.6 One day, Petitioner's immediate supervisor ordered her to cut out the top of a metal drum. At formal hearing, Petitioner asserted that this was heavier work than she should have been required to do on light duty, but there is no evidence the supervisor's order was motivated by gender bias. There also is no evidence a full-time male spotter was never required to do similarly heavy work. Petitioner advised her supervisor that she had hurt her arms and elbows and she went home on sick leave. Petitioner had complained over the term of her employment about not being provided one of Respondent's trucks so that she could conveniently get from her sector of the landfill to a restroom. After her workers' compensation injury, Respondent arranged for male employees to drive Petitioner to the restroom. Eventually, Respondent provided Petitioner with a portable toilet in her work sector. Mr. Hardee maintained that no spotter had ever been assigned a truck but that all spotters, including Petitioner, had access to one. There is evidence to show that male employees drove the trucks and Petitioner did not, but insufficient evidence to show this was an active management decision or that Mr. Hardee acquiesced in male employees preempting trucks as a result of any gender bias. On or about November 13, 1995, Petitioner informed Mr. Hardee that she was permanently physically disabled and would have to be on light duty indefinitely. After consultation with his "workers' compensation people," Mr. Hardee terminated Petitioner as of that date. 7 At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted Respondent was still paying her workers' compensation benefits and that her workers' compensation claim has not been settled.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding no discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1997.
The Issue In her charge of discrimination Ms. Alexander alleges that her employer created a hostile work environment and unfair conditions of employment when it singled her out as a thief of a stolen purse, denied her overtime, disciplined her for the size of her earrings, and made insulting statements about African Americans. The issues in this proceeding are whether that discrimination occurred, and if so, what relief is appropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter its final order dismissing the complaint by Felicia A. Alexander against Dynair. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Felicia A. Alexander Post Office Box 549 Sanford, Florida 32772-0549 Gabriel G. Marrero, Administrator Dynair Services, Inc. Two Red Cleveland Boulevard, Suite 205 Orlando-Sanford International Airport Sanford, Florida 32773 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Moncrief Bail Bonds, Inc., conducted business operations in the State of Florida without obtaining workers' compensation coverage, meeting the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2005), in violation of Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2002 through 2005). If so, what penalty should be assessed by Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2005),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rule, Chapter 69L.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. Petitioner is a corporation domiciled in Florida, and engaged in the business of issuing bail bonds. On August 3, 2005, Respondent's investigator, Robert Cerrone, visited Petitioner's office location at 3910 South John Young Parkway, Orlando, Florida, on a referral from his supervisor. He interviewed a number of persons at the office site. Cerrone documented his investigation in the narrative of his Initial Investigative Report. Based upon these field interviews, Respondent determined that the workers were employed by Petitioner. Cerrone contacted Petitioner's president, Russell Bruce Moncrief, and inquired whether Petitioner had secured the payment of workers' compensation, to which Moncrief responded that he had never secured the payment of workers' compensation for his business. Subsequent to the site visit, it was determined that Petitioner did not have a State of Florida workers' compensation insurance policy to provide workers' compensation coverage for any of its workers. Florida law requires that an employer who has four or more employees, engaged in non-construction work in Florida, obtain a Florida workers' compensation policy. Petitioner was an employer, with four or more employees, all of whom were paid remuneration, during all times material to the instant case. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.019(2) requires that in order for an employer to comply with Subsections 440.10(1)(g) and 440.38(7), Florida Statutes, any policy or endorsement used by an employer to prove coverage of workers' compensation for employees engaged in Florida work, must be issued by an insurer that holds a valid certificate of authority in the State of Florida. Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, allows an individual to apply for an election to be exempt from workers' compensation benefits. Only the named individual on the application is exempt from carrying workers' compensation insurance coverage. During the relevant time period, there were no current, valid exemptions for Petitioner. 11. Subsections 440.107(3) and 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes, authorize Respondent to issue Stop-Work Orders to employers unable to provide proof of workers' compensation coverage. Failure to provide such proof is deemed "an immediate serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare " On August 3, 2005, Respondent issued and served on Petitioner a SWO and Order of Penalty Assessment for failing to obtain coverage that meets the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Insurance Code, Chapter 624, Florida Statutes. Also at that time, Cerrone issued a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment to Petitioner, seeking business records for the period August 3, 2002, through August 3, 2005. Employers conducting business in Florida are required to keep business records that enable Respondent to determine whether the employer is in compliance with the workers' compensation law. Petitioner complied with the records request and provided Respondent with the requested payroll records for the time period between August 3, 2002, and August 3, 2005. Utilizing the records provided, and applying the statutorily mandated penalty calculation methodology, the penalty for Respondent was calculated by assigning a class code to the type of work conducted by the employees, utilizing the manual approved by rule. The approved manual rate was multiplied by the wages paid to the employee per one hundred dollars, and the product therof was then multiplying by 1.5. The Amended Order, which assessed a penalty of $51,499.34, was personally served on Petitioner on August 4, 2005. On August 12, 2005, Petitioner entered into a Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty, and was issued an Order of Conditional Release from the SWO by Respondent. Petitioner made a down payment of ten percent of the assessed penalty, provided proof of compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by obtaining six exemptions for officers of the corporation, and agreed to pay the remaining penalty in 60 equal monthly installments. The entities listed on the Amended Order penalty worksheet were Petitioner's employees, during the relevant period, and none had valid workers' compensation exemptions or workers' compensation coverage. At the hearing, Petitioner attempted to provide an alternative class code for the calculation of the penalty that significantly reduced his penalty. Petitioner alleged that his workers were misclassified by Respondent as Class Code 7720, police officers and drivers, when in fact they should have been classified under Class Code 8810, clerical office employees. Petitioner contends that the calculation of the penalty imposed is inaccurate. Specifically, six of Respondent's employees, although these individuals held bail bonds licenses, performed only clerical duties and did not go into the field to apprehend persons in violation of their bail bond or court order. Their rate of compensation was based on their experience and knowledge, rather than their job descriptions. Petitioner introduced evidence that the current workers' compensation policy, which exempts six employees, is less than the premium calculated by Respondent. Class Code 7720, utilized by Respondent, is the most appropriate code for bail bondsmen regardless of whether their duties were mostly performed in the office. Furthermore, all of the individuals on the penalty worksheet classified under Class Code 7720 possess surety agent (bail bond) licenses, and are thus able to function as bail bondsmen in their full capacity, including, but not limited to apprehending individuals. At the final hearing, Petitioner provided information that six of its employees had obtained workers' compensation exemptions, four of which listed the employee's duties as "bail bondsman" and two as "clerical." Petitioner also alleged that his workers were independent contractors, but did not provide evidence to support that assertion.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order, as follows: Petitioner failed to secure worker's compensation coverage for its employees, as required by statute; and Petitioner be assessed a penalty of $51,499.34. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Human Rights Act by maintaining racially segregated restroom facilities, as alleged by Petitioner; and, if so, the affirmative relief which should be granted.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the COMPANY operated a business establishment located at Pompano Beach, Florida. BOYKIN a black male, was employed by the COMPANY during a one-week period in 1978. During BOYKIN'S employment, the COMPANY maintained separate restroom facilities, segregated on the basis of race. (Testimony of Boykin.) The COMPANY'S two restroom facilities were racially segregated by the use of signs affixed to the outside door of each restroom--one sign labeled "Colored," and the other, "White." (Testimony of Boykin.) The COMPANY'S maintenance of racially segregated restrooms was offensive to BOYKIN, and the other black employees. (Testimony of Boykin.) As of September 26, 1980, the offending signs by which the COMPANY racially segregated its restrooms were no longer affixed to the restroom doors. (Viewing by hearing officer, accompanied by parties.) The COMPANY presented no evidence controverting BOYKIN'S allegation that it maintained racially segregated restrooms during the time in question. Neither did it assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose for maintaining segregated restroom facilities. BOYKIN presented no evidence to establish that the COMPANY employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during 1977 or 1978.
Conclusions Conclusions: Respondent company maintained racially segregated restrooms for Petitioner and its other employees. The signs, by which the restrooms were labeled, "Colored" and "White" were no longer affixed to the restrooms at the time of final hearing. However, Petitioner failed to prove an essential elements of his claim-- that Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. Recommendation: That the Petitioner for Relief be DISMISSED. Background: On November 27, 1978, Petitioner Michael C. Boykin ("BOYKIN") filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations a complaint of unlawful discrimination against Respondent H. L. Westberry Paving and Trucking Company ("COMPANY"). The gravamen of BOYKIN'S complaint was that he was subjected to an unlawful condition of employment by virtue of the COMPANY'S maintenance of racially segregated restroom facilities. After investigation, the Commission on Human Relations issued its determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that the COMPANY had engaged in an unlawful employment practice, as alleged, in violation of the Human Rights Act, Sections 23.161, et seq., Florida Statutes. After an unsuccessful effort to effect voluntary conciliation of the dispute, the Commission issued a Notice of Failure of Conciliation on June 11, 1980. Within the requisite 30-day period thereafter, BOYKIN filed a Petition for Relief from the alleged unlawful employment practice. Notwithstanding the COMPANY'S failure to file any pleading responding to BOYKIN'S Petition for Relief, or request a hearing thereon, the Commission forwarded it to the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 10, 1980, for the assignment of a hearing officer. By Notice of Hearing, final hearing was thereafter set for September 26, 1980. At final hearing, counsel for the COMPANY represented that on September 25, 1980, he received a telephone call from an unidentified employee of the Commission purporting to cancel the hearing scheduled for September 26, 1980. As a result, he asserted his witness was not present at final hearing; he then proffered that, if present, his witness could testify that signs indicating "Colored" and "White" were not now affixed to the doors of the separate restrooms located on the COMPANY'S premises. In order to avoid continuing the hearing, the parties agreed that the undersigned hearing officer should determine whether or not the described signs were present by conducting a viewing of the COMPANY'S premises. In light of this viewing, the COMPANY declined to request a continuance, and indicted that it wished to present no further evidence. The COMPANY also moved to dismiss the Petition for Relief, claiming that the Commission lacked jurisdiction based on: (1) federal preemption of the area by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and (2) failure of the Commission to complete its proceeding within 120 days from the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's deferral of this matter to the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Respondent's Exhibit 1 was offered, and received in support of the motion, after which the motion was denied. The only witness who testified at final hearing was BOYKIN. No other exhibits were offered by either party. The Florida Commission on Human Relations was not represented at final hearing; BOYKIN represented himself, in proper person, and without assistance by the Commission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended: That the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October 1980 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael C. Boykin 801 Powerline road, #161 Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Thomas P. Quinn, Esquire 2455 East Sunrise Boulevard Suite 605, International Building Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33404
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Andrea Bateman, is a female. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Bateman was 41 or 42 years of age. Ms. Bateman is an attorney. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was a member of The Florida Bar during the period of time at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. Ms. Bateman's Employment by the Department. In October of 1990, the Department employed Ms. Bateman as an attorney in the Department's Office of Child Support Enforcement. Ms. Bateman was required to be a member of The Florida Bar. Ms. Bateman's position with the Department was classified as a "Select Exempt Service" position. Pursuant to Chapter 22SE-1.002(5), Florida Administrative Code, and Part V, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, persons employed in select exempt service positions may be terminated from employment without cause. Ms. Bateman's immediate supervisor was Chriss Walker. Mr. Walker is a Senior Attorney with the Department and, at the time Ms. Bateman was hired, also served as the Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement. As of December 4, 1991, the Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement, and Mr. Walker's immediate supervisor was Anne F. Donovan. At all times relevant to this proceeding, William H. Bentley was an Assistant Deputy Secretary of the Department with supervisory authority over the Department's Assistant Secretary's, including Mr. Walker and Ms. Donovan. "Productivity Enhancement" at the Department. During 1991, the Department was required to evaluate all employment positions at the Department and to reduce those positions in an effort to improve the productivity of the Department. Generally, all positions at the Department and the work performed by the persons filling those positions were considered and decisions were made as to which positions could be eliminated. The Department referred to the elimination of positions as "red-lining". The Department also made efforts to insure that any person affected by the elimination of their position would be placed in another position. Ms. Bateman's attorney position with Child Support Enforcement was identified for elimination. Another attorney position in Child Support Enforcement and Mr. Walker's Senior Attorney position were not identified for elimination. The decision to eliminate one of the attorney positions was based upon conclusion that the administrative duties of the two attorney positions could be handled by a paralegal position and the legal duties could then be handled by one attorney. Efforts to assist Ms. Bateman to find another position were not successful. Ultimately, the Department decided to find a position in which to continue to employ Ms. Bateman rather than to terminate her position and release her. The Department reclassified another vacant position so that Ms. Bateman could continue to be employed as an attorney for Child Support Enforcement. Mr. Walker was directed to create an attorney position for Ms. Bateman by the Assistant Secretary for Human Services. This decision was made during the early Fall of 1991. The Department's decision to continue to employ Ms. Bateman was based in part on the Department's concern about terminating an employee of the Department. The evidence failed to prove that the Department acted unreasonably with regard to the red-lining of Ms. Bateman's position. Ms. Bateman's Performance. During the year after Ms. Bateman began her employment with the Department, Mr. Walker, Ms. Bateman's supervisor, began to develop concerns about the adequacy of her work product. Ms. Bateman also began to evidence behavior which was not acceptable for an attorney of the Department. As a result of Ms. Bateman's odd behavior, Mr. Walker became concerned about Ms. Bateman's mental well-being. Mr. Walker memorialized his concerns about Ms. Bateman in a memorandum to Mr. Bentley dated December 2, 1991. The memorandum was revised December 19, 1991 to eliminate references to a counselor that Ms. Bateman had informed Mr. Walker she was seeing. Ms. Bateman's work deteriorated to an extent which necessitated other employees carrying out some of her duties. Among the difficulties experienced with Ms. Bateman which formed a reasonable basis for terminating her employment were the following: Ms. Bateman had difficulty communicating with other employees and her supervisor. As an attorney, Ms. Bateman was required to communicate orally and in writing. She was unable to do so in an adequate manner. Ms. Bateman failed to demonstrate good judgment and trustworthiness and, therefore, her supervisors were unable to rely upon her judgment as an attorney of the Department. Ms. Bateman's appearance was unacceptable for an employee of the Department who was required to meet and communicate with the public. Ms. Bateman's hair was unkempt and dirty, her clothes were often soiled and wrinkled, she failed to brush her teeth and she appeared not to be bathing based upon her appearance and her strong body odor. Although required to do so by Department policy, Ms. Bateman refused to give her supervisor a permanent home address or phone number. On one occasion Ms. Bateman was found asleep in the offices of the Department at night and on one occasion she was found asleep during working hours. Based upon the inadequacy of Ms. Bateman's performance, the Department had a reasonable basis for terminating Ms. Bateman's employment. Mr. Walker's Evaluation of Ms. Bateman. On December 18, 1991, Mr. Walker presented Ms. Bateman with a Professional Employee Performance Appraisal form he had completed on her performance. The Appraisal was reviewed by Ms. Bateman and signed by her on December 18, 1991. Mr. Walker gave Ms. Bateman's performance a rating of "effective" on the Appraisal. Of the factors evaluated on the Appraisal, Mr. Walker judged Ms. Bateman's performance as "excellent" on one factor, "effective" on eleven factors and "needs improvement" on nine factors. Mr. Walker gave Ms. Bateman's performance an "effective" rating despite his conclusion that her work product was not acceptable and despite his concerns about her inappropriate behavior. He did so because he had recently been directed to create a position to keep Ms. Bateman as an employee of the Department and in an effort to avoid litigation over Ms. Bateman's termination. Mr. Walker did not believe that his supervisors wanted to avoid any difficulties concerning Ms. Bateman employment. Mr. Walker failed to follow Department procedure in presenting the Appraisal to Ms. Bateman. The Appraisal was required to be reviewed and approved by Mr. Walker's immediate supervisor, Ms. Donovan, before it was given to Ms. Bateman. Mr. Walker, contrary to Department policy, presented the Appraisal to Ms. Bateman before Ms. Donovan had seen and approved it. Ms. Donovan was aware of the problems with Ms. Bateman's performance and would not have approved an "effective" rating. Upon receiving the Appraisal, Ms. Donovan discussed the Appraisal with Mr. Walker and rejected it, as it was her right to do. Ms. Donovan, consistent with Department policy, specified that Ms. Bateman would be evaluated again in sixty days. The Department's Request that Ms. Bateman Undergo a Psychological Evaluation. Although the Department had a reasonable basis for terminating Ms. Bateman's employment by the end of 1991 and in early 1992, the Department decided to attempt to discover the cause of Ms. Bateman's decline in performance and the onset of her odd behavior rather than terminate her employment. The Department made this decision in an effort to determine what assistance Ms. Bateman might need. Ultimately, the Department was attempting to determine what work, if any, Ms. Bateman was capable of performing. The Department's decision was based upon a number of incidents involving Ms. Bateman. Those incidents are included in Mr. Walker's Chronology of December 2, 1991 and his Revised Chronology of December 19, 1991 and are hereby incorporated herein. Although not all the incidents described in the chronologies were proved during the final hearing to have occurred, the Department's consideration of the incidents reported by Mr. Walker was reasonable. Due to the Department's concerns about Ms. Bateman, the Department requested that Ms. Bateman voluntarily participate in the Department's employee assistance program. Ms. Bateman refused. In order to determine what could be done to help Ms. Bateman, and to determine what duties and responsibilities she was capable of performing, the Department requested that Ms. Bateman undergo a psychological, or other, evaluation. Ms. Bateman refused. After discussing the matter with Ms. Bateman and legal counsel she had retained, the Department notified Ms. Bateman that her continued employment was conditioned upon her undergoing a psychological evaluation or some other evaluation which would allow the Department to determine what work she was capable of performing. In a letter of February 12, 1992, Ms. Bateman, through her representative, was informed of the following: As you also know, we are attempting to help Andrea address a problem which we believe exists and has been well documented over the past 16 months. In return, we need Andrea's help and cooperation. If Andrea chooses to agree to our request that she undergo a psychiatric evaluation and authorize the release to us of the psychiatrist's prognosis, diagnosis and recommendation for treatment, we will be glad to schedule an appointment for her with a psychiatrist, and will pay for such an evaluation. We will use the evaluation to determine an appropriate course of action. Ms. Bateman's Termination from Employment. Ms. Bateman continued to refuse to undergo any evaluation or to suggest any alternative course of action. Consequently, based upon Ms. Bateman's inadequate and unacceptable work performance, the Department terminated Ms. Bateman's employment with the Department on or about February 13, 1992. Ms. Bateman's termination from employment was effective February 28, 1992. Ms. Bateman was terminated from employment due to the fact that she was not adequately performing her job and she refused to cooperate with the Department to find out what could be done to help her become an effective employee. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department's reason for terminating her employment was a pretext. Ms. Bateman's Charge of Discrimination. On or about September 15, 1992, Ms. Bateman filed a Charge of Discrimination against the Department with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ms. Bateman alleged that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex and a perceived handicap. On February 10, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Ms. Bateman filed a Request for Redetermination on March 4, 1992. On April 12, 1993, the Commission issued a "Redetermination: No Cause" affirming its decision. On May 12, 1993, Ms. Bateman filed a Petition for Relief seeking a formal administrative hearing. In the petition Ms. Bateman alleged that the Department had discriminated against her on the basis of sex, a perceived handicap and, for the first time, age. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Ms. Bateman. Alleged Sex Discrimination. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that any action of the Department was based upon Ms. Bateman's sex: she was not held to any standard or requirement based upon her sex, she was not terminated because of her sex and the Department's efforts to determine the cause of Ms. Bateman's problems was not based upon her sex. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that any Department policy or standard had a disparate impact on female employees. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was replaced by a male attorney. Ms. Bateman's grooming habits were discussed with her. Some of those discussions concerned the wearing of panty hose and her makeup. It must be inferred that such discussions were not carried on with male employees. The evidence, however, failed to prove that Ms. Bateman's termination was based upon these matters. Although grooming played a part in the decision to terminate Ms. Bateman's employment, it was grooming related to basic cleanliness and neat appearance required of all employees and not just female employees. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, female. Alleged Age Discrimination. At the time that Ms. Bateman was hired she was 41 years of age, and at the time she was terminated she was 42 years of age. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that age played any part in her treatment by the Department. This finding is supported, in part, by the fact that the difference between Ms. Bateman's age when she was hired and when she was terminated was only one year. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was replaced by a younger person. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the persons who made the decision to terminate her employment were aware of her age. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her age. Alleged Perceived Handicap. The Department did believe that Ms. Bateman was suffering from some mental problem. This belief was based upon Ms. Bateman's odd behavior and a concern that Ms. Bateman was "homeless". It was for this reason that the Department requested that Ms. Bateman undergo a psychological evaluation. Ms. Bateman failed to prove, however, that the Department treated her differently from the manner other employees of the Department were treated under similar circumstances. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that the Department's request that she undergo a psychological or other evaluation to determine how to assist her to meet the requirements of her employment was made for a discriminatory reason. Under the circumstances, the Department's request of Ms. Bateman was reasonable. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that she was terminated from employment because of any perceived handicap. The evidence proved that she was in fact terminated from employment due to her inability to satisfactorily carry out her job responsibilities. Ms. Bateman also failed to allege or prove that she has a handicap based upon her mental condition. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of a handicap or a perceived handicap.
The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Baypoint Hotel Associates operates a hotel at Marriott's Bay Point Resort in Panama City, Florida. Petitioner, Jerry D. Hicks, was employed by Respondent, Baypoint Hotel Associates, for approximately five and one Petitioner worked as a bell captain at Respondent's Panama City Beach, Florida, hotel for approximately two and one termination of his employment with Respondent. The bell captain's job required some heavy lifting. There was no dispute regarding the fact that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Human Rights Act, and that all jurisdictional requirements have been met. Petitioner requested, and was granted, a leave of absence from his job effective December 17, 1991, in order to have back surgery to repair a herniated disc. By electing to take a leave of absence, Petitioner understood that he was not guaranteed his bell captain's job upon his return. In fact, he was not guaranteed any job upon his return, but would be given preference should there be an opening in any employment position for which he was qualified. There was no evidence that Respondent's leave of absence policy was not consistently applied or applied in a discriminatory manner. As a result of his surgery, Petitioner was unable to work from December 17, 1991, until April 9, 1992, when he was released by his doctor to return to work. No medical evidence was presented that Petitioner's "back problem" constituted a handicap or was perceived as a handicap by his employer. During Petitioner's absence from work, his job duties were reassigned to two assistant bell captains. After being released by his doctor to return to work, Petitioner informed Respondent's Human Resources Department, on or about the week of April 13, 1992, that he was ready to return to work, but that he would temporarily not be able to perform all of the duties, namely heavy lifting, of his former job as bell captain because of his surgery. After Petitioner requested to return to his job as a bell captain, Respondent's Director of Human Resources informed Petitioner that his former job was no longer available because Respondent's management had reassigned the bell captain's duties to two assistant bell captains and that Respondent did not plan to refill the job of bell captain under a reorganization of that service area. In lieu of returning Petitioner to his former job as bell captain, Respondent's human resource director informed Petitioner that he could interview for several available jobs at Respondent's hotel, including the jobs of telephone operator/supervisor, front desk clerk or reservation sales agent. Petitioner testified that he was unwilling to consider any job that paid less money than he was paid in his former job as a bell captain. By the time Petitioner informed Respondent's human resource director on April 28, 1992, that he was ready to interview for the reservation job; however, the reservations job had already been filled. Petitioner had waited an inordinate amount of time in advising Respondent of his interest in the reservations job and therefore lost his opportunity to apply. There was no evidence of any discrimination on the part of Respondent.
Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of October, 1993. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1504 The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry D. Hicks 1202 Parker Drive Panama City, Florida 32401 Michael D. Giles, Esquire 1410 AmSouth Harbert Plaza 1901 Sixth Avenue North Birmingham, Alabama 35203-2602 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F (Suite 240) Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Ms. Sharon Moultry Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from his position as a janitor with Respondent because of his handicap, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lee, was hired by Respondent in August 1994 as a custodial worker at the Tallahassee Mall in Tallahassee, Florida. As a janitor Petitioner's duties included bending, stooping, and lifting. He was assigned to zone 3 in the Mall. Up until 1996, when Petitioner was injured, Petitioner received good evaluations on his job performance. Indeed Petitioner was very proud of the quality of his work and took special care to do his job well. Sometime prior to May 20, 1996, Petitioner, while at work and in the scope of his employment, stepped on a set of stairs which were not properly attached to a stage in the Tallahassee Mall. The steps slipped causing Petitioner's feet to come out from under him. Petitioner fell flat on his back. As a consequence Petitioner suffered a permanent back injury for which he received workers' compensation. The injury impairs his ability to work and therefore is a handicap. Around May 20, 1996, Petitioner was released by his doctor and was given orders for light duty with no bending, stooping, or heavy lifting. Petitioner gave these orders to his supervisor, Mr. Navin, when he returned to work on May 20, 1996. Respondent had light duty work available which Petitioner was qualified to perform. However, Respondent did not assign Petitioner to light duty work, but changed his work area from zone 3 to zone 1. Zone 1 is located at the front entrance to the mall and requires more work to maintain. Petitioner attempted to perform his duties but could only work for 3 1/2 hours before being overcome by pain from his injury. Petitioner could not work the next four working days because of the aggravation of his injury. On May 28, 1996, after returning to work, Petitioner was again given full duty work. Petitioner attempted to perform his custodial duties for about 2 weeks. However, the pain from his injury was so severe he again requested light duty work. Petitioner's supervisor asked Petitioner to bring him another notice from his doctor. Petitioner's doctor faxed the supervisor a second notice and Petitioner was placed on light duty work. Once Petitioner was placed on light duty work, the mall manager, Mr. Renninger, followed Petitioner around the mall watching him all the time while he worked. On July 8, 1996, prior to the mall opening for business, Petitioner was helping one of the mall store owners with a problem. Such aid was part of Petitioner's job. The mall manager walked up to Petitioner and began to yell at him in a very rude and disrespectful manner. The manager would not listen to Petitioner's explanation of the event. The manager gave Petitioner a written disciplinary notice for his aid to the mall store owner. The manager continued to follow Petitioner around the mall while he worked. Sometime around August 15, 1996, the mall manager advised the mall's employees that they should take their respective vacations prior to October. Petitioner thought it would be a good time for him to take the 4-day vacation time he had accumulated during his employment with the mall. He could use the time to allow his back to heal more. On August 15, 1996, Petitioner requested vacation leave and vacation pay for the period beginning September 3, 1996 and ending September 9, 1996. Initially, the request was denied. Petitioner's supervisor felt he had missed too much work and been late too often. However, Petitioner had only been absent or late in relation to his back injury. Petitioner explained that fact to his supervisor. His supervisor agreed and approved Petitioner's vacation. Petitioner returned to work on August 10, 1996. An argument with the administrative assistant occurred when she refused to recognize that Petitioner was entitled to be paid for his vacation time. She was not going to turn in any time for him so that Petitioner could get paid while on vacation. Getting a paycheck was a serious matter to Petitioner, and Petitioner, understandably, became gruff with the administrative assistant. Petitioner only raised his voice at the administrative assistant. He was not abusive and did not curse at her. In fact, the administrative assistant yelled at Petitioner when he raised the subject of his pay "Now, before you start bitching." Petitioner called the headquarters of Respondent and confirmed he had vacation time and pay accrued. After this incident Petitioner was fired ostensibly for mistreating the administrative assistant. The administrative assistant, who was incorrect, was not terminated. The reason appears to be a pretext. Petitioner's pay was $5.35 per hour and he worked a 40-hour-work-week. After his termination, Petitioner actively sought employment but could not find any until September 1, 1997. At that time he began work for Tallahassee Community College as a custodial worker with light duties at a higher rate of pay. Petitioner's search for work was reasonable.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner and awarding Petitioner backpay in the amount of $11,770.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2000.
