The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Richard Koenig, D.P.M., should be licensed as a podiatrist in the State of Florida. More specifically, this case must determine these issues: whether Richard Koenig, D.P.M., has practiced podiatry in the past at an acceptable standard of care as required by Section 461.013(1)(s), Florida Statutes; whether he fraudulently misrepresented material facts on his application for licensure as a podiatrist in violation of Section 461.013(1)(a), Florida Statutes; and whether his application to become licensed as a podiatrist is barred on grounds of administrative res judicata because of the Board of Podiatry's denial of his application in 1994-1995.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Koenig is an applicant for licensure as a podiatrist in the State of Florida. He is presently licensed to practice podiatry in the State of Missouri and was previously licensed in Illinois and Florida. Both of the latter licenses have expired. Dr. Koenig meets all criteria for licensure in Florida other than the grounds for denial cited by the Board in its Notice of Intent to Deny and described in the Statement of the Issues, above. The Board is responsible for certifying individuals who are qualified to become licensed as podiatrists and the Department of Health is responsible for issuing the licenses after the Board's certification. Dr. Koenig permitted his Florida license to lapse while he practiced in Missouri. He initially sought to be licensed again in this state in 1994. At that time, his application to sit for the examination, and thereafter to be licensed, was denied by the Board. Dr. Koenig requested a hearing on the denial before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and a case was opened as DOAH Case No. 95-0570. Dr. Koenig later dismissed his petition and the DOAH file was closed. The earlier denial thus became final. Dr. Koenig reapplied for licensure in 1997. It is this application which is the subject of the instant proceeding. Dr. Koenig has already taken and passed the national podiatric licensure examination in Louisiana in 1997, thus meeting the examination requirement. Dr. Koenig was involved in approximately eleven podiatric malpractice cases during his practice in Missouri in the 1980's and early 1990's. Eight of the cases were settled by his insurance carrier. Three additional cases were pending at the time of Dr. Koenig's initial application in 1994. Of these three, Dr. Koenig prevailed at trial in two cases. The third case has been voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff and has not been refiled. Dr. Koenig has not been engaged in the practice of podiatry as his primary professional activity since 1993-1994. He occasionally provides podiatric services as part of his commitment to the U.S. Navy, but he has primarily been engaged in developing and marketing two devices for use in podiatric and related services and has been teaching. Dr. Koenig received and reviewed the 1994 Board Notice of Intent to Deny Application for Examination and Licensure prior to filing his 1997 licensure application. In addition, he was aware that he had dismissed his petition to review that decision and the Board's decision was thus final. Nevertheless when called upon to state in the 1997 application whether he had ever been denied licensure as a podiatrist, Dr. Koenig answered "No." (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1) This answer was false. Question five of the application for podiatry licensure reads: "Has any podiatry license held by you ever been acted upon, suspended or revoked, or have you ever been denied licensure?" Dr. Koenig's explanation concerning his negative answer to this question was that he thought he was being denied the right to take the examination, which was a condition required before he could be licensed. His understanding is supported by a reading of the minutes of the Board meeting at which the decision was made: "Dr. Simmonds moved to deny Dr. Koenig from taking the examination based on not having the ability to practice Podiatric Medicine at a level of care and safety." (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1) However, the Board sent, and Dr. Koenig received, a Notice of Intent to Deny Application for Examination and Licensure. While that document plainly states that he was both being denied the right to take the examination and the right to be licensed, he did not focus on the second point--the right to be licensed. Dr. Koenig offered his explanation to the Board at its meeting on July 25, 1997, and when asked about the application question, he stated, "Because it is a misunderstanding. I make a differentiation between being denied a license and being denied the opportunity to sit for a license, and I may be wrong, and I stand corrected if I am, but that's what my intention was." (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, Transcript pp. 21-22). He understood that the Board was denying him the right to take the examination, an essential element of his application process. Dr. Koenig's explanation has been consistent throughout this proceeding, both before the Board and in the formal hearing. Although Dr. Koenig did answer the question incorrectly, his explanation that he did so without any fraudulent intent is entirely credible. Had there been an intent to defraud the Board regarding his application, Dr. Koenig might have avoided disclosing the malpractice suits which resulted in the Board's earlier decision to deny him licensure. Those malpractice suits are no longer an appropriate basis to deny licensure. Dr. Koenig is a Board-certified podiatrist and is a Fellow of the American College of Foot and Ankle Surgeons. One becomes Board-certified by taking an examination, by meeting practice requirements, and by submitting a number of medical cases to the Board for evaluation. Only about 10 percent of all podiatrists are Board-certified. Dr. Koenig's specialty is foot surgery and he has operated more often than a podiatrist in standard practice. Dr. Koenig has written several articles in peer- reviewed journals, and has spoken widely in the United States and elsewhere at various continuing medical education seminars. A frequent topic of his speeches involves the use of an implant which he developed to replace the big toe joint. This implant is patented, approved as a safe device by the FDA, and is covered by Medicare and Medicaid. Dr. Koenig has developed and marketed a special shoe for patients who have had foot surgery. There have been no Medicare or Medicaid complaints brought against Dr. Koenig and he maintains Medicare and Medicaid provided numbers. The two lawsuits which went to a jury verdict were decided in his favor and there are no lawsuits pending now. The multiple claims of malpractice occurred when he was actively engaged in foot surgery practice in Missouri. His insurance carrier, without consulting him, settled those claims. After he changed carriers and contested the claims, he has prevailed. The Board in this proceeding presented no evidence that Dr. Koenig has practiced below the standard of care. Nor did it refute his credible testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: that a Final Order be entered granting Dr. Koenig's license to practice podiatry in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: John J. Rimes, III Office of Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Eric B. Tilton Gustafson, Tilton, Henning & Metzger, P.A. Suite 200 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Eric G. Walker, Executive Director Board of Podiatry Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Florida Medical Association, Inc. and Florida Association of Physicians Assistants have standing to initiate this challenge to an existing rule. (See Section 120.56(3), Florida Statutes.) Whether Rule 64B1-3.001(6), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it exceeds the Board of Acupuncture's rulemaking authority contained in Section 457.104, Florida Statutes. (See Section 120.52(8)(b), Florida Statutes). Whether Rule 64B1-3.001(6), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the provisions of Section 457.102, Florida Statutes. (See Section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes).
Findings Of Fact It was stipulated that Petitioner FMA is organized and maintained for the benefit of approximately 16,000 licensed allopathic and osteopathic Florida physicians. FMA's standing in this proceeding has always been at issue. The foregoing stipulation encompasses all of the factual allegations about the Petitioner contained in the Petition. It was stipulated that there is only one Respondent, the Board of Acupuncture, created by the Florida Legislature and placed within the Florida Department of Health. It is axiomatic that the Respondent has standing herein. There were no stipulations as to the standing of either Intervenor, and both the Board and FSOMA have asserted in their respective Proposed Final Orders that FAPA, as well as FMA, is without standing to bring this rule challenge. However, no party has contested the veracity of the factual statements concerning standing in either Petition to Intervene, and no party opposed intervention. The Petitions to Intervene of FAPA and FSOMA were granted, subject to proving-up standing at hearing. Even stipulations as to standing do not preclude consideration of standing as a matter of law. Florida Medical Ass'n., Inc., et al. v. Dept. of Health, Florida Bd. of Nursing, et al., DOAH Case No. 99-5337RP (Final Order March 13, 2000), per curiam affirmed Bd. of Nursing, et al. v. Florida Medical Ass'n. Inc., So. 2d (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Therefore, under these circumstances, and applying that case, the Intervenors' factual allegations for purposes of standing may be taken as true for findings of fact, but each Intervenor's status still depends upon that of the respective party upon whose behalf each Intervenor entered this case. Therefore, with regard to the status of FAPA, it is found that: FAPA is organized and maintained for the benefit of the licensed Florida physicians assistants who compromise [sic] its membership and has as one of its primary functions to represent the interests of its members before various governmental entities of the State of Florida, including the Department of Health and its boards. (FAPA Petition to Intervene) Therefore, with regard to the status of FSOMA, it is found that: FSOMA is a Florida nonprofit corporation comprised of over one-third of the doctors of oriental medicine and licensed acupuncturists under the regulatory aegis of the Board of Acupuncture, State of Florida Department of Health, Chapter 457, F.S., with a mission to represent the acupuncture and oriental medicine practitioner interests of its members in judicial administrative, legislative and other proceedings. (FSOMA Petition to Intervene) Existing Rule 64B1-3.001(6), Florida Administrative Code, was promulgated by the Board of Acupuncture. The challenged rule provides: (6) Acupuncture physician means any person certified as provided in this Chapter to practice acupuncture as a primary health care provider. The rule was adopted on August 13, 1984. It was most recently amended on February 27, 1992. The "authority" cited by the Board for the challenged rule is Section 457.104, Florida Statutes. The Board cites the "law implemented" for the challenged rule as Section 457.102, Florida Statutes. Section 457.104, Florida Statutes, currently provides: The board has authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement provisions of this chapter conferring duties upon it. Section 457.102, Florida Statutes, currently provides: "Acupuncture" means a form of primary health care, based on traditional Chinese medical concepts and modern oriental medical techniques, that employs acupuncture diagnosis and treatment, as well as adjunctive therapies and diagnostic techniques, for the promotion, maintenance, and restoration of health and the prevention of disease. Acupuncture shall include, but not be limited to, the insertion of acupuncture needles and the application of moxibustion to specific areas of the human body and the use of electroacupuncture, Qi Gong, oriental massage, herbal therapy, dietary guidelines, and other adjunctive therapies, as defined by board rule. "Acupuncturist" means any person licensed as provided in this chapter to practice acupuncture as a primary health care provider. "Board" means the Board of Acupuncture. "License" means the document of authorization issued by the department for a person to engage in the practice of acupuncture. "Department" means the Department of Health. "Oriental medicine" means the use of acupuncture, electroacupuncture, Qi Gong, oriental massage, herbal therapy, dietary guidelines, and other adjunctive therapies. "Prescriptive rights" means the prescription, administration, and use of needles and devices, restricted devices, and prescription devices that are used in the practice of acupuncture and oriental medicine. (Emphasis supplied) Section 457.116(1)(b), Florida Statutes, provides: A person may not: (b) Use, in connection with his or her name or place of business, any title or description of services which incorporates the words "acupuncture," "acupuncturist," "certified acupuncturist," "licensed acupuncturist," "oriental medical practitioner"; the letters "L.Ac.," "R.Ac.," "A.P.," or "D.O.M."; or any other words, letters, abbreviations, or insignia indicating or implying that he or she practices acupuncture unless he or she is a holder of a valid license issued pursuant to ss. 457.101-457.118; (Emphasis supplied) It was stipulated that witnesses for the Respondent Board of Acupuncture would testify that "A.P." as employed in Section 457.116 (1) (b), Florida Statutes, means "acupuncture physician."1
The Issue On April 17, 2015, Respondent, Department of Health, issued a Notice of Agency Action Denial of License Renewal ("First Denial Notice"), notifying Petitioner, Alicia Chilito, M.D., that it had denied her application for renewal of her physician license. Thereafter, on May 19, 2015, Respondent issued an Amended Notice of Agency Action Denial of License Renewal ("Second Denial Notice"), reiterating, and stating alternative grounds for, its denial of Petitioner's physician license. Petitioner timely challenged Respondent's decision and the matter was referred to DOAH to conduct a hearing pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1). The final hearing initially was scheduled for August 14, 2015, but pursuant to motions, was set for December 16, 2015. On August 14, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, contending that there were no disputed issues of material fact to be resolved in a hearing conducted under section 120.57(1). This motion was denied by order issued on September 1, 2015, on the basis that disputed issues of material fact existed regarding whether Petitioner was entitled to renewal of her license by default pursuant to section 120.60(1). On December 11, 2015, Respondent filed Department of Health's Motion in Limine, seeking to limit the scope of the final hearing. A telephonic motion hearing was conducted on December 15, 2015, the day before the final hearing. The undersigned granted the motion and excluded evidence that may be offered at the final hearing to challenge the underlying factual basis on which the Termination Final Order was entered. The final hearing was held on December 16, 2015. Joint Exhibits 1 through 4 were admitted into evidence. Petitioner did not present any witnesses. Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 10 were tendered but not admitted, and were proffered for inclusion in the record. Respondent presented the testimony of Heidi Nitty. Respondent's Exhibit 1 was admitted into evidence without objection and Respondent's Exhibits 5 and 6 were admitted over objection. Official recognition was taken of the Final Order issued by the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") in the case of Agency for Health Care Administration v. Alicia Chilito, M.D., Case No. 12-571PH (AHCA November 4, 2013) and the Order Granting Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction in the case of Agency for Health Care Administration v. Alicia Chilito, M.D., Case No. 12-0859MPI (Fla. DOAH July 12, 2012). The one-volume Transcript was filed on January 8, 2016, and the parties were given until January 19, 2016, to file proposed recommended orders. The parties timely filed proposed recommended orders, which were duly considered in preparing this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Alicia Chilito, M.D., is a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida pursuant to License No. ME 74131. Respondent, Department of Health, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine, including licensing physicians pursuant to chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes (2015). Petitioner timely filed a Renewal Notice, which constituted her application to renew her physician license.1/ Respondent received Petitioner's Application on January 5, 2015. Respondent did not, within 30 days of receipt of her application, request Petitioner to provide any additional information that it was permitted by law to require, nor did it notify her of any apparent errors or omissions in her application. Accordingly, Petitioner's application was complete on January 5, 2015, by operation of section 120.60(1), for purposes of commencing the 90-day period for Respondent to approve or deny her application.2/ The 90-day period from Respondent's receipt of Petitioner's complete application expired on or about April 6, 2015.3/ Heidi Nitty, a government analyst I with Respondent, was involved in the review of Petitioner's application. Her specific role in the application review process was "reviewing court documents and other orders for possible denial of renewal and also recording [Respondent's] final orders in the national practitioner database." In the course of Nitty's review, she determined that Petitioner previously had been terminated from the Florida Medicaid program. Accordingly, she entered a "do-not-renew modifier" to Petitioner's license application file in Respondent's computer system. On January 20, 2015, Petitioner called Respondent to inquire about the status of her application. She was referred to Ms. Nitty, who was not available to speak to her at that time. Petitioner and Nitty exchanged calls over the course of that day, but did not speak to each other until January 21, 2015, when Petitioner again called, and that time, reached, Nitty. At that point, Nitty verbally informed Petitioner that her application "was being denied" due to having previously been terminated from the Florida Medicaid program. On April 17, 2015——some 102 days after Petitioner filed her complete application——Respondent issued its First Denial Notice, notifying Petitioner that it was denying her application. The First Denial Notice stated that Petitioner's license renewal was being denied pursuant to section 456.0635(2)(e) because she was listed on the United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General's List of Excluded Individuals and Entities.4/ On May 19, 2015——some 134 days after Petitioner filed her complete application——Respondent issued its Second Denial Notice, again stating its intent to deny Petitioner's application. However, the Second Denial Notice stated that Petitioner's license renewal was being denied pursuant to section 456.0635(3)(c) because she had been terminated for cause from the Florida Medicaid Program pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the Termination Final Order issued by AHCA on March 6, 2014. The stated basis for AHCA's March 6, 2014, Termination Final Order was that Petitioner previously had been terminated from the federal Medicare program and the Florida Medicaid program. The Termination Final Order is a final order issued by AHCA, who is not a party to this proceeding. Petitioner disputes the underlying factual basis for AHCA's Termination Final Order and claims that, in any event, she did not receive the notice, issued on January 17, 2014, that AHCA was proposing to terminate her from the Florida Medicaid program; thus, she did not challenge the proposed termination. Although Petitioner has raised these challenges to the Termination Final Order in her Petition for Hearing Involving Disputed Issues of Material Fact filed in this proceeding, the undersigned is not authorized to "reopen" AHCA's Termination Final Order and revisit its factual and legal underpinnings5/ so declined to take evidence on those issues at the final hearing in this proceeding.6/ Petitioner asserts that because Respondent's First Denial Notice and Second Denial Notice both were issued more than 90 days after Respondent received her complete application, she is entitled to licensure by default under section 120.60(1). Respondent counters that the 90-day period for approving or denying Petitioner's license commenced on February 4, 2015, so its First Denial Notice was timely issued. Respondent further asserts that, in any event, Nitty's statement to Petitioner during their January 21, 2015, telephone discussion satisfied the "90-day approval or denial requirement" in section 120.60(1), so that Petitioner is not entitled to issuance of a renewed license by default. It is undisputed that AHCA did not issue the written notices of its decision to deny Petitioner's license renewal until well after April 6, 2015. Therefore, unless Nitty's statement to Petitioner on their January 21, 2015, telephone call constituted Respondent's denial of Petitioner's application within 90 days after its receipt, Petitioner is entitled to issuance of her license by default, pursuant to section 120.60(1). The evidence establishes that when Nitty told Petitioner on January 21, 2015——notably, in response to communication that Petitioner initiated——that her license "was being denied," Respondent had not yet made its final decision to deny her application, so had not yet "approved or denied" Petitioner's license. Nitty's role in the application review process was limited to determining whether Petitioner previously had been terminated from the Florida Medicaid program, and, if so, to draft a denial letter for review and approval by her superiors. That is precisely what she did. Based on her confirmation that Petitioner had previously been terminated from the Florida Medicaid program, Nitty drafted a denial letter, which was then sent up Respondent's "chain of command" for approval or rejection, and, ultimately, for signature by Respondent's Deputy Secretary for Administration. The "chain of command" included her immediate supervisor, the bureau chief, the division director, and legal counsel——any and all of whom had the authority to reject her recommendation. To that point, Nitty acknowledged that the denial letter she drafted had "some rewrite issues" and that her supervisor, had, in fact, rewritten the letter. Nitty was not the person authorized by Respondent to make its final, binding decision to approve or deny Petitioner's application, and she did not know who actually made the ultimate decision to deny Petitioner's license renewal. Thus, at bottom, when Nitty told Petitioner that her license "was being denied," she was only conveying her preliminary assessment, as application review staff, that Petitioner's application was being denied. Nitty's communication of her preliminary assessment could not, and did not, constitute Respondent's "approval or denial" of Petitioner's application.7/ Thus, Respondent did not approve or deny Petitioner's application within the 90-day approval/denial period. Accordingly, pursuant to section 120.60(1), Petitioner's application is "considered approved." There is no evidence showing that, as of the date of the final hearing, Petitioner had notified Respondent's agency clerk of her intent to rely on the default license provision in section 120.60(1).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order that: (1) acknowledges that Petitioner's application for renewal of License No. ME 74131 is considered approved pursuant to section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes, and (2) directs Respondent's agency clerk, upon Petitioner's notification to said agency clerk that complies with section 120.60(1), to issue Petitioner's license, which may include such reasonable conditions as Respondent is authorized by law to require. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of February, 2016.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether disciplinary action should be imposed against the licensure of Douglas R. Shanklin, M.D., the Respondent, for allegedly falsely testifying that he had not been issued a "Letter of Guidance", in violation of Section 458.331(1)(k), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the Respondent was a physician licensed in the State of Florida. He holds license number ME0009372. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensure status and related practice standards of physicians in Florida, including making investigations and bringing Administrative Complaints against those physicians, in their licensure status, believed to be departing from those practice standards. On January 8, 1993, the Respondent testified as a defense witness, by deposition, in a medical malpractice case. The case style was Faircloth v. Coastal Empire Pathology Services, P.C., et al. The trial occurred in Savannah, Georgia. During his deposition, the Respondent was asked three times, by opposing counsel, if he had ever been issued a Letter of Guidance by any state licensing agency. The Respondent stated three times that, indeed, he had not. In fact, on May 15, 1984, a Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Medical Examiners in Florida considered a complaint against the Respondent. The Probable Cause Panel made a determination that while probable cause existed to believe that the Respondent had violated the provisions of the Medical Practice Act, the complaint should be dismissed with a Letter of Guidance. The Board stated in its Order that: Probable cause exists to believe that subject has violated the provisions of the Medical Practice Act. In light of the circumstances presented, however, this case should be and the same is hereby dismissed with a letter of guidance to subject. Thereafter, an undated letter was sent to and received by the Respondent. See Petitioner's Exhibit 2 in evidence. The Closing Order was never mailed to, nor received, by the Respondent. The Respondent was unaware of the Closing Order until March of 1993, when the investigation in this case was commenced and at which time he was first supplied a copy of that Closing Order of the Board's Probable Cause Panel. The Petitioner's Exhibit 2 in evidence, the undated letter, is not entitled or otherwise delineated as a "Letter of Guidance" and at no place in the letter is the word "guide" or "guidance" used. Consequently, at the time the Respondent received the letter, which is Exhibit 2, he did not understand or perceive it to be a Letter of Guidance but, rather, understood it to be a letter of closing indicating that he had prevailed in the complaint case. On January 8, 1993, when the Respondent testified at the deposition referenced above, he did not have in mind, nor did he remember, the undated letter. On January 8, 1993, when he testified at that deposition that he had not been issued the Letter of Guidance, he believed he was answering those questions truthfully. He did not know or understand that he had been issued a Letter of Guidance. On January 8, 1993, when he testified at the deposition, he did not testify falsely, because he had not been given the Closing Order at the time that the undated letter (Exhibit 2) was received. He thus did not understand that undated letter to be a Letter of Guidance from the then Department of Professional Regulation. He was never served a copy of the actual Closing Order which might have explained the situation to him. Consequently, he had a genuine, good-faith belief that he had not been issued a Letter of Guidance. Because his belief was genuine and he had no specific intent to tell a false story in those particulars, he made no false or fraudulent representation and committed no deception in conjunction with his answers to those questions at his deposition.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence or record, the candor and credibility of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the Respondent not guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and that the Complaint be dismissed in its entirely. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5903 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-3. Accepted. 4-6. Rejected, as not entirely in accord with the greater weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-11. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Rothenburg, Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 9125 Bay Plaza Boulevard Suite 210 Tampa, FL 33619 Larry G. Turner, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, FL 32602 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant thereto, respondent, Manuel M. Maralit, held medical doctor license number ME 0033337 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners. Maralit has been licensed as a medical doctor by the State of Florida since September 13, 1978. He has been a medical doctor since graduation from medical school in May, 1967. From January 1, 1983 through September 30, 1983, Maralit practiced medicine in Alachua County, Florida. During that period of time, he filed two unauthorized claims under the Florida Medicaid Program, each having an aggregate value of $200 or more in violation of Subsection 409.325(4)(a), Florida Statutes. He also received one unauthorized payment under the same program having an aggregate value of more than $200.00 in violation of Subsection 409.325(4)(c), Florida Statutes. After an information was filed by the State Attorney on December 13, 1983, Maralit pled guilty to the above three violations, and to a fourth charge of grand larceny. For this, he received twenty years probation, 2,000 hours of community service, a $15,000.00 fine to be paid within 12 months, and was required to make restitution of $2,398.51 to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and $921.00 to the Florida National Bank. According to the official records of petitioner introduced into evidence, Dr. Maralit was subject to prior disciplinary action by the Medical Board in 1982 (DOAH Case No. 81-1367, Final Order entered January 4, 1982). At that time his license was suspended for thirty days, and was placed on probation for one year. The probationary period has long since expired. The violations in that proceeding are not similar in any respect to those charged in this case. There is no evidence as to any damage, physical or otherwise, to specific patients caused by respondent's conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as charged in Counts I and II of the administrative Complaint, and that his medical license be suspended for one year with six months' suspension stayed and his license be placed on three years probation. Count III should be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1985.
