The Issue At issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, the "Florida Equal Access to Justice Act." Also at issue is whether, as contended by Respondent, there is "a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by [Petitioner's claim]" and, therefore, Respondent should be awarded attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Finding related to the underlying disciplinary action The Department of Health, Division of Medical Quality Assurance, Board of Chiropractic (Department), is a state agency charged with the duty and responsibility for regulating the practice of chiropractic pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 455 and 460, Florida Statutes.3 At all times material hereto, Petitioner, Robert Frankl, D.C. (Dr. Frankl), was licensed to practice chiropractic in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CH 0002560. On August 6, 1997, the Department filed a two-count Administrative Complaint against Dr. Frankl (agency case number 94-20261). Count I charged Dr. Frankl violated Subsection 460.413(l)(m), Florida Statutes, by failing to keep written chiropractic records justifying the course of treatment of a patient, including patient histories, examination results, test results, X-rays, diagnosis of a disease, condition or injury. Count II charged Dr. Frankl violated Subsection 460.413(l)(v), Florida Statutes, by violating Rule 59N-17.0065(2), Florida Administrative Code, which requires that adequate patient records be legibly maintained, and that initial and follow-up services (daily notes) shall consist of documentation to justify care. For such violations, the Department proposed that one or more of the following penalties be imposed: . . . suspension of . . . [Dr. Frankl's] license, restriction of . . . [Dr. Frankl's] practice, imposition of an administrative fine, issuance of a reprimand, placement of . . . [Dr. Frankl] on probation, and/or any other relief that the Board [of Chiropractic] deems appropriate. Dr. Frankl disputed the allegations of fact contained in the Administrative Complaint, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of an administrative law judge to conduct a formal hearing. The matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 97-4109, and a hearing was duly scheduled for December 17, 1997. Shortly prior to hearing, the Department filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction that was denied by the administrative law judge. Pertinent to this case, the reaction of Dr. Frankl's counsel to the Department's maneuver was memorialized in a letter of November 20, 1997, from Dr. Frankl's counsel to the Department's counsel, as follows: This letter will confirm our telephone conversation of today in which you advised me that the Administrative Law Judge denied the AHCA's Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction. At this point you are contemplating whether or not to voluntarily dismiss Count I and II of the Administrative Complaint. Thereafter, the AHCA may decide to re-charge Dr. Frankl if the Chiropractic Probable Cause Panel finds cause after re-reviewing this case. In the event that the AHCA recommends that this case be re-presented to the Probable Cause Panel for purposes of re-charging him, please be advised that Dr. Frankl will be prosecuting the AHCA and/or the Chiropractic Probable Cause Panel for attorney's fees especially given the potential dismissal of the pending charges against him. Dr. Frankl is willing to waive his claim for attorney's fees if the AHCA and/or the Panel consider immediate dismissal with prejudice of any and all charges arising out of this matter, including the charges alleged in the investigative report. From the beginning of the Panel's investigation of Dr. Frankl almost two years ago, they would have certainly pursued all potential violations against him for purposes of bringing the subsequent Administrative Complaint. Notwithstanding their investigation of all potential violations against Dr. Frankl, as identified in their investigative report, the AHCA chose only to prosecute two of those charges in the form of a two count Administrative Complaint against him. Certainly at that time counsel for the AHCA would have been aware of all of the charges in the investigative report when they filed the two count Complaint against him. By counsel for the AHCA's own actions in prosecuting only these two charges in the Complaint and not the remainder of the charges in the investigative report proves that the remaining allegations in the report are meritless (even though the AHCA would like to now have these same charges re- presented to the Probable Cause Panel for purposes of potentially re-charging him). Dr. Frankl has had to spend considerable monies, time, costs and attorney's fees in defending this matter. The situation is tantamount to a witch hunt by the Panel to find anything to hang over Dr. Frankl's head. Further, the last minute attempts by the AHCA on the eve of trial, presently set for December 17, 1997, to have the Judge relinquish jurisdiction because they realized the counts were meritless in view of their own experts' reports proves that the Panel and/or the State seek to prolong the process and harass Dr. Frankl and thereby deny him his day-in-court to defend these charges and bring this matter to a final resolution. Subsequently, counsel for the Department and counsel for Dr. Frankl reached an agreement whereby counsel for the Department would recommend to the Board of Chiropractic that the investigation against Dr. Frankl be closed. In exchange, Dr. Frankl, through counsel, agreed, provided the investigation was closed, to waive any action for attorney's fees related to the case. The parties agreement was memorialized in a letter, dated December 19, 1997, from Dr. Frankl's counsel to the Department's counsel, as follows: Pursuant to our telephone conversation of Friday, December 19, 1997 this letter will confirm that upon your recommendation to the Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Chiropractic on Monday, December 22, 1997 at 12:30 p.m. that you will be requesting on behalf of AHCA that the instant investigation in regards to Dr. Frankl be closed (given the Voluntary Dismissal)4[.] Dr. Frankl, in turn, agrees to waive any action for attorneys' fees related to this case so long as the Probable Cause Panel elects to close their investigation against Dr. Frankl on December 19, 1997 (sic) [December 22, 1997] at the hearing. A memorandum of the Probable Cause Panel, Board of Chiropractic, for the Probable Cause Panel meeting of December 22, 1997, notes that the panel resolved that "PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NOT FOUND IN THIS CASE." (Respondent's Exhibit 3.) That finding resulted in the entry of a formal "CLOSING ORDER" on January 16, 1998, which provided: THE COMPLAINT: The Complaint alleges that the Subject is in violation of Section 460.413(l)(m), Florida Statutes, for failing to keep written chiropractic records justifying the course of treatment of the patient. THE FACTS: On or about June 18, 1995, Patients A.M. and J.M. voluntarily withdrew their complaint against the Subject; and stated that no violations occurred. On or about November 7, 1995, an Agency expert opined that the Subject's records on Patients A.M. and J.M. contain "adequate initial history and examination records" and "they seem to correspond with dates of services as are noted in billings." On or about April 3, 1996, probable cause was found that a violation of Section 460.413(l)(m), Florida Statutes, occurred. On or about April 4, 1997, another Agency expert opined "that legible written chiropractic records were kept on both patients J.M. and A.M. justifying treatment." THE LAW: Based on the foregoing, although probable cause had previously been found by the panel to exist, in light of the foregoing, the case shall be dismissed. It is, therefore, ORDERED that this matter be, and the same is hereby, DISMISSED. Findings relating to Dr. Frankl's claim for attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes Pertinent to Dr. Frankl's claim for attorney's fees and costs under the provisions of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, the "Florida Equal Access to Justice Act," the Department has, by its response to the application, conceded that the underlying action was initiated by the Department, or its predecessor, that Dr. Frankl prevailed in the underlying case, and that the claim for attorney's fees and costs was timely filed. Accordingly, an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs would be appropriate provided Dr. Frankl can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was a "small business party," as defined by Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes, and the Department fails to establish that its actions were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make an award unjust. Addressing first Dr. Frankl's status, the proof demonstrates that at the time the underlying proceeding was initiated, and at all other times material hereto, Dr. Frankl practiced chiropractic through a professional service corporation, as authorized by Chapter 621, Florida Statutes. The principal (sole) office of the corporation was located in Hollywood, Florida, and at the time the underlying action was initiated by the Department, the corporation had not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than two million dollars. Dr. Frankl was, and continues to be, the sole owner of the corporation. Given the proof, for reasons more fully stated in the Conclusions of Law, Dr. Frankl was not a "small business party," as defined by law, when the underlying proceeding was initiated.5 As for the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and costs claimed, it is observed that, with regard to attorney's fees, Dr. Frankl offered no proof that any attorney time or fee was incurred in the underlying proceeding. Consequently, there is no record basis upon which to assess a reasonable fee. Standard Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990); Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985); and Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association v. Carreras, 633 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). With regard to costs, Dr. Frankl did offer testimony that, at the attorney's request, he provided his attorney in the underlying case with four copies of his office file at a cost of $118. There was, however, no showing as to why the documents were requested (their need), and, therefore, no showing that the costs were necessarily incurred. Fundamentally, copying costs are generally not recoverable, and there was no showing in the instant case that Dr. Frankl's claim met any recognized exception.6 Florida Rules of Court, Statewide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs in Civil Actions. Findings relating to the Department's claim for attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes Pertinent to the Department's claim for attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, the Department claims that there was a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact to support Dr. Frankl's claim or application for an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, the "Florida Equal Access to Justice Act." The gravamen of the Department's position is its contention that, as evidenced by the letter (of December 19, 1997) from Dr. Frankl's counsel, he waived any claim for attorney's fees and costs when the Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Chiropractic closed their investigation (dismissed the case). In contrast, Dr. Frankl contends that there was never an agreement to waive costs. As for the waiver of attorney's fees, Dr. Frankl contended: . . . It is not clear whether the probable cause panel meeting at which the referenced case was reconsidered and closed was held on December 22, 1997. The minutes of the meeting reference both "December 22, 1997" and "Tuesday, December 23, 1997". The tape recording of the referenced reconsideration maintained by the Board of Chiropractic does not reference a date upon which the meeting was held. Dr. Frankl agrees that if the panel voted to close the case on December 22, 1997, he has agreed to waive attorney fees.7 (Emphasis in original.) Addressing first the issue of attorney's fees, the only proof of record reflects that, at the Probable Cause Panel meeting of December 22, 1997, the Panel voted no probable cause or, stated differently, to close the case. Consequently, by the terms of their agreement, Dr. Frankl waived any claim for attorney's fees. Moreover, whether the Panel had voted on December 23, 1997, as opposed to December 22, 1997, to close the case is immaterial or, stated differently, a distinction without a meaningful difference. Consequently, Dr. Frankl's claim for attorney's fees was lacking any justiciable issue of law or fact. While Dr. Frankl's claim lacked merit with regard to his claim for attorney's fees, the same cannot be said for his claim for costs. In this regard, it is observed that while the Department alleged the waiver was for attorney's fees and costs, the parties agreement (as evidenced by the letter of December 19, 1997) states otherwise, and the Department offered no proof that the parties intent was other than that evident from the express language of the parties' agreement. Given the foregoing, it must be concluded that the Department failed to demonstrate that Dr. Frankl's claim was entirely without merit. More importantly, for reasons appearing in the Conclusions of Law, the Department was not, as a matter of law, entitled to attorney's fees under the provisions of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes. Finally, like Dr. Frankl, the Department failed to present competent proof to demonstrate what attorney's fees, if any, were necessarily and reasonably incurred.8
Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case as follows: The Respondent, Clifford Fruithandler, D.C. is and has been at all times material hereto [sic] the Administrative Complaint filed in DOAH Case No. 89-7036, (DPR Case Number 0094598) a chiropractor licensed in the State of Florida having been issued license number CH 0004149. The Respondent's address is 5417 West Atlantic Boulevard, Margate, Florida 33063. The Respondent, in his capacity as a licensed chiropractor caused to be published an advertisement in the North West Medical Guide in Broward County. The advertisement was published on September 16, 1987. The advertisement identified the Respondent's chiropractic practice as "Advanced Chiropractic and Pain Control Center". The Respondent has been subject to discipline by the Board of Chiropractic in DPR Case Number 44292, 40777, and 28914. On or about March, 4, 1988, the Department of Professional Regulation wrote a letter to Respondent which stated "Please be advised that the Department has received a complaint based on the enclosed advertisement. The allegations are: (1) Advance Chiropractic implies that you possess skills and or other attributes which are superior to other chiropractors..." Within one week following the receipt of such letter by Respondent, the Respondent changed the name of the clinic and stopped using the name "Advanced Chiropractic and Pain Control". Prior to the receipt of DPR's letter of March 4, 1988, Respondent had received no complaints from DPR, the Board of Chiropractic, or from any patient regarding the use of such name.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Chiropractic Examiners enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint, issuing a reprimand to the Respondent and assessing a fine against Respondent in the amount $750.00. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of April, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Mone, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Roger W. Calton, Esquire Qualified Legal Representative 30131 Town Center Drive Suite 177 Laguna Niguel, CA. 92677-2040 Patricia Guilford Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the two-count Administrative Complaint, dated April 17, 2007, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (the "Department"), is the state agency charged with enforcing the statutory provisions pertaining to persons holding real estate broker and sales associate's licenses in Florida, pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, except where specifically noted, Respondent Mathew Johnson was a licensed Florida real estate sales associate, having been issued license number SL3149081. Respondent first obtained his real estate associate's license in 2003 and worked under the license of broker Jacqueline Sanderson in Orlando. When he married and his wife became pregnant, Respondent believed that he needed a more steady income than his commission-based employment with Ms. Sanderson provided. Respondent left Ms. Sanderson's employ on good terms and commenced work as the marketing manager for the downtown YMCA in Orlando. While working at the downtown YMCA, Respondent met a member of the YMCA named Tab L. Bish ("Mr. Bish"), a broker who owns First Source, Inc., an Orlando real estate sales company (sometimes referred to as "FSI Realty"). Respondent became friendly with Mr. Bish, and expressed an interest in getting back into the real estate business. Mr. Bish offered Respondent a job at First Source. Respondent had allowed his sales associate's license to lapse while he was working at the YMCA. Respondent informed Mr. Bish of that fact, and told Mr. Bish that he required a salaried position in order to support his young family. Respondent testified that Mr. Bish was happy to hire him as an office manager, because Mr. Bish wanted Respondent to perform a marketing role for First Source similar to that he had performed for the YMCA. Respondent started working at First Source in May 2005, as a salaried office manager. Mr. Bish agreed that he initially hired Respondent as an office manager, but only on the understanding that Respondent would take the necessary steps to reactivate his sales associate's license and commence selling property as soon as possible. Respondent took the licensing course again. Mr. Bish believed that Respondent was taking too long to obtain his license, and cast about for something Respondent could do during the interim. In order to make profitable use of Respondent's time, Mr. Bish began to deal in referral fees from apartment complexes. Certain complexes in the Orlando area would pay a fee to brokers who referred potential renters to the apartments, provided these potential renters actually signed leases. Among the apartment complexes offering referral fees was the Jefferson at Maitland, which in 2005 offered a referral fee of half the first month's rent. Mr. Bish placed Respondent in charge of connecting potential renters with apartment complexes, showing the apartments, following up to determine whether the potential renters signed leases, and submitting invoices for the referral fees. Mr. Bish did not authorize Respondent to collect the payments. Respondent initiated contact with the Jefferson at Maitland and began sending potential renters there. Respondent would submit invoices to the Jefferson at Maitland, payable to First Source, for each referral that resulted in a lease agreement. Respondent estimated that he submitted between 12 and 15 invoices for referral fees to the Jefferson at Maitland during his employment with First Source. Respondent obtained his license and became an active sales associate under Mr. Bish's broker's license on November 16, 2005. Mr. Bish began a process of weaning Respondent away from his salaried position and into working on a full commission basis. Respondent stopped showing apartments under the referral arrangement and began showing properties for sale. The last lease for which First Source was due a referral fee from the Jefferson at Maitland was dated December 5, 2005. In early February 2006, it occurred to Respondent that he had failed to follow up with the Jefferson at Maitland regarding the last group of potential renters to whom he had shown apartments during October and November 2005. Respondent claimed that he "hadn't had the opportunity" to follow up because of the press of his new duties as a sales associate and the intervening holiday season. However, nothing cited by Respondent explained his failure to make a simple phone call to the Jefferson at Maitland to learn whether First Source was owed any referral fees. Respondent finally made the call to the Jefferson at Maitland on February 9, 2006. He spoke to a woman he identified as Jenny Marrero, an employee whom he knew from prior dealings. Ms. Marrero reviewed Respondent's list and found three persons who had signed leases after Respondent showed them apartments: Mike Tebbutt, who signed a one-year lease on October 26, 2005, for which First Source was owed a referral fee of $532.50; Terry Ford, who signed an eight-month lease on November 14, 2005, for which First Source was owed a referral fee of $492.50; and Juan Sepulveda, who signed an eight-month lease on December 2, 2005, for which First Source was owed a referral fee of $415.00. However, there was a problem caused by Respondent's failure to submit invoices for these referral fees in a timely manner. Respondent testified that Ms. Marrero told him that the Jefferson at Maitland had reduced its referral fee from 50 percent to 20 percent of the first month's rent, effective January 2006.2 Ms. Marrero could not promise that these late invoices would be paid according to the 2005 fee structure. According to Respondent, Ms. Marrero suggested that the Jefferson at Maitland's corporate office would be more likely to pay the full amount owed if Respondent did something to "break up" the invoices, making it appear that they were being submitted by different entities. She also suggested that no invoice for a single payee exceed $1,000, because the corporate office would know that amount exceeded any possible fee under the 2006 fee structure. Ms. Marrero made no assurances that her suggestions would yield the entire amount owed for the 2005 invoices, but Respondent figured the worst that could happen would be a reduction in the billings from 50 percent to 20 percent of the first month's rent. On February 9, 2006, Respondent sent a package to the Jefferson at Maitland, via facsimile transmission. Included in the package were three separate invoices for the referral fees owed on behalf of Messrs. Tebbutt, Ford, and Sepulveda. The invoices for Messrs. Tebbutt and Sepulveda stated that they were from "Matt Johnson, FSI Realty," to the Jefferson at Maitland, and set forth the name of the lessee, the lease term, the amount of the "referral placement fee," and stated that the checks should be made payable to "FSI Realty, 1600 North Orange Avenue, Suite 6, Orlando, Florida 32804." The invoice for Mr. Ford stated that it was from "Matt Johnson" to the Jefferson at Maitland. It, too, set forth the name of the lessee, the lease term, and the amount of the referral fee. However, this invoice stated that the check should be made payable to "Matt Johnson, 5421 Halifax Drive, Orlando, Florida 32812." The Halifax Drive location is Respondent's home address. The package sent by Respondent also included an Internal Revenue Service Form W-9, Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and Certification, for Mr. Bish and for Respondent, a copy of Respondent's real estate sales associate license, a copy of Mr. Bish's real estate broker's license, and a copy of First Source, Inc.'s real estate corporation registration. Approximately one month later, in early March 2006, Mr. Bish answered the phone at his office. The caller identifying herself as "Amber" from the Jefferson at Maitland and asked for Respondent, who was on vacation. Mr. Bish asked if he could help. Amber told Mr. Bish that the W-9 form submitted for Respondent had been incorrectly filled out, and that she could not send Respondent a check without the proper information. Mr. Bish told Amber that under no circumstances should she send a check payable to Respondent. He instructed her to make the payment to First Source. Amber said nothing to Mr. Bish about a need to break up the payments or to make sure that a single remittance did not exceed $1,000. Mr. Bish asked Amber to send him copies of the documents that Respondent had submitted to the Jefferson at Maitland. Before those documents arrived, Mr. Bish received a phone call from Respondent, who explained that he submitted the invoice in his own name to ensure that Mr. Bish received the full amount owed by the Jefferson at Maitland. On March 10, 2006, after reviewing the documents he received from the Jefferson at Maitland, Mr. Bish fired Respondent. On March 29, 2006, Mr. Bish filed the complaint that commenced the Department's investigation of this matter.3 At the hearing, Mr. Bish explained that, even if Respondent's story about the need to "break up" the invoices and keep the total below $1,000 were true, the problem could have been easily resolved. Had Mr. Bish known of the situation, he would have instructed the Jefferson at Maitland to make one check payable to him personally as the broker, and a second check payable to First Source, Inc. In any event, there was in fact no problem. By a single check, dated March 15, 2008, First Source received payment from the Jefferson at Maitland in the amount of $1,440, the full sum of the three outstanding invoices from 2005. Respondent testified that he never intended to keep the money from the invoice, and that he would never have submitted it in his own name if not for the conversation with Ms. Marrero. Respondent asserted that if he had received a check, he would have signed it over to Mr. Bish. Respondent and his wife each testified that the family had no great need of $492.50 at the time the invoices were submitted. Respondent's wife is an attorney and was working full time in February 2006, and Respondent was still receiving a salary from First Source. In his capacity as office manager, Respondent had access to the company credit card to purchase supplies. Mr. Bish conducted an internal audit that revealed no suspicious charges. Respondent failed to explain why he did not immediately tell Mr. Bish about the potential fee collection problem as soon as he learned about it from Ms. Marrero, why he instructed the Jefferson at Maitland to send the check to his home address rather than his work address, or why he allowed a month to pass before telling Mr. Bish about the invoices. He denied knowing that Mr. Bish had already learned about the situation from the Jefferson at Maitland's employee. The Department failed to demonstrate that Respondent intended to keep the $492.50 from the invoice made payable to Respondent personally. The facts of the case could lead to the ultimate finding that Respondent was engaged in a scheme to defraud First Source of its referral fee. However, the same facts also may be explained by Respondent's fear that Mr. Bish would learn of his neglect in sending the invoices, and that this neglect could result in a severe reduction of First Source's referral fees. Respondent may have decided to keep quiet about the matter in the hope that the Jefferson at Maitland would ultimately pay the invoices in full, at which time Respondent would explain himself to Mr. Bish with an "all's well that ends well" sigh of relief. Given the testimony at the hearing concerning Respondent's character and reputation for honesty, given that Respondent contemporaneously told the same story to his wife and to Ms. Sanderson that he told to this tribunal, and given that this incident appears anomalous in Respondent's professional dealings, the latter explanation is at least as plausible as the former. Respondent conceded that, as a sales associate, he was not authorized by law to direct the Jefferson at Maitland to make the referral fee check payable to him without the express written authorization of his broker, Mr. Bish. Respondent also conceded that Mr. Bish did not give him written authorization to accept the referral fee payment in his own name. Respondent has not been subject to prior discipline.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: Dismissing Count I of the Administrative Complaint against Respondent; and Suspending Respondent's sales associate's license for a period of one year for the violation established in Count II of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2007.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a pedorthist should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health, Board of Orthotists and Prosthetists, is responsible for licensure of pedorthists in the State of Florida. The Petitioner has applied for licensure in Florida as a pedorthist. In his license application, question 3L states as follows: Have you ever entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to, or been convicted of a crime? You must include all misdemeanors and felonies, even if adjudication as withheld. The Petitioner responded to Question 3L by checking the box marked "Yes." The Application provides as follows: Any "YES" answer must be accompanied by an attached written AFFIDAVIT (a sworn statement before a notary public) explaining in detail the "YES" answer. The affidavit must include all pertinent information such as explanation(s), date(s), address(es), employer(s), physician(s), institution(s), agency(ies), and hospital(s). Additional information may be requested, such as court documents, employment verification, evaluation letters from treating physicians, etc. By letter dated February 28, 1998, accompanying the application, the Petitioner advised the Board that additional documentation would be forthcoming. By letter dated April 10, 1998, the Board requested additional information, including the response to question 3L. By affidavit dated July 13, 1998, the Petitioner states in material part as follows: In late 1982 I became ensnared in a check cashing 'scheme' while I was employed as Claims Manager for a large international moving & storage company which is headquartered in Tampa, FL. There were four other people involved including outside repair people and employees under my supervision. The unlawful activity was in process well before I was employed with the company. The problem was that I allowed it to continue after I found out about it, and since I was the supervisor, I was ultimately held responsible. Naturally, everyone got caught. I received ten years probation, which was served out in Nashville, TN. . . . The Petitioner's affidavit fails to state the full extent of his participation in what he identified as the "scheme." As the Claims Manager for a moving company, the Petitioner was responsible for the payment of property damage claims filed by customers of the company, after customers' possessions were damaged in moving or storage. While reviewing the books, the Petitioner determined that outside repair persons were receiving payments for work not performed and inflated payments for other work which was done. After discussing the situation with one of his employees, the Petitioner determined that company employees were receiving "kickbacks" from the outside repair people. Although the Petitioner suggested he tried to stop the practice, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that he participated in and profited from the operation. The company paid approximately $40,000 to $50,000 monthly in damage claims. The Petitioner was responsible for approval of approximately 90 percent of the claims each month. In March of 1983, the Petitioner was charged with four counts of grand theft in Hillsborough County, Florida, related to his participation in the operation. In May of 1983, the Petitioner was convicted of two counts of second-degree grand theft. A sentence of ten years' probation was imposed, and restitution was ordered. In the two remaining counts, the Petitioner entered a guilty plea and adjudication was withheld. A sentence of five years' probation as imposed and restitution was ordered. The court terminated the Petitioner's probation on June 29, 1998. The Petitioner has not had his civil rights restored. The testimony of Jeffrey Hyman establishes that the practice of pedorthics provides opportunities for the commission of fraud. Insurance companies can be defrauded by billing for devices not provided to patients or by billing for expensive devices while providing less expensive devices to patients. Patients can be exploited by providing services that are unnecessary for which insurance reimbursement is available. A physician and pedorthist, both willing, could enter into a "kickback" scheme similar to that for which the Petitioner has previously been convicted. The Petitioner's prior convictions directly relate to the type of business in which a licensed pedorthist would engage. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner meets the education and training requirements set forth by statute. Section 468.805, Florida Statutes, exempts persons who practiced in Florida for two years between July 1, 1990 and March 1, 1998, from meeting certain education and training requirements. The Petitioner did not practice pedorthics in Florida for two years between July 1, 1990 and March 1, 1998. The education and training requirements applicable to the Petitioner mandate 120 hours of board-approved training and completion of an 80-hour internship of "qualified working experience." The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner has completed the training and education required for licensure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health, Board of Orthotists and Prosthetists, enter a final order denying the application for licensure of Thomas Elmo Howse. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee Ann Gustafson, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Thomas Elmo Howse 15227 Gulf Boulevard Madeira Beach, Florida 33708 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Joe Baker, Executive Director Board of Orthotist and Prosthetists Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Is the Petitioner, Gaylord A. Wood, Jr., entitled to an award of fees and costs from Respondent, R.C. "Rick" Lussy, under section 106.265(6), Florida Statutes (2016),1/ for filing a complaint against Mr. Wood "with knowledge that the complaint contains one or more false allegations or with reckless disregard for whether the complaint contains false allegations of fact material to a violation of this chapter [chapter 106] or chapter 104?" If Mr. Wood is entitled to an award of fees and costs, what is the proper amount of fees and costs to be awarded?
Findings Of Fact On August 24, 2016, Mr. Lussy filed a Complaint Affidavit against Mr. Wood with the Commission. Mr. Lussy’s Complaint Affidavit identified the person against whom the complaint was brought as “Gaylord A. Wood Jr. Esq., Florida [sic] FBN 089465, lawyer for Abraham Skinner Incumbent.” The seven-page affidavit does not allege that Mr. Wood is an elected official or that he has been a candidate for elected office. Mr. Wood is not an elected official. Mr. Wood has never run for elected office. He represented Abraham Skinner in Florida Elections Commission Case No. 16-245. The case arose out of a complaint by Mr. Lussy. Mr. Skinner was the elected property appraiser for Collier County. Mr. Wood was successful in that representation. The Commission dismissed Mr. Lussy’s complaint. Mr. Lussy is a property appraiser. He was going to be an expert witness for the plaintiff in a case where Mr. Wood represented the elected Property Appraiser for Collier County. Mr. Wood deposed Mr. Lussy. Shortly after the deposition, Mr. Lussy’s client dismissed his lawsuit. Mr. Wood also filed a complaint against Mr. Lussy with the Appraisal Institute, questioning Mr. Lussy’s fitness to provide property appraisals. Because of these experiences, Mr. Lussy holds ill will for Mr. Wood. He acted with malice in filing his complaint. This invective and vitriol of statements in the Complaint Affidavit manifest malice. The statements include referring to “empty boasting” by Mr. Wood, stating that Mr. Wood is a “cartel representative lawyer,” accusing Mr. Wood of manipulation and falsification of public records, describing a response to a public records request as malicious, describing Mr. Wood as “a classic corrupt persuader,” charging Mr. Wood with obstruction of justice, and asserting Mr. Wood participated in criminal acts. Mr. Lussy augments these claims with attacks against Mr. Wood’s client accusing him of “womanizing,” sexual harassment, boring public officials, wrongly denying portability of a homestead exemption, and by referring to him as “Dishonest Abe.” When Mr. Lussy filed the complaint against Mr. Wood, he knew that Mr. Wood was not an elected official or candidate for elected office. The letter from the Commission’s Executive Director advising Mr. Lussy that his amended Complaint Affidavit was legally insufficient accurately describes it. The letter states: “While almost impossible to discern, the essential allegation of this complaint, as amended, appears to be that Respondent conspired with Property Appraiser Abraham Skinner to manipulate and falsify public records and obstruct justice.” Mr. Lussy offered no evidence tending to prove the allegations described. Mr. Lussy’s Complaint Affidavit refers to sections 104.051, 104.011, and 104.091, Florida Statutes. Section 104.051 imposes penalties upon any official who violates the election code, performs his or her duty fraudulently or corruptly, or attempts to influence or interfere with an elector voting a ballot. Section 104.011 prohibits providing false information in connection with voting or voter registration. Section 104.091 makes knowingly aiding, abetting, or advising violation of the election code an offense. In this proceeding, Mr. Lussy offered no evidence indicating that he had reason to believe that Mr. Wood was an elected official or a candidate for elected office. His Complaint Affidavit demonstrates that he knew Mr. Wood served as a lawyer for Mr. Skinner. Mr. Wood is not an “official” as the word is used in chapter 104. Mr. Lussy offered no evidence to support the allegations of his Complaint Affidavit. He offered no evidence that Mr. Wood violated sections 104.051, 104.011, or 104.091. Mr. Lussy offered no evidence that would support a finding that he could reasonably think that Mr. Wood violated the prohibitions of those statutes. Mr. Lussy offered only his bare and assertions. Most deal with complaints about property appraisals by Mr. Skinner, responses to requests for documents under Florida’s Public Records Act, and Mr. Skinner’s maintenance of the property tax rolls. Mr. Lussy filed his Complaint Affidavit with reckless disregard for whether the complaint contained false allegations of fact. He also filed it with reckless disregard to the absence of allegations of violations of the election code by Mr. Wood. Mr. Lussy acted with ill will or malice. The statement of attorney time spent on Mr. Wood’s behalf reasonably reports time spent on routine activities such as reviewing orders and drafting motions. The time spent preparing for the hearing is also reasonable. The bulk of Mr. Lussy’s filings in this proceeding and before the Commission were lengthy, difficult to read, confusing, and disorganized. This made reading and evaluating Mr. Lussy’s filings time- consuming. The nature of Mr. Lussy’s filings and the multiple filings related to Mr. Lussy’s misuse of subpoena authority made this proceeding more time consuming than it otherwise would have been. With the exception of the entries discussed below, the time recorded as expended on the tasks and activities is reasonable. The unrebutted testimony of Mark Herron, Esquire, accepted as an expert in attorneys’ fees in administrative proceedings, establishes the reasonableness of the fees claimed. March 16 - .125 – File Amended Petition to Award Fees and Costs (time should be attributed to representation before the Commission not the Division) March 23 - .5 (reduce to .3) – Read Initial Order March 27 – 3.5 (reduce to 1.0) – Read/Dissect Respondent’s Public filing March 27 – 4.0 (reduce to 1.5) – Read/Dissect Counterclaim April 3 – 6.5 (reduce to 2.0) – Read/Dissect Lussy Emergency Answer to Scheduling Order Mr. Herron testified that the .5 hours spent on April 24 to draft and file the witness and exhibit list should be increased to 1.0 hours. The proposal is not accepted. First, the witness and exhibit list was elementary and should have been simple to prepare, as apparently it was. Second, the statute provides for award of fees incurred. The proposed increase of .5 hours does not represent a fee incurred. The hearing in this matter lasted four hours. The time was not included in the itemized statement filed before the hearing for obvious reasons. The time was, however, spent and is a reasonable amount of time for the hearing. Four hours are added to the time used to calculate attorney’s fees. Mr. Wood seeks payment for nine hours of Mr. Woolsey’s time identified as “drive time.” Florida’s Statewide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs in Civil Actions, III(D)1, identifies attorney travel time as a litigation cost that should not be recovered. The nine hours are not included in the hours for which attorney’s fees are awarded. Mr. Lussy offered no evidence about what would be a reasonable number of hours for an attorney to work to represent Mr. Wood in the proceeding before the Commission or the proceeding at the Division. He also offered no evidence about what a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney would be. The reasonable hourly rate in this jurisdiction for proceedings before administrative agencies and the Division ranges between $250.00 to $400.00 per hour, depending on the lawyer’s degree of expertise. Mr. Woolsey is an experienced lawyer. However, he has no litigation or administrative law expertise. Handling this case also did not interfere with Mr. Woolsey’s ability to attract or retain other clients. The representation was not unduly time-consuming or difficult. Mr. Woolsey’s normal hourly rate for public officials is $200.00 per hour. His normal hourly rate for private clients is $350.00. Awarding fees based on a rate of $250.00 per hour is reasonable in this matter. The reasonable time spent on proceedings before the Commission is 8.025 hours. The reasonable time spent on proceedings before the Division is 35.425 hours. The total time reasonably spent for representation of Mr. Wood in this proceeding is 43.45 hours. The total number of hours do not reconcile with the totals shown in Petitioner’s Amended Itemized Statement of Costs and Reasonable Attorney’s Fees because the itemized statement contains mathematical errors. Mr. Wood’s Proposed Recommended Order seeks payment of costs in this matter. He, however, did not offer evidence of costs at the hearing. He only provided information about costs in a post-hearing statement filed June 16, 2017. The amount of reasonable attorney’s fees for Mr. Woolsey’s representation of Mr. Wood in this proceeding is $10,862.50.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter an Order awarding Petitioner Gaylord A. Wood, Jr., attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,862.50 against Respondent, R.C. “Rick” Lussy. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2017.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a certificate of need should be deemed withdrawn from further review and consideration for the reasons stated in the Agency for Health Care Administration's November 12, 1997, letter to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a division of Jewish Family Service of Broward County, which operates under the umbrella of the Jewish Federation of Broward County. On August 1, 1997, Petitioner submitted to the Agency a letter indicating its intent to seek a certificate of need authorizing the establishment of a Medicare-certified home health agency in Broward County. By letter dated August 27, 1997, the Agency advised Petitioner that Petitioner's letter of intent "had been accepted . . . for submission of an application in the upcoming review cycle" and that the application filing deadline was September 24, 1997. In its letter, the Agency provided the following additional advisement: The application filing fee is $5,000.00 plus 0.015 times the total project cost up to a maximum fee of $22,000.00. The minimum fee for projects with no capital expenditure is now $5,000.00. The non-refundable filing fee should be submitted with the application on or before the application due date listed above [September 24, 1997]. Petitioner filed its application for a certificate of need on September 24, 1997. The application indicated that the "project cost subject to fee" (Schedule 1, Line 51, which excludes the base application filing fee of $5,000.00) would be $44,150.00. Accompanying Petitioner's application, among other things, was a check in the amount of $5,000.00 and an audited financial statement of Jewish Family Service of Broward County covering the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995. No other audited financial statements were provided. By letter dated October 9, 1997 (Agency's omissions letter), the Agency advised Petitioner that Petitioner had submitted neither the "appropriate [filing] fee," nor the audited financial statement(s), "needed to implement formal review" of Petitioner's application, and it requested that Petitioner cure these deficiencies by providing the appropriate fee and by furnishing "audited financial statements of the applicant's most recent complete fiscal year of operation," or, "[i]f the most recent fiscal year ended within 120 days prior to the application filing deadline and the audited financial statements [we]re not yet available, [of] the prior fiscal year." In its omissions letter, the Agency issued Petitioner the following warning: Section 408.039, (1992 Supplement to Florida Statutes), requires that you file a response to the attached omissions with the agency and the appropriate health council by November 10, 1997. Failure to file your written response to this office and the appropriate local health council by 5 p.m. on that date will result in your application being deemed withdrawn from consideration, pursuant to Rule 59C-1.010, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner received the Agency's omissions letter on October 14, 1997. Petitioner submitted its response to the Agency's omissions letter on November 10, 1997. It provided the Agency with a check in the amount of $425.00 and financial statements and reports (including a profit and loss statement covering the period starting October 1996 and ending September 1997) that were not audited. In a cover letter, Petitioner explained that, "[a]t this time, there is no complete financial audit for Jewish Family Home Care, since its first fiscal year just ended on September 30, 1997." On November 12, 1997, the Agency sent a letter to Petitioner advising that, "[b]ecause of [Petitioner's] failure to submit the correct CON filing fee in accordance with Chapter 59C- 1.008(3)(b)2., Florida Administrative Code and an audited financial statement of the applicant in accordance with Chapter 59C-1.008(5)(c)1.-3., Florida Administrative Code, and Section 408.037(1)(c), Florida Statutes, [Petitioner's] application [would be] deemed incomplete and withdrawn from further review." Petitioner thereafter requested an administrative hearing on the matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order taking the action proposed in its November 12, 1997, letter to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1998.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner demonstrated that she was terminated from employment by Respondent as the result of an unlawful employment practice based on her race, or as retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to a practice which is an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a provider of health-care services that receives funding from the West Volusia Hospital Authority (WVHA). Respondent operates health clinics in Pierson, DeLand, and Deltona, Florida. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a Certified Medical Assistant on September 25, 2009. After a period of time in Respondent’s Pierson office, Petitioner was transferred to Respondent’s DeLand office. Petitioner’s duties included those as a referral clerk. In that capacity, Petitioner arranged, scheduled, and coordinated referrals from Respondent’s medical providers to outside physicians and laboratories. Petitioner also performed blood-draws, Pap smears, and related services. Petitioner was frequently behind in her referrals. Petitioner sought assistance with her referrals. Taken in the light most favorable to Petitioner, an employee of Respondent with some apparent supervisory authority denied her requests, and advised other employees that they were not to assist Petitioner in catching up. In October 2010, Petitioner was assigned to Respondent’s newly created Emergency Room Diversion (ERD) program. That assignment caused a change in Petitioner’s shift from the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. shift, to the 12:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. shift. She was returned to her normal day shift in mid-November. The disruption in her standard shift caused Petitioner to fall further behind in her referrals. To minimize the problem, nurses began to make referrals for their doctors when they had the time. On November 19, 2010, Petitioner called Juanita McNeil, an elected commissioner of the WVHA, to discuss what Petitioner perceived to be sub-standard patient care that, in some cases, related to referrals that were not being timely completed, and for which Petitioner was receiving no assistance. Petitioner asked Ms. McNeil to keep their conversation confidential because she feared that she would be terminated for going outside of the chain of command. Later in the day on November 19, 2010, Petitioner was presented with a separation notice by which she was terminated from employment. The separation notice listed four reasons for her termination. The reasons were “employee not doing job in a timely manner, being rude with patients, being rude with other employees, [and] insubordination (calling the WVHA) instead of talking with appropriate supervisors.” During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that “100% of the reason that I was fired is because of me calling the WVHA.” Upon follow up inquiry, Petitioner reiterated that she was terminated for insubordination in bypassing her supervisors to contact a WVHA commissioner, and that reason formed the basis for her complaint that she had been the subject of discrimination or retaliation. Petitioner knew of no other employee that ever communicated directly with a WVHA commissioner, or that ever escaped disciplinary sanctions for having done so. Thus, there was no comparator upon which to measure whether Petitioner was treated differently under like circumstances as a result of her race. Petitioner’s admission of the basis for her termination is dispositive of this case. Being terminated for insubordination, in the absence of evidence that persons outside of her protected class were treated differently, is not related to Petitioner’s race. Petitioner’s admission demonstrates that her claim is not founded on an unlawful employment practice based on her race, or retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to a practice which is an unlawful employment practice. Based on Petitioner’s admission, the undersigned concluded that there was no legal basis upon which relief could be ordered under the Florida Civil Rights Act. Thus, the final hearing was adjourned.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 460.413(1)(c), Florida Statutes; and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Joseph Forlizzo, is, and has been at all times material hereto, a chiropractor licensed in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CH-0003278. Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Chiropractic, is the state agency that licenses and has regulatory jurisdiction of chiropractors. Section 20.43, Florida Statutes; Chapter 455, Part II, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 460, Florida Statutes. On September 3, 1996, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Case No. 95-132-CR-T-24(E), Respondent was convicted of conspiracy to collect an extension of credit by extortionate means as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 891, from Michael Muzio and Wesley Earl Ball by express and implicit threats and acts of violence and other criminal means to cause harm to the person, property, and reputation of said Michael Muzio and Wesley Earl Ball. The conspiracy to commit extortion referred to in the conviction involved the contemplated use of actual or threatened force or violence against the person of another. The crime of which the Respondent was convicted, conspiracy to collect an extension of credit by extortionate means, is a felony. As a result of the subject conviction, Respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 51 months followed by supervised release for a term of 36 months and ordered to pay restitution of $100,000 to Michael Muzio. The subject conviction has not been overturned or vacated on appeal. Respondent was a co-owner in a business known as American Mobile Imaging (AMI) with Michael Muzio and others. AMI was in the business of providing medical testing or diagnostic services. The medical testing or diagnostic services provided by AMI included the use of a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) mobile unit. Chiropractic is a healing art. Dr. Butler's credible testimony was that, in his expert opinion, the practice of chiropractic has a foremost and formidable requirement for mental fitness and emotional stability on the part of practitioners. Moreover, Dr. Butler's credible testimony was that the crime of which Joseph Forlizzo was convicted shows a callous disregard for and lack of respect for human life and that respect for human life is the entire premise of health care providers. The crime of which Respondent was convicted is directly related to the practice of chiropractic medicine.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Chiropractic Medicine, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Joseph Forlizzo, is guilty of conduct described in Section 460.413(1)(c), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and revoking Respondent's license to practice as a chiropractic physician. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James A.G. Davey, Jr., Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Timothy E. Leahy, Esquire Leahy and Associates, P.A. 535 Central Avenue, Suite 300 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Eric G. Walker, Executive Director Department of Health Board of Chiropractic 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast BIN A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast BIN A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
