The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a Limited Surety Agent should be suspended or revoked for alleged violations of Section 648.45, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated August 14, 1978. Notice of Hearing was mailed to the Respondent at his last address of record with Petitioner on October 26, 1978, by the Division of Administrative Hearings. The record reflects that the Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner had been received by the Respondent at that address by virtue of the fact that he had filed an answer to the complaint on September 8, 1978. Neither Respondent nor any representative appeared at the place of hearing at the designated time. Accordingly, the matter was tried as an uncontested proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Ronald John Anderson, North Miami Florida, is currently licensed as a limited surety agent with Petitioner and was so licensed to represent the Stuyvesant Insurance Company during the period October 1 to September 30, 1977. A limited surety agent licensed under Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, is a bail bondsman whose authority extends only to a power of attorney to execute or countersign bail bonds in connection with judicial proceedings. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Testimony of Stewart) On December 15, 1976, Respondent purportedly acting on behalf of the Stuyvesant Insurance Company, New York City, New York, posted a $1,000 immigration bond on behalf of Brutus Cadet, an alien of Haitian nationality, with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice, at Miami, Florida. The bond was conditioned for the delivery of an alien; however, the power of attorney executed by Respondent, power no. 582936, recited on its face that the said power of attorney authorized Respondent to execute a criminal bail bond on behalf of the said company. In like manner, on March 24, 1977, Respondent attached his power of attorney no. 603734, for Perelus Charles, a Haitian national, on a $2,500 immigration bond, which was posted with the United States Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service in Miami, Florida. Both bonds were approved and accepted by the district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4, Supplemented by Petitioner's Exhibit 5) Respondent's contract with the Stuyvesant Insurance Company appointed Respondent as executing agent for the company in Florida for the soliciting and writing of bail bonds, and provided in paragraph 13 thereof that such excuting agent could excute and renew only this type of bond. In fact, separate power of attorney forms were issued by the Stuyvesant Insurance Company for criminal bail bonds and immigration bonds. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 6) The only persons authorized to write immigration bonds in Florida are general lines insurance agents licensed under Chapter 626, F.S. (Testimony of Stewart) Although Respondent did not appear at the hearing, he filed an answer in this cause wherein he admitted executing the bonds in question but stated that he was not aware that a bail bondsman could not execute immigration bonds and that it was a common practice by all Dade and Broward County bondsmen. The answer further recited that in order to preclude the surrender of the principals to the custody of the Immigration Service, Respondent obtained new bonds from another Dade County bondsman and paid the premiums himself. The facts alleged in Respondent's answer are considered admissions against interest properly cognizable in this proceeding. (Case Pleadings )
Recommendation That an administrative penalty of $100 be imposed against Respondent and that he be administered a public reprimand, pursuant to Section 648.52(1), Florida Statutes, for the aforesaid actions falling within the purview of Section 648.45 (1)(j), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. T. Taylor, Esquire Department of Insurance Room 428A - Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Ronald John Anderson 2170 NE 122nd Road North Miami, Florida 33181
The Issue Whether the Respondent, a licensed limited surety (bail bond) agent, should be disciplined on charges stated in an Amended Administrative Complaint, DFS case 214761-17-AG; and, if so, the appropriate discipline.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent holds Florida limited surety (bail bond) agent license P166880. She has held the license since 2009 and has not been disciplined for any violations before this case. The Respondent entered into a contract with Braswell Surety Services, Inc. (Braswell Surety), the Florida managing general agent for Lexington on March 9, 2011, and wrote bail bonds for Lexington through mid-November 2016. The Respondent was the owner and primary bail bond agent for 1st Premier Bail Bonds (1st Premier), and conducted her business with Braswell Surety and Lexington through 1st Premier. Under the Respondent’s contract with Braswell Surety and Lexington, premiums for the Lexington bail bonds written by the Respondent were to be turned over to Lexington promptly. The Respondent also was obligated to submit a monthly execution report to Braswell Surety. The execution reports were supposed to detail all bonds executed by the Respondent’s company since the last report and include a remittance equal to 20 percent of the total amount of premium written since the last report. The Respondent also was obligated to submit a monthly discharge report to Braswell Surety. The discharge reports were supposed to list all bonds executed by the Respondent’s company that had been discharged by the court since the previous discharge report, along with appropriate documentation evidencing the discharges. The Respondent also was obligated to remit to Braswell Surety, monthly, 10 percent of the total amount of premiums written since the last execution report. This amount was to be held or invested and maintained by Braswell Surety as the Respondent’s “build-up funds” (BUF) account. The purpose of the BUF account was to hold Lexington and Braswell Surety harmless from any loss, cost or expenses or for the payment of losses resulting from bail bonds written by the Respondent’s company. Braswell Surety and Lexington could use money from the BUF account for those purposes at their discretion and could require money used for that purpose to be replaced by the Respondent’s company if Braswell Surety and Lexington deemed the account to be inadequate to provide full protection to them. In November 2016, it came to Braswell Surety’s attention that the Respondent’s company cashed a $9,690 check made out to 1st Premier by the court clerk in reimbursement for a forfeiture that had been remitted. The Respondent testified that the check was cashed before it was noticed that it should not have been made out to the Respondent’s company. Braswell Surety demanded that the Respondent’s company give Braswell Surety or Lexington a check in that amount, which was done. In November 2016, it also came to Braswell Surety’s attention that the Respondent’s company had several other forfeitures paid by Lexington. Braswell Surety sent the Respondent a list of them. The Respondent investigated and determined that many had been set aside and others were expected to be set aside. One still outstanding was in the amount of $35,000. In a letter dated November 9, 2016, the Respondent promised to resolve all issues involving forfeitures by the end of 2017. In her letter, the Respondent complained: “Cutting me off isn’t helping anyone. I’m trying to have you and Lexington all caught up by the end of 2017. I’m working hard to make this right. It’s all about money. I can’t pay if I can’t make money. Please reply and let me know how we can resolve our differences without taking this to a level that can’t resolve anything for anybody.” In November 2016, it also came to Braswell Surety’s attention that the Respondent was not reporting on its inventory of Lexington powers of attorney (powers) sent to the Respondent’s company at the end of 2014 for use in 2015 and at the end of 2015 for use in 2016. (Powers are essentially blank bond forms that can be used for one year.) Only one 2015 power was reported by the Respondent’s company as having been used. None of the other powers for 2015 and 2016 were reported by the Respondent’s company. Braswell Surety and Lexington had information from other sources about a few powers that were used in 2015 and 2016, but it was unknown in late 2016 whether any of the numerous other unreported powers were used or not, or if premiums were owed. By the end of November, Braswell Surety and Lexington decided not to provide the Respondent with powers for 2017. Braswell Surety also reported to the Petitioner that the Respondent owed premiums and forfeitures, and the Petitioner initiated an investigation. On January 9, 2017, Braswell Surety sent the Respondent a letter with an inventory report on the information Braswell Surety and Lexington had about the Respondent’s 2015 and 2016 powers. The letter acknowledged that the Respondent had no 2017 Lexington powers and was not authorized to write any more Lexington bonds. However, the letter stated, the Respondent’s appointment was not terminated, and the Respondent was expected to report all bonds in her inventory and pay all premiums owed to Lexington. During January 2017, the Respondent and Braswell Surety determined that the Respondent owed $14,906 in premiums. There was no evidence as to when any of the premiums owed became due and payable. The evidence was clear and convincing that all or almost all of the $14,906 was due and payable between June and November 2016, even if they might have first become due and payable before June 2016. However, the Petitioner declined to argue that this evidence proved the charges in Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint. To the contrary, the Petitioner conceded in its PRO that those charges were not proven. An attorney for Lexington wrote the Respondent a letter on January 18, 2017, claiming that the Respondent still owed Lexington for forfeitures. The evidence did not prove whether forfeitures were still owed at that time. At some point in time, the Respondent agreed to work for Shamrock Bail Bonds (Shamrock). Shamrock was owned by a bail bondsman named Brendan O’Neal, who was its main agent. The Respondent agreed to act as a sub-agent for Shamrock. Under this arrangement, between the Respondent and Mr. O’Neal, Mr. O’Neal was primarily responsible for any bail bonds written by the Respondent for Shamrock. In order to write bail bonds for Shamrock as a sub- agent, the Respondent had to be appointed as a limited surety agent. On January 20, 2017, the Respondent filled out Form DFS- H2-1544 to be appointed by Palmetto Surety Corporation. The form is mandated and controlled by the Petitioner and is adopted by rule. See § 648.382(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2016)1/; Fla. Admin. Code R. 69B-221.155(3) (2016).2/ In signing the form, the Respondent swore under oath that she owed no premiums to any insurer. This was untrue, as she did not pay Lexington the $14,906 she owed in premiums until February 20, 2017. The signed form was filed with the Petitioner, as required by statute. See § 648.382(1), (2), Fla. Stat. The Respondent claims not to have known that she was swearing falsely when she signed the Form DFS-H2-1544 because she did not read the form carefully and did not think a sub-agent would be required to swear to owing no premium to any insurer. She claims she would have waited to sign the form until after paying the premium she owed to Lexington if she knew what the form said. However, the evidence was clear that Braswell Surety attempted to motivate the Respondent to pay the premiums owed to Lexington by warning that she could not write bonds for any other insurer until the debt to Lexington was paid. The Respondent also admitted that she knew this from the time she learned it in “bond school” prior to licensure as a bail bondsman and knew it from experience ever since. Her testimony that her status as a sub-agent of Mr. O’Neal confused her is not credible. The evidence, taken as a whole, was clear and convincing that the Respondent intended to misrepresent when she signed the form. Her misrepresentation was relied on by Palmetto Surety and Shamrock.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint, finding the Respondent guilty under Count II, and suspending her licenses and appointments for one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 2018.
The Issue Did Respondent plead nolo contendere to aggravated stalking, a felony, in violation of Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, so as to be subject to discipline by the Department of Insurance pursuant to Sections 648.45(1); 648.45(2)(a), (e), (j), (k); 648.45(3)(a), (c), and/or (e), and if so, what penalties may be imposed, pursuant to Sections 648.45, 648.46, 648.49, 648.50, , and/or 648.53, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was licensed in the State of Florida by Petitioner Agency as a limited surety agent, License No. 265986204. At the time of formal hearing, Respondent's license was suspended, pursuant to a Second Amended Emergency Order of Suspension entered by the Agency on March 11, 1997. Certified Court documents reveal that on February 10, 1997, Lesley Charles Corbin entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to the charge of "aggravated stalking," in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in Case No. 96-9760-CF. The particulars of the charge pled to allege that Respondent "did knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow or harass . . . [name] . . . after an injunction for protection against repeat violence pursuant to Section 784.046, to-wit: 92-1772-DV, contrary to the provisions of Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes." The Court documents also reveal repetitive previous similar or related criminal charges against Respondent. Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, constitutes a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in Sections 775.082, 775.083, or 775.084, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1996). Under the plea bargain, Count I, alleging aggravated assault pursuant to Section 784.021, Florida Statutes, was dropped, and adjudication was withheld on Respondent's nolo contendere plea to Count II. Respondent was required to enter into nine months of community control followed by one year probation with special conditions to protect the person he had stalked. Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes, provides that third degree felonies may be punished by up to 5 years' imprisonment. Section 775.083(1)(c) provides for third degree felonies to be punished by up to a $5,000 fine. Section 775.084(1)(c)1.b. applies to habitual felony offenders/stalkers and is not relevant here. The foregoing establishes prima facie facts in evidence, which facts Respondent did not overcome. Ms. Sarah Burt is the Bail Bond Coordinator for Petitioner Department of Insurance. In that capacity, she is responsible for administrative coordination of all bail bond related matters for the Agency. She is knowledgeable of the practices and procedures of the Agency regarding bail bondsmen and limited surety agency licensure and discipline, pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. Based on her education, training, experience, and actual knowledge, Ms. Burt related that a plea of nolo contendere to a felony charge has always resulted in the Agency denying a licensure application or revoking of an existing license. To the best of Ms. Burt's knowledge and belief, this has been the Agency's consistent procedure in all similar circumstances. She did not know of any licensee who had retained his or her licenses after the Agency became aware the licensee had pled nolo contendere to a felony.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 648.45(2)(a) and (k), and 648.45(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and revoking his license. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of December, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dick E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 R. Cash Barlow, Esquire Post Office Box 492 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent.
Findings Of Fact On July 22, 2002, Petitioner signed, under penalty of perjury, a statement declaring that his application for a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent was true. In the application, Petitioner answered "no" to the question: Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory, or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered?" By Information dated February 28, 1971, the State of Florida charged Respondent with "unlawfully and feloniously break[ing] and enter[ing]" into a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony--namely, grand larceny. By Order entered October 15, 1971, the court acknowledged that Respondent had entered a plea of guilty to "breaking and entering with intent to commit a misd[demeanor]," withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Petitioner on three years' probation. By Order entered August 15, 1974, the court terminated Petitioner's probation, noting that he had successfully completed it.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Santiago Lavan-dera Law Office of Pena and Lavan-dera 7950 Northwest 155th Street, Suite 201 Miami Lakes, Florida 33016 Eduardo Federico Godoy 969 East 29th Street Hialeah, Florida 33013 Ladasiah Jackson Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of unlawfully employing a felon in the conduct of the bail bond business, in violation of Sections 648.44(8)(b) and 648.45(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 4-221.001, Florida Administrative Code. If so, an additional issue is what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed limited surety agent, holding license number A025071. At all material times, Respondent has been the president and owner of Dolly Bolding Bail Bonds, Inc. (Dolly Bolding), which is located at 108 South Armenia Avenue in Tampa. In July 1999, Carver Taitt visited the office of Dolly Bolding to obtain a bail bond for his son, who had been arrested on drug charges. The judge had set bond at $20,000, so the bail bond premium was $2000. Mr. Taitt spoke with Respondent and said that he did not have the entire $2000; he had only $1000. Respondent declined to extend Mr. Taitt credit for the $1000 balance. Mr. Taitt then offered $1500, and Respondent agreed to allow Mr. Taitt to owe Dolly Bolding the remaining $500. At this time, Mr. Taitt saw Frank Cueto, Sr., also known as “Paunch,” in the office of Dolly Bolding. Mr. Taitt also told Mr. Cueto that Mr. Taitt would pay the remaining $500. Mr. Taitt had obtained bonds in the past five years from Dolly Bolding. During this time, he had often seen Respondent and Mr. Cueto in the office, and Mr. Taitt was acquainted with both of them from these past purchases of bonds. Mr. Cueto contacted Mr. Taitt several times and asked him to pay the remaining $500. At one point, Mr. Cueto threatened that Dolly Bolding would revoke the bond if Mr. Taitt did not immediately pay the remaining $500, especially because he was about to take a trip whose cost would approximate the outstanding balance. Mr. Taitt paid the $500 on the day prior to his son’s court appearance. When he complained to Mr. Cueto that he should have trusted Mr. Taitt based on their past relationship, Mr. Cueto replied that money is money. Mr. Taitt’s son missed his court appearance, and the judge ordered the forfeiture of the bond. The judge later entered an order reinstating bail, but this order did not reinstate the obligation previously undertaken under the bond by Dolly Bonding or its principal. Consequently, Mr. Taitt telephoned Dolly Bonding and requested a reissuance of the bond. Told that Respondent was unavailable, Mr. Taitt spoke with Mr. Cueto. Mr. Cueto told Mr. Taitt that no surety company would agree to reissue the bond. In the meantime, the assistant public defender obtained an order from the judge for the administrative release of Mr. Taitt’s son. By this means, the jail released Mr. Taitt’s son immediately without posting any bond. The facts contained in paragraphs 4-8 above are derived from Mr. Taitt’s testimony. This constitutes some, but not all, of Mr. Taitt’s testimony. The Administrative Law Judge has not credited much of the remainder of the testimony, including, most significantly, Mr. Taitt’s testimony that Mr. Cueto was always in the office of Dolly Bolding and that he seemed to run the bonding business. Mr. Taitt was angered by Mr. Cueto’s involvement in this transaction. Much of his uncredited testimony lacked the detail of his credited testimony. As for the credited testimony, Respondent, who was not always present in the office, was not able to rebut the more-detailed portion of Mr. Taitt’s description of Mr. Cueto’s handling of the transaction. Mr. Cueto did not testify, although he is engaged to be married to Respondent and lives with her. However, Respondent’s testimony is credited over Mr. Taitt’s vague, conclusory testimony as to the business relationship between Respondent and Mr. Cueto. Thus, consistent with Respondent’s testimony, the Administrative Law Judge finds that Mr. Cueto has not exercised any dominion over Dolly Bolding or Respondent. Respondent is an articulate, intelligent individual, who is a college graduate. She makes all bonding decisions for Dolly Bolding. Mr. Cueto is not an employee, officer, or shareholder of Dolly Bolding, and Respondent is not an employee, officer, or shareholder in any company owned by Mr. Cueto. He maintains an office in the same building as Dolly Bolding’s office, and he is present in the Dolly Bolding office on a frequent basis. At least in the case of the bond for Mr. Taitt’s son, Mr. Cueto has involved himself to some extent in Respondent’s bonding business. It is entirely possible that Mr. Cueto’s involvement in this bonding transaction is isolated, as he may have been inclined to involve himself to an unusual degree in a bonding matter due to the number of years that Mr. Cueto has known Mr. Taitt. It is even more likely that Mr. Cueto’s involvement in this bonding transaction was without the knowledge of Respondent. Mr. Cueto is a felon. He was convicted in 1994 of unlawful engaging in the bail bond business and misleading advertising. Mr. Cueto was formerly a licensed limited surety agent, but Petitioner suspended his license sometime ago. Respondent was at all times aware of these aspects of Mr. Cueto's background. In November 1991, Petitioner commenced an administrative proceeding against Respondent, as a licensed limited surety agent, for allowing an unlicensed person to participate in the bail bond business. By Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order and Consent Order, both signed in April 1992, Respondent agreed, and was ordered, to pay an administrative fine of $2000.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance dismiss the Second Amended Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Commissioner of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Anoush A. Arakalian Division of Legal Services Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph R. Fritz Joseph R. Fritz, P.A. 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Respondent has been charged by Administrative Complaint with violations of several provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. All of the violations charged relate to allegations that the Respondent failed to return certain personal property received by the Respondent as collateral security on a surety bond.
Findings Of Fact Facts admitted by all parties The Respondent, Sergio Roque, Jr., is currently licensed in this state as a limited surety agent. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referred to in the Administrative Complaint in this matter, the Respondent was licensed in this state as a limited surety agency. On or about July 19, 1990, Respondent, while acting in his capacity as a limited surety agent, did, as agent for Amwest Surety Insurance Company, post a $100,000 general surety appearance bond, power number X00-0-00000331, to obtain the release of defendant Domingo Arrechea from the Dade County Jail. In conjunction with the posting of the aforementioned surety bond, Respondent did on or about July 19, 1990, receive $10,000, which represented the premium payment for said surety bond. Respondent did in conjunction with the posting of said bond receive from indemnitor Lorraine DeVico a diamond engagement ring, a Rolex watch, and the title to a 1979 Mercedes automobile (ID#11602412149348) as partial collateral security for the aforementioned surety bond. On or about April 3, 1991, Respondent did cause to be surrendered back into custody the defendant Domingo Arrechea, thus terminating all liability for said surety bond. Respondent has failed to return to indemnitor Lorraine DeVico the collateral security described above; namely, the diamond engagement ring, the Rolex watch, and the title to the 1979 Mercedes automobile. Additional facts proved at hearing In addition to the collateral described above, the Respondent also received as collateral from the defendant Arrechea, and from the defendant's wife, a conditional mortgage on a condominium. In addition to the collateral described above, the Respondent also received as collateral from "Mike Farina" a conditional mortgage on real estate owned by Mike Farina. Mike Farina was a friend of the defendant Arrechea. "Mike Farina" later turned out to be a fictitious name. Lorraine DeVico was a very close friend of the defendant Arrechea. The Rolex watch Ms. DeVico put up as part of the collateral for Arrechea's bond was a watch that had been given to her by her father. Shortly after Ms. DeVico put the watch up for collateral, her father began to inquire as to the whereabouts of the watch. Because she felt that her father would disapprove of what she had done, and because her father was the source of most of her wealth, Ms. DeVico told several lies to her father about the whereabouts of the watch. As a result of continuing inquiries by her father, Ms. DeVico wanted her watch back and no longer wanted to be responsible under the indemnity agreement she had signed. Towards the beginning of February 1991, Ms. DeVico began to call the Respondent to advise that she was frightened that the defendant Arrechea was considering jumping bond. The Respondent received numerous calls from Ms. DeVico requesting return of her collateral and requesting to be off the indemnity agreement. Consequently, the Respondent hired MV Investigations on February 16, 1991, to locate the defendant Arrechea. On March 27, 1991, Ms. DeVico advised the Respondent that the defendant Arrechea was not answering his digital pager and that his telephone had been disconnected. She advised the Respondent that she sent her employee to look for Arrechea but could not find him. She asked the Respondent to pick up the defendant Arrechea and get her off the bond, agreeing to pay all the expenses. On April 1, 1991, Ms. DeVico again asked the Respondent to pick up the defendant Arrechea and again agreed that she would pay the costs associated with the pick-up. On April 3, 1991, the investigators hired by the Respondent located and picked up defendant Arrechea and surrendered him back to the Dade County Jail. The Respondent returned the collateral deposited by Mr. Farina and by the defendant Arrechea and his wife. After having the defendant Arrechea picked up and surrendered, the Respondent called Ms. DeVico to give her the information and advise her of the pick-up costs. Ms. DeVico verbally refused to pay any pick-up costs. On April 14, 1991, the Respondent sent by certified mail to Ms. DeVico a notice under Section 648.442, Florida Statutes, notifying her that he would be selling her collateral in ten days against his pick-up expenses. The Respondent sold the Rolex watch and diamond ring pledged as collateral by Ms. DeVico after expiration of the ten days. The indemnity agreement signed by Ms. DeVico in conjunction with applying for bail for the defendant Arrechea included the following language: 2. The indemnitor(s) will at all times indemnify and keep indemnified the Company and save harmless the Company from and against any and all claims, demands, liabilities, costs, charges, legal fees, disbursements and expenses of every kind and nature, which the Company shall at any time sustain or incur, and as well from all orders, decrees, judgments and adjudications against the Company by reason or in consequence of having executed such bond or undertaking in behalf of and/or at the instance of the indemnitor(s) (or any of them) and will pay over, reimburse and make good to the Company, its successors and assigns, all sums and amounts of money required to meet every claim, demand, liability, costs, expense, suit, order, decree, payment and/or adjudication against the Company by reason of the execution of such bond or undertaking and any other bonds or undertakings executed in behalf of and/or at the instance of the Indemnitor(s) and before the Company shall be required to pay thereunder. The liability for legal fees and disbursements includes all legal fees and disbursements that the Company may pay or incur in any legal proceedings, including proceedings in which the Company may assert or defend its right to collect or to charge for any legal fees and/or disbursements incurred in earlier proceedings. * * * 7. The Indemnitor(s) agree(s) that the Company may at any time take such steps as it may deem necessary to obtain its release from any and all liability under any of said bonds or undertakings, and it shall not be necessary for the Company to give the Indemnitor(s) notice of any fact or information coming to the Company's notice or knowledge concerning or affecting its rights or liability under any such bond or undertaking, notice of all such being hereby expressly waived; and that the Company may secure and further indemnify itself against loss, damages and/or expenses in connection with any such bond or undertaking in any manner it may think proper including surrender of the defendant (either before or after forfeiture and/or payment) if the Company shall deem the same advisable; and all expenses which the Company may sustain or incur or be put to in obtaining such release or in further securing itself against loss, shall be borne and paid by the Indemnitor(s). In conjunction with applying for bail for the defendant Arrechea, Ms. DeVico also signed a Bail Bond Information Sheet which advised her in bold print that: When all agreements have been fulfilled and bond is discharged, in writing or by the court, and without loss expense on the bond, your full collateral will be returned to you.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaint, and Imposing an administrative penalty consisting of an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00 and a suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of 90 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4378 The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected for two reasons; first, the proposed finding is irrelevant because it is not alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, second, the proposed finding was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: First sentence accepted. Remainder of this paragraph rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 6 through 13: Accepted in substance with some details clarified. Paragraph 14: First sentence accepted. Remainder rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 15: Rejected as constituting procedural details or conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 16: Rejected as constituting statement of position or legal argument, rather than proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 17: First sentence accepted. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as constituting conclusions of law or legal argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 18: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 19 and 20: Accepted COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Martin L. Roth, Esquire Haber & Roth 1370 Northwest 16th Street Miami, Florida 33125 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of a violation of bail bondsmen disciplinary statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bondsman. He operates Freedom Bail Bonds in Orlando, Florida. On May 28, 1988, law enforcement officers of the Orange County Sheriff's Office arrested John P. Moody and placed him in the Orange County jail. Mr. Moody had never previously been arrested. After he was arrested, Mr. Moody contactedRespondent about obtaining a bail bond in order to get out of jail. Respondent agreed to come to the jail and interview Mr. Moody to determine if Freedom Bail Bonds could provide him a bond. When Respondent arrived at the jail on the evening of May 28, he was informed by an officer of the three charges that were pending against Mr. Moody. The bond was $1000 per charge, and the premium was 10% of the bond. Respondent met with Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had any assets to secure the bond. Mr. Moody explained that he had no assets such as a car, cash, or cash equivalent. However, he said that he owned jointly with his mother some land in Orange County. At the conclusion of the interview, Respondent had decided to write the bond. Respondent then learned from the booking officer that another charge had been added. Following a brief conversation between Respondent and Mr. Moody concerning the new charge, Respondent learned from the booking officer that a fifth charge had been added. After another conversation with Mr. Moody, Respondent learned in this manner that a sixth, and final, charge had been added. In all, Mr. Moody was charged with one count of failing to return a hired automobile and five counts of fraudulent bank deposits. Each charge carried a $1000 bond, so Mr. Moody now required a total bond of $6000, which in turn required a total premium of $600. Due to the increased amount of the bond, Respondent informed Mr. Moody that he would have to secure the bond with a mortgage on the property jointly held with his mother. Mr. Moody agreed, but asked Respondent not to contact Mr. Moody's mother immediately. It was the middle of the night, and Mr. Moody's mother is an invalid. Respondent agreed to allow Mr. Moody to contact his mother later and obtain her signature on a mortgage. Because Mr. Moody lacked the funds, a friend, Marion Reed Johnson, agreed to pay the premium. Knowing that Mr. Moody would not be able to obtain that evening his mother's signature to a mortgage, Respondent insisted on some interim security and agreed to accept six $1000 promissory notes from Mr. Johnson. These notes were payable on demand, but, according to their terms, became void if Mr. Moody appeared in court when ordered to do so and discharged all of the obligations of the bail bond. Respondent gave Mr. Johnson receipts for the $600 premium and six $1000 notes as soon as Respondent received these items. At the same time, also on the evening of May 28, Respondent completed a bail bond application and indemnity form, on which Mr. Moody provided certain background information. Mr. Moody and Mr. Johnson also signed indemnifications in favor of the surety. The application form states that the surety: shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. The application form also provides: In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearances, and for reason other than as enumerated below is paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the Surety hereunder, and the Surety shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal, and principal shall have no right to any refund of premium whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the Surety or its Agent. * * * If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. * * * The application and indemnities were signed. Mr. Johnson paid the $600 premium and executed and delivered the six $1000 demand notes. Respondent then caused Freedom Bail Bond to issue the bond. Mr. Moody was released from the jail during the evening of his arrest (actually during the predawn hours of May 29). May 28 was a Saturday. The following Monday, Respondent gave one of his employees a copy of the warranty deed from Mr. Moody's mother to herself and Mr. Moody. Mr. Moody hadgiven a copy of the deed to Respondent during their initial interview in order to allow Respondent to prepare the mortgage that Mr. Moody had agreed to provide. Respondent instructed the employee to use the legal description from the warranty deed to prepare a mortgage and send it to Mr. Moody for execution by his mother and him. The employee did as instructed and promptly mailed the mortgage to Mr. Moody with instructions for execution, witnessing, and notarization. After about a week, Respondent asked the employee if she had received the executed mortgage. She replied that she had not and proceeded to telephone Mr. Moody. When she asked him about the mortgage, Mr. Moody did not express any unwillingness to sign it, but said that he had not received it. Confirming the mailing address, the employee agreed to send him another mortgage and did so on June 6, 1988. Several times after mailing the second mortgage, the employee contacted Mr. Moody and discussed the need to get the document fully executed and delivered to Freedom Bail Bonds. On one occasion, Mr. Moody agreed to return the executed mortgage on June 22. But on the last of these conversations, Mr. Moody informed the employee, for the first time, that he had no intention of providing the mortgage. The employee told Respondent what Mr. Moody had said and returned the file to Respondent for further action. At about the same time that Respondent's officehad sent the mortgage to Mr. Moody the second time, Mr. Moody's sister telephoned Respondent. Estranged from her brother, she was concerned that Mr. Moody, whom she believed had misused funds of their invalid mother in the past, might try to obtain their mother's signature on a mortgage to secure a bond in order to get out of jail. Mr. Moody's sister informed Respondent that her brother was not authorized to obtain their mother's signature on the mortgage. She said that her brother was not to be trusted, had improperly removed money from their mother's trust in the past, and had defaulted on at least one debt so as to require the creditor to lien the jointly held property in order to be repaid. At about the same time, a different employee of Respondent received an anonymous telephone tip that Mr. Moody was about to depart, or had already departed, on a trip to Alabama with another man. The informant described what turned out to be a vehicle owned by Mr. Johnson, with whom Mr. Moody had been living since his release from jail on May 29. Several attempts by Respondent's employees to reach Mr. Moody over the next two to four days were unsuccessful. In fact, Mr. Moody had gone to Alabama, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Orange County Circuit Court. On July 18, 1988, one of Respondent's employees contacted the Clerk of Court's office and learned that Mr. Moody had not qualified for the services of a Public Defender. In addition, the employee had been notified on or about July 6, byreceipt of a notice of hearing on a Determination of Counsel, that Mr. Moody had not been diligent in obtaining counsel. After determining that other Determination of Counsel hearings had been and were being set by the Court, the employee reasonably concluded that Mr. Moody was not diligently trying to obtain counsel or independently resolve the pending criminal matters. The employee communicated this information to Respondent on July 18. Respondent contacted Mr. Moody by telephone on July 18 and asked when he was going to supply the executed mortgage. Mr. Moody responded that he had determined that Respondent did not need the additional security and was not going to provide it. At this point, Respondent concluded that it was likely that Mr. Moody had in fact left the state without permission. Respondent also concluded that Mr. Moody no longer represented an acceptable risk. Respondent thus directed another employee to join him to arrest Mr. Moody and surrender him to the Orange County Sheriff's Office. Respondent and his employee immediately visited Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had left the state. Mr. Moody admitted doing so. Respondent and the employee then arrested Mr. Moody and returned him to jail. Mr. Moody remained in jail for 63 days until he pleaded guilty to the charges. He was sentenced to the time served, placed on probation for four years, and required to makerestitution, which he has done so far in accordance with the schedule. Following his release from jail, Mr. Moody returned to live with Mr. Johnson and gradually repaid him the $600 that he owed him. Although Mr. Moody demanded return of the $600, he never offered any proof of payment to Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson never demanded the return of the money. Respondent has retained the $600 premium. The six $1000 notes were automatically voided when Mr. Moody was arrested on July 18.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399 (904) 488 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney David D. Hershel Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney Alan B. Robinson 56 East Pine Street Orlando, FL 32801
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Barry Stephen Yanks (Yanks), has applied to respondent, Department of Insurance (Department), for examination as a bail bondsman (limited surety agent) pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. By letter dated February 7, 1989, the Department denied Yanks' application. The gravamen of the Department's denial was its contention that on December 9, 1987, Yanks had accepted jewelry as collateral for a bail bond, and that such jewelry had not been timely returned to its owner. As a consequence, the Department concluded that Yanks had acted as a bail bondsman without being licensed as such, and that he lacked the fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business. Yanks filed a timely petition for formal hearing to contest the Department's action. At hearing, the proof failed to demonstrate that Yanks had acted inappropriately as contended by the Department. Rather, the proof demonstrated that when Yanks accepted jewelry from Corrine Hough on December 9, 1987, as collateral for a bail bond to be written on her son, that he was acting on behalf of the attorney for American Bankers Insurance Company (American), the proposed surety. Under the arrangements made with Ms. Hough, the collateral was to be held by the attorney for American because she did not have confidence in the bondsman who was to write the bond, one Nestor Tabares, to safeguard her property. Accordingly, at the request of American's attorney, Yanks secured the collateral from Ms. Hough, gave her a receipt, and delivered the jewelry back to the attorney. After delivery of the jewelry to the attorney, Yanks had no further contact with or control over it. While there was a delay of some 10 months following the termination of the bond that was ultimately written on Ms. Hough's son before her jewelry was returned, such delay was not occasioned by or within the control of Yanks. In sum, Yanks did not act as a bail bondsman on December 9, 1987, and did not exert any control over Ms. Hough's jewelry such that he might be held accountable for any delay in its return.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting the application of Petitioner, Barry Stephen Yanks, for examination as a bail bondsman (limited surety agent) pursuant to Chapter 648, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of October 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October 1989. APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Yanks have been adopted in substance in paragraphs 1-5. The purposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Department are addressed as follows: Subordinate or not necessary to the result reached. To the extent supported by the proof, adopted in paragraph 3, otherwise rejected. Adopted in paragraph 3. Not relevant. 5 & 6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 4. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert V. Elias, Esquire Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ana Hernandez-Yanks, Esquire 1481 N.W. 7th Street Miami, Florida 33125 The Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent, a bail bondsman, committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a limited surety and as a professional bail bondsman. Prior to November 23, 1992, Gredys Tarazona entered into an agreement for Respondent to post a bond for James Johansen. In connection with that transaction, Ms. Tarazona delivered to Respondent the sum of $200 that was to serve as collateral security for the bond. They agreed that the sum of $200 would be returned to Ms. Tarazona once the conditions of the bond had been satisfied. On November 23, 1992, the conditions of this bond were satisfied and the liability on the underlying bond was terminated. Respondent failed to return the sum of $200 to Ms. Tarazona despite demands for her to do so. Prior to August 23, 1992, Julian Maldonado purchased a bail from Respondent. In connection with that transaction, Mr. Maldonado delivered to Respondent the sum of $200 that was to serve as collateral security for the bond. They agreed that the sum of $200 would be returned to Mr. Maldonado once the conditions of the bond had been satisfied. On August 23, 1992, the conditions of this bond were satisfied and the liability on the underlying bond was terminated. Respondent failed to return the sum of $200 to Mr. Maldonado despite demands for her to do so. Prior to April 1, 1993, Faye Finley entered into an agreement for Respondent to post a bond for Michael Finley. In connection with that transaction, Ms. Finley delivered to Respondent the sum of $200 that was to serve as collateral security for the bond. They agreed that the sum of $200 would be returned to Ms. Finley once the conditions of the bond had been satisfied. On April 1, 1993, the conditions of this bond were satisfied and the liability on the underlying bond was terminated. Respondent failed to return the sum of $200 to Ms. Finley despite demands for her to do so. Prior to November 8, 1992, Robert Post purchased a bail from Respondent. In connection with that transaction, Mr. Post delivered to Respondent the sum of $150 that was to serve as collateral security for the bond. They agreed that the sum of $150 would be returned to Mr. Post once the conditions of the bond had been satisfied. On November 8, 1992, the conditions of this bond were satisfied and the liability on the underlying bond was terminated. Respondent failed to return the sum of $150 to Mr. Post despite demands for her to do so. Prior to December 10, 1992, Jo Anne Adams entered into an agreement for Respondent to post a bond for Wilfred Byam. In connection with that transaction, Ms. Adams delivered to Respondent the sum of $200 that was to serve as collateral security for the bond. They agreed that the sum of $200 would be returned to Ms. Adams once the conditions of the bond had been satisfied. On December 10, 1992, the conditions of this bond were satisfied and the liability on the underlying bond was terminated. Respondent failed to return the sum of $200 to Ms. Adams despite demands for her to do so. Prior to December 22, 1992, Shannon Davidson purchased a bail bond from Respondent. In connection with that transaction, Mr. Davidson delivered to Respondent the sum of $250 that was to serve as collateral security for the bond. They agreed that the sum of $250 would be returned to Mr. Davidson once the conditions of the bond had been satisfied. On December 22, 1992, the conditions of this bond were satisfied and the liability on the underlying bond was terminated. Respondent failed to return the sum of $250 to Mr. Davidson despite demands for her to do so. Prior to July 23, 1993, Albert Perone entered into an agreement for Respondent to post a bond for Richard Falaro. In connection with that transaction, Mr. Perone delivered to Respondent the sum of $250 that was to serve as collateral security for the bond. They agreed that the sum of $250 would be returned to Mr. Perone once the conditions of the bond had been satisfied. On July 23, 1993, the conditions of this bond were satisfied and the liability on the underlying bond was terminated. Respondent failed to return the sum of $250 to Mr. Perone despite demands for her to do so. Respondent permitted her husband, Ken Jenkins, to participate in the transaction involving the bail bond purchased by Mr. Perone for Mr. Falaro. At the time she permitted him to engage in the conduct of her bail bondsman business as part of the Perone transaction, Respondent knew or should have known that her husband's license as a bail bondsman had been revoked and that he had entered a plea of guilty to a felony charge in a criminal proceeding. On or about April 27, 1993, Respondent received payments totaling $650 for placement of a bond from Angelene G. Goulos. No bond was posted by the Respondent. Respondent failed to return any part of the sum she had received from Ms. Goulos despite demands for her to do so. Prior to November 18, 1992, Ross Rankin purchased a bail bond from Respondent. In connection with that transaction, Mr. Rankin delivered to Respondent the sum of $250 that was to serve as collateral security for the bond. They agreed that the sum of $250 would be returned to Mr. Rankin once the conditions of the bond had been satisfied. On November 18, 1992, the conditions of this bond were satisfied and the liability on the underlying bond was terminated. Respondent failed to return the sum of $250 to Mr. Rankin despite demands for her to do so. Prior to May 18, 1993, Mary Pilcher entered into an agreement for Respondent to post a bond for Hassan Niksirat. In connection with that transaction, Ms. Pilcher delivered to Respondent the sum of $200 that was to serve as collateral security for the bond. They agreed that the sum of $200 would be returned to Ms. Pilcher once the conditions of the bond had been satisfied. On May 18, 1993, the conditions of this bond were satisfied and the liability on the underlying bond was terminated. Respondent failed to return the sum of $200 to Ms. Pilcher despite demands for her to do so. Prior to March 31, 1993, Tania Rodriguez, a/k/a, Tania Cuevas entered into an agreement for Respondent to post a bond for Edwin Cuevas. In connection with that transaction, Ms. Rodriguez delivered to Respondent the sum of $400 that was to serve as collateral security for the bond. They agreed that the sum of $400 would be returned to Ms. Rodriguez once the conditions of the bond had been satisfied. On March 31, 1993, the conditions of this bond were satisfied and the liability on the underlying bond was terminated. Respondent failed to return the sum of $400 to Ms. Rodriguez despite demands for her to do so. On May 4, 1993, and May 6, 1993, Respondent permitted her husband, Ken Jenkins, to conduct bail bond business in transactions with Mary Gandy, another bail bondsman. At the time she permitted him to engage in the conduct of her bail bondsman business in transactions with Ms. Gandy, Respondent knew or should have known that her husband's license as a bail bondsman had been revoked and that he had entered a plea of guilty to a felony charge in a criminal proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that Petitioner revoke Respondent's existing licensure and her eligibility for licensure under the Florida Insurance Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Tharpe, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 N.W. 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, Florida 33166 Loudelle Davis Jenkins 1372 Northampton Terrace West Palm Beach, Florida 33414 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Charles Bernard Smith (Respondent) was licensed as a limited surety agent (bail bond agent) by the Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) at all times material to this matter. On or about June 3, 1997, the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of larceny by embezzlement, a felony in violation of Section 648.295, Florida Statutes, in Case No. 96-1922F in the Twelfth Circuit Court, Manatee County, Florida. On or about June 3, 1997, the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of giving a worthless check, a felony in violation of Section 832.05(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and to one count of unlawful deposit of an item, a felony in violation of Section 832.05(3)(a), Florida Statutes, in Case No. 96-1982F in the Twelfth Circuit Court, Manatee County, Florida. Based upon the two nolo contendere pleas, the Court withheld adjudication, placed the Respondent on two years probation, ordered restitution and payment of court costs, and imposed a public service requirement of 100 hours. At the formal administrative hearing, the Respondent acknowledged the resolution of the criminal charges as set forth herein. There is no evidence that the Respondent has previously been subjected to disciplinary action by the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order revoking the licensure of Charles Bernard Smith as a limited surety agent. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Division of Legal Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Charles Bernard Smith 1701 4th Avenue West Palmetto, Florida 34221 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
