The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent unlawfully refused to honor a subpoena issued by Petitioner as is more particularly set forth hereinafter in detail.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, ASPEC, Inc., is a Florida Corporation engaged in the business of Mortgage Brokerage in Florida. Shanker S. Agarwal is President of ASPEC, Inc. Mr. Agarwal has been licensed by the Department as a Mortgage Broker since May 24, 1985 and currently holds License No. HB-0016435 which expired, by its terms, August 31, 1986. On February 14, 1986, the Department received a consumer complaint about ASPEC, Inc., and pursuant to its investigation of Respondent's brokerage activities, the Department sent a certified letter to ASPEC, Inc., on March 21, 1986, to the attention of President Agarwal requesting that an appointment be scheduled with its Area Financial Manager, Division of Finance, Paul Richman. The returned service of the referenced letter was postmarked April 14, 1986. President Agarwal, or an officer from Respondent failed to schedule an appointment with Paul Richman as requested. On May 22, 1986, the Department served Respondent a subpoena duces tecum on May 23, 1986, by its then Financial Examiner Analyst I, Kevin J.C. Gonzales. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, pp 9-10.) The subpoena issued to President Agarwal requested that the custodian of records, an officer, director, employee or member of ASPEC, Inc. appear before Paul Richman on May 30, 1986, at 9:00 a.m. at the Department's Miami Office and produce all books, papers and documents (of ASPEC, Inc.) from its inception to April 29, 1986, so that the Department could determine ASPEC's compliance with Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. President Agarwal, or a representative on behalf of ASPEC, Inc., failed to appear at the date and time specified on the subpoena, or thereafter, at the designated place to produce the requested documents. Respondent has challenged on constitutional and other procedural grounds, the Department's authority to conduct an investigation of Respondent as a licensee under the Mortgage Brokerage Act. Respondent's challenges were determined to be either beyond the authority of the Hearing Officer or lacked merit, and rulings to this effec were made during the course of the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending the Mortgage Brokers License No. HB-0016435 issued to Respondent for a period of (1) year. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of May 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles J. Gopman Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Mr. Shanker S. Agarwal, President ASPEC, INC 6912 Stirling Road Hollywood, Florida 33024 Ronald P. Glantz, Esquire 320 Southeast 9th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0305 =================================================================
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the request of petitioners to participate in the distribution of mortgage broker guaranty funds pertaining to First Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. be granted, and that they be paid their pro-rata portion of the fund in accordance with Section 494.044, Florida Statutes. It is further RECOMMENDED that the request of intervenors in Case No. 85- 3305 to be included in the above group of claimants for fund distribution purposes be denied unless they furnish the Division evidence of compliance with Subsections 494.043(1); (4) and (5), Florida Statutes (1985), by June 18, 1986. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee; Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1986.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondent was a licensed Mortgage Broker and the principal broker for Mortgage Associates of Countryside, located at 2623 Enterprise Rd., Clearwater, Florida. The Department was and is the state agency charged with regulating the activities of mortgage brokers in this state. In September, 1987, Andrew Grosmaire and Kevin Gonzalez, compliance officer and financial examiner, respectively, for the Department, pursuant to a complaint from Mark Snyder, conducted an examination of Respondent's affairs as they pertained to his operation as a mortgage broker. During the survey, which covered the period from August, 1986 through August, 1987, Mr. Grosmaire and Mr. Gonzalez examined between 50 and 60 loan files which had culminated in loan closings. In addition, they examined loan files which did not result in closings, bank account records, and other of Respondent's miscellaneous records. In order for an appropriate audit of a closed loan file to be conducted, it is imperative that the loan closing statement be included. Without it, the examiner cannot accurately determine what, if any, closing costs the borrower actually paid and if closing costs paid were consistent with those disclosed by the broker on the Good Faith Estimate Form at the initial interview. Of the closed loan files reviewed, these closing statements were missing from seven files. Respondent admits that several closed loan files did not have the required closing costs statement form enclosed. He attributes this, however, to the failure of his processor, an assistant, to place the closing statement in the file. They were not presented at hearing or thereafter. The investigators examined the Good Faith Estimate Forms in those files which culminated in loans and found that the form utilized by the Respondent failed to contain language, required by statute, which summarized the limits and conditions of recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund. Respondent contends that the pertinent statutory section was not in existence at the time he was engaged in mortgage brokerage activities. This was found to be not true. The Act became effective July 1, 1986 and the files surveyed were from the period August, 1986 through August, 1987. Examination of the Good Faith Estimate Forms used by the Respondent in each of the cases which culminated in loan closing revealed that Respondent consistently underestimated closing costs. This resulted in the borrowers generally paying higher closing costs than was initially disclosed to them. On -loans applied for by Mr. and Mrs. Snyder, Mr. Iyer, and Mr. Toland. Respondent redistributed loan points to himself in an amount higher than that which was agreed to by the parties. In the Toland case, Mr. Toland agreed to pay a 1% loan origination fee in the amount of $996.00. The settlement statement dated approximately 2 months later reflected that Toland paid Respondent a loan origination fee of $1,128.00 in addition to a 1% ($664.00) loan discount fee to the lender. This latter mentioned discount fee was not disclosed in advance to Mr. Toland on the estimate form nor was the excess loan origination fee charged. It should be noted here that a second Good Faith Estimate Form, dated nine days after the original, reflecting a 3% loan origination fee, was found in the file. Though signed by Respondent, this second form was not signed by the borrower as required. It cannot, therefore, serve to support Respondent's claim that he advised the Tolands of the higher cost by this second form. There is no showing that the Tolands were aware of it. In the Iyer case, the estimate form dated September 19, 1986 reflected a points and origination charge of $1,332.50 which is 1% of the mortgage loan amount of $133,250.00. The Iyers were subsequently approved for a mortgage in the amount of $145,600.00. The closing statement dated March 6, 1987, almost six months later, reflects that the Iyers paid a 2% loan origination fee of $2,740.00 to Mortgage Associates and a load discount fee of $685.00 to the lender. Here again the Respondent claims that a second cost estimate form reflecting a 2% point and origination fee of $2,912.00 was subsequently executed by the Iyers. However, this second form, found in Respondent's files, is undated and fails to reflect the signature of either Respondent or the Iyers. It cannot, therefore, serve as proof that the Iyers were made aware of the change. It does appear, as Respondent claims, that the bottom of the second form, (here, a copy) , was excluded from the copy when made, but there is no evidence either in the form of a signed copy or through the testimony of the Iyers, that they were aware of the change. Consequently, it is found that the Iyers had not been made aware of the second estimate and had not agreed to pay as much as they did, in advance. As to the Snyder closing, both Mr. Snyder and Respondent agree that it was their understanding at the time the loan was applied for, that Respondent would attempt to obtain a lower interest rate for them than that which was agreed upon in the application and in the event a lower rate was obtained, Respondent's commission points would remain the same as agreed upon in the brokerage agreement. In that case, as Respondent points out, his commission is based on the mortgage amount, not the interest rate, and he would be entitled to the agreed upon percentage of the loan face amount regardless of the interest rate charged by the lender on the loan. The Snyders had agreed to a 1% commission to Respondent plus a 1% loan origination fee to the lender. When the lender agreed to lend at par, without an origination fee, Respondent appropriated that 1% to himself, thereby collecting the entire 2% called for in the application. This was improper. Respondent's claim that it is an accepted practice in the trade is rejected. The Snyders initially made demand upon the Respondent for reimbursement of that additional 1% and ultimately had to hire an attorney to pursue their interests. Respondent subsequently made a $400 partial reimbursement payment of the amount owed but nothing further notwithstanding the fact that the Snyders ultimately secured a Judgement in Pinellas County Court against him for $1,082.52 plus interest, attorney's fees and costs. As a result, the Florida Mortgage Brokerage Guarantee Fund will reimburse the Snyders for their loss. According to the investigators, the Snyders Toland, and Iyer files, in addition to the problems described, also reflected that Respondent received payments for other items which should have gone into an escrow account. These included such things as credit reports and appraisal fees. The Department requires that any money received by a broker other than as commission, be placed in the broker's escrow account pending proper disbursement. Respondent did not have an escrow account. Mr. Gonzalez looked at Respondent's overall operation, including closed files, in an attempt to correlate between income and outgo to insure that Respondent's operation was in compliance with the statute. In addition to his search for an escrow account, Mr. Gonzalez also examined Respondent's "Loan Journal" which by statute is required to contain an entry for each transaction in each loan. The purpose of this journal is to provide a continuing record to show when each item in the loan processing was accomplished. In Mr. Gonzalez' opinion, the Respondent's journal was inadequate. It contained repeat and conflicting entries for specific items which hindered the investigators' ability to determine an audit trail. In addition, all required information was not put in the journal in complete form in each account. In the opinion of the investigators, the Respondent's violations were significant in that they made it impossible for the Department to determine compliance with statutes and Department rules and inhibited the compliance examination. All in all, Respondent's way of handling his accounts, his failure to maintain an escrow account, and his unauthorized increase in commission income, all indicated his actions were not in the best interest of his clients. The investigators concluded that clients funds were not being handled properly and that the purpose of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, to protect the consumer, was not being met. In Mr. Gonzalez' opinion, Respondent's method of business constituted incompetence as a mortgage broker and "possibly" fraudulent practice. It is so found. Both Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Grosmaire indicated they had extreme difficulty in attempting to locate Respondent after the complaint was filed by Mr. Snyder, in order to conduct their examination. They finally located him at a site different from that which appeared in the records of the Department. Respondent contends that the Department had been notified in writing within the required time, of his change of location when he filed a notice of fictitious name. He contends that after filing his notice of name change, he received no response from the state but took no action to inquire whether the change had been made. In any case, his current address was in the phone book and had the agents chose to look there, they would have found him. Respondent contends that the good faith estimates required by the statute are just that, an estimate, and that actual figures may vary from and exceed these estimates. This is true, but there is a procedure provided whereby the broker is to notify the client of a change in advance and if the change exceeds a certain amount, it may constitute grounds for voiding the contract. In paragraph 7 of the complaint, Petitioner alleges that Respondent used a form for the estimates which failed to contain a statement defining the maximum estimated closing costs. Review of the statement offered herein reflect this to be a fair analysis. However, Respondent claims that certain items cannot be predicted accurately in that some companies charge more than others for the same item and it was his practice to insert in the estimate portion of the form a "worst case scenario." However, at no time did he address in his form what could be the maximum a prospective purchaser might be expected to pay. Respondent "doesn't like" the total picture painted by the investigators concerning his operation. He claims it is cot a fair and accurate representation. In many cases, he claims, he expended funds on behalf of clients in excess of that he received in either commission or reimbursement and even though he may have received more than entitled in some cases, it "evens out over a period of time." Though this may be so, it is no way to do business. The state requires the keeping of accurate records and, just as the broker should not be required to assume responsibility for other than his own misconduct, neither should the client be required to pay more than is his legal obligation. Respondent professes to know the mortgage business and he resents having his qualifications as a mortgage broker questioned. In his opinion, he has trained himself well and has acted in good faith on the basis of the information available to him at the time. He ignores the impact of the Judgement of the court in the Snyder matter because he feels it was "unilateral." He believes the law is designed to protect the client and he wants to know who protects the broker. It is for that very reason, he contends, that fees paid in advance are not refundable. Mr. Sample feels the Department should be more informative to the brokers and get the governing regulations updated more quickly. Respondent cherishes his license and claims he needs it to make a living. He went out of business once before, several years ago, because of bad business conditions, (the reason he uses for not complying with the court order), but did not declare bankruptcy because he wanted to go back into business and pay off the judgements against him. Though he has been back in business for several years, he has failed to make any effort to pay off any of his former creditors even though in his former operation, he improperly tapped his escrow account for other business expenses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Howard E. Sample's license as a mortgage broker in Florida be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of September, 1988 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 88-2858 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Insofar as Petitioner's submission refers to testimony of a witness, that is considered as a proposed finding of fact. FOR THE PETITIONER; Accepted and incorporated herein & 3. Accepted and incorporated herein 4. & 5. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted and incorporated herein & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein Rejected as contra to the evidence A conclusion of law and not a finding of fact & 11a Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted Accepted and incorporated herein - 18. Accepted 19. - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted & 24. Accepted and incorporated herein 25. & 26. Accepted and incorporated herein Accepted &-29. Accepted 30. - 34. Accepted and incorporated herein FOR THE RESPONDENT: Nothing Submitted by way of Findings of Fact COPIES FURNISHED: Elise M. Greenbaum, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 400 West Robinson St. Suite 501 Orlando, Florida 32801 Howard E. Sample 2465 Northside Drive Apartment 505 Clearwater, Florida 34621 Honorable Gerald Lewis Ccmptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts, Esquire General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Plaza Level, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 3 2399-0350
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a Florida corporation headquartered in Boca Raton, Florida. William Kirschner is Petitioner's owner and chairman of the board. Stacey Interlandi is its President and principal broker. Petitioner is in the mortgage lending and brokerage business. All of the mortgage loans it makes are sold to investors. Petitioner held an active mortgage brokerage business registration (No. HB 592567137 00) issued pursuant to former Section 494.039, Florida Statutes, which was effective from September 1, 1990, until its expiration on August 31, 1992. 2/ It currently holds a mortgage brokerage business license (No. MBB 592567137 000) issued pursuant to Section 494.0031, Florida Statutes. The effective date of this license was September 1, 1992. The license expires on August 31, 1994. From October 1, 1989, through September 30, 1991, Petitioner acted as a seller or assignor of mortgage loans and/or a servicer of mortgage loans. Since October 1, 1991, Petitioner has made mortgage loans by advancing funds to mortgage loan applicants. With respect to each of these loans, however, the commitment to advance funds was made prior to October 1, 1991. Since October 1, 1991, Petitioner has sold or assigned mortgage loans to non-institutional investors, but for no monetary gain. Since October 1, 1991, Petitioner has serviced mortgage loans pursuant to agreements into which it entered prior to October 1, 1991. At no time has Petitioner been licensed as a mortgage lender pursuant to Chapter 494, Part III, Florida Statutes. On or about July 31, 1991, the Department sent the following written advisement concerning the revisions made by the 1991 Legislature to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, to all registered mortgage brokerage businesses, including Petitioner: The 1991 Legislature revised Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, effective October 1, 1991. A copy of the new law is enclosed. Some of the changes which affect mortgage brokerage businesses are: A mortgage brokerage business may not make (fund) loans or service loans. Only mortgage lenders and correspondent mortgage lenders may make (fund) loans. Only mortgage lenders may service loans. A mortgage brokerage business may ONLY act as a mortgage broker. "Act as a mortgage broker" is defined as: "... for compensation or gain, or in the expectation of compensation or gain, either directly or indirectly, accepting or offering to accept an application for a mortgage loan, soliciting or offering to solicit a mortgage loan on behalf of a borrower, or negotiating or offering to negotiate the terms or conditions of a mortgage loan on behalf of a lender." There are no net worth requirements for mortgage brokerage businesses. A principal broker designation form must be completed and maintained in the principal place of business and a branch broker designation form must be completed and maintained at each branch. The required forms will be sent to your office prior to October 1, 1991. To act as a mortgage broker, a licensed individual must be an associate of a licensed brokerage business and is prohibited from being an associate of more than one mortgage brokerage business. "Associate" is defined as: ". . . a person employed by or acting as an independent contractor for a mortgage brokerage business . . ." Under the new law, no fee or notification to the Department is required when a mortgage broker becomes an associate of your business. However, the license of each mortgage broker must be prominently displayed in the business office where the associate acts as a mortgage broker. Note: The Department will discontinue processing change of status requests under the current law effective August 1, 1991. Mortgage brokerage businesses in good standing which hold an active registration are eligible to apply for licensure as a mortgage lender pursuant to the saving clause. The applicant must have: For at least 12 months during the period of October 1, 1989, through September 30, 1991, engaged in the business of either acting as a seller or assignor of mortgage loans or as a servicer of mortgage loans, or both; Documented a minimum net worth of $25,000 in audited financial statements; Applied for licensure pursuant to the saving clause before January 1, 1992 and paid an application fee of $100. Should you meet the above requirements and wish to apply for licensure as a mortgage lender pursuant to the saving clause or if you wish to apply for licensure as a mortgage lender pursuant to Section 494.0061, please contact the Department for the appropriate application. These applications will be available in early September 1991. THESE CHANGES ARE EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 1991. PLEASE REVIEW THE ENCLOSED COPY OF THE LAW CAREFULLY FOR OTHER CHANGES WHICH MAY AFFECT YOUR MORTGAGE BROKERAGE BUSINESS. As promised, application forms for licensure as a mortgage lender were available the first week of September, 1991. Petitioner requested such an application form on September 18, 1991. The requested form was mailed to Petitioner the following day. On December 31, 1991, Petitioner submitted a completed application for licensure as a mortgage lender pursuant to the "saving clause," Section 494.0065, Florida Statutes. The application was accompanied by an application fee of $100.00 and an audited financial statement reflecting that Petitioner had a net worth in excess of $25,000.00. At the time of the submission of its application, Petitioner had an unblemished disciplinary record.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage lender pursuant to the "Saving Clause." DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of November, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-4313 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of facts proposed by the Department: 1-7. Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. 8. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a statement of the law, albeit an accurate one, than a finding of fact. 9-12. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 13. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a statement of the law, albeit an accurate one, than a finding of fact. 14-15. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 16. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 17-21. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 22. Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 24 6/-39. Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 40. Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Department is a state agency charged with the administration and enforcement of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, the Florida Mortgage Brokerage Act, and the rules promulgated thereunder. Financial Funding is a corporation. Eric Schwartz is the sole director, officer and shareholder of Financial Funding. Mr. Schwartz has been licensed by the Department as a mortgage broker continuously since 1983. Between 1983 and 1988 Mr. Schwartz acted as broker for a wholly-owned mortgage brokerage business. From 1988 until October 1, 1991, Mr. Schwartz was licensed as a self-employed mortgage broker. Mr. Schwartz has also held a real estate broker's license since approximately 1978. Financial Funding was created by Mr. Schwartz in order to comply with newly enacted requirements of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Effective October 1, 1991, licensed mortgage brokers in Florida were required to be employed by a mortgage brokerage business. Mr. Schwartz was, therefore, required to create a business entity or work for someone else's mortgage brokerage business in order to continue as a mortgage broker. Financial Funding's Application. On or about December 12, 1991, Financial Funding filed an application with the Department for licensure as a mortgage brokerage business (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"). It was revealed in the Application that Mr. Schwartz was the President of Financial Funding. By letter dated April 24, 1992, the Department denied Financial Funding's Application. The Department denied the Application because of its conclusion that Mr. Schwartz, an officer of Financial Funding, had violated Chapter 494, Florida Statutes and had a disciplinary history. Financial Funding timely challenged the denial of its Application. The Eason Complaint. Between approximately 1984 and 1987, Mr. Schwartz was the sole owner and president of Paramount Finance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Paramount"). Mr. Schwartz was the principal mortgage broker for Paramount and utilized Paramount as the vehicle for his practice as a mortgage broker. On or about November 5, 1985, Agnes Eason filed a complaint against Mr. Schwartz and Paramount (hereinafter referred to as the "Eason Complaint"), in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, In and For Dade County, Florida. A Final Judgment was entered on the Eason Complaint on or about February 17, 1987. The court found that Mr. Schwartz had initiated contact with the Plaintiff, Agnes Eason. The court also found that Mr. Schwartz had represented to Ms. Eason that the Small Business Administration (hereinafter referred to as the "SBA"), was about to foreclose a lien on her home. The court also found that "[t]he Small Business Administration, in fact, was not foreclosing on Plaintiff's property [and had no plans to institute foreclosure proceedings in the near future.]" The language in brackets was struck from the Final Judgment. Therefore, no determination was made as to whether foreclosure proceedings might have been instituted in the future. The striking of this language, however, does not prove that the SBA was considering possible foreclosure proceedings on Ms. Eason's property. Nor was Mr. Schwartz's testimony persuasive enough to reject the findings of the court on the Eason Complaint. The court concluded that Mr. Schwartz told Ms. Eason that "the only way to save her home from foreclosure" would be to execute notes and mortgages in favor of Paramount. Ms. Eason executed the suggested notes and mortgages and they were recorded. Although the notes and mortgages were executed on terms which Ms. Eason accepted, the court concluded that "no consideration" passed from Paramount to Ms. Eason for the notes or mortgages. The court also concluded that Ms. Eason executed the notes and mortgages because of the misrepresentation concerning the SBA by Mr. Schwartz. The court found that when Ms. Eason notified Mr. Schwartz that her payments on the note she had executed to Paramount were more than she could afford, the notes and mortgages were cancelled and a satisfaction was recorded. The court also found that after cancelling the notes and mortgages, Mr. Schwartz incorrectly told Ms. Eason that "the only way left to save her home from imminent foreclosure by the Small Business Administration" would be to execute a Warranty Deed conveying the fee simple interest in Ms. Eason's home to him. Mr. Schwartz also told Ms. Eason that, pursuant to a document titled a "Disclosure", he would grant Ms. Eason and her mother a life estate in the property. Mr. Schwartz was also to pay Ms. Eason $1,000.00 and to pay real estate taxes on the property pursuant to the Disclosure. Ms. Eason executed a Warranty Deed and the Disclosure on June 18, 1985. The Warranty Deed was recorded June 19, 1985. The Disclosure was recorded, but not until September 13, 1985. Although the transaction was explained by Mr. Schwartz to Ms. Eason and she accepted it, the court concluded that Mr. Schwartz's representation that foreclosure by the SBA was imminent was incorrect and that Mr. Schwartz failed to tender the sum of $1,000.00 agreed to in the Disclosure. Although Mr. Schwartz testified that he did attempt to tender the $1,000.00 (less $175.00 in recording fees), he did so after the Eason Complaint had been filed and it was rejected because of the litigation. Therefore, although the Disclosure agreement was executed June 18, 1985, Mr. Schwartz did not attempt to tender the $1,000.00 until some time after the Eason Complaint was filed on November 5, 1985. The court also found that Mr. Schwartz had not paid real estate taxes on the property as promised in the Disclosure. Mr. Schwartz explained, however, that the taxes had not been paid because the first real estate taxes due on the property had not become due until after the litigation had been instituted. The court concluded as a matter of law, among other things, the following: That the Defendant, ERIC SCHWARTZ, on behalf of Defendant PARAMOUNT FINANCE CORPORATION [fraudulently] misrepresented a material fact to the Plaintiff, AGNES EASON, for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff to execute the aforementioned notes and mortgages. That the Defendant, ERIC SCHWARTZ [fraudulently] misrepresented a material fact to the Plaintiff, AGNES EASON, for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff to execute the aforementioned Warranty Deed and "Disclosure." That the Warranty Deed executed by Plaintiff in favor of Defendant was procured by Defendant SCHWARTZ through the exercise of coercion and duress upon Plaintiff. That no consideration passed from Defendant SCHWARTZ to Plaintiff for any of the instruments executed by Plaintiff. That the purported promises made by Defendant SCHWARTZ in the "Disclosure", to the effect that certain debts of the Plaintiff will be paid by SCHWARTZ "if necessary", are illusory promises and impose no obligation upon the Defendant SCHWARTZ. Such promises are therefore unenforceable and do not constitute consideration in support of the subject conveyance. The court ordered the promissory notes, Warranty Deed and the Disclosure cancelled and declared them null and void. The Department's Awareness of the Eason Complaint. There were employees of the Department that were aware of the Eason matter at the time that an administrative action against Mr. Schwartz, which is discussed, infra, was being investigated by the Department. Prior to the action of the Department in this case, the Department has not taken disciplinary action against Mr. Schwartz's individual mortgage broker license as the result of the judgment on the Eason Complaint. The weight of the evidence failed to prove why the Department did not take action against Mr. Schwartz as a result of the judgment on the Eason Complaint until this case arose. The evidence also failed to prove, however, that the Department ever represented to Mr. Schwartz that it would not take any action against his license as a result of the Eason matter. 1990 Administrative Action. At some point during 1987, Mr. Schwartz decided to begin business as a mortgage broker with Mr. Stephen Hertz. Mr. Schwartz intended to discontinue operating through Paramount. Mr. Schwartz and Mr. Hertz intended to operate their business as Dollar Mortgage Company (hereinafter referred to as "Dollar"). In June of 1987 Mr. Schwartz prepared an application to register Dollar as the mortgage broker. Mr. Schwartz also prepared an endorsement transferring his individual license as principal mortgage broker to Dollar. These documents (hereinafter referred to as the "Dollar Applications"), were provided to Mr. Hertz to file with the Department. Mr. Schwartz, having been advised by Mr. Hertz that the Dollar Applications had been filed, believed that the Dollar Applications had been filed with the Department. Before being informed by the Department that the Dollar Applications had been approved or that his individual license had been renewed, Mr. Schwartz engaged in several mortgage brokerage transactions in the name of Dollar. Engaging in the transactions in the name of Dollar, therefore, constituted acting as a mortgage brokerage business without a license. At some point after the Dollar Applications were filed, Mr. Schwartz contacted Mr. Paul Richman of the Department's Miami office to determine what the status of the applications was. Mr. Schwartz was informed that the Department was in the process of changing the manner in which applications were processed and the process was causing a delay. Mr. Richman advised Mr. Schwartz to check with the Department's Tallahassee office in November, 1987, if the Department had not acted on the Dollar Applications by then. In November, 1987, Mr. Schwartz contacted the Department's Tallahassee office and was informed that the Dollar Applications had never been received. Mr. Schwartz submitted new applications at that time. As a result of the fact that Mr. Schwartz had transacted business before his license had been renewed and had acted in the name of Dollar before receiving approval of Dollar to transact such business, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint, Number 1154-F-5/88 (hereinafter referred to as the "Complaint"), against Mr. Schwartz. The Complaint was entered August 29, 1988. On or about January 23, 1990, the Department and Mr. Schwartz entered into a Stipulation and Consent Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Stipulation"), settling the Complaint. Mr. Schwartz admitted in the Stipulation to the following: 3. Eric S. Schwartz admits that he acted as a mortgage broker with an inactive license, and that Dollar acted as a mortgage brokerage business without a valid registration but denies intentional wrongdoing as more fully set forth in Mr. Schwartz's affidavit dated May 30, 1989 which is referenced as if fully set forth at length herein. Pursuant to the Stipulation, Mr. Schwartz was required to pay an administrative fine of $2,500.00 for his violation of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. It was also agreed that the Dollar application would be withdrawn and it was. Mr. Schwartz's individual license was, however, renewed. The Stipulation also provided that the Department would make at least one examination of Mr. Schwartz's mortgage brokerage activities during each six month period during the next twenty-four months from the date of the Stipulation. Audits were in fact conducted by the Department. No further charges were brought against Mr. Schwartz as a result of these audits. Additionally, the following agreement was contained in the Stipulation: 13. The Department agrees that, upon execution of this Stipulation, payment of the administrative fine, payment of the restitution ordered, and faithful compliance hereafter by Eric S. Schwartz with all of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation, the Department will take no further action against Eric S. Schwartz for violations of the Act and the rules of the Department as set forth in the Complaint. However, should the Department, in its exercise of its discretion, deem it necessary to take action against Eric S. Schwartz for violations of the Act and rules of Department occurring after the time period set forth in the Complaint, then, in that event, all such allegations and charges may be used against Eric S. Schwartz in any such subsequent proceeding, if relevant. Eric S. Schwartz understands that there is no order, administrative or judicial, sealing these proceedings in the event of a future administrative complaint regarding activities alleged to occur subsequent to the final date of the timeframe of the investigation of the affairs of Eric S. Schwartz' activities as set forth in the Complaint. See the second paragraph number "13" on page 4-5 of the Stipulation. In March of 1990, the Department entered a Consent Final Order incorporating the Stipulation. The Department has not brought any charges against Mr. Schwartz subsequent to the execution of the Stipulation. The Department has continued to renew Mr. Schwartz's mortgage broker's license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order denying Financial Funding's application for licensure as a mortgage brokerage business. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1993. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Financial Funding's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 6 and 8. Accepted in 9. Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5. Although the Department offered no such evidence, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that there is "no difference." Hereby accepted. See 8. Accepted in 34. Accepted in 10-11 and 28-29. Accepted in 30, 32-33 and 37. Accepted in 31 and 34. Whether Mr. Hertz advised Mr. Schwartz to start doing business in the name of Dollar is not relevant. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Schwartz "had no reason to operate improperly." What Mr. Hertz noted in his letter of May 18, 1988 is hearsay. The evidence failed to prove when the documents "had been previously provided . . . ." The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that Mr. Schwartz "was not at fault." Hereby accepted. See 37 and 38. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Schwartz had "nothing to hide." The evidence also failed to prove that the Department's audits were "extremely thorough. What the Department did during their audits of Mr. Schwartz is based upon hearsay. Accepted in 37. Accepted in 39. Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12 and 25. See also 17-19 and 21. The weight of the evidence failed to prove the second sentence. The fifth sentence through the end of this proposed paragraph is not relevant. The evidence also failed to prove that Ms. Eason was "initially pleased." 20 See 14-15, 19, 21 and 22. 21 See 25-27. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Department was aware of the Eason matter for "seven years." The weight of the evidence also failed to prove the third sentence.. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 12. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 13, 21 and 23 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 34. Accepted in 35. The Stipulation was executed in January, not December. Accepted in 36. Accepted in 37. Accepted in 38. Accepted in 40. Accepted in 6. Accepted in 3 and 7. Accepted in 8. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Highpoint Center, Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. Ashley Peacock Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Room 1302 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Respondents Phillip A. Banks (Banks) was at all times Material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0324865. Banks was the qualifying broker for Respondent, Abode Realty, Inc., which was at all tines material hereto registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0232550. On August 24, 1985, Respondents received in escrow $2,200 from Patricia Turner, as a deposit on her agreement to purchase a home located at 1300 Westview Drive, Miami, Florida. Pertinent to this case, the agreement was conditioned on Ms. Turner's ability to qualify for and obtain a first mortgage, insured by the FHA or guaranteed by the VA, in an amount not less than $40,837. Ms. Turner's application for the subject mortgage was duly submitted to American International Mortgage Company (American International). That application was, however, denied because the property did not appraise at the contract price. Following the denial of her application for mortgage financing on the first house, Ms. turner entered into an agreement through Respondents, dated November 20, 1985, to purchase another home located at 2501 Northwest 155 Terrace, Miami, Florida. At that time, Respondents returned to Ms. Turner the $2,200 deposit on the first contract, and she in turn deposited such sums with Respondents as a deposit on her agreement to purchase the second home. Pertinent to this case, the agreement was conditioned on Ms. Turner's ability to qualify for and obtain a first mortgage, insured by the FHA or guaranteed by the VA, in an amount not less than $39,867. The agreement further provided: When this contract is executed by the Purchaser and the Seller and the sale is not closed due to any default or failure on the part of the Purchaser, Purchaser shall be liable to Broker for full amount of brokerage fee. The agreed brokerage fee was 7 percent of the purchase price, or $2,800. The second home was owned by Independent Properties, Inc., a corporation owned, at least in part, by Banks. This ownership interest was, however, fully disclosed to Ms. Turner at the time the agreement was executed. Ms. Turner's application for the mortgage on the second home, as with the first home, was processed by American International. While that loan was being processed, Ms. Turner contracted to purchase and purchased, unbeknown to Respondents or American International, a different home (the third home). When a American International discovered this fact, Ms. Turner's application was disapproved because she lacked sufficient resources to afford two homes and because she could not comply with the FHA regulation which required that the buyer reside in the home. But for Ms. Turner's purchase of the third home, she would have qualified for the mortgage contemplated by the second agreement. Ms. Turner entered into the agreement to purchase the third home on or about January 20, 1986, and her application for the mortgage on the second home was disapproved by American International on April 1, 1986. In the interim, on January 30, 1986, Ms. Turner secured a loan of $1,000 from Banks on the pretext that her uncle had been charged with a criminal offense and the monies were needed to secure his release. The proof established, however, that Ms. Turner had no intention of fulfilling her agreement to purchase the second home, and that the pretext she used to secure $1,000 from Banks was but a subterfuge to secure the return of some of her deposit. Ms. Turner made no demand for the return of any of her deposit monies. She did, however, file a civil action in January 1987 to recover such monies. That action was dismissed on motion of Respondents, but faced with the threat of continued litigation Respondents offered to settle with her for $1,100. Ms. Turner rejected Respondents' offer, and commenced a second civil action. That action resulted in the entry of a final judgment in her favor for $1,100 and costs. Respondents are ready, willing and able to satisfy such judgment, and have attempted to satisfy such judgment through Ms. Turner's counsel without success.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of January 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the a Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Brian M. Berman, Esquire SMITH & BERMAN, P.A. 2310 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, Florida 33020 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Acting Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issue in Case No. 90-4722 was whether B & B Mortgage Equity, Inc. was entitled to licensure as a mortgage broker in the State of Florida. As discussed in more detail below, B & B Mortgage Equity subsequently withdrew its application for licensure and that case is now moot. The issue in Case No. 90- 6577 is whether Respondents committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed in that case, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, B & B Investors was registered with the Department as a mortgage broker pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Until June 15, 1990, the business address for B & B Investors was 1481 N.W. 7th Street #1, Miami, Florida 33125. B & B Investors' registration number is HB 592369518. On or about July 5, 1990, B & B Investors filed a petition for relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 9090-14587-SMW. Yanks was the president and principal mortgage broker for B & B Investors until May 10, 1989. Yanks is a licensed mortgage broker in Florida having been issued license number was 262788177. He has been licensed since 1980 or 1981. There is no evidence of any prior disciplinary action against him or B & B Investors. At all times pertinent hereto, Yanks was also the President of B & B Equity. B & B Equity has never been registered pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Until June 15, 1990, the business address for B & B Equity was also 1481 N.W. 7th Street #1, Miami, Florida 33125. At all times pertinent hereto, Hernandez-Yanks was married to Yanks and was the Vice President and Secretary of B & B Equity. Hernandez-Yanks is an attorney, but she has never been licensed pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. On or about March 15, 1990, Hernandez-Yanks filed a Petition for Relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 90-11654-BKC-AJC. On or about January 1, 1990, B & B Equity filed an Application for Registration as a Mortgage Brokerage Business (the "Registration Application"). Paragraph 6 of the Registration Application stated in part: List all officers, directors, partners, joint-ventures, and ultimate equitable owners. Ultimate equitable owner means natural person who owns 10 percent or more of applicant. NAME ADDRESS TITLE Barry Yanks 1481 NW 7 St. Pres. Ana Hernandez-Yanks 1481 NW 7 St. VP/Scty Yanks was designated as the principal mortgage broker on the Registration Application. The Department denied the Registration Application by notice dated June 4, 1990. CALVARY CHAPEL TRANSACTION At the time of the hearing in this matter, Marie Hall was 66 years old. She was last employed in 1988 by the Broward County School System as an adult vocational education instructor teaching students how to operate sewing machines. Her husband, the late Reverend Arthur Hall, died on March 22, 1988, at the age of 75. Because of health problems, he had been unable to work since 1962. The late Reverend Hall had very little education. Prior to the transactions involved in this case, the only other real estate deal in which the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall had been involved was the purchase of their home many years ago. In the summer of 1987, the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall sought to purchase Mount Bethel Baptist Church (the "Church"). To assist in their effort to purchase the Church, the Halls contacted Reverend Frank Lloyd. Reverend Frank Lloyd was the pastor of Hope Outreach, Church of God in Christ and the Chairman of the State of Florida Prison Ministry. Reverend Lloyd was also engaged in a consulting business through a company called Professional Proposal and Financial Consultants, Inc. ("PPFC"). In the summer of 1987, the Halls entered into an agreement with PPFC pursuant to which they paid PPFC $800 for PPFC's assistance in securing a loan of $250,000 to purchase the church. The agreement called for an interest rate of approximately 11 3/4 percent. The Halls deposited a total of $15,000 in escrow with Reverend Lloyd and/or PPFC. At the time the first $10,000 was deposited with PPFC, the parties entered into an agreement which provided as follows: ...This money is not to be used for down payment, or services rendered. It is to be escrowed only. At the closing of the loan this entire amount is to be returned to Elder Hall or his designate. If in the event no loan is secure [sic] all funds is [sic] to be returned to Elder Arthur Hall, President Calvary Chapel Church of God in Christ or his designate. Reverend Lloyd attempted to obtain a mortgage for the Halls from several companies including Ft. Lauderdale Mortgage and Horizon Development Mortgage ("Horizon"). The Halls decided not to pursue a loan from Horizon because Horizon wanted a non-refundable $3,000 up-front fee. There was also some question whether either company would handle a loan for a church. Reverend Lloyd introduced the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall to Yanks because Reverend Lloyd knew that Yanks had successfully obtained loans for other churches. The Halls met with Yanks on a couple of occasions in late 1987 and early 1988. Other members of the Hall's congregation attended some of these meetings. During those meetings, the need for some of the other church members to sign on the loan and/or pledge additional collateral was discussed. Yanks advised the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall that he might be able to secure a loan for them to purchase the Church, but the amount of the loan would be smaller and the interest rate would be higher than they had anticipated in their agreement with PPFC. Yanks did not require an up-front loan application fee. On January 14, 1988, the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall met with Reverend Lloyd and Yanks at the office of B & B Investors in Miami. As noted above, the Halls were initially seeking a loan of $250,000. During the January 14, 1988 meeting, Yanks advised the representatives of Calvary Chapel that he could arrange a loan of $162,000 at 17 percent if additional collateral was provided. At the January 14 meeting, the late Reverend and Mrs. Hall executed a mortgage loan application (the "Loan Application") with B & B Investors. The Halls executed the Loan Application on behalf of Calvary Chapel Church of God in Christ, Inc. (hereinafter Calvary Chapel). Yanks executed the Loan Application on behalf of B & B Investors. The Loan Application was for a $162,000 loan and stated that the loan origination fee would be $4,860.00 and the loan discount fee would be $4,860.00. The Loan Application did not indicate when those fees would be due or to whom they would be paid. The Loan Application noted that there would be an appraisal fee of $600.00 and attorneys' fees of $750.00. The evidence established that, in the mortgage brokerage business, a loan origination fee is often considered synonymous with a broker's fee. The origination fee is traditionally charged at closing. However, the agreement between a mortgage broker and a client determines when the mortgage broker is entitled to his fee. In certain circumstances, a mortgage broker may be entitled to payment upon obtaining a firm commitment for a loan irrespective of whether the loan closes. Although there was no statutory or rule requirement at the time of this transaction, it was customary in the industry for a mortgage broker to set forth in writing the terms as to when he is to be paid. The Application in this case did not state when the fees were to be considered as earned. The Loan Application also provided in part: If the above commitment or a commitment in an amount and/or upon terms acceptable to the undersigned is obtained and said mortgage loan is not closed because (I)(We) have not fulfilled our part of this agreement. (I)(We) agree to pay $ , the application deposit being a part, for obtaining said commitment. If an acceptable commitment is not obtained, the mortgage application deposit will be refunded, except $ to cover expenses actually incurred. A loan discount fee is the cost to the lender to discount the interest rate on a mortgage loan for sale in the secondary market. The discount fee is owed to the lender or investor and was collected at closing. A broker is not entitled to a loan discount fee. Yanks tries to ignore the terminology used in the Loan Application he prepared and claims that all parties knew that he and/or B & B Investors would receive both the loan origination fee and loan discount fee. He contends that he explained to the late Rev. Hall and Mrs. Hall that the loan origination fee and the loan discount fees were fees that would be paid to him when he arranged a firm commitment for a loan at the agreed upon terms. However, the more persuasive evidence established that the late Rev. Hall and Mrs. Hall did not understand that the loan origination fee and/or discount fee would be paid to Yanks irrespective of whether the loan actually closed. Moreover, Yanks has provided no credible explanation as to why he would ever be entitled to receive the loan discount fee. At the January 14, 1988 meeting, Yanks orally arranged a deal with Alan Greenwald, a private investor with whom Yanks had worked in the past, to fund a $162,000 loan at 17 percent. At the time of this transaction, there was no statutory requirement that loan commitments be made in writing. No written confirmation of the commitment was provided even though it was common in the industry for commitments to be given in writing in order to bind the lender to the transaction and to provide evidence of the terms of the commitment. The only written evidence of the loan commitment is a letter from Yanks to the attorney for Alan Greenwald. That letter states that Mr. Greenwald had asked for additional collateral. During the January 14, 1988 meeting, the late Rev. and Mrs. Hall agreed to put up their house as additional collateral. In addition, two other members of the congregation who were present at the meeting, Effie Davis and Cleveland Foreman, agreed in principal to permit a mortgage to be placed on their houses as additional collateral to secure the loan. Yanks contends that, as a result of his efforts in securing a commitment from Alan Greenwald as noted above, he was entitled to receive the loan origination fee and loan discount fee set forth in the Loan Application. After the January 14, 1988 meeting, Rev. Lloyd released to Yanks $10,000 of the $15,000 that he had been holding in escrow for the late Rev. and Mrs. Hall. The $10,000 check was made payable to B & B Investors. The $10,000 was not placed in an escrow or trust account upon receipt. Yanks apparently arranged for $1,000 of the money to be paid to Debbie Landsberg, the attorney for Alan Greenwald, as an advance on the legal fees and costs that were expected to be incurred in closing the transaction. At the time the $10,000 was transferred to B & B Investors, all of the parties to the transaction expected the loan to close and no one contemplated or anticipated that the loan would not go through. While both Yanks and Rev. Lloyd claim that the late Rev. Hall approved the release of the $10,000 as payment to Yanks for services in securing a commitment from Alan Greenwald, this testimony is rejected as not credible. The more persuasive evidence clearly established that at no time did the late Rev. and Mrs. Hall understand that if the loan did not close Yanks would keep the $10,000. After the January 14, 1988 meeting, the parties initiated the steps necessary to close the deal. These efforts were complicated by the illness of the attorney for the seller, the marriage of the attorney for the lender and the difficulty in locating the abstracts for the properties involved. Moreover, a number of title deficiencies regarding the Church were discovered and had to be corrected. The arrangements for financing the purchase of the Church changed several times. Initially, the Seller had indicated that it would take back a second mortgage for $50,000 in order to facilitate a closing. However, as the parties got closer to closing, the Seller changed its mind regarding the second mortgage. Ultimately, in September of 1988, the Seller agreed to take back a second mortgage of $35,000. Sometime during the summer of 1988, Greenwald reduced to $110,000 the amount he was willing to lend on the deal. That amount was to be secured solely by the Church property. Yanks claims that he arranged for another investor to lend between $40,000 to $45,000 with the residences of certain congregation members, including the Halls, Effie Davis and Cleveland Foreman, serving as collateral. These modifications were never memorialized in writing. As preparations for a closing proceeded, it became apparent that Effie Davis' house could not be used as security for the loan. While there is conflicting evidence as to why Effie Davis' house could not be used for additional collateral, the more persuasive evidence indicates that the presence of one or more existing liens on the property rendered it of minimal value as additional collateral. As a result of the inability to use Ms. Davis' house as part of the collateral for the loan, Yanks advised Calvary Chapel that the amount of the loan would have to be decreased from $162,000 to $150,000. Yanks also advised Calvary Chapel that an additional cash deposit of $14,000 was necessary to demonstrate to the lender that sufficient funds were available to conclude the deal. The additional money was paid in two parts. On or about August 23, 1988, Calvary Chapel paid $10,000 to the Ana-Hernandez-Yanks Trust Account. Shortly thereafter, on or about September 1, 1988, Calvary Chapel paid an additional $4,000 to the Ana Hernandez-Yanks Trust Account. These sums were received by Ana Hernandez-Yanks in trust as the attorney for the B & B Investors. No written escrow agreement was executed. No written amendment to the Loan Application was provided to reflect the new terms for the anticipated loan nor was there any written commitment letter. As noted above, the late Rev. Hall died in March of 1988. Reverend Phillip Hall, the son of the late Rev. Hall, was appointed the pastor of Calvary Chapel in April of 1988. At the time of his appointment, Rev. Phillip Hall was living in Nashville. He commuted between Nashville and Fort Lauderdale for a while before moving to Fort Lauderdale on July 31, 1988. Yanks suggests that the Reverend Philip Hall did not like the deal his parents had entered into and refused to honor it. More specifically, Yanks contends that Calvary Chapel and the seller made alternate arrangements for the sale of the property in order to avoid paying him. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. The Seller was obligated to provide clear title before the sale could close. The evidence established that the Seller was never able to provide all of the documents necessary to clear title. There is no persuasive evidence that Calvary Chapel failed to meet its obligations under the contract to purchase the Church. Instead, it appears that Calvary Chapel did everything in its power to go through with the transaction. Sometime in the fall of 1988, the seller, Mount Bethel Baptist Church, rescinded the contract to sell the Church. At some point thereafter, Calvary Chapel began occupying the Church under a lease/purchase arrangement, the terms of which have not been established in this case. As noted above, there is no persuasive evidence that the Rev. Phillip Hall and/or Calvary Chapel conspired to cheat Yanks out of his fees. In any event, even if Calvary Chapel decided for economic reasons not to go forward with the loan that Yanks was trying to arrange, it is concluded that neither Yanks nor B & B Investors had the contractual right to retain any of the money that had been advanced. After the deal failed to close, Rev. Lloyd returned to Calvary Chapel the remaining $5,000 he had been holding in escrow for the Halls. By letter dated September 19, 1988, Holly Eakin Moody, an attorney for Calvary Chapel, wrote to Yanks demanding the return of all the money that had been advanced. The letter stated: Please be advised that I have been retained by Calvary Chapel Church of God in Christ, Inc., to begin the appropriate legal action against you and your wife, Ana Hernandez-Yanks, for return of my clients [sic] escrow funds in the amount of $24,000. On or about December 24, 1988, Hernandez-Yanks tendered a check in the amount of $14,000 to Calvary Chapel. On the back of the check, the following release language was written: Full and Final Settlement of all claims against B & B Mortgage and Barry Yanks or Ana Hernandez- Yanks. Hernandez-Yanks wrote a letter dated February 7, 1989 to Holly Eakin Moody stating in part: Please be advised that as per your client's request, on December 24, 1988 I mailed them my trust account check in the amount of $14,000. I have checked numerous times with the bank and said check has not been presented for payment. I am hereby depositing said monies with the Registry of the Court. If you should have any questions, please contact me. It does not appear that Hernandez-Yanks ever deposited any money in the Registry of the Court in accordance with that February 7 letter. By letter dated March 14, 1989, Holly Eakin Moody returned the check containing the accord and satisfaction language to Hernandez-Yanks and reiterated a demand for a return of the entire $24,000. Ultimately, Hernandez-Yanks paid Calvary Chapel $14,000 by check dated March 6, 1990 on account number 020051156008 at the TransAtlantic Bank. A review of the bank records indicates that the $14,000 advanced by Calvary Chapel to B & B Investors in late August and early September of 1988 was not held in escrow. On or about September 1, 1988, $10,000 was deposited in the trust or escrow account of Hernandez-Yanks at Continental Bank (the "Continental Trust Account"). An additional $4,000 was deposited in the Continental Trust Account on or about September 6, 1988. On or about October 4, 1988, the Continental Trust Account was closed with a closing balance of or about $13,553.06. On or about October 4, 1988, Hernandez-Yanks opened a trust or escrow account at Ocean Bank (the "Ocean Trust Account"). The beginning balance of the Ocean Trust Account on or about October 4, 1988, was $13,000. On or about December 7, 1988, the balance in the Ocean Trust Account was $2,437. On or about December 15, 1988, Hernandez-Yanks opened a trust or escrow account at United National Bank (the "United Trust Account"). On or about January 19, 1990, the cash balance in the United Trust Account was $2,236.29. On or about January 5, 1990, Hernandez-Yanks opened a trust or escrow account at TransAtlantic Bank (the "TransAtlantic Trust Account"). The beginning balance of the TransAtlantic Trust Account on or about January 5, 1990, was $10,000. By check dated March 6, 1990, Calvary Church was paid $14,000 from the TransAtlantic Trust Account. There is no evidence that Yanks, Hernandez-Yanks and/or B & B Investors had any other escrow accounts. Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that Yanks failed to ensure that monies received in trust were properly placed in escrow in a transaction wherein he acted as a mortgage broker. Moreover, Yanks failed to ensure that the $14,000 received by Hernandez-Yanks was returned expeditiously to Calvary Chapel. Yank's explanation that he does not tell his wife, who is an attorney, "how to run her business" does not excuse his failure to ensure that money placed in escrow with his company was promptly returned when the transaction was terminated. Yanks refused to repay any of the remaining $10,000 that was paid to B & B Investors claiming that he was entitled to keep the money as fees earned for processing a mortgage commitment from Allan Greenwald. As set forth above, the contention that the late Rev. Hall authorized payment in full of Yanks' fees is rejected as not credible. The more persuasive evidence established that the principals of Calvary Chapel did not understand that Yanks and/or B & B Investors were to be paid their fee even if the loan did not close. Since there was no agreement specifying when Yanks was to be paid, he had no legal right to retain the $10,000. Arguably, Yanks was entitled to some reimbursement for the expenses he incurred, including perhaps the $1,000 he supposedly paid to the investor's attorney. However, the evidence clearly established that Yanks was not entitled to retain the entire $10,000. 52 After the Department began its investigation of this case, Yanks offered to repay the loan discount fee of $4,860 to Calvary Chapel. As of the date of the hearing, Yanks was still refusing to repay the $4,860 loan origination fee which he claims he has earned. While Yanks' claim to the $10,000 was legally insufficient and should have been recognized as such, the evidence did not establish that Yanks was attempting to defraud the Halls and/or Calvary Chapel. There were clearly some misunderstandings between the parties. Many of these problems could have been avoided if Yanks had properly documented his fee arrangement in writing. Yanks spent a good bit of time trying to put the deal together and felt slighted when the transaction he structured fell apart, especially when Calvary Chapel ended up occupying the Church anyway. Yanks overreacted in his attempts to obtain compensation for his services. The evidence was insufficient to establish that his actions should be characterized as fraudulent. VAZQUEZ-CASTILLO TRANSACTION In approximately mid-December of 1988, Ana Vazquez began working for Yanks. Vazquez was hired by Yanks to assist in the processing of mortgages. Prior to becoming employed by Yanks, she had little experience in real estate transactions. Vazquez was employed by Yanks for only about two or three weeks. Thereafter, she was employed by Hernandez-Yanks as a secretary. Both Yanks and Hernandez-Yanks occupy space in the same building. As noted above, Hernandez- Yanks is an attorney. On or about February 27, 1989, Pura Castillo entered into a contract (the "Sales Contract") with Vazquez for the purchase of a condominium owned by Vazquez and located in Dade County, Florida, at 7440 Harding Avenue, Unit 301, Miami Beach, Florida (the "Condominium"). The sales price was $70,000. Pursuant to the Sales Contract, Vazquez was to convey title free and clear of all encumbrances, by a good and sufficient Warranty Deed. "Free and clear of all encumbrances" meant that the title being transferred from Ana Vazquez to Pura Castillo was not to be encumbered by any mortgages, judgments or other liens. The Sales Contract was not made contingent upon Pura Castillo obtaining new financing. The relationship between Ana Vazquez and Pura Castillo is not entirely clear. They were obviously well acquainted with each other. The evidence suggests that Pura Castillo's common law husband, Joseph Hardisson, was a close friend of the father of Ana Vazquez. While Pura Castillo and Joseph Hardisson were visiting with Vazquez, they began discussing the possible purchase of the Condominium by Pura Castillo. Yanks first learned about the possible sale of the Condominium to Pura Castillo when Vazquez asked Hernandez-Yanks to represent her. Hernandez-Yanks indicated that she would represent Vazquez in the sale. Vazquez also requested Yanks' assistance in obtaining a loan for Pura Castillo. Yanks advised Vazquez that he did not process loan applications for employees. He suggested that she contact one of the mortgage lenders with whom he did business. Vazquez contacted one such company, Inter-Mortgage Corporation, and obtained a loan application package. Shortly thereafter, a loan application was submitted with InterMortgage Corporation in the name of Pura Castillo. The circumstances surrounding the completion and submittal of that loan application are not entirely clear nor are they necessarily pertinent to this proceeding. The evidence did establish that the loan application contained some false information regarding Pura Castillo's residence and employment. InterMortgage contacted Yanks' office and advised that there were some problems with the application. Vazquez went to InterMortgage's office and retrieved the application. The evidence did not establish that Yanks was aware of the filing of the application with InterMortgage and/or that he knew the application contained any false information. It appears that a similar application with false information may also have been filed with another lender, Dixie Mortgage. There is no indication that Yanks was aware of the filing of this application and/or that he knew it contained false information. The Condominium was subject to a $42,000 mortgage from Standard Federal to Vazquez (the "Standard Federal Mortgage"). The Standard Federal Mortgage was a typical Fannie Mae mortgage and included a commonly used due-on- sale clause in Clause 17. That clause provided for a default by the borrower upon sale of the property unless the mortgagee had consented to the assumption of the mortgage by the purchaser. There were no federal or state laws in existence at the time prohibiting the enforceability of Clause 17. Vazquez had a contract to purchase another home which was contingent upon the sale of her Condominium. Thus, she was under some time pressure to close the sale of the Condominium. When it became apparent that a quick loan could not be arranged for Pura Castillo, Ana Vazquez turned to Yanks for advice. While there is conflicting evidence as to the discussions that took place, the more persuasive evidence established that Yanks agreed to structure a deal that would enable Ana Vazquez to sell the Condominium to Pura Castillo. As discussed in more detail below, Yanks structured a complicated and confusing arrangement whereby Pura Castillo was to make her monthly payments to B & B Equity, which was to play the role of a servicing agent and distribute the payments to the first mortgagee, Standard Federal. While Yanks now claims that after the Standard Federal Mortgage payment was made, the remainder of the monthly payments received by B & B Equity were going to be paid to Vazquez, there is no written agreement confirming this arrangement. It is the usual practice in the industry for mortgage brokers to determine whether there are outstanding mortgages on the property to be sold and to see to it that an existing mortgage is paid off or otherwise taken care of at the time of closing. It is the responsibility of the mortgage broker to contact the institution holding the mortgage to find out if it is assumable. If an existing mortgage has a due-on-sale clause, the mortgage broker would characteristically contact the first lien holder and get an estoppel letter to determine the balance of the loan. The mortgage broker might also seek a waiver from the lender so that the sale could be made without paying off the loan. Without such a waiver, a due-on-sale clause would entitle the original lender to declare the entire original loan due upon sale of the property. Yanks never obtained an estoppel letter or a waiver of the due-on-sale clause from Standard Federal. While Yanks claims that he contacted various persons regarding the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses, he never contacted Standard Federal about the specific clause in its mortgage to Vazquez. There is conflicting evidence regarding the discussions between Yanks and Vazquez regarding the structuring of the transaction. It is clear that Vazquez was more concerned with concluding the transaction rather than understanding the intricacies of it. As discussed in more detail below, the transaction structured by Yanks included several unexplained and/or inappropriate charges. In addition, the loan documentation was confusing and sometimes conflicting and/or contradictory. Vazquez indicated to Yanks that Pura Castillo was prepared to go forward with the sale and a closing was scheduled for June 16, 1989. In preparation for the closing of the sale of her condominium, Vazquez incurred several expenses. On or about March 31, 1989, she paid $275 to have the condominium appraised. On or about April 5, 1989, Vazquez paid $200 to National Title Abstract Company for an update of the abstract. On or about June 15, 1989, she paid $150 to Ticor Title Co. She also paid for a credit report on Pura Castillo. On June 16, 1989, Pura Castillo arrived at the office of Yanks and B & B Investors at 1481 N.W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida, to close on the purchase of the Condominium in accordance with the Sales Contract. Yanks and/or Hernandez- Yanks prepared the closing documents used at the closing. Much of the closing was conducted in Spanish. Yanks is not fluent in Spanish. Hernandez-Yanks, who speaks Spanish, acted as the closing agent and remained throughout the process. Yanks and Vazquez were in and out of the room throughout the closing. During the closing, Pura Castillo was told that B & B Equity was going to be the lender for the transaction. Pura Castillo inquired whether it was necessary for her to have her own attorney. Hernandez-Yanks replied that she could represent all parties and that it was not necessary for Pura Castillo to have her own attorney. At the closing, Pura Castillo presented cashiers checks for $5,800, $7,250 and $5,900 all made payable to the order of Ana Hernandez-Yanks, Trust Account. In addition, either Yanks or Hernandez-Yanks was given a check from Parker Realty in the amount of $2,800 which was the balance of the $7,000 deposit after payment of the $4,200 real estate commission. From the $21,750 brought to the closing, $14,000 was disbursed to Ana Vazquez. As noted above, Vazquez had already paid for the abstract, appraisal and credit report. In addition, as part of her mortgage payment, she had contributed approximately $1,281 to an escrow for taxes and insurance for which she was entitled to be reimbursed. Thus, the net cash that she received from the closing was less than $12,000 from the sale of a $70,000 condominium with a $42,000 mortgage. At the closing, Vazquez executed an "Agreement for Deed" in favor of Pura Castillo. An agreement for deed is a conditional sales contract pursuant to which a seller agrees to sell property to a buyer over a period of time. The seller retains the legal ownership of the property until the full consideration for the purchase is paid. After all the conditions have been met, the seller delivers a deed conveying ownership of the land to the buyer. The Agreement for Deed in this transaction provided as follows: That if said Buyers shall first make the payments and perform the covenants herein mentioned on their part to be performed, the said Sellers hereby covenant and agree to convey and assure to the Buyers or their heirs or assigns, in fee simple, clear of all encumbrances whatever, by good and sufficient Warranty Deed...[the condominium] And the Buyers hereby covenant and agree to pay to the Sellers the sum of $70,000 to be paid as follows: $19,073.12 cash in hand, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and $704.32 or more per month on or before the 16th day of each and every month after the date of this instrument, to be mailed to the Sellers' address given herein, with interest at the rate of 11 percent, per annum on the whole sum remaining from time to time unpaid,... Arguably, the Agreement for Deed required Pura Castillo to make monthly payments to Vazquez of $704.32 plus interest on the outstanding balance. However, at the closing, Yanks provided Pura Castillo with a letter which explained that her monthly payments of $704.32 included $499.97 for principal and interest, $142.35 for real estate taxes and $62 for insurance. At the closing, Pura Castillo executed a mortgage (the "Mortgage") in favor of B & B Equity as mortgagee. The Mortgage stated that it secured an indebtedness of $52,500 and a promissory note for that amount was executed by Pura Castillo to B & B Equity at the closing. The Mortgage was similar in form and content to a Fannie Mae or a Freddie Mac mortgage form, except it included some additional provisions stating that it was a "Wraparound Mortgage." A wraparound mortgage is a financing device that is sometimes used when a seller of a piece of property agrees to take back and finance a portion of the difference between an existing first mortgage which is not being assumed or satisfied and the sales price for the property. Typically, the mortgagor on the first mortgage is the seller of the property and the mortgagee on the wraparound mortgage. The wraparound mortgage becomes a second or other junior mortgage behind the existing mortgage. The mortgagee of the wraparound mortgage agrees to continue making payments on the existing primary mortgage, at least so long as payments are made under the wraparound mortgage. Page 8 of the Mortgage included the following language: This is a Wraparound Mortgage. This wraparound mortgage is a second mortgage. It is inferior to certain mortgage [sic], herein called the first mortgage which covers the above described property at the time of execution of this wraparound mortgage. The wraparound mortgagee shall be excluded from any terms or conditions of the prior mortgagees. The wraparound mortgagee's obligation to pay the prior mortgages is limites [sic] to funds received from the wraparound mortgagor. For a number of reasons, the use of a wraparound mortgage in this transaction was totally inappropriate. The first page of the mortgage included a number of warranties including the following: The mortgagor hereby covenants with and warrants to the Mortgagee that the Mortgagor is indefeasibly seized with the absolute and fee simple title to said property. This warranty is inconsistent with the ownership interest that the Mortgagor, Pura Castillo, had as a result of this transaction. Pura Castillo's only claim to title was via the Agreement for Deed and she was not indefeasibly seized with the fee simple title. As noted above, the Mortgage states that it secures an indebtedness of $52,500 and a promissory note (the "Note") for that amount was executed by Pura Castillo to B & B Equity at the closing. That Note required Pura Castillo to make payments directly to B & B Equity. However, the Agreement for Deed calls for Pura Castillo to make payments to Vazquez. Moreover, Pura Castillo signed the Note obligating herself to make payments on a $52,500 indebtedness to B & B Equity even though the Standard Federal Mortgage was not satisfied and had a remaining balance of $42,000. In other words, the result of this transaction, at least as it appeared on the public records, is that a $70,000 condominium was encumbered by two separate mortgages (the Standard Federal Mortgage and the "Wraparound Mortgage") securing separate promissory notes totalling more than $94,000. At no time prior to or during the closing did Yanks or Hernandez-Yanks explain to Pura Castillo that an Agreement for Deed was being utilized in this transaction and that she would not obtain full legal title until all of the mortgages were paid off. Furthermore, neither Yanks or Hernandez-Yanks explained to Pura Castillo that the mortgage she signed in favor of B & B Equity was a wraparound second mortgage. While Yanks contends that Pura Castillo had plenty of opportunity to review the documents and ask questions regarding them, she was clearly an unsophisticated buyer who was incapable of deciphering the confusing and ambiguous documentation for this clumsily crafted transaction. In sum, the use of an agreement for deed and a wraparound mortgage in the same transaction was redundant, confusing and illogical. Moreover, Yanks' efforts in this transaction clearly violated the due-on-sale clause (Clause 17) in Standard Federal's existing first mortgage. The Department has suggested that the transaction was a calculated fraud with some undefined goal. After considering all the evidence, the transaction can more accurately be described as an awkward attempt at creative financing which included a number of hidden and inappropriate charges for the benefit of Yanks and/or B & B Equity. Yanks contends that Vazquez was desperate to close the sale and authorized him to proceed with whatever financing he could arrange so long as she netted $14,000 from the sale. He claims that she agreed to the wraparound mortgage as the only way to proceed with the deal under the circumstances. Under this arrangement, he contends that B & B was authorized to retain any additional proceeds as compensation for serving as a servicing agent on the wraparound mortgage. Even if this explanation is accepted, there are a number of problems with the actions of Yanks and B & B Equity in this transaction. First of all, there was no written servicing agreement setting forth the obligations of the servicing agent nor is there any delineation of the amount of money to be paid for servicing the wraparound mortgage. Moreover, the Agreement For Deed and the Promissory Note call for Pura Castillo to make payments of slightly more than $700 per month. These payments exceed the monthly payments due under the Standard Federal Mortgage. However, there is no written delineation of how the additional payments received each month were to be disbursed. Finally, the servicing arrangement was never explained to Pura Castillo and the documentation for the transaction was very confusing and often contradictory. There is no closing statement for the transaction that accurately reflects all of the disbursements made from the proceeds of the closing. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 is a closing statement signed by both Vazquez and Pura Castillo and purports to delineate certain expenses paid from the proceeds of the sale. Petitioner's Exhibit 7 is an unsigned closing statement which Yanks contends he prepared for use at the closing of the loan. He claims that, after the closing, he found out that Vazquez substituted Petitioner's Exhibit 23 for the closing statement that he intended to be used because she thought it more accurately depicted the fees as she had discussed them with Pura Castillo. This explanation is rejected as not credible. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 was the only closing statement signed by both the buyer and seller. As noted above, Vazquez was in and out during the closing. Hernandez-Yanks was present throughout the closing. The more credible evidence established that Petitioner's Exhibit 23 was the closing statement presented at the closing and executed by the participants. Neither closing statement accurately explains how all of the funds from the sale were disbursed. Thus, it is impossible to determine conclusively how much money Yanks and/or B & B Equity received from the closing. Both statements include some charges which are inappropriate or questionable. Furthermore, it is clear that Yanks and/or B & B received more than either statement indicated. Both closing statements reflect a payment of $600 for title insurance. However, the evidence established that no title insurance policy was ever issued. Vazquez paid for a title insurance commitment prior to the closing. Such a commitment is typically issued by a title insurance company prior to a real estate transaction and is a contractual agreement by the title insurer to issue a policy of title insurance upon compliance with certain terms and conditions. The actual title insurance policy is not issued until after the transaction has closed. The title insurance policy, not the commitment, insures the main insured against certain defects in title. The $600 charge for title insurance reflected on both closing statements was totally inappropriate in this case since no title policy was ever issued. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 includes a number of charges assessed to the buyer which were wholly inappropriate to this transaction. For example, the closing statement included a $500 charge for FNMA underwriting. This fee is charged by the institution underwriting a mortgage loan for compliance with Fannie Mae guidelines. Since the Mortgage in this case was clearly not intended to be sold to a Fannie Mae pool, the FNMA charge was not appropriate. Similarly, the closing statement included a $250 charge for a warehouse fee. This is a fee paid to institutions to cover the cost of a warehouse line of credit and is totally inapplicable to the transaction involved in this case. The closing statement also included a photo fee of $25, a lender's inspection fee of $150 and a survey fee of $225. There is no indication that any photos were taken, an inspection was conducted or a survey was prepared. Petitioner's Exhibit 23 also included a loan origination fee of $1,375 and brokerage fees of $1,575. Petitioner's Exhibit 7 included a lump sum brokerage fee of $5000, but did not include any of the other charges listed in this paragraph. There is no dispute that Yanks and/or his firm were paid mortgage brokerage fees out of the proceeds of the closing. These fees are reflected on both of the closing statements (Petitioner's Exhibits 7 and 23). A mortgage broker is paid a fee to negotiate a mortgage loan transaction for another party. In other words, he is retained to find a lender for a potential borrower. Under a mortgage servicing agreement, the servicer is paid a fee to handle the collection and disbursement of payments on a mortgage loan. Any fees paid for servicing a loan should be separately itemized and disclosed. It is not appropriate for a person who is to service a loan to receive what has been disclosed as a broker fee. Irrespective of which closing statement is deemed authentic, the evidence established that Yanks and/or B & B Equity received significantly more money from the closing than was reflected on either closing statement. As indicated above, $21,750 cash was presented at the closing, of which $14,000 was paid to Vazquez. According to Petitioner's Exhibit 7, there was $6,123.35 in closing costs (including a $5,000 brokerage fee). Thus, there is at least $1,626.65 in cash that is not reflected on the closing statement. Yanks contends that Vazquez told him to keep this money in return for servicing the loan. This contention is rejected as not credible. Similarly, Petitioner's Exhibit 23 indicates closing costs of $6,379 (including the charges in paragraph 89 above). Thus, there is $1371 unaccounted for. Moreover, it is clear that Yanks and/or B & B received in excess of $6,500 which is not readily discernible from the face of the closing statement. Subsequent to the closing, B & B Equity received at least five monthly payments of $704.32 on the Wraparound Mortgage from Joseph L. Hardisson, the common law husband of Pura Castillo. B & B Equity apparently distributed some of these funds in accordance with its claimed role of "servicing agent." However, on at least one occasion in late 1989, a check issued by B & B Equity to pay the Standard Federal Mortgage was returned for insufficient funds. In addition, a check issued by B & B Equity in the amount of $700 to Ana Vazquez in December of 1989 bounced. At some point in late 1989 or early 1990, Pura Castillo became concerned when she learned that the Standard Federal Mortgage had not been paid off. In January or February 1990, Pura Castillo and her husband came to Florida and attempted to contact Yanks regarding the transaction and the irregularities surrounding it. Ultimately, Pura Castillo filed a complaint with the Department and also filed a civil suit in Circuit Court seeking cancellation of the Mortgage and the issuance of a warranty deed in her favor. On April 17, 1990, Vazquez executed a warranty deed to Pura Castillo. Vazquez states that she felt obligated to convey all of her interest in the property to Pura Castillo in view of the confusing and unfair circumstances surrounding the initial transaction. On October 23, 1990, Yanks and B & B Equity entered into a Settlement Agreement with Pura Castillo pursuant to which they paid Pura Castillo $12,000 and the wraparound mortgage was cancelled of record. The Settlement Agreement also resulted in the dismissal of the civil suit and called for Pura Castillo to withdraw her complaint filed with the Department. Despite this withdrawal, the Department has chosen to proceed with this administrative action.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: A Final Order be entered finding Respondents B & B Investors, Yanks and Ana Hernandez-Yanks guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Amended Administrative Complaint, finding them not guilty of Count VI and imposing an administrative fine of $5,000 which should be payable jointly and severally. Yanks and B & B Investors should also be required to repay $9,000 to Calvary Chapel within 30 days after the rendition of the Final Order. Failure to repay this sum should be a basis for the imposition of additional penalties, including revocation. The mortgage brokerage licenses of Yanks and B & B Investors should be suspended for one (1) year for their actions in connection with the Calvary Chapel transaction. A Cease and Desist Order should also be entered against Ana Hernandez- Yanks prohibiting her from any future violations of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, from engaging in any act within the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, and from being an ultimate equitable owner of a business license pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. The facts surrounding her trust account should be reported to the Florida Bar for investigation. A Final Order should also be entered finding Yanks, Hernandez-Yanks, and B & B Equity guilty of the violations alleged in Counts VIII, IX, and XI, finding Yanks and B & B Equity guilty of the violations alleged in Counts XII and finding Hernandez-Yanks guilty of violations alleged in Count XIII of the Amended Administrative Complaint. The Final Order should find the Respondents not guilty of the violations alleged in Counts X and XIV. Based upon the foregoing, the Department should impose an administrative fine of $5,000. The mortgage brokerage license of Yanks should be suspended for a period of three years to run consecutively with the suspension issued in connection with the Calvary Chapel transaction. Respondents should also be required to repay $6,040.12 to Ana Vazquez for inappropriate and undisclosed charges made at the closing. The collection of all fines and/or assessments against Ana Hernandez- Yanks and/or B & B Investors should be suspended pending approval of the Bankruptcy Court. In view of the Voluntary Dismissal filed on November 9, 1993, the Final Order should formally dismiss the Application Case. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of August 1994. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August 1994.
The Issue Whether Assertive Mortgage LLC’s (“Assertive Mortgage”) application for a mortgage broker license should be granted.1 1 Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references shall be to the 2020 version of the Florida Statutes. See generally McClosky v. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., 115 So. 3d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the entire record of this proceeding, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: OFR is the state agency responsible for regulating mortgage brokering, mortgage lending, and loan origination.8 Toshia Glover became a Florida-licensed mortgage broker in 1999, and she became licensed in Florida and Georgia as a mortgage loan originator in 2000. At some point after 2003, she obtained a Florida real estate broker’s license. In 2006, Ms. Glover became a Georgia-licensed mortgage broker. Ms. Glover operated a mortgage broker company called A+ Loans from 2005 until September of 2008. The economic downturn that occurred in 2008 decimated her real estate and loan origination businesses and forced her to discontinue operations. 7 Pages 9 and 10 of the Transcript erroneously attribute comments by Petitioner’s counsel to counsel for Respondent. 8 Prior to 2010, OFR issued mortgage broker licenses to individuals and businesses. Since 2010, OFR has issued loan originator licenses to individuals and mortgage broker licenses to businesses. Therefore, the individual mortgage broker license is the historical equivalent of the current loan originator license. Section 494.001(18), Florida Statutes, defines a “loan originator” as “an individual who, directly or indirectly, solicits or offers to solicit a mortgage loan, accepts or offers to accept an application for a mortgage loan, negotiates or offers to negotiate the terms or conditions of a new or existing mortgage loan on behalf of a borrower or lender, or negotiates or offers to negotiate the sale of an existing mortgage loan to a noninstitutional investor for compensation or gain.” Ms. Glover moved to Georgia from Florida during the fourth quarter of 2008, and sustained herself by doing odd jobs. Ms. Parrish estimates that she earned less than $10,000 in 2009. In February of 2009, OFR unsuccessfully attempted to personally serve an Administrative Complaint on Toshia Glover alleging that A+ Loans and Ms. Glover, as the principal broker of A+ Loans, received improper compensation of $1,530 and $600. Those allegations amounted to violations of sections 494.0038(1)(a) and (1)(b)1. Florida Statutes (2005 and 2006), and rule 69V-40.008(1). In March and April of 2009, OFR published notice of the Administrative Complaint in the Sun-Sentinel daily newspaper. After Ms. Glover and A+ Loans did not respond to the Administrative Complaint, OFR issued a “Default Final Order and Notice of Rights” (“the Default Final Order”) on April 22, 2009, immediately revoking Ms. Glover’s mortgage broker license and imposing a $7,000 administrative fine for which Ms. Glover and A+ Loans were jointly and severally liable. Ms. Glover and A+ Loans were also required to refund a total of $2,130 to one or more borrowers. Ms. Glover married her current husband on December 12, 2012, and has not used her maiden name since. She will hereinafter be referred to as Ms. Parrish. Ms. Parrish owns Assertive Mortgage. In September of 2020, Ms. Parrish, on behalf of Assertive Mortgage, filed an application with OFR for licensure as a mortgage broker. The application identified Ms. Parrish as Assertive Mortgage’s president and qualifying individual. Ms. Parrish is the owner and president of Assertive Mortgage. OFR determined that Assertive Mortgage’s application could not be granted because the Default Final Order had revoked Ms. Parrish’s mortgage broker license.
Conclusions For Petitioner: H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. Suite 206 1882 Capital Circle Northeast Tallahassee, Florida 32308 For Respondent: Joaquin Alvarez, Esquire Office of Financial Regulation Fletcher Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation issue a final order denying Assertive Mortgage, LLC’s, application for a mortgage broker license. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2021. H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. Suite 206 1882 Capital Circle Northeast Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Russell C. Weigel, Commissioner Office of Financial Regulation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Joaquin Alvarez, Esquire Office of Financial Regulation Fletcher Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Anthony Cammarata, General Counsel Office of Financial Regulation The Fletcher Building, Suite 118 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0370