The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's license as a medical technologist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel was the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation of the medical technology profession in this state, and for the licensing of medical technologists in Florida. Respondent, James A. Beyer, was licensed as a medical technologist under license number JC0033961, originally issued on November 27, 1995, and current until June 30, 2000. On February 23, 1996, B.A., a 21-year-old female, was admitted to Naples Community Hospital complaining of increasing abdominal pain. Laboratory tests run on the patient indicated she was undergoing an ectopic pregnancy. A diagnostic laporoscopy was performed, as were subsequent laporotomy and left salpingectomy with lysis of adhesions. It was also determined she had severe pelvic inflammatory disease with bilateral tubo-ovarian complexes. As a result, she was placed on drug and antibiotic therapy which improved her condition. The pathology report based on the surgery performed on the patient revealed no evidence of intrauterine pregnancy in the fallopian tube specimen. She was discharged from the hospital on February 29, 1996. Final diagnosis, as indicated on the discharge summary, was "left ectopic pregnancy" with secondary diagnoses of chronic pelvic inflammatory disease and extensive pelvic adhesions. Notwithstanding the final diagnosis, as noted on the discharge summary, the Agency contends a second pregnancy test done on the patient revealed she was not pregnant. The laboratory tests giving rise to the allegedly erroneous initial diagnosis were processed in the hospital's lab by one of two technologists. Respondent was one of the two. It appears the test results for patient B.A. were confused in the lab with those of another patient. No evidence was presented to show who actually handled and processed B.A.'s specimen, nor was any evidence introduced by Petitioner to show what the laboratory's appropriate procedures were. However, Respondent's initials were entered into the computer as having done the allegedly erroneous test. Respondent labeled the incident regrettable, as indeed it was. He admits that human error caused the mix-up in specimens, but notes that the incident took place in the primary care chemistry section of the laboratory which was staffed by several different individuals. He claims it is impossible to determine who was responsible for the error. Respondent has no memory of doing the procedure and does not believe he did it. His belief is based on several factors. The first of these is that for the error to have occurred, there would have to have been at least two specimens present: that of B.A. and that of another patient. The demographic information relating to B.A. would have to have been placed on the analyzer with the specimen from the other patient. When Respondent does this test, it is his procedure to hold the specimen in his hand while he reads the label and enters the patient identification information into the analyzer computer. Then he labels the serum cup to be used with the same patient identification information as is on the specimen container he is holding. Before running the test, he verifies the identification number on the test sample cup against the identification number in the computer, and it is inconceivable to him that he would have picked up another patient's sample and placed a portion of it on the instrument instead of the sample on which he was working. Another reason he believes he did not commit the error is that the incident was thoroughly and promptly investigated by laboratory and hospital personnel, and the human error cause was treated without placing blame on anyone. No disciplinary action was taken against him by the hospital, and he is still employed by Naples Community Hospital in the laboratory in the same position as before the incident occurred. His annual ratings before and after the incident have been "meets" or "exceeds" standards. Respondent is of the opinion that the Department of Health's investigation into the incident was superficial at best and lacks concrete evidence to support the claims of misconduct made. Petitioner presented no information to indicate what are the appropriate procedures to be followed in the laboratory for the procedure in issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard M. Bernstein, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 James A. Beyer 2501 8th Street West Lehigh Acres, Florida 33971 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Eric G. Walker, Executive Director Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated sections 458.331(1)(t), 458.331(1)(m), and 458.331(1)(n), Florida Statutes (2004), and section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2006), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state department charged with regulating the practice of medicine in Florida pursuant to section 20.43, Florida Statutes (2010), and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes (2010). At all material times to the Administrative Complaints, Dr. Rubinstein was licensed as a medical doctor within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME37720. He is an otorhinolaryngologist, meaning he is a specialist in ears, nose and throat, and facial plastic and reconstructive surgery. He also treats allergies. On November 7, 2003, Dr. Rubinstein and the Department entered into a Consent Agreement, related to the following Administrative Complaints filed against Dr. Rubinstein: Case No. 2001-07091, Case No. 1999-5773, and Case No. 2000-02195. Based on the Consent Agreement, a Final Order, DOH-04-0020-S-MQ, was filed by the Board on January 7, 2004, imposing a fine of $25,000; imposing 60 hours of community service; requiring Dr. Rubinstein to submit to a two-day evaluation at the Institute for Physician Education (IPE); requiring Dr. Rubinstein to comply with the recommendations resulting from the evaluation at IPE; and placing Dr. Rubinstein on probation for five years. On August 6, 1993, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DPR) and Dr. Rubinstein entered into a Consent Agreement to resolve DPR Case Nos. 90-06221, 91-06043, 91-08800, 91-12051, 92-00308, 92-11650, 92-11763. The Consent Agreement provided a stipulated disposition of a $10,000 fine and probation for five years. The Consent Agreement was adopted by a Final Order of the Board filed August 23, 2009. On May 11, 1993, DPR and Dr. Rubinstein entered into a Consent Agreement relating to DPR Case No. 92-13503. The Consent Agreement provided a stipulated disposition of a $5,000 fine, a reprimand, and requirement that Dr. Rubinstein review section 458.331, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 21M. The Consent Agreement was adopted as a Final Order by the Board on June 8, 1993. On August 24, 1992, the Board entered a Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 0081610, 8906844, 8903225, 109405, and 8907280 finding Dr. Rubinstein guilty of violations of subsections 458.331(1)(d), (k), (m), (n), (t), and (x), Florida Statutes; imposing a $15,000 fine; reprimanding Dr. Rubinstein; prohibiting Dr. Rubinstein from initiating contact with patients or their families for the purpose of persuading them to agree to his treatment recommendations; and placing Dr. Rubinstein on probation for one year. On June 8, 2005, a Determination and Order was entered by the State of New York, Department of Health, State Board for Professional Medical Conduct, BPMC No. 05-115, revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license to practice medicine in New York, based on the disciplinary actions by the Board in the Final Order in Case DOH-04-0020-S-MQ. Facts Relating to DOAH Case No. 09-5267PL At all times material to this Administrative Complaint, Dr. Rubinstein did not hold hospital staff privileges for any hospital in the Sarasota, Florida, area. On January 11, 2005, J.D. presented to Dr. Rubinstein's office, seeking the following medical procedures: a breast lift or augmentation; possible liposuction on her hips; and a tummy tuck. J.D. completed a form during the office visit. Dr. Rubinstein recommended that J.D. have a breast augmentation; liposuction of hips, outer and inner thighs, and knees; and an abdominoplasty (tummy tuck). During the January 11, 2005, visit, Dr. Rubinstein told J.D. that he could help her with the dark circles under her eyes with some allergy testing. J.D. had not gone to Dr. Rubinstein for diagnosis, help, or treatment for any other conditions other than her request for cosmetic surgery. On January 11, 2005, J.D. was provided with a cost estimate for the surgical procedures of $29,550. These costs included a tummy tuck at $8,900; liposuction of the abdomen at $3,800; liposuction of the hips at $2,800; liposuction of the waist at $2,400; liposuction of the lateral thighs at $3,400; liposuction of the medial thighs at $1,800; liposuction of the knees at $800; operating room for $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; anesthesia at $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; and lab work for $250. The cost estimate did not include the breast augmentation. The surgical cost estimate stated: "It is estimated that your operating and recovery time will be 9 hours." J.D. took the cost estimate and discussed them with her husband, who felt that the costs were too much. J.D. called Dr. Rubinstein's office and advised that the cost was too high, and she could not have the surgeries for that price. Dr. Rubinstein revised his surgical cost estimate as follows: abdominoplasty $8,900; breast augmentation $4,200; implants $1,400; liposuction of the abdomen $0; liposuction of the hips $2,800; liposuction of the waist $0; liposuction of the lateral thighs $3,400; liposuction of the medial thighs $0; operating room at $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; anesthesia at $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; and pre-op lab work $250. There was no mention of liposuction of the knees in the revised cost estimate. The revised cost estimate stated: "It is estimated that your operating and recovery time will be 9 hours." The revised cost estimate was signed by J.D. on January 14, 2005. Both the original and revised cost estimates contained the following: "The Anesthesia and operating room charges are based on operating and recovery time. Consequently, if a surgical procedure turns out to be more or less lengthy than was expected, both fees will be correspondingly increased or decreased." J.D. went to Dr. Rubinstein's office on January 14, 2005, for a pre-operative visit. A history was taken, and a physical examination was done. Frank Steig, M.D. (Dr. Steig), who is board certified in otolaryngology, head and neck surgery, and plastic and reconstructive surgery, testified as an expert on behalf of the Department. He was of the opinion that the history and physical met the basic criteria. His opinion was based on a review of the medical records. Some of the forms used by Dr. Rubinstein in recording the information concerning J.D. were forms that are more suitable for an otolaryngology physician's use. However, no evidence was presented that the information listed on the forms did not meet the basic criteria for medical records or that the use of a certain form fell below the standard of care. Although J.D. was seeing Dr. Rubinstein for cosmetic surgery, she was asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning allergies. On or about January 14, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein gave Patient, J.D., a cost estimate for allergy testing totaling $3,565.00. On or about January 14, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein directed J.D. to go to Lab Corp for pre-operative testing, which included a CBC with Differential/Platelet, Complete Metabolic Panel, Urinalysis, Prothrombin Time, and Partial Thromboplastin Time. On or about January 19, 2005, J.D. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for the decided cosmetic procedures. Based on Dr. Rubinstein's operative report, he performed the following procedures on J.D. on January 19, 2005: abdominoplasty; liposuction of lower lateral abdomen, hips, waist, lateral thighs, medial thighs, and knees; and augmentation of breasts. Based on the surgical and anesthesia notes, the anesthesia began at 9:15 a.m. and ended at 11:55 p.m. There was some difficulty in finding a vein on J.D. that would be suitable to deliver the anesthesia. Eventually the anesthesia was administered through the jugular vein. Surgery was begun at 11:45 a.m. and was completed at 11:20 p.m. The breast augmentation took three hours and 35 minutes. The liposuction took one hour and 55 minutes. The abdominoplasty took six hours and five minutes. At the final hearing, Dr. Rubinstein testified that he would have predicted that the breast augmentation would have taken approximately two to two-and-a-half hours. He would have estimated that the liposuction would have taken one hour and 55 minutes. He would have estimated that the abdominoplasty would have taken three to four hours. Given these estimates, the planned surgery time at a maximum would have been eight hours and 25 minutes. Dr. Rubinstein's testimony contradicts his estimate of the surgical time as reflected on the surgical cost estimates, which were done prior to the surgery. The first cost estimate did not include the breast augmentation; therefore, the planned surgery for liposuction and the abdominoplasty was eight hours as reflected on the cost estimate. In the revised cost estimate, he added the breast augmentation, which he estimated to be between two and two-and-one-half hours. Thus, the planned time for the three surgical procedures would have been between ten and ten-and-one-half hours. No explanation was given by Dr. Rubinstein why there was no adjustment between the planned time for surgery as reflected in the cost estimates. On or about January 19, 2005, J.D. was taken to the recovery room at 11:55 p.m. and released to return home at 1:00 a.m. on January 20, 2005. Based on the anesthesiologist's assessment, J.D. met the discharge criteria of Dr. Rubinstein's surgical facility, which was accredited as a Level III surgical facility. J.D.'s husband, Mr. J.D., was called to Dr. Rubinstein's office to take J.D. home. He testified that after he arrived at the facility, he was told that there would be an additional fee of $4,900; however, he stated that the discharge of J.D. was not conditioned on the payment of the additional fee. The evidence is conflicting concerning when Mr. J.D. actually paid the additional $4,900 by credit card. Mr. J.D. testified that he paid by credit at the time of J.D.'s discharge on January 20, 2005. The computer credit card receipt, which was signed by Mr. J.D., shows that the payment by credit card was made at 1:01 p.m. on January 20, 2005. The evidence shows that the credit card payment was made in the afternoon of January 20, 2005. Dr. Rubinstein's operative report did not include the amount of tissue that was removed during the abdominoplasty or the tightening of J.D.'s abdominal wall. Dr. Steig, the Department's expert, did not testify that the standard of care required that such information be included in the operative report. He said that generally such information is included. Douglas Dedo, M.D. (Dr. Dedo), expert witness for Dr. Rubinstein, opined that the standard of care did not require Dr. Rubinstein to document the amount of tissue removed during the abdominoplasty or to document the tightening of the abdominal wall. Dr. Dedo's testimony is credited. Dr. Rubinstein belongs to the International Trade Exchange (ITEX), which is a corporation that serves as a network for businesses to do business with each other using an alternative currency system called trade dollars. In other words, businesses can barter with one another. Dr. Rubinstein suggested to J.D. that she might want to become a member of ITEX, and it could be a way of paying for procedures. J.D. and her husband own a tour guide service. One of Dr. Rubinstein's employees, Judy Trapani (Ms. Trapani), was interested in bartering a trip to Italy for procedures performed by Dr. Rubinstein. Based on the testimony of Mr. J.D., it appears that conversations concerning bartering a trip to Italy for surgical procedures occurred between Ms. Trapani and Mr. J.D. The evidence is not clear and convincing that Dr. Rubinstein was trying to barter the surgical procedures for a trip for Ms. Trapani. Facts Relating to DOAH Case No. 09-5269PL On March 22, 2005, B.L. first presented to Dr. Rubinstein, accompanied by her mother, C.L., for complaints of severe acne. C.L. filled out a general patient questionnaire and was also asked to fill out a form concerning allergies. It is not clear why a form relating to allergies would need to be completed prior to the initial examination when B.L. was being seen for severe acne. On the general questionnaire, C.L. indicated that B.L. had had asthma or other respiratory problems, chronic bronchitis, and ear infections. The allergy questionnaire was to determine the cause of the patient's allergy symptoms. However, B.L. was not seeing Dr. Rubinstein for allergy symptoms, and C.L., understandably, thought that the allergy questionnaire related to past symptoms. On the allergy questionnaire, C.L. indicated that B.L. had had trouble with her skin; hives; trouble with ears popping and itching, hearing loss; frequent sore throats with drainage; itching eyes; thick/colored discharge from her nose; sniffles, and sneezing. Other than trouble with her skin, B.L. did not have any of these symptoms when she presented to Dr. Rubinstein. On examination, Dr. Rubinstein noted that B.L.'s turbinates were engorged and pale and that she had hypoplastic lymphoid tissue. Dr. Rubinstein diagnosed B.L. with cystic acne. Cystic acne occurs when an obstruction of the hair follicle inflames the sebaceous gland and the inflammation rises to the surface. Allergies do not cause cystic acne. However, Dr. Rubinstein told C.L. and B.L. that food allergies could affect the inflammatory component of B.L.'s cystic acne. On one of the questionnaires, C.L. had indicated that B.L. had problems with sugars and carbohydrates. From this information, Dr. Rubinstein deduced that B.L. must have a problem with yeast and put her on a yeast-free diet. It is not understood why B.L. was put on a diet eliminating yeast, since sugar and carbohydrates also occur in foods other than foods containing yeast. Dr. Rubinstein put B.L. on a yeast-free diet before any testing was done to determine whether she had an allergy to yeast. Dr. Rubinstein also recommended blue-light therapy for the inflammation. He recommended allergy testing and the Obagi Nu-Derm System (Obagi) products. The Obagi program consists of topical products that are applied to the problem area. A prescription is required for the Obagi products. He prescribed an antibiotic, Minocycline. He also prescribed Nystatin for B.L. During the initial office visit on or about March 22, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein administered 1000mg of Erythromycin to B.L. by mouth prior to performing a deep pore facial cleansing on her. B.L. was also given a facial mask. B.L. suffered severe stomach pains and diarrhea from the Erythromycin. C.L. called Dr. Rubinstein and told him about the stomach problems, and he told C.L. that was a normal reaction. On or about March 28, 2005, B.L. and C.L. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a follow-up appointment. Dr. Rubinstein documented in the medical records that B.L.'s complexion appeared improved. He continued B.L. on Nystatin and Minocycline. Dr. Rubinstein continued to recommend the allergy tests and the Obagi program. C.L. purchased the Obagi program products for $1,200. B.L. and her mother returned to Dr. Rubinstein's office on April 4, 2005, for a follow-up visit. Dr. Rubinstein continued the Minocycline and reviewed the progress in the Obagi program. C.L. authorized the allergy tests. The charge for the allergy tests was $2,821. One of the allergy tests which Dr. Rubinstein had performed was IgG testing. Such testing is not done by mainstream allergists, and it is below the standard of care to use such testing. On the evening of April 11, 2005, B.L. ate a piece of cake at her grandmother's birthday party. On the morning of April 12, 2005, B.L. went to school at 7:30 a.m., and, by 8:20 a.m., she was experiencing hives, swollen joints, problems catching her breath, and problems moving her fingers, bending her knees, and bending her feet. B.L.'s joints were visibly swollen. C.L. took B.L. to see Dr. Rubinstein on April 12, 2005. Dr. Rubinstein noted in his records on April 12, 2005, that B.L. had hives, but he did not mention that B.L.'s joints were swollen. He opined that the hives were caused by eating cake. B.L. had eaten cake at times before the ingestion of cake on April 11, 2005, and had not experienced the symptoms that she had on April 12, 2005. B.L. has eaten cake since the ingestion of the cake on April 11, 2005, and has not experienced the symptoms that she had on April 12, 2005. Dr. Rubinstein had the results of the allergy tests to foods on April 12, 2005. None of the tests showed that B.L. was allergic to baker's yeast or gluten. One of the tests showed that B.L. might be allergic to candida albicans, which is a yeast that is usually found in babies with thrush and people whose immunity system is compromised. An allergy to candida albicans is not the same as an allergy to baker's yeast. However, Dr. Rubinstein continued the yeast-free diet. During the office visit on April 12, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein administered a 6mg dose of Decadron to B.L. for an acute allergic reaction. Decadron is a steroid used to treat conditions such as arthritis, blood/hormone/immune system disorders, allergic reactions, certain skin and eye conditions, breathing problems, certain bowel disorders, and certain cancers. B.L. had an adverse reaction to the Decadron, resulting in vomiting, stomach pains, and diarrhea. Dr. Rubinstein placed B.L. on another round of Minocycline. He suggested to C.L. that he might want to have B.L. switch to tetracycline because it may be more effective and cheaper than the Minocycline. C.L. told Dr. Rubinstein the price that she was paying for the Minocycline, and he told C.L. that if she could get the Minocycline for the price she stated that B.L. could stay on the Minocycline. During the office visit on April 12, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein lanced and drained four extremely inflamed cysts located on B.L.'s forehead and cheek. On April 12, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein suggested that B.L. go on a Rotation Elimination Diet to eliminate positive allergic foods. B.L. was to continue abstaining from eating yeast. The cost of the diet was $100. On April 12, 2005, after the office visit with Dr. Rubinstein, C.L. called Dr. Rubinstein and advised that B.L. was still not improving. Dr. Rubinstein made a note of C.L.'s telephone call. He continued to opine that the rash was caused by the ingestion of cake. He noted that the allergic reaction may be caused by the medication, but he still did not discontinue the medication. Although, Dr. Rubinstein had just examined B.L. that day, he requested that B.L. be seen again for re-evaluation. On or about April 14, 2005, C.L. went to see Dr. Rubinstein without B.L. to obtain the results of B.L.'s allergy tests. C.L. indicated that B.L.'s hives were worse. Dr. Rubinstein suggested that B.L. present to him again, after having seen B.L. two days prior, and that she may need antihistamines and medrol dose packs. He did not tell C.L. to discontinue the Minocycline. C.L. no longer trusted Dr. Rubinstein. On April 15, 2005, B.L.'s symptoms had not improved, and C.L. took B.L. to see B.L.'s pediatrician. The pediatrician referred B.L., to Hugh H. Windom, M.D. (Dr. Windom), a board-certified allergist. Dr. Windom saw B.L. on April 15, 2005, for hives, joint pain, and some swelling of her hands and lower arms. On examination, Dr. Windom found that B.L. had cystic acne, raised blanching, a red rash on her lower arm, mild nasal mucosal edema, and swelling in the joints on both hands and that B.L. was dermatographic. B.L. told Dr. Windom that she had been prescribed Minocycline by Dr. Rubinstein and had been taking it since sometime in March 2005. B.L. advised Dr. Windom that she did not take the Minocycline on April 14, 2005, and that her symptoms had improved some. Dr. Windom suspected that the hives, joint pain, and swelling were allergic reactions to drugs. He discontinued B.L.'s use of Minocycline and Nystatin. Within 24 hours after her visit with Dr. Windom, B.L.'s symptoms were gone. Dr. Windom referred B.L. to a dermatologist for her acne. Michael Pacin, M.D. (Dr. Pacin), is a board-certified allergist and testified as an expert for the Department. Dr. Pacin was of the opinion that there is no connection between allergies and acne. Acne is not an allergy symptom. He is also of the opinion that the prescription of a yeast-free diet when the physician does not know if the patient has an allergy to yeast is below the standard of care. Dr. Pacin's testimony is credited. C.L. paid Dr. Rubinstein $100 for the Rotation Diet, and $2,821 for allergy testing. Facts Relating to DOAH Case No. 09-5270PL On July 17, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein with complaints that he had a rash on his face and that it was itching. R.A. thought that he might have an allergy, which is why he sought out an allergy specialist. R.A. had not gone to see Dr. Rubinstein for any nasal problems. R.A. felt that, when he mentioned that he thought he might have allergies, "it just locked in with [Dr. Rubinstein] that he had nasal problems." R.A. filled out a questionnaire on the first visit concerning his current problem. He advised Dr. Rubinstein that he had prostate cancer in 1999, and his prostate had been removed. He also stated that he had had nasal problems and had gone to the Silverstein Institute1/ in October 2005. In December 2005, he had surgery at the Silverstein Institute. Part of the surgery had been for the removal of polyps. R.A. had been going to the Silverstein Institute for follow-up visits and felt that his nasal and sinus issues were clearing up. Dr. Rubinstein recommended that R.A. have a CT scan done. Dr. Rubinstein asked R.A. to get his medical records from the Silverstein Institute. R.A. requested his medical records, including a CT scan of his sinuses, from the Silverstein Institute, and those records were provided to Dr. Rubinstein. On July 18, 2006, a CT scan was performed on R.A. The physician who interpreted the CT scan had the following impression of the CT scan results: Surgical alteration includes bilateral superior and middle turbinate removal. Opacificaton of the anterior ethmoidal air cells present bilaterally extends into the frontal sinuses where there is mild mucoperiosteal thickening. The right sphenoid sinus is completely opacified. There is mention in the history of a possible nasal bone fracture however, fractures are not identified. The CT Scan did not show a deviated septum to the extent that surgery would be needed. The physician who prepared the report on the CT stated: "Nasal septum is not significantly deviated." The medical records from the Silverstein Institute showed that in 2005 that R.A.'s septum was intact in midline. The CT scan report stated: "Mucoperiosteal thickening exists in the left maxillary sinus in a relatively mild fashion with probable polyp formation of the anterior ethmoidal air cells." The CT scan did not conclusively state that polyps were present. Dr. Steig, the Department's expert, reviewed the CT scan image and opined that the CT scan did not show nasal polyps, but instead showed polypoid changes which may or may not have been associated with the presence of polyps. Polypoid changes can be caused by mucosal irritation or suctioning. The polypoid changes in the CT scan were on the mucosa on the lateral wall. Dr. Steig's testimony is credited. On or about July 19, 2006, Dr. Rubinstein called R.A. to discuss the CT scan results and told R.A. that the CT scan results were abnormal. Dr. Rubinstein diagnosed R.A. with chronic allergic rhinitis, chronic sinusitis, nasal septal deviation with moderate obstruction, recurrence of nasal polyps, loud snoring, and dry mouth secondary to mouth breathing. Dr. Rubinstein felt the redness on R.A.'s face was a form of rosacea. Dr. Rubinstein's treatment plan consisted of reviewing the CT results, providing R.A. with supplements, in vitro allergy testing, and providing allergy medication if needed. On July 24, 2006, R.A. underwent in vitro allergy testing, using IgE blood testing for inhalants and IgG blood testing for food. On or about July 27, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a follow-up appointment, complaining of a number of symptoms bothering him since his previous appointment the week before. R.A. complained of symptoms on his skin, a stuffy nose, sore throat, body ache, and watery eyes. On July 27, 2006, Dr. Rubinstein performed an endoscopy on R.A. Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that the polyps that had been removed at the Silverstein Institute had grown back. He further told R.A. that his septum was crooked and that the physician at the Silverstein Institute had not done a good job and needed to be reported. Dr. Rubinstein advised R.A. of the results of the allergy testing. The allergy test, which Dr. Rubinstein requested for food allergies, showed that R.A. was allergic to all foods tested except for sunflower seeds. The food allergies were tested by Commonwealth Medical Labs in Warrenton, Virginia. The test used was called an IgG test. The laboratory report stated: "This test is For Investigational Use Only. Its performance characteristics have not been cleared or approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration." Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that the allergies could be treated with homeopathic vitamins, supplements, acupuncture, and a Rotation Elimination Diet. Dr. Rubinstein sold R.A. a lot of homeopathic vitamins and supplements from Dr. Rubinstein's office. Dr. Rubinstein also recommended that R.A. get some treatments from an acupuncturist, who worked out of Dr. Rubinstein's office on a case-by-case basis. Some of the treatments included injection of some homeopathic medications. The acupuncturist was supposed to help with the rash on R.A.'s face and the allergies. On July 27, 2006, Dr. Rubinstein ordered a sleep apnea test for R.A. The method of testing was a home test, which R.A. rented from Dr. Rubinstein. R.A. often woke during the night to urinate since he had his prostate removed. The results of the test showed that R.A. had significant snoring and mild obstructive sleep apnea. Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that he suffered from sleep apnea that was very serious and that R.A. had almost died three to four times during the test. Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that he needed surgery immediately to treat the sleep apnea. The sleep apnea test did not show severe sleep apnea. The sleep could and should have been treated using positive pressure ventilation via a mask. Dr. Rubinstein's testimony that he suggested the use of a mask and R.A. rejected the idea is not credited. It is clear from R.A.'s testimony that he was led to believe by Dr. Rubinstein that his sleep apnea was life- threatening and that he needed immediate surgery. On or about July 29, 2006, R.A. returned to Dr. Rubinstein's office. Dr. Rubinstein discussed the Rotation Elimination Diet with R.A. On or about August 1, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a follow-up appointment with complaints of a stuffy nose and dry mouth. Dr. Rubinstein noted that a culture from R.A. was positive for staph aureus and prescribed the antibiotics, Septra and Gentamicin nasal spray. On or about August 4, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein with complaints of inability to breathe through his nose at night. Dr. Rubinstein reviewed the progress of the Rotation Elimination Diet with R.A. On August 8, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein complaining of bilateral congestion. Dr. Rubinstein prescribed Allegra-D, an antihistamine decongestant, and Nasonex, a cortical steroid. Dr. Rubinstein presented R.A. with a surgical plan that included: endoscopic sphenoidoscopy and debridement; septoplasty; radiofrequency inferior turbinates; radiofrequency soft palate; radiofrequency base of tongue; and bilateral intranasal endoscopic ethmoidectomy revision. Dr. Steig, the Department's expert, is of the opinion that the recommended surgeries were unnecessary and that Dr. Rubinstein should have tried medical treatment before resorting to surgery. Dr. Steig's opinion is credited. On or about August 11, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a pre-operative appointment to take a history and physical examination. Dr. Rubinstein discussed EKG results with R.A., stating that the results were borderline and that Dr. Rubinstein would ask another physician to review the results. On August 14, 2006, R.A. called Dr. Rubinstein's office and left a message that he was cancelling the surgery. R.A. went to see Howard B. Fuchs, M.D. (Dr. Fuchs), on August 14, 2006, to get a second opinion. Dr. Fuchs is board- certified in pediatrics and allergies. On August 14, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Fuchs with chronic rhinitis, which is a chronic inflammation of the nasal tissues. He wanted to find out whether he had allergies. R.A. told Dr. Fuchs that he had been tested for allergies when he was Dr. Rubinstein's patient. R.A. did not bring any of the allergy test results with him to the office visit. Dr. Fuchs told R.A. to stop taking antihistamines and scheduled R.A. for skin testing ten days later. On August 24, 2006, Dr. Fuchs performed allergy skin tests, and the results were negative. R.A. did not have any allergies. Dr. Fuchs changed the Allegra-D to doses twice a day and continued R.A. on Nasonex. The Allegra-D was for congestion and to shrink the tissues in R.A.'s nose. Dr. Fuchs diagnosed R.A. with vasomotor rhinitis, which is non-allergic. Vasomotor rhinitis is triggered by things like smoke and chemical fumes. Dr. Fuchs saw R.A. again on September 14, 2006. R.A. said that he was better, but the medication made him jittery. Dr. Fuchs changed the medication. The last time that Dr. Fuchs saw R.A. was on October 13, 2006, and R.A. said that he was doing well. On August 16, 2006, Jack J. Wazen, M.D. (Dr. Wazen), who is board certified in otolaryngology, head and neck surgery, saw R.A. for the first time. Dr. Wazen is employed at the Silverstein Institute, but had not treated R.A. when R.A. had been a patient at Silverstein Institute before August 16, 2006. R.A. was seeking a second opinion concerning Dr. Rubinstein's plan for nasal surgery. Dr. Wazen did a physical examination of R.A., including an endoscopic nasal examination, which revealed the septum to be in the midline with no obstructive deviation. There were no polyps, and the sites on which R.A. had had surgery looked well-healed. Dr. Wazen also reviewed a CT scan, which R.A. had provided. Based on his examination and evaluation, Dr. Wazen told R.A. that he did not have polyps and that there was no clinical benefit to be derived from surgery. R.A. presented with complaints of nasal congestion, stuffy nose, and hives. Dr. Wazen diagnosed R.A. with allergic rhinitis. Dr. Steig was of the opinion that surgery should not have been recommended for the sleep apnea or the chronic allergic rhinitis or chronic sinusitis without first trying other medical treatments such as a mask for the sleep apnea. He opined that the rhinitis and sinusitis could have been treated by the avoidance of a known cause of the rhinitis or sinusitis and continuation of nasal steroids and antihistamines. Dr. Steig's testimony is credited. Dr. Steig was of the opinion that the recommended surgery was not justified by the medical records. There were no polyps present and the septum was not deviated to the extent that surgery was necessary. The sleep apnea was moderate and did not warrant surgical intervention. Dr. Steig's testimony is credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered as follows: DOAH Case No. 09-5267PL Finding that Dr. Rubinstein violated section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2004); Finding that Dr. Rubinstein did not violate sections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(n); Revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license; and Imposing a $10,000 administrative fine; DOAH Case No. 09-5269PL Finding that Dr. Rubinstein violated sections 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(n), and 458.331(1)(t); Requiring Dr. Rubinstein to pay C.L. $2,921 for the allergy testing and the Rotation Diet; Revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license; and e. Imposing an administrative fine of $10,000. DOAH Case No. 09-5270PL Finding that Dr. Rubinstein violated section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2006); Revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license; and Imposing a $10,000 administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2011.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses described in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October 18, 1977, a physician authorized to practice medicine in the State of Florida under license number ME 0013979. He is a board certified dermatologist and dermapathologist. Respondent's practice is located in St. Lucie County. He is the only dermapatholgist in the county. E.M. is a former patient of Respondent. He is a fair complected retiree with red hair who has lived his entire life in areas that have warm and sunny climates. Fair complected individuals are more prone to develop skin cancers as a result of exposure to the sun than are their darker complected counterparts. E.M. had been treated for skin cancer on several occasions, dating back to some time between 1954 and 1960, before becoming Respondent's patient. In June of 1988, E.M. became concerned about two lesions that he had in a dime-sized area on his left forearm below the elbow. The lesions were scaly and crusted in texture, pea-sized in diameter, irregularly shaped, reddish in color and sensitive to the touch. E.M.'s concern led him to make an appointment to see Respondent. His initial visit to Respondent's office was on June 29, 1988. Because he was a new patient, E.M. filled out a medical history form before going into the examining room. Respondent did not give E.M. a complete physical examination. He examined only E.M.'s left forearm. His examination revealed the lesions about which E.M. was concerned. These were not the only lesions Respondent discovered on E.M.'s left forearm, however. By all appearances, the lesions on E.M.'s left forearm were pre- cancerous growths. There was no evidence of any ulceration, discharge, bleeding or other indication that these lesions were malignant. Having no reason to suspect that these lesions were cancerous, Respondent determined that they were solar keratoses, which are pre-malignant growths that appear on the superficial layers of sun damaged skin. E.M. had told Respondent before the examination that he had previously used Efudex, which is a chemotherapeutic drug used in the treatment of solar keratoses. Accordingly, at the time he made his diagnosis, Respondent knew that E.M. had a history of pre-cancerous growths. As a general rule, Respondent treats growths of the type he found on E.M.'s left forearm with cryosurgery1 and cauterization.2 If, after two or three such treatments, sufficient progress has not been made, he will then perform a biopsy to determine if there are cancerous cells in the deeper layers of the skin. In accordance with his usual practice, Respondent, during E.M.'s first visit on June 29, 1988, treated the lesions on E.M.'s left forearm, which Respondent reasonably believed to be pre-cancerous growths, with cryosurgery and cauterization. He then gave E.M. a cortisone cream to apply to the treated areas to aid the healing process. An appointment for a follow-up visit was made for July 13, 1988. Respondent next saw E.M. on July 13, 1988. His examination of E.M.'s left forearm on July 13, 1988, did not reveal any evidence of a malignancy, however, he did determine that there was a need to, and therefore he did, perform additional cryosurgery. Respondent sent E.M. home with a cream that contained not only cortisone to aid in healing, but an antibiotic as well to prevent against infection. An appointment for a second follow-up visit was made for July 27, 1988. E.M.'s next visit to Respondent was on July 27, 1988. Respondent's examination of E.M.'s left forearm on July 27, 1988, revealed that the treated areas were slowly healing. Based upon his examination, he had no reason to suspect a malignancy. Nor was there any indication that further cryosurgery was necessary. Respondent noted a flat, pigmented lesion in close proximity to the areas on E.M.'s left forearm that had been treated during his two previous visits. Respondent was not particularly concerned about this lesion,3 but he nonetheless mentioned to E.M. that it might be a good idea to have it biopsied to be on the safe side. E.M. responded that he preferred that such a biopsy not be performed. Respondent did not pursue the matter any further during the visit. Once again, Respondent gave E.M. a different cream to apply to the areas that had been treated. This time it was a pure antibiotic ointment. An appointment for a third follow-up visit was made for the morning of Wednesday, August 10, 1988. Respondent typically schedules biopsies and excisions on Wednesday mornings. E.M. cancelled his August 10, 1988, appointment with Respondent. He did not make another appointment. Accordingly, Respondent did not see E.M. as a patient again. In failing to biopsy the lesions on E.M.'s left forearm, which he had no reason to suspect were cancerous, Respondent did not act in a manner that was inconsistent with what a reasonably prudent physician with his training and experience would have done under like circumstances. More than a year later, in September, 1989, E.M. noticed that a lesion on his left forearm had opened and was draining. E.M. went to see Dr. Gary Marder, an osteopathic physician who specializes in dermatology. Marder suspected a malignancy. Accordingly, he performed a biopsy and scheduled E.M. for surgery. The initial biopsy report indicated an "invasive moderately differentiated squamous cell carcinoma." After Marder surgically excised the area, the pathologist revisited the matter and changed his diagnosis to an amelanotic melanoma, which is a rare type of melanoma4 that is characterized by an absence of pigmented cells. Pigmented lesions, like the one Respondent noticed on E.M.'s left forearm during E.M.'s July 27, 1988, visit, are not precursors of amelonotic melanomas. It was subsequently determined that the cancer had spread. Cancerous lymph nodes were removed from E.M.'s axilla in April, 1990, and from his elbow in November, 1990.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the instant Administrative Complaint against Respondent in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of January, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1992. 1/ Respondent uses liquid nitrogen to freeze and destroy the unwanted tissue. 2/ The cautery device that Respondent uses is battery-operated and produces a low current. It is particularly effective in removing rough, hard-crusted areas of skin. 3/ It did not even appear to be a pre-cancerous condition. 4/ Melanomas are one of the three types of skin cancers. Basal cell carcinomas and squamous cell carcinomas, which together account for 98% of all cancers, are the two other types. Of these three types of cancers, melanomas are the most destructive and the most likely to metastasize. 5/ Respondent has not been charged with failing to keep adequate medical records. 6/ Precisely what information E.M. provided on this form is unclear. 7/ The issue is not whether the practice described in this proposed finding is common, but whether it is acceptable. 8/ As noted above, the adequacy of Respondent's medical records are not at issue in the instant case. 9/ The Department did not advance this theory in the Administrative Complaint. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-3696 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the Department: Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second and fourth sentences: Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony than findings of fact; Third sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding suggests that there was also a "pigmented lesion" on E.M.'s left forearm that Respondent observed during E.M.'s first visit to his office, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer.5 First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance;6 Second sentence: Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case. Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence, fragment before comma: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence, fragment after comma: Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case. 11-12. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 13. Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case. 14-17. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case.7 First sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony than a finding of fact; Third sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding suggests that Respondent believed that the pigmented lesion was a squamous cell carcinoma, it is rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. First sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony than a finding of fact; Second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third sentence: Rejected because it constitutes argument regarding the credibility of testimony rather than a finding of fact. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer.8 First sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony than a finding of fact; Second sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding states that "E.M. had had several prior biopsies . . . [and therefore] was aware of the reasons for a biopsy," it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that it suggests that Respondent never recommended to E.M. that a biopsy be performed on the pigmented lesion that Respondent observed on E.M.'s left forearm during the July 27, 1988, visit and that, if such a recommendation had been made, E.M. "would have willingly submitted," it has been rejected because it is contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence; Second and third sentences: Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. First sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a recitation of testimony than a finding of fact; Second sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 28-29. Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 30-34. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in subst ance; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case. Rejected because it is contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case.9 COPIES FURNISHED: Mary B. Radkins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Shamsher Singh, M.D. 1701 Hillmoor Drive, #A-3 Port St. Lucie, Florida 34952 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a licensed certified nursing assistant, holding Florida license number 113243. On or about December 14, 2008, the Petitioner submitted to a drug screening urinalysis test at the request of an employer, Maxim Healthcare Services (Maxim). The sample was collected at a Maxim facility located at University Park, Florida. The Forensic Drug Testing Custody and Control Form and the urine sample collection container bear handwritten dates of December 13, 2008. At some point, the dates on the form and the container were overwritten to indicate that the sample was collected on December 14, 2008. According to the Respondent's Response to the Petitioner's Request for Admissions, the sample was collected on April 14, 2008. The Petitioner presented an expert witness who testified as to the testing procedures, including custody and storage of the urine samples to be tested. The expert witness' testimony regarding sample collection and transportation, calibration of equipment, sample storage and testing methodology, and reporting of test results, was persuasive and has been fully credited. According to the documentation presented by the Petitioner's expert witness, the sample collection container was received by the testing laboratory on December 15, 2008, with all transportation packaging and the sample container seal intact. According to the expert witness, the test for which Maxim paid, screened for ten drugs, including marijuana. According to the expert witness, the testing equipment was properly calibrated at the time the Respondent's urine sample was tested. The initial immunoassay test result indicated the presence of a recognized by-product of marijuana (delta nine tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid) in the Respondent's urine sample. Because the first result was positive, a second test was performed using a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry device, which confirmed the presence of delta nine tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid in the Respondent's urine sample. The Respondent denied using marijuana. The Respondent asserted that the test results were inaccurate. The Respondent testified that he had a prescription for, and was taking, hydrocodone at the time he provided the urine sample for the test at issue in this proceeding, but that the test results did not indicate the presence of hydrocodone. The Respondent asserted that the test result was either the result of lab error or that the sample was not his urine. The Petitioner's expert witness testified that the screening tests purchased by Maxim included limited testing for opiates and would not have indicated the presence of hydrocodone in the Respondent's urine. Although the Respondent testified that he had been told by Maxim personnel that the test results should have revealed the presence of hydrocodone, the Respondent's testimony in this regard was uncorroborated hearsay and was insufficient to support a finding of fact. Although the Respondent asserted that the sample tested was either not his urine or was otherwise tampered with, the evidence failed to support the assertion. There was no evidence that the sample was tampered with in any manner when the sample was obtained or during transportation to the testing laboratory. There was no evidence that the seal on the sample collection container was not intact at the time the sample was provided or transported. There was no evidence that the sample was stored improperly. There was no evidence that the testing equipment was not properly calibrated or that the tests were improperly performed. The Respondent testified, without contradiction, that over the course of 20 years in nursing work both before and after the tests at issue in this proceeding, his test results have never reported the presence of marijuana.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order assessing a fine of $250, requiring completion of an IPN evaluation, and imposing a 12-month period of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Ana M. Viamonte Ros, Secretary State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Rick Garcia, MS, RN, CCM Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Patricia Dittman, Ph.D(C), RN, CDE Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Megan M. Blancho, Esquire Carla Schell, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Michael N. Heimur, C.N.A. 4901 South Salford Boulevard North Port, Florida 34287
The Issue The issues concern the Petitioner's candidacy for licensure as a chiropractic practitioner in Florida. In particular, Petitioner stood examination for licensure in November, 1987, and was not successful in that attempt. Consequently, he has challenged the examination results in the portion of the examination related to physical diagnosis. His examination results have otherwise been sufficient to gain licensure. The Petitioner's claims in this challenge to the examination results relate to his assertions that the examination questions in dispute were not reasonable, alternatively that the answers given were sufficient and that contrary to Rule 21-11.009(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code the examiners in the oral examination phase of his testing conferred in assigning a score to his performance instead of arriving at a score independently.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, John G. Bahrs, is a graduate of Life Chiropractic College in Atlanta, Georgia, having graduated in June, 1987. He currently resides in Gainesville, Florida, at the address previously identified. In November, 1987, Petitioner took the Florida license examination to gain a license to practice chiropractic in Florida. The summarizing results of the various phases of that examination may be found in Respondent's exhibit no. 1 which is a copy of the examination results. It notes the requirement that the candidate receive a score of seventy-five (75) percent to pass the physical diagnosis portion of the examination. The score received by the Petitioner was sixty (60) percent. Having been unsuccessful in attempts to gain an adjustment of that score through an informal process, Petitioner requested a formal hearing in accordance with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. That request was honored by the submission of this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a Hearing Officer and a subsequent hearing which was held on October 3, 1988. Under the general category of physical diagnosis there are various sub- elements to that examination process. In each of those areas, Petitioner received the minimum passing score of seventy-five (75) percent by the examiners, who are referred to as examiners numbers 23 and 25, with exception of scores related to laboratory diagnosis, nutrition and x-ray technique and diagnosis. The score assigned by examiner number 25 on laboratory diagnosis equates to fifty (SO) percent and the nutrition score likewise. Examiner number 23 assigned a laboratory diagnosis score of fifty (50) percent and nutrition, twenty-five (25) percent. He also gave the Petitioner a score of fifty (50) percent on x-ray technique and diagnosis. This analysis of the scores received in the sub-elements to the examination may be found in Respondent's exhibit no. 2, a copy of that compilation which has been admitted as evidence in this case. In addition to the break out of the scores, there is a comment section prepared by each of the graders; this, together with an analysis of the written recap of these phases of the examination process and the testimony of the Petitioner and the Respondent's chiropractic expert, focuses the dispute and allows a factual analysis to be made. The expert who testified for the Respondent Agency is Dr. Steven M. Ordet. He is a graduate of the National College of Chiropractic in Lombard, Illinois. He achieved that degree in 1974. At present, he is a consultant, lecturer and author. He practiced chiropractic in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, between the years 1974 and 1985. He is a member of the American Chiropractic Association and Florida Chiropractic Association. He has been associated with the 1icensure of candidates in Florida for approximately seven (7) years as an examiner and consultant. In the subsection of the examination for which Petitioner received substandard scores on nutrition, examiner 23 noted that the Petitioner had received no training in that field. Examiner 25 made notations concerning the Petitioner's lack of understanding of the effects of use of iron and the implications of a vitamins B 6 deficiency. In his oral examination phase on nutrition, one of the questions posed related to a patient who was experiencing swelling in her hands in the morning and problems with her rings being too tight and burning in the soles of her feet. Petitioner was asked if there was some supplementation that might be provided to that patient that would assist the patient in her condition. In response, the Petitioner indicated that he had not had the type of training in his education that would lead to any specific clinical decision and that this, nutrition, was not one of his strong points. Petitioner made the suggestion by way of a query that this might sound like an edema problem to which the retort by an examiner was to the effect that you tell the examiners what you think should be done, meaning by supplementation. At hearing, the Petitioner indicated that his training in school in nutrition had related to what the food groups consist of, what vitamins are about, what minerals are and carbohydrates, proteins, again, basic information not sufficient to respond to some particular condition that a patient was experiencing. As identified by Dr. Ordet, the supplement for the problem described in the previous paragraph is pyridoxine, vitamin B 6, which is a natural diuretic that would help to reduce edema. The Petitioner did not respond sufficiently to the question under examination. Furthermore, his references provided at hearing on the topic of pyridoxine do not disturb the opinion of Dr. Ordet. Another question under the category of nutrition was to the effect that this patient, the hypothetical patient, a woman, takes vitamins and minerals regularly and is experiencing constipation and the Petitioner was asked what would cause this problem of those substances being utilized. Petitioner responded from a supplementation standpoint that he couldn't answer specifically but knows that generally you can overload a patient with supplements and can cause diarrhea or constipation. The proper answer as identified by Dr. Ordet would be that iron could cause the problem of constipation. Iron is a mineral. This is another instance in which the reference sources that the Petitioner presented did not dispel the conclusions reached by Dr. Ordet. Under the heading of x-ray technique and diagnosis, the examiners asked the Petitioner about the x-ray of a lower back involvement. He described an anterior to posterior examination in which a bucky was employed in a lateral cervical setting. He went on to describe that a non-bucky was used in x-ray of extremities measuring less than ten (10) centimeters. A further question concerned whether you would use more or less exposure going from 8 to 1 to 12 to 1 ratios and employing a bucky, to which the Petitioner indicated you would use less exposure. It is that portion of the questions which related to the ratio being increased and the belief expressed by the Petitioner that would cause less exposure that made examiner 23 grade the Petitioner down to a fifty (50) percent rating. Dr. Ordet, whose opinion is accepted on this matter, felt that the cervical view was a non-bucky projection, which contrary to the Petitioner's assertion is a matter which should be evident as a standard applied to all training in x-ray techniques. Therefore, Petitioner's claim that his schooling would allow the bucky to be employed in this form of projection is out of keeping with acceptable standards. Moreover, Dr. Ordet pointed out that the ratio increase would promote further exposure to the patient, not less exposure as answered by the Petitioner causing him to be downgraded by examiner 23. Petitioner's contention that the questions that preceded the matter of the increase in ratio were related to film exposure and not patient exposure misstates the context of those questions in this portion of the examination. It is clear that what was being referred to was the effect on the patient, not the effect on the film. The reference material which Petitioner has provided tends to confirm that the increase in ratio will increase the amount of exposure to the patient. Under the heading of laboratory diagnosis, the question was posed to the Petitioner that a female patient presents with tenderness above the pubic bone with difficulty urinating, burning sensation and pain, and he was asked to provide a statement of what laboratory tests would be ordered by the Petitioner and what would one look for through that analyses. The Petitioner responded that there is an indicated bladder infection and stated he would do an urinalysis. He was then asked what he might expect to see under that analysis and he said that he would expect to see cells, red blood cells and increased white blood cells and infection. He was asked what kind of white blood cells he would find in the urine and he said that he would see neutrophils in a microscopic examination. He again mentioned red blood cells and squamous epithelial cells in the bladder infection. In describing what he might see up in the area of the kidney, he said that he would see renal cells which are smaller and rounder compared to the epithelial cells in the area of the bladder which are larger and irregular in shape. As to a question about what he would expect to see in the way of a Ph in this case as presented compared to the normal condition, he said that he expected to see acidic values in that patient compared to the normal values which were in a range of 4.6 to 6.8 Ph. Then he stated between 4 and 6 Ph. According to Petitioner the Ph in the patient's condition would be a shift toward 4 and closer to 4 than the other end of the Ph scale. Examiner 25 had :noted that the Petitioner had insufficient knowledge of the situation in the test and Examiner 23 referenced the remarks about acidic Ph and the round kidney cells. By way of interpretation of the concerns which the examiners had In the area of laboratory diagnosis Dr. Ordet, whose opinion is accepted, noted that white cells in the urine any level show an abnormal condition. It is not the increase in those white cells that is significant. He also observed that the white cells would not be identified as neutrophils. The laboratory process, urinalysis, does not further describe the nature of the cells or than that they are white cells. Dr. Ordet identified that the nature of the cells in the kidney area were those associated with casts. Their relative size and shape are not the important factors. Consequently, the remarks by the Petitioner about size and shape of the cells in the bladder and the kidney are not significant. What is significant is to look for bonding between some foreign material and the cell forming casts in the kidney. One of the products in a cast might be calcium oxalate. Dr. Ordet noted that the Ph in the urine with the infection in this patient's case would be more alkaline, as opposed to acidic. Petitioner's reference sources concerning the urinary condition do not overturn the impressions which Dr. Ordet had of this condition in the hypothetical. Dr. Ordet has stated the opinion that the questions which were challenged were fair questions in examining a candidate for licensure as a chiropractic physician. His opinion is accepted and the opinion of the Petitioner that the questions were not fair is rejected. Petitioner, at hearing, suggested that the tape cassette of his examination which is exhibit 3 by the Respondent pointed out that contrary to Rule 21-11.009 (2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code, examiners 2 and 25 conferred in reaching conclusions about scores to be assigned to Petitioner's examination. A thorough review of that cassette does not reveal any arrangements of that sort. Their remarks indicate that the examiners were checking to see what sub-categories were involved in the examination as depicted in Respondent's exhibit number 2, and to verify that each examiner acknowledged what those sub-categories were.
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice medicine, No. ME 0046170, based upon the alleged violations of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes, set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated April 6, 1989, (the "First Administrative Complaint") which has been assigned DOAH Case No. 89-3723 and/or the Administrative Complaint dated August 16, 1990, (the "Second Administrative Complaint") which has been assigned DOAH Case No. 91-3864.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the hearings on October 3, 1990, and March 10, 1992, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician, having been issued license number ME 0046170 by the State of Florida. Respondent was initially licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida in approximately April of 1985. No evidence was presented of any prior disciplinary action against Respondent. Respondent's last known address is 10611 N.E. 11th Avenue, Miami Shores, Florida 33138. Sometime around 1986, Respondent became affiliated with EMSA which is an emergency room provider. EMSA contracts with hospitals to staff emergency rooms. Thus, Respondent has been working as an emergency room physician since 1986. The evidence did not establish the extent of Respondent's obligations with EMSA since 1986. As discussed in more detail below, since 1986, Respondent has also been affiliated with at least two other entities, the Institute of Specialized Medicine and the Immunology Allergy Institute, Inc. Facts Regarding the First Administrative Complaint Respondent was employed as a salaried employee of the Institute of Specialized Medicine (the "Institute") for at least several months during the year 1987. Although the evidence regarding Respondent's affiliation with EMSA was not entirely clear, it appears that he retained his affiliation with that company during the time that he worked at the Institute. In June of 1987, Respondent was associated with the Institute. In June of 1987, J.P. was a 36 year old female who saw an advertisement in a newspaper for the Institute of Specialized Medicine. That advertisement suggested that weight loss could be accomplished through adjusting a person's metabolism. J.P. called the Institute and scheduled an appointment for June 30, 1987. J.P. had been seriously overweight all of her adult life and had previously tried almost every possible method of weight loss. Shortly before her visit to the Institute, J.P. had been able to lose 80 pounds by diet and exercise alone. On June 30, 1987, J.P. visited the Institute and was told that she needed to provide certain information to determine her eligibility for the Institute's program. J.P. was advised that the Institute charged a $925 fee for testing and consultation. That fee included her first two visits, after which she was to be charged $40 per visit. The Institute's staff told J.P. that she had to pay $285 and that the rest would be billed to her insurance company. J.P. paid $285 on this first visit. On her first visit, J.P. filled out various questionnaires regarding her health, background and other general information. She was given a "blood test," a spirometric test, an EKG, and she provided a urine sample. J.P. did not see a physician or dietician during this visit. On July 6, 1987, J.P. returned to the Institute and was seen for about ten minutes by Respondent, who listened to her heart and lungs. Her height, weight, blood pressure, and pulse rate were noted, but no other physical examination was performed and Respondent did not inquire regarding any of the matters disclosed in the questionnaire filled out by J.P. during her first visit. During the July 6, 1987 visit, Respondent informed J.P. of his interpretation of her test results. He told J.P. that her tests showed she had an irregular thyroid, that her metabolism was below normal range, and that her body retained fluid. In his records of J.P.'s July 6, 1987 visit, Respondent diagnosed J.P. as having "Euthyroid Sick Syndrome." Euthyroid Sick Syndrome is a condition which may arise in a patient seriously ill from another cause. In such a situation, there are abnormal findings in blood tests for thyroid function, but these findings do not indicate the true thyroid status which is normal. The evidence established that this was an incorrect diagnosis for J.P. based upon the test results and history provided. Respondent did not provide a cogent explanation for his written diagnosis of Euthyroid Sick Syndrome nor did he explain the verbal diagnosis given to J.P. Respondent's records do not include the results of the spirometric test or the EKG. In addition, the urinalysis was incomplete and, while the doctor's notes and billing records reflect a chest x-ray was taken, there is no evidence of such an x-ray in the records. The results of J.P.'s blood tests reflect all normal values with the exception of a slightly low "total iron." At the conclusion of the July 6, 1987 visit, Respondent prescribed Cytomel, 25 micrograms BID, and Maxzide for J.P. No directions were given regarding the administration of Maxzide. Cytomel is a prescription drug containing the active ingredient of the secretions of the thyroid gland. Cytomel is used to replace the hormone in cases of thyroid underactivity (hypothyroidism). There is no indication from the medical records that J.P. was suffering from Euthyroid Sick Syndrome, that her thyroid was malfunctioning, that her metabolism was below normal, or that she required any hormonal replacement therapy. Respondent now admits that the test results indicate J.P. was not hypothyroid. Respondent claims that if he had actually believed that the patient had been hypothyroid, the dosage prescribed would have been approximately three times greater. He contends that he prescribed Cytomel to increase oxygen consumption. To justify his prescription of Cytomel, Respondent cited to two medical texts which he claims were in wide circulation in 1987. He says those texts support his prescription of Thyroid hormone to encourage weight reduction. Only one of the two cited references even marginally supports Respondent's contention. In any event, the more persuasive evidence established that, before the advent of thyroid testing (approximately twenty years ago), Cytomel was occasionally used in an attempt to encourage weight loss in patients. However, the prescription of Cytomel for weight loss in 1987 was below the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent physician under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent also attempted to justify his prescription of Cytomel by claiming that J.P. had advised him that she had previously been taking a thyroid supplement. Respondent contends that some patients who stop taking thyroid supplements have a "rebound effect where their metabolic rate decreases." During her testimony, J.P. denied having ever been on thyroid medication. The questionnaires filled out by J.P. during her first visit to the Institute do not reflect that she had ever taken thyroid medication in the past. Furthermore, there is no notation in the medical records indicating that J.P. had been on thyroid medication in the past. Respondent's testimony that J.P. advised him that she had previously been on thyroid supplements but was no longer taking them is not credited. Maxzide is a prescription drug, a diuretic appropriate for patients with high blood pressure. Maxzide should not be used as initial therapy for fluid retention. Maxzide can have deleterious effects on a patient and should not be used in a weight reduction program unless other reasons indicating its use are present. Respondent's medical records do not justify the prescription of Maxzide to J.P. There is no indication that the patient had high blood pressure. Furthermore, J.P. denied having any previous problems with fluid retention and no such problems are noted on the medical history that she filled out. While Respondent noted "++edema" as part of his examination on July 6, 1987, the notation is not consistent with Respondent's other notes of his exam or J.P.'s testimony regarding her condition. Moreover, J.P.'s weight loss of only three pounds between July 6 and July 30, 1987, indicates that she had no edema on July 6, 1987. During the July 6, 1987 visit, J.P. saw the Dietitian at the Institute of Specialized Medicine for about 20 minutes. The only thing the Dietitian did was to give J.P. a 1,000 calorie per day diet which she was told to follow. On July 30, 1987, J.P. returned to the Institute to see Respondent because she thought she was suffering nausea from the effects of the medications Cytomel and Maxzide. Respondent did not document in his notes any treatment for her nausea. J.P.'s health insurance claim form, submitted under Respondent's signature, reflects a diagnosis of "Euthyroidism" and a corresponding insurance code number of 244.9. Euthyroidism means normal thyroid function. An insurance company will not pay for a diagnosis of a normal condition. Insurance code number 244.9 indicates a condition of hypothyroidism or thyroid insufficiency which Patient J.P. did not have. The health insurance claim form submitted under Respondent's signature reflects overlapping billings for a hemogram and WBC, includes charges for an x- ray and spirometry of which there is no record, and contains a coded diagnosis of Hypothyroidism which conflicts with the results of the tests performed on J.P. and also conflicts with the Respondent's recorded diagnosis of Euthyroid Sick Syndrome. The insurance claim form also includes charges for a complete history and physical. After J.P. filed a complaint with Petitioner, Respondent attempted to justify this billing by telling Petitioner's investigator that he gave J.P. a complete physical examination and a "full workup". However, the evidence established that Respondent did not perform a complete physical examination of J.P. Respondent did not examine J.P.'s breasts, recommend a mammogram, perform or refer J.P. for a gynecological examination, examine her throat, eyes, ears, or abdomen; address her familial history of diabetes, kidney disease, hypertension or obesity; question her about her listed allergies, past anemia, abnormal stomach x-rays, or changing moles; consider her serious depressions and emotional problems; interpret her EKG; or address the basic causes of her obesity. Respondent contends that he did not handle the billing for the Institute and did not himself submit any diagnosis to the insurance carrier. In addition, he claims that he has subsequently learned that the Institute forged his name on some insurance documents. These contentions do not provide a defense to the charges in this case. It is clear that the billings to the insurance company were submitted under Respondent's signature. There is no evidence that the health claim form in this case was forged. The insurance company directed an inquiry to Respondent regarding his diagnosis of J.P. and Respondent did little or nothing to clarify the situation. Furthermore, when J.P. complained to Respondent about the treatment and costs, there is no indication that Respondent took any steps to investigate the situation or correct the problems. In the original billings submitted to J.P.'s insurance company, the Institute sought payment of $925 for the treatment and tests rendered to J.P., even though the patient had already paid $285 of that agreed upon fee. Respondent's records reflect that ultimately the insurance company paid $670 for the services rendered to J.P. Respondent's treatment of J.P. failed to meet that level of care, skill and treatment expected of a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar conditions and circumstances because Respondent inappropriately prescribed Cytomel and Maxzide to J.P. when the need for those drugs was not indicated by the results of the tests performed and because his final diagnosis of "Euthyroid Sick Syndrome" was incorrect and unsupported by any tests or physical findings. Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying his course of treatment of J.P. because the records (1) do not justify his diagnosis of Euthyroid Sick Syndrome, (2) do not justify his prescription of Cytomel for the patient who had no evidence or history of hypothyroidism, (3) do not justify his prescription of Maxzide for the patient who had no fluid retention and who presented with normal findings other than her obesity, (4) do not justify the extensive and inappropriate tests performed, (5) do not appropriately reflect J.P.'s EKG, do not report on results of her x-ray (if it was made) or spirometry, and (6) do not indicate that Respondent either advised or treated J.P. on July 30, 1987, when she complained that the medications were making her nauseous. By prescribing medications for J.P. which were medically unnecessary, by filing conflicting diagnoses, by charging for a complete physical examination when one was not performed, and by signing off on duplicative billing on J.P.'s health insurance claim form, Respondent has made deceptive, untrue and/or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine. Facts Regarding the Second Administrative Complaint Respondent quit working at the Institute in approximately November of 1987. As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Respondent was indicted in October of 1988 in connection with his affiliation with the Institute of Specialized Medicine. While the circumstances and facts surrounding that indictment were not fully explained at the hearing in this cause, it appears that Respondent was indicted with several other individuals for allegedly participating in a scheme to defraud insurance companies by billing for tests and treatments that were unnecessary or unrelated to patients' true conditions. The indictment was pending through out the time of the incidents alleged in the Second Administrative Complaint. Respondent ultimately entered into a pretrial diversion program as a result of those charges. Sometime in 1988, Respondent became associated with the Immunology Allergy Institute, Inc., (the "Allergy Clinic"). Respondent claims that he was seeking to establish a private family practice and associated with the Allergy Clinic as part of an office sharing arrangement. The Allergy Clinic was owned by Frank Seedarnee and his ex-wife. Respondent contends that in return for office space, he was to serve as the "medical director" for the office and would be responsible for examining and diagnosing all medical problems and prescribing necessary controlled substances. Respondent contends that he never discussed cases with Seedarnee and did not rely on any recommendations from him because Seedarnee was not a doctor. Respondent further contends that Seedarnee's only function was to recommend diet changes, vitamins, or other products to help patients keep their homes free from allergies. However, the evidence presented in this case established that the Allergy Clinic did not always function in this manner, at least with respect to the patient S.L. and her son A.L. In March of 1989, S.L. was experiencing sinus problems and had a cough. In addition her son, age 10 months at the time, had been coughing for a few months. S.L. had previously been diagnosed as having allergies. S.L. was told of the Allergy Clinic by a friend who recommended "Dr. Seedarnee" as a allergist. She assumed from this conversation that Dr. Seedarnee was a medical doctor. She made an appointment at the Allergy Clinic for herself and her son for March 30, 1989. On March 30, 1989, S.L. arrived at the Allergy Clinic with her son as scheduled. She did not see a sign at the Allergy Clinic or any indication as to who the doctors were. During her initial visit, S.L. filled out an extensive health questionnaire form on herself and her son, A.L. S.L. and her son were escorted by a woman who appeared to be a nurse into an office. The nurse stated "Dr. Seedarnee will see you now." This nurse also mentioned that Respondent was not in because he was out on an emergency. The office contained a large microscope and a TV-like screen. A man in a white coat introduced himself as Dr. Seedarnee. Seedarnee reviewed S.L.'s health history forms and discussed with her the reasons why she wished to see an allergist. He told S.L. that he had developed an immune booster to help immune systems, that he would be taking blood from S.L. and A.L. so he could diagnose their problems, and that he had invented a microscope capable of evaluating the blood that same day. Seedarnee did not physically examine S.L. or A.L. or inquire if anyone else in the office had examined them. Seedarnee ordered a nurse to draw blood from S.L. and A.L. The blood was drawn as requested without question or surprise by the nurse. S.L. also provided a urine sample at the nurse's request. After the samples were obtained, S.L. and A.L. returned to Seedarnee's office where an enlarged picture of two slides of blood were shown to S.L. on the TV-like screen. Seedarnee took photographs of the blood slides and gave them to S.L. Those photographs were introduced as Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 3. Seedarnee told S.L. that the white cell in the middle of her blood slide was an "allergy cell" and the other figures in the picture were iron- deficient cells. He also told her that she had a "low immune system." Seedarnee told S.L. that A.L.'s blood slide had clumped-together cells because he had a sluggish immune system. Seedarnee indicated that his conclusions were based on the blood pictures. He recommended that S.L. receive one of his "immune boosters" once a month for the next few months and one yearly thereafter. He also indicated that A.L. needed an immune booster and should get one yearly thereafter. Seedarnee specifically used the words "diagnosis" and "treatment" and stated that he was going to run further tests in order to make his final diagnosis. Seedarnee's statements to S.L. on March 30 constituted a diagnosis and the practice of medicine. The evidence presented at the hearing established that the diagnosis made by Seedarnee on March 30 could not validly be made on the basis of the blood slides. Moreover, the pictures of S.L.'s and A.L.'s blood appear normal. The "allergy cell" was simply a white blood cell and the clumping of A.L.'s blood was due to an artifact. S.L. did not see Respondent or any other person she thought was a physician on the March 30 visit. At this point, she still believed Seedarnee to be a physician. S.L. was told that she was required to pay 20% of the "total cost" for the treatment and her insurance company was to pay the remaining 80%. At the conclusion of the March 30, 1989 visit, S.L. wrote a check to the Allergy Clinic for $371.20. On April 4, 1989, S.L. returned without her son to the Allergy Clinic. She did not bring her son because her husband was skeptical that a proper diagnosis could be made from the blood slide picture. On April 4, S.L. was taken directly to Seedarnee's office where Seedarnee reviewed with her the results from her blood test and urinalysis, told her that she was allergic to dust and had a sensitivity to milk and yeast, and suggested to her that she needed his immune booster and B-12 injections. Seedarnee also reviewed with S.L. her son's test results. He told S.L. that A.L. had no allergy problems, but, because A.L. had a low immune system, he recommended an immune booster. During the April 4 visit, S.L. asked Seedarnee where he went to school. He told her India and England and said he had a Ph.D. and worked under a physician. Until this time, S.L. believed him to be a medical doctor. The office staff at the Allergy Clinic all referred to Seedarnee as "doctor." The medical records from the Allergy Clinic for S.L. and A.L. are captioned as follows: Patient: L, S. Physician: Seedarnee/Kunen and Patient: L, A. Physician: Seedarnee/Kunen After S.L. met with Seedarnee in his office on April 4, she was given two injections by a nurse. The medical records indicate the injections were (1) B-12 and Folic Acid and (2) "URT." There was no doctor's order for these injections. At the hearing, neither Seedarnee nor Respondent could, or would, identify "URT." Seedarnee's interpretation of tests, diagnosis of allergies and development of a treatment plan for S.L. on April 4 by ordering two injections for her which were given before S.L. ever saw a physician constitute the practice of medicine. After the injections, the nurse took S.L. to an examining room. Shortly thereafter, Respondent entered and introduced himself as Dr. Kunen. He asked S.L. what Dr. Seedarnee had recommended. Thus, it is clear that Respondent was aware that the patient had already seen Seedarnee and that he knew Seedarnee had at least developed some recommendations for her treatment. It is not clear whether Respondent knew that S.L. had already been given two injections. S.L. told Respondent that Seedarnee had diagnosed her allergies and told her that she needed B-complex, an immune booster and yearly immune boosters thereafter. Respondent's only response was something to the effect of "good, fine." He said nothing more about her treatment. S.L. was with Respondent for only about five minutes. Respondent briefly examined her. He listened to her heart and lungs and checked the glands in her neck. She was fully clothed during the exam. Respondent did not review with S.L. any of the items on her health form questionnaire. He did not inquire as to any of the items noted on the form such as the antibiotics she was taking, her sensitivity to perfume, her symptoms of fatigue and/or lethargy, her complaints of pressure in her head, muscle weakness and heart palpitations, or her notations of mucus in her stool or problems with urinary frequency. Her blood pressure was never taken. She was not asked about her history of rheumatic fever. Respondent did not discuss with S.L. her allergy symptoms, what she was allergic to, her test results or why she needed an immune booster and B-complex. Respondent did not ask about A.L. and S.L. did not tell Respondent that she wanted A.L. to be tested. Respondent's medical records regarding S.L. contain one undated page of notes indicating that Respondent requested allergy testing for S.L. and that S.L. wanted her son to be tested. S.L. denies telling Respondent that she wanted her son tested. Indeed, the evidence established that S.L. and her son had already been tested the week before by Seedarnee and that S.L. told Respondent of Seedarnee's diagnosis and treatment plan. Respondent's medical records for A.L. contain the boy's birth date rather than a current date. The notation in Respondent's handwriting states "patient here for testing, will return next week." Respondent claims that he saw the son otherwise he would not have filled out this medical note on the child. S.L. claims that her son was not with her on the April 4, 1989 visit and, therefore, Respondent never saw him. S.L.'s testimony is credited. In sum, it is concluded that Respondent's notes in the medical records for S.L. and A.L. do not accurately reflect the events that occurred and were an apparent attempt to justify after the fact Seedarnee's actions and treatment. It is also concluded that Respondent never saw A.L. as a patient and that Respondent "recommended" a treatment plan for S.L. which had already been carried out. At the conclusion of her April 4 visit, S.L. wrote a check to the Allergy Clinic for $162 to cover the cost of her visit and the purchase of a product which Seedarnee had recommended and supposedly developed called Allergex. This product was supposed to be put in the laundry and used to wipe down tables, etc. to eliminate household dust. After her visit on April 4, S.L.'s suspicions were aroused. She inquired of authorities about the licensure of the Allergy Clinic (it had none) and of Respondent and Seedarnee (he had no license). Following the April 4 visit to the Allergy Clinic, S.L. went to see a Board certified allergist who questioned the treatment she received at the Institute. The allergist advised S.L. that she was allergic to items other than those Seedarnee had claimed. On May 23, 1989, S.L. wrote to Respondent elaborating on what Seedarnee had done, complaining that she was mislead to believe that Seedarnee was a physician and that Respondent had done nothing but rubber stamp Seedarnee's findings and treatment. Respondent was on notice at least from this time that Seedarnee was practicing medicine without a license. S.L. filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation on June 9, 1989. During the ensuing investigation, Respondent told the Department's investigator on January 23, 1990 that Seedarnee only worked under his supervision and that Seedarnee never made recommendations to patients. These statements were made even though S.L. had told Respondent during her April 4th visit and in her letter of May 23, 1989 about Seedarnee's actions. At the hearing, Respondent disclaimed any knowledge of the "diagnosis" made by Seedarnee and/or the administration of injections to S.L. pursuant to Seedarnee's instructions. He suggests that if any such actions took place, they were contrary to the specific understandings that he had as to the procedures of the Allergy Clinic. Even if Respondent thought that he was supposed to make all diagnoses and develop all treatment plans at the Clinic, it is clear that these procedures were not followed with respect to S.L. and A.L. Moreover, it is clear that Respondent was aware of Seedarnee's activities by at least April 4, 1989. It is the physician's responsibility to formulate a treatment plan and treat a patient. Professional responsibility should be delegated only to individuals who have training and degrees to perform those tasks and non-medical personnel should not be allowed to assume functions that are to be performed by physicians. It is the physician's obligation, if he knows an unlicensed, untrained individual with whom he is working is following practices which constitute the practice of medicine, to stop that activity if possible and report it to the Department of Professional Regulation. Respondent was aware that Seedarnee was not a licensed medical doctor and was not qualified to make a diagnosis or to treat patients. Respondent never reported Seedarnee's unlicensed activity to any authority. Respondent's actions on April 4 with respect to S.L. constitute an acquiescence to Seedarnee's recommendations and treatment. Respondent contends that even if S.L. was administered the two injections discussed above, there is no evidence that those injections were controlled substances. Thus, Respondent argues there is no evidence that Seedarnee engaged in the unauthorized practice of medicine. This contention is rejected. As noted above, neither Seedarnee nor Respondent could explain what the immune booster or "URT" was. They both suggest that anything not prescribed should be considered part of a therapy program not medicine. However, the administration of an injection, particularly if not indicated by medical testing, always runs the risk of causing a reaction in a patient. The Respondent's interpretation of the practice of medicine is unduly narrow and is rejected. As discussed above, it is clear that the Clinic operations led at least one person, S.L., to believe that Seedarnee was a physician and it is clear that, with respect to at least this patient, Seedarnee interpreted test results, developed a diagnosis and directed a treatment plan. Moreover, it is clear that Respondent was made aware of these activities by at least April 4, 1989 and that he took no steps to halt or correct the situation and, indeed, that he acquiesced to it. The Allergy Clinic has been owned by Seedarnee for approximately 12 years. Seedarnee refers to the entity as a "research institute" rather than a laboratory or medical clinic. Seedarnee formulated the internal rules and procedures for the Allergy Clinic. Seedarnee's testimony on these procedures and other issues at the hearing was evasive, ambiguous and inconsistent. Seedarnee recognized that he needed a licensed physician to "approve prescribed substances and supervise techniques." However, it is clear that, at least during the time in question, the Allergy Clinic was operated in a manner that permitted him to diagnose and order vitamins and booster injections. Respondent was Medical Director of the Allergy Clinic from 1988 until at least mid-1990. Other than the matters raised in the Second Administrative Complaint and discussed above, no evidence was presented as to any other situations where Respondent acquiesced in the practice of medicine by Seedarnee. Respondent's testimony regarding his relationship with the Allergy Clinic was vague, conveniently selective and sometimes inconsistent. Respondent admits that he was hired to be Medical Director and was given office space. However, he claims that he had no obligation to Seedarnee, was not salaried (although he admits he was "loaned" money by Seedarnee, only some of which he paid back) and that he had no duties as Medical Director except "to be a good physician and see patients and to build a practice." He says he never had the need to discuss a case from a medical standpoint with Seedarnee or with other physicians there. He also says there were no staff meetings. Seedarnee's version of the relationship was quite different. Seedarnee testified that Respondent was paid a salary for his duties at the Allergy Clinic. At one point, Seedarnee claimed that the Medical Director made decisions for testing of patients on the basis of the patient's medical questionnaire. Because the allegations of the Second Administrative Complaint are limited to the treatment rendered to S.L. and her son, it is not necessary to fully explore and/or resolve the nature of Respondent's affiliation with the Allergy Clinic. That evidence established that, at least with respect to S.L. and her son, Respondent's role differed greatly from his description of the Clinic's operations. Respondent failed to report what was clearly the unauthorized practice of medicine by Seedarnee. Furthermore, by acquiescing in Seedarnee's diagnosis and treatment, Respondent unlawfully delegated professional responsibility to a person he knew to be unlicensed. Finally, Respondent's participation in the treatment of S.L. and her son constitutes the employment of a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(k), (m) and (t), Florida Statutes as alleged in the First Administrative Complaint and finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 458.331(e), (k) and (w), Florida Statutes as alleged in the Second Administrative Complaint. As punishment therefore, Respondent should be (1) reprimanded, (2) fined $15,000, (3) suspended from the practice of medicine for five years, two years of which should be suspended if Respondent successfully completes Board approved continuing medical education courses, and (4) thereafter, Respondent should be placed on probation for a period of three years, the terms and conditions of which should be set by the Board of Medicine. It is recommended that one condition of probation should be a limitation on Respondent's establishment or participation in a private office practice. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of September, 1992. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX Case Numbers 89-3723 and 91-3864 Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Submittal with Respect to the October 3, 1990 Hearing Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. 4. Adopted and 8. in substance in Findings of Fact 7 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. 6. Adopted 10. in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted 14. in substance in Findings of Fact The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. The second sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 31. The Petitioner's Supplemental Proposals regarding the First Administrative Complaint Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20 and 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 11. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings regarding the Second Administrative Complaint Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36 and 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 41. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 42. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 43. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 45. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 46. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 50. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 52. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 53. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 53. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 53. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 56. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 54. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 55. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 57. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 58. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 58. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 58. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 59. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 59. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 59 and 61. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 62. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 63. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 64. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66 and 67. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 68. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 69. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 57. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 76. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 74. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 71. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 72. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 76. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 77. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76 and 77. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 79 and 80. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact regarding the Second Administrative Complaint Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Rejected as unnecessary. The first and the third sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. The second sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 33-35, 70, 75 and 79-80. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 34. Rejected as unnecessary. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 38. 6.-10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35, 70, 75, 77, 79 and 80. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to Findings of Fact 40, 58 and 59. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to Findings of Fact 58 and 59. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 59. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 37. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 41 Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 45. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 42. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 49. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 46 and 47. 28.-29. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to Findings of Fact 70. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 50. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 52 and 53. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 54. The first two sentences are adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 55 and 57. The remainder is subordinate to Findings of Fact 70, 79 and 80. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 35, 70, 75, 79 and 80. 36.-37. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 70, 75, 77, 79 and 80. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 70. Rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76, 77 and 78. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 75. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 75, 79 and 80. Rejected as vague, ambiguous and unnecessary. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 56. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to Findings of Fact 64. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 70. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 70. Rejected as unnecessary. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 34 and 77. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 57 and 70. Rejected as unnecessary. The evidence established that Respondent continued working at the Allergy Clinic for a year or more after S.L. alerted him to Seedarnee's actions. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact regarding the First Administrative Complaint Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and subordinate to Findings of Fact 18 and 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence and subordinate to Findings of Fact 18 and 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary and as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 28. Rejected as unnecessary and subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Rejected as constituting argument. The issues raised by Respondent go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. The issues raised by Respondent regarding Dr. Lindbergh's qualifications go to the weight to be given to his testimony rather than its admissibility. Rejected as constituting argument. See #31 above. Rejected as speculative, constituting argument rather than a finding of fact and unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Addressed in Findings of Fact 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary B. Radkins, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Northwood Centre, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Neil F. Garfield, Esquire Suite 333 3500 North State Road 7 Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33319 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation/Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Northwood Centre, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Northwood Centre, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
