The Issue The issue in this case is whether proposed amendments to Rule 12A-1.070 are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners and Intervenors challenge Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1) and (4)(a) and (b). Respondent published the amendments in the Florida Administrative Law Weekly on March 18, 1994 and June 10, 1994. As described in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the proposed rule amendments address, among other things, the taxation of payments to airport authorities from concessionaires like rental car companies and airport restaurants. The law imposes a sales tax on payments for the use or occupancy of real property, whether the agreement consists of a lease or a license to use real property. The main dispute in these cases is whether the proposed rule amendments illegally extend the sales tax to payments for intangibles like a concession, franchise, or privilege to do business.
Findings Of Fact The Proposed Rules By notice published in 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 1549 on March 18, 1994, Respondent proposed amendments to existing Rule 12A-1.070. (All references to Sections are to Florida Statutes. All references to Rules are to the Florida Administrative Code. All references to Proposed Rules are to the rule amendments that are the subject of this proceeding.) The notice explains that the purpose of the rule amendments is to clarify the application of specific statutory sales tax exemptions for the lease or license to use real property at airports, malls and nursing homes. The rule amendments clarify that the total payment pursuant to a lease or license of real property is subject to tax, unless specifically exempt, irrespective of how the payment, or a portion thereof, is identified. However, if such leased property includes specifically exempt property, then such exemption may be applied on a pro rata basis. 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 1549 (March 18, 1994). In the notice, Respondent cites as specific authority for the proposed amendments Sections 212.17(6), 212.18(2), and 213.06(1). Respondent states that the proposed amendments implement Sections 212.02(10)(h) and (i) and (13), 212.03(6), and 212.031. By notice published June 10, 1994, in 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 4096, Respondent proposed amendments to the amendments previously proposed. As amended by both notices, Rule 12A-1.070 provides, with deletions stricken through and additions underlined: * 12A-1.070 Leases and Licenses of Real Property; Storage of Boats and Aircraft (1)(a) Every person who rents or leases any real property or who grants a license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property is exer- cising a taxable privilege unless such real property is: * * * <<a>>. Property used at an airport exclusively for the purpose of aircraft landing or aircraft taxiing or property used by an airline for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft or for fueling aircraft. See Subsection (3). <<b. Property which is used by an airline exclusively for loading or unloading passengers onto or from an aircraft is exempt. This property includes: common walkways inside a terminal building used by passengers for boarding or departing from an aircraft, ticket counters, baggage claim areas, ramp and apron areas, and departure lounges (the rooms which are used by passengers as a sitting or gathering area immed- iately before surrendering their tickets to board the aircraft). Departure lounges commonly known as VIP lounges or airport clubs which are affiliated with an airline or a club which requires a membership or charge or for which membership or usage is determined by ticket status are not included as property exempt from tax. The lease or license to use passenger loading bridges (jetways) and baggage conveyor systems comes under this exemption, provided that the jetways and baggage conveyor systems are deemed real property. In order for the jetways and baggage conveyors to be deemed real property, the owner of these items must also be the owner of the land to which they are attached, and must have had the intention that such property become a permanent accession to the realty from the moment of installation. The items shall not be considered real property if the owner, when the owner is not the airport, retains title to the items after the purchase/installation indebtedness has been paid in full. Any operator of an airport, such as an airport authority, which is the lessee of the land on which the airport has its situs is, for the purposes of this sub- subparagraph, deemed the owner of such land. Real property used by an airline for purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft which is exempt from tax includes: office areas used to process tickets, baggage processing areas, operations areas used for the purpose of the operational control of an airline's aircraft, and air cargo areas. If any portion of the above property is used for any other purpose, it is taxed on a pro- rata basis, which shall be determined by the square footage of the portions of the areas in the airport that are used by an airline exclusively for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft (which areas shall be the numerator) compared to the total square footage of such areas used by the airlines (which areas shall be the denominator). Example: An airline leases a total of 3,000 square feet from an airport authority. The airline uses the space as follows: 1,000 square feet are used to process tickets and check in the passengers' luggage; 1,000 square feet are used for the passengers' departure lounge; and 1,000 square feet are used for the management office and the employees' lounge. The 1,000 square feet used to process tickets and check in the luggage is exempt; the 1,000 square feet used as a passengers' departure lounge is also exempt; and the 1,000 square feet used as the management office and employees' lounge is taxable. Therefore, a total of 2,000 square feet is exempt because that portion of the total space leased by the airline is used exclusively for the purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft. However, the total amount used as office space and the employees' lounge (i.e., 1,000 square feet) is taxable, because that portion of the space leased by the airline is not used exclusively for the purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft. Real property used for fueling aircraft is taxable when the fueling activities are conducted by a lessee or licensee which is not an airline. However, the charge made to an airline for the use of aprons, ramps, or other areas used for fueling aircrafts is exempt. From July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1991, property used at an airport to operate advertising displays in any county as defined in s. 125.011(1), F.S., was exempt from tax.>> * * * (b)1. A person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food or drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall be subject to tax on the rental of such real property. 2. However, effective July 1, 1987, a person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food and drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall not be subject to the tax on any license to use such property. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "sale" shall not include the leasing of tangible personal property. <<3. For purposes of this rule, the term "retail concessionaire," which may be either a lessee or licensee, shall mean any person .. . who makes sales of food, drinks, or other tangible personal property directly to the general public within the premises of an airport. With regard to airports, any persons which contract to service or supply tangible personal property for airline operations are considered to be providing aircraft support services and are not concessionaires for purposes of this rule.>> * * * The provisions of this rule relating to the license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property are effective July 1, 1986, unless other- wise noted. "Real property" means the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with "realty" and "real estate." "License," with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or parcel of real property for any purpose. <<1. Example:>> [[(g)]] An agreement whereby the owner of real property grants another person permission to install and <<operate>> [[maintain]] a full service coin-operated vending machine, coin- operated amusement machine, coin-operated laundry machine, or any like items, on the premises is a [[taxable]] license to use real property. The consideration paid by the machine owner to the real property owner <<for the license to use the real property>> is taxable. . . . <<2. Example:>> [[(h)]] An agreement between the owner of real property and an advertising agency for the use of real property to display advertising matter is a [[taxable]] license to use real property. <<The consideration paid by the advertising agency to the real property owner for the license to use the real property is taxable.>> * * * (4)(a)<<1.>> The tenant or person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use any real property from which rental or license fee is subject to taxation under s. 212.031, F.S., and shall pay the tax to his immediate landlord or other person granting the right to such tenant or person to occupy or use such real property. <<2. Where the lessor's or licensor's ability to impose fee(s) is based on its ownership or control of the real property, and the payment made to the lessor or licensor is for the lessee's or licensee's use of the real property, such fees are subject to tax. In such circumstances, the total payment for the use of real property, including airport property, is taxable, irrespective that the payment or a portion of the payment may be identified as consideration for the privilege to do business at that location, privilege fee, guaranteed minimum, concession fee, percentage fee, or by the use of similar terms which seek to distinguish such portion(s) from the payment for the lease of or license to use such real property for any purpose, unless such lease or license is otherwise specifically exempt. Example: A clothing retailer occupying a location inside a mall has an agreement with the owner of the mall under which it pays a minimum rent plus a percentage of its gross sales for the right to operate its store at that location. The agreement characterizes the minimum rent as consideration for the lease of designated real property and the percentage of gross sales as consideration for the privilege to do business in the mall; failure to make any of these payments can cause the agreement to be terminated. The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax, regardless of how the consideration, or a portion thereof, is characterized. Example: A push cart or kiosk vendor has an agreement with the owner of the mall under which it pays a minimum rent plus a percentage of its gross sales for the right to sell its merchandise at various locations within the common areas of the mall. Failure to make the payments can terminate the right to sell merchandise in the mall. The total amount under the agreement is subject to tax because the statute defines a taxable license as the granting of the privilege to use real property for any purpose, including the privilege to use the real property to do business. Example: A car rental company has an agree- ment with an airport authority to operate its rental car business with a designated office and counter space within the airport terminal building. The agreement provides for a payment designated as rent for the use of real property as well as a payment based on a percentage of gross sales designated as a privilege fee for engaging in business at the airport. Failure to make either payment can terminate the agreement. The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax. All past declarations, including Temporary Technical Assistance Advisements issued pursuant to Emergency Rule 87AER-91, Technical Assistance Advisements, Letters of Technical Assistance, and similar correspondence, issued by the Department, which advised that fees or portions of fees identified as privilege fees to engage in business were exempt, and which are inconsistent with this rule are rescinded. Therefore, such privilege fees are taxable payments for a lease or license to use real property for business purposes. (b) Except for tolls charged to the travelling public, both commercial and non- commercial, imposed exclusively for the right to travel on turnpikes, expressways, bridges, and other public roadways, the full consideration paid for the license to use airport real property for the purpose of picking-up or dropping-off passengers and baggage from airport sidewalks, landings, and other facilities by any person providing ground transportation services to such airport, shall be taxable as a license to use airport real property, irrespective of whether the operator of such service enters the airport terminal building while engaged in providing such service. Example: The fee paid by a hotel to an airport, for the privilege of coming on the airport property for the purpose of picking-up and dropping- off its guests at the airport terminal, is a license to use airport real property, and is taxable. Example: The fee paid by a taxicab and limousine company to an airport, for the privilege of coming on the airport property for the purpose of picking-up and dropping- off its passengers at the airport terminal, is a license to use airport real property, and is taxable. Example: The fee paid by a remote location rental car company, for the privilege of using the airport premises to pick-up and drop-off its customers at the airport terminal, is a license to use real property, and is taxable.>> Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Statutes and Legislative History As amended by 66, Chapter 86-152, Laws of Florida, Section 212.031 states: (1)(a) It is declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of renting, leasing, [[or]] letting<<, or granting a license for the use>> of any real property unless such property is: * * * Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Section 212.02(10)(h) defines "real property" as "the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with 'realty' and 'real estate.'" The 1986 amendments extend the sales tax to licenses for the use or occupancy of real property. Section 212.02(10)(i) defines "license." "License," as used in this chapter with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or a parcel of real property for any purpose. Section 212.031 imposes a sale tax for the use and occupancy of real property, but not upon payments for intangibles, such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. The sales tax imposed by Section 212.031 is limited to the payments, or portions of payments, for the use or occupancy of real property. Each of the ten subsections under Section 212.031 exempts from the sales tax various types of property. Three exemptions relevant to these cases are at Section 212.031(1)(a)6, 7, and 10, which exempt real property that is: 6. A public street or road which is used for transportation purposes. 7. Property used at an airport exclusively for the purpose of aircraft landing or aircraft taxiing or property used by an airline for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft or for fueling aircraft or, for the period July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1991, property used at an airport to operate advertising displays in any county as defined in s. 125.011(1). Leased, subleased, or rented to a person providing food and drink concessionaire services within the premises of [[an airport,]] a movie theater, a business operated under a permit issued pursuant to chapter 550 or chapter 551, or any publicly owned arena, sport stadium, convention hall, [[or]] exhibition hall<<, auditorium, or recreational facility. A person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food and drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall be subject to tax on the rental of real property used for that purpose, but shall not be subject to the tax on any license to use the property. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "sale" shall not include the leasing of tangible personal property.>> Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. The indicated changes in subparagraph 10 were enacted by 10, Chapter 87-101, Laws of Florida. The remaining statutes cited by Respondent as law implemented by the Proposed Rules are not relevant to this proceeding. Court Decisions In Quick and Havey v. Department of Revenue, Case No. 72-363, Second Judicial Circuit, decided December 5, 1974, Donald O. Hartwell, Circuit Judge, entered a summary judgement in favor of Respondent. Quick and Havey operated a food concession at the municipal auditorium in West Palm Beach. In return for the concession, they agreed to pay the city base rental and a percentage of gross sales. The agreement entitled Quick and Harvey to the exclusive occupancy of part of the auditorium; they also provided concession services at other locations throughout the auditorium. Quick and Harvey paid the sales tax on the base rental, but argued that the percentage payment constituted "a fee paid for the exercise of a privilege." Judge Hartwell held that the tax applied to the base rent and percentage rent because the latter payments "are so inextricably entwined and enmeshed in the agreement to pay rent that they cannot be separated or distilled . . .." Judge Hartwell reasoned that rent is the "compensation paid for the use and occupation of real property." Recognizing that a tenant might make payments to its landlord that are not rent, Judge Hartwell found that at least under the terms of the instruments before it for construction and analysis that there has not been such a sufficient separation of the source of these funds as to warrant their classification solely as a fee for the exercise of a privilege. The right to use property cannot be separated from the property itself. We, of course, do not pass upon the question of whether the so-called concession rights can be [illegible] separated from the lease of the property itself. Suffice it to say that under the facts as herein presented, the Court is of the opinion that all payments made to the City of West Palm Beach under the agreement before the Court constitute payment of rent and are therefore subject to the tax specified in Section 212.031, Florida Statutes. In Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Askew, Case No. 74- 338, Second Judicial Circuit, decided January 20, 1977, Judge Hartwell decided whether certain payments made by Avis were taxable under Section 212.031. Avis had "entered into various contracts for a concession or license to do business at various airports and for the rental of real property," as well as contracts with private individuals for the rental of real property to conduct business at nonairport locations. Judge Hartwell divided the contracts of Avis into three categories. The first type of contract was for the payment of rental for the use real property. The second type of contract was for the payment of a concession fee for the right to do business on the premises and for the payment of a sum explicitly identified as rent for the use of real property. The third type of contract was for the payment of a concession fee for the right to do business on the premises and for the use of real property without a sum explicitly identified as rent. Judge Hartwell concluded that all payments for the rights conveyed by the first type of contract were taxable under Section 212.031. He ruled that the payments for the right to rent real property under the second type of contract were taxable, but the payments for the remaining rights were not. Declining to aggregate payments as he had in Quick and Havey two years earlier, Judge Hartwell ruled that the payments for the rights conveyed by the third type of contract required a "reasonable allocation." The allocation was between the payments for the use of real property, which were taxed, and the remaining payments, which were not. Judge Hartwell ordered that the allocation should be based on rental rates charged for the right of occupancy of the real property charged other tenants for comparable space. In a per curiam decision not yet final, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently considered the taxation of concession fees in Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 20 Fla. Law Weekly D552 (March 3, 1995). The findings of fact and conclusions of law in this final order do not rely upon Lloyd Enterprises, which is discussed merely as supplemental material. In Lloyd Enterprises, the taxpayer entered into a concession agreement with Volusia County for the rental of motorcycles at the beach. A fixed- location concessionaire, the taxpayer had the right to park its vehicles within 100 feet in either direction of its assigned spot during its assigned operating hours. Other concessionaires were allowed to roam the beach, but beach rangers would enforce the taxpayer's exclusive right to sell goods within its 200-foot territory if the free- roaming concessionaires parked or tried to sell goods in this territory. Rejecting Respondent's interpretation of its own rules, the court considered the language of the agreement, as well as a county ordinance incorporated by the agreement. The court held that neither document created a lease or license for the use of real property. Rather, they reflected the County's concern with the image that activities on the beach projected to visitors. The documents evidenced the County's intent to enhance the public's enjoyment of the beach through the provision of goods and services, as well as to raise revenue, mostly to defray cleanup costs at the beach. Thus, under the documents, the payments were nontaxable concession fees. Agency Interpretations Interpretations of Law Prior to Proposed Rule Amendments By letter dated May 14, 1968, Mr. J. Ed Straughn, Executive Director of Respondent, advised Mr. Wilbur Jones that tax is due on the space rented to car rental companies in any airport building. If the agreement makes no allocation between rental and nonrent payments, Respondent would require a "reasonable allocation" between rent and other payments with the tax due only on the amount paid for the right of occupancy. Mr. Straughn suggested that the rent component be estimated by the use of comparable rental rates for space elsewhere in the building. By letter dated August 14, 1985, Mr. Hugh Stephens, a Technical Assistant for Respondent, advised Mr. Victor Bacigalupi that a contract between an advertising company and Dade County, concerning advertising at Miami International Airport, did not involve the rental of real property. Mr. Stephens evidently relied on the nonexclusive right of posting advertising displays and the right of Dade County to require the advertiser to relocate or remove displays. By memorandum dated October 28, 1986, Mr. William D. Townsend, General Counsel, proposed policy for the taxation of licenses. Consistent with the Straughn letter 18 years earlier, the memorandum, which is directed to Mr. Randy Miller, Executive Director, states: A license in real property can be defined as a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferred either by writing or orally, to do one or more acts on land without possessing any interest in the land. Every license to do an act on land involves the occupation of the land by the licensee so far as it is necessary to do the act. Example: A concessionaire pays for permission (a license) to sell hot dogs in the building of a wrestling arena. The concessionaire has no possessory interest in the building. He normally has no specifically or legally described area which is his. He is allowed simply to vend his hot dogs in the building. Perhaps he delivers and vends in the stands. Without special permission, he cannot assign his license and it is normally revocable by the licensor unless specifically agreed otherwise. . . . For purposes of F.S. 212.031, however, the Department of Revenue (DOR) takes the position that either a lease or license is present in any business arrangement in which one or more owners, lessors, sublessors, or other persons holding a possessory interest in real property, permits a third party to use such real property for authorized acts unless all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement between the parties conclusively indicate that the agreement is neither a lease nor a license. The form in which the transaction is cast is not controlling. Accordingly, some portion of the consideration paid for an agreement that in form is a joint venture, profits interest, management agreement, franchise, manufacturer's discount, bailment or other arrange- ment will be presumed by the DOR to be allocable to a lease or license if the arrangement involves the use of real property to perform authorized acts by the lessee or licensee. If the terms of the agree- ment are silent with respect to the portion of the consideration allocable to the inherent lease or license or if the consideration allocated under the terms of the agreement is less than its fair market value, the DOR will allocate to the lease or license a portion of the consideration that is equal to the fair market value of the lease or license. Contrary to the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum eight months earlier, Technical Assistance Advisement 87A-011 dated July 2, 1987, which was prepared by Mr. Melton H. McKown, advised the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority that the privilege fees paid by car rental companies to the aviation authority were taxable. The agreement between the parties stated that the fees were "for the concession privileges granted hereunder, and in addition to the charges paid for the Premises .. ., [the car rental company] shall pay a privilege fee " Two months later, Temporary Technical Assistance Advisement TTAA 87(AER)-225 reversed TAA 87A-011. In TTAA 87(AER)-225, which is dated September 10, 1987, Ceneral Counsel William Townsend informed Mr. Samuel J. Dubbin that the payments made to airport authorities from concessionaires are "not for the right to use real property, but are for the right to engage in business at the airport." The letter relies upon Avis Rent-A- Car Systems, Inc. v. Askew. Respondent confirmed TTAA 87(AER)-225 in TTAA 88(AER)- 198, which is dated March 24, 1988, and in a letter dated April 6, 1989, from Mr. Robert M. Parsons, Technical Assistant, to Mr. Thomas P. Abbott. The April 6 letter confirms that payments from on- airport rental car companies are taxed only to the extent that the payments represent rent for space on airport property and not to the extent that the payments represent consideration for the privilege to do business. The April 6 letter adds that the payments from off-airport car rental companies for the right to pick up customers at the airport are not taxable because such payments are merely consideration for the privilege to engage in business. The April 6 letter discusses fees paid by other airport concessionaires. Acknowledging the recent enactment of the statutory exemption for license payments made to airports by food and drink concessionaires, the letter notes that, after July 1, 1987 (the effective date of the statutory changes), such payments, even if calculated as percentages of sales, are not taxable because such payments are construed as payments for a mere privilege or license to engage in business. The April 6 letter evidently marks the first time that, in a single document, Respondent inconsistently treats car rental company concession fees and all other concession fees. The April 6 letter adopts the Straughn/Townsend approach when it states that percentage rent is not taxable because it is payment for the privilege to do business. (The letter actually states "privilege or license" to do business, and this alternative use of "license," not involving the use or occupancy of real property, may have caused part of the confusion.) But the assurance of nontaxability of concession fees in the April 6 letter is limited to the period after July 1, 1987. Consistent with the McKown approach, the letter relies on the relatively recent statutory exemption for license payments from airport retail concessionaires. Consistent with the McKown approach, the letter later adds that percentage rent was taxable after the legislature amended Section 212.031 to tax payments for a license to use real property. The April 6 letter concludes erroneously that it is treating all airport concessionaires like on-airport car rental companies. In a Notice of Decision dated July 28, 1992, Respondent addressed the taxation of payments to airport authorities from car rental companies. Under a concession agreement, the airport charged a car rental company a fixed rent for occupied airport space, such as for parking, check-in, and service. Under the same agreement, the airport also charges the car rental company the greater of a guaranteed minimum or percentage of gross revenues. Taking the Straughn/Townsend approach, the Notice of Decision reversed a tentative assessment and held that the additional payments were not taxable. The July 28, 1992 Notice of Decision also addresses the taxation of percentage payments to airport authorities from other concessionaires. Explicitly endorsing the inconsistency of the April 6 letter, Respondent determined that percentage payments from concessionaires other than rental car companies were taxable either as leases or, since July 1, 1986, as licenses. The only explanation offered for the inconsistent treatment of concessionaires is that TTAA 87(AER)-225 applies only to rental car companies. Two years later, as reflected in a March 3, 1994 internal memorandum from Ms. Nydia Men,ndez to two Miami auditors, Respondent continued to perpetuate its inconsistent policy of taxing all payments for the privilege of engaging in business at airports, except for such payments from rental car companies. Returning to advertising, the July 28, 1992, Notice of Decision also states that the payments from the advertiser addressed in the letter dated August 14, 1985, have been taxable, as payments for a license, since July 1, 1986. This conclusion represents the correct treatment of licenses, as another means of granting a right to use or occupy real property. This treatment contrasts with the apparent misinterpretation in the April 6 letter that taxable licenses include grants of privileges to do business. In an early attempt to revisit the tax treatment of payments for concessions, franchises, and other privileges to do business, especially at airports, Respondent evidently chose the Quick and Havey and McKown approach that such business payments are taxable, at least when they are combined with taxable payments for the use or occupancy of real property. By memorandum dated January 14, 1993, from Assistant General Counsel Jeff Kielbasa to Ms. Lorraine Yoemans, Legislative Affairs Director, Mr. Kielbasa explained the purpose of unidentified proposed rule amendments addressing the same issues addressed by the subject proposed rule amendments. He wrote: The proposed rule amendment attempts to level the field by recognizing that any charge for the right, privilege, or license to do business at an airport is fundamentally a charge for the privilege to use or occupy land. If an airport business refuses to pay the fee, the airport's remedy is to have the business removed as a trespasser. It should be pointed out that we are not concerned with true business licenses or privilege fees attendant to use of trademarks, franchises and the like. These are licenses or privilege fees unrelated to the use of real property. The proposed rule does not differentiate between businesses such as on-airport car rental companies (with counterspaces) and off-airport car rental companies. The fee (however characterized) charged by the airport for the privilege to use or occupy the airport for business purposes is subject to the section 212.031 sales tax. See section 212.02(10)(i) defining license with reference to the use of real property as the "privilege to use or occupy a building or parcel of real property for any purpose." We believe that separation of a payment by characterizing one portion as a lease or license of realty (whether site specific or not) and another for the privilege of conducting business on the premises is artificial. It would be just as easy for the property owner on the corner of College and Monroe to charge a business tenant the average commercial square footage rental in Leon County for the lease and require the tenant to pay the premium attributable to the location at College and Monroe as a separate charge in the form of a license to do business. However carved up and characterized, under the statute each charge would be taxable since both leases and licenses to use real property are taxable. Interpretations of Proposed Rule Amendments On April 14, 1994, Respondent conducted a workshop on the proposed rule amendments prior to the modification published June 10, 1994. Respondent's representatives were understandably reluctant to opine on questions of law without detailed facts. However, explaining the tax consequences of payments from a concessionaire to an airport, Assistant General Counsel Kielbasa stated: I think the notion that there is a separate privilege fee that an airport charges unrelated to the fact that the privilege is being granted to function at the airport, I don't think that's what's happening. I think it's a very simple case, and I think it's very clear. But there may be separate provisions in contracts or lease agreements which have nothing to do with operating at that location, and to that extent, I don't think it would be subject to tax at all under the statute, and that's what we're trying to get at. Respondent's Exhibit 1A, pages 33-34. A major element of the dispute between Respondent and Petitioners and Intervenors (collectively, Petitioners) concerned Respondent's choice to take the Quick and Havey and McKown approach over the Avis and Straughn/Townsend approach in taxing mixed payments for the use of real property and for business intangibles. Following the rule workshop, Respondent made some Avis and Straughn/Townsend changes to the proposed rules, but the changes did not preclude a Quick and Havey and McKown approach, as evidenced by the following statement in the Prehearing Stipulation: "The Department contends that where the amount paid for a privilege fee is so intertwined or meshed with a payment for a license or lease to use real property that it cannot be separated, the full amount is taxable." Airports and Concessions Governmental entities operate and typically own large commercial airports, such as those in Orlando, Miami, and Tampa. By law, these airport authorities are empowered to enter into contracts with third parties to supply persons using airports with goods and services, such as food and beverage, retail sales, and car rentals. In some cases, airport authorities may obtain services by management agreements, which are not subject to sales tax. In most cases, though, airport authorities obtain goods and services for airport visitors by leases and grants of concessions, franchises, or other privileges to do business. The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines "concession" as "a franchise for the right to conduct a business, granted by a government body or authority." The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines "franchise" as "a privilege or right that is conferred by grant to an individual or group of individuals; usually an exclusive right to furnish public services or to sell a particular product in a certain community." By what are normally labelled "concession" or "franchise" agreements, airport authorities permit a concessionaire to operate a business with some nexus to the airport or at least its passengers, in return for which the concessionaire pays money to the airport authority. The nexus to the airport may take various forms. Some concessionaires sell food or drink or retail merchandise at exclusively assigned locations within the airport terminal. Hotel concessionaires operate hotels at fixed locations in the terminal. Some concessionaires, like taxi companies and nonairport hotels, pick up and drop off passengers at the airport terminal in areas designated for such purpose, but not reserved exclusively for any one concessionaire. An on-airport car rental concessionaire rents cars at the airport, using fixed counter space, parking areas, car service areas, and car pick-up and drop-off areas. A variation of the car rental concession is the off- airport car rental concessionaire, which has no fixed space at the airport except for customer pick-up and drop-off areas and usually counter space. In Florida, all off-airport rental car companies use their own vans to pick-up and drop-off customers. At some airports outside Florida, such as Sacramento, Dallas, and Minneapolis, the airport authorities operate their own vans to pick up and drop off customers of off-airport rental car companies. In such cases, the off-airport rental car companies do not directly use or occupy any of the real property of the airport. In general, the payments from the concessionaires to the airport authorities consist of two categories. First, there is a fixed payment, which the concession agreement typically characterizes as consideration for the use and occupancy of real property. The airport authority normally bases this rental payment on the fair market value of the space leased, as estimated by a licensed real estate appraiser, or under a cost-based formula. Second, there is a payment representing a percentage of the gross revenue of the concessionaire derived from airport business. The concession agreement typically characterizes this payment as consideration for the privilege to do business with airport passengers. Rents typically exceed $50 per square foot per year. Most, but not all concessionaires, make total payments of considerably more that $50 per square foot per year, often totalling hundreds and sometimes thousands of dollars. In entering into concession agreements, airport authorities pursue a variety of goals. They must produce high revenues because airport authorities do not operate on public subsidies, aside from the monopoly grant of the airport operation itself. But high returns from concessionaires are not the only goal. Airport authorities must serve airport visitors in order to maintain successful relations with the airlines. And airport visitors demand a mix of goods and services at acceptable prices and quality. In selecting concessionaires and pricing concession fees, airport authorities therefore balance maximizing revenues with serving visitors' needs. Airport authorities price concession fees based on the type of goods and services offered by the concessionaire. A bank at one major Florida airport pays six times the concession fees of a travel agency, which occupies space of equal size next to the bank. At the same airport, one theme-park retailer pays concession fees of more than three times what another theme-park retailer pays for the identical space. In the typical concession arrangement, the airport authority receives payments consisting of rent and "something else." The rent is attributable to the use and occupancy of real property. The "something else" is business income, which is attributable to an intangible business asset, such as a franchise, concession, or privilege to do business. Like any other lessor, airport authorities undertake, in their concession agreements, to provide their lessees with offices or retail space for their use and occupancy. Unlike other lessors, however, airport authorities also undertake, in their concession agreements, to provide nearly all of the concessionaire's customers through operating agreements with airlines. Through concession agreements, airport authorities allow concessionaires to share in the authority's most valuable asset, which is not the real property comprising the airport, but the exclusive, governmental franchise to operate the airport. In these regards, airport authorities are in very similar roles to the county in Lloyd Enterprises with the subjects of the government monopoly being in one case a beach and another an airport. Both governmental "owner/operators" provide customers for their respective concessionaires and predicate their agreements upon the ability of the contracting party to supply the needs of the customers in a manner that does not compromise the public asset--i.e., an airport or a beach. These elements are not typical of a lessor or licensor. To varying, lesser degrees, airport authorities also distinguish themselves from mere lessors through the marketing, management, working capital, and workforce that characterize the airport operation. Respondent's key witness identified four factors useful in determining whether a payment is for the use or occupancy of real property: the relationship of the parties to the real property, the use to be made of the real property, the rights granted the parties under the agreement, and the basis for the payment or charge for the real property. These four factors assist in the determination whether a payment is for the use or occupancy of real property. But the usefulness of the four factors is limited because they do not directly address the other possible component of a mixed payment, which is a payment for a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. It is easy to determine that concessionaire payments typically comprise rent or some other payment for the use and occupancy of real property plus a payment for an intangible, such as the privilege to do business with airport users. Obviously, Respondent is not required to accept the parties' labelling or allocations of these payments. But it is difficult to determine how much of a mixed payment is for the use or occupancy of real property, which is taxable (ignoring, as always, the special treatment of certain airport license payments, as well as other exemptions), and how much is for a privilege to do business, which is nontaxable. The issue is whether a "reasonable allocation" is possible between the two components in a mixed payment. As ordered in Avis and suggested by the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum, the allocation process should begin with finding a fair rental value. It is difficult to estimate the fair market rent for space in a large commercial airport. The universe of comparables is small due to the uniqueness of major airports. But the appraisal of airport real property is not impossible. Nonairport comparables normally exist that, with suitable adjustments, yield reasonable approximations of fair market rentals. A real estate appraisal helps determine how much of a concessionaire's payment should be characterized as rent. However, the allocation problem can be approached at the same time from the opposite end. In appraising business assets, an accountant or business appraiser estimates the value of the concession, franchise, or other privilege to do business with airport visitors. The business-income approach to the allocation problem is aided by analysis of the payments made by completely off- airport car rental concessionaires in Sacramento, Minneapolis, and Dallas. These payments provide a rough approximation of the value of this intangible, even though they probably require major adjustments to reflect, among other things, differing passenger counts and demographics, as well as the costs incurred by the airport authorities in providing transportation to the off- airport sites. Based on the foregoing, the record demonstrates that: a) the payments of a concessionaire to an airport authority ordinarily consist in part of rent or license payments and in part of payments for an intangible, such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business and b) these payments may be allocated, with reasonable precision, between the real property and business components. The Proposed Rules Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 and (b) Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)1. is not materially changed by the proposed rule amendments. Consistent with the statute, this paragraph of the rule merely imposes the sales tax in taxable transactions on the person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use the real property and requires that such person pay its immediate landlord or grantor. The next subparagraph is new. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2 contains two introductory sentences followed by three examples and a notice. The first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 fairly interprets the statute. The first sentence states that the sales tax is due on payments made to lessors or licensors when the payment is for the use of the real property and is based on the ownership or control of the real property by the lessor or licensor. By limiting the tax to those payments based on the payee's interest in the real property, the proposed rule ensures that the tax is imposed only on the portion of the payment attributable to the use or occupancy of real estate. The first sentence is unobjectionable. The second sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 is no more controversial. This sentence provides that the "total payment for the use of real property" is taxable, even though the payment or part of the payment "may be identified" as payment for a privilege to do business. The use of "may be identified" in the "even though" clause refers to the label given such payments by the parties. The second sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 merely provides that the taxable consequence of the transaction is not governed by the label given the payments by the parties. In other words, just because the parties use "concession fee," "privilege fee," "percentage fee," or "similar terms" does not necessarily make them payments for the privilege to do business. The second sentence assures that Respondent will not be deterred by mere labels from its lawful responsibility to characterize properly the nature of the payments, and make reasonable allocations when allocations are indicated. The three examples under Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 are neither illustrative nor useful. To the contrary, they are vague and misleading and appear to reveal a misunderstanding of the proper taxation of mixed payments consisting of rent and payments for a privilege to do business. The first example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.a. A clothing retailer occupies a location in a shopping mall. The retailer pays the mall owner minimum rent plus a percentage of gross sales. The agreement characterizes the minimum rent as consideration for the lease of designated space and the percentage of sales as consideration for the privilege to do business in the mall. The failure to pay either amount is grounds for termination of the agreement. The proposed rule concludes: "The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax, regardless of how the consideration, or a portion thereof, is characterized." In fact, both payments made by the retailer to the mall owner may constitute taxable payments for the use of real property. Supplying little useful information as to how to determine the true character of payments, the proposed example ignores all of the important factors necessary in making this determination. The proposed example overrides the characterization of the payments by the parties. As discussed above, the parties' labelling of a payment may be tax-motivated, but it may also reveal their true intent. However, the proposed example offers insufficient explanation why it ignores the label of "privilege to do business" at the mall. The only possible grounds for ignoring the label are that the retailer occupies a location inside a mall under which it pays minimum rent and percentage rent and a default in the payment of either amount is grounds for terminating the agreement. The first basis is only that the payments are mixed and, except under the most strained reading of Quick and Havey, cannot, without more, possibly be considered justification for taxing the total payments. The key factor in the first proposed example is thus the presence of a cross-default clause. Such a clause may play a role in distinguishing between payments for the use of real property and other types of payments. In certain cases, the total amount actually being paid for the use of the real property may include all payments that must be paid in order for the agreement to remain in good standing. This would likely be true of base rent and additional rent, consisting of a lessee's prorata share of insurance, taxes, maintenance, and utilities. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that a cross- default clause is of such importance as to confer upon it the status that it is given in the rule example. Nothing in the record supports the assertion that all cross-defaulted payments are therefore payments for the use or occupancy of real property. For instance, Respondent concedes that a lessee/payor might be obligated under a lease to make taxable payments of rent and nontaxable payments of promotional fees, such as for the use of logos or other intangibles. It is conceivable that a prudent (and powerful) lessor/payee might provide in the agreement, even if called a "lease agreement," that a default in either payment is grounds for terminating the agreement. Even so, the mere existence of such a cross-default clause does not, without more, transform the promotional fee into rent. The proper characterization of the two payments under the first proposed example requires consideration of, among other things, the four factors identified by Respondent's key witness: the relationship of the parties to the real property, the use to be made of the real property, the rights granted the parties under the agreement, and the basis for the payment or charge for the real property. The proper characterization requires consideration, in some fashion, of the elements that distinguish a real property asset from a business asset, such as any contributions by the mall owner in the form of operating agreements, other leases, marketing, management, working capital, and workforce, as well as the method by which the mall owner decides with whom it will enter into agreements and the total payments that it will require. The second example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.b. A push cart vendor pays a mall owner minimum rent plus a percentage of gross sales for the right to sell merchandise at various locations within the common area of the mall. The mall owner may terminate the agreement if the vendor fails to make either payment. The example concludes that both payments are taxable "because the statute defines a taxable license as the granting of a privilege to use real property for any purpose, including the privilege to use real property to do business." The only difference in the first two examples is that the second involves a license and the first involves a lease. Like the example of the mall retailer, the example of the push cart vendor elevates the cross-default provision to outcome-determinative status. Again, the record does not support such reliance upon this factor for the above-discussed reasons. The third example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.c. A car rental company pays an airport authority for designated office and counter space in the terminal. The agreement identifies a payment as rent for the use of real property. The agreement also identifies a payment, representing a percentage of gross sales, as a privilege fee for the right to engage in business at the airport. Failure to make either payment is grounds for terminating the agreement. The example concludes that the "total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax." As with the preceding examples, the example of the airport car rental company relies upon a cross-default clause to characterize all payments as for the use of real property. Again, for the reasons stated above, the record does not support such reliance upon this single factor. The three examples make no "reasonable allocation" between the real property and business components of what are probably mixed payments. Best revealed by the last sentence of the second example, the examples illegitimately transform business payments into real property payments simply because the business payor uses or occupies real property to conduct its business. In reality, the three examples seek to find their way back to the haven of Quick and Havey by equating cross-default clauses with inextricable intertwining and enmeshment. It is only conjecture whether a court would today so readily abandon an attempt to allocate between real property and business income. In any event, the present record demonstrates that "reasonable allocations" are achievable and require consideration of much more than cross- default clauses. Respondent's defense of the examples is inadequate. Respondent argues that the examples are modified by the language of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. As previously stated, the two sentences of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2 represent a fair restatement of the statutory taxing criteria. But the role of the two examples is to illustrate the application of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, not provide a circular restatement of the rule and, thus, the statute. Given their language, the proposed examples stand alone and cannot be saved by the implicit incorporation of the first two sentences of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. Standing alone, the illustrations are erroneous in their reliance on cross-default clauses, misleading in their omission of material factors required for any reasonable allocation, and misguided in their implicit bias against making allocations between payments for real property and business components. Respondent claims that the examples create presumptions that a taxpayer may rebut. This claim is dubious on two counts. First, Respondent's key witnesses disagreed on whether the presumptions created by the examples were indeed rebuttable. One witness testified clearly that, if a nonexempt transaction fit one of the examples, then the transaction was taxable. Nothing in the examples suggests that these presumptions are rebuttable. But the examples do not work even if they establish only rebuttable presumptions. The cross-default provision cannot bear the burden even of creating a rebuttable presumption. A cross-default provision is simply not that important to the proper characterization of the payments, especially in light of far more important factors. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)d warns taxpayers that all past declarations, including technical assistance advisements, that "advised that fees . . . identified as privilege fees to engage in business were exempt, and . . . are inconsistent with this rule" are rescinded. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)d concludes: "Therefore, such privilege fees are taxable payments for a lease of license to use real property for business purposes." Respondent's key witness could not identify with certainty the past declarations rescinded by Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)d or the past declarations left unaffected. This leave the proposed rule unnecessarily vague, at least as to airport authorities. There are a limited number of airport authorities and concessionaires that could be relying on past declarations and, if there are any besides those uncovered in this proceeding, they should be easily found. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) identifies as a taxable license to use real property the "full consideration paid for the license to use airport real property for the purpose of picking- up or dropping-off passengers and baggage from airport sidewalks, landings, and other facilities" by any provider of ground transportation services, regardless whether the provider "enters the airport terminal building while . . . providing such service." The full payment for the real property component is taxable, and Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) accurately interprets the statutes. However, Respondent again encounters problems in the three examples that follow Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b). In Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b)1, a hotel pays a fee to an airport authority for the privilege of coming onto airport property to pick up and drop off hotel guests at the terminal. The example states that the payment is taxable because it is for a license to use airport real property. The second and third examples are identical except they involve a taxicab and limousine company and an off-site car rental company. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) states the obvious-- i.e., that whatever the payor pays for the right to use or occupy real property is subject to sales tax. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(b) does not require the characterization of all payments between such parties as taxable payments for the use or occupancy of real property. The problem with the proposed examples is that they depart from the real-property language of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(b) and use the business language of a privilege to do business. The first example baldly provides that a fee paid by a hotel to an airport for the "privilege" to enter airport property and pick up and drop off hotel guests is a license to use airport property and is taxable. There is no mention of allocation or of the factors that would go into a reasonable allocation. The fee is taxable. The language and paucity of reasoning are practically identical for the second and third examples. Respondent argues that Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) must be read in connection with the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, which restates the statutory language. This argument fails for two reasons. Like the examples under Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) does not incorporate by reference the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2. Respondent's argument of implicit incorporation is even weaker here because Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) is not even a subparagraph of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. The first set of proposed examples at least mentions a cross-default clause, which could have some bearing on the proper characterization of the payments, even though the omission of far more important factors invalidates the first set of examples. The second set of proposed examples fails even to mention a single factor. If the hotel, taxi cab company, or rental car company pays for the privilege of entering airport property to do business, the entire payment is taxable. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b and c Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b provides that property "used by an airline exclusively for loading or unloading passengers onto or from an aircraft is exempt." The proposed rule identifies examples of such property as common terminal walkways used by passengers for boarding or exiting planes, ticket counters, baggage claim areas, ramp and apron areas, and departure lounges (but distinguished from VIP lounges or clubs that require a membership not determined by ticket status). Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c adds that "[r]eal property used by an airline for purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property . . . which is exempt from tax includes ... office areas used to process tickets, baggage processing areas, operations areas used for the purpose of the operational control of an airline's aircraft, and air cargo areas." Petitioners object to the use of "exclusively" in subparagraph b. The statute provides an exemption for property used exclusively for aircraft landing or taxiing or property used by an airline for loading or unloading persons or property or for fueling. Clearly, due to the repetition of "property used" in the second clause, the modifier "exclusively" applies only to the first clause, which is consistent with the doctrine of the nearest antecedent argued in Petitioner's proposed final order. It is unclear how Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b and c work together because they seem to define the same exempt property under different subparagraphs. Both subparagraphs apply to real property, and both seem to describe the same examples of real property, using different words. The subparagraphs under subparagraph b present reasonable rules for determining what is real property based on ownership of the underlying land, with a special rule when the airport authority leases, but does not own, the land on which the airport is situated. The subparagraphs under subparagraph c identify a prorating process, which applies when the property is used for both exempt and nonexempt purposes. It is unclear how property could be used for exempt and nonexempt purposes under the requirement of "exclusive" use in subparagraph b, although such mixed uses is contemplated by subparagraph c. The requirement contained in the first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b that the property be used exclusively for loading or unloading passengers conflicts with the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c, as well as the language of Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.a; neither of the latter two provisions predicates the exemption upon exclusivity of use. More importantly, the first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b conflicts with the relevant statutes. However, the remainder of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b, including subparagraphs (I) and (II), is a reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutes, as is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c, including subparagraphs (I) and (II). Petitioners argue that Respondent intends to tax nonairline concessionaires for their use of property used for loading or unloading persons or property. This argument is unclear, perhaps because the unobjectionable proposed rules do not require such an application. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)3 Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)3 defines "retail concessionaire" as either a lessee or licensee that makes sales directly to the public within an airport. The words "retail concessionaire" are not used elsewhere in the rule or proposed rules at issue except in Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)1 and 2, which addresses "a person providing retail concessionaire services" involving the sale of food or drink or other tangible personal property in an airport. Subparagraph 1 imposes tax on rent paid by such persons, and subparagraph 2 exempts from tax any license payments made by such persons. Petitioners' arguments against the definitional proposed rule are misplaced. The definition covers lessees and licensees, but does not impose any tax. In conjunction with subparagraphs 1 and 2, the proposed definition of "retail concessionaire" says, in effect, that all lessees and licensees selling food and drink or other personal property are subject to tax on payments for the rental of associated real property, but are not subject to tax on payments for the licensing of associated real property. The subparagraphs that carry tax consequences honor the legislative directives as to taxability.
The Issue Whether the application of the Biscayne Bay Pilots' Association for an increase in the pilotage rates for the Port of Miami should be granted in whole or in part or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In their Prehearing Stipulation, the parties stipulated to the following facts, which are deemed admitted: The Cargo Carriers Association is a Florida not-for- profit corporation with its principal office in Miami, Florida. The purpose of the Cargo Carriers Association is to promote, advance, and secure laws, rules, and regulations concerning vessels utilizing the navigable waters of the State of Florida, in particular the Port of Miami and Port Everglades, in order that the waters, harbors, and ports of the state and the environment and property of all persons be protected to the fullest possible extent consistent with sound financial principles. A substantial number of the members of the Cargo Carriers Association are affected by the rates of pilotage currently set for the Port of Miami, inasmuch as they are required by Florida law, Chapter 310, Florida Statutes, to utilize and compensate the Port of Miami pilots whose rates are established by the Board, and they are, in fact, utilizing and compensating pilots in accordance with the rates established for the Port of Miami. Accordingly, the Cargo Carriers Association is substantially affected by and has standing to maintain this challenge to the Board's Decision dated March 9, 2000. The Board is an agency of the State of Florida created pursuant to Section 310.151, Florida Statutes, which is invested with the authority and responsibility to determine the rates of pilotage at the various ports of Florida, including the Port of Miami. Section 310.151, Florida Statutes (2000). The Pilots' Association is an association of harbor pilots that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes and that performs the pilotage services at the Port of Miami. The offices of the Pilots' Association and its affiliate, Biscayne Bay Pilots, Inc., are located in Miami, Florida. In October 1999, the Pilots' Association submitted to the Board an application for an increase in the pilotage rates for the Port of Miami. On October 28, 1999, the Investigative Committee for the Board convened a fact-finding public hearing on the Pilots' Association's application in Miami, Florida, at which numerous interested persons provided comments and testimony, both for and against the Pilots' Association's requested rate increase. On November 29, 1999, the Pilots' Association submitted to the Board a version of its application that, in its words, "has been edited to correct scrivener's errors." On December 9, 1999, the Investigative Committee for the Board completed its review and investigation of the Pilots' Association's application and presented its written findings to the Board as required by Rule 61E13-2.007(4), Florida Administrative Code. On January 21, 2000, the Board met in Miami, Florida, to review the rate increase application of the Pilots' Association and heard comments and testimony from persons who supported or opposed the application in whole or in part. At the conclusion of this meeting, the Board preliminarily determined to grant the Pilots' Association's application in part with a phased-in increase in rates. The Board's written decision was filed with the agency's clerk on March 9, 2000. The Cargo Carriers Association timely filed its petition for a proceeding under Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1999). The Pilots' Association requested in its application a 10 percent increase in the rate for draft charges, for tonnage charges, for shifting or anchoring charges, and for minimum fees, effective immediately, with an additional increase of 5 percent in these rates and fees six months after the effective date of the initial increase. The requested increase would result in a total 15.5 percent increase in pilotage rates and minimum fees at the Port of Miami. The Board hired an Investigative Committee composed of two consultants, one a Certified Public Accountant and the other a retired Coast Guard officer, to examine the Pilots' Association's application in light of the statutory factors set forth in Section 310.151(5)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1999). The Investigative Committee held a public hearing in which it received testimony from interested parties. The Investigative Committee Report was presented to the Board at the public hearing on January 21, 2000. The Board included in its written Decision findings of fact and comments with respect to each of the criteria set forth in Section 310.151(5), Florida Statutes (1999), 3/ an analysis and statement of its decision to approve an increase in the pilotage rates at the Port of Miami, and an order specifying the approved increases. The Board stated its intention to grant the Pilots' Association's application in part and to increase the rates of pilotage at the Port of Miami 3 1/2 percent for draft charges, tonnage charges, shifting or anchoring charges, and the minimum fees, effective on the date of its order, 4/ with an additional 3 percent rate increase in each of the charges effective 12 months from the effective date of the first increase and another 3 percent increase in each of the charges effective 24 months after the effective date of the first increase. This increase is 63.16 percent of the increase requested by the Pilots' Association. The public interest in having qualified pilots available to respond promptly to vessels needing their service. Section 310.151(5)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2000). 5/ In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 11 of the report. 6/ The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. 7/ A determination of the average net income of pilots in the port, including the value of all benefits derived from service as a pilot. For the purposes of this subparagraph, "net income of pilots" refers to total pilotage fees collected in the port, minus reasonable operating expenses, divided by the number of licensed and active state pilots within the ports. Section 310.151(5)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 12 and 13 of the report, with the following modification to the depreciation adjustment included in the calculation of the pilots' total compensation if the requested rate increase were approved in toto and the resulting modification in the projected "adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot": The depreciation adjustment projected for the year 2000 was decreased from $6500.00 to $1600.00, resulting in an adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot for the year 2000 of $340,800.00; the depreciation adjustment projected for the year 2001 was decreased from $6500.00 to $4800.00, resulting in an adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot for the year 2001 of $340,000.00. The Investigative Committee Report included in the computation of average net pilot income the value of health and retirement benefits, pension valuation, and discretionary costs such as political contributions, lobbying expenses, and business promotion expenses. The Investigative Committee identified the actual total pilot compensation for pilots at the Port of Miami, including adjustments for pension valuation and discretionary costs but not for depreciation, as $308,200.00 for 1998, and it projected the total pilot compensation for 1999, 2000, and 2001, without a rate increase, as $288,200.00, $296,200.00, and $290,200.00, respectively. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. Since 1993, the Pilots' Association has tried to maintain a roster of 18 active pilots at the Port of Miami, although this number has fluctuated from time to time. Currently, there are 17 pilots and one deputy at the Port of Miami. Excluding adjustments for pension valuation and discretionary costs, compensation in 1997 and 1998 for pilots at the Port of Miami was $281,000.00 and $278,000.00, respectively; compensation at Port Everglades was $329,000.00 and $344,000.00, respectively; compensation at the Port of Palm Beach was $154,000.00 and $230,000.00, respectively; and compensation at the Port of Jacksonville was $250,000.00 and $254,000.00, respectively. Because of the exclusions noted above, these amounts understate actual compensation. Compensation for the Port of Miami pilots increased 38.4 percent between 1989 and 1996. In 1989, pilot income at the Port of Miami was $203,000.00, and, in 1990, it was $181,000.00. The pilots received an effective 32 percent rate increase as a result of a 26 percent rate increase in 1992 and a 5 percent rate increase in 1993, and gross pilotage revenue increased 72 percent between 1989 and 1996, an increase primarily attributable to an increase in the number of larger vessels using the port. As a result of the revenue increase, pilot income rose to over $281,000.00 in 1997. In addition to piloting, the pilots at the Port of Miami carry out the duties of Harbor Master, which involve coordinating all of the ship traffic in the port. The pilots receive no additional compensation for this service. Reasonable operating expenses of pilots. Section 310.151(5)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 13 through 16 of the report. In the report, the Investigative Committee found that, with the exception of the costs associated with the Pilots' Association's retirement plan, the operating expenses included in the Pilots' Association's application were reasonable. The Investigative Committee Report included a detailed discussion of the Pilots' Association's retirement plan. The retirement plan of the Pilots' Association is a non-qualified plan under the Internal Revenue Code and is unfunded and, therefore, contingent on the future operations at the Port of Miami. The plan is in the form of a consulting agreement between the Pilots' Association and its retirees, pursuant to which each pilot who reaches 55 years of age and completes 20 years of service as a full-time active pilot, and who agrees to act in the best interests of the Pilots' Association, is eligible to be paid up to 50 percent of an active pilot's income, provided that the aggregate amount paid to retirees may not exceed 20 percent of the annual total gross pilotage revenue. The payments are to be made from future pilotage revenue. The total costs associated with retired pilot compensation and benefits (equity buy-outs, surviving spouse accrual, and health insurance) included in the Investigative Committee Report for 1998 were $2,093,086.00, of which $1.4 million was attributable to payments to 11 retirees for consulting services. The Investigative Committee questioned the reasonableness of this operating expense at page 16 of its report, although it noted that there are similar plans in other Florida ports. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. In 1998, payments to the five retired pilots at Port Everglades totaled $962,714.00. The retirement plan for the Port Everglades pilots has the same limits as the plan for the pilots at the Port of Miami: A Port Everglades retiree's benefit is limited to 50 percent of the income of an active pilot, and the aggregate benefits paid to Port Everglades retirees may not exceed 20 percent of the pilots' annual gross revenue. The plan at Port Canaveral limits the aggregate benefits paid to retirees to 33 1/3 percent of gross annual revenue; the limitation at the Port of Jacksonville for current retirees is 28 percent of gross annual revenue and 22 percent for new retirees. There are no aggregate limits on the amounts paid to retirees at the ports in Charleston, South Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia. Pilotage rates in other ports. Section 310.151(5)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 16 and 17 of the report, and stated its intention to confine its comparative rate analysis to ports in Florida and the southeastern seaboard. It was noted in the Investigative Committee Report that, in 1998, the Port of Miami was ranked the seventh highest of 12 Florida ports with respect to the cost for piloting both a standard large and a standard small vessel and the eighth highest out of the 12 Florida ports in the amount of revenue per handle. 8/ As part of its comparison of pilotage rates in other ports, the Investigative Committee included in its report a chart based on 1998 data setting out the number of handles in each of the 12 Florida ports surveyed, together with 1998 revenue, average handle time, number of pilots, revenue per handle, and revenue per handle hour for each of the 12 ports. In 1998, the Port of Miami had 8,909 handles, revenue of $8,433.539.00, average handle time of 2.0 hours, 18 pilots, revenue per handle of $947.00, and revenue per handle hour of $473.00. Based on 1998 data, Port Everglades, the port closest geographically to the Port of Miami, had 10,168 handles, revenue of $6,899,006.00, average handle time of 1.9 hours, 16 pilots, revenue per handle of $679.00, and revenue per handle hour of $357.00. In its Decision, the Board recognized that pilotage rates cannot be considered in a vacuum and that a rate increase or decrease is not justified simply because a rate is comparatively low or high. Rather, the Board found that consideration must be given to the size and number of vessels using the port, the time required to service the vessels, and the characteristics of the port that impact positively or negatively on the gross revenue and net income derived from the rate structure. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. The Investigative Committee determined that Port Everglades was the closest and most relevant competitive port to the Port of Miami. The Port of Miami handles primarily cruise ships, excluding daily cruise ships, and container cargo vessels. Port Everglades handles both container cargo vessels and vessels containing bulk and neo-bulk products such as petroleum, cement, steel, and lumber, as well as a mix of large cruise ships and smaller, daily cruise ships. Port Everglades is one of the largest petroleum ports in the southeastern United States. The Port of Miami handles fewer but generally larger vessels than Port Everglades. The distance between the sea buoy 9/ and the turning basin where the pilots turn and dock cruise ships in the Port of Miami is approximately six miles; the distance between the sea buoy and the turning basin where the pilots turn and dock cruise ships in Port Everglades is approximately two miles. In Port Everglades, the distance from the sea buoy to the channel is short, so that there is little room to position the vessel properly for entry into the channel. The channel is, however, straight. In the Port of Miami, there is a 40-degree turn mid- channel. Currently, Port Everglades has 16 pilots and two deputies. A comparison of the pilotage rates in the Port of Miami and in Port Everglades shows that, without considering the rate increase proposed by the Board, the current draft rate in the Port of Miami is 38 percent higher than that in Port Everglades and the current tonnage rate is 7.5 percent higher in the Port of Miami than in Port Everglades. With the Board's proposed rate increase, the draft rate at the Port of Miami is roughly 40 percent higher than that at Port Everglades, and the tonnage rate is roughly 16 percent higher. Without a rate increase, total pilotage fees at the Port of Miami are 18 percent higher for small vessels and 14 percent higher for large vessels than the total pilotage fees at Port Everglades. Using the cruise ship Enchantment of the Seas as an example, without the rate increase, pilotage fees are $5,700.00 per trip in and out of the Port of Miami, or $260,000.00 annually; with the Board's proposed rate increase, pilotage fees are $6,270.00 per trip, or $326,000.00 annually. In contrast, the pilotage fees for the Enchantment of the Seas at Port Everglades are $5,150.00 per trip in and out of the port, or $268,000.00 annually. 10/ The amount of time each pilot spends on actual piloting duty and the amount of time spent on other essential support services. Section 310.151(5)(b)5., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 18 of the report. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. The prevailing compensation available to individuals in other maritime services of comparable professional skill and standing as that sought in pilots, it being recognized that in order to attract to the profession of piloting, and to hold the best and most qualified individuals as pilots, the overall compensation accorded pilots should be equal to or greater than that available to such individuals in comparable maritime employment. Section 310.151(5)(b)6., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 18 and 19 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee recognized that the Board, in the Port Everglades case, concluded in its Final Order that the profession most comparable to that of a port pilot is that of a captain of a large United States-flagged vessel. The Investigative Committee further recognized that the Board, in the Port Everglades case, concluded that pilot compensation should be equal to or greater than $203,000.00, represented by the Investigative Committee in its report as the annualized compensation of a "U.S. master." The Investigative Committee found, further, that the skills, risks, and working conditions of a ship's captain and a pilot are considerably different in that a pilot must have a wider range of technical skills to pilot a variety of vessels of different sizes; a pilot assumes more physical risks because of the need to board and disembark each vessel; a pilot is constantly in a stressful situation while piloting a vessel into port; and a pilot is a private businessman rather than an employee and must face all of the attendant risks and obligations. In its Decision, the Board established the "floor" compensation for pilots at approximately $200,000.00 to $220,000.00, which represents the wage of the highest-paid ship's master on a United States-flagged ship. 11/ The Investigative Committee found in its report that the amount of compensation above the floor established by the Board depends on several factors, including the size of the ships calling on the port, the difficulty of the port, the cost of living in the surrounding community, and pilot compensation in other United States ports. Finally, the Board expressly recognized in its Decision that, unlike ships' masters, pilots are not employees of a corporation but are independent businessmen, with all of the financial risks that status implies. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. 12/ The education and training of a pilot and a ship's master is, in many cases, the same. A ship's master operating on the high seas, however, has the responsibility for the ship's well-being 24 hours a day, seven days a week during the course of the voyage. The scope of responsibility of a ship's master requires a wider array of skills than those of a pilot; he or she must make judgments regarding matters extending beyond the navigation of the ship. The ship's master is responsible for the ship's crew and, if the ship is a cruise ship, for the welfare of the passengers, and he or she must deal with the hazards of the ship catching fire, disease onboard, and a variety of other matters requiring non-technical skills. A ship's master must have navigational skills and must be knowledgeable about many ports throughout the world and many weather systems. Even when a ship is being piloted into port, the ship's master retains the ultimate responsibility for the ship, and the ship's master will sometimes dock the ship once the pilot has brought it to the docking area. Pilots are licensed to operate in a particular port, and they must have an intimate knowledge of that port. Because pilots must handle almost every vessel calling at the Port of Miami, they must be familiar with the peculiarities of numerous types and sizes of vessels, and they must continually take courses to keep up with the changing technology used on new vessels. Consequently, the knowledge and skills required of a pilot are more specialized and more narrowly focused than those required of a ship's master. When a vessel is ready to come into the Port of Miami, the pilot is taken to the vessel, which, depending on its size, may be located two-to-three miles east of the sea buoy. The pilot must, therefore, board and disembark from a vessel in open water. A pilot at the Port of Miami must guide vessels, sometimes exceeding 1,000 feet in length, through a 500-foot wide channel cut in rock, make a 40-degree turn, and guide the vessel into the port's turning basin and, ultimately, to its berth. There is little maneuvering room, and the pilot must deal with the ever-changing winds, currents, and tides that affect a vessel's passage to the berthing area. For ships of 1,000 feet or longer, there is adequate but not generous room for maneuvering in the turning basin. The number of large vessels using the Port of Miami has increased since 1989. Piloting large vessels increases the complexity of the pilot's job and increases the potential for an accident, necessarily increasing the amount of stress experienced by pilots routinely bringing such vessels into the Port of Miami. A pilot must direct the crew of a vessel when bringing the vessel into and through the channels leading to the turning basin and from the turning basin to the berths, and his or her success depends on his ability to communicate instructions to crewmembers. This communication is becoming more difficult because crewmembers are recruited from many different countries, including those from Eastern Europe, and they may or may not understand English. The stress experienced by a pilot is significantly increased when he must depend on crewmembers who do not understand English, because disaster could result if the pilot's instructions are not followed precisely. The stress experienced by pilots when they are on the job is much more intense, though of shorter duration, than that experienced by ship's masters. A pilot at the Port of Miami will pilot between six and 18 ships each week and is on-call 24 hours each day while on piloting duty, under conditions that are physically and mentally stressful. The pilots at the Port of Miami are not employees of the Pilots' Association. Rather, the Pilots' Association is operated as a partnership of the pilots, and it is funded from the pilotage revenue at the Port of Miami. There are significant operating expenses deducted from gross pilotage revenue before the pilots are paid. The Pilots' Association owns and maintains a building at the far eastern end of the Port of Miami that houses the pilots' business office and also contains bedrooms, restrooms, a lounge, and a chart room for use by the pilots. The Pilots' Association employs office staff to handle billing and accounting functions. The Pilots' Association owns and operates four pilot boats used to transport pilots to and from vessels arriving at and departing from the Port of Miami, and it employs six full- time boat operators. Replacement costs for the pilot boats exceed $2 million. The pilots must absorb rising fuel costs, which cannot be passed on as a surcharge to those using the port and are also responsible for the costs of maintaining the boats. The pilots provide communications services to the vessels entering the Port of Miami, and the Pilots' Association maintains three Federal Communications Commission licenses, a marine coastal station, a high power UHF repeater, and VHF radios in all of the pilot boats. The pilots have invested approximately $50,000.00 in communications equipment that they make available to the Port of Miami, including a 100-watt VHF long range radio and tower, as well as the UHF repeater, and they also maintain the equipment. In addition, the pilots employ dispatchers who handle the radios. The pilot's income is a function of the volume and size of traffic in and out of the port, and they are, consequently, affected by decisions made by the Port of Miami authorities with respect to services to be provided vessels using the port and with respect to port charges. The financial risks faced by the pilots at the Port of Miami are, for the most part, shared by all independent business owners. However, even though pilots of the Pilots' Association are the only pilots allowed to provide services in the Port of Miami and even though pilotage rates are highly regulated and, to an extent, non-competitive, pilots, unlike most private independent business owners, cannot pass on increases in operating expenses; rather, the pilots must absorb these increases until, and unless, an application for a rate increase is approved. 13/ The impact rate change may have in individual pilot compensation and whether such change will lead to a shortage of licensed state pilots, certificated deputy pilots, or qualified pilot applicants. Section 310.151(5)(b)7., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 19 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee found that all-inclusive pilot compensation for the pilots at the Port of Miami would increase 8.76 percent if the increase requested by the Pilots' Association were approved by the Board. As a result, the compensation of pilots at the Port of Miami would still be lower than that of the pilots at Port Everglades, but only slightly. The Investigative Committee noted that an opening at any of the four major Florida ports, the Port of Miami, Port Everglades, Tampa, and Jacksonville, draws 20 to 30 applicants from all over the United States. The Investigative Committee observed that, with or without a rate increase, any of these four ports would attract qualified pilots because they are likely to find more attractive compensation and working and living environments than provided by their present situations. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Projected changes in vessel traffic. Section 310.151(5)(b)8., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 20 and 21 of the report. The Investigative Committee accepted the estimated handles provided by the Pilots' Association in its application, which reflects an increase from 8,909 handles in 1998, to an estimated 9,200 handles in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Investigative Committee noted in its report that the number of cruise passengers at the Port of Miami has remained steady since 1991 and that, although the number of handles decreased between 1992 and 1995, there was steady growth in cargo tonnage between 1988 and 1998. Even with the decrease in the number of handles, the average revenue per handle increased from $545.00 in 1990 to $978.00 in 1998, accounting for a 73 percent increase in the gross annual revenue and a 79 percent increase in the average revenue per handle. The Investigative Committee found that the data suggests that the increase in the pilots' average revenue per handle, and, therefore, its gross annual revenue, is more a function of the increase in the size of the vessels calling at the Port of Miami than a function of the 32 percent rate increase in 1992 and 1993. The Investigative Committee found in its report, and the Board recognized in its Decision, that Port Everglades and the Port of Miami have a strong competitive relationship and that a large increase in pilotage rates at the Port of Miami might result in a decision by Maersk Shipping, a large shipping company currently calling at the Port of Miami and at Port Everglades, to consolidate its operations and use Port Everglades rather than the Port of Miami, resulting in a material decrease in the revenue of the Port of Miami pilots. Prior to the rate increase proposed by the Board, Maersk Shipping paid the pilots at the Port of Miami $1.08 million each year in pilotage fees. A change in operations to Port Everglades would result in a decrease in each pilot's annual income of approximately $48,000.00, with a $24,000.00 decrease in each retiree's benefits. 14/ The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. In choosing ports of call, ship owners, particularly cargo lines, consider many factors, including marketing factors, the availability of berths, the availability of terminal space, the availability of inland transportation, and port congestion, as well as port costs. Port costs, also known as port call expenses, at the Port of Miami are composed of many elements in addition to pilotage fees, such as terminal fees ($8,800.00) 15/ , dockage fees ($3,349.00), wharfage fees ($3,400.00), tug boat fees ($3,009.00), agent fees ($1,500.00), custom and agriculture entry fees ($1,995.00), and harbor fees ($162.00), for a total of $5,570.00; pilotage fees at the Port of Miami for a standard large vessel, according to 1998 data, were $1,085.40, or approximately 15-to-20 percent of port call expenses for a standard large vessel. Therefore, while pilotage fees are a significant part of the mix of port call expenses considered by ship owners in determining whether to call at the Port of Miami, pilots have no control over most of the fees and tariffs comprising port call expenses or over the many other factors that might influence the competitive posture of the Port of Miami vis-à-vis Port Everglades or changes in vessel traffic in the Port of Miami. The Port of Miami consists of Lummus and Dodge Islands, and it is run by the Miami-Dade County Seaport Department. The port rates at the Port of Miami increased approximately 30 percent between 1991 and 1998, generating a revenue increase of approximately 76 percent. Operating expenses increased approximately 44 percent during that time period, but, in general, the port's rate increases have gone primarily to finance improvements in the port's infrastructure and to provide its customers with facilities to accommodate their larger vessels. The port has also received a number of federal and state grants to fund construction programs to improve the port, as well as federal funds for the Port of Miami's dredging program. POMTOC, the Port of Miami Terminal Operating Company, recently received approval to raise its gate fee and empty container storage fee 2.7 percent. The Miami-Dade County Seaport Department also increased its harbor fee for large vessels from $195.00 in 1999 to $235.00 in 2000. In addition, the majority of the port's tariff items increased between 1999 and 2000. Competition is very aggressive among the ports along the eastern seaboard of the United States and along the Gulf of Mexico. As one response to the competitive nature of the market, the Port of Miami has, since 1998, entered into volume incentive agreements with several of its largest customers. The purpose of these agreements is to increase the level of activity at the port by offering a reduction in the port's tariff rate, while at the same time having a guaranteed minimum level of revenue for the port. The Port of Miami has entered into volume incentive agreements with Carnival Cruise Lines, Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Seaboard Marine, Maersk, Columbus Lines, and Chilean, and it is in the process of negotiating other such agreements. As a result of the agreements, these lines have brought additional business to the port or have brought new lines to the port. Cost of retirement and medical plans. Section 310.151(5)(b)9., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 22 through 25 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee determined that the estimated cost of the medical plan available to active and retired pilots for 1999, 2000, and 2001 was $8,125.00, $8,235.00, and $8,400.00, respectively, for each active pilot (or a gross for active pilots of $143,000.00, $140,000.00, and $148,000.00, respectively), and $4,636.00, $5,083.00, and $5,083, respectively, for each retiree (or a gross for retirees of $51,000.00, $61,000.00, and $61,000.00, respectively). The Pilots' Association funds both a money purchase pension plan and a 401k plan for all of its employees, after they have completed one year's service. The total annual contribution averages $6,000.00 per employee. Because the pilots are members of a partnership, they are not considered Pilots' Association employees. Their retirement plan is unfunded, and, as noted above, is in the form of a lifetime consulting agreement pursuant to which eligible pilots receive income that is limited to 50 percent of an active pilot's income, with the aggregate payments to retirees capped at 20 percent of the pilots' gross annual revenue. A surviving spouse of a retired pilot is entitled to receive 25 percent of an active pilot's income for life. The equity interests of retiring pilots in the Pilots' Association are also purchased by the Pilots' Association. These benefits result in an aggregate cost to the Pilots' Association of $2,093,086.00 per year. The Investigative Committee valued the pension plan at a conservative $30,000.00 per year, a figure that the Board accepted over objections by the Pilots' Association. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Physical risks inherent in piloting. Section 310.151(5)(b)10., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 25 and 26 of the report. The Investigative Committee found that boarding a vessel at sea is the most difficult and dangerous aspect of a pilot's job, and that several pilots were injured between 1996 and 1999. Pilots board vessels in the open sea under many different conditions, with considerable risk, and the pilot often receives minimal support from a vessel's crew. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except to the extent specifically set forth in the immediately following paragraphs. Even though they may refuse if conditions are unsafe, as a general rule pilots board and disembark from vessels in the open sea, in all kinds of weather, day and night, on rope ladders that are not fixed, that are sometimes not consistent with standards established by the International Maritime Organization, and that are sometimes in poor repair. Whenever possible, the vessels turn to create a lee, or sheltered side, where the pilot can board and disembark from the vessel with less risk, although it is always possible, even in a calm sea, for a cross swell to hit the vessel during boarding or disembarking. Another point at which a pilot is physically at risk is upon moving from the ladder to the deck of the vessel. Many cruise ships have pilot doors low on the side of the vessel to shorten the distance a pilot must ascend or descend a ladder to board and disembark from the ship. Once the pilot is on board the vessel, he is escorted to the bridge, which is accessible only by stairs, sometimes totaling 100 steps in many modern cargo ships. Special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the particular port. Section 310.151(5)(b)11., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 26 and 27 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee identified several special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the Port of Miami. It recognized that, due to the velocity and direction of the currents, the proximity of the Gulf Stream presents a variety of challenges to pilots as vessels approach the Outer Bar Channel and that the Gulf Stream, together with northerly winds and a flooding current, make transiting the jetties especially difficult. Because the channel bottom is hard coral from the sea buoy to the berths, it is extremely difficult to handle large, deep-draft vessels to and from the gantry berths, and the current and wind conditions require special handling of these vessels when they dock or turn. In addition, reefs lining the approaches to the Port of Miami are unmarked, and the background light from Miami-Dade County makes it difficult to identify land and navigational marks. Weather can cause hazards to navigation in the Port of Miami, with rapidly changing wind conditions resulting from thunderstorms and with changing tidal conditions resulting from heavy rains. In addition, northwesterly and northeasterly winds cause heavy sets on a flood tide for vessels passing through the jetties. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except to the extent specifically set forth in the immediately following paragraphs. 16/ The complexity of the waterway poses a high risk to vessels being piloted into the Port of Miami. Waterway complexity at the Port of Miami includes the amount of crossing traffic, turns in the channel, converging traffic from different channels, background lighting, and the large number of small pleasure craft in and around the channels. The hard rock bottom of the channels poses a high risk to vessels being piloted into the Port of Miami. The channel is dredged in a "U" shape, forming a narrow underwater trench through which vessels must pass, and vessels can be seriously damaged if they come into contact with the sides of the trench. Any other factors the board deems relevant in determining a just and reasonable rate. Section 310.151(5)(b)12., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board determined that there were no such factors. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the Board's finding. The board may take into consideration the consumer price index or any other comparable economic indicator when fixing rates of pilotage; however, because the consumer price index or such other comparable economic indicator is primarily related to net income rather than rates, the board shall not use it as the sole factor in fixing rates of pilotage. Section 310.151(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 28 and 29 of the report and in the attachments thereto. In its report, the Investigative Committee found that the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") had increased 17.8 percent since January 1, 1993, the date of the last pilotage rate increase, and 22.9 percent since October 1991, the date of the Pilots' Association's last application for a rate increase. In reaching its conclusion that some increase in pilotage rates at the Port of Miami is justified, the Board noted in its Decision that it considered it compelling that the CPI had increased 17.8 percent since the last rate increase and that pilotage rates at the Port of Miami had not increased for seven years. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Taken in its entirety, the evidence presented by the Cargo Carriers Association and the Pilots' Association in this proceeding with respect to the statutory factors set forth in Section 310.1151(5)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (2000), yielded findings of fact in addition to those found by the Board in its Decision. There was not sufficient credible and persuasive evidence presented by the Cargo Carriers Association to support a finding of fact contrary to the findings of the Board in its Decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Pilotage Rate Review Board consider the additional facts established by the evidence presented at the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings in determining, in accordance with its interpretation of its statutory mandate, its expertise, and the appropriate policy considerations, whether the Decision on the Biscayne Bay Pilots' Association Pilotage Rate Increase Application in the Port of Miami, filed March 9, 2000, will result in fair, just, and reasonable pilotage rates at the Port of Miami. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Richard L. Hensch submitted to the Department of Transportation (DOT) an Airport Site Approval and License Application dated December 8, 1987, for a private seaplane base on Lake Fairview in Orange County. On the application, Mr. Hensch indicated that flight activities that would be conducted from the proposed site could be sight-seeing flights, seaplane rides and tours and occasional seaplane instruction. Mr. Hensch plans to offer these activities to the public and charge fees for them. Attached to the Application was a letter dated December 17, 1987, from Ms. Sharon Smith, the Orange County Zoning Director, in which she states: Please be advised that insofar as Orange County Zoning requirements are concerned, our department has no jurisdiction over the use of water bodies of lakes; rather such use falls under the jurisdiction of the State of Florida. This letter was written at the request of the Petitioner. While the above-referenced application was under consideration by DOT, Petitioner applied for and received from the County tentative approval for an occupational license for his proposed operation. F.A.A. airspace determination approval letter for the proposed site was dated June 1, 1989. A Notice of Intent about the "proposed Private Seaplane Base" was issued by the Department of Transportation on June 21, 1989. A public meeting in connection therewith was conducted on August 28, 1989. Bronson Monteith, working for the DOT in Orange County, conducted the public meeting and recommended site approval relying on the letter by Orange County, dated December 17, 1987, as to the zoning. The Orange County Commission at its meeting held on August 14, 1989, objected to the placement of a seaplane base at Lake Fairview based on a determination by the zoning director and the county attorney's office that the proposed seaplane base did not comply with the zoning ordinance. The Lake Fairview area property is zoned predominantly residential, R- 1A, R-1AA with some C-2, R-T and R-3 zoning within the lake. Included within the commercial-type operations along and on the lake are jet-ski, sailboat and other watercraft rentals. Airports can be located only by special exception in A1 and A-2, agricultural zoning districts, and are permitted outright in I-5, Industrial Airport Zoning District. None of the lake area or shoreline areas are zoned A-1, Z-2 or I-5. During August of 1989, the Assistant Zoning Director, Joanne McMurray, who as Acting Zoning Director, received a memorandum from Mr. Hartman, Acting Director of the County's Administrative Services Office, about the seaplane base proposal whereby she researched the zoning regulations as to airport facilities and zoning districts and permitted uses. She determined the proposed seaplane site would not comply with the Orange County zoning requirements. Ms. McMurray had received information from the county legal department that Zoning had jurisdiction to govern the use of lakes. Lacy Moore, DOT's Chief of Airport Inspection, indicated that licensing followed site approval and was subject to annual renewal. Licensing was subject to revocation or denial of renewal if zoning changes occurred that made the airport out of compliance with zoning. DOT sought clarification from the County as to whether the proposed site was in compliance with the Orange County zoning regulations. Phillip N. Brown, Orange County Administrator, sent a letter to Mr. Moore dated October 30, 1989, advising that the proposed seaplane site was not a permitted use in the County zoning district for Lake Fairview. As a result of Mr. Brown's letter, Petitioner's application was denied on November 1, 1989, based on failure to comply with local zoning requirements. An "airport" is defined by the Orange County Zoning Ordinance as "any area of land or water designated and set aside for the landing and taking off of aircraft and utilized or to be utilized in the interest of the public for such purpose." No amendments to the zoning ordinance or zoning district map have been enacted since the filing of Petitioner's Application of December 8, 1987. On or about November 11, 1988, Ms. Smith, Orange County Zoning Director, by letter, stated that there were no zoning regulations in force in connection with another unrelated application for site approval and licensure of a private seaplane base on Big Sand Lake in Orange County, Florida. Licensed private airports have been authorized by DOT to provide services to the public such as airplane rides and flight instruction and charge fees. At the formal hearing held on this matter, several residents of the Lake Fairview area expressed opposition to the proposed seaplane site and indicated their concerns as to noise and safety because of extensive activity on the lake. Some people spoke in favor of the seaplane base indicating operational safety. Members of the public, including lake residents and others who spoke at the hearing, were not under subpoena by either party.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered by the agency head denying site approval for a private seaplane base on Lake Fairview in Orange County, Florida, because it does not comply with applicable county zoning as required by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-6714 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9,10 (discussed in Preliminary Statement). Rejected as argument: 8,11. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: 1,2,3,4,5 COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Brian D. Stokes, Esquire Post Office Box 538065 Orlando, Florida 32853-8065 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, MS 58 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact The record reflects that notice was given to Respondent at its business address. The hearing was recessed for over 15 minutes to give Respondent added time to appear. Respondent has not contacted the Division as of the date of this Order. Yellow Whirleybird Helistop was issued an airport license renewal by the Department of Transportation, on March 11, 1987, for a private helistop located at latitude 30 degrees 11' 24" and longitude 85 degrees 49' 52" in Bay County, Panama City Beach, Florida. The service provided by this helistop is helicopter rides and it is located on property owned by Bay County, Florida. The City of Panama City Beach enacted a land use ordinance, No. 316, effective June 11, 1987, prohibiting the operation of sightseeing rotocraft "within the area bounded on the north by the southerly right-of-way U.S. Highway 98, alternate (Front Beach Road) and south Thomas Drive, and east and west by the easterly and westerly boundaries of the city, ---". The heliport in question is located within the area described above. The Office of the County Attorneys, Bay County, by letter dated July 22, 1987, notified Yellow Whirleybird Heli- copter, Inc. that the concession agreement it had with the county was terminated and gave Yellow Whirleybird 30 days to vacate the premises. The Department of Transportation, by letter dated June 25, 1987, notified Yellow Whirleybird Helistop that its airport license was being revoked because of lack of proper zoning at the site, due to Panama City Beach Ordinance No. 316. In addition, suitable local zoning and ownership or lease of the airport site are requirements of site approval and license by the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the airport license located at latitude 30 degrees 11' 24" and longitude 85 degrees 49' 52" in Panama City Beach, Florida, issued to Whirleybird Helistop, Respondent, for a private helistop be revoked because it does not currently meet the zoning and lease requirements of the statute and rule. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon-Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Mr. Ron Brown Whirleybird Helistop 430 Lyndell Panama City Beach, Florida 32407 Douglas J. Sale, Esquire City Attorney 110 South Arnold Road Panama City Beach, Florida 32407 Kay N. Henderson, P.E., Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon-Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact On September 22, 1981, the Respondent, Sonoma International (hereafter Sonoma) , through its vice president, Claudette Bruck, filed an application with the Florida Department of Transportation (hereafter D.O.T.) for a license to construct and operate a private airport to be known as Greener Pastures Private Airport. The proposed airport site is located on Loxahatchee Road (SR 827) in an unincorporated area of southwest Palm Beach County. The parcel on which the proposed airport is to be located consists of approximately 63.42 acres and is owned by Sonoma. The property is approximately 800 feet east to west and 3900 feet north to south. The proposed landing strip would be located on the western-most portion of the property and will run the entire length of the property except for any applicable setback requirements. Petitioner, John J. Burton, (hereafter Burton) owns approximately 15 to 20 acres of undeveloped land in the area of the proposed site. The eastern portion of Burton's property is directly north of the location of the proposed landing strip. The Burton property is approximately 300 feet north of the Hillsborough Canal and approximately 600 to 800 feet north of the proposed airport site. The Petitioner, Florida National Properties, Inc., owns the land contiguous to the southern boundary of the proposed site. This property is also undeveloped. The Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge is located approximately 3/4 of a mile north of the proposed site. The area where the proposed site is located remains undeveloped. Sonoma proposes to sell subdivided five (5) acre parcels with the landing strip located on the western portion of each lot. The landing strip is for the use of the owners of these parcels and their guests. The proposed landing strip will be a grass strip and will run the full length of the property. D.O.T. reviewed Sonoma's application, performed site inspections and found the proposed site was adequate to meet the site approval requirements set forth in Rule 14-60.05, Florida Administrative Code. The site inspections were performed by Mr. Boswell and Mr. Brown of D.O.T., who submitted reports of their findings. On October 20, 1982, D.O.T. entered a site approval order which contained the following conditions: All operations are to be conducted in VFR weather conditions. Use of the airstrip is limited to property owners and their invited guests. Left traffic patterns will be established for Runway 18 and Right traffic patterns will be established for Runway 36. Aircraft arriving or departing the airport will avoid overflying the Loxachatchee National Wildlife Refuge below 2000 feet AGL. Users of the airport and invited guests will be informed of possible bird activity in the vicinity of the site. Traffic patterns and operational procedures are subject to review by this Department prior to licensing or re-licensing. The landing strip surface for private airports must be a minimum of 1800 feet in length with a primary surface width of 100 feet and a usable width of 50 feet. The proposed site is more than adequate for a landing strip with these dimensions. A private airport must have and maintain approach zones which are a trapezoidal area increasing in width from 50 feet either side of the runway centerline at a distance of 3000 feet outward from the ends of each runway. Rule 14-60.07(5), Florida Administrative Code. These approach zones must be clear of obstructions above a glide path of 20:1 from the ends of each usable runway. Rule 14-60.07(6). It is not necessary for the applicant to own or control the ground area beneath the approach zones. The approach zones for the proposed airport will extend over property owned by the Petitioner Burton on the north and Petitioner Florida National on the south. Neither of the Petitioners has granted an easement or other right of use of the airspace above their property. There are presently no obstructions which will prevent Sonoma from obtaining the necessary approach zones at the time of licensing. There are Australian Pines located on the northern tip of Sonoma's property and along the right-of-way of Loxahatchee Road where it abuts Sonoma's property on the north. These trees are 80 to 90 feet in height. By constructing the landing strip the full length of Sonoma's property, the threshold for landing may be displaced to the south of these trees. The 90 foot height will require a displacement of 1800 feet in order to obtain the 20:1 glide path clear zone. With a runway length of 3700 feet (3900 feet minus 2 x 100 feet set back) leaves a usable runway length of 1900 feet. This exceeds the minimum 1800 feet requirement. The trees may be topped or removed prior to final inspection. Although there are bird-nesting areas within the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge from which regular flights of birds occur, these flights are fairly predictable as to time and location and will not create an abnormal safety hazard for the proposed site. There are also microwave towers in the general area of the proposed site, but these towers do not constitute a hazard to planes landing or taking off from the proposed airport. Safe air traffic patterns can be developed on the site for takeoff and landing. Herbert L. Brown, an Aviation Specialist with D.O.T., flew low approaches over the proposed site on two different occasions on December 2, 1982, and April 22, 1983. Mr. Brown flew right-hand traffic patterns and approaches to Runway 36 and left-hand patterns and approaches to Runway 18. On each occasion, he could have landed safely on the proposed site but made a go- around. Mr. Brown did not detect any potential hazards on either of these flights and determined that safe air traffic can be developed on the proposed site. On April 29, 1982, the Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County approved Sonoma's petition for a Special Exception to the Palm Beach County zoning ordinance. This approval permits Sonoma to construct a private use airport on the proposed site with the following conditions: The developer shall convey to Palm Beach County within ninety (90) days of Special Exception approval 80 feet south of the south right-of-way line of the Hillsboro Canal for the ultimate right-of-way for State Road #827. The developer shall contribute Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) toward the oust of meeting this project's direct and identifiable traffic impact, to be paid on a pro-rata basis at the time of issuance of the building permit(s). A 100 ft. setback shall be required between the runway edge and any property line. No structure or navigation aids shall be closer than 50 ft. from any property line. Use of this airstrip shall be limited to owners of this property and their guests. The developer has agreed, and shall limit the County's liability for any future condemnation to exclude any improvements constructed as a result of this Special Exception. Airspace approval for the proposed site was obtained from the FAA on February 24, 1982. A private use airport constructed on this site will conform to the minimum standards of safety for a private use airport if constructed in accordance with D.O.T. requirements. The determination of such conformity is made by D.O.T. in a final inspection prior to licensing. The procedure for obtaining a private use license is a two-step procedure. The first determination is site approval and basically addresses the question of whether it is feasible to establish a private use airport on the proposed site which will meet D.O.T. requirements. In this phase, no detailed construction plans or site plans are required. After site approval, the proposed licensee prepares the site and constructs the airport. Upon completion, D.O.T. makes a final inspection to determine if all D.O.T. requirements have been met. If the airport fails to meet any D.O.T. requirement, the license will not be issued.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation issue its site approval order to Sonoma International for the proposed private airport, subject to those specific conditions set forth in the Notice of Intent and proposed Site Approval Order. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald K. Burton, Esquire Mark A. Seff, Esquire 2740 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, Florida 33020 Paul A. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas G. Wright, Jr., Esquire Gregory S. Sollitto, Esquire 3300 University Drive Coral Springs, Florida 33065 Leslie T. Ahrenholz, Esquire Post Office Box 2656 Fort Myers, Florida 33921 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for site approval and licensure of a private seaplane base near Manatee Springs on the Suwannee River should be approved.
Findings Of Fact By application dated July 18, 1990, Petitioner applied to the Department of Transportation for site approval and licensure for a private seaplane base to be known as Manatee Springs Seabase on the Suwannee River in Dixie County, Florida, seven miles south of Old Town. On the application, Petitioner agreed that the private seaplane base would be for his personal use, that it would not be used for commercial operations, that flight activities from the proposed site would be conducted only during the day, and that operations would only occur in VFR weather conditions. Petitioner owns 362 acres of land with approximately 2,400 feet of that land being riverfront property. Petitioner's property is on the west shore of the Suwannee River. Approximately across from the southern boundary of Petitioner's property is the Spring Run in Manatee Springs State Park. The Park extends a considerable distance to both the north and the south, far beyond the boundaries of Petitioner's property. Approximately 100 feet south of the entrance to Spring Run is the dock of Manatee Springs State Park. Numerous manatee have been sighted around the Park's dock, at the entrance to the Spring Run, in the Spring Run, and in the middle of the River across from the dock. The Suwannee River between Petitioner's property on the west bank and the Park's property on the east bank is between 600 and 700 feet wide. In that area, the Suwannee River is open to all kinds of boat traffic, some of which travels as fast or faster than a seaplane taking off and landing. That area of the River is used by fishing boats, ski boats, airboats, jet skis, houseboats, and canoes. There is a tour boat which travels through the area in question, and canoes can be rented at the Park from a concessionaire. Personnel at the commercial canoe rental business advise renters to stay within 50 to 100 feet from the east shore line, along the Park. However, some renters ignore the instructions and cross the River. Due to the heavier manatee and boat activity at the Spring Run and Park docking area across from the southern portion of Petitioner's property, Petitioner proposes that his landing and take-off area be located just to the north of the northern boundary of his property, away from the entrance to Manatee Springs State Park, in the middle of the River, and in a section of the River which is straighter, which would increase his visibility of boat traffic in the area. Petitioner will place no structures of any kind in the River. Under Petitioner's proposal, he will store his seaplane in an area in the northern portion of his property. No structures will be constructed in this storage area. Petitioner would taxi out from the seaplane's storage area to his take-off and landing area which starts approximately 300 feet north of his storage site. The take-off and landing area would extend approximately 2,600 feet up the River and would be 100 feet wide. Petitioner proposes to use either a two-passenger or four-passenger seaplane. Such seaplanes utilize 100 h.p. and 150 h.p. engines, respectively. Such seaplanes taxi at 3-5 knots per hour, which speed would create the same wake as a canoe. When a seaplane is idling, it creates no wake. When a seaplane takes off, it rotates onto the pontoon step within 15 to 20 seconds and completes take-off within an additional 10 to 15 seconds. The total take-off time is approximately 30-35 seconds, and the seaplane during take-off will achieve a speed of 40-45 m.p.h., less the head wind. The total take-off distance is approximately 1,000 feet. Accordingly, Petitioner would be on the River for approximately 5 minutes of taxiing and 30 seconds of take-off, at which point the seaplane is off the River. The amount of wake created during take-off is 2-3 inches. The distance betwen the entrance to the Spring Run into Manatee Springs State Park and the southern end of Petitioner's proposed landing and take-off area is 3,000 feet. Thus, Petitioner's proposed landing and take-off area is located a safe distance from where boaters and manatee congregate around the Springs. Further, although some of Petitioner's neighbors on the west shore of the Suwannee River tie their boats to trees along the shore, there are no docks extending into the River in or near the area proposed for the landing and take- off strip. There are a public boat ramp at Clay Landing approximately 2 miles above the proposed seaplane landing area, a public boat ramp somewhere south of the Park, and a third public boat ramp somewhere in the Park. The boat ramps are not close enough to Petitioner's proposed landing and take-off strip to pose any threat to their users from Petitioner's proposed use of his seaplane. Petitioner is a licensed pilot, who possesses all appropriate ratings and has passed the required physical examinations. He learned to fly in 1940 and operated a seaplane base in Fort Walton during the 1940s and 1950s. He was then employed as a pilot for Eastern Airlines for 33 years. He has 18,000 hours of flying time, which includes 1,000 hours of flying seaplanes. He will carry liability insurance on his seaplane of at least $100,000. Petitioner understands that when his seaplane is on the water, it is subject to the rules and regulations governing boats and other watercraft. Accordingly, when "no wake" restrictions are in effect on the Suwannee River when the River is high, Petitioner cannot use his seaplane base. The Department's aviation specialist assigned to process Petitioner's application for site approval visited Petitioner's property on five separate occasions, observing boat traffic on the River during his visits. On one occasion, he spent the day counting the boat traffic and estimating intervals of traffic relative to landing and take-off times. Although the River was high on that occasion, it was during a weekend when boat traffic would be heavier than during the week. He determined that the proposed location of Petitioner's seaplane base was a safe location and that Petitioner's activity would not constitute a hazard to boating traffic. The Department issued its Notice of Intent to approve Petitioner's seaplane base, subject to several conditions: All operations are conducted during daylight hours and during VFR weather conditions only. Operations are prohibited on long holiday weekends that generate a high volume of river traffic (Memorial Day, 4th of July, Labor Day). A non standard traffic pattern be used, all traffic patterns will be to the west of the extended runway center line to prevent over flight of Manatee Springs State Park. Pursuant to the Department's regulations, Petitioner was required to provide notice of his application to all property owners within 1,000 feet from any boundary of the airport operational area, and the Department's Notice of Intent was published notifying interested persons that a public meeting would be conducted, if requested, on Petitioner's application. A number of persons attended the public meeting, some of whom supported Petitioner's application, but the majority of whom opposed Petitioner's application. After the public meeting, the Department issued a letter denying Petitioner's application, citing the concerns voiced at the public meeting. Additionally, the denial letter advised Petitioner that the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund have state sovereignty jurisdiction of the River area where the proposed seaplane base would be located and that Petitioner would, therefore, need appropriate authorization from the Trustees through the Department of Natural Resources to use the sovereign submerged land. That letter further advised Petitioner that the Trustees' jurisdiction is subject to the navigation servitude of the federal government and that Petitioner, therefore, would need a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers to use the proposed site on the Suwannee River as a seaplane base. Although the statutes and rules regulating the Department's site approval and licensure of airports and seaplane bases do not contain a requirement for authorization from the Trustees or the requirement of a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers, Petitioner contacted those agencies. By letter dated June 28, 1991, the Florida Department of Natural Resources advised Petitioner as follows: Please be advised that you do not need authorization for the use of state-owned submerged lands if you are not storing your sea plane waterward of the Ordinary High Water Line of the Suwannee River, constructing structures waterward of the Ordinary High Water Line, or impacting state-owned submerged lands and resources when removing your seaplane from the Suwannee River. Petitioner's proposal does not contain any of those characteristics. By letter dated September 6, 1991, the Department of the Army, Jacksonville District Corps of Engineers, advised Petitioner that no authorization or permit was required for his proposed seaplane base. Petitioner can safely take-off and land in his proposed strip without presenting a danger to boaters and swimmers any greater than the risk presented by other fast moving vessels currently permitted to utilize the Suwannee River in the area under question. The height of a seaplane propeller poses no danger to swimmers or manatee. One must be fully licensed and trained to operate a seaplane, while one needs no training or licensure to operate a speed boat. The height of a seaplane presents a better view of obstacles in the River than the view of someone in a boat or in the River. A seaplane offers the ability to stop quickly or "pull up" in a split second to avoid something coming quickly into the path of the seaplane. Although the Florida Department of Natural Resources advised Petitioner that he did not need authorization to use the state-owned submerged lands of the Suwannee River, employees of the Division of Recreation and Parks of the Department of Natural Resources testified at the final hearing in opposition to Petitioner's application. Those employees believe that Petitioner's proposed landing and take-off area is within the jurisdiction of the Division of Recreation and Parks pursuant to a Management Agreement entered into between the Division and the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida. That Management Agreement entered into on November 24, 1986, and amended on January 19, 1988, does grant management responsibilities to the Division over: All those sovereign submerged lands lying within 400 feet of the Mean High Water or Ordinary High Water Line, or in the case where the shoreline is vegetated with. . .wetland vegetation, within 400 feet of the emergent edge of the vegetation, and within the riparian area of any state park. . .administered by the Division of Recreation and Parks . . . . Petitioner's proposed landing and take-off strip is within 400 feet of the emergent edge of the vegetation of Manatee Springs State Park. That Management Agreement, however, also provides that the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida retained the right to also engage in management activities over those sovereign submerged lands and further provides that the Management Agreement is not to be construed in any way to interfere with the traditional riparian rights of private landowners. Lastly, that Management Agreement required the Division of Recreation and Parks to submit to the Board for its approval a management plan for those submerged lands and prohibited the Division from engaging in activities not provided for in the required plan without the advance written approval of the Board. There was no evidence indicating that the Division had adopted any management plan for the area under consideration in this cause. Further, no explanation was offered as to how the Division of Recreation and Parks could impose requirements not imposed by the Department of Natural Resources.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting Petitioner's airport site approval and license application, with the conditions set forth in paragraph numbered 13 of this Recommended Order. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of November, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 91-4391 Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4 have been adopted in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 6 has been rejected as being subordinate to the issues involved herein. Copies furnished: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Attn: Eleanor F. Turner 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Henry C. Fucik, 8290 S.W. 58th Street Miami, Florida 33143
Findings Of Fact The Garemore airport is located in Marion County and is known as the Greystone Airport. The Garemores were issued a private airport license for the period September 24, 1980, through September 30, 1981, and have made timely application for annual renewal of this license. Neighboring property owners and residents who objected to grant of the initial license also object to renewal. Generally, their objections concern excessive noise and unsafe aircraft operations. Several Petitioners raise and breed thoroughbred horses on property adjacent to the airport. They fear for their personal safety and the well-being of these horses and other livestock. These Petitioners also contend that aircraft noise and low flying upset their animals and interfere with mating. However, Respondent introduced opposing evidence, and Petitioners' contention was not established as factual. Through unrebutted testimony, Petitioners established that crop dusters routinely originate operations from Greystone Airport, and that crop dusting chemicals are stored on the site. About six months ago, a crop duster taking off from Greystone Airport dumped his chemical load on a Petitioner's property and subsequently crashed on this property. Petitioners also argue that the airport glide slope does not meet accepted criteria and that runway surfacing is inadequate. Respondent DOT has recently inspected the facility and through the testimony of its airport inspector, demonstrated that the glide slope has been measured and meets the 20 to 1 requirement set forth in Section 14-60.07, Florida Administrative Code. The runway is not surfaced and Petitioners contend it is not hard enough for aircraft operations during the rainy season. As evidence of this, they cite an incident where a visiting airplane ground looped on landing and appeared to lose a wheel. This incident did not establish a runway deficiency, however, nor did Petitioners offer evidence that the runway surface fails to meet any statutory or rule standard. Petitioners related numerous examples of low flying, night flying and acrobatic maneuvering at and near the Greystone Airport. They contend that these activities along with the concentration of World War II and antique aircraft, and the crop dusting operations, have made this a commercial facility.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the private airport license issued to James and Geraldine Garemore be renewed subject to a restriction against crop dusting operations. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Clark Hardwick 900 Northeast 100th Street Ocala, Florida 32677 Charles and Terry Kerr 8149 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32670 Mr. John P. Edson 8610 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32671 Sherry and Vince Shofner Post Office Box 467 Anthony, Florida 32617 Frank and Carol Constantini 8545 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32670 Mr. James B. Banta, Sr. 9349 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32670 Ms. Deborah Allen 8263 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32671 Mr. Worthy E. Farr, Jr. 8215 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32671 Mr. Michael J. Stavola Post Office Box 187 Anthony, Florida 32617 Frances Spain Post Office Box 128 Anthony, Florida 32617 Ms. Beatrice Shepherd Post Office Box 215 Anthony, Florida 32617 J. W. Houston 900 Northeast 100th Street Ocala, Florida 32670 John F. Welch, Esquire Post Office Box 833 Ocala, Florida 32678 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Suite 562 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, David E. Rabren was licensed as a Tampa Bay state pilot and was president of the Tricounty Pilot's Association (TRICO). At the time the movement of the OCEAN LORD occurred, there was only one state licensed pilot who was a member of TRICO. That was David E. Rabren. Other members held only federally issued pilot's licenses. Prior to the movement of the VOMAR, a second state licensed pilot joined TRICO. At present, there are four licensed state pilots and one deputy pilot associated with TRICO. The vessel OCEAN LORD arrived in Tampa Bay February 18, 1986, and was piloted by Captain Rabren to its berth at C. F. Industries (CFI). After taking on cargo, the OCEAN LORD was moved the same date to Gadsden Anchorage. During this move, Captain Murphy, a federally licensed, but not state licensed, pilot was on board. Captain Murphy is associated with TRICO. On February 21, 1986, the OCEAN LORD was moved from Gadsden Anchorage to the CSX Transportation dock at Rockport. Again, Captain Murphy was the pilot. On September 21, 1986, the vessel VOMAR was moved from Rockport to a dock at Big Bend with Captain Murphy as the pilot. Anita Rabren determined that the movement could be accomplished with a federally licensed pilot on board. On October 5, 1986, the vessel ASPEN, an American flag vessel, arrived at Tampa Bay, and the ship's agent requested TRICO provide a pilot. Due to a misunderstanding of the agent's statement that the ASPEN was coming from the west coast, Anita Rabren assumed this was from the west coast of the United States. Actually, the ASPEN's last port of call was in Korea. Had the vessel come from a west coast of the United States port, the voyage would have been a coastwise trip, and a federally licensed pilot would be required. A federally licensed pilot was assigned to pilot the ASPEN. The last port of call of the ASPEN was ascertained after the pilotages up Tampa Bay commenced, and the fact that an improperly licensed pilot was used was reported forthwith. TRICO paid a double pilot fee to the Tampa Bay Pilot's Association. Tampa Port Authority has jurisdiction over all of Hillsborough County and establishes rules and regulations for that area. They do not regulate pilotage of vessels. Many of the terminals in Hillsborough County are owned by the Port Authority, but some are privately owned such as Big Bend and Rockport, both of which are in the port of Tampa. The Port Authority controls the allocation of berths at all terminals owned by the Port Authority, but does not control the berths at privately owned terminals. The CFI terminal is owned by the Port Authority who establishes wharfage rates and docking rates at this terminal. The berths at Rockport and Big Bend are privately owned, and tariff rates are not set by the Port Authority. CSX Transportation owns a dock at Rockport where phosphate is loaded onto vessels. No wharfage or dockage charge is levied, but such charges are included in charges for the commodity loaded. Ships can clear customs at any of the terminals above noted. The Big Bend facility is under the jurisdiction of Gulf Coast Transit Company. Vessels bring coal to Big Bend for use by Tampa Electric Company. The AGRICO terminal at Big Bend is used for loading phosphate rock. All of these privately owned terminals are licensed by the Tampa Port Authority to whom they pay a fee and submit reports of their activities. The Tampa Port Authority charges a fee to vessels who load or unload cargo at the Gadsden Anchorage which is also in the port of Tampa. Section 310.002(4), Florida Statutes, defines "port" to mean, any place in the state in which vessels enter and depart. For Tampa Bay, this section lists Tampa, Port Tampa, Port Manatee, St. Petersburg and Clearwater as ports. Of those listed ports, Tampa and Port Tampa are in Hillsborough County and come under the jurisdiction of the Tampa Port Authority. No evidence was submitted showing the areas encompassed by the Port of Tampa and Port Tampa. The Port of Tampa's Terminal and Facilities Map (Exhibit 5) showing the port facilities at Tampa, Florida, does not show the facilities at Port Tampa; it shows only those facilities on the east side of the Tampa peninsula, and does not reach as far south as Big Bend. Presumably, if there are only two ports in Hillsborough County that portion of Hillsborough County west of the Tampa peninsula would comprise Port Tampa, and that portion of Hillsborough County east and south of the Tampa peninsula would comprise the Port of Tampa. If so, all of the movements here complained of occurred in the Port of Tampa. Exhibit 5 supports this conclusion. Finally, no credible evidence was presented that Respondent assigned a federally licensed, but not a state licensed, pilot to the OCEAN LORD, VOMAR and ASPEN as alleged, except Exhibit 3 which states the assignment of a federally licensed pilot to the Aspen was due to an error on the part of Captain Rabren. The direct testimony presented in this regard is that Anita Rabren assigned federally licensed pilots to those ships. Further, this determination that use of a federally licensed pilot for those movements of foreign flag vessels within the Port of Tampa was proper was made by Anita Rabren after receiving legal advice regarding the in-port movements of foreign flag vessels that can be piloted by a federally licensed pilot.
