The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the permit for sign installation previously issued by the Department of Transportation is still valid to authorize Petitioner’s sign located on State Road 60 in Pinellas County.
Findings Of Fact The parties entered into two stipulations of fact which are accepted and incorporated herein. Stipulation of Fact #1 reads: The off-premise outdoor advertising billboard structure located at 2815-2817 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida, owned by Allan J. Stowell was lawfully erected under the applicable provisions of the City’s ordinances in the fall of 1981. The City issued building permit number 6361D, dated September 3, 1981, to Stowell to erect the billboard in issue. On August 25, 1985, the City of Clearwater adopted sign regulations which required, among other things, uniformity among signs. City Code Section 44.55(3)(b), required that all billboards on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, east of Highland Avenue, be brought into conformance with the Code provisions by January 19, 1996. On January 19, 1989, the City adopted Ordinance No. 4753-88, regulating signs on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard. Pursuant to that ordinance, the billboard in issue became non-conforming due to its size. Mr. Stowell was allowed a seven-year amortization period which expired on January 19, 1996. By letter dated August 30, 1994, the City advised Mr. Stowell that the billboard in issue would have to be brought into compliance with the provisions of the City’s sign ordinance by January 19, 1996. As a result of the sign regulations adopted by the City in 1985, the billboard in issue was classified thereafter as a legal non-conforming sign, and it was such on November 25, 1995. Stipulation of Fact #2 reads: State Road 60 means that segment of roadway, also known as Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, which is located within the City of Clearwater and is east of Highway 19. The effective date of the national highway system was November 28, 1995, and all references in stipulated exhibits, stipulations, transcripts of depositions, correspondence or other documents which erroneously refer to November 25, 1995, shall be amended to read November 28, 1995, for the purposes of this administrative proceeding. Any reference in this administrative proceeding to the “subject sign,” “billboard,” “off-premise outdoor advertising structure,” “sign,” or other similar designations shall mean the off-premise outdoor advertising billboard structure owned by the Petitioner and located at 2815-2817 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard (State Road 60). On May 22, 1974, State Road 60 was designated a Federal- Aid Primary. On July 1, 1976, State Road 60 was re-designated from a Federal-Aid Primary to a Federal-Aid Urban. Allan J. Stowell was licensed by the Florida Department of Transportation as an outdoor advertiser pursuant to license number 19848, dated October 2, 1981. On or about October 1, 1981, Allan J. Stowell was issued state sign permit numbers AF307-10 and AF308-10, by the Florida Department of Transportation, for the construction, maintenance and operation of the two sign facings on the subject billboard structure. At this point, State Road 60 was not part of the Federal-Aid Primary Highway System within Florida. After 1988, the Department discontinued billing Mr. Stowell because State Road 60 was not a Federal-Aid Primary, Interstate, or a part of the State Highway System outside a municipality. State Road 60 became a part of the national highway system on November 25, 1995. Petitioner, Allan J. Stowell, purchased the property on which the sign in issue is located in 1972. At that time, a sign owned by Foster and Kleiser (F&K), an outdoor advertising firm, was situated on the property. After Petitioner purchased the property, he entered an amended lease agreement with F&K for the use of his property. At that time, the existing sign was permitted by the state. Subsequent to the execution of the amended lease, because he wanted to develop the land and put up his own sign, Mr. Stowell requested that F&K remove their sign from his property, and an agreement to do that was received on August 3, 1981. During his research in preparation for the request for removal, Mr. Stowell spoke with Mr. Andre DeVetter of the Brandon office of the Department of Transportation (DOT). Mr. DeVetter advised him the sign was located adjacent to a Federal Aid Primary Highway, that the property on which the sign was to be located was properly zoned for that purpose, that after removal of the existing sign, Stowell could apply for and receive a permit for a new sign, and that under the terms of the Federal Highway Beautification Act (the Act), Mr. Stowell could not be required to take the sign down without compensation therefor. Based on these assurances, Petitioner borrowed $35,000, placing his home as collateral for the loan, which he used for the construction of the new sign. Before starting construction, however, Mr. Stowell went to the City of Clearwater for both a permit for the construction and a variance to exceed the normal size limitations because his proposed sign was to be bigger than the code calls for by more than 100 square feet. He requested and obtained a permit to construct a 10 by 40-foot sign. The variance was initially denied by the city’s sign approval board, but a subsequent action by the Board of Adjustment granted the variance. Though the minutes of the pertinent meeting of the Board of Adjustment cannot now be found, Mr. Stowell has a letter dated August 21, 1997, from DOT in which the Department agrees that a variance was granted. He also obtained an occupational license to conduct the outdoor sign business. Mr. Stowell constructed the new sign which was permitted by the Department as promised in 1982. He thereafter obtained renewals of the permits for the sign from DOT for calendar years 1983 and 1984 - one for each face. Over the succeeding years, Mr. Stowell did not receive annual renewal notices for the years 1985, 1986, or 1987, and the fees for those years were not initially paid. However, he received a letter in 1988 indicating he was delinquent in certain costs and fees for the permits. When he received that letter, Mr. Stowell sent in a check for the delinquent costs and fees in the amount of $308.00, which covered all delinquent permit fees and a 10 percent delinquency penalty, and believed his delinquencies had been brought current. The Department issued permits to Mr. Stowell for the sign in 1981 and 1982. After the delinquencies were brought current in 1988, Mr. Stowell did not hear anything further from the Department, other than the previously mentioned letter, which noted the sign was now on the Federal Highway System and he needed to obtain permits for it. Since he had previously been issued permits for the sign in 1981 and 1982, and since he had never received any notice that those permits had been revoked, he mistakenly believed his status was acceptable. When Mr. Stowell received the variance from the city for the 14 by 48-foot sign prior to its installation, he advised Mr. DeVetter at the Department’s Brandon office of its granting and was told his status was acceptable. After the City later sent him a letter indicating that the sign had to come down due to a change in the City ordinance, instead of planning to amortize the cost of the sign over the succeeding seven years, he started research into what he needed to do to obtain compensation for the taking as is required by the FHBA. In response, he received a copy of a certificate of sign removal from Reginald N. Millian, the Department’s Outdoor and Property Advertising Inspector, indicating that the sign had been removed by the owner, and that this determination was made based on a personal visit to the site. This was patently in error. The sign had not been removed and, in fact, had been operated and maintained, structurally unchanged, continuously since its construction in 1981. After the Department advised Mr. Stowell of his delinquency in permit fees in September 1988, even after the fees were paid up, due to the change in jurisdiction status, the Department inactivated his permits for this sign, dropped his permit numbers from its permit billing inventory, and did not issue and further billings to him for the previously issued permits. However, the Department did not issue a notice of intent to revoke the two permits, AF307-10 and AF308-10, nor did it in any way advise Mr. Stowell that his permits were no longer valid. Mr. Stowell mistakenly assumed that his sign was validly permitted, even after the City notified him of its status in 1994. After the Department reassumed jurisdiction, by letter dated June 21, 1996, the Department’s District Administrator, Property Management/ODA, Susan L. Rosetti, advised Mr. Stowell that his sign was not permitted and that the sign’s two faces required permits. At this point Mr. Stowell was provided with application forms for the permits and a set of instructions. After receipt of the June 21, 1996, letter, Mr. Stowell contacted Kenneth M. Towcimak, the Director of the Department’s Office of Right-of-Way, to request assistance in obtaining the required permits. In response, Mr. Towcimak advised Mr. Stowell that the permits had been inactivated by the Department, and that because State Road 60, on which the sign was located, was now under the Department’s jurisdiction, he had to obtain a new state permit by January 1, 1997. Towcimak contacted the City to determine the appropriate status of the sign, and as a result of this inquiry, advised Stowell in writing on November 6, 1996, that the Department was precluded by Florida Statute from approving any application for a permit which was not accompanied by a statement from the appropriate local government that the sign complies with all local government requirements, and that the local government will issue a permit upon approval of the application by the Department. Thereafter, On December 31, 1996, Mr. Stowell filed an application with the Department by certified mail. The document reflects it was date stamped in the Department on January 1, 1997, at 4:31 p.m., and again on January 3, 1997, at 1:07 p.m. Since the application Mr. Stowell filed was to reinstate the previously issued permits and not for new permits, he failed to complete a number of the information blocks on the form. On January 21, 1997, the Department issued a Notice of Denied Application for the permits to Mr. Stowell. The denial form reflected the reason for denial was that Mr. Stowell had failed to provide proof of ownership of the billboard, and had provided incorrect information on the application form. The evidence of record indicates that Mr. Stowell did provide the requested proof of ownership of both the billboard and the property on which it is located in his application. One of the City’s previously existing sign ordinances was declared unconstitutional by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on March 23, 1993. Since that time, the City has not enacted a comprehensive sign ordinance, but in 1989 it enacted an ordinance, No. 4753-88, which relates to signs located on SR 60 and which requires those signs on that road which are non- conforming to be brought into conformance or removed within seven years. This provides affected sign owners an opportunity to either bring the sign into conformity with the requirements or amortize the cost of the sign over seven years. Mr. Towcimak, Director of the Department’s Office of Right-of-Way, indicated that when the national highway system under ISTEA came into effect in November 1995, the Department had no inventory of existing signs. As a result, it did not provide notice to the owners of effected signs, and instructed its district offices to accept applications for sign permits through January 1, 1997. The operations of the Department of Transportation are decentralized with policy being set at the headquarters, but the day-to-day operations being determined at each of the eight districts. As to outdoor advertising enforcement, however, while each district handles enforcement, accounting is handled in the central office. In doing so, the Department follows the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which specifies that all permits expire on January 15 of each year. In practice, the advertiser is billed by October 1 of each year and is furnished a list of all permits shown by the Department records to be held by that permittee, along with a bill for all fees owed. If the Department records do not reflect an active permit for a particular sign, no billing will go out for that sign. Petitioner’s instant application for permit reflects it was timely received in the pertinent Department office. It is general practice within the Department for the District Outdoor Advertising Administrator to review the application and decide whether to grant or deny the permit. Thereafter, the application is forwarded to the central office for final check prior to issuance of the metal tag. It is Department practice to issue or deny the permit within 30 days of receipt of the application, as mandated by statute. When an application for a permit for an outdoor sign is received by the Department it is agency practice to review it for completeness. If the application is complete, a decision is made whether to approve or disapprove the application. If the application is incomplete, it is returned to the applicant without decision. However, if an application is incomplete, but it is apparent that, even if complete, the application would not be approved, that application will be returned “denied” rather than “incomplete.” There are several requirements which must be satisfied before an application may be approved. One of these is that the applicant submit a statement from the local government that the proposed sign would comply with local sign regulations, as required by Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes. If an application is received by the Department without this element being present, the Department may either return the application as incomplete or, if it appears the sign does not comply with local sign regulations, deny the application. The “Harmony of Regulations” provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, prohibits the state from issuing a permit where local government does not approve the sign, and prohibits local governments from issuing a sign permit where the Department does not approve. Consistent with that direction, when Petitioner contacted Mr. Towcimak to request guidance in the permitting process, and outlined his problem regarding the City’s position, Mr. Towcimak contacted the City to find out where that entity stood. On two separate occasions, the City advised the Department in writing that Petitioner’s existing sign was illegal and it would not grant permission for the Department to issue a sign permit. When that information was received by the Department, Petitioner was advised of the City’s position and that the permit would not be issued as a result.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying Petitioner permits for the maintenance of the signs in issue, and denying compensation for their removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Livingston & Associates, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Diedre Grubbs 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner Lamar Advertising Company-Lakeland (Lamar) rebuilt a billboard that it owns on the Florida Turnpike in violation of the law that limits the rebuilding of nonconforming signs.
Findings Of Fact Lamar is the owner of a billboard which displays outdoor advertising and is located on the Florida Turnpike near State Road 91 in Martin County. It is a "back-to-back" billboard with both north-facing and south-facing advertising. The advertising is permitted by DOT Outdoor Advertising Sign Permits 13882 and 13883, and the billboard bears tag numbers CC087 and CC088. The billboard was first built in 1972 and was acquired by Lamar in 1998. The billboard is 549 feet from the nearest sign to the south and 570 feet from the nearest sign to the north. When the sign was built, there were no minimum spacing requirements applicable to signs on the Florida Turnpike, which was classified by DOT as a secondary roadway. Before 1984, the minimum spacing requirement for "federal-aid primary highways" (primary roadways) was 500 feet. In 1984, Subsection 479.07(9), Florida Statutes, was amended to require a minimum spacing between signs on primary roadways of 1,000 feet. Subsection 479.07(9), Florida Statutes (1984), included a provision that not only grandfathered existing signs on primary roadways that were less than 1,000 feet from other signs, but went further to state that such signs, if conforming before the spacing requirement was changed, would not be construed thereafter as nonconforming. The significance of this provision is that signs on primary roadways that were more than 500 feet, but less than 1,000 feet from other signs in 1984, are not subject to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.007(2), which limits the rebuilding of damaged nonconforming signs. In November 1995, the Florida Turnpike was added to the National Highway System. Thereafter, DOT treated the Florida Turnpike as a primary roadway. The reclassification of the Florida Turnpike from a secondary roadway to a primary roadway was not accomplished through a statute or DOT rule. DOT interprets the grandfathering provision in Subsection 479.07(9), Florida Statutes, to apply only to signs that were on primary roadways in 1984 when the 1,000-foot spacing requirement was established. Because the Florida Turnpike was not a primary roadway in 1984, DOT contends that signs on the Florida Turnpike less than 1,000 feet from other signs are nonconforming signs and are subject to the rebuilding limitations in Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.007(2). Hurricane Wilma struck Florida in October 2005. Mark Johnson, DOT's outdoor advertising inspector for the area that includes Martin County, testified that in late October or early November 2005, he saw that Lamar's billboard had been seriously damaged. He testified that he saw "everything down" and "poles splintered." He took photographs and made notes about his inspection of the damage. Mr. Johnson said he sent the photographs and notes from his October 2005 inspection to DOT headquarters in Tallahassee. Without explanation, they were not offered into evidence at the final hearing. Mr. Johnson testified that on December 7, 2007, he saw that the billboard was rebuilt. He inspected the billboard on that date, and he believes that the six poles that support the billboard are new poles. He saw and photographed old sign materials, including at least one pole, on the ground next to the billboard. It cannot be determined from the photograph whether the pole on the ground is splintered. Lamar denies that the billboard was destroyed and then reconstructed between October and December 2005. It presented the testimony of its real estate/leasing manager, David Henry, who stated that the billboard was not destroyed by the hurricane, and none of its six support poles were replaced. Mr. Henry showed that none of the leasing or maintenance records of Lamar indicate that the billboard was rebuilt. Neither party seemed to recognize the significance to this dispute of photographs of the billboard taken in August and November 2005. Petitioner's Exhibit 3I is a September 2, 2005, letter from DOT to Lamar, informing Lamar that the billboard had been without advertising for 10 months and was about to be deemed abandoned. One of the photographs attached to the letter and admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 3J was taken on August 31, 2005, two months before Mr. Johnson's first inspection. Petitioner's Exhibit 2, which is some general information about Lamar's sign permits that is accessible from DOT's internet website, includes photographs of the billboard taken on November 19, 2005, just after Mr. Johnson's first inspection. To reconcile Mr. Johnson's testimony with the November 19, 2005, photographs, it would be necessary to find that the photographs depict the billboard very soon after it was rebuilt. However, there are no discernible changes in the main structural elements of the billboard as they appear in the November 2005 photographs from how they appear in the August 2005 photographs. The November photographs do not appear to show a billboard that was just constructed. The old sign materials on the ground that appear in photographs taken by Mr. Johnson on December 7, 2005, would not have been visible to him in October 2005 because of the dense vegetation around the billboard that existed in October 2005. Lamar removed much of that vegetation before Mr. Johnson's December 2005 inspection.1/ The old sign materials could have been there long before October 2005. Lamar removed the advertising sign facings from the billboard when Hurricane Wilma was approaching to avoid damage to the sign facings and billboard and replaced the sign facings before Mr. Johnson's December 2005 inspection. Mr. Johnson appeared to be a credible witness, but he might have been confused by Lamar's temporary removal of the sign facings from the billboard and the clearing of vegetation that exposed old sign materials on the ground next to the billboard. On this record and without Mr. Johnson's October 2005 photographs that purport to show Lamar's billboard to be substantially destroyed, DOT failed to prove that more than 50 percent of the structural materials in the billboard was replaced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation issue a final order rescinding its Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit regarding Outdoor Advertising Sign Permits 13882 and 13883. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Chapter 479 and the rules promulgated pursuant to that chapter establish the authority for Petitioner to regulate outdoor advertising in Florida. This regulatory function includes signs which are located on Interstate 75 in Florida. Interstate 75 is part of the interstate highway system in the United States as defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Respondent is in the outdoor advertising business and is subject to the requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. All signs which are in dispute in these cases are located adjacent to Interstate 75 in Alachua County, Florida and are or were owned by Respondent at all relevant times. The signs within the relevant time frame associated with this dispute could be seen from Interstate 75. Bartley Burch is a property and outdoor advertising inspector who routinely inspects the signs in question on a weekly basis. During the roughly three years which he had been performing inspections in the area in question he had inspected the seven signs a minimum of 200 times. His inspection schedule for the signs was on a weekly basis. His inspections led to the citations of those signs belonging to the Respondent. The basis of the citations are described in the Statement of the Issues. The citations date from July 18, 1990, based upon inspections performed July 12, 1990. The citations were received by Respondent on July 23, 1990. As described, Respondent having served the citations, this prompted the formal hearing. The sign in 5871T is located on Interstate 75 North, 22.4 miles north of the Marion County line. It advertises the Red Lobster restaurant. It is depicted in the photographs consisting of Petitioner's exhibits 2 and Respondent's exhibits 2A through 2C. Concerning the complaint, Burch discovered what he considered to be a lack of permit through his inventory or inspection activities that are routinely performed mentioned before. In conducting these inspections Burch used a computer printout issued by Thomas N. Brown, district outdoor advertising administrator in the Petitioner's district where the subject signs were found. That printout indicates the sign location and whether the signs are permitted or not. The printout also includes signs which Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, describes as nonconforming signs. The sign in 5871T did not show up on the computer printout as having been permitted. Burch does not recall that a permit tag was attached to the sign in 5871T. In addition to checking his printout Burch contacted Petitioner's Tallahassee office to see if that office had any record of a permit being issued to the sign in 5871T. He was told that the Tallahassee records did not reflect a permit issuance. From the tenor of his remarks, Burch also examined records in the district office where he works to ascertain whether a permit had been issued for the sign in 5871T. Those records dated back to 1987. They did not reveal the issuance of a permit. In his contacts with the Tallahassee office of Petitioner, he did not determine how far back in time those records went. Neither did he go to Tallahassee to examine the records which were held by the Petitioner on this subject. The methods of looking at his inventory list, available information at the district level where he works and contacts with Tallahassee, in Burch's attempts to ascertain whether permits had been issued were the same in 5873T and 5876T as they were in 5871T concerning the basic methods which Burch employed to find out if permits had been issued for the latter two signs. The sign in 5873T is at Interstate 75 North at mile 5.93. It is a Red Lobster advertisement. It is depicted in Petitioner's exhibit number 2 and Respondent's exhibits numbers 2A through 2C, photographs of the sign. The photographs taken of this sign and all other signs which are Petitioner's exhibits were made by Burch on July 12, 1990. The photographs which are Respondent's exhibits were made by Andrew Wayne Lee on August 23, 1990. In 5873T a permit tag is not attached to the sign or any of its supporting posts. Burch noted at hearing that if an application was made at that point in time to have a new permit issued it would not be approved because of a spacing problem. In 5876T, the sign in question is a Red Lobster advertisement. The sign is at Interstate 75 South at mile 3.49. Petitioner's exhibit number 2 and Respondent's exhibits 2A through 2C are photographs of the sign in 5876T. The Respondent's photographs depict attached permit tags. The details of those permit tags may not be discerned by examining the photographs. Burch had no recollection of those tags at the time that he made his inspection. His attempts to determine if a permit had been issued for this sign are as previously described. These attempts did not lead to the confirmation that a permit had been issued. In 5872T, the sign is at Interstate 75 North at mile 23.46. Petitioner's exhibit number 2 and Respondent's exhibits 2A through 2C are photographs of the sign. They depict a blank sign face which has been painted. At no time during the inspections which Burch made did he observe any advertising on the sign face. The sign had been painted before the formal complaint was made concerning the allegation of being void of advertising for 12 months or longer. The sign had a permit tag attached dating from 1974. It is classified as a nonconforming sign. In addition to the date of the permit tag being 1974, the spacing which Burch measured pointed out that the sign was nonconforming. According to Burch, the sign at 5872T became void of advertising approximately two years before the hearing date. What he meant was whatever was on the sign was not legible to Burch. What the witness said was that approximately two years ago is when he noticed that he was unable to read the message on the signboard even though there was something written there. That is the reason why he began to believe that it was void of advertising. Legibility to Burch means that the message is dilapidated, faded or the paint pealing off, things of that nature. He is unaware of any policy by the Petitioner by way of a memorandum which sets out standards of what it means to be void of advertising as a definitional matter. From the record there does not appear to be any standards by Petitioner which further describe the meaning of void of advertising beyond what is stated in Rule 14-10.007(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code. In 5874T the sign in question is at Interstate 75 North at mile 21.79. It is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit 2A and B and Respondent's Exhibits 2A-C, photographs of the sign. Unlike the situation in 5872T, this sign does have information which is portrayed; however, the message that is being presented is unclear. In his inspections Burch has never viewed advertisement that he considered legible. His statement of legibility equates to the notion of clarity evidenced by the photographs referred to. The sign also had a spacing problem and was nonconforming for that reason. Again, this sign had been void of advertising in terms of legibility for approximately two years before the hearing date, according to Burch's observations. In 5875T the sign in question is located at Interstate 75 North at mile 22.39. The sign is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibits 2A and B and Respondent's Exhibits 2A-C. This sign is in disrepair in that some of the panels are missing. The sign while it contains writing is unclear in its message or lacking in legibility when observing the photographs. Respondent's Exhibits No. 2A and B show permit tags affixed. Those tags cannot be read as to their contents concerning dates upon which the permit tags were issued. Burch confirmed that the sign was void of advertising for over 12 months by making weekly inspections. The sign in question is nonconforming because of spacing problems. In 5877T the sign in question is at Interstate 75 South at mile 3.44. This sign is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 and Respondent's Exhibit No. 2A-2C. The photographs show that the sign has been painted and has no message portrayed. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2B shows certain tags affixed. The uppermost tags on the pole bear dates of 1973 and 1974. This sign had been painted before the complaint was issued concerning the alleged violation. The sign is a nonconforming sign based upon spacing problems. No prior action had been taken concerning the signs that have been discussed, as Burch understands it, based upon the Petitioner's policy of not filing complaints against a Respondent unless the process may be concluded by removing the signs that are offending. Brown supervises Burch. He rides Interstate 75 and conducts periodic inspection or inventories in the same areas where his inspectors perform their duties. This had made Brown familiar with the signs in question. As Brown describes it, if there is no permit tag, and the inventory related to signs based upon computer records at the district level don't include questioned signs, resort is made to the records in Tallahassee to ascertain whether a permit exists for a questioned sign. If the records checks locally and in Tallahassee do not reveal that a permit was issued then the district officials conclude that the sign is illegal. Alternatively, at times the sign owner may have records which will verify the existence of a permit and that would be available to the Petitioner. Copies of applications for permits are available to Brown and in the absence of an approved application this is further evidence that the permit was not issued. It may also be evidence that the approved application has been lost. At the end of each year a list of signs held by companies such as that of the Respondent is prepared and sent to the sign owner for billing purposes, the collection of fees. This gives an indication of permits that are held by the sign owner and the sign owner assists in verifying the ownership by remitting annual fees to pay for the sign operation and through such remittance clarifying the status of permitted signs which are held by that vendor. As Brown describes, Petitioner also becomes aware of the status of signs through transfers of permit tags from one owner to another related to a given sign. Brown employed general methods for researching the question of whether a permit had been issued for the questioned signs as was described before. In particular related to 5871T, 5873T and 5876T he checked for original applications and could find none. He called Tallahassee and tried to get research information from Tallahassee concerning permits being issued and was unable to find any information. He went through old filing cabinets at the district level and found nothing. This search in the filing cabinets was a manual search in addition to the computer search which he had made at the district level. None of these attempts led to verification of a permit being issued for the signs in question. There was information which suggested that the signs may have been in violation as far back as 1983. He did find one permit that had been issued related to 5871T, that permit belonged to the National Company for a Manatee County sign. It was not for a permit for the Alachua County sign owned by Respondent. The 1971 permit tag belonging to National can be seen in the photographs by Respondent, his Exhibit No. 2. That same tag number is referenced in an affidavit requesting a new tag permit for a loss permit that relates to that location and is found as Petitioner's exhibit number 3 admitted into evidence. It was submitted on August 6, 1990 and will be further discussed in describing the testimony of Andrew Wayne Lee at hearing. The computer records at the district level at times include unpermitted signs as well as those that have permits. This is not an indication that a permit had been issued for the sign upon some former date. Mr. Brown believes that the idea of a sign void of advertising is a sign which has no copy on the sign, an example is a sign that is painted blank for a period of one year. In 5874T Brown recalls this sign as being void of advertising for five and a half years, this is taken to mean illegible. When shown the photographs depicting the sign in 5874T he described that sign as looking the same way as depicted in the photographs for a period of five and a half years. He said that in driving 55 or 60 miles an hour he could not read what was on that sign. He also remarked that in 5875T he couldn't read some of the letters in that sign well enough to tell what was written. Brown described the speed limit in the area of the signs in question as being 65 miles per hour. His representation is accepted. Brown describes the fact that when the owner of the signs do not pay the annual fees the signs are found in violation and a "take down" order is issued. In making his record search to discover whether the signs which were charged with having no permit had ever been recorded as permitted, Brown indicated that the records of the Petitioner went back as far as 1971 but that they were not complete. This incompleteness as to some of the records refers to the absence of a paper record or a computer entry record. Brown acknowledges certain contacts with Respondent or members of his family. He does not recall that Respondent or members of the family were requested to submit Respondent's proof of permitting for the three signs that are the subject of a claim that no permits were issued for them. Notwithstanding this lack of inquiry, the hearing presented the opportunity for the Respondent to submit any information it had regarding the matter of permits being issued for those three signs in defending against the allegations. In the annual billing lists which are submitted to the vendors such as Respondent, they include properly permitted signs or signs in good standing as well as signs that are considered in violation. The idea of in violation would include the problem of not having permits issued for the sign. This is borne out by Respondent's exhibit number 4 which is a billing list which Respondent had which refers to the three signs in question for which permits are said to be lacking. For that reason permit numbers are not found on that page of the exhibit which describes the signs. Andrew Wayne Lee, son of Respondent described how he is in the cattle business, the outdoor advertising business and that he buys and sells properties. He says his family has been in the outdoor advertising business since about 1965. His involvement in the outdoor advertising business has been more extensive in the last three or four years. He became involved because his father was diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease in or around April or May of 1985. Before that date the son had very little participation in the outdoor advertising business. Respondent's son made an attempt to find records which would verify the status of the signs in question, especially those which Petitioner claims to not have permits. He describes that a number of records concerning the outdoor advertising business had been stored in a family residence around 1972 and in 1981 an accidental fire occurred and those records were burned up. He says that other records were put in different places by his father and that he is unable to converse with his father about where those additional records may be found given his father's illness. Lee points out in 5871T, the photograph Respondent's 2B showing the 1971 tag permit. As stated that tag permit is the incorrect tag permit for the sign. In 5873T, Respondent's 2A and 2C show markings on the pole where permit tags were probably affixed, according to Lee. Unfortunately it is unclear what happened to those permit tags and whether they were the appropriate permit tags for the sign at the time they were affixed. It may well be that they were the inappropriate permit tags as was the case of the 1971 permit tag which was affixed to the sign in 5871T at the time Lee took photographs on August 23, 1990. In 5876T Lee refers to Respondent's exhibit 2C which shows two permit tags. He did not describe the idea that these two permit tags were the appropriate permit tags for the sign in question. He made no mention of those permit tags when he attempted to obtain a new permit tag for that sign by submission of an affidavit on August 6, 1990 as depicted in Respondent's exhibit number 3 in 5876T. It is unexplained why Respondent in making an affidavit in furtherance of its attempt to gain a new permit tag for the sign in 5876T would not refer to the older permit tags affixed to the sign and their numbers in an attempt to verify that a permit had been issued in the past. On the other hand, resort to that information found on the preexisting permit tags located on the sign post would be unavailing if they were not associated with that sign when they were issued or if they could not be cross-referenced with the older records held by the Petitioner that established the permits on the signpost as being related to the sign in question. Neither party made connection in the record between the permit tags on the sign post and the idea of a permit having been issued specifically for that sign at that location. In his attempt to bring the signs in compliance by making affidavits seeking the reissuance of a tag permit for the three signs in question where Petitioner claims permits did not exist, Lee described his methods. Having found no record held by Respondent which would describe the issuance of permits for those three signs, in preparing the affidavit in 5871T, he used a 1971 permit tag number that was found on the sign because it was the only number he had available. He was hopeful that the Department could use that as some sort of cross reference to verify the existence of a permit. He believed the three signs were permitted, but felt that he had no means of tracking down the proper numbers. In addition to searching the records held by Respondent he went up and down the road trying to ascertain the appropriate permit numbers. Lee also went to Tallahassee and examined Petitioner's files. He noted that the amount of records concerning the activities of his father in the outdoor advertising business, which is much more extensive than the seven signs in question, were not the same as on other occasions when he and his father had visited the Petitioner's office in Tallahassee. This refers to records held by the Petitioner. The comparison of what he saw on the occasion of his attempt related to the present cases and what he found on trips made by Lee and his father differed in that on prior occasions he found considerably more material than he found on the latter trip. In describing the permit affidavit for obtaining a new permit tag in 5871T, Lee describes this as having been involved in an agreement with Peterson Outdoor Advertising. This is in addition to his remarks about the use of the 1971 tag which have been stated before. The significance of this swap agreement, if one existed with Peterson Outdoor Advertising, as it relates to the question of an appropriate sign permit having been issued in 5871T was not explained in the hearing. In 5873T, as with 5871T and 5876T Lee prepared an August 6, 1990 affidavit requesting a new tag permit. This is found in Respondent's exhibit number 3 in case number 5873T. The several affidavits submitted in an attempt to gain new permit tags for the three signs Petitioner claims do not have permits were rejected. All affidavits were returned. In summary, Lee believes that the three signs in question had permits issued but has no proof from any source which would confirm that belief. In the signs which are the subject of the claims of being in jeopardy for reasons that they are void of advertising, the signs in 5874T and 5875T have been removed by Petitioner. The signs in 5872T and 5877T have been painted but have not been leased given the pendency of these proceedings. Robert Still is construction manager and supervisor for Respondent. He has worked for that concern for over 18 years. Still describes the painting of the signs at 5872T and 5877T in June of 1990. The sign in 5872T had copy related to McDonald's and the sign related to 5877T had copy related to Sonny's Bar-B-Q before they were painted over in the blank color described in the photographs. Still offered no comments concerning the legibility of the McDonald's copy in 5872T and the Sonny's Bar-B- Q copy in 5877T before that copy was painted over in June, 1990. Still's relationship with the Respondent's company did not extend to being responsible as records custodian for information associated with permit issuance and permit renewal fees. He expresses, as did Lee, the belief that the three signs in question were permitted at one time or another but has no records to verify this belief. He does recall placing permit tags on the signs in question. In 5876T he makes mention of the fact of the older permit tags which are shown in the photographs by Respondent. He states that the sign in 5871T had a permit at one time which was a 1974 permit. This was as distinguished from the 1971 permit which was found on that sign on August 23, 1990 depicted in Respondent's photographic exhibit. Still has worked with the sign in 5871T for about 12 years; the sign in 5876T for 12-14 years and the sign in 5873T since 1973. In spite of the remarks by Lee and Still concerning their belief that permits had been issued for the signs in 5871T, 5873T, and 5876T, on balance based upon the record and the facts found herein, permits were not issued for those signs.
The Issue Whether Respondent's outdoor sign permit should be revoked because the original sign has been destroyed by an Act of God, as alleged by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this sign permit dispute, Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), seeks to revoke the permit for an off- premise outdoor advertising sign owned by Respondent, North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc. (Respondent), on the grounds that the original sign was destroyed by a fire in June 1998, the newly rebuilt sign has lost its nonconforming status, and any rebuilt sign is now illegal. In response to these charges, Respondent contends that the fire that destroyed the sign was an act of criminal mischief or arson, rather than an Act of God, and thus the sign still qualifies for a nonconforming status. The sign in question is located 12.2 miles north of the Flagler County line on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) facing south, and is perhaps a mile or so south of the intersection of State Road 207 and I-95 (intersection) in St. Johns County, Florida. Respondent does not own the property where the sign is located, and it conducts no other business activities on that property. The property on which the sign is located is zoned Open Rural by St. Johns County (County), and it is not designated predominately for commercial or industrial uses by the County under the County's future land use map, comprehensive plan, or zoning ordinances. The sign is used to advertise Respondent's combination gas station and "open-area fruit market" located "just off" the intersection. The parties have stipulated that the sign was originally constructed more than 20 years ago before the current sign regulations became effective; under the present law, it would be a nonconforming sign and illegal. On May 27, 1998, a thunderstorm occurred in St. Johns County, resulting in between one-quarter and one-half inch of rainfall in the area. Due to a lightning strike on a tree, a 2-acre fire started approximately 1,000 feet southwest of the intersection in the vicinity of the sign. Although firefighters believed they had "knocked out" the fire within a day or two, the fire continued to smoulder under the dampened top layer of organic matter for several weeks until June 15, 1998, when it "worked its way back to the surface," broke out again, and cleared the containment line of the earlier fire. Aided by a light wind from the southeast and extremely dry conditions, the fire quickly spread eastward at the rate of 1,000 to 1,500 feet every 15 minutes and consumed several hundred acres, including the land on which Respondent's sign was located, before it was brought under control. That fire is commonly referred to as the Fort Peyton fire. In determining the cause of the Fort Peyton fire, forestry officials could not find any indicators of arson, and visual burn patterns clearly indicated that the new fire's origin was where the May 27 fire had begun. Therefore, it was officially classified as a "rekindle or breakout" of the May 27 fire, which was started by lightning. Put another way, the fire was the result of an Act of God, which is "the sudden manifestation and forces of nature." On either May 30 or June 5, 1998, depending on whether court or forestry records are accepted as being the most accurate, a fire began in Flagler Estates, which, "as the crow flies," lies approximately 12 to 15 miles southeast of the Fort Peyton fire. The Flagler Estates fire, however, was the result of an unattended illegal burn which was started by three individuals and went out of control. The fire was brought under control the same evening by firefighters, but only after some 450 surrounding acres were destroyed. The three individuals were later charged with arson. Respondent established that the prevailing winds during May and June 1998 were from the southeast and that "spoilers" or "floaters" (hot debris) from existing fires can sometimes float in the air and ignite new fires several miles away. Indeed, Respondent's investigator observed spoilers from inland fires floating through the air some 8 or 9 miles out in the Atlantic Ocean while he was fishing during that period of time. Accordingly, Respondent contends that it is just as likely that a spoiler floated northeastward from the Flagler Estates fire on May 30, 1998, and ignited the Fort Peyton blaze, some 12 to 15 miles away. If this theory is accepted, it would mean that the Fort Peyton fire would be attributable to arson, and not to an Act of God. The foregoing assumption has been rejected for several reasons. First, spoilers from the Flagler Estates fire did in fact ignite several spot fires in the area, but all of these spot fires occurred on the same day as the fire started and were within an eighth of an mile from the Flagler Estates perimeter. Second, it is highly unlikely that a spoiler would float up to 15 miles and then lie dormant for two weeks before igniting the Fort Peyton fire. Finally, the theory goes counter to the more persuasive evidence given by the supervising forester who investigated the Fort Peyton fire and concluded that it was an outbreak of the earlier fire that was started on May 27, 1998. After the sign was destroyed, Respondent rebuilt the sign at the same location using substantially the same materials that had composed the sign before it burned. However, the materials used to rebuild the sign were not part of the sign structure which was burned in the Fort Peyton fire. The new sign is the same size, shape, and height of the destroyed sign.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order confirming that the outdoor advertising sign maintained by North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc., under sign permit number BR 252-55 is illegal and must be removed. The permit should also be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 17th of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 J. Stephen Alexander, Esquire 19 Old Mission Avenue St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, by placing a sign facing a state road right-of-way without a valid sign permit. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.07(9)(a)2, Florida Statutes, by placing a sign in violation of the DOT spacing rule. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, violated Section 479.04(1), Florida Statutes, by operating outside the city limits without a state license. Whether Petitioner, KOA Campground, is entitled to the issuance of a sign permit for the east-facing sign located 678 feet West of Seven Dwarfs Lane on US Highway 192, in Osceola County, Florida. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, by placing a sign facing a state road right-of- way without a valid sign permit. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(9)(a)2, Florida Statutes, by placing a sign in violation of the DOT spacing rule. Whether Respondent, Peloso, violated Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, by failure to display a current valid sign permit tag. Whether Respondent, Peloso's state permit number AG636-10 become invalid and subject to revocation by the DOT.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system. Petitioner, KOA Campground, as Lessor, and Respondent, Arthur S. Peloso, as Lessee, entered into a Lease for space to erect a sign structure to be located approximately 0.67 mile east of State Road 535 (north side) adjacent to U.S. 192 in Osceola County on March 1, 1982. The real property described in said Lease covered an area approximately 100 feet in width adjoining the Peloso property to the east. On the property encompassed in said Lease, dated March 1, 1982, KOA erected some time in 1982, at its expense, an existing sign on its property which was constructed to face east. The message on the sign related to the KOA Campground which is on the same site. As such, it is an on-premises sign not requiring a DOT sign permit so long as the message on the sign relates to the business being conducted on the property. On the land adjoining the property described in said Lease, Peloso erected a sign, at his own expense, on his property in 1982 which was constructed to face west. At that time in 1982, Peloso applied for and received two outdoor advertising permits nos. AG636-10 and AG637-10, from the DOT. AG636-10 was issued for the west facing sign and AG637-10 was issued for the east facing sign. AG636-10 was promptly posted on the west facing sign which presently advertises Peloso's restaurant in Kissimmee, Florida. Said permit has remained posted on that sign continuously to the present time. AG637-10 was lost by Peloso. Thereafter, a request was filed by Peloso to replace permit AG636-10 rather than AG637-10. As a result, permit AX346-35 was issued to replace AG636- 10, and no replacement for AG637-10 has been issued. AX346-35 has now been posted along with AG636-10 on the west-facing sign owned by Peloso. Peloso has continuously paid the renewal fees relating to both permits issued. Pursuant to paragraph 6 and 7 of the Lease, dated March 1, 1982, the 100 foot strip of land owned by KOA was leased to Peloso and states: "6. Said premises are hereby leased for use by the lessee as a site for billboard advertising sign only, and for no other use or purposes unless the lessor gives his written consent thereto, and shall be operated at all times in a lawful manner. The lessee shall carry all necessary insurance, procure all necessary permits and licenses, and build and construct all signs in strict conformity with applicable Florida Statutes; and the lessor shall not be liable or held responsible therefor in any manner whatsoever. The parties agree that the lessee shall position his sign so that it faced in the general direction of west and the lessee shall provide space for the lessor to place a sign in the vicinity thereof also, so that it faces in the general direction of east." The Lease does not set forth a specific purpose on its face, but was requested in order to accommodate setback requirements under local law, and possibly to allow the sign to be erected to overhang the KOA boundary line. Said Lease has not been terminated and is still in full force and effect. On October 14, 1988, Peloso filed applications for two outdoor advertising sign permits "to rebuild and improve existing sign structure", which were treated as an amendment to the existing permits and tentatively approved by DOT. KOA filed an application for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the east-facing sign on its property sometime in the Fall of 1989. Peloso is the holder of the two existing permits (AG636-10 and AX346- 35), and is entitled to maintain permits for both an east-facing and a west- facing sign in the vicinity of the present Peloso restaurant sign (AG636-10). KOA has whited-out the copy on its sign and presently is not advertising any business (on-site or off-site) on the sign. Peloso has ceased construction on his new sign structure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Alleged Violations of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code and Notice to Show Cause, dated June 30, 1989, directed to KOA Campground be dismissed, so long as its sign qualifies for exempt status under the provision of Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. The Alleged Violations of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code and Notice to Show Cause, dated October 20, 1989, directed to Arthur S. Peloso be dismissed, upon compliance with Section 479.07(5)(b), Florida Statutes, (lost tag). Thereafter, DOT should process the Amended Application of Peloso, dated October 14, 1988, relating to the construction of a new sign structure and ensure compliance with all applicable statutes and rules. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Buildi.ng 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitoner, KDA Campground. Paragraph 1- Accepted in substance except the statement the original permit was issued "for the existing sign on KOA property...", which is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 2- The first sentence is rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. The second sentence is Accepted. Paragraph 3- Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4- Rejected. Paragraph 5- Accepted in substance. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Respondent, Arthur S. Peloso. Paragraphs 1-9. Accepted in substance. The Department of Transportation did not file proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Muntzing, Esquire 1102 Oak Street Post Office Box 421966 Kissimmee, Florida 34742 Philip W. Watson, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson Firstate Tower, 17th Floor Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32302 Rivers Buford, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450
The Issue The issue in these causes is whether denial of Petitioners' outdoor advertising sign site permit applications by Respondent were correctly determined under Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), on the basis that the sign sites were unzoned commercial/industrial areas; and on the basis that within attending factual circumstances, the sign site did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial areas as defined in Subsection 479.01(23), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Tropical Landholdings, a Florida Corporation, was created in 1998 and purchased approximately 700 to 800 acres of land comprised of residential multi-family and commercial properties along Interstate 75 (I-75) in Punta Gorda, Florida. On September 8, 2003, Petitioner, Crown Advertising, Inc., of Belleview, Florida, submitted three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications to the Department for review. On September 23, 2003, the Department denied the three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign sites were not permitted under the local land use designation of site (§ 479.111(2), Fla. Stat. (2003)); and (2) the sign sites did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area. § 479.01, Fla. Stat. (2003). The sign site permit application forms used by Petitioners in these causes were composed and authorized by the Department. The form required the applicant to obtain and provide information regarding the proposed sign site, what is proposed to be constructed on the site, and where the proposed construction is to occur. The sign site permit applications also required the applicant to secure information from the appropriate local zoning official of the future land use designation and the current zoning of the proposed sites enacted by the local government's Comprehensive Plan and land use development regulations. This form required information from the local government as to whether the applicant is or is not in compliance with all adopted local ordinances. Permission to erect an outdoor sign structure on the identified sign site is subject to approval by the City. Petitioners complied with the requested information. The local government, the City of North Port, approved the three sign site permit applications in question and granted Petitioners permission to erect three outdoor billboard signs. This local grant of approval was then subjected to concurring approval by the Department. After receiving the sign site permits that were approved by the City, the Department engaged the services of a consultant to conduct on-site review and identification of: (1) the local government's designation for each proposed sign site; (2) the permitted uses of each proposed sign site (local drainage facilities, pipeline corridors, underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs); and (3) a review of adjacent and surrounding parcels. The consultant reported to the Department the factual circumstances attendant the three locally approved sign sites. It should be noted that the consultant did not render an opinion regarding the Department's approval or denial of the sign site permit applications. The sign sites in question were zoned under the local "land use designation" of the City of North Port's Ordinance 02-46, Section 53.146 (Ordinance 02-46), as a "utility industrial corridor." The zoned land was composed of strips of land measuring 25 to 70 feet in width on the west side and 160 to 170 feet in width on the east side. The "permitted governmental uses" of a parcel zoned as a "utility industrial corridor," included such uses as underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs. Ordinance 02-46, under the title "Prohibited Uses and Structures," specifically prohibits "all commercial and industrial uses." Based upon a review of all information provided by Petitioners, the local government, and its consultant, the Department first determined the three sign sites on which the subject signs were to be erected and located, prohibited commercial or industrial uses. The Department then determined, based upon an analysis of the materials provided by its consultant and the City of North Port, the three sign sites in question had not been zoned for commercial or industrial uses as a part of the local government's comprehensive zoning plan. Based upon (1) the prohibition of commercial or industrial uses and (2) no commercial or industrial zoning of the sign sites, the Department concluded these three sign sites were zoned "primarily to permit outdoor advertising," a prohibited function. The denials were required. Under the local land use designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included local drainage facilities and a pipeline corridor. Under governmental uses designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising. However, Ordinance 02-46 specifically prohibits all commercial and industrial uses under the governmental uses designation. When questioned by Petitioners, Ms. Holschuh testified "that the Department's intent was to allow [sign] permits whenever possible and never prohibit the installation of billboards." From this specific statement of testimony, Petitioners argued that "implementing the intent the Department must look beyond the labels of the zoning and look at the actual primary uses allowed under those designations." (Emphasis added.) Ms. Holschuh disagreed with Petitioners' characterization of the Department's procedures and convincingly maintained that the Department based its denials on "sign site zoning" and factors considered for determining an "unzoned commercial/industrial area" as defined by statute. Continuing with its argument, Petitioners conclude "[T]he department . . . appears to be in conflict with Judge Barbara Staros' decision of February 16, 2004, in a rule challenge proceeding, where she analyzed the Sign Permit procedure under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes." In her Final Order, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros made a Finding of Fact in paragraph 30, stating: Once the local government zoning official certifies that the proposed sign identified in the application is in compliance with the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, the Department does not go behind that certification to look factually at whether the zoning action was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Page 13. The procedures followed by the Department in this proceeding complied with Judge Staros Finding of Fact in paragraph 31, where she wrote: The Department uses the application and the information contained therein to determine whether a proposed sign location falls within the definition of a "commercial or industrial zone." If it does, [fall within] then the Department determines whether those designations were adopted as part of the local government's comprehensive planning efforts or were "primarily" adopted to permit outdoor advertising signs on that location. Page 30. Based upon it's receipt, review, and analysis of the specific facts provided by all parties of interest, the Department determined the sites where the signs were to be erected prohibited commercial or industrial use. The Department factually determined that no local zoning identified the sites as commercial or industrial. The Department concluded correctly and in accord with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052 that these three sign sites were zoned by the City of North Port, the local governmental entity, "primarily to permit outdoor advertising" contrary to sign site permit procedures under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes (2003). Based upon the evidence of record and considering the size of the sign site, the local government's zoning of the site, designated uses of the site, and prohibited uses on the site, denial of the sign applications was correctly determined pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052. Based on the testimonies of Ms. Holschuh and James Duff, who testified regarding his ownership, property taxes paid, and the investors' inability to use the property in question to their economic advantage, Petitioners failed to carry the burden of producing a preponderance of credible evidence to establish that the Department incorrectly and/or wrongfully denied Petitioners' applications for three sign site permits pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052.
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a permit for an outdoor advertising sign should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Poz Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Poz), filed an application dated June 19, 1996, with the Department of Transportation (Department) for an outdoor advertising sign permit. The application stated that the sign was to be located at I-95 approximately 2500 feet north of Midway Road in St. Lucie County, Florida. Additionally the application provided that the sign would not be located within city limits. The Department issued a Notice of Denied Application to Poz on July 16, 1996, stating the application was not approved because the “site is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange or intersection at grade," citing Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code. The Department uniformly interprets Rule 14- 10.006(1)(b)5, Florida Administrative Code. In the mid-80’s, the Department's central office sent out a diagram and instruction memo to all district staff explaining the measurement and distance requirements in Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5. Based on the methodology used by the Department for measuring compliance with Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)5, the site of the sign proposed by Poz is within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. The area where I-95 crosses or intersects with Midway Road is called an interchange. Petitioner claims that the Department has approved other signs which are within 500 feet of a restricted interchange, namely, signs with permit numbers BM 097 and BM 096, located at the east side of I-95 and State Road 514; signs with permit numbers BM 819 and BM 820 located at the west side of I-95 and State Road 516; and signs with permit numbers BM 825 and BM 826 located at the west side of I-95 and State Road 514. The signs with permit numbers BM 096 and BM 097 are located within the city limits of Palm Bay according to the approved applications for those signs. According to the information contained in the Department’s computerized outdoor advertising location information, the signs with permit numbers BM 825 AND BM 826 are located within city limits. According to the information contained in the Department’s computerized outdoor advertising location information, the signs with permit numbers BM 819 and BM 820, are located within city limits. Petitioner also claims that the sign located at the interchange of I-95 and State Road 60 was within 500 feet of a restricted interchange. This sign is located in an unincorporated area of Indian River County. A sign was erected in this location in 1973 and was replaced with another sign at the same location in 1991. The county building permit for the restructured sign was issued conditioned upon the applicant receiving approval from the “State of Florida Right of Way Administration.” No evidence was presented to show that such approval was sought from or given by the Department. No evidence was presented to establish that the Department was aware that the sign had been restructured. Richard Pozniak, the husband of one of the owners of Poz, testified that a former sign inspector for the Department, Vanna Kinchen, had showed him how to measure for proposed sign sites. Ms. Kinchen rode out with Mr. Pozniak to a location about five miles from the interchange at issue and taught Mr. Pozniak how to measure from the interchange. Ms. Kinchen was not involved with the site at issue and was no longer a sign inspector at the time that Poz made the application for a permit of the site at issue. All interchanges are not constructed alike. Richard Pozniak and his wife, Barbara, measured the site which is at issue. Mr. Pozniak computed the distance from the interchange to the site by measuring 500 feet from the safety zone or gore area on I-95. The gore area is located on the inside of an entrance or exit ramp rather than along the outside of the widening of the pavement. In determining whether the site is within 500 feet of the interchange, the Department measures 500 feet beyond the widening of the entrance ramp onto I-95. The site proposed by Poz was located in the area before the widening of the ramp ends. A sign cannot be placed in the area. The logo program is a federally funded program. The requirements for the issuance of an outdoor advertising permit is different from the requirements for a business to display its logo in the logo program. In the logo program, the business is limited to displaying its logo on a Department sign structure located on the interstate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner, Poz Outdoor Advertising, Inc.’s application for a permit for an outdoor sign at I-95 and Midway Road in St. Lucie County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of May, 1997. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Pennington, Culpepper, Moore, Wilkinson Dunbar & Dunlap, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 34399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Attn: Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's predecessor in interest leased property along the I-275 in October 1973 (Exhibit 3) and erected an outdoor advertising sign thereon. One witness testified that at the time this sign was erected in 1973 there was no other sign within 500 feet of this sign. The sign was erected within the city limits of Tampa, Florida and no permit other than a city building permit was required for this sign. In 1974 DOT required permits for all signs including those located within city limits, but no fee was collected for the permits issued for signs within the city limits. This regulation was not enforced by DOT until 1976- 1978, although in 1974 DOT had advised sign owners that permits were required for all signs and how they were to apply for permits for those signs located within the city limits (Exhibit 4). In 1975 National Advertising Company, in accordance with DOT instructions for obtaining permits for signs located in incorporated areas, submitted a renewal application in which it listed the sign located within 500 feet of Petitioner's sign (Exhibit 5). When no permit was issued by DOT, National Advertising Company, by letter dated September 1, 1977 (Exhibit 6), called to DOT's attention that they had not been issued permits for signs within city limits for which they had applied. Application for a sign permit for their sign along the I-275 located within 500 feet of Petitioner's sign was submitted by National Advertising Company on 31 March 1980 (Exhibit 7) and approved by DOT. This application showed the sign to have been erected prior to 1972. At this hearing Petitioner introduced as Exhibit 1 a copy of an Advertising Sign Permit application dated 9-1-76 executed by its predecessor in title, Martin Outdoor Advertising Company. The only indication on this application that it was received by Respondent is a received stamp dated April 15, 1980. During the period 1976-1979 considerable confusion existed in the outdoor sign industry respecting permits for signs and particularly for those signs located within city limits despite notification to sign companies (Exhibit 4). In an effort to clarify the situation, Respondent sent out circulars with the annual renewal notices advising all sign owners that signs along Interstate and Federal Aid Primary Highways within incorporated towns and cities required permits. In the circular dated December 18, 1978 (Exhibit 8), sign owners were told to submit applications for all unpermitted signs prior to February 17, 1979, and that failure to do so could result in the removal of the unpermitted signs. This was followed up by another circular dated October 31, 1979 (Exhibit 9) in which the deadline for applying for permits for those unpermitted signs was extended to January 1, 1980. Neither of these circulars which were enclosed with renewal notices were delivered by Petitioner's mail room to Petitioner's real estate section. Instead, they were forwarded to accounting with renewal notices. Upon an inspection of signs along the I-275 in March 1980, Petitioner's sign was observed without a permit and in violation of the spacing requirements. Notice of alleged violation dated 3 April 1980 was forwarded to Petitioner (Exhibit 10). Petitioner then applied for a permit for the sign which was disapproved and request for this hearing followed.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to an outdoor advertising sign permit to be located in an unzoned commercial/industrial area and whether the sign site qualified as an unzoned commercial/industrial area.
Findings Of Fact Lamar is in the business of erecting, operating and maintaining outdoor advertising signs in Northwest Florida. The proposed sign’s location was in Walton County along US Highway 331, .1 mile south of Bay Grove Road, a collector road. U.S. Highway 331 is a federal aid primary highway and therefore, a state permit is required for signs placed along its path. According to a Walton County zoning plan, the proposed sign’s location was in an area zoned Rural Village on both the Future Land Use Map and Land Development Regulations. The June 2006 version of the Walton County Land Development Code provides: F. Rural Village (RV): This district is a mixed use district which permits predominately residential development up to a maximum of two units per acre. Residential uses shall account for approximately 95 percent of the total land area within any area designated on the FLUM for this District. The remaining area may be utilized for related and compatible commercial uses. Commercial uses may occupy up to five percent of the total land area designated on the FLUM for this District. Commercial land uses shall be limited to collector and arterial road intersections, intersections of subdivision collectors and arterial or collector road, and areas that are specifically designated Commercial on the FLUM. Not more than 15 percent of the total frontage on both sides of a collector or arterial road shall be occupied by commercial uses within this district. The Walton County Land Development Code also defined general commercial activity as including inventory storage. The proposed sign’s location met the requirements for commercial use under the RV designation. Walton County certified to the Department that the designated parcel for the proposed outdoor advertising sign was Rural Village and that the primary use of the area under the current comprehensive plan was agriculture, general agriculture, residential, civic uses, and residential subdivision. Walton County also confirmed that the proposed outdoor advertising sign would be in compliance with all duly adopted local ordinances and would be issued the necessary County permit for such sign. The Walton County Property Appraiser’s website listed the usage of the proposed outdoor advertising sign location as a “service station.” The service station building was still on the property, but had not been used as such for a number of years. Billy Wayne Strickland, the state outdoor advertising administrator of the Department, processed the outdoor advertising permit applications submitted by Lamar. Mr. Strickland determined after a review of Lamar’s applications that the site, being designated as Rural Village with mixed uses allowed, met the need for evaluation under the use test for unzoned commercial or industrial areas contained in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The use test is set forth in Florida Statutes 479.02. Under the test, the Department examines a proposed sign’s location under the applicable current land use designation and future land use designation to determine if the outdoor advertising site meets the use criteria set forth in the statute for unzoned commercial and industrial areas. The use criteria for such unzoned property require that three commercial or industrial activities be located within 1600 feet of each other, with one of those activities located on the same side of the road and within 800 feet of the proposed sign’s location. Distances are measured from building to building. Additionally, the commercial or industrial activity must be visible from the highway. Mr. Strickland visited the property in order to determine if the proposed sign location met the requirements of the use test. He observed that the proposed sign’s site holds an abandoned-looking gas station and a house with a large fenced in area. Leaking fuel tanks made it unlikely the service station would be restored. There were several small, boarded-up, “fishing style cabins” associated with the fenced property. The fenced area had a sign posted for North Florida Development, Inc., a construction company. There was a number for the company listed on the sign. On a tree to the right of the fence was a sign that read “Private Road Keep Out.” In general, the area behind the fence appeared to be used for storage of building materials and equipment such as trucks and trailers. Except for the area behind the fence, the North Florida Development property was clearly visible from the highway. Mr. Strickland called the phone number on the sign and was informed that North Florida Development, Inc., that he was calling, was in Miramar Beach, Florida, and that North Florida Development was storing equipment and trucks at the U.S. Highway 331 location for a job they were doing in Destin. There was no one present at the house or the adjacent buildings. The North Florida Development buildings and fenced area were within 800 feet of the proposed sign’s location and were on the same side of the road as the proposed sign’s location. Because of the lack of activity, Mr. Strickland concluded that the North Florida Development property was not a commercial activity which was visible from the highway. On the opposite side of the Highway, Mr. Strickland observed two businesses within a 1600-foot zone that met the criteria of the use test. Additionally, while at the site, Mr. Strickland issued a Notice of Violation for the on-premises sign of North Florida Development. The Notice required the sign to be removed. Later, after the hearing in this matter, this action was dismissed by the Department. On November 29, 2006, the Department issued a written denial of the outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign site was not permitted under the local land use designation of site per Section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, and (2) the sign site did not qualify as an unzoned commercial/industrial area per Section 479.01(23), Florida Statutes. On the morning of April 5, 2007, Mr. Strickland, again visited the proposed sign’s site. He observed essentially the same things he observed during his first visit to the location, except the large North Florida Development sign that had been on the entrance to the fenced area had been removed. Andrew White, a regional inspector with the Department, inspected the North Florida Development site on May 17, 2007, and photographed the area. The sign for North Florida Development had been removed, but the keep-out signs were still in place. Photographs taken from the street revealed a partial view of a storage trailer through the open fence. On the morning of June 6, 2007, just prior to the hearing, Mr. Strickland again visited the proposed sign’s location and observed no activity at the location. He could only see a trailer partially visible beyond the privacy fence. Larry Wayne Adkinson, vice president of North Florida Development and a general contractor licensed in Mississippi, lives and works on the property of the proposed sign’s location. Mr. Adkinson testified that the property totaled five and a-half or six acres and consisted of his home, his office, the service station and five fishing cabins. He and his business have been at this location for at least 12 years. Work has been delayed on repairing the service station based, in part, upon the fact that the state was seeking to condemn a portion of the property where the service station was located for the expansion of U.S. Highway 331. Mr. Adkinson uses the property as an inventory site, storing construction materials, heavy equipment, landscaping materials, and other bulk material related to his business. The site contained three semi-tractor trailers that were utilized to store construction materials, including doors, windows, and heavy equipment and equipment and materials for a landscape business owned by Mr. Adkinson. The landscape business stored tractor-trailers, small-equipment trailers, plants, brick pavers, scaffolding and rock molds. The site’s storage of inventory and business activity was very visible to people who lived in the neighborhood around the North Florida Development property. The visibility was such that, in 2006, the neighbors complained about the view to the County. The County, in turn, asked Mr. Adkinson to place a fence around the area to block the view of people passing through the area. Mr. Adkinson complied with the County’s request and built the privacy fence that Mr. Strickland observed. Mr. Adkinson also placed the company’s business sign on the fence to identify the property as North Florida Development’s business property. Most of the loading and unloading of material and equipment occurs in the early morning and evening hours. At those times, there is considerable activity at the site with trucks and equipment entering and leaving the property. Mr. Adkinson’s testimony was confirmed by the testimony of Chad Pickens, who routinely drives by the site during those hours. Mr. Strickland never visited the property during those busy hours, and therefore, did not observe the business activity associated with the site. Mr. Adkinson uses two of the fishing cabins as machine shops for his company’s equipment and tools. The shops contain drill presses, welding and repair equipment. Entry is gained through the rear doors of the cabins. He left the front of the cabins boarded up to prevent theft and storm damage. Mr. Adkinson also receives business mail at the U.S. Highway 331 location and has employees and job applicants report to that location. Clearly, the North Florida Development property is a viable and on-going business that conducts one of its business activities on the property on which the proposed sign is to be located. The activity is visible from the highway, although such activity ebbs and flows through the day. The property, therefore, meets the land use test requirements of Florida Statutes, and the Petitioner’s applications should be granted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Department of Transportation enter a Final Order granting the applications for outdoor advertising sign permits filed by Lamar Advertising of Fort Walton Beach. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2007. COMPLETE COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Schwartz, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James E. Moore, Esquire Post Office Box 1622 Crestview, Florida 32536 David M. Littlejohn, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Meyers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Stephanie Kopelousos, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 57 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Alexis M. Yarbrough, General Counsel Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
