The Issue Whether Respondent's real estate broker's license should be disciplined for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in any business transaction, pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes(1983).
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, Respondent Thomas F. Steffan Jr. was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0402257. Respondent has since been issued a license as a real estate broker, same license number. Mr. and Mrs. Walther Ellis were the owners of certain property located on Windsor Road, Bonita Springs, Florida. Mr. and Mrs. Ellis listed their property for sale with Wesley Brodersen of Gulder Real Estate, Inc. in Bonita Springs, Florida. The Respondent was employed at Gulder Real Estate, Inc. during the time that the Ellises listed said property with Gulder Real Estate, Inc. On or about May 23, 1984, the Respondent solicited and obtained a Catherine A. Griffin as a prospective purchaser of the Ellis' property. Mrs. Griffin submitted a contract for sale and purchase, witnessed by Respondent, which contract for sale and purchase the Respondent in turn submitted to the Ellises. Pursuant to the terms of the May 23, 1984 contract for sale and purchase, Mrs. Griffin had placed down a total deposit of $5,000.00. The Ellises rejected the terms of sale (offer) as expressed in the May 23, 1984 contract for sale and purchase. Thereafter, Mrs. Griffin, as buyer, along with her husband, Donald Griffin, who is not a buyer in the transaction but was intimately involved in the negotiations, continued to express an interest in the property and the Ellises continued to express an interest to sell the property. In July, 1984, contract negotiations were once again begun and Mr. Griffin informed the Respondent what terms would be acceptable to his wife, Catherine A. Griffin. Mr. Griffin further requested that the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Ellis be obtained first on a new contract for sale and purchase setting out the terms he had dictated to Respondent. Somewhere during this time period, Mr. Griffin directed Respondent to have completed a survey of the property at the Griffins'expense. Respondent next communicated with Mr. Ellis and a new contract for sale and purchase was prepared by the Respondent and signed by Mr. Ellis personally and signed by Mr. Ellis for Mrs. Ellis with Mrs. Ellis' express consent and permission. Subsequent thereto, the Respondent brought the new contract for sale and purchase to the Griffins. In the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Donald Griffin the Respondent presented the offer. Mr. Griffin immediately signed the new contract for sale and purchase in the presence of both Respondent and Mrs. Griffin on the line indicating he was signing as a witness to the buyer's signature/execution. However, as this contract (offer) was physically handed by Mr. Griffin to his wife for formal execution, it was further reviewed by Mr. Griffin, who became aware that the terms of purchase contained in the new contract for sale and purchase were not as he had dictated them to the Respondent. Mr. Griffin advised his wife not to accept the offer, instructed her not to sign, and, in fact, the new contract for sale and purchase was not signed or accepted by Mrs. Griffin. Respondent requested that the Griffins think about the offer for a while longer and they agreed to do so over an extended vacation. While the Griffins were on vacation, the Respondent, apparently believing the offer contained in the second contract for sale and purchase would eventually be accepted, notified Mr. Ellis that the offer had already been accepted. Believing that the offer had been accepted by a bona fide purchaser, Mr. Ellis requested a copy of the signed contract. Due to the fact that the Respondent did not have a contract signed by a bona fide buyer (Catherine A. Griffin) but believing that one would be obtained in the very near future because Donald Griffin had signed the second contract and because Donald Griffin had indicated that he could finance the entire operation by himself, the Respondent caused a photo copy of the signature of Catherine A. Griffin to be placed onto the second contract without the permission , consent, or knowledge of either Donald Griffin or Catherine Griffin. The altered copy of the second contract is apparently no longer in existence and did not come into evidence. The only real point of contention in the parties' respective proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is concerning what representation was made by Respondent to Mr. Walther Ellis concerning who had accepted the second contract. Respondent admits he represented to Mr. Ellis that Mr. Griffin, controlling the transaction for buyers, had accepted the second contract. Mr. Ellis maintained that Respondent represented to him that the second contract had been accepted on his terms but he is not clear·whether Respondent told him Mrs. Griffin accepted it or who accepted it. (Walther Ellis Deposition Page 22). Mrs. Ellis's testimony presents no independent confirmation of any of this as her information in all respects is second-hand. Mr. Brodersen's testimony is that the Respondent's representation to him was that "the Griffins" had accepted the second contract for purchase and sale and that Respondent told Mr. Ellis the same thing in Brodersen's presence and also told Brodersen that the last copy of the signed contract had been mailed to Mr. Ellis by Respondent the day previous to this three-way conversation. Mr. Brodersen thought Mr. Ellis never got the fraudulent contract but testified further that Respondent later admitted to Brodersen that he had altered this copy of the second contract so as to fraudulently reflect Mrs. Griffin's signature and further admitted to Brodersen that he, Respondent, had mailed that fraudulent copy to Mr. Ellis. Mr. Brodersen never saw the fraudulent contract. Mr. Ellis testified to receiving in the mail a copy of the second contract with a suspicious-looking set of signatures which he turned over to his attorney. The parties stipulated the attorney does not now have the contract copy. By itself, the testimony of Investigator Jacobs that Respondent by telephone admitted falsifying Mrs. Griffin's signature onto a copy of the second contract for purchase and sale and further admitted destroying one copy of the fraudulent contract would fail as not having the proper predicate for voice identification. However, in light of Mr. Ellis's and Mr. Brodersen's testimony, Mr. Jacobs' testimony on Respondent's creation of the fraudulent document is accepted as corroborative pursuant to Section 120.58 Florida Statutes. The remainder of his testimony is rejected. At no time did Catherine A. Griffin and/or Donald Griffin as her agent or on his own behalf accept the Ellis' offer contained in the second contract for sale and purchase nor did Catherine A. Griffin nor Donald Griffin ever execute the second contract as a buyer. The transaction was never closed and Mrs. Griffin was returned her deposit money when she requested it in September 1984. Mr. Ellis admits having told Respondent he was not anxious for the deal to close and did not care if the deal failed to go through. Mr. Griffin spoke at length and with considerable feeling at the hearing of his desire that Respondent not receive a permanent record as a result of a single mistake committed while under stress from Respondent's father's medical condition. That Respondent was under such stress when all this occurred was confirmed by Mr. Brodersen.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered whereby Respondent Thomas F. Steffan Jr.'s licenses as a real estate salesman and broker be suspended for a period of one year and that he pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James T. Mitchell, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation-Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas F. Steffan Jr., Pro Se 18645 Sandpiper Road Ft. Myers, Florida Harold R. Huff, Director Department of Professional Regulation-Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether respondent's license as a real estate salesman should be revoked or otherwise disciplined on the ground that she is guilty of misrepresentation, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, culpable negligence, and breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1) (b), Florida Statutes (1979).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the charges, respondent Margaret Perry was a licensed Florida real estate salesman holding license No. 0147966. Her business address is Key Place Realty, 513 West Vine Street, Kissimmee, Florida. (Stipulation of Parties.) I. The Offer On December 12 and 13, 1980, Perry W. Ripple, Jr., and Carol C. Ripple, his wife, signed a contract to purchase a 5-acre tract, with residence, located on Hickory Tree Road, Osceola County, Florida. The contract was prepared by respondent, who had previously shown the property to the Ripples. (Testimony of Perry, P. Ripple, C. Ripple; Joint Exhibit No. 1.) On Saturday, December 13, 1980, the contract constituted only a written offer to purchase the property since Novie P. Cleveland and Pamela A. Cleveland- -the owners of the property--had not yet accepted the offer by signing the contract. Pursuant to the contract, the offer was accompanied by a $1,000 earnest money deposit and an assignment of a certificate of deposit. (Testimony of P. Ripple, Perry.) On Saturday, December 13, 1980, when respondent received the signed offer, with earnest money deposit and certificate of deposit assignment, she mailed a copy to the American Title Insurance Company and ordered title insurance. Before mailing the contract offer to the title insurance company, she typed two dates above the contract signature lines: "December 13, 1980" as the date it was signed by the buyers; 3/ and "December 15, 1980" as the date it would be signed by the sellers (the sellers had not yet signed the contract; she inserted December 15, 1980, in anticipation of their signing on that date). She used December 15, 1980, because, under the terms of the contract, that was the last day the offer could be accepted by the sellers. (Testimony of Perry, Carlyon; P-1.) II. The Acceptance At approximately 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, December 14, 1980, respondent telephoned the sellers, Novie P. and Pamela A. Cleveland, and arranged for them to meet her at Mr. Cleveland's office and accept the offer by signing the contract. Respondent expedited the signing of the contract because the Ripples were in a hurry to close the transaction. (Testimony of N. Cleveland, P. Cleveland, Perry.) A few minutes later, the Clevelands met respondent at the designated place and signed the contract. Although they signed the contract on December 14, 1980, respondent inadvertently failed to correct the December 15, 1980, date which she had earlier placed in the contract as the date of execution by the sellers. (Testimony of Perry, N. Cleveland, P. Cleveland; Joint Exhibit No. 1.) III. Buyers' Attempt to Withdraw Offer Later on that evening--between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. on December 14, 1980--Mr. Ripple telephoned respondent at her home. He questioned her about the boundaries and size of the property and, for reasons not material here, told her that he no longer wanted to buy the property, that he wanted the earnest money deposit returned. The conversation was abrupt and heated; both parties became upset with each other. The subject of whether the contract had been accepted and signed by the sellers was not mentioned. (Testimony of Perry, C. Ripple, P. Ripple.) The critical dispute in this case is the time of Mr. Ripple's telephone call to respondent. The Ripples testified it was between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m.; respondent testified it was between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. If the Ripples' testimony is accepted, then respondent presented an offer to the sellers for acceptance after the buyers had told her they wanted to withdraw the offer and not proceed with the contract; this is the essence of respondent's alleged misconduct. If respondent's testimony is accepted, the buyers did not notify her that they wanted to withdraw their offer until after the offer was accepted by the sellers; under such circumstances, her conduct was clearly proper. Respondent's testimony on the timing of the Ripples' telephone call is accepted as persuasive; (see paragraph 7 above) the Ripples' testimony concerning the time of the call is rejected. In earlier testimony, Mr. Ripple's memory of the events in question was shown to be unreliable: [Respondent's Counsel] Q: You say you signed the contract on December the 13th, on a Saturday. [Mr. Ripple] A: Yes. Q: Isn't it true that you signed the contract at the Sun Bank in St. Cloud on Friday, December 12th, on the hood of your car or Marge's car? That's possible, yes. Q: So you were mistaken when you said you signed it on Saturday. A: Yes, I was. I probably was. (Tr. 23.) More importantly, if the Ripples' testimony is correct, respondent deliberately presented an offer for acceptance which the purchasers no longer wished to make. Assuming such conduct occurred, it is inconceivable that she would inadvertently fail to correct the date on the contract to indicate that the sellers signed on December 14, 1980 (the same day the Ripples attempted to withdraw), not December 15, 1980. The events occurred close together and timing was critical. By not changing the date, she allowed the contract to incorrectly reflect that the sellers signed the contract a day later than they actually did: the time between the buyers' attempt to withdraw and the sellers' acceptance becomes greater than it was and even more difficult for her to explain. In short, her failure to correct the date of the sellers' signing of the contract is not a mistake she would have made if, as the Department alleges, she knowingly presented an offer and completed a contract against the expressed wishes of the buyers. IV. No Damage to Parties Involved On Monday, December 15, 1980, the Ripples stopped payment on their earnest money deposit check. The sellers did not pursue any legal rights or remedies they may have had against the Ripples. Eventually, the property in question was sold to another party. There is no evidence that the Ripples or Clevelands were financially harmed as a result of the events in question. (Testimony of Perry, C. Ripple, P. Ripple, N. Cleveland.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department's administrative complaint dated October 20, 1981, be dismissed. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 26th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Terry G. Jewell is the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, wherein Jewell engages in business as a real estate broker-salesman. His net worth is less than $2,000,000. In DOAH Case No. 87-2192, the Division filed an Administrative Complaint dated April 20, 1987, wherein the Division essentially alleged that Jewell was co-owner and agent for Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., a corporation engaged in the business of constructing homes; that Jewell, as vice- president and agent for Sun Country Homes, entered into a contract with the Koblinskis to build their house; that Sun Country Homes received approximately $74,900.00 to build the home; that Sun Country Homes did not pay certain materialmen and contractors; and that Jewell did not pay the outstanding liens. The Division sought revocation and other penalties against Jewell's license as a real estate broker-salesman, alleging that Jewell was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction. After hearing, a Recommended Order was entered by the undersigned on September 25, 1987, recommending dismissal of the Administrative Complaint. The recommendation was based on findings that Jewell's contacts with the Koblinskis were solely as an officer, co-owner and agent for Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc.; that all sums paid by the Koblinskis were to Sun Country Homes and were deposited to its corporate account; that the president of Sun Country Homes mismanaged the corporate funds and did not pay some of the subcontractors on Koblinskis' home, that Jewell quit the corporation then he found out about this; that Jewell did all he could to assist the Koblinskis once he had resigned from the corporation; that the president of the corporation disappeared with the Koblinskis' money; and that Jewell did not benefit from the funds paid by the Koblinskis to Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc. The recommendation was based on conclusions of law that the contract was between the Koblinskis and Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc.; that Jewell had no intent to deceive the Koblinskis; that it is well settled law that disciplinary action cannot be taken against a real estate broker's license for conduct not connected with the licensee's business as a broker; and that Jewell did not violate Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged. The Final Order of the Division, through the Florida Real Estate Commission, adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation in the Recommended Order and dismissed the Administrative Complaint. The affidavit which initiated this action was filed on February 5, 1988, and was later supplemented by the Petition for Small Business Party's Attorney's Fees and Costs. The affidavit, which was an application for an award of fees and costs, was timely, having been filed within 60 days after the date on which Jewell became a prevailing small business party. In this case, the 60 days is calculated from the date on the Certificate of Service showing mailing of the Final Order to the parties. See Section 57.111(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes. According to the affidavit of William C. Andrews, and the statements of account attached thereto, Jewell incurred legal fees of $3,252.50 and costs of $957.21. These fees and costs are found to be reasonable since the Division has not filed a counter affidavit or response questioning their reasonableness. According to the Petition, the disciplinary action in DOAH Case No. 87- 2192 was substantially unjustified at the time it was initiated: because the Administrative Complaint was an attempted disciplinary action taken against Petitioner's real estate broker-salesman's license for conduct not connected with the licensee's business as a broker-salesman, and there was a complete absence of evidence to show any wrong doing on the part of the Petitioner.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a real estate salesperson in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0611282. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed by Steven J. David at Century 21 Tri City Realty, Inc., in Fort Lauderdale as a licensed real estate salesperson. Her duties were selling and leasing real estate and managing properties owned by her employer. She was paid a commission on transactions she handled. In November 1996, Mike Nickas began receiving late notices from various mortgage companies which held mortgages on properties owned by him and David. He and David began investigating how that could be. They discovered that Respondent had written seventeen checks totaling in excess of $8,000 during 1996 from the business accounts payable to "cash" or to herself and had forged Nickas' signature to those checks. Those payable to "cash" were endorsed and cashed by her. Respondent was not a signatory on those accounts. In order to hide her theft, Respondent wrote in the checkbook that each check was "void" or wrote false entries as to the amount of the check and the payee. Further, when the bank statements arrived at the business each month, Respondent removed the unauthorized checks from the envelope. Respondent was not authorized to sign Nickas' name to any of those checks. Further, Respondent was not authorized to write those checks payable to herself or to write them payable to "cash" and then cash them herself. When David and Nickas confronted Respondent with their discovery, she admitted that she had written the checks without authorization. Respondent's employment was terminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint filed against her and revoking her license as a real estate salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, No. N 308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Stephen Post, Esquire 600 South Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted an equitable adjustment to increase the contract price in the amount of $337,714 for a mistake in bid on project No. BR-7702/8701, Library/Auditorium, Florida International University.
Findings Of Fact In April 1974, Respondent advertised for bids for the construction of a library-auditorium building at Florida International University, Miami, Florida, State Project No. B.R. 7702/8701. Respondent's representative for this project was the architectural firm of Ferendino/Grafton/Spillis/Candela, Coral Gables, Florida. The advertisement for bids specified that sealed bids would be received until 2:00 p.m. on May 16, 1974, at which time they would be publicly opened and read aloud. In fact, the advertised time period was extended until the same hour on May 23, 1974. The advertisement provided that bids must be submitted on the proposal form furnished by the architect/engineer and be accompanied by a bid bond or an equivalent cash amount in a sum not less than five per cent of the amount of the base bid as a guarantee that the bidder would enter into an agreement with the owner if this bid was accepted. It further provided that the bid would remain in force for thirty (30) days after the time of opening. The advertisement also contained the following statement: "The Department of General Services reserves the right to reject any and all bids and to waive informalities in any bid whenever such rejection or waiver is in the interest of the State of Florida." (Exhibit 1a, testimony of Williams) In preparing its bid on the project, Petitioner utilized two company forms. One included columns for the various portions of the work with blocks opposite each portion for the insertion of the names of subcontractors and the amounts of their bids. The other form was a recapitulation of the low subcontractors' bid by the various segments of the contract, and the form also included spaces and amounts for the work to be accomplished by the contractor itself. The normal procedure followed by Petitioner in this and prior projects was to enter subcontractors' bids on the subcontractor's bid tabulation form when received over the telephone and, when all such bids had been received shortly before the deadline for submission of bids by the prime contractors on the project, to enter each low subcontractor bid on the recapitulation form. This would then be totaled to arrive at Petitioner's bid to be submitted to Respondent. (Testimony of Kearns). The subcontractor tabulation form for the instant project listed an item for "PRECAST STRUCTURAL." Opposite this entry in blocks on the form had been printed the names of subcontractors from whom Petitioner expected to receive bids, including Pre-Stressed Systems, Inc. (P.S.I.), Meekins, Stresscon, and Houdaille. However, since there were two different pre-case structural items called for under the specification, i.e., joists under section 3-B and pre-case panels under section 3-C, the words and figures "3B Joists" and "3C panels" were penciled in above and below the printed words "PRE-CAST STRUCTURAL" to show the need for entering bid figures for both items. However, there was no separation of these items in the various blocks for subcontractor's bids. (Exhibits 1b, 1c, Testimony of Kearns) Usually bids of major subcontractors were not received until the morning of the final day for submission of the total bids, and many were not received until immediately prior to the time the bid must be tallied and submitted. On the morning of May 23, 1974, the day for bid opening, Petitioner's employee, Edward A. Kearns, Jr., an estimator, was responsible for preparing Petitioner's bid. The only bid Petitioner had received for precast joists was that submitted by P.S.I. in the base amount of $460,000. This sum was entered on the bid tabulation from in pencil under the printed name P.S.I. Bids for the pre-cast panels were received from two of the subcontractors whose names were printed on the form an the amounts were entered in pencil as follows: "Meekins - 399,800, Stresscon - 400,00." No bid was entered for Houdaille. About 11:00 a.m., a telephonic bid on the panels was received from Cast-Crete Corporation of Kissimmee. This bid was considerably lower than that of Meekins and, because Petitioner had not heard of or dealt with Cast-Crete in the past, it asked all three bidders on the panels to verify the requirements and prices. While awaiting the return of this information, the Cast-Crete bid was not entered on the bid tabulation form. Thereafter, Cast-Crete informed Petitioner that it was raising its bid somewhat and this information was placed on a separate subcontractor bid form for cast-Crete, but not entered on the tabulation form containing all bids. The final Cast-Crete bid was in the amount of $337,714. By this time, Petitioner's office was quite hectic in that other bids were coming in at a fast pace and the phone was ringing continuously. Many bidders sought clarification on items or had to give their bids to Kearns which was time-consuming. As the time for submission by Petitioner to Respondent drew near, Kearns took the low subcontractor bids from the bid tabulation form and transferred them for each category of work to the recapitulation form. On this form, there was a single line for "Precast structural" and, on that line, Kearns entered the bid that had been received from P.S.I. for precast joists, but forgot to include any bid for the precast panes. Since no breakdown for joists and panels was shown on the recapitulation form, he assumed that bids for all portions of the work hand been included. All items on the recapitulation form were added and Petitioner arrived at a total base bid of $3,999,259, which did not include the bid for precast panels in the amount of $337,714. (Testimony of Shafer, Sr., Kearns, Exhibits 1b, 1c, 1f) Petitioner's employee, Ron Shafer, Jr., previously had been sent to the place of bid opening at Florida International University with the formal bid letter with the amounts left blank. Shortly before 2:00 p.m., Petitioner provided him by telephone with the amounts to place on the be bid form and submit to the Respondent's representative. He submitted the formal bid just prior to the deadline. The bids were thereafter opened and, although Ron Shafer, Jr., noted that Petitioner's bid was some $400,000 lower than the next lowest bidder, he was unaware of the circumstances of the mistake and returned to the office. The representative of Respondent had opened the bids and an officer of the architectural firm, Freeman J. Williams, was also present. Nothing was said at the time concerning the large disparity between Petitioner's bid and the other bids, and Williams saw no need to ask Petitioner to verify its bid at that time. (Testimony of Shafer, Jr., Williams, Exhibits 1d, 1v) Meanwhile, after Kearns had tallied the final bid figures and they had been called in to the employee at Florida International University, Petitioner's personnel sat around the office and discussed the job for several minutes. They then started to gather up all the sub-bids to put in a folder when they discovered a "subcontractor's bid form" for Cast-Crete Corporation and realized that it had not been included on the tabulation sheet or on the final recap sheet. Immediate attempts were made to telephone the architect about the mistake. When Williams was reached at his office some thirty minutes after he had left Florida International University, Petitioner requested that its bid be withdrawn after explaining the circumstances. Williams suggested that Petitioner immediately send a telegram to Respondent explaining this situation. Petitioner did so in the following language: "In reviewing our bid, we discovered we had omitted the cost of precast panels manufacturers bid from our tabulation sheet, in the amount of $282,714. We, therefor, regretfully must with- draw our bid on the FIU library and auditorium building. We could, however, accept award of contract if this amount could be added to either of our base bids. Please advise. SHAFER AND MILLER, INC. R C Shafer" In the telegram, an additional mistake was made by using the figure of $282,714 which did not include the erection of the panels in the amount of $55,000 that had been the subject of a separate bid by Cast-Crete. After receipt of the telegram, Respondent's representatives requested that Petitioner come to Tallahassee with their pertinent documents relating to the bid to discuss the matter. They did so and thereafter heard nothing further until June 5, 1974, at which time a letter was received from the Department of General Services, dated May 31, 1974, advising that, subject to final approval by the Governor and the Cabinet, it was propose to recommend acceptance of Petitioner's low bid and award the contract to it in the amount of $4,122,000 for Base Bid 1 and Priority 1 Alternate A, Priority 2, Alternate C, and Priority 3, Alternate D. The meeting of the Cabinet at which the award was to be recommended was stated in the letter to be held on June 4, 1975. Since Petitioner did not receive the letter until June 5, it had no opportunity to be present at the time matter was considered. By separate letter of May 31, 1974, the Department of General Services enclosed four copies of a standard form of agreement and performance and payment bond to be executed and returned. (Testimony of Williams, Shafer, Sr., Kearns, Exhibits 1e, 1g, 1h) Petitioner contacted legal counsel, James E. Glass, on June 5. He checked into the matter and found that the contract had already been awarded on June 4 by the Cabinet. He then telephoned Arnold Greenfield, General Counsel for the Department of General Services, and asked if the state could rebid the job at which time Petitioner would submit its original intended bid. Greenfield stated that the project was critical from a budget standpoint and that the state would not rebid it, and insisted that the Petitioner proceed or else forfeit its bid bond and be subject to suit for any excess costs of performance. Glass reminded Greenfield that Petitioner proceed or else forfeit its bid bond and be subject to suit for any excess costs of performance. Glass reminded Greenfield that Petitioner could seek injunctive relief in the matter, and the latter then stated that if Petitioner would proceed with the contract, Respondent would acknowledge its right to claim a modification of the contract. This conversation was confirmed in a letter from Greenfield to Glass, dated June 7, 1974, wherein it was stated "We further understand that your client may wish to seek a modification of such contract, after execution." Glass, in a return letter dated June 12, returned the executed contracts and bonds, stating that Petitioner was doing so in order to act "equitably and in good faith", and was fully reserving its rights to contest the erroneous bid by judicial action for equitable relief. Thereafter, Petitioner received notice to proceed with the work and in due course satisfactorily completed the contract within the required period. This was evidenced by a certificate of acceptance of the building by the using agency, which was approved by Respondent on December 4, 1975. (Testimony of Glass, Exhibit 1e, 1g, 1h, 1i, 1j, 11, 1m, 1s) In December, 1974, Petitioner had submitted its claim for an equitable adjustment in the amount of $337,714 which was the amount of the omitted Cast- Crete bid. During the ensuing year Petitioner submitted audits of its expenses on the job to Respondent and in January, 1976, further audit information was provided at the request of Respondent. On May 6, 1976, Respondent informed Petitioner that it would not approve any increase in the contract amount. Thereafter, on June 11, Petitioner filed its petition herein seeking an equitable adjustment in the amount of $337,714. The petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Respondent on August 2, 1976, and the undersigned Hearing Officer was assigned to conduct the hearing therein. (Exhibit 1r, 2, 4, 5, 6) By a Motion to Abate, dated August 23, 1976, Respondent requested that the matter be held in abeyance pending the submission of the petition to the project architect and his rendering of a determination indicating whether the relief should be granted or denied, as a "condition precedent to the contractor obtaining consideration of said petition in any proceeding authorized by Chapter 120, Florida Statutes." Respondent stated in its motion that the contract clearly provided that nay and all claims or disputes should be first submitted to the architect for determination, and that thereafter, either party could obtain administrative review of the determination by filing a written appeal to the Department of General Services within thirty days. The motion further stated that since this prerequisite had not been accomplished, there was no basis for an administrative appeal at that time. On the same date, Respondent advised the architect of the situation and requested expeditious consideration of the matter. On August 27, the architect issued its determination stating "From our personal knowledge of the events during the bid opening process, and the subsequent events that led to the awarding of the bid, we concur in the contractor's request." In November 1976, Respondent's general counsel advised the Hearing Officer that settlement efforts were in progress but requested that the matter be scheduled for hearing nevertheless. Notice of hearing was issued on December 15, 1976, and the case was heard on January 27, 1977. (Exhibits 1t, 1u, Pleadings) Petitioner's intended total bid, including alternates, amounted to $4,459,714. A change order of $194 was issued during the course of the work, amounting to a total of $4,459,908. Petitioner's direct costs on the project were $4,094,890. Overhead was computed at 2.85 per cent of direct costs in the amount of $116,705, for a total cost of $4,211,595. Overhead was computed based on the ratio of total general and administrative expense to total direct costs incurred on all of Petitioner's jobs in process for the year ending May 31, 1975. However, the audit reports included payment in the amount of $335,634 to Cast-Crete Corporation. The actual amount paid to that firm was $325,234 - difference of $10,400, making Petitioner's actual costs $4,201,195. During the course of the contract, Respondent paid Petitioner $4,122,194, resulting in a net loss to Petitioner of $79,001. An anticipated profit for performance of the contract was computed on the basis of the average profit on other jobs of 4.4 per cent, amounting to the sum of $180,377. The latter two sums total $259,378, and it is found that figure is the reasonable amount of Petitioner's claim. (Exhibits 2-5)
Recommendation That Petitioner's claim for equitable adjustment under Project No. BR- 7702/8701 be granted and that a change order be issued increasing the contract price by $259,378.00. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 388-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donna H. Stinson and Daniel S. Dearing, Esquires Post Office Box 1118 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James E. Glass, Esquire 2600 First Federal Building 1 Southeast 3rd Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 John A. Barley, Esquire General Counsel Department of General Services Room 110 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent Santaniello holds real estate broker license number 0186475, and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. Santaniello is the active broker for Respondent, Sunair Realty Corporation, which holds license number 0213030. Mr. Don M. and Mrs. Agnes C. Long own two lots in Port Charlotte which they purchased as investments. By letter dated June 8, 1981, Respondents forwarded a "Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase" on each of these lots to the Longs. The documents established that Anni Czapliski was the buyer at a purchase price of $1200 per lot. Respondent Sunair Realty Corporation was to receive the greater of $120 or ten percent of the felling price for "professional services." The letter and documents were signed by Respondent Santaniello. Anni Czapliski was Bernard Santaniello's mother-in-law at the time of the proposed sale. This relationship was not disclosed by Respondents and was not known to the Longs at the time they were invited to contract with Respondents for sale of the lots. The Longs rejected the proposed arrangement for reasons not-relevant here.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondents guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), and fining each $500. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert J. Norton, Esquire Suite 408 First National Bank Building Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Mr. C.B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Frederick Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R.T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 475.025(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what the appropriate penalty is.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, O. Dane Streets was licensed by the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate broker having been issued License No. 0085710-1 for an address in Lakeland, Florida. In the Spring or early Summer of 1991, Nathan Price, a minister in Orlando, Florida, contacted Respondent to solicit Respondent's participation in representing Price's daughter, Melissa Howard, in purchasing real estate in Orlando. Price and Respondent have been business and social acquaintances for more than 10 years, and Price was helping his daughter and son-in-law in purchasing a home. The Howard's found a house they liked, Respondent obtained the listing information from the listing broker and prepared a contract for sale and purchase (Exhibit 1). As modified and accepted by all parties, this contract provided for a $1000 earnest money deposit to be held in escrow by Respondent's real estate company. In lieu of obtaining the deposit from Price or Howard, Respondent told Howard to give the earnest money deposit to the selling broker as all of the transactions were to be conducted in Orlando. The $1000 earnest money deposit was given to neither Respondent nor the listing broker, ReMax Southwest in Orlando. The failure of Respondent to follow up to insure that the earnest money deposit had been given to the listing broker in this transaction does not reach the status of fraud or dishonest dealing as Respondent had no such intent. Shortly before the August 21, 1991 closing date, Price advised Respondent that the mortgage lender was asking about the earnest money deposit. Respondent immediately obtained a cashier's check dated August 8, 1991 (Exhibit 2) in the amount of $1000 which Price presented at the closing on August 21, 1991. In his testimony, Respondent acknowledged that he erred in not obtaining the earnest money deposit or failing to check to be sure the deposit had been made with the listing broker. Since Respondent is located in Lakeland and the property being purchased is in Orlando when the closing was held, Respondent thought everything would be simplified if the deposit was held by the listing broker. When the listing broker learned that the deposit of $1000 had never been received by Respondent and placed in escrow, a complaint was made to the Florida Real Estate Commission, and these proceedings followed. Respondent has held licenses from the Florida Real Estate Commission for some 20 years, and this is the first time any charges have been brought against his license.
Recommendation It is Recommended that a Final Order be entered finding O. Dane Streets not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged. ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1992. Copies furnished to: Steven N. Johnson, Esquire Darlene F. Keller Division of Real Estate Division Director 400 W. Robinson Street Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801-1900 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801-1900 O. Dane Streets Post Office Box 6852 Jack McRay, Esquire Lakeland, FL 33807 Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Todd T. Catlette, applied for full registration as a general securities representative. Mr. Catlette is not licensed to call or offer to sell securities in the State of Florida. The Department of Banking and Finance denied the application by letter dated January 22, 1988. Ex. 3 The application was denied based upon the following facts: On May 3, 1988, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a third degree felony, filing a false and fraudulent insurance claim, in violation of Section 817.234(1)(a), Fla. Stat., and pleaded nolo contendere to a second degree felony, second degree grand theft, in violation of Section 812.014(2)(b), Fla. Stat. He was placed on probation for one year and ordered to make restitution to the insurance company in the amount of $2,148.00. Upon failing to make restitution, his probation was extended three years. He was discharged from probation on April 28, 1987. On August 3, 1979, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to sale and delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver, both second degree felonies, in violation of Section 893.03(2)(a)4, Fla. Stat. He was sentenced to two years in state prison. On November 22, 1976, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to possession of less then five grams of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, a first degree misdemeanor; and was placed on three months probation. After serving his sentences in state prison, the Petitioner obtained a college education. The Petitioner testified that he was innocent of the possession of marijuana offense in 1976 and innocent of the fraudulent insurance claim and theft offenses in 1985. He presented a deposition of a detective involved in the fraudulent insurance claim case which was admitted as hearsay evidence to support his assertion of innocence. It appears from the deposition and the testimony of Mr. Cutlette that the detective relied solely upon the testimony of one witness as support for the charges of false insurance claim and theft. The foregoing evidence is not sufficiently credible to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner was innocent of the fraudulent insurance claim and grand theft offense. When presented with an opportunity for a trail, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere.
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Respondent issue its final order denying the application of Todd T. Catlette for full registration as a general securities representative. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 1988. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1161 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have either been rejected or which have been adopted by reference. The numbers used are the numbers used by parties. Findings of Fact proposed by the Petitioner: None Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: 1. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 3.-4., 10. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. COPIES FURNISHED: Todd T. Catlette 3450 Palencia Drive, No. 1317 Tampa, Florida 22618 Reginald R. Garcia, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32388-0350 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts, Esquire General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact On October 12, 1981, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the felony charge of unemployment compensation fraud, adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was placed on probation for one year (Exhibit 2). The probation was terminated by Order Dismissing Warrant entered October 27, 1982 (Exhibit 3). The unemployment compensation fraud resulted from Petitioner's continuing to receive unemployment compensation following his discharge from the armed services after he had obtained full-time employment. The Information charged Petitioner with failure to disclose a material fact, to wit: he reported that he was unemployed while he was in fact working and receiving wages from Pacific Packing Company (Exhibit 2). In Application For Filing for Examination as an Ordinary Life, Including Health, agent dated March 16, 1984, Petitioner, in response to question 11(a) on this application asking if he had ever been charged with a felony, answered, "no." He gave the same answer to question 11(b) which asked if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Petitioner testified that he discussed the completion of this application with a fellow employee of an insurance agency at which he was working; and, since he had, on a earlier application for temporary employment, furnished the information regarding his unemployment compensation fraud conviction to the Department of Insurance, he did not deem it necessary to again report this offense. The fellow employee confirmed that he had discussed this answer with Petitioner and had suggested Petitioner answer the question as he did. Neither petitioner nor this witness satisfactorily answered the Hearing Officer's question how Petitioner could answer no to question 11 and then swear that all answers given on the application are true and correct. Petitioner's minister testified that Petitioner is a deacon in his church and he has found Petitioner to be truthful, honest, and capable of making mistakes and admitting them. As a temporary employee of A. L. Williams Company, a distributor of insurance products, Petitioner was deemed to be truthful, honest, and upright.
Findings Of Fact The complaining witnesses in this case, the Marino's, owned real property in Fern Park, Florida that they listed in November, 1973, with Area One, Inc., a corporate broker. They were very anxious to sell this property. At all times here involved, respondent was a registered real estate broker and was employed as a salesman and office manager of Area One, Inc. The property was listed through salesman Eleanor Stanfield although respondent Greene accompanied her to the Marino's when the listing was obtained. Approximately two weeks thereafter, respondent obtained a prospective buyer for the property who was willing to purchase but couldn't meet the cash down payment required to make up the balance over a 95 percent mortgage. The buyer, Borsack, was an acquaintance respondent had known socially for a year or so. The suggestion was made that if Marino could loan Borsack the money for the down payment the latter would sign a balloon note payable twenty dollars per month for the first five years with the balance then due and payable. When bringing this proposal to Marino, respondent told him it was not the best deal but it was the best he could offer at the moment. At the time, Borsack was employed as a salesman and was apparently earning a good salary. Marino was receptive to the idea and agreed to loan the buyer $2400. Marino was advised by his lawyer that he should have more security for the loan than the note signed by Borsack alone and respondent agreed to guarantee the note. Marino prepared a check for $2400 which he exchanged for a cashier's check for a like amount. This was given to respondent when he executed as the guarantor and was subsequently given to the closing agent. There was conflicting testimony regarding the dispenser of the information that the existence of the note should be withheld from the mortgage broker at the closing. The complaining witnesses contended that respondent so advised them, but he denies ever giving such advice. Regardless of the complicity of respondent in this regard, both parties to the contract were aware that the mortgage would not be approved if the existence of the loan was disclosed to the mortgagee. To account for his cash payment at closing, Borsack produced for the mortgage a letter from his sister reciting a gift from her of $2200. Borsack also signed a residential loan application (Exhibit 8) in which he indicated no financing other than first mortgage and the cash he would pay at closing. Both buyer (Borsack) and seller (Marino) executed an affidavit (FNMA Form 1009)(Exhibit 10) on which they advised the mortgagee no secondary financing was involved in the transaction. At the time the loan was made by Marino to Borsack the former's attorney was aware of the circumstances surrounding the transaction and this attorney advised Marino that it would be all right for him to accept the note provided payment was guaranteed by respondent. Although no testimony was elicited from the attorney in this regard, I would expect him to be cognizant of the fact that the mortgage would not be approved if the mortgagee was aware of the loan from seller to buyer. Considerable testimony was adduced regarding whether or not the promissory note given by the buyer to the seller constituted secondary financing as intended on Exhibits 8 and 10. Since this determination is not necessary to the results reached below, respondent's understanding that "secondary financing" relates only to that financing that would create a lien on the property is likewise immaterial to the result. During a 60 day period including the time this transaction occurred, respondent sold four pieces of property for the Marino's. At no time during the negation which resulted in the sales of the property from Marino to Borsack did respondent give any false or misleading information to the Marinos. Although no evidence was presented to this effect, the complaint alleges, and the answer admits, that after the transaction closed Borsack subsequently defaulted on his mortgage and on his note to Marino; that respondent made a few payments on the note he had guaranteed before stopping these payments; and that Marino obtained a judgment against respondent for the amount of the promissory note. Thereafter, in December 1975, some two years after any act of respondent in this transaction that could have given rise to a violation of Chapter 475, F.S. occurred, the Marinos filed a complaint with the FREC and the investigation and administrative complaint here involved followed.
