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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs MICHAEL PAUL VALENTINE, 98-002435 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Naples, Florida May 29, 1998 Number: 98-002435 Latest Update: Dec. 14, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent provided the Florida Real Estate Commission with false information in his application to take the broker's examination, in violation of Sections 475.25(1)(b)and (l), Florida Statutes, or whether he is guilty of misrepresentation, false promises, or dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device in any business transaction, in violation of Section 457.25(1)(b), and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent became a licensed real estate salesperson on September 27, 1993. On this date, he placed his license with Brokers Realty of Naples, Inc. Respondent has not pursued the real estate profession as his primary business. He has not bought or sold any real estate under his license and has not put any time into it. Respondent's profession is the ministry. He as been a minister for 20 years and has been the senior pastor of Gulf Shore Community Church for five years. Respondent is a member of the Christian Missionary Alliance. In June 1993, Respondent was assigned the responsibility of forming a church in Naples. Respondent's wife was more interested than Respondent in pursuing a real estate career, and Respondent took the course with her more for moral support. While in class, they met a broker with whom they agreed they would place their salesperson's licenses. After receiving their salesperson's licenses, Respondent and his wife placed their licenses under the broker, as they had agreed. However, the broker closed her office after a couple of months. In the meantime, Respondent's wife had met David Bayer of Century 21 Old Naples Realty, Inc. (Century 21). In November 1993, she decided to place her license with Century Respondent agreed that he would do the same. Busy with starting a church, Respondent did not attend to the details of transferring his license. He believed that someone else was doing this for him, but no one did. Respondent's inattention allowed his licensing status to lapse. Unknown to Respondent at the time, his salesperson's license became invalid on November 16, 1993, for lack of an employing broker, according to Petitioner's records. Respondent's license remained invalid until March 31, 1995, when it became inactive, according to Petitioner's records. Respondent's wife later decided to pursue her broker's license. Again for moral support and to help her with preparing for the examination, Respondent agreed that he would also apply for his broker's license. In attempting to obtain the necessary paperwork to take the broker's examination, Respondent discovered in late August 1995 that Petitioner's records had not been updated to reflect the transfer of his license to Century 21. It appears that Respondent was not yet aware of the other above-described impediments to licensure. Trying to update Petitioner's records, Respondent submitted the two forms that are the subject of the present disciplinary proceeding. The first form was a Request for License or Change of Status, which Respondent faxed to Petitioner. Respondent completed the top section of this form, which is to be completed by the licensee. He signed it beside a typed-in date of December 30, 1993, which was the effective date of the transfer of his license to Century 21. Petitioner has not objected to anything in this section. The next section is to be completed by the broker/employer or nonlicensed owner/employer. At the bottom of this section are the words, "Broker or Non-Licensed Owner Sign Here:". Respondent hand-wrote Mr. Bayer's name in what he described as printing, but, on a blurry fax, could be mistaken for a signature for someone unfamiliar with Mr. Bayer's signature. Beside Mr. Bayer's name "December 30, 1993" was typed in. Petitioner has objected to Respondent's undisclosed signing of Mr. Bayer's name on this form. On September 11, 1995, Petitioner received another Request for License or Change of Status form. The bottom section of this form was signed by Mr. Bayer at the bottom in script considerably different from that of the earlier form. The top section of this form is filled out exactly as the earlier form, with Respondent's signature beside the typed-in date of "December 30, 1993." Petitioner objected to the typed-in date because it was nearly two years prior to the date that the form was filed. As to the second objection, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Respondent was trying to file paperwork with Petitioner in 1995 that was misdated so as to suggest that it was filed two years earlier. The 1993 date was the effective date of the license transfer. The form does not state "Date Signed"--only "Date." There is no place on the form to show an earlier effective date. Not only was Respondent not trying to mislead Petitioner with the date on the form, but it is almost impossible to find that the date was misleading. There is no way to conceal that the forms were filed in September 1995, not December 1993. Respondent even sent the second form certified, return receipt requested, so as to document further that the form was sent in 1995. In the absence of another place on the form to show the effective date of the transfer, Respondent's use of the date line to show the effective date was reasonable and not misleading. Thus, Respondent did not intend to mislead with this date entry, and no one could reasonably have claimed to have been misled by this date entry. Interestingly, Petitioner did not claim that Respondent's first form, which had a similar date entry, was misleading as to the date. As to the first form, Petitioner's objection is more substantial: Respondent signed Mr. Bayer's name without disclosing that he was doing so. Mr. Bayer testified that he would have signed the form in December 1993 or September 1995 because Respondent in fact had transferred his license to Century 21 in December 1993. The record does not establish that Mr. Bayer authorized Respondent to sign the form before he did so, but the record clearly established that he ratified the signature. A few days after the first form was faxed, Mr. Bayer signed a form and sent it to Petitioner. Clearly, Respondent's handling of the signature of Mr. Bayer does not rise to misrepresentation, false promises, or dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device. There was not fraudulent intent. The question is closer as to whether Respondent's handling of the signature rises to the level of making or filing a false report or record which the licensee knows to be false. Given the standard of evidence imposed upon Petitioner, there is considerable doubt whether the factual basis supporting a finding that Respondent signed as the agent of Mr. Bayer, who immediately ratified the act to eliminate any doubt as to its authorization, is sufficient to find that Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly made or filed a false report or record. However, the parties stipulated to a violation of at least one count, and the administrative law judge accepted the stipulation.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order either dismissing the Administrative Complaint or finding Respondent guilty of knowingly making or filing a false record or report and issuing a notice of noncompliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven D. Fieldman, Chief Attorney Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jeanette Martinez Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur 4501 Tamiami Trail North, Suite 400 Naples, Florida 34103 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-24.001
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. DUDLEY COHN, 84-001637 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-001637 Latest Update: Dec. 03, 1984

Findings Of Fact Respondent, at all times pertinent, was a registered real estate salesman holding license number 0314085. This license is currently under suspension as a result of disciplinary action by Petitioner. Respondent was, at all times pertinent, the President and a stock holder in D.S.A.E., Inc. D.S.A.E., in turn, was the owner (or co-owner with another corporation) of a tract of land located adjacent to U.S. Highway 27 in Broward County. Respondent, acting in his capacity as a real estate salesman, sought buyers for segments 1/ of the U.S. 27 property. He had made earlier sales of other property to Mrs. Lottie Kay and her son Michael Kay, and contacted the former in October, 1980, regarding the U.S. 27 property. The D.S.A.E. tract was zoned B-3 (business) on that portion which fronted U.S. 27. The rear segments were zoned A-1 (limited agriculture) and did not front U.S. 27. Initially, Respondent mentioned segments being offered for $60,000 and $24,000. However, Lottie Kay indicated that she could not afford the higher priced segments (which were zoned B-3). Lottie Kay asked Respondent to show her the property, and a visit to the general area was made. However, Respondent told her they could not get to the property which he said was located "on the other side of the construction." After visiting the area, she was not aware of the actual location of her property or of its character. 2/ She continued to believe that the property was "right on" U.S. 27. She based this belief on Respondent's original sales presentation rather than her visit to the area. The segment she purchased is about one quarter of a mile from U.S. 27. Lottie Kay was also confused as to the zoning on the property. She believed it was "commercial" and does not recall being told of the agricultural zoning by Respondent until about a year after the purchase. Her son, Michael Kay, who was present during a part of Respondent's initial sales presentation, heard only the B-3 zoning mentioned. Since he was not present throughout the discussion, he could have missed Respondent's reference, which he claims to have made, to the agricultural zoning on the back segments. On October 8, 1980, Lottie Kay, as buyer, contracted with Respondent on behalf of D.S.A.E. and a third party corporation, as sellers, to purchase "Tract 14" for $24,000 on an "agreement for deed." Under the terms of the contract, Lottie Kay paid $4,000 down and was to pay $215.59 per month thereafter beginning in November, 1980. Lottie Kay made the monthly payments through 1983. When she missed her first two payments in 1984, Respondent offered to reduce the contract price by $2,000 if she would resume monthly payments and make up the missing payments. Lottie Kay agreed to this modification of the contract, but discontinued further payments in April, 1984. Lottie Kay bought this property for speculation in reliance on Respondent's claim that its value would increase substantially in the immediate future. Respondent showed her newspaper clippings which supported his claim that the general area was one of future growth. He predicted her segment would be worth at least $30,000 in one year and stated that as to possible appreciation, "The sky's the limit." Respondent did not, however, point out that Lottie Kay's property could not be resold for any use other than agriculture since her segment was too small for even a home site under the existing zoning. Respondent also neglected to advise her that the property was underwater much of the year, and would have to be filled and probably permitted before any development could take place. The testimony of a real estate appraiser called by Petitioner established that the property was worth about $750 when purchased by Lottie Kay in October, 1980. 3/ This valuation was based on the witness' study of nearby land sales over a period of years as well as his inspection of the area in which the Kay segment is located. Respondent attempted to establish a higher market value by producing various warranty deeds whereby he or his affiliates had sold similar segments to other buyers for amounts approximating that agreed to by Lottie Kay. These sales do not establish value but, rather, indicate the gullibility of other buyers in making such purchases. After she fell behind in her payments, Lottie Kay tried to resell her property through Respondent in reliance on his claim at the time of his initial sales presentation that he could resell it for her in one week. When requested to do so he was unable to produce any prospective buyer. Thus, there appears to be no real market for this property, other than that generated by Respondent in his initial sales campaign. Lottie Kay did not consult an attorney or have the land surveyed or appraised prior to contracting for the purchase. Rather, she trusted Respondent who she knew to be a real estate professional. She was also aware that he was an owner of the property, but still believed she could rely on his statements that the current market value of her segment was at least $24,000 and that future profits were assured. Respondent attacks the fairness of these proceedings on the alleged misconduct of Petitioner's investigator, who encouraged Lottie Kay to come forward after she (with the help of her son) had filed a complaint with Petitioner. The investigator made statements to the Kays which indicated his belief that Respondent was engaged in fraudulent land sales, and was a menace to the public. Although the investigator's statements to the Kays were gratuitous and inconsistent with his fact finding role, there is no indication that such statements resulted in any false testimony or other unreliable evidence. Respondent notes that Lottie Kay continued to make payments on her contract with Respondent even after she had filed a complaint with Petitioner and reasons that she must have considered the property a worthwhile investment. Lottie Kay demonstrated through her testimony and recitation of her dealings with Respondent that she is gullible and imprudent in financial matters. Thus, her continued investment of funds in this property indicated lack of prudence rather than an informed belief that the property had any substantial value.

Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of misrepresenting property value as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license as a real estate salesman for a period of three years to begin upon completion of his current license suspension period. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1984.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. LOUISE DIABO, D/B/A MARATHON REALTY, 86-003904 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003904 Latest Update: Jul. 09, 1987

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints relative to real estate transactions. (Official recognition of Florida Statutes, TR 6-7) Respondent is now and was at times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in Florida, having been issued License No. 0149408. The last license to Respondent was as a broker, t/a Marathon Realty at Post Office Box 2386, Marathon Shores, Florida 33052. (Petitioner'S Exhibit 1) On or about May 2, 1985, Respondent solicited and obtained a sales contract entered into by Emily Cathy Cronnon, as purchaser, and W. J. and Delores Sarver , as sellers, for the purchase and sale of certain residential property (contract for sale). (Petitioner'S Exhibit 2) The sales transaction was scheduled to close on or about July 1, 1985, but the transaction did not close. On or about December 2, 1985, the purchaser and sellers terminated the sales contract. (Petitioner'S Exhibit 3) On or about May 13, 1985, the Respondent allowed Emily Cathy Cronnon and her live-in boyfriend, Billy Hull, to take possession and occupy the property with the knowledge and consent of seller W. J. Sarver. In this regard, W. J. Sarver denies giving permission to Ms. Cronnon to occupy the property prior to closing. However, it is found herein and the testimony of Billy Hull and Respondent substantiate the fact that Emily Cronnon and Billy Hull visited Respondent's office during early May, 1985, to find out whether they could move into the Sarver property with their furnishings prior to closing. Initially, Ms. Diabo advised Cannon and Hull that she was not at liberty to permit them to move in. However, she told them that if they liked, they could phone Mr. Server and get his permission. This was done and it is found that Mr. Sarver gave his permission to Respondent to allow Ms. Cronnon and Billy Hull to occupy the premises prior to closing, provided they turned the utilities off and then had the same turned on in their name. This was done, and the contract purchaser (Cronnon) and her boyfriend, Billy Hull, moved in prior to the time that the transaction closed. Respondent received a $500 rental payment from the purchaser on August 19, 1985. (Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) Respondent deposited said check in an appropriate bank account and waited eleven (11) days for that check to clear. On August 30, 1985, she wrote a $500 check to the Sarvers indicating that the same was rental payment to them for the use of their property by Cronnon and Hull. Respondent customarily waits at least ten (10) days for any check to clear before she writes a check drawn on those same funds.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings: 1. Accepted as modified. 7. Rejected based on credible evidence herein which reveals that Emily Cathy Cronnon and her live-in boyfriend, Billy Hull, took possession and occupied the property with the prior knowledge and consent of seller, W. J. Sarver. Rejected based on credible evidence which reveals that Respondent did not conceal the rent payment, but rather deposited the rent payment until the funds cleared her bank and she immediately thereafter transmitted the proceeds to the Sarvers. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary to decide the issues posed. Rejected as a conclusion and not a finding of fact. Respondent's proposed findings and conclusions are largely a brief in the form of resolutions of credibility, conflicts, recommendations as to how those conflicts should be resolved, and conclusions in the form of ultimate findings of fact. As such, they are not specifically addressed in the Appendix, but were carefully considered and reviewed by the under signed in preparation of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: JAMES H. GILLIS, ESQUIRE SENIOR ATTORNEY DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 MICHAEL H. DAVIDSON, ESQUIRE WATSON & CLARK POST OFFICE BOX 11959 FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA 33339 HAROLD HUFF, EXECUTIVE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32502 HONORABLE VAN B. POOLE, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 JOSEPH A. SOLE, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. GUSTAVE A. MILLER AND PAMELA MICHAELS, 83-000139 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000139 Latest Update: Sep. 22, 1983

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this case, Respondent Gustave A. Miller was a licensed real estate broker with license number 0060208, and Respondent Pamela Michaels was a licensed real estate salesman with license number 0059873. At all times pertinent to this case, Respondent Miller operated Gus Miller Real Estate, Inc., 5505 E. Colonial Drive, Orlando, Florida; and Respondent Michaels was a salesperson working for him at that office. On or about November 15, 1981, Respondent Michaels prepared a contract for the sale of property owned by Betty B. Stahl (1/2 interest) and Helen Vierbickas or Flora Belle Turner Van Trease (1/2 interest) in Orlando, Florida, to Timothy Karl Kunke and Shawna Jean Kunke. Purchase price was to be $64,000 with $1,000 paid as deposit. Buyer was to apply and qualify for a loan guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Seller was to clean and paint the inside of the house, but did not enter into a contract with Respondents to accomplish this work. The contract contained the usual provision for the division of forfeited deposit in the event of buyer default. Due to a death in the buyer's family, he was not able to qualify for an FHA loan, and without any coordination with or approval of seller, Respondent Miller deducted $235 from the deposit held by him, as his fee for painting the property, and refunded $765 to the Kunkes. Thereafter, on or about December 4, 1982, Respondent Michaels presented a second contract for the sale of the same property to Mrs. Stahl, although the majority of her dealings were actually with Mr. Stahl, who was advising his wife. The buyer listed this time was Robert G. McRae, and the contract reflected a deposit in the amount of $4,000 paid by check to Gus Miller Real Estate, Inc. This contract, which was accepted by the sellers, also called for the buyer to apply for and qualify for an FHA loan, and seller agreed to pay the discount points on that loan, not to exceed 3 percent. Though the $4,000 was reflected as paid on the front of the contract, the provision reflecting the receipt of earnest money to be held in escrow on the bottom of the reverse side of the contract was not filled in or signed by either Respondent, even though Respondent Miller's firm name was stamped in. Nonetheless, when Mr. Stahl asked Respondent Michaels about the check at the time the contract was signed by Mrs. Stahl, Michaels assured him they had it in their possession and agreed to send him a photocopy of it, which she failed to do. In the prehearing stipulation, Respondents agreed that no deposit had been paid. At some point in time, Respondents admitted they did not have the deposit. Mrs. Vierbickas, a friend of Mrs. Stahl's sister, Mrs. Van Trease, was told by Respondent Michaels that they did not have the check, but she is unsure when she was told this. I find, nonetheless, that Respondents continued to represent to the Stahls that the deposit had been received and was being held by them until after the transfer was cancelled for other reasons. McRae signed the contract on December 4, 1981. That same day, he was taken by Respondent Michaels to the Orlando office of Countrywide Funding Corporation where, before an employee of that Company, Joyce Freed, he filled out an application for an FHA mortgage in the amount of $61,300. On that same visit, he signed a certificate that the property to be covered by the mortgage would serve as his primary home. He also acknowledged in writing that he understood FHA financing could not be utilized for any purpose other than owner- occupied properties. He subsequently signed additional documents in relation to the loan in which he affirmed that the property to be financed would be occupied by him, even after the mortgage commitment was received from the FHA. On January 11, 1982, McRae certified on a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (BUD) form that he intended to occupy the property. Coincidentally, that same day, a lease was signed by a Barbara Sullivan, on behalf of herself and her husband, purporting to lease the home McRae was then occupying for one year at $650 per month with an advance deposit of $1,300 paid. McRae was not asked to sign this lease, which was witnessed by both Respondents and notarized by Respondent Miller. McRae did not receive any rent from this lease, which was not a bona fide conveyance of an interest in the property. It was not intended to convey the property, but was generated by Respondents for some purpose not related to a tenancy by the Sullivans. McRae testified that when Michaels took him to Countrywide's office, he did not intend to occupy the property to be purchased, but instead intended for his daughters to live there. However, when he saw from the forms he was signing that there was a requirement for the property to be owner-occupied, he, at that moment, changed his mind; and when he signed the documents, minutes thereafter, he intended to move in. I find this testimony to be unworthy of belief. During the period from the date of the sales contract with McRae to the date of the proposed closing, the interest rate went up higher than was called for in the contract, and McRae refused to close. Sometime later, in late February, 1982, a Larry Werts came to the property in question and discussed with Mr. Stahl the possible purchase of Mrs. Stahl's one-half interest in the property for $27,500 in cash. Werts was, however, unable to secure this much cash. Thereafter, he indicated he would make an offer on the entire parcel through Respondent Michaels; and subsequently, Respondents, together, brought a contract to Mrs. Stahl, signed by Werts, which reflected a purchase price of $50,000. The Stahls rejected this offer as being too low.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the license of each respondent be suspended for one year, that each respondent pay an administrative fine of $1,000, and that each respondent be reprimanded in writing, but that the execution of the suspension be deferred for one year with a provision for automatic recission. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Robert W. Olsen, Esquire 205 N. Rosalind Avenue Post Office Box 1767 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. FRED M. BENNETT, 88-004903 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004903 Latest Update: Mar. 31, 1989

The Issue The central issue is whether Bennett committed the violations as alleged and, if so, what discipline is appropriate. More specifically, did he violate Section 475.25(1)(b), (d) and (k), Florida Statutes, by committing fraud, culpable negligence or the like, by failing to account for and deliver trust funds, and by failing to properly maintain trust funds?

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Fred M. Bennett was, at all times relevant, licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0161968 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Harold E. McNally is a self-employed businessman from Chillicothe, Ohio. He met Fred Bennett in 1976 or 1977 when he bought some property in Orlando. Thereafter, the relationship continued with McNally buying and selling property as an investment, and Bennett acting as agent or purchaser. Four of McNally's properties in Orlando, Florida were held as rentals: 3939 Spoonbill Avenue 4525 Salvia Drive 7806 Toledo Street 1308 Forester Avenue Bennett collected the rents and sent them to McNally, after deducting his management fee. There was no written management agreement, but rather McNally leased the properties back to Bennett. Later, those leases expired and since the market was not good for sales, Bennett and McNally continued their relationships with Bennett sending the rents and deducting his fees. The rents were $450.00 and $485.00 per month and his fee was $93.00 per month in 1986. The rents remained the same in 1987, but the management fee was raised to $103.00 per month. Beginning in May 1986, the rents were not sent to McNally on a regular basis. McNally attempted to contact Bennett but was unsuccessful. By July 1987, Bennett owed McNally $11,169.00 for back rents and a $400.00 deposit on one of the houses. After McNally retained counsel and sent a letter informing Bennett that he was terminating the management arrangement, Bennett eventually returned the keys and (with the exception of one which he had applied to rent) transferred the tenants' deposits to McNally's new agent. Bennett attempted to account for the back rents with promissory notes. McNally never acknowledged the notes and filed them. The $11,169.00 was never paid. James D. Stayton is another real estate investor who dealt with Bennett. He had two properties which Bennett handled for him. Between September 20, 1984, when he acquired the property, and October 1986, when he removed the property from Bennett's control, Stayton was owed $7,447.44 in back rents. Again, Bennett signed a promissory note in this amount, but never paid on the note. Bennett admits that he owes the funds but denies fraud or dishonesty and claims that his failure to pay the rents was the result of a business deal that went bad. Bennett Does not claim that the rents were not collected. One tenant, Patricia Sulter established that she lived in the 4525 Salvia Drive unit and paid her deposit and rents regularly to Bennett during the months when Bennett failed to forward the funds as agreed, to Harold E. McNally.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Fred M. Bennett guilty of violations of Section 475.25(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes, imposing a $4,000.00 fine and suspending his license for four years. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4903 The following constitute specific rulings on each of the findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: Adopted in paragraph :1. Adopted in paragraph #3. Rejected as unsupported by the evidence. & 5. Adopted in paragraph #5. Adopted in paragraph 6, except for the finding that the funds were converted to Bennett's own use, which finding was not proven. Adopted in paragraph #6. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation - Legal Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Bennett Post Office Box 3102 Orlando, Florida 32802 Darlene Keller, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (3) 120.57455.225475.25
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TODD T. CATLETTE vs. OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER, 88-001161 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001161 Latest Update: Jun. 24, 1988

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Todd T. Catlette, applied for full registration as a general securities representative. Mr. Catlette is not licensed to call or offer to sell securities in the State of Florida. The Department of Banking and Finance denied the application by letter dated January 22, 1988. Ex. 3 The application was denied based upon the following facts: On May 3, 1988, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a third degree felony, filing a false and fraudulent insurance claim, in violation of Section 817.234(1)(a), Fla. Stat., and pleaded nolo contendere to a second degree felony, second degree grand theft, in violation of Section 812.014(2)(b), Fla. Stat. He was placed on probation for one year and ordered to make restitution to the insurance company in the amount of $2,148.00. Upon failing to make restitution, his probation was extended three years. He was discharged from probation on April 28, 1987. On August 3, 1979, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to sale and delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver, both second degree felonies, in violation of Section 893.03(2)(a)4, Fla. Stat. He was sentenced to two years in state prison. On November 22, 1976, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to possession of less then five grams of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, a first degree misdemeanor; and was placed on three months probation. After serving his sentences in state prison, the Petitioner obtained a college education. The Petitioner testified that he was innocent of the possession of marijuana offense in 1976 and innocent of the fraudulent insurance claim and theft offenses in 1985. He presented a deposition of a detective involved in the fraudulent insurance claim case which was admitted as hearsay evidence to support his assertion of innocence. It appears from the deposition and the testimony of Mr. Cutlette that the detective relied solely upon the testimony of one witness as support for the charges of false insurance claim and theft. The foregoing evidence is not sufficiently credible to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner was innocent of the fraudulent insurance claim and grand theft offense. When presented with an opportunity for a trail, the Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere.

Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Respondent issue its final order denying the application of Todd T. Catlette for full registration as a general securities representative. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 1988. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1161 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have either been rejected or which have been adopted by reference. The numbers used are the numbers used by parties. Findings of Fact proposed by the Petitioner: None Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: 1. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 3.-4., 10. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. COPIES FURNISHED: Todd T. Catlette 3450 Palencia Drive, No. 1317 Tampa, Florida 22618 Reginald R. Garcia, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32388-0350 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts, Esquire General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (4) 517.12517.161812.014817.234
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JOENATHAN HARRIS, JR. vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 84-004096 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004096 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact On October 12, 1981, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the felony charge of unemployment compensation fraud, adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was placed on probation for one year (Exhibit 2). The probation was terminated by Order Dismissing Warrant entered October 27, 1982 (Exhibit 3). The unemployment compensation fraud resulted from Petitioner's continuing to receive unemployment compensation following his discharge from the armed services after he had obtained full-time employment. The Information charged Petitioner with failure to disclose a material fact, to wit: he reported that he was unemployed while he was in fact working and receiving wages from Pacific Packing Company (Exhibit 2). In Application For Filing for Examination as an Ordinary Life, Including Health, agent dated March 16, 1984, Petitioner, in response to question 11(a) on this application asking if he had ever been charged with a felony, answered, "no." He gave the same answer to question 11(b) which asked if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Petitioner testified that he discussed the completion of this application with a fellow employee of an insurance agency at which he was working; and, since he had, on a earlier application for temporary employment, furnished the information regarding his unemployment compensation fraud conviction to the Department of Insurance, he did not deem it necessary to again report this offense. The fellow employee confirmed that he had discussed this answer with Petitioner and had suggested Petitioner answer the question as he did. Neither petitioner nor this witness satisfactorily answered the Hearing Officer's question how Petitioner could answer no to question 11 and then swear that all answers given on the application are true and correct. Petitioner's minister testified that Petitioner is a deacon in his church and he has found Petitioner to be truthful, honest, and capable of making mistakes and admitting them. As a temporary employee of A. L. Williams Company, a distributor of insurance products, Petitioner was deemed to be truthful, honest, and upright.

Florida Laws (1) 626.621
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