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DEBRA A. LARSON vs DRACUT CORPORATION, D/B/A KINGS INN RESTAURANT AND LAWRENCE F. JUDGE, 89-005585 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Sep. 21, 1989 Number: 89-005585 Latest Update: Apr. 12, 1990

The Issue The amount of back wages and benefits to which petitioner is entitled pursuant to the Commission's order entered July 20, 1989, as clarified by order entered August 31, 1989.

Findings Of Fact While employed by respondent, petitioner Debra A. Larson worked three or four days most weeks, an average of 27 hours per week. Respondent paid her $2.01 per hour. During the time she worked for respondent, she received tips that averaged $152.18 per week. The evidence established no other job benefits. If she had continued to work for respondent, she would have continued to earn an average of $206.45 (27 hours at $2.01 + $152.18) per week. After her constructive discharge on May 10, 1986, petitioner remained unemployed for eleven months until she began another job as a waitress at The Point Restaurant and Oyster Bar in April of 1987. From April of 1987 until the date of the Commission's order, petitioner earned approximately what she would have earned if she had not been obliged to leave King's Inn Restaurant, working first at The Point Restaurant and Oyster Bar and then at Alice's Restaurant. Eleven months' work at an average weekly rate of $206.45 amounts to $9,840.79. While she was unemployed, petitioner received unemployment compensation benefits aggregating $1,166.

Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission award petitioner back wages in the amount of nine thousand eight hundred forty dollars and seventy- nine cents ($9,840.79.) DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra A. Larson 9742 Aileron Avenue, #606 Pensacola, FL 32506 Lawrence F. Judge, Jr. and Dracut Corporation, d/b/a Kings Inn Restaurant 830 East Gregory Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Lawrence F. Judge, Jr. and Dracut Corporation, d/b/a Kings Inn Restaurant 1309 Maldonado Pensacola, FL 32561-2323 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 * PREVIOUS DOAH CASE NO. 88-003098

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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA vs LARRY FISHER, 04-001044 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Mar. 24, 2004 Number: 04-001044 Latest Update: Aug. 01, 2005

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is entitled to a "name clearing" hearing in this proceeding after Petitioner terminated the employment of Respondent in a separate proceeding.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible, in relevant part, for the employment and dismissal of non-instructional employees at the University of South Florida (USF). Petitioner was a non-instructional employee at USF from a date sometime before March 25, 2003, until sometime before April 16, 2005. The precise dates of employment and termination are not identified in the record. Shortly before March 25, 2003, Petitioner suspended Respondent without pay for three days. The suspension occurred on March 25, 26, and 27, 2003. The suspension of an employee without pay affects the substantial interests of an employee within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6C4-10.213(1)(e). On April 17, 2003, Respondent filed a grievance for informal resolution, but was unsuccessful. Respondent proceeded with what is identified in the record as a Step-1 internal review. Respondent was unsuccessful in the Step-1 internal review. On November 26, 2003, Respondent requested an administrative hearing, and Petitioner referred the matter to DOAH on March 24, 2004. The request for administrative hearing requests reinstatement of Respondent to full-time employment for the three-day suspension and reimbursement of the compensation to which he was entitled during the three-day suspension (back pay). On June 15, 2005, Petitioner paid Respondent the entire amount of back pay claimed by Respondent. The suspension of an employee with pay does not affect the substantial interests of an employee within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 6C4-10.213(1)(e). Respondent is not entitled to reinstatement for the period covered by the three-day suspension. Subsequent to the request for hearing in this proceeding, Petitioner terminated the employment of Respondent on separate grounds in a separate proceeding that was addressed in an order of the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) filed on April 14, 2005. Larry Fisher v. University of South Florida, Case No. CA-005-001, Order No. 05U-079 (PERC April 14, 2005). DOAH is precluded by the judicial doctrine of collateral estoppel from revisiting the issues addressed by PERC. Respondent claims that he is entitled to proceed in this proceeding to clear his name (a name-clearing hearing). Respondent is not entitled to a name-clearing hearing based on a three-day suspension with pay. Respondent suffered no injury in fact. The three-day suspension with pay did not alter the legal status of Respondent's employment, did not deprive Respondent of any property right, and did not injure the reputation of Respondent. If it were determined that the three-day suspension with pay injured the reputation of Respondent, the intervening termination of Respondent on separate grounds in a separate proceeding renders inadequate any remedy available to Respondent in a name-clearing hearing in this proceeding.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the original proceeding for lack of jurisdiction and denying Respondent's request for a name-clearing hearing in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fisher Post Office Box 424 Zephyrhills, Florida 33539 Gerard D. Solis, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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GERALD KREUCHER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF STATE GROUP INSURANCE, 13-004644 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 26, 2013 Number: 13-004644 Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2015

The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of premiums paid for life insurance coverage during the 2013 plan year.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state employee with over 30 years of public employment. Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance (Division), is the state agency charged with administering the state group insurance program. Pursuant to section 110.123(5), Florida Statutes, its duties include determining the benefits to be provided to state employees and the contributions to be required for the state group insurance program. The Department of Management Services is also authorized, pursuant to section 110.161, to administer a pre-tax benefits program that allows employees’ contributions to premiums be paid on a pre-tax basis, and to provide for the payment of such premiums through a pre-tax payroll procedure. Among the insurance products available to state employees are group health insurance, basic group term life insurance, and optional group term life insurance. At the crux of this case is the premium to be paid for group term life insurance. Basic insurance is noncontributory insurance (meaning the employer pays the premium) for full-time employees and is contributory insurance (meaning the employee pays the premium) for part-time employees. Optional insurance is contributory insurance for all employees. At the time relevant to this proceeding, career service, university system support staff, senior management, and select exempt service employees, as well as active state senators and representatives, were entitled to a basic group term life insurance benefit of $25,000. For retired vested legislators, the basic group term life benefit was $150,000, and for retirees who were not vested legislators, the benefit was either $2,500 or $10,000. Optional group term life insurance was also available to active employees enrolled in basic term life. This insurance coverage was available for purchase up to seven times an employee’s annual earnings, to a maximum of $1,000,000. Both basic and optional life insurance are provided through Minnesota Life. The opportunity to enroll in or make changes to insurance coverage occurs during open enrollment each year. During open enrollment in 2012, Petitioner made selections for the 2013 plan year, which corresponds with the calendar year. Among his selections, Petitioner opted to continue his optional life insurance coverage at four times his annual salary. To make his selection, Petitioner used the People First System. The Minnesota Life screen shot for determining the premium for coverage contains the following information: Determining the cost To determine the new monthly cost of changing your Optional Life coverage, please follow the example below: How is your monthly premium calculated? Your annual earnings = Basic amount Choose the salary multiple of one = to seven times your annual Optional multiple earnings Multiply your basic amount by your = optional multiple and round to the Coverage amount next higher thousand Divide your coverage amount by = 1,000 $1,000 increments Of coverage From the table on the right, find = the rate that corresponds with Rate from table your age X Answer from #4 = Your monthly Insurance premium The table referenced above provides the premium rates based on age bands, such as under age 30, 30-34, 35-39, etc. For ages 55-59, the rate is $0.335. From 60-64, the rate is $0.613. Below the rate/age table is the statement, “[r]ates increase with age and all rates subject to change.” However, nothing in the worksheet indicates that the rate changes during a plan year if the insured has a birthday that puts the employee in a different age band. Based upon his completion of the worksheet in People First, the monthly premium for the optional life insurance selected by Petitioner was $81.08. Petitioner received a document entitled “State of Florida Confirmation of Benefits for 2013 Plan Year.” The Confirmation of Benefits document confirmed that for the 2013 plan year, Petitioner’s monthly cost for optional life insurance would be $81.08. For the first two months of 2013, the expected amount of $81.08 was deducted from Petitioner’s salary. However, beginning in March 2013, for the coverage beginning in April 2013, the premium increased from $81.08 to $148.36, a difference of $67.28 per month.1/ Petitioner did not receive any specific notice regarding the change in policy premiums. He did not notice the difference in his net pay immediately because his salary is subject to additives, and it was not unusual for the net pay to vary from month to month. Employees do not automatically receive a copy of their pay stubs. They must affirmatively retrieve them electronically from a Department of Financial Services website. Petitioner first called the People First information line on August 27, 2013, to inquire regarding the increase in premiums. He followed up with a letter dated September 10, 2013, asking for a refund of the amount deducted from his salary in excess of $81.08 a month. On September 12, 2013, the People First Service Center responded to his request by stating that the increase was a “Significant Cost Increase Qualifying Status Change (QSC) event,” and that inasmuch as Petitioner did not request a decrease in coverage level within 60 days of the QSC event, any change to his benefits would have to wait until open enrollment. The letter referenced Florida Administrative Code Rule 60P-2.003, stating, We are charged with the responsibility of administering the State Group Insurance Program pursuant to these state regulations, as well as the federal regulations. The rules pertaining to changes in health plans are found in Chapter 60P-2.003 which states: “An employee may elect, change or cancel coverage within thirty-one (31) days of a Qualified Status Change (QSC) event if the change is consistent with the event pursuant to subsection 60P-2.003(7), F.A.C. or during the open enrollment period.” While the letter purports to quote the rule, rule 60P- 2.003, the language above does not actually appear as quoted in the rule. Rule 60P-2.003 states in relevant part: An employee enrolled in the Health Program may apply for a change to family coverage or individual coverage within thirty-one (31) calendar days of a QSC event if the change is consistent with the event or during the open enrollment period. * * * All applications for coverage changes must be approved by the Department, subject to the following: The Department shall approve a coverage change if the completed application is submitted to the employing agency within thirty-one (31) calendar days of and is consistent with the QSC event. Documentation substantiating a QSC event is as follows: If changing to family coverage, proof of family status change or proof of loss of other group coverage is required. If changing to individual coverage, proof of family status change or proof of change of employment status is required. If adding an eligible dependent to family coverage, proof of family status change is required. If terminating coverage, proof of family status change or proof of employment change is required. On September 23, 2013, Petitioner sought a Level-II appeal, forwarding all of his correspondence to the Division. On October 11, 2013, Barbara Crosier, Director of the Division, wrote to Petitioner and advised that his Level-II appeal was denied. The letter cited rule 60P-2, and stated that Petitioner needed to have acted within 31 days of the QSC event if the change was consistent with the event, or wait until the open enrollment period. The letter provided Petitioner with notice of his right to a hearing pursuant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and on November 6, 2013, Petitioner filed a request for hearing that resulted in these proceedings. Both the correspondence from People First and the letter from Ms. Crosier refer to a qualifying status change. However, the definition of a QSC event in rule 60P-1.003(17) does not include a change in age band. The events identified in the rule are “the change in employment status, for subscriber or spouse, family status or significant change in health coverage of the employee or spouse attributable to the spouse’s employment.” There is a table available somewhere through People First2/ entitled “State of Florida Qualifying Status Change Event Matrix.” The matrix identifies changes in status, the type of documentation required, and the options available to the employee. There was no evidence presented indicating that the matrix has been adopted by rule and in some instances, the matrix is inconsistent with both section 110.123 and rule 60P-1.003. Petitioner did not see this matrix when making his insurance selections during open enrollment. Included in the matrix as a category of QSC events is a category entitled “Significant Cost Changes.” Under this category, the grid identifies “[p]remium increase or decrease to subscriber of at least $20 per month as a result of a change in pay plan (e.g., Career Service to SES), FTE (e.g., part-time to full-time), LWOP, FMLA, legislative premium mandates, Optional Life age banding, etc.” The category “significant cost changes” is not identified as a QSC event in rule 60P-1.003(17). Footnote four of the matrix states, “[t]he period of time to make allowable changes to benefits, as defined by the IRS. All QSC windows are 60 days unless otherwise specified.” Footnote four is appended to text within the cell for information related to a change in marital status, which states “60-day QSC window4.” Petitioner credibly testified that he was not experiencing any change to marital status, so did not believe that the information identified in footnote four would necessarily relate to his circumstances. On December 19, 2008, the Division published the State of Florida Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan with a Premium Payment Feature, a Medical Reimbursement Component, and a Dependent Care Component (Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan), which Petitioner submitted without objection as Petitioner’s Exhibit 10. This document is available on the DMS website but has not been identified as a rule. However, it is consistent with the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 125, which authorizes cafeteria plans, and 26 C.F.R. § 125-4, which identifies permitted election changes in cafeteria plans. The Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan states: Establishment of Plan The Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance established the State of Florida Flexible Benefits Plan effective July 1, 1989. The Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance hereby amends, restates and continues the State of Florida Flexible Benefits Plan, hereafter known as the State of Florida Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan (“the Plan”), effective December 19, 2008. This plan is designed to permit an Eligible Employee to pay on a pre-tax basis for his or her share of premiums under the Health Insurance Plan, the Life Insurance Plan and the Supplemental Insurance Plan, and to contribute to an account for pre-tax reimbursement of certain medical care expenses and dependent care expenses. Legal Status This Plan is intended to qualify as a “cafeteria plan” under Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code 1986, as amended (“the Code”), and regulations issued there under. The Medical Reimbursement Component of this Plan is also intended to qualify as a “self- insured medical reimbursement plan” under Code 105(h), and the Medical Care Expenses reimbursed under that component are intended to be eligible for exclusion from participating Employees’ gross income under Code 105(b). The Dependent Care Component of the Plan is intended to meet the requirements of Code 129. The Life Insurance Plan is intended to meet the requirements of Code 79. The Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan contained definitions for a change in status. Those definitions are consistent with the definitions in rule 60P-1.003(17), although more detailed in terms of description. The definition does not include a change in cost due to age banding. Section 4.3 of the Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan provides: Each eligible Employee’s Salary Reduction Agreement shall remain in effect for the entire Plan Year to which it applies, shall be irrevocable (except as provided in Sections 5.6, 6.4, and 7.4) and shall set forth the amount of the Participant’s Compensation to be used to purchase or provide benefits and the benefits to be purchased or provided. Sections 6.4 and 7.4 deal with a participant’s election to participate in the medical reimbursement component and the dependent care components of the plan and have no bearing on this proceeding. Section 5.6 deals with the irrevocability of the election under the premium component of the plan. The section states in pertinent part: In other words, unless one of the exceptions applies, the Participant may not change any elections for the duration of the Plan Year regarding: Participation in this Plan; Salary Reduction Amounts; or Election of particular component plan benefits. The exceptions to the irrevocability requirement, which would permit a Participant to make a mid-year election change in benefits and/or Salary Reduction amounts for this Premium Payment Component, are as follows: Change in Status: A Participant may change or terminate his actual or deemed election under the Plan upon the occurrence of a change in status, but only if such change or termination is made on account of, and is consistent with, the change in status. The Administrator (in its sole discretion) shall determine whether a requested change is on account of, and is consistent with, a change in status. Special HIPAA Enrollment rights. . . . Certain judgments, decrees and orders. . . . Medicare and Medicaid. . . . Significant Change in Cost or Coverage. A Participant may revoke a prior election with respect to pre-tax contributions and, in lieu thereof, may receive, on a prospective basis, coverage under another plan with similar coverage if any independent, third-party provider of medical benefits previously elected by the Participant either significantly increases the premium for such coverage, or significantly curtails the coverage available under such plans, during the plan year coverage period. (Note: if any mid- year premium increase by the third-party provider is insignificant, the Participant’s Salary Reduction election will be automatically adjusted by the Administrator or its agent. Significant Change in Coverage Attributable to Spouse’s Employment. . . . (emphasis added). None of the exceptions to irrevocability identified above apply in this instance. Section 5.2 of the Agreement addresses the Participant’s contributions and is the provision upon which Petitioner relies. It states in pertinent part: If an employee elects to participate in the Premium Payment Component the Participant’s share (as determined by the employer) of the premium for the plan benefits elected by the Participant will be financed by salary reductions. The salary reduction for each pay period is an amount equal to the annual premium divided by the number of pay periods in the plan year, or an amount otherwise agreed upon. . . . (emphasis added). Petitioner did not experience a QSC event. The Confirmation of Benefits received by Petitioner identifies the amount of premium Petitioner has agreed to pay and the benefit he was to receive for that premium. He elected optional life insurance coverage in accordance with the information provided to him on the People First screen. The statement “rates increase with age” can be construed, as Petitioner did, to explain the differences in rates reflected in the table described in paragraph 10. Nothing placed Petitioner on notice that upon achieving his 60th birthday, his premium would automatically increase to the next premium category. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the method of premium calculation described in paragraph 5.2 of the Salary Reduction Cafeteria Plan.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a Final Order authorizing the refund of excess premiums in the amount of $605.52. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2014.

USC (1) 26 U.S.C 125 CFR (1) 26 CFR 125 Florida Laws (5) 110.123110.161120.52120.54120.57
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SUSAN PAINTER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 18-000054 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 05, 2018 Number: 18-000054 Latest Update: Jan. 15, 2019

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has forfeited her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2017).1/

Findings Of Fact Based on the record in this proceeding, including the evidence presented at the formal hearing and the stipulation of the parties in the Joint Response to Pre-hearing Order, the following Findings of Fact are made: The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. The Florida Division of Retirement is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Florida Department of Management Services. For over 21 years, Ms. Painter was the head softball coach for Gulf Coast, an FRS-participating employer. By virtue of her employment, Ms. Painter was enrolled in the FRS. On May 5, 2014, the Bay County Sheriff’s Office commenced an investigation into allegations that Ms. Painter had misappropriated cash that had been provided to her to pay for players’ meals during a softball tournament in Las Vegas and that Ms. Painter was collecting and keeping rent money from softball players who were on full room-and-board scholarships and had their rent paid by the college. In the summer of 2014, Ms. Painter was charged by information with one count of grand theft, a third-degree felony. Gulf Coast did not terminate Ms. Painter’s employment. Gulf Coast allowed Ms. Painter’s employment contract to expire on June 20, 2014. On January 9, 2015, the information was amended to include seven counts of grand theft, each constituting a third degree felony under section 812.014(1) and (2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014). Though some counts dealt with other allegations, for the purposes of this proceeding, the essential charges involved the meal money and the rental payments. Ms. Painter ultimately entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of grand theft. During the hearing before the court, the state attorney specified that Ms. Painter was pleading to Count IV, which alleged theft of the meal money. The contemporaneous notes taken by the court clerk state that Ms. Painter was pleading to “Count 4.” The order of probation states that she pled to “Count 4.” However, the actual written “Plea, Waiver and Consent” signed by Ms. Painter and the attorneys shows the numeral “1” under the heading, “Count.” It is unclear from the document whether Ms. Painter was pleading nolo contendere to one count of grand theft, or to Count I of the information. Count I involved the allegation that Ms. Painter had improperly collected rent from one of the scholarship players, Megan Griffith. At the circuit court hearing, no mention was made of the specific factual allegations in the count to which Ms. Painter was pleading. The court made no findings of fact. Ms. Painter was not required to allocute to any facts.2/ Upon entry of the nolo contendere plea, the court withheld adjudication. Ms. Painter was given two years’ probation and ordered to make restitution of $4,400, perform 100 hours of community service, and was directed to have no contact with Gulf Coast or her former players. The undersigned finds that the understanding of all parties, including the court, was that Ms. Painter was pleading nolo contendere to Count IV of the information. The amount of restitution ordered is roughly consistent with the amount of meal money that was at issue in Count IV. The numeral “1” on the plea document is either a misprint or was intended to convey that Ms. Painter was pleading to a single count of grand theft. At the final hearing, Ms. Painter testified that she was given $4,752 in cash to pay for meals during the Las Vegas trip, which began on January 31, 2014, and ended on February 4, 2014. Ms. Painter testified that if the girls were splitting up to eat at different restaurants, she would dole out cash to each group. If everyone was eating at the same restaurant, all the girls would place their orders, and Ms. Painter would pay the entire tab. Ms. Painter testified that this had been her practice on team trips for some time. She stated that she used to give each girl her portion of the total meal money at the start of a trip. However, some girls would inevitably spend all of their money before the end of the trip and Ms. Painter would have to pay for their meals out of her own pocket. By doling out the money one meal at a time, Ms. Painter ensured that it would last the entire five days. Ms. Painter denied keeping any of the meal money for herself. She admitted that she did not keep receipts from each meal she purchased, but testified that meal receipts were not required on multiple day trips, such as the Las Vegas tournament. Nothing she did on this trip was different than her usual practice. At the end of the trip, she returned $132 in unspent meal money to the athletic department. Ms. Painter testified that her nolo contendere plea was made for financial and emotional reasons. The case had dragged on for 17 months. The ordeal was humiliating and exhausting. She stated that accepting the plea deal was the hardest decision she had ever made, but that she did not in fact take any of the meal money from her softball players. The Department offered no admissible direct evidence to contradict Ms. Painter’s version of events. The undersigned did not admit the deposition of Gulf Coast Athletic Director Gregg Wolfe because it was a discovery deposition taken in Ms. Painter’s criminal case. The undersigned did admit the Bay County Sheriff’s Office case file on Ms. Painter’s criminal case, which included witness interviews and Ms. Painter’s bank statements. However, the case file was admitted on the understanding that it was a hearsay document that could only be used to supplement or explain other evidence. In the absence of competent non-hearsay evidence, or any showing by the Department that elements of the case file would be admissible over objection in a civil trial, the case file was of no utility. The Department’s only witness aside from Ms. Painter was its employee Allison Olson, the benefits administrator in the Bureau of Retirement Calculations. Ms. Olson’s knowledge of the case was gleaned purely through her review of the paper record, including the case file and the transcripts of depositions taken in the criminal proceeding. She had no first- hand knowledge of any of the events in question. Ms. Painter offered the deposition testimony of Joanne Booker, a member of Ms. Painter’s softball team at the time of the Las Vegas trip and currently an assistant basketball coach for Gulf Coast. In most essentials, Ms. Booker corroborated Ms. Painter’s testimony. Ms. Booker did not recall many particulars as to how the meals were purchased, but testified that at each meal the players were either given cash by Ms. Painter or had their meals paid for by Ms. Painter. Ms. Booker recalled no problems as to meals and recalled no one complaining about food on the Las Vegas trip. Even if it were found that Ms. Painter’s plea was actually entered as to Count I, the findings would be much the same. Ms. Painter testified that the “rent” she was accused of collecting and pocketing from the scholarship players was actually a voluntary contribution toward the rent of the non- scholarship players, to enable the entire team to live together in the same apartment complex. Ms. Painter testified that any money she collected was turned over to the lessor of the apartments. Again, the Department offered no admissible direct evidence to contradict Ms. Painter’s version of events. Ms. Painter’s testimony was at least credible enough to be accepted in the absence of any competent non-hearsay evidence to the contrary.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order restoring to Susan Painter her rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System and providing for payment to her of any past due benefits, together with interest at the statutory rate. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2018.

Florida Laws (9) 112.3173120.569120.57120.68800.04812.014838.15838.1690.202
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GEORGE CABANY vs. HOLLYWOOD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 89-000237 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000237 Latest Update: Oct. 05, 1989

The Issue The ultimate issue for determination is whether the Petitioner's discharge by the Respondent constituted discrimination on the basis of handicap within the meaning of the Florida Human Rights Act.

Findings Of Fact Having considered all of the evidence in the record, the Hearing Officer makes the following findings of fact: Petitioner was hired as a Mechanic II (Electrician) by Respondent on January 25, 1982 in the Plant Engineering Department. The term "Mechanic II" denoted Petitioner's pay grade. The term "Electrician" designated Petitioner's speciality. Petitioner's pay grade was changed to Electrician and the Mechanic II pay grade was eliminated by Respondent for all such employees on or about November 16, 1983. Petitioner's duties as an Electrician included ladder work, running conduit and wire, repairing laundry and laboratory equipment and appliances, changing ballasts, and repairing electrical beds and nurse-call equipment. Petitioner performed all of the duties of an electrician, including ladder work until approximately November 27, 1985. Three months after he was employed in 1982, Petitioner injured his back while repairing electrical beds. Repairing electrical beds required much bending and stooping. Petitioner filed for Worker's Compensation benefits for the injury he sustained in repairing electrical beds. Petitioner suffered an off-the-job injury in 1983. Respondent permitted Petitioner to go on medical leave for two months. Petitioner again injured his back while working at the Hospital on or about November 27, 1985. Due to his injury, Petitioner was on leave of absence from November 30, 1985, through December 11, 1985. Petitioner returned to work but again went on leave of absence from January 9, 1986, through February 17, 1986. Petitioner returned to work subject to a "light duty" restriction imposed by his physician. On or about June 10, 1986, Petitioner's physician released him for full duty subject to a 15 pound restriction on any lifting. In September, 1986, Petitioner's physician indicated that it was "probably best" for Petitioner to work only 4 hours per day. The Respondent again allowed Petitioner to work 4 hours per day even though he occupied a full-time, 8 hour per day position. In early October, 1986, Petitioner was released by his physician to perform full duty work, even though Petitioner was restricted to half days. Frank Kleese, Petitioner's foreman, asked Petitioner to investigate a problem with an overhead light. Petitioner refused Kleese's directive and stated that, even though he had been released for full duty work, he would not climb a ladder unless his doctor approved it. Petitioner argued with Kleese and used "strong language". Petitioner became belligerent. Petitioner received reprimands for insubordination. When Petitioner refused Kleese's second request to do ladder work, Petitioner received a reprimand for refusing to do the job assigned to him. Both reprimands were discussed with Petitioner. Petitioner later presented a doctor's note stating he could "return to full active duty," but could work only half days with no ladder work. As a result of Petitioner's half day schedule, other electricians were required to do more work. The department as a whole fell behind in its work. Furthermore, light duty work was not always available for Petitioner. While working half days in late 1986, Petitioner was late to work on three occasions. Petitioner's reason for being late, as explained to Frank Kleese, his foreman, was that Petitioner's injury made it difficult for him to get out of bed in the morning. In November, 1986, Clark, Kleese, and Kunz met with Petitioner and advised him that he could not remain on half days indefinitely. Petitioner was advised that unless his condition was found to have improved by his upcoming doctor's appointment on December 1, 1986, he would be placed on medical leave. On December 1, 1986, Petitioner visited his physician, Dr. Richard D. Strain, Jr. Dr. Strain stated that there was no reason to think that Petitioner's condition would change quickly. Dr. Strain was going to send Petitioner home and put him on physician therapy (i.e., not allow him to work at all). Petitioner asked Dr. Strain if he could work half days, and Dr. Strain agreed. Kleese, Kunz, and Clark met with Petitioner and informed him that he would be placed on medical leave as a result of the Petitioner's medical condition. Continuation of his half-day status without any foreseeable cutoff date was not acceptable to the Respondent. On December 4, 1986, Respondent Benefits Supervisor Ralph Rettig advised Dr. Strain that Petitioner had been placed on medical leave of absence because there were no part-time positions available in Petitioner's department. Rettig requested Dr. Strain to advise him as to whether Petitioner's condition was the result of his injury at work and whether Petitioner would ever improve to the level where he could work more than half day duty. Dr. Strain responded to Mr. Rettig in a letter dated December 22, 1986, which indicated that Petitioner's condition was partially caused by degenerative changes. Dr. Strain further stated: Mr. Cabany tells me he is unable to work more than a half day, and I think that is a reasonable thing for him to do. Certainly, a man of his elderly years with the degenerative changes that he has, with super imposed trauma, that would be a good way to go. Petitioner went on medical leave beginning December 17, 1986. Prior to the beginning of his leave, Petitioner failed to fill out the leave of absence request form. When this came to Rettig's attention, Rettig requested that Vernon Clark send Petitioner the form. Clark wrote to Petitioner and informed him that he must fill out the leave of absence request form Clark had enclosed. Clark further informed Petitioner that he would have to request renewal of his leave when it expired in mid-January, 1987, in accordance with Respondent policies. During a telephone conversation several days prior to the expiration of Petitioner's leave, Clark reminded Petitioner that he still had not sent in the original request form for the leave he was then under. Clark also reminded Petitioner that, if he wished to extend his leave, Petitioner would have to submit a written request for extension. Petitioner eventually sent in the signed request form for the leave of absence which he was then under. The signed form stated: "If I do not request an extension of my Leave prior to expiration . . . my employment at Memorial Respondent will be terminated. . . ." Petitioner never submitted a request for an extension of his leave, and Petitioner was terminated. In February, 1987, Ralph Rettig became aware of a part-time porter position in the Respondent's Dietary Department. Mr. Rettig contacted Petitioner and asked him to meet with Joseph Marino, Administrative Director of Food and Nutrition Services, with regard to a job in the Dietary Department. Marino offered Petitioner a porter position which required only half days and involved no bending or lifting of heavy objects. Marino explained the duties and responsibilities of the position to Petitioner and showed him the work area. Petitioner refused the position because he felt it was "beneath his dignity". Petitioner said virtually the same thing to Rettig. Hospital Benefits Supervisor Rettig, a quadriplegic, was involved throughout in dealing with Petitioner's medical situation. Rettig testified that he has never witnessed discrimination by the Respondent based upon handicap and felt that the Respondent reasonably accommodated Petitioner's back problem. Eighty percent of an Electrician's work at the Respondent involved the use of a ladder. Petitioner could not do ladder work. Petitioner also could not work on ceilings or do much bending or lifting. Petitioner cannot work at all now, still has pain, and has not worked since leaving the Respondent's employ. Petitioner did not know of any available half-day jobs he could have performed at the Hospital other than the porter position that was offered to Petitioner by Mr. Marino. Prior to his 1985 injury, Petitioner had repeatedly requested to work part time as an Electrician because his wife had arthritis and he needed to care for her. Petitioner was consistently turned down because no such part-time position existed in his department. During his employment with Respondent, a few half-day positions existed throughout the Hospital as PBX Operators, Cashiers, and Porters. No part-time Electrician positions in the Plant Engineering Department where Petitioner was employed were ever available. Petitioner occupied a full-time position even though he worked only part-time. Sandy McNeil, a former Electrician, is now a Systems Technician/Welder who works full days on a part-time basis. Mr. McNeil operates a lathe and works full weeks when needed. Petitioner is not a welder and could not perform the duties required of Mr. McNeil. Richmond Blatch is a painter who works a full week every other week. Petitioner is not a painter and could not perform Mr. Blatch's duties. Tom Nottage, another individual who had been working in the Engineering Department, obtained a courier position with the Hospital. For a brief period, Mr. Nottage worked 2 full days a week in the Engineering Department and 3 days week as a courier. Since mid-January, 1987, Mr. Nottage has worked full-time as a courier. His job requires driving over 25,000 miles per year, lifting mail tubs weighing between 20 and 50 pounds, often lifting heavier packages, and getting in and out of his car between 20 and 40 times per day. Petitioner could not perform the duties required of Mr. Nottage. A part-time position could not be created for an Electrician. Electricians are given jobs which frequently carry through from day to day. Permanently employing someone on a half-day, health-restricted basis presented scheduling and work load problems. Jobs that do not carry through from day to day are frequently comprised of so-called bench work. Some bench work requires an entire day to complete. There was not always a half-day's worth of bench work available. During his employment with the Respondent, Petitioner had been receiving Social Security pension benefits. In 1987, Petitioner would have been required to reimburse Social Security for a portion of his pension benefits if he earned more than $8,000,00. Half day employment would have afforded Petitioner the ability to earn the maximum allowed by Social Security. Because Petitioner refused to accept a job for which he was physically qualified, the worker's compensation benefits begun as a result of his injury on the job in 1982, were stopped. If Petitioner had accepted the porter position offered to him by Mr. Marino, his worker's compensation benefits would have compensated him for the wage loss resulting from the lower paying job. Petitioner's termination had no effect on the worker's compensation benefits Respondent was paying Petitioner. Respondent would have gained a financial benefit from retaining Petitioner as a part time Electrician because there would have been less of a wage loss to make up through worker's compensation benefits. Glen Mora and Luis Villanueva, two other Electricians, were injured while Petitioner was working half days. Both individuals were allowed to take medical leave, and return to work on light duty until they returned to full duty status. Both individuals in fact returned to full duty status. Petitioner received a merit pay check from Respondent in 1986 even though Petitioner had not achieved the requisite "fully proficient" rating in his evaluation. Vernon Clark, Director of Plant Engineering, intervened on behalf of Petitioner. Mr. Clark recommended that Petitioner receive the merit pay because Petitioner would have received a higher rating had it not been for Petitioner's injury.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Human Rights Commission issue a Final Order that Respondent is not guilty of discharging Petitioner in violation of the Human Rights Act. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of October, 1989. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner submitted no proposed findings of fact. Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection NONE The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Included in Findings 1, 2 2-3 Rejected as irrelevant 4-9 Included in Findings 3-10 Included in Finding 35 Included in Finding 11 Included in Finding 25 Included in Finding 26 Included in Finding 31 15-17 Included in Findings 27-30 Included in Finding 17 Included in Finding 36 Included in Finding 32 21-28 Included in Findings 12-21 29 Included in Finding 22 30-31 Included in Findings 33-34 Included in Finding 22 Included in Findings 15, 17 34-35 Included in Findings 23, 24 COPIES FURNISHED: George Cabany 3905 Garfield Street Hollywood, Florida 33021 James S. Bramnick Muller, Mintz, Kornreich, Caldwell, Casey, Crosland & Bramnick, P. A. Hollywood Memorial Respondent Suite 3600 Southeast Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2338 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.22
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CHRISTOPHER A. KINGSLEY vs. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 87-002117 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002117 Latest Update: Oct. 23, 1987

Findings Of Fact On February 15, 1977, Petitioner was employed by the City of Clearwater as a full-time firefighter. He became certified as a firefighter on April 21, 1977, and was issued certificate number 5374. After receiving an associate's degree from St. Petersburg Junior College, Petitioner became eligible to receive firefighters' supplemental compensation benefits on July 1, 1981. After receiving a bachelor's degree from Eckerd College, Petitioner became eligible to receive additional firefighters' supplemental compensation benefits on May 1, 1984. Until July 2, 1986, Petitioner received his supplemental compensation benefits according to the appropriate level. On July 2, 1986, a hearing was held before the City of Clearwater Pension Advisory Committee as to whether Petitioner was entitled to a job- connected disability pension for injuries that he received in firefighting related activity. Following a finding by the Clearwater Pension Advisory Committee that Petitioner was entitled to the disability, the City of Clearwater forwarded to Respondent a Notice of Ineligibility for Supplemental Compensation Benefits, reflecting an ineligibility date for Petitioner of July 2, 1986. Based upon the Notice of Ineligibility, as well as the fact that Petitioner had received a disability that could not be corrected to the satisfaction of the Respondent, Respondent voided Petitioner's certification as a firefighter and terminated his supplemental compensation benefits as of July 2, 1986. Petitioner elected a retirement plan option offered by the City of Clearwater under which he extended his termination of employment date by the amount of time due him for vacation, holiday pay, and one-half of his accrued sick leave. By utilizing the vacation and sick leave time to which he was entitled, Petitioner extended his termination of employment date to October 8, 1987. Between July 2, 1986 and October 8, 1987 Petitioner occupied the status of an employee on vacation or on sick leave, i.e., he was on leave with pay. He received a paycheck at the same time that other employees of the City of Clearwater received theirs, and his paycheck carried the same deductions that other employees would have in their checks. It is uncontroverted that although Petitioner received his disability on July 2, 1986, Petitioner has received compensation from the City of Clearwater on an uninterrupted basis encompassing the period from July 2, 1986 through October 8, 1987 for duties that he performed as a full-time firefighter for the City of Clearwater Fire Departments his employing agency.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered reinstating Petitioner's supplemental compensation benefits from July 2, 1986 through October 8, 1987 and directing that those benefits be paid to Petitioner forthwith. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Fredric S. Zinober, Esquire Village Office Park, Suite 107 2475 Enterprise Road Clearwater, Florida 33575 Lisa S. Santucci, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.68
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CARLOS GOMEZ vs VESTCOR COMPANIE, D/B/A MADALYN LANDING, 05-000565 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Feb. 16, 2005 Number: 05-000565 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2005

The Issue The two issues raised in this proceeding are: (1) whether the basis and reason Respondent, Vestcor Companies, d/b/a Madalyn Landings (Vestcor), terminated Petitioner, Carlos Gomez's (Petitioner), employment on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for Petitioner's protected conduct during his normal course of employment; and (2) whether Vestcor committed unlawful housing practice by permitting Vestcor employees without families to reside on its property, Madalyn Landing Apartments, without paying rent, while requiring Vestcor employees with families to pay rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, and Chapter 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).

Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying, exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the respective position of the parties received in evidence, stipulations of the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2002), and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant, material, and substantial facts are determined: Petitioner filed charges of housing discrimination against Vestcor with the Commission on August 30, 2002. Petitioner alleged that Vestcor discriminated against him based on his familial status and his June 28, 2002, termination was in retaliation for filing the charge of discrimination. Vestcor denied the allegations and contended that Petitioner's termination was for cause. Additionally, Vestcor maintained Petitioner relinquished his claim of retaliation before the final hearing; and under oath during his deposition, asserted he would not pursue a claim for retaliation. Petitioner was permitted to proffer evidence of retaliation because Vestcor terminated his employment. The Commission's Notice was issued on January 7, 2005. The parties agree that Petitioner was hired by Vestcor on June 25, 2001, as a leasing consultant agent for Madalyn Landing Apartments located in Palm Bay, Florida. Petitioner's job responsibilities as a leasing consultant agent included showing the property, leasing the property (apartment units), and assisting with tenant relations by responding to concerns and questions, and preparing and following up on maintenance orders. Petitioner had access to keys to all apartments on site. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was, as was all of Vestcor employees, given a copy of Vestcor's Employee Handbook. This handbook is required reading for each employee for personal information and familiarity with company policies and procedures, to include the company requirement that each employee personally telephone and speak with his/her supervisor when the employee, for whatever reason, could not appear at work as scheduled, which is a basis and cause for termination. The parties agree that Vestcor's handbook, among other things, contains company policies regarding equal employment; prohibition against unlawful conduct and appropriate workplace conduct; procedures for handling employee problems and complaints associated with their employment; and procedures for reporting illness or absences from work, which include personal notification to supervisors, and not messages left on the answering service. Failure to comply with employment reporting polices may result in progressive disciplinary action. The parties agree that employee benefits were also contained in the handbook. One such employee benefit, at issue in this proceeding, is the live-on-site benefit. The live-on- site benefit first requires eligible employees to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, and be a full-time employee. The eligible employee must pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the live-on-site unit. Rent-free, live-on-site benefits are available only to employees who occupy the positions of (1) site community managers, (2) maintenance supervisors, and (3) courtesy officers. These individuals received a free two-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment at the apartment complex in which they work as part of their employment compensation package. The rent-free, live-on-site benefit is not available for Vestcor's leasing consultant agent employees, such as Petitioner. On or about July 3, 2001, Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with Vestcor to move into Apartment No. 202-24 located at Madalyn Landing Apartments. The lease agreement ended on January 31, 2002. The lease agreement set forth terms that Petitioner was to receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, which became effective on September 3, 2001. Although he was eligible for the 25-percent monthly rental concession, to have given Petitioner the full 25 percent of his monthly rental cost would have over-qualified Petitioner based upon Madalyn Landing Apartment's tax credit property status. Petitioner and Vestcor agreed he would receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, thereby qualifying him as a resident on the property. Petitioner understood and accepted the fact that he did not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. Petitioner understood and accepted Vestcor's $50.00 monthly rental concession because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. The rental concession meant Petitioner's regular monthly rental would be reduced by $50.00 each month. On September 1, 2001, Henry Oliver was hired by Vestcor as a maintenance technician. Maintenance technicians do not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Oliver did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Oliver was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 13, 2001, Michael Gomez, the brother of Petitioner (Mr. Gomez), commenced his employment with Vestcor as a groundskeeper. Groundskeepers did not meet the qualifications for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Gomez did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Gomez was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 21, 2001, 81 days after his hire, Mr. Oliver commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 203-44 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Mr. Oliver's leasing consultant agent was Petitioner in this cause. Like other eligible Vestcor employees and as a part of the lease application process, Mr. Oliver completed all required paperwork, which included, but not limited to, completing a credit check, employment verification, and income test to ensure that he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Fifteen days later, on November 28, 2001, Mr. Gomez commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. As part of the leasing process, Mr. Gomez, as other eligible Vestcor employees who intend to reside on Vestcor property, completed all necessary paperwork including, but not limited to, a credit check and employment verification and income test to ensure he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Included in the paperwork was a list of rental criteria requiring Mr. Gomez to execute a lease agreement to obligate himself to pay the required rent payment, consent to a credit check, pay an application fee and required security deposit, and agree not to take possession of an apartment until all supporting paperwork was completed and approved. Mr. Gomez's leasing consultant was Petitioner. On December 28, 2001, Petitioner signed a Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 206-24, effective February 1, 2002. The Notice to Vacate was placed in Vestcor's office files. Petitioner's reasons for vacating his apartment stated he "needed a yard, garage, more space, a big family room, and some privacy." Thirty-four days later, February 1, 2002, Mr. Gomez moved into Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments without the approval or knowledge of Vestcor management. On January 9, 2002, a "Corrective Action Notice" was placed in Petitioner's employee file by his supervisor, Genea Closs. The notice cited two violations of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Specifically, his supervisor noted Petitioner did not collect administration fees from two unidentified rental units, and he had taken an unidentified resident's rental check home with him, rather than directly to the office as required by policy. As a direct result of those policy violations, Ms. Closs placed Petitioner on 180 days' probation and instructed him to re-read all Vestcor employees' handbook and manuals. Petitioner acknowledged receiving and understanding the warning. At the time she took the above action against Petitioner, there is no evidence that Ms. Closs had knowledge of Petitioner's past or present efforts to gather statements and other information from Mr. Gomez and/or Mr. Oliver in anticipation and preparation for his subsequent filing of claims of discrimination against Vestcor. Also, on January 9, 2002, Petitioner was notified that his brother, Mr. Gomez, did not qualify to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments because of insufficient credit. Further, Petitioner was advised that should Mr. Gomez wish to continue with the application process, he would need a co-signer on his lease agreement or pay an additional security deposit. Mr. Gomez produced an unidentified co-signer, who also completed a lease application. On January 30, 2002, the lease application submitted by Mr. Gomez's co-signor was denied. As a result of the denial of Mr. Gomez's co-signor lease application, Vestcor did not approve Mr. Gomez's lease application. When he was made aware that his co-signor's application was denied and of management's request for him to pay an additional security deposit, as was previously agreed, Mr. Gomez refused to pay the additional security deposit. As a direct result of his refusal, his lease application was never approved, and he was not authorized by Vestcor to move into any Madalyn Landing's rental apartment units. At some unspecified time thereafter, Vestcor's management became aware that Mr. Gomez had moved into Apartment No. 206-24, even though he was never approved or authorized to move into an on site apartment. Vestcor's management ordered Mr. Gomez to remove his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24. Subsequent to the removal order, Mr. Gomez moved his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24 into Apartment No. 103-20. Mr. Gomez's move into Apartment No. 103-20, as was his move into Apartment No. 206-04, was without approval and/or authorization from Vestcor's management. Upon learning that his belonging had been placed in Apartment No. 103-20, Mr. Gomez was again instructed by management to remove his belongings. After he failed and refused to move his belongings from Apartment No. 103-20, Vestcor's management entered the apartment and gathered and discarded Mr. Gomez's belongings. As a leasing contract agent, Petitioner had access to keys to all vacant apartments. His brother, Mr. Gomez, who was a groundskeeper, did not have access to keys to any apartment, save the one he occupied. Any apartment occupied by Ms. Gomez after his Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 103-20 was without the knowledge or approval of Vestcor and in violation of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Therefore, any period of apartment occupancy by Mr. Gomez was not discriminatory against Petitioner (rent-free and/or reduced rent), but was a direct violation of Vestcor's policies. On February 10, 2002, Mr. Oliver signed a one-year lease agreement with Vestcor. Mr. Oliver's lease agreement reflected a 25-percent employee rental concession. Throughout Mr. Oliver's occupancy of Apartment No. 203-64 and pursuant to his lease agreement duration, Mr. Oliver's rental history reflected his monthly payment of $413.00. There is no evidence that Mr. Oliver lived on site without paying rent or that Vestcor authorized or permitted Mr. Oliver to live on site without paying rent, as alleged by Petitioner. On June 2, 2002, Ms. Closs completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal report. Performance ratings range from a one -- below expectations, to a four -- exceeds expectations. Petitioner received ratings in the categories appraised as follows: Leasing skills -- 4; Administrative skills -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork, computer updating, and policy adherence; Marketing skills -- 4, with comments that Petitioner had a flair for finding the right markets; Community awareness -- 3, with no comment; Professionalism -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork reporting; Dependability -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in attendance; Interpersonal skills -- 3, with no comments; Judgment/Decision-making -- 3, with no comments; Quality of Work -- 2, with comments that work lacked accuracy; Initiative -- 4, with no comment; Customer service -- 3, with no comments; Team work -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in the area of resident confidence; Company loyalty -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in adherence to company policy and procedures; and Training and development -- 3, with no comments. Petitioner's Overall rating was 2.5, with comments that there was "room for improvement." On June 27, 2002, while on 180 days' probation that began on January 9, 2002, Petitioner failed to report to work and failed to report his absence to his supervisor, Ms. Closs, by a person-to-person telephone call. This conduct constituted a violation of Vestcor's policy requiring all its employees to personally contact their supervisor when late and/or absent from work and prohibited leaving messages on the community answering service machine. On June 28, 2002, Petitioner reported to work. Ms. Closs, his supervisor, informed Petitioner of his termination of employment with Vestcor for failure to report to work (i.e. job abandonment) and for probation violation, as he had been warned on January 9, 2002, what would happen should a policy violation re-occur. It was after his June 28, 2002, termination that Petitioner began his personal investigation and gathering of information (i.e., interviews and statements from other Vestcor employees) in preparation to file this complaint. Considering the findings favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Vestcor, when they terminated his employment on June 28, 2002. Considering the findings of record favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of housing and/or rental adjustment discrimination by Vestcor, based upon familial status of himself or any other employer. Petitioner failed to prove Vestcor knowingly and/or intentionally permitted, approved, or allowed either Mr. Gomez or Mr. Oliver to live on site without a completed and approved application followed by appropriate rent adjustments according to their employment status and keeping within the tax credit requirement, while requiring Vestcor employees with families (or different employment status) to pay a different monthly rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Petitioner failed to prove his termination on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for his actions and conduct other than his personal violation, while on probation, of Vestcor's policies and procedures.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Florida Commission on Human Rights enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief alleging discrimination filed by Petitioner, Carlos Gomez. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 2000e42 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57741.211760.11760.23
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JOYCE A. GREEN vs. MARK III INDUSTRIES, 89-000985 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000985 Latest Update: Jan. 04, 1990

The Issue Whether or not Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice by terminating Petitioner due to the "handicap" of manic depression and/or bipolar disorder.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner suffers from bipolar disorder, a psychiatric disorder manifested by mood swings from elation to depression. When experiencing an episode of mania, the Petitioner is incapable of attending to a task for any length of time. She is also overly excited and exercises poor judgment. Dependent upon how expert medical physicians characterize this condition at various stages, it is either a type of manic depression or a psychiatric condition very similar in symptomatology to classic manic depression. Petitioner began working for Respondent Mark III on March 20, 1985 as a seamstress. Her primary job function was running an industrial grade sewing machine for van conversions. She was a very good employee except for the occasions when she suffered bouts of mania. She was never subject to discipline, and during the periods of mania she experienced, her work-related problems were treated by the employer as a disability. The first episode of mania occurred in April 1986. Prior to her hospitalization for mania, the Petitioner was drinking excessively and staying out from work. She was hospitalized in Monroe Regional Hospital from April 22, 1986 to April 29, 1986. Thereafter, she returned to work, but again began to experience problems and had to be hospitalized again from June 7, 1986 to June 13, 1986. After she came-out of the hospital, Respondent employer permitted her to work part-time (that is, fewer hours) for a period of several months until she was able to resume full-time responsibilities. The employer's providing Petitioner part-time employment in 1986 was prompted by several factors. First, Petitioner was accorded the same accommodation any of Respondent's employees would receive under Respondent's general policy of allowing persons who have left for medical reasons to return to work if work is available. Second, this was also done personally and specifically for Petitioner at this time to accommodate her individual situation at that time. Third, the cyclical nature of Respondent's business of van conversions is such that June and July are a wind-down period toward the month of August when Respondent either closes down or lays off personnel for one to three weeks' duration. Fourth, Petitioner's team position had not been filled because "many girls," in the words of Respondent's representative Joe Krim, "float regularly." Respondent's method of payment of seamstresses in Petitioner's category bears some discussion because it does not equate in every respect with the street definition of "full-time" and "part-time" labor. Petitioner worked as part of a group or team on production work. Teams are paid when each van is completed, and payment for each van is then divided among the whole sewing room, based upon hours individually worked. The entire team is needed to construct each vehicle and in Petitioner's absence, if they did not replace her, the rest of the team had to pick up her slack. Petitioner's rate of pay was determined on a weekly basis depending upon the amount of work produced by the team/group she worked with. During her period of full-time employment just prior to November 1987, Petitioner's weekly net pay, if averaged, would be $534.74. Pursuant to the foregoing arrangement, Petitioner received no pay during any of the periods that she was out of work. The Respondent provided no sick leave or disability benefits and did not have a formal procedure for requesting a leave of absence. After the manic episode(s) in 1986, the Petitioner returned to work full-time on or about July 1986 and experienced no problems for over a year. In November 1987, Petitioner again experienced an episode of mania. She began staying away from her job and disrupting her coworkers with overt sexual solicitation and lewd remarks when she was present. Her immediate supervisor, Jon Lanning, requested a meeting with her sometime shortly before December 1, 1987. Petitioner's friend, Mark Wagner, accompanied her to that meeting. At that meeting, Mr. Lanning urged Petitioner to seek hospital treatment for her psychiatric problems. Mr. Lanning was unavailable to testify at formal hearing, having left Respondent's employment in October 1988. Petitioner's impression of Mr. Lanning's representations on behalf of Respondent were that her job would be held for her if she would seek medical help. Mr. Wagner's impression of this so-called "admission" on behalf of Respondent by its agent Lanning was that Lanning was saying Petitioner was a good worker and would be welcome to come back to work when she was able to work. It was obvious to Wagner from this meeting that "if [Petitioner] did not get the situation under control, they would have to let her go." Petitioner was hospitalized from December 1, 1987 to December 6, 1987 at Charter Springs Hospital. Upon her discharge, she continued to take Loxitane, a prescription medication which can cause drowsiness if taken in excess, at the wrong times of day, or with alcohol. The use of alcohol is contraindicated in the presence of Loxitane. Although Respondent established alcohol and drug mixing by Petitioner back in 1986, the uncorroborated hearsay and inconclusive and uncredible repetition by witnesses of so-called "admissions" by Petitioner do not permit or support a finding that Petitioner was abusing alcohol or mixing alcohol with prescription medications in 1987- 1988. Dr. Fred Miley, Petitioner's psychiatrist, signed a release permitting the Respondent to return to work on December 21, 1987. Petitioner returned to work on December 22, 1987 but exhibited signs of drowsiness around the heavy sewing machinery she had to operate and was told by a superior to go home. At formal hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that she "did not need to be on the machine" in that condition. Petitioner stated that after her December 22, 1987 work attempt she had decided that the decision to go back to work was one, "I and I alone would have to make." Petitioner did not report the problem of drowsiness to her psychiatrist at the time she had the Loxitane prescription renewed by him December 30, 1987 or at the time of her next office visit to him on January 12, 1988 except that she did complain to him on that date of being drowsy in the mornings. At formal hearing, Dr. Miley opined that there was really no reason physically or psychiatrically why Petitioner could not have returned to work for Respondent on January 12, 1988; he merely felt pressured by the patient to defer her return-to-work date since she did not want to go back to work then and therefore he felt she could not return to work successfully. Dr. Miley did not know prior to formal hearing in this case that Petitioner's inability to work precluded an award to her of unemployment compensation benefits. On January 12, 1988, Petitioner advised Dr. Miley she wanted to draw unemployment compensation and would receive it until June 1988; that Petitioner did not want to return to work at that time because Respondent had only part- time employment; and that Petitioner was working for herself, sewing free lance. In fact, Petitioner had filed an application for unemployment benefits on December 15, 1987, effective December 13, 1987. She had been denied unemployment benefits on January 4, 1988 because she was deemed by the unemployment compensation reviewer to be unable to work. "Unavailability for work" precludes the award of unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Chapter 443 F.S. On January 15, 1988, Dr. Miley filled out an unemployment compensation form stating that Petitioner had been unable to work from December 1, 1987 to January 15, 1988 and with the equivocal statement that Petitioner "may possibly be able to return to work in early February 1988" and it should be halftime (20 hours). Petitioner took the January 15 statement by Miley to Jon Lanning because Lanning had advised her he could not hold her job without a statement from her doctor. Sometime in January 1988 Petitioner approached Joe Krim, Mr. Lanning's superior, for help with Mr. Lanning about "getting on up." At some time between the December 1987 hospitalization and February 3, 1988, Petitioner sent her employer a note asking to work night shift instead of day shift. On February 3, 1988, the Petitioner initiated a meeting with Mr. Lanning for the purpose of inquiring whether she could return to work halftime. Mr. Lanning responded that she had been terminated the day before, February 2, 1988. Petitioner had received no prior notice of her impending termination, and Barbara Boos' and Joe Krim's direct testimony confirm Petitioner's understanding that her team position had not yet been filled as of February 3, 1988. At Petitioner's specific request, motivated by her intent at that time to pursue a social security disability claim, Mr. Lanning supplied her with a document dated February 3, 1988 stating: Due to health reasons, [Petitioner] was unable to perform her duties and has not returned to work since late November 1987. Petitioner later abandoned the social security appeal plan. According to Mr. Krim's testimony, Petitioner was actually not rehired because she had not returned to work between November 1987 and February 1988. He was apparently unaware at the time of her termination by Mr. Lanning on February 3, 1988 that she had tried to work for a few hours on December 22, 1987. Nonetheless, he emphasized that although December and January are not heavy production months, February is the month the Respondent must "gear up" for its heaviest production of the season and that he had to "get production up" at that time for that reason. Further, the purpose of Respondent's recent move to new quarters had been partly to eliminate a night shift which in 1986 had done little real production work and did mostly clean up and preparation for the day sewing teams. In February 1988, he had put all teams on full-time day work. He did not, therefore, have available part-time work (fewer hours) with which to accommodate Petitioner as he had in 1986. Respondent had full-time work available for Petitioner in January and February of 1988. By February of 1988, the new "season" had commenced, Respondent had moved into a new plant, and Respondent could no longer accommodate halftime or part-time work arrangements. On March 15, 1988 Dr. Miley completed an additional form stating that the Petitioner had been unable to work from December 1, 1987 to February 14, 1988. Petitioner admitted that in February 1988, she wanted to go back to work only part-time but that Respondent had not established a part-time crew, as such. Petitioner also admitted not knowing if there were any part-time work available then. In light of her several conflicting representations under the circumstances related supra., the undersigned is not persuaded by Petitioner's representations at the formal hearing in the instant case that if she had been told by Mr. Banning directly that part-time employment was unavailable, she would have agreed to full-time employment on February 3, 1988. Petitioner eventually received unemployment compensation from approximately March 1988 until September 1988. In November 1988, Petitioner secured employment very similar to that she previously held with Respondent, which employment she has continuously held with no further episodes of mania requiring psychiatric treatment.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of January, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-0985 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are accepted. 4 is accepted with the exception of the last sentence, which rejected as not supported by the record. See FOF 7. 11 is rejected. This is legal argument which mischaracterizes both the burden to go forward and the burden of proof in this type of case. Except for sentence 1 of 12 which is rejected as not supported by the record for the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Thaw, 12 and 13 are accepted as modified to more clearly reflect the record evidence as a whole. Respondent' s PFOF: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 are accepted. 3 and 9 are rejected as stated as not supported by the record as a whole. 7 is immaterial. See FOF 8. 12 and 13 are subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank C. Amatea Attorney at Law 500 Northeast Eighth Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Carla Franklin Attorney at Law Post Office Box 694 Gainesville, Florida 32601 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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VELTIE A. DODSON vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 76-000678 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000678 Latest Update: Mar. 09, 1977

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner owned property in Charlotte County, Florida which laid within the right of way of proposed Federal Highway 1-75. The Petitioner's property was required for the highway right of way. The Petitioner lived on the property in a mobile home for more than ninety (90) days prior to the time that officials of the Florida Department of Transportation initiated negotiations for acquisition of the property. During February, 1975, David L. Nicholson, a Right of Way Agent with the Department of Transportation, contacted the Petitioner in order to negotiate the acquisition of the Petitioner's property, and to explain the amount of relocation assistance benefits that the Petitioner might be entitled to receive in order to compensate him for his having to move his residence. Petitioner was offered $3,500.00 in relocation benefits. This offer was predicated on the Petitioner's remaining an owner/occupant of new property to which he moved. When Mr. Nicholson was advised that the Petitioner was going to be renting new property, rather than purchasing it, Mr. Nicholson advised the Petitioner that he could receive up to $4,000.00 in rent supplements. The Petitioner construed the $4,000.00 figure as the amount that he would receive. The $4,000.00 was actually the highest figure that the Petitioner could receive, and was considerably more than the Petitioner was entitled to receive. The Department of Transportation compensated the Petitioner for the cost of moving his mobile home, and setting it up on the lot which the Petitioner was renting. The amount provided the Petitioner for this purpose was $970.15. Petitioner concedes that he was adequately compensated for moving and setting up his mobile home. The rental value of the Petitioner's property in Charlotte County, without the mobile home on it was $50.00 per month. This figure is called the "economic rent" of the property. A comparable lot in Charlotte County, Florida, would have cost the Petitioner $55.00 per month to rent. The difference between the monthly rental of a comparable lot, and the economic rent of the Petitioner's property was $5.00. If the Petitioner received this amount for four years, he would be entitled to $240.00. The Department of Transportation offered to pay this amount to the Petitioner, but he refused it, contending that he is entitled to $4,000.00. No evidence was offered at the hearing from which it could be concluded that Petitioner was entitled to receive more than the $970.15 provided him to move and set up his mobile home, and $240.00, the difference between the rental value of a comparable lot, and the economic rent of the Petitioner's property for four years as relocation assistance benefits.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That an order be entered finding the Petitioner entitled under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 4624 to $240.00 in relocation assistance benefits above and beyond the $970.15 already provided; and that this amount be forwarded to the Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building, Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Veltie A. Dodson Route 5, Box 268 Rocky Mount, Virginia 24151 Tom B. Webb, Jr., Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 4624 Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ORMOND HOTEL CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 80-000268 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000268 Latest Update: May 16, 1991

Findings Of Fact During the audit period in question, i.e., December 1, 1975 through March 31, 1979, Petitioner Ormond Hotel Corporation operated the Ormond Hotel, Ormond Beach, Florida. It was licensed during the audit period by the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business Regulation, and classified as a retirement establishment. (Interrogatories) The Ormond Hotel is an old wooden structure containing 350 rooms with 258 rooms available for rental. The remaining rooms are not in proper condition for rental. Most of the hotel guests are over 65 years of age and reside there either permanently or on a seasonal basis, usually from December through March of each year. A few married couples have accommodations at the hotel, but most of the residents are single individuals occupying one room. Prior to 1978, Petitioner advertised the hotel in a national magazine called "Retirement Living" and conducted advertising on billboards, brochures, and in the classified section of the local telephone book under the hearing "Retirement Homes." The latter advertisement states that the facility is "a residential hotel," but also includes the words "DAY-WK-MO-YR." Similarly, the hotel's brochure recites that accommodations are available by day, month, or year. All units are available for rental to permanent tenants, but short-term occupancy is accepted if there are available rooms. The hotel does not have a swimming pool, but does have restaurant facilities and recreation areas. The hotel does not primarily cater to transient guests. (Testimony of Salveson, interrogatories) Respondent's auditor conducted an audit of Petitioner's business operations for the period December 1, 1975, through March 31, 1979. In arriving at whether or not the Ormond Hotel was subject to tax imposed by Section 212.03, Florida Statutes, on its rentals, he examined the Petitioner's books to ascertain the number of total available rental units and the status of tenants at the hotel during the months of April, May, and June of each year. If he found that 50 percent or more of the total units had been rented to persons residing there continuously for the specific three-month period, those tenants were considered to be permanent rather than transient tenants and the hotel was deemed exempt from tax pursuant to Rule 12A-1.61(1), F.A.C. In arriving at his determination of exempt status, the auditor did not deduct unoccupied rooms from the total number of units in arriving at his "fifty percent" determination. Although the auditor analyzed the advertising brochures of Petitioner, and was aware that the hotel was listed in the telephone directory under retirement homes, and concluded that such advertising was directed primarily to the acquisition of permanent guests, he predicted his audit findings solely on the "fifty percent" test concerning occupancy of total units. In this manner, he determined that Petitioner was exempt from taxation in 1975 based on the fact that for the April through June period for that year, 135 of the 264 total units had been occupied continuously by "permanent" tenants. In a similar manner he found that the hotel did not qualify for exemption during the succeeding years of the audit period. In this respect, he found that for 1976, there were only 119 such guests during the three-month period out of the 263 total units, which was less than 50 percent. In 1977, there were 102 such tenants out of 261 total units, which was less than 50 percent. In 1978, there were 98 such tenants and 259 total units, which was less than 50 percent. The auditor's worksheet reflects that there were 124 vacant rooms during the three-month period in 1975, 140 in 1976, 153 in 1977, and 153 in 1978. He concedes that if he had applied the "fifty percent" rule by comparing the number of three-month or "permanent" tenants with the number of occupied rooms for the three-month period each year, the number of rooms occupied by "permanent" guests would have been over fifty percent for each year of the audit period. (Testimony of Boerner, Exhibits 1-2, 4) Based on the audit, Respondent issued two separate "Second Revised Notices of Proposed Assessment" on January 15, 1980. The first assessment covered the period December 1, 1975 through November 30, 1978. It asserted tax due on room rentals in the amount of $21, 362.91 plus a delinquent penalty, and interest through January 15, 1980, for a total sum of $28,062.45. The assessment also asserted tax, penalty and interest for purchases unrelated to room rentals in the amount of $984.92, for a total assessment of $29,047.37. The assessment reflected that a partial payment had been made on October 2, 1979, in the amount of $2,590.62, leaving a balance due of $26,456.75. The other assessment showed tax on room rentals in the amount of $6,001.75, plus delinquent penalty of $300.10, and interest through January 15, 1980 in the amount of $611.76 for a total of $6,913.61. It also asserted tax, penalty, and interest on purchases in the amount of $23.39 for a total assessment of $6,937.00. This assessment also showed partial payment on October 2, 1979, in the amount of $132.08, leaving a balance due of $6,804.92. In a letter transmitting the assessments, dated January 16, 1980, Respondent advised Petitioner that the hotel did not qualify as an exempt facility under Rule 12A- 1.61(1)(a), F.A.C., during the audit period, because less than fifty percent of the facility's units were occupied by guests who had resided there three or more months as of July 1 each year. The letter further stated that "an analysis" of the rental of units submitted by Petitioner as to its exempt status did not conform to the requirements of the rule because the facility advertised to guests on a daily, weekly and monthly basis in addition to long-term leasing, the analysis used an annual rather than a three-month period prior to July as a basis, and the number of tenants at the facility rather than total units. (Exhibit 2) Petitioner's accountant prepared an analysis of the room status at the Ormond Hotel during the period July 1, 1977 to June 30, 1978. It reflects that 165 rooms, or 64.5 percent of the total of 256 units rented during the year, were occupied by tenants for a continuous period of over three months. On March 31 of that year, 157 rooms, or 61 percent of the total of 258 room available for occupancy, were occupied by guests for more than three months. Sixty-nine of the rooms were occupied by transient tenants or those with less than three- months occupancy (17 percent) and 32 rooms were unoccupied (12 percent). As of June 30, 1978, the hotel had 110 guests who had resided there for more than three months, and 18 guests with residency of less than three months. (Testimony of Salveson, Exhibit 3)

Recommendation That the proposed tax assessments against Petitioner Ormond Hotel Corporation arising out of the rental of living accommodations at the Ormond Hotel during the period December 1, 1975 through March 1, 1979, be vacated, and that the remainder of the proposed assessments be enforced. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Lester Kaney, Esquire Post Office Box 191 Daytona Beach, Florida 32015 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.56212.03
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