Findings Of Fact Twenty-five feet high, 20 feet west of the right of way of State Road 79, about a half mile north of Interstate 10 in Holmes County, stands a sign advertising Simbo's Restaurant and Truck Stop. Because the sign is on the premises of the business it advertises, no sign permit is required. Since March 23, 1985, when the present owner acquired the property, it has spent substantial sums to operate the sign, which was originally erected some 15 years ago. It would cost about $100.00 to modify the sign so that all lights remained on the whole time the sign was lighted. Only when a DOT quality assurance team from Tallahassee raised the question did the present proceedings arise. As a result of the team's visit to northwest Florida, some 200 notices of violations went out to owners of "flashing" signs. On either side of the top (and largest) of five panels, neon script proclaims "Simbo's" in large letters rising diagonally from left to right. In smaller letters "STEAK" appears above and "SEA FOOD" below the name. While the sign is on, "Simbo's" remains lit, but "STEAK" and "SEA FOOD" are illuminated only intermittently. First "STEAK" but not "SEA FOOD" shines for two seconds, then "SEA FOOD" but not "STEAK" is on for two seconds, then both are lit for two seconds, then neither. Both are off for no more than two seconds. While this sequence repeats, blue bulbs bordering the top panel go on and off at intervals of unspecified duration. Milford C. Truett, DOT's acting outdoor advertising supervisor with responsibility for Holmes County, testified that a light is "flashing" if it is on or off for less than five seconds.
Recommendation It is, accordingly recommended that DOT dismiss the violation notice. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, MS #58 Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Attorney Dept. of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS #58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Frank G. Young Simbo's Restaurant & Truck Stop Bonifay, FL 32425
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding Respondent, Robert Hoffman, was a member of the Deltona Fire District Commission. He was elected to his office in the Deltona Fire District in November, 1992. At all times pertinent to this proceeding Theresa Cresswell was a dispatcher at the Deltona Fire District. She served as dispatcher for approximately eight years, leaving in January, 1995. On April 30, 1993, Ms. Cresswell filed Complaint No. 93-56 with the Florida Commission on Ethics, alleging that Mr. Hoffman had touched and kissed her on January 20, 1993, and on March 20, 1993. Ms. Cresswell also alleges that in March, 1993, after she had spilled water on her blouse while drinking from the water fountain that Mr. Hoffman said that he liked watching her brush the water off her blouse. JANUARY 20, 1993 INCIDENT In December, 1992, Ms. Cresswell organized a Santa Clause workshop for needy children. Mr. Hoffman had promised to provide candy canes and build the workshop for the event. He failed to keep his promise. As a result, Ms. Cresswell had to purchase the candy. On January 20, 1993, Ms. Cresswell came to the Deltona Fire Station around 9:30 p.m. to pick up some papers relating to her schoolwork. She was not on duty. Mr. Hoffman was at the fire station when she arrived. Ms. Cresswell was upset with Mr. Hoffman for his failure to provide the candy and build the workshop. She approached Mr. Hoffman in the reception area while he was talking to Robert Bell and told Hoffman that she was "pissed off at him." Mr. Hoffman acknowledged that he knew that she was upset and that he was sorry that he did not do what he had promised. Ms. Cresswell alleges that during the conversation Mr. Hoffman came to her, put his hand on her shoulder, leaned against her, kissed her on her cheek and whispered in her ear, "I'm sorry. Do your forgive me?" Ms. Cresswell's allegation that he whispered in her ear was made known for the first time at the formal hearing. Mr. Hoffman asserts that he never touched or kissed Ms. Cresswell on January 20, 1993. Robert Bell, the dispatcher who was on duty when the discussion between Ms. Cresswell and Mr. Hoffman took place, observed the discussion and described Ms. Cresswell as being upset. He did not see Mr. Hoffman kiss Ms. Cresswell on the evening of January 20, 1993. Ms. Cresswell did not tell Mr. Bell that Mr. Hoffman had kissed her. Ms. Cresswell did not make a complaint to anyone about the January 20 incident until March, 1993. Fire Chief Holland had been keeping notes about Mr. Hoffman's activities and he sent those notes to the attorney for the fire district. In those notes, he details a conversation that he had with Ms. Cresswell concerning the January 20, 1993 incident. There is no mention that Mr. Hoffman kissed Ms. Cresswell. Having observed the demeanor of the witnesses and having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Mr. Hoffman did not touch or kiss Ms. Cresswell on January 20, 1993. THE WATER FOUNTAIN INCIDENT On March 20, 1993, Mr. Hoffman was attending an all day CPR class at the fire station. Ms. Cresswell was working dispatch on the 8:00 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift on that day. Ms. Cresswell alleges that she was drinking at the water fountain located in the hall of the fire station down from the room in which the CPR class was being conducted. She spilled water on her blouse and was brushing the water from her blouse when Mr. Hoffman came up to her and said, "Can I watch you do that? I like to watch you do that." Mr. Hoffman contends that the incident never occurred. There were no witnesses to the alleged incident. Timothy Brown was teaching the CPR class. He remembered Mr. Hoffman as being the only male student in the class on that day. Mr. Brown does not recall Mr. Hoffman leaving the classroom other than at the assigned breaks and at lunchtime. Mr. Brown was near the water fountain several times during the day while he used a nearby copy machine and when he drank from the fountain, but he did not see Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Cresswell together at the water fountain. When Ms. Cresswell complained to Assistant Chief Rogers on March 22, 1993 about the alleged incident of kissing which occurred either on the evening of March 20 or early morning of March 21, she did not mention the water fountain incident which allegedly occurred on March 20, 1993. When Ms. Cresswell's deposition was taken on April 12, 1993, three weeks after the alleged incident, Ms. Cresswell could not recall when the water fountain incident took place. Having observed the demeanor of the witnesses and having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that the water fountain incident did not occur and that Mr. Hoffman did not say, "Can I watch you do that? I like to watch you do that." THE MARCH 20-21, 1993 INCIDENT On the evening of March 20, 1993, Ms. Cresswell traded shifts with another dispatcher and reported to work at approximately 11:50 p.m. to work the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift. Robert Bell was working the dispatch when she arrived. Mr. Hoffman was also at the fire station. Ms. Cresswell put away her purse and made coffee. As part of her duties on the midnight shift, she was responsible for erasing and rewinding the 911 dictaphone tapes. She went to the communications center, which is located adjacent to the reception area, and began to erase the tapes soon after her arrival at the fire station. While she was erasing the tapes, she, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Hoffman began talking about a storm that evening which caused a fire, destroying a local funeral home. During the discussion about the fire, they started to talk about cremation. Ms. Cresswell stated that she did not want to be cremated. Ms. Cresswell alleges that after she made the remark about cremation that Mr. Hoffman came over to her, put his hand on her shoulder, laughed, kissed her on the cheek, and said, "I hear you." At the formal hearing she could not recall whether Mr. Hoffman allegedly kissed her before or after midnight. According to Ms. Cresswell, Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Bell continued to talk about the funeral home after Mr. Hoffman kissed her. Additionally, Ms. Cresswell asserts that after Mr. Bell left the fire station that Mr. Hoffman stayed for approximately one and one half hours. Mr. Hoffman contends that he never touched or kissed Ms. Cresswell as she alleged and that he left the fire station the same time as Mr. Bell. During the conversation concerning the funeral home, Mr. Bell was in and out of the communications center. Mr. Bell did not see Mr. Hoffman kiss Ms. Cresswell as she alleged. Ms. Cresswell did not tell Mr. Bell that Mr. Hoffman had kissed her. Ms. Cresswell did not confront Mr. Hoffman concerning the alleged kiss. Donald Allen Helberg, a firefighter/EMT was present in the dispatch side of the fire station during the late evening and early morning hours of March 20 and 21, 1993, respectively. He saw Ms. Cresswell pull into the parking lot when she came to work the midnight shift. Mr. Helberg recalled Ms. Cresswell joining in the conversation that he, Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Bell were having. He also recalls seeing Mr. Bell head toward the double doors leading to the outside followed by Mr. Hoffman. Mr. Helberg was also leaving at that time to return to the firefighter section of the building. While he was present, Mr. Helberg did not see or hear anything unusual involving Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Cresswell. Sometime after March 21, 1993, Ms. Cresswell called Mr. Helberg and asked him if he remembered being present at the fire station on the night of the alleged incident. Mr. Bell left the fire station approximately ten minutes after midnight. Mr. Hoffman was walking behind Mr. Bell as he walked out the door. Mr. Hoffman was driving a red Jimmy vehicle that night. As Mr. Bell was driving out of the fire station parking lot, he observed a reddish vehicle behind him. The reddish vehicle left the parking lot after Mr. Bell, headed in the opposite direction. Mr. Hoffman lived approximately a mile and a half from the fire station. He arrived home at approximately fifteen minutes after midnight. His wife was up waiting for him when he got home. Having observed the demeanor of the witnesses and having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Mr. Hoffman did not touch or kiss Ms. Cresswell either on the evening of March 20, 1993 or the morning of March 21, 1993.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Complaint No. 93-56 against Robert Hoffman. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5835EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Stipulated Facts 1. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted. Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 6-7: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance except as to the occurrence of the water fountain incident. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: The last sentence is rejected as not supported by credible evidence. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted that it is what Ms. Cresswell alleges but rejected as to that is what happened based on the credible evidence. Paragraph 12: The first part of the first sentence is accepted in substance. The last part of the first sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Mr. Bell did not see Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Cresswell the entire time but that does not mean that he wasn't paying attention to them during the time that he did see them. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 13: Rejected as not supported by credible evidence. Paragraphs 14-15: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 16: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found as to what Ms. Cresswell believed. Rejected as not supported by the evidence as to what Mr. Hoffman believed. Paragraph 17: The first two sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted. Paragraphs 3-5: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 6-7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance as that is what Ms. Cresswell contended. Paragraphs 9-10: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 15-17: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 18-19: Accepted that it was what Ms. Cresswell contended but rejected as not supported by credible evidence that it was what happened. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 21: Accepted to the extent that it is Ms. Cresswell's testimony. Paragraphs 22-25: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 26: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 27: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 28-30: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 31-33: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 34-37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 39: The first sentence is accepted in substance as that was what was alleged. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 40-43: Accepted in substance as that is what was alleged. Paragraph 44: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 45: Accepted in substance as that is what was alleged. Paragraphs 46-47: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 48-49: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 50-51: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 52: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 53-56: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 57: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 58-60: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 61: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 62: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 63: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 64: Accepted in substance as that was what was alleged. Paragraph 65: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 66-67: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 68: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 69-7O: Accepted in substance that the dictaphone equipment is located in the communications center. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 71: Accepted in substance that she made those allegations. Paragraphs 72-74: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 75-76: Rejected as not supported by credible evidence as that was what happened. Paragraph 77: Accepted in substance to the extent that Mr. Bell was not watching Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Cresswell the entire time of the conversation. Paragraphs 78-79: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 80-81: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 82: Accepted to the extent that she did not tell Mr. Bell of the kissing incident; otherwise rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence or unnecessary. Paragraphs 83-84: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 85: The first sentence is accepted to the extent that it is Ms. Cresswell's testimony. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 86: Accepted in substance that it was her testimony. Paragraph 87: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 88: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 89: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 90-99: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 100: Accepted to the extent that he saw Bell heading toward the outside door, followed by Hoffman as Helberg was leaving to go to the firefighter side of the building. Paragraphs 101-104: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 105: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 106-107: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 108: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 109-111: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 112-116: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 117: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 118-125: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 126-127: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 128-130: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 131-133: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 134: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 135-137: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 138-155: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 156-262: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 263: Rejected to the extent that it implies that there was a conspiracy. The evidence does not support a conclusion of conspiracy among Mr. Holland, Mr. Rogers, and Ms. Cresswell. Paragraphs 264-288: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 289-290: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Stephen D. Milbrath, Esquire Alan, Dyer, Doppelt, Franjola & Milbrath Post Office Box 3791 Orlando, Florida 32802-3791 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact On or about January 27, 1988, a DOT sign inspector observed Respondent's sign along U. S. 19 in the vicinity of S. R. 595. The sign had no permit attached, and DOT records revealed no permit has ever been issued for this sign. The sign is visible from U. S. 19. U. S. 19 is a federal aid primary highway.
Findings Of Fact On or about August 11, 1987, Respondent owned a sign advertising the business which was located on the DOT right-of-way along U.S. 41 in Pasco County. When Respondent moved into its present location it placed some of its castings on display on the right-of-way alongside its business. The co-owner was told by the Deputy Sheriff that the castings had to be removed from the right-of-way but it was all right to leave the sign on the DOT right-of-way. Accordingly, until the sign was cited for the violation, Respondent thought its sign was legally erected.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates a motel in Ft. Myers known as the Shores Motor Lodge. The motel is on the northwest corner of the intersection of Cypress Street and State Road 739 (US Business 41). In the vicinity of the motel, State Road 739 is busy with a projected weekday traffic volume of 57,000 vehicles. The posted speed limit is 45 miles per hour. Petitioner is in the process of widening State Road 739 in the area from four lanes to seven lanes. Cypress Street is a short, residential street. The intersection of State Road 739 and Cypress Street is not at a 90 degree angle. Instead, a vehicle turning right onto Cypress Street must execute a sharp turn of about 135 degrees. The motel is an established property. Guests visiting the motel office have diagonally parked in front of the motel on the State right-of-way separating the motel from State Road 739. The road-widening project consumes nearly all of the right-of- way with road surface and a sidewalk, leaving no room for vehicles to park in front of the motel on the remaining right- of-way. The motel occupies about 50 feet of frontage. On the other side of the motel, to the north, there is a driveway serving an adjacent church. To accommodate Respondent's guests, Petitioner modified the original design to shorten the curb along Cypress Street so that motel guests may turn onto Cypress Street, park alongside the road beside the motel, and walk a few feet to the front office. Respondent's solution is to obtain a driveway, cutting at a 65 degree angle across a wide expanse of the sidewalk and beginning at the southern edge of the church's driveway. This driveway would run only a sort distance at this angle before requiring a sudden turn to the right in order to negotiate a narrow set of supports supporting the motel canopy under which the vehicles must pass. The driveway would run only eight feet from the front door to the office. Respondent's solution is unsafe to pedestrians on the sidewalk and the motel property. It is likely that vehicle operators leaving State Road 739 at a gentle angle would not anticipate the tight passageway that they must navigate, while turning their vehicle further to the right in dangerously close proximity to the front door of the office. Pedestrians on the sidewalk are also endangered by vehicles traveling at high speeds veering off the highway to cross a wide expanse of sidewalk so near an intersection and another driveway. Respondent's solution is unsafe to other vehicles on Cypress Street, State Road 739, and the motel property. Vehicles parked on the proposed driveway block site lines for drivers seeking to exit Cypress Street and are in danger of being rear- ended by vehicles exiting State Road 739 too fast. Likewise, the risk of rear-end collisions on State Road 739 is greater when drivers turning into the motel suddenly notice the narrow passageway that they must navigate or an obstruction in their path. On the other hand, Petitioner's proposal is safe and mandated by operational considerations resulting from the road widening project. There remains reasonable and safe access for motel guests, many of whom are long-term residents who have little need to visit the office.
Recommendation It is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing Respondent's challenge. ENTERED on May 9th, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 9th, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Paul Sexton Chief, Administrative Law Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg., MS 58 605 Suwannee St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Wayne RinkenbacK Shores Motor Lodge 7243 Winkler Rd. Ft. Myers 33919
The Issue Whether the Respondent, a licensed general contractor, committed the offenses alleged in the three administrative complaints and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of contracting pursuant to Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been licensed as a general contractor by the Petitioner. Respondent was issued license number CG C010162 in 1975 and has held that licensure ever since. The first complaint against Respondent’s licensure, like the three complaints at issue in this proceeding, arose from a post-Hurricane Andrew contract. That complaint was resolved by stipulation of the parties. Respondent did not admit to wrongdoing in his stipulation. Respondent was financially unable to comply with the terms of the settlement. Consequently, his license was suspended at the time of the formal hearing. There was no explanation as to why this complaint, which occurred at approximately the same time as the three contracts at issue in this proceeding, was prosecuted separately. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was the qualifier for Allstate Construction Management, Inc. (Allstate), a Florida corporation. THE RODRIGUEZ CONTRACT (DOAH CASE 96-4580) On March 17, 1993, Allstate entered into a contract with Anthony Rodriguez to build a garage at 15525 SW 209th Avenue, Miami, Florida. The contract price was $16,250.00, which included “plans, permit and cleanup.” Allstate was paid the sum of $4,062.50 on March 17, 1993. Allstate obtained the Dade County building permit for the project on March 26, 1993. Allstate was paid the sum of $5,593.75 on April 5, 1993, after the concrete blocks were installed. On April 8, 1993, Allstate requested a tie beam/reinforcing inspection from the Dade County building department. In response to that request, Antonio Varona inspected the project on April 12, 1993. The inspector noted that the project was not ready for inspection because no truss plans were available. Respondent testified, credibly, that he had to construct the roof conventionally because of the difficulty in obtaining pre-fabricated trusses; however, that testimony does not explain why there were no truss plans available for inspection. Appropriately engineered truss plans are required for a roof to pass inspection. Despite the failure of the project to pass inspection, Mr. Rodriguez accepted the roof and paid Allstate $4,968.75 on May 21, 1993. As of May 21, 1993, there remained a final payment of $1,625 on the contract. After May 21, 1993, Respondent and Allstate left the Rodriguez job. There was a dispute in the evidence as to whether Mr. Rodriguez fired Allstate or whether Allstate abandoned the project. This dispute is resolved by finding that the evidence was insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Allstate abandoned the Rodriguez project. When Allstate left the Rodriguez job, there were sufficient funds remaining unpaid to complete the project. Because he had obtained the initial building permit, it was incumbent upon Respondent to either obtain a final inspection of the project or notify the building department that his company had been terminated by the owner. Respondent did neither. THE ELLIS CONTRACT (DOAH CASE 96-4581) At the times pertinent to this proceeding, William R. Ellis owned the Arleen House, which is an apartment building located at 2191 N.E. 168th Street, North Miami Beach, Florida. This building suffered damages from Hurricane Andrew. On September 11, 1992, Respondent and Mr. Ellis inspected the building and Respondent prepared an estimate as to the items that had been damaged by the hurricane and other non-hurricane related repairs that should be made. The mansard roof for this building had been damaged by Hurricane Andrew to the extent that it contained gaping holes. Shortly after that inspection, Mr. Ellis met with his insurance adjuster who gave him a check in the amount of $13,000 to repair the roof. It was necessary to dry in the roof and repair the mansard as soon as possible to avoid additional damage to the building from rains. While there was a dispute as to the extent of the services Allstate was to provide Mr. Ellis, the record is clear that Respondent, on behalf of Allstate, agreed to undertake the roof repair for the sum of $13,000. Respondent told Mr. Ellis that his company had a roofing crew ready to begin work on the roof repairs as soon as Mr. Ellis paid the sum of $13,000. Between September 11 and September 15, 1992, Mr. Ellis gave Allstate a check in the amount of $13,000 with the understanding that the check he had received from the insurance company had to clear before his bank would honor the check he was giving to Allstate. Immediately thereafter1 Allstate sent a roofing crew to the project for the purpose of temporarily covering exposed areas. Despite having been told by Mr. Ellis that the check he was giving Allstate would not be good until after the check for the insurance proceeds had cleared, Allstate did not wait to deposit Mr. Ellis’ check. Respondent was promptly notified that the check Mr. Ellis had given him would not be honored by Mr. Ellis’ bank. Respondent immediately thereafter withdrew the roofing crew from the project. The roofing crew had made only minor repairs at the time they were withdrawn from the project. Respondent knew, or should have known, that the building was vulnerable to further damage from rain. On September 15, 1992, Mr. Ellis gave Respondent a second check in the amount of $13,000. This check cleared the banking process on September 18, 1992. Mr. Ellis made repeated efforts to have Allstate send a crew to repair the roof. After it withdrew the crew that had been sent to the property when Allstate received the first check, Allstate did not take action to protect the property by repairing the exposed areas of the roof. Towards the end of September 1992, a heavy rainstorm caused additional damages to Mr. Ellis’ building. Allstate did not send a crew to the project again until October 6, 1992. Mr. Ellis hired this crew away from Allstate. He testified he did so because the crew complained about Allstate not paying for the materials they were using to repair the roof and because the workmen were threatening to file liens against the property. Mr. Ellis paid this crew the sum of $3,400 to temporarily repair the roof. He then entered into a contract with another contractor to complete the roofing repairs for the sum of $17,500. Mr. Ellis demanded the return of the $13,000 he paid to Allstate, but, as of the time of the formal hearing, he had not been repaid. THE KUCHENBACKER CONTRACT (DOAH CASE 96-4582) On November 6, 1992, Allstate entered into a contract with Carl F. Kuchenbacker to repair his residence at 18500 SW 88th Road, Miami, Florida. Mr. Kuchenbacker’s residence had been damaged by Hurricane Andrew. The initial contract price was $33,375.00. Respondent secured the building permit and Allstate began work on the project. During the course of the work, additional work was added to the contract, which raised the total contract price to $38,015.00. In late February or early March, 1993, Allstate abandoned the project without just cause and without notice to the owner. At the time it abandoned the project, Allstate had been paid the sum of $26,620.00. Allstate failed to pay all of the subcontractors and materialmen who had performed work or provided material for the Kuchenbacker job. As a result of that failure, valid liens were recorded against Mr. Kuchenbacker’s property. The following liens were recorded: Rite-Way Plumbing and Plastery, Inc. in the amount of $3,520.00; Commercial Lighting and Maintenance, Inc., in the amount of $1,835.00; and Scott Bornstein Plumbing, Inc., in the amount of $798.00. Allstate had received sufficient funds from the owner to pay these liens, but neither Respondent nor Allstate paid these liens. Mr. Kuchenbacker and Petitioner’s expert witness testified that the value of the work performed by Allstate before it abandoned the job was $21,000.00. Mr. Kuchenbacker also testified as to the items that remained undone and as to the percentage of the work that had been completed. From that testimony and from the testimony as to the estimated costs of completing the job, it is found that the sum of $11,395.00, which was the difference between the total contract price and the total amount that was paid to Allstate, was sufficient to complete the project and pay off the liens on the property. Respondent did not call for a final inspection of the property and he did not advise the Dade County Building Department that he was abandoning the project. Allstate abandoned the Kuchenbacker project because it went out of business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that Petitioner impose fines totaling $5,000 against Respondent’s licensure as follows: For the violation established by Count I of DOAH Case 96-4580, an administrative fine in the amount of $500. For the violation established by Count II of DOAH Case 96-4580, an administrative fine in the amount of $500. For the violation established by Count IV of DOAH Case 96-4580, an administrative fine in the amount of $250. For the violation established by DOAH Case 96-4581, an administrative fine in the amount of $500. For the violation established by Count I of DOAH Case 96-4582, an administrative fine in the amount of $750. For the violation established by Count II of DOAH Case 96-4582, an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000. For the violation established by Count III of DOAH Case 96-4582, an administrative fine in the amount of $500. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT in addition to the fines recommended for the violations found in DOAH Case 96-4581, Respondent’s licensure be suspended for two years. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT in addition to the fines recommended for the violations found DOAH Case 96-4582, Respondent’s licensure be suspended for two years, to run concurrently with the suspension recommended for DOAH Case 96- 4581. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 23rd day of May, 1997
Findings Of Fact During an inspection of signs along U. S. 19, a DOT sign inspector observed Respondent's signs 1/2 and 3/4 mile south of C. R. 582 which appeared to be on the right-of-way of U. S. 19. U. S. 19 is a Federal Aid Primary Highway and a part of the State Highway System. The right-of-way of U. S. 19 at this location extends 100 feet east and west of the centerline of U. S. 19 and 50 feet from the edge of the pavement of U. S. 19. Measurements taken from the edge of the pavement of U. S. 19 to the sign 3/4 mile south of C. R. 582 revealed the sign to be 42 feet from the edge of the pavement. The other sign measured 43 feet from the edge of U. S. 19. Accordingly, both signs were on the right-of-way of U. S. 19. Generally, the telephone poles and power line poles are erected along the DOT right-of-way of roads in the State Highway System, and the line of these poles is usually believed to mark the right-of-way boundary. Photographs of Respondent's signs showed those signs to be erected just touching this pole line, but outside that line. Photographs submitted by Respondent also showed other signs clearly on the right-of-way which were not cited as being in violation. One of these signs advertised Job Services of Florida, a state agency. The DOT inspector testified this sign was not cited because he understood state owned signs were exempt from the-no sign on right- of-way statute.
