The Issue Whether Respondent's employment should be terminated "for being absent without approved leave," as recommended in the Superintendent of Schools of the School District of Palm Beach County's Petition for Involuntary Resignation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The School Board is responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) and support facilities within the jurisdictional boundaries of the School District. Systemwide testing programs in the School District are coordinated by the School District's Department of Research, Evaluation, and Accountability (DREA). At all times material to the instant case, Marc Baron headed DREA. DREA operates a test distribution center. Cherie Boone is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, in charge of the DREA test distribution center. Ms. Boone supervises four employees. As their supervisor, she is "responsible for [among other things, their] time and attendance." Respondent is employed as a materials handling technician with the School District. At all times material to the instant case, he was assigned to work in the DREA test distribution center under the direct supervision of Ms. Boone. As a materials handling technician employed by the School District, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 1227 (NCF&O) and, at all times material to the instant case, has been covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School District and NCF&O (NCF&O Contract). Article 7 of the NCF&O Contract discusses "employees['] contractual rights." It provides as follows: SECTION 1. Probationary Employees All newly hired or rehired employees may be subject to a probationary period of ninety (90) workdays. Employees who have not completed such period of employment may be discharged without recourse. Probationary employees shall not be eligible for any type of leave except accrued sick leave, annual leave, or short term unpaid leave (due to illness) not to exceed five (5) days. SECTION 2. Permanent Employees Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee status shall be continuous unless the Superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). In the event the Superintendent seeks termination of a continuous employee, the School Board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the termination. The appeals process shall be determined in accordance with Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). Article 8 of the NFC&O Contract addresses the subject of "[m]anagement [r]ights." It provides as follows: NCF&O and its members recognize the responsibility of the District to operate and manage its affairs in all respects in accordance with its responsibilities as established by law and as delegated by the State Board of Education; and the powers of authority which the District has not officially agreed to share by this agreement, are retained by the District. It is the right of the District to determine unilaterally the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organization and operations. It is also the right of the District to manage and direct its employees, establish reasonable rules and procedures, take disciplinary action for proper cause, and relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, provided, however, that the exercise of such rights shall not preclude employees or their representatives from raising grievances, should decisions on the above matters have the practical consequences of violating the terms and conditions of this agreement in force. The District has the sole authority to determine the purpose and mission and the amount of the budget to be adopted by the School Board. The District and NCF&O agree that the District has and retains unaltered, its legal right to select, assign, reassign, or relocate any of its employees, and to carry out its mission under the law and State Board of Education Regulations, unless otherwise specifically enumerated herein. Except to the extent it has been done prior to May 26, 1998, no bargaining unit work which would result in the loss of jobs by members of the bargaining unit, shall be contracted out without prior consultation with the Union. It is understood that changes under this Article may not be arbitrary and capricious, and it is agreed that the District has those rights which are enumerated within Florida Statute 447; however, nothing herein shall relieve the parties of their ability to request impact bargaining. Among the "rules and procedures" that the School District, through the School Board, has established in exercising its "[m]anagement [r]ights" are School Board Directive 3.27 and School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80, which provide, in pertinent part, as follows: School Board Directive 3.27 * * * Resignations. If employees desire to be released from their employment contract the following procedures are to be followed: * * * c. When employees do not report for duty for three (3) consecutive days without notifying their supervisor, the principal/department head will initiate a certified letter to the employee stating that their resignations will be recommended to the School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. * * * Suspension/Termination. The Principal/Department Head may recommend to the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Relations disciplinary action against an employee if the employee commits one or more of the following offenses, including but not limited to: * * * b. Willful absence from duty without leave in violation of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes.[2] * * * Employees included in a bargaining unit are subject to suspension/dismissal provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. * * * 6. When a recommendation for suspension and termination is made, the procedures listed in School Board Policy 3.27 shall be followed. * * * School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80 A leave of absence is permission granted by the Board, or allowed under its adopted policies, for an employee to be absent from duty for specified periods of time with the right of returning to employment on the expiration of the leave. All absences of School Board employees from duty shall be covered by leave duly authorized and granted. Leave shall be officially granted in advance by the School Board and shall be used for the purposes set forth in the leave application. Leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. No leave except military leave shall be granted for a period greater than one (1) year. A new leave application may be filed and granted at the expiration of leave, but automatic renewals of leave shall not be allowed. Leave may be with or without pay and provided by law, rules of the State Board of Education, School Board policy, and negotiated contracts. If the terms of the collective bargaining agreement differ from this Policy, the language of the employee's agreement will take precedence. The following types of leave are available for School District employees: Leave for personal reasons Annual leave for 12-month personnel Sick leave Catastrophic leave Injury or illness in-line-of-duty leave Sabbatical leave Temporary military leave Regular military service leave Professional leave and extended professional leave Charter school leave Voluntary/extended military leave Leave of absence for the purpose of campaigning for political office Personal leave including maternity/ recovery and child care Paid Leaves * * * c. Sick Leave * * * iv. An employee requiring more than thirty (30) working days of paid leave for recovery may be required to submit medical evidence at reasonable intervals supporting the need for additional leave. * * * Sick leave claims shall be honored as submitted by the employee for personal illness, as well as illness or death of father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, child or other close relative or member of the employee's own household. Sick leave without pay may be granted for employees who have used all accumulated sick leave, but who would otherwise qualify for sick leave. The Superintendent may require a doctor's statement of verification of illness. A request to the Superintendent for a verification of claim may be initiated by the principal or supervisor. * * * Unpaid Leaves * * * e. Personal Leave -- An employee requesting short-term or long-term personal leave shall make written application to the supervisor, stating reasons for such leave. The Board shall satisfy itself in terms of the need of the requested leave. Personal leave may be used to extend a leave of absence due to sickness when that sickness has extended beyond all compensable leave for the duration of up to one (1) calendar year when supported by doctor's statements verifying the necessity of the extended leave. An employee requesting return to duty who has served efficiently and exhibited those qualities called for in the position held prior to such leave will be given every consideration for reemployment provided the conditions of employment have been met and the request is supported by a doctor's statement certifying that his physical condition is satisfactory to return to normal duties. * * * Article 17 of the NCF&O Contract, as noted in Article 7 of the contract, deals with the "[d]iscipline of [e]mployees." It provides as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Union, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. All disciplinary action shall be governed by applicable statutes and provisions of the Agreement. Further, an employee shall be provided with a written charge of wrongdoing, setting forth the specific charges against that employee as soon as possible after the investigation has begun. Any information which may be relied upon to take action against an employee will be shared promptly with said employee and his/her Union representative as soon as possible. Copies of any written information/correspondence that is related to the action of the employee or the investigating administrator(s) will be provided promptly to the employee and his/her Union representative. An employee against whom action is to be taken under this Article and his/her Union representative shall have the right to review and refute any and all of the information relied upon to support any proposed disciplinary action prior to taking such action. To this end, the employee and the Union representative shall be afforded a reasonable amount of time to prepare and present responses/refutations concerning the pending disciplinary action and concerning the appropriateness of the proposed disciplinary action. This amount of time is to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. Only previous disciplinary actions which are a part of the employee’s personnel file or which are a matter of record as provided in paragraph #7 below may be cited if these previous actions are reasonably related to the existing charge. Where just cause warrants such disciplinary action(s) and in keeping with provisions of this Article, an employee may be reprimanded verbally, reprimanded in writing, suspended without pay, or dismissed upon the recommendation of the immediate supervisor to the Superintendent and final action taken by the District. Other disciplinary action(s) may be taken with the mutual agreement of the parties. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable School Board rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With A Written Notation. Such written notation shall be placed in the employee’s personnel file and shall not be used to the further detriment of the employee, unless there is another reasonably related act by that same employee within a twenty-four (24) month period. Written Reprimand. A written reprimand may be issued to an employee when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article. Such written reprimand shall be dated and signed by the giver of the reprimand and shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file upon a receipt of a copy to the employee by certified mail. Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay by the School Board may be issued to an employee, when appropriate, in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. The length of the suspension also shall be determined by just cause as set forth in this Article. The notice and specifics of the suspension without pay shall be placed in writing, dated, and signed by the giver of the suspension and a copy provided to the employee by certified mail. The specific days of suspension will be clearly set forth in the written suspension notice which shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file in keeping with provisions of Chapter 119 and 231.291 of the Florida Statutes. An employee may be dismissed when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. An employee against whom disciplinary action(s) has/have been taken may appeal through the grievance procedure. However, if the disciplinary action(s) is/are to be taken by the District, then the employee shall have a choice of appeal between either the Department [sic] of Administrative Hearings in accordance with Florida Statutes or the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. Such choice must be exercised within fifteen (15) days of receipt of written notification of disciplinary action being taken, and the District notified accordingly. If the grievance procedure is selected, the grievance shall be initiated at Step Three. Article 18 of the NCF&O Contract describes the grievance procedure available to bargaining unit members who allege a "misapplication or misinterpretation of the agreement." The described procedure consists of an "informal level" and four formal "levels," the final one being "arbitration before an impartial arbitrator, using the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services." Pursuant to Section 4B. of Article 18, "if NCF&O decides to withdraw its support of an alleged grievance, the individual may continue to process the claim on his/her own, so long as all costs are borne by that individual"; however, according to Section 4E. of Article 18, "[a]grievance, once [actually] withdrawn, may not be reopened without the mutual written agreement between the [School District] and [the] NCF&O." "[L]eave [w]ithout [p]ay" is the subject of Article 25 of the NCF&O Contract, which provides as follows: SECTION 1. Personal Leave of Absence Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent. An employee granted an unpaid leave of absence shall be returned to his/her former classification if the leave is less than ninety (90) days, notwithstanding the layoff provisions contained in this agreement. An employee granted a leave of absence and who wishes to return before the leave period has expired, may submit a request to return to the principal/department head. An employee granted a leave of absence in excess of ninety (90) days will be permitted to return to work provided there is an opening in the same job classification in the work unit. If the former position is not available, the employee, upon written request, shall be listed as an eligible applicant for a period of six (6) months. Group Life and Hospitalization Insurance coverage may be continued for a period equal to the authorized leave of absence, provided full premium payments, including the Board's payment, are kept current by the employee. SECTION 2. Return from Leave Failure to return to work at the expiration of approved leave shall be considered as absence without leave and grounds for dismissal.[3] This section should be subject to extenuating circumstances preventing timely return, as determined by the Superintendent.4 Section 2 of Article 35 of NCF&O Contract protects employees from "[h]arassment." It provides as follows: No employee shall be subjected to or be part of: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, offensive, lewd or suggestive comments. Also includes the creation of a hostile, intimidating, or offensive work environment. Verbal or physical abuse is submitted to by an employee. An adverse decision is made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. Verbal or physical abuse. An adverse decision shall not be made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. There came a time when Respondent claimed, in a Level One grievance filed under the NCF&O Contract, that he was a victim, at the hands of Ms. Boone, of the "[h]arassment" proscribed by Section 2 of Article 35 of the contract. The grievance was filed (with the support of NCF&O) on or about April 8, 2004, several weeks following an incident in which Ms. Boone "yell[ed]" at Respondent for returning "a little bit late[]" from a delivery run. It contained the following "[g]rievance [s]tatement" and description of the "[r]elief [s]ought": Grievance Statement: (Include Date of Occurrence) Mr. Ellis fe[e]ls that he is working in a hostile work environment. He had meeting with the Dept. Head to express his feelings. On March 31, the employee was issued a written reprimand when there has never been any discipline for the employee. Relief Sought: The reprimand is withdrawn from all personnel files. All intimidation of the employee to cease immediately. Ms. Boone, on behalf of the School District, responded to the grievance by providing Respondent with the following written "disposition": After careful consideration of all available information, it has been determined that there has not been a violation, misapplication, or misinterpretation of the collective bargaining procedures. The grievance was not pursued beyond Level One. Since March 16, 2004, Respondent had not been reporting to work, notwithstanding that he had not received authorization to be absent. On or about April 5, 2004, Respondent submitted a request for leave of absence without pay for the period from April 5, 2004, to July 5, 2004. The type of leave without pay he requested was personal leave. By letter dated April 8, 2004, Mr. Baron advised Respondent that Respondent's request was being denied. In his letter, Mr. Baron wrote: You were absent without approved leave on April 5, 2004, April 6, 2004, and April 8, 2004. On Monday, April 5, 2004, you reported your intended absences and requested personal leave of absence starting April 5, 2004 through July 5, 2004. Pursuant to Article 25, Section 1, of the Agreement between The School District of Palm Beach County and National Conference of Firem[e]n & Oilers, "Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent." Your request for personal unpaid leave is denied. You are directed to return to work on Monday, April 12, 2004. Continued unapproved absences will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. Respondent did not return to work on April 12, 2004, as directed. The matter of Respondent's unauthorized absences was then "turn[ed] . . . over to [the School District's] personnel [office]" to "deal with." The personnel office decided to ask the School Board to terminate Respondent's employment for his having been absent without authorization. Before the School Board took any action, Respondent submitted another request for leave of absence without pay. The type of leave without pay he requested this time was sick leave. On the request form, Respondent indicated that he wanted the leave period to begin on April 16, 2004, "but there was no end date" written in anywhere on the form. Without an "end date," the form could not be processed. Sherry Kleinman, a School District analyst assigned to the personnel office (whose job duties include processing "all the leaves of absence for School [District] employees"), telephoned Respondent and "asked him what end date he wanted" her to place on the form for him. During their telephone conversation, Ms. Kleinman and Respondent "agreed upon" a May 17, 2004, "end date." Ms. Kleinman inserted this "end date" in the appropriate space on the form and then completed processing Respondent's leave request. Respondent was granted leave without pay for the period starting April 16, 2004, and ending May 17, 2004. Moreover, the personnel office "pulled" its recommendation that the School Board terminate Respondent for his having been absent without authorization. Respondent did not report to work at any time following the expiration of his authorized leave on May 17, 2004, nor did he seek an extension of this leave. There has been no showing made that there were extenuating circumstances present preventing Respondent's timely return to work; nor has it been shown that the issue of whether such extenuating circumstances existed has ever been presented to the Superintendent for determination. Personnel office staff attempted to reach Respondent by telephone to encourage him to seek an extension of the authorized leave that had expired. These efforts were unsuccessful. Upon being advised of the situation by Ms. Kleinman, NCF&O business agent Carolyn Killings, who had helped Respondent in filing his "[h]arassment" grievance, offered to try to contact Respondent, but she too was unable to "reach him." By letter dated June 14, 2004, Ernie Camerino, the assistant director of the personnel office, advised Respondent of the following: You were recently notified by your supervisor of your failure to return to work. As a result of such action, Personnel is currently processing your involuntary resignation from employment with the School District. Please be advised that I will recommend at the July 21, 2004 meeting of the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, your involuntary resignation. Subsequent to the July 21, 2004 Board meeting you will have fifteen (15) days to file an appeal under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. Unless a timely request for an administrative hearing (DOAH) is made within fifteen (15) days stated herein pursuant to Section 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes the District will consider this matter closed. This action is taken in accordance with Section 1001.42 and 1001.51, Florida Statutes. Failure to timely request an administrative hearing shall waive all rights to request a DOAH hearing on such matters and shall be subject only to appeal rights under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. You have a choice of filing a grievance or requesting a hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). Questions regarding the appeals process should be referred to the District's Legal Department. If you find this letter inconsistent with the action taken above, you may contact Mr. Camerino immediately at . . . to resolve this matter prior to School Board Action. By letter dated July 8, 2004, Respondent informed the School District's legal department that he was "requesting an appeal" of Mr. Camerino's "involuntary resignation" recommendation. On August 23, 2004, the same day the Superintendent filed his Petition for Involuntary Resignation recommending that the School Board terminate Respondent's employment, the School District referred Respondent's appeal to DOAH.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order terminating Respondent's employment based on his failure to return to work following the expiration of his leave without pay on May 17, 2004. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2005.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Kenneth M. Watson, abandoned his career service position with the Department pursuant to Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by being absent from work without authorization on November 4, 5 and 6, 1987?
Findings Of Fact Mr. Watson was employed by the Department from June l2, 1985, until November 6, 1987. When Mr. Watson was first employed by the Department he was given a copy of the Florida Department of Transportation Employee Handbook. Mr. Watson was, therefore, informed of the following, which appears on page 43 of the Handbook (DOT exhibit 5-B): JOB ABANDONMENT After an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current leave policy. The leave policy of the Department requires that employees "[g]et your supervisor's approval before taking leave." Page 21 of the Handbook (see DOT exhibit 5-A). In November, 1987, Mr. Watson was employed by the Department as a Highway Maintenance Technician II. He was a Career Service employee. In November, 1987, Mr. Watson worked under the direct supervision of Tommy Gay. Mr. Gay was a welder and had no authority over Mr. Watson other than to supervise work they performed together. Mr. Gay had no authority to approve personal absences from work for Mr. Watson. Mr. Watson's next immediate supervisor was Elzie Mercer, a Highway Maintenance Supervisor IV. Mr. Mercer had authority to approve personal absences from work for Mr. Watson. Mr. Watson's next immediate supervisor was Joseph Heath, the District Bridge Inspection Engineer. Mr. Heath also had the authority to approve personal absences from work for Mr. Watson. On November 3, 1987, Mr. Watson was absent from work. This absence had been approved by the Department. Mr. Watson was supposed to return to work on November 4, 1987. He was supposed to be at work on November 5 and 6, 1987, also. Mr. Watson did not report to work with the Department on November 4, 5 or 6, 1987. Neither Mr. Mercer or Mr. Heath approved Mr. Watson's absence for November 4, 5 or 6, 1987. Mr. Watson did not directly contact Messrs. Gay, Mercer and Heath, or anyone else at the Department about his absence on November 4, 5 or 6, 1987. Mr. Watson did not request approval for his absence on November 4, 5 or 6, 1987. A woman who identified herself as Mrs. Green called the Department on November 4, 1987, and spoke with the receptionist, Carol Ellis. Mrs. Green informed Ms. Ellis that "if Mr. Watson does not show up at his job in a couple of days he is probably in jail." Ms. Ellis informed Messrs. Gay and Mercer about this conversation. Mrs. Green called again on November 6, 1987, and spoke with Barbara Taylor, a secretary with the Department. Ms. Taylor informed Mr. Heath of this phone call. Mr. Heath had Mr. Gay call the Duval County Jail. Mr. Gay verified that Mr. Watson was in jail. Mr. Watson first spoke with Mr. Heath on November 10, 1987. Mr. Watson informed Mr. Heath that he was in jail. Mr. Watson requested approval of annual and sick leave for the period of his absence. Mr. Watson was told that he could not use sick leave for the absence. Mr. Heath also informed Mr. Watson that he was denying the request for annual leave and that Mr. Watson would be treated as having abandoned his position with the Department because of his unauthorized absence. Mr. Watson spoke with Mr. Heath by telephone again on November 13, 1987. Mr. Heath again denied Mr. Watson's request for leave. On November 17, 1987, Mr. Watson appeared at work for the first time since before his authorized absence on November 3, 1987. He was informed that he could not work and he left. Messrs. Mercer and Heath were not contacted by Mr. Watson and requested to approve his absence from work on November 4, 5 and 6, 1987, until November 10, 1987, or later. At no time did Mr. Watson obtain approval of his absence. Mr. Watson was informed by letter dated November 24, 1987, that he had abandoned his position with the Department. The Department received a letter on November 25, 1987, requesting a formal administrative hearing. Mr. Watson had sufficient annual leave to cover his absence from the Department on November 4, 5 and 6, 1987. He did not have sufficient annual leave to cover his absence through November 17, 1987.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued by the Department of Administration concluding that Kenneth M. Watson abandoned his career service position with the Department. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX Case Number 88-0798 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-3. 2-3 4. 4-5 5. 6 7. 7 11. 8 13. 9 11-15. 10 16. Hereby accepted. See 17. 13 13. 9. But see 16. Mr. Watson attempted to return to work on November 17, 1989. Hereby accepted. 16 18. 17-18 2. 19-20 Although generally true, the Department failed to present evidence sufficient to support these policies. See Florida Medical Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 463 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1 and 3-6. 2 7. 3 9. 4 11. 5 12. Except for the last three sentences, these proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last three sentences are accepted in findings of fact 14-16. Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence or irrelevant in this de novo proceeding. Not supported by the weight of the evidence or argument. See 20. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Irrelevant in this de novo proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry G. Traynham, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Larry D. Scott Senior Attorney Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS #58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye N. Henderson, P.E., Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Corrections as a full-time career service employee. On July 13, 1984, he was ranked as a Correctional Officer I at Florida State Prison (FSP). On March 2, 1990, Petitioner had been placed on workers' compensation due to a back injury. On Thursday, April 5, 1990, Dr. W. David Sikes of the Bradford Chiropractic Center signed a medical release permitting Petitioner to return to light duty on Monday, April 9, 1990. Dr. Sikes was apparently the authorized treating physician to whom the agency had currently obligated itself pursuant to Chapter 440 F.S. [The Florida Workers' Compensation Act]. A previous physician had released Petitioner for full-duty work on April 3, 1990. Petitioner was present in the office of Personnel Manager Marion Bronson on Friday, April 6, 1990. At that time, Mr. Bronson told Petitioner to report for work on the first shift (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) on Monday, April 9, 1990. This meant Petitioner would be doing mail room duty during the day instead of his regular duties on his regular shift of midnight to 8:00 a.m. Petitioner told Mr. Bronson he could not work the first shift due to his needing to be home to take of his invalid wife. To this, Mr. Bronson replied that the first shift was the only light duty available. On Friday, April 6, 1990 Petitioner did not refuse to come in to work the first shift on Monday, April 9, and he did not tell Mr. Bronson that he was already signed out on annual leave for that date. Nonetheless, Mr. Bronson was left with the impression at the end of their meeting that Petitioner would not come back to light-duty work on Monday. Petitioner did not report for work on the first shift on April 9, 10, or 11, 1990 (Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday). On Wednesday, April 11, 1990, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: You have been carried in unauthorized leave without pay status since April 9, 1990. You were also carried on unauthorized leave without pay on April 3, 1990. You are hereby instructed to return to duty at 8:00 a.m. the day after you receive this letter. If you do not return to duty on that date it will be deemed that you have abandoned your position at Florida State Prison and you will be dismissed. In the past, the FSP personnel office usually made further efforts to contact missing employees after such a letter had been sent, but no such attempts were made in this instance. Normally, FSP gives employees an opportunity to call in and rectify absentee problems but deems it abandonment if the employee does not respond. At no time subsequent to April 6, 1990 did Petitioner contact anyone at FSP regarding his absence. Petitioner did not actually receive the April 11 letter until Friday, April 13. Petitioner did not report for work on Saturday, April 14, Sunday, April 15, or Monday, April 16. Saturday would have been a regular workday for Petitioner. However, Petitioner's usual days off were Sunday and Monday, and nothing had been said by Mr. Bronson about altering Petitioner's workdays. On Monday, April 16, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: This is to inform you that in accordance with Section 22A-7.010(2), F.A.C., you have been deemed to have abandoned your position as Correctional Officer I and resigned from the Career Service System effective April 14, 1990. A copy of Section 22A-7.010(2) is enclosed for your information. You have been absent from duty for at least three consecutive workdays without authorized leave as follows: April 10, 11, and 12, 1990. Please be advised that you have been dropped from the payroll effective the close of business April 14, 1990. Unbeknownst to Mr. Bronson, Petitioner had exercised preapproved annual leave for the period of April 10-14, 1990. None of Petitioner's superiors advised Mr. Bronson of this fact. There was no notation to this effect in Petitioner's personnel file in Mr. Bronson's office. It was Mr. Bronson's testimony that it was better personnel management and he would have preferred to have Petitioner drawing annual leave during this period than to be paying him full pay for makeshift light duty. If Petitioner had requested annual leave on April 6, 1990, Mr. Bronson would have granted it. As of April 14, 1990, Petitioner had "banked" 119.75 hours of annual leave time which would have been sufficient to cover his April 10-14, 1990 vacation or "no show" days. Additionally, he also had available 26.5 hours of sick leave but this sick leave was subject to certain deductions and adjustments which had allowed the agency to keep Petitioner on at full pay the previous week while technically he was only eligible for a reduced amount based on workers' compensation. In accord with standard FSP policy, Petitioner had previously submitted an annual leave request form on October 16, 1989 to request leave for the week of April 10 through April 14, 1990. This form had been approved by his immediate superior, who at that time was his shift supervisor, Officer Gaskin. Officer Gaskin was the correct superior to make such approval. Mr. Bronson has nothing to do with the approval of leave under such circumstances. Harry Tison, who became Petitioner's shift supervisor in April 1990 while Petitioner was still out on workers' compensation leave, was not aware of Petitioner's preapproved annual leave until Mr. Bronson's office began making inquiries after the April 16 letter, but at that time, Tison was able to refer to a leave calendar posted in his area which showed that Petitioner was expected to be out on annual leave on those days. From that information, Officer Tison, by reason of his familiarity with the FSP system and hierarchy, could infer that Petitioner's leave had been approved by FSP's highest command figure, "the Colonel." Some witnesses alluded to FSP policy that even preapproved annual leave requests constituted only tentative approval unless the employee checked with his supervisor a week before actually exercising his leave so as to be sure that the preapproved leave had not been revoked due to an employee crunch, but there is no such rule or printed policy of the Department of Corrections or FSP, and the evidence is insufficient to establish such a vague policy as uniform or binding on Petitioner. Also, in this instance, the week before, Petitioner was away from work most of that week on workers' compensation disability, and there is no evidence of any employee crunch which would have altered the prior annual leave approval.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner has not abandoned his position and returning him to the appropriate position with back pay and emoluments, subject to any appropriate setoffs under the Workers' Compensation Act and any mitigation from other employment. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Petitioner has filed only a "Final Argument" and that is essentially legal argument and proposed conclusions of law as opposed to proposed findings of fact which are entitled to a ruling pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. Moreover, the format does not lend itself to intelligible rulings since no sentence is numbered. Respondent's PFOF: 1-6 Accepted. Accepted except for the last sentence, which does not comport with the testimony heard. Accepted. Rejected in FOF 13, which reflects the greater weight of the credible evidence. Accepted but subordinate. - 15 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Perri M. King Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Gloria W. Fletcher, Esquire 515 North Main Street, Suite 300 Post Office Box 1208 Gainesville, Florida 32602 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue in this case involves a consideration of whether the Petitioner has abandoned his job position with the Respondent as described in Rule 22A- 7.010, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact In the relevant time period which is associated with this case, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Revenue as an Appraiser II in the Jacksonville, Florida, office of the Northeast Region, Bureau of Field Appraisals, Division of Ad Valorem Tax. He worked with the Respondent agency beginning April 1980 until his dismissal from the agency on December 17, 1986, based upon the theory that he had allegedly abandoned his job within the meaning of Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. During his employment Petitioner operated out of his home, which was in Palm Coast, Florida. Douglas Drozd, an employee of the Respondent agency, was sent to the Jacksonville office of the Bureau of Field Appraisals, Division of Ad Valorem Tax to serve as a temporary Appraiser Supervisor for that office. This assignment occurred on October 6, 1986. On October 21, 1986, Albert Johnson, the former Appraiser Supervisor with the Jacksonville office, left that position. Following the departure of Johnson, Drozd became the permanent Appraiser Supervisor for the Jacksonville office. From October 6, 1986, through November 18, 1986, Drozd acted in the capacity as the immediate supervisor of the Petitioner. Beyond that date, Robert Worley, an Appraiser II in the Jacksonville office, took over the position of Appraiser Supervisor in the subject regional office. Worley served in the capacity of supervisor from November 19, 1986, until December 22, 1986, when he returned to his duties as Appraiser II. While Worley was serving as Appraiser Supervisor, Drozd took over the function of Property Appraiser, Duval County, Florida. On December 22, 1986, Drozd returned to his duties as Appraiser Supervisor for Respondent's Jacksonville office. On November 17, 1986, Petitioner asked the permission of his supervisor, Drozd, to take annual leave for days in December 1986. This request was not made in writing and was not responded to in writing. Although Rule 22A- 8.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, contemplates that leave shall be requested in writing, it gas the custom and practice of the Respondent agency for oral requests for annual leave to be made and approved orally. At the time of the conversation on November 17, 1986, between the Petitioner and Drozd concerning the request for annual leave, Drozd initially granted that request without any reservations or contingencies being applied to the permission given. Subsequently, on that same day, Drozd told Richards that he expected that all "field work" assigned to the Petitioner should be completed before leave was taken. This arrangement included work being done on vacant parcels of property as well as improved parcels. More particularly, "field work" includes: Completion of neighborhood analysis form Dr-549 Completion of structural elements form Dr-551 Measurements of all improvements Notes pertaining to subject property (condition of property, any unusual circumstances) Sketching and traversing (perimeter measurements for calculating square footage) Pictures Completion of factual change of physical characteristics forms. Worley was unaware on November 17, 1986, of the arrangement between Drozd and the Petitioner concerning conditions placed upon the permission for the Petitioner to take leave as set forth by Drozd. Petitioner's work assignment involved 180 parcels. Effective December 12, 1986, 27 parcels had "field work" which was incomplete, according to his flow chart of that date. Effective that date, Petitioner had turned in field folders for 88 of the 180 parcels. He kept 92 field folders for the remaining parcels. Thus, his supervisor was unable to verify whether Petitioner had completed his "field work" as summarized in his flow chart submitted on December 12, 1986. According to Petitioner's account set forth in his flow chart of December 12, 1986, which is part of Petitioner's Exhibit R submitted by the Respondent and admitted into evidence, the 27 parcels pertained to vacant land. Petitioner further conceded that other minor problems existed concerning the completeness of the "field work" pertaining to the improved parcels reported in his flow chart. Prior to Petitioner's departure from the Jacksonville office on December 12, 1986, Worley, who was then serving as the Appraiser Supervisor, did not have a detailed knowledge of the flow chart submitted by the Petitioner on that date. Worley had reviewed some of the Petitioner's files and noted shortcomings in the work; however, on balance, Worley took no issue with Petitioner's work progress. Worley acquiesced in the Petitioner's departure on the afternoon of December 12, 1986, as a prelude to the commencement of Petitioner's annual leave on December 15, 1986 This acquiescence was by a verbal expression to the effect that the Petitioner should have a nice holiday. By contrast, on December 12, 1986, Drozd became aware, upon examination of Petitioner's flow chart, that certain parcels had not been completed in terms of "field work." Drozd's observations about Petitioner's flow chart became significant when Worley and Drozd spoke to supervisors in Tallahassee, Florida, on the afternoon of December 12, 1986, in the person of Ben Faulk, Chief of the Bureau of Field Operations in the Respondent agency, and Eugene White, who was the Deputy Director of the Division of Ad Valorem Tax for that organization. In actuality, there were two conversations, and in the latter conversation Drozd participated in a discussion in which Faulk, White and Drozd determined that Petitioner should not be allowed to proceed with annual leave based upon his failure to comply with the contingency which Drozd had established on November 17, 1986, pertaining to Petitioner's wish to take annual leave, the contingency being completion of "field work." The latter conversation between Worley, Drozd, White and Faulk took place following Petitioner's departure from the Jacksonville office. At the time this conversation was held, Drozd was not a member of the Respondent agency. On the other hand, Faulk and White were appropriate officials within the Respondent agency with power to make determinations concerning the annual leave of a subordinate employee, in this instance, the Petitioner. Worley was also a proper source of policy in she management chain. It was decided that Worley should try to telephone the Petitioner and forestall the use of the annual leave by Petitioner. Emphasis is placed upon the fact that Faulk and White felt that this denial of Petitioner's annual leave based upon Petitioner's failure to meet a contingency concerning his "field work" was an appropriate disposition of the case. Around 6:00 p.m., Worley was able to reach Petitioner by telephone while Petitioner was at his daughter's home, preparing to leave for a trip to Washington, D.C. In placing the telephone call to Petitioner, Worley did not favor the revocation of leave opportunity. Nonetheless, he did revoke the leave while acting as supervisor for the Northeast Region, at the behest of Drozd and upon authority of Faulk and White. In the conversation with Petitioner on December 12, 1986, by telephone, Worley told Petitioner that his leave had been revoked and that Petitioner should report to his job assignment at 8:00 a.m. on Monday, December 15, 1986, or be considered on unauthorized leave. Further, it was explained to Petitioner that he would be considered to have abandoned his job position if he had not returned to work by 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, December 17, 1986. These remarks by Worley were not equivocal, and Petitioner understood the significance of those instructions and the implications of his failure to attend his duties on the dates described. This understanding of the explanation of unauthorized leave and potential abandonment of his job position was held by the Petitioner at the point of the conversation at approximately 6:00 p.m. on December 12, 1986. Instead of reporting to work on December 15, 1986, at 8:00 a.m., Respondent absented himself from his job assignment on that date and on December 16 and 17, 1986. For those three consecutive days in which Respondent did not attend his job, his nonattendance was without authorization to take any form of leave and in the face of having been advised that he was in the posture of unauthorized leave. The days that Petitioner was missing from his job were work days. Petitioner's choice to go forward with his vacation plans and ignore the instruction of his supervisor concerning returning to his job position was made knowingly, with volition, with intent and showed willful disregard of a legitimate order of a superior. Petitioner had decided that since he had longstanding plans for taking annual leave in Washington, D.C., and given the fact that his wife was already there awaiting the arrival of the Petitioner and his daughter, he would go forward with his plan on the expectation that someone in his employment system would not allow a conclusion to be drawn that he had abandoned his job position. In furtherance of the assertion that the Petitioner would be considered to have abandoned his job position if he didn't return before the conclusion of the work day on December 17, 1986, a memorandum was sent to the Petitioner at his residence on December 15, 1986. A copy of that memorandum may be found as Respondent's Exhibit Q admitted into evidence. Petitioner did not become aware of this memorandum until returning from his vacation. When he returned, he signed for service of correspondence of December 18, 1986, which constituted the Respondent agency's notice of claimed abandonment and notice of rights to administrative hearing to contest that claim. A copy of that notification may be found as part of the Respondent's Exhibit M admitted into evidence, together with the return receipt signed by the Petitioner on December 29, 1986. A timely petition requesting consideration of the agency's claims of abandonment was filed by the Petitioner on January 5, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Respondent has been a permanent full-time employee of petitioner's for over 22 years and at the time of the alleged abandonment was employed as a Engineer Technician III in petitioner's Second District and is subject to the Career Service rules of Chapter 22A, Florida Administrative Code. Walter Henry Skinner, III, is the District Engineer, Second District, with offices in Lake City, Florida, covering a 16 county area over northeast Florida. In this instance, directly below Mr. Skinner in the chain of command is Raymond O. Humphreys, Resident Construction Engineer. His is a supervising position as contract administrator for road and bridge contracts let by the petitioner to private contracting firms for construction of roads and bridges within 9 counties of the second district. Respondent has worked within Mr. Humphreys' jurisdiction since March, 1976. The record is not clear, but apparently there is at least one other supervisor between Mr. Humphreys and respondent, the position of survey crew chief. Respondent was granted leave of absence without pay on Humphreys' recommendation on May 1, 1983 through July 12, 1983 (Petitioner's Exhibit 9); October 3, 1983 through April 2, 1983 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8); and again on April 3, 1984 for 6 months (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4). Respondent returned to work before the end of this 6 months leave of absence without pay. The record does not reflect when respondent returned to work but apparently he returned to work sometime after his release from the Hamilton County Jail on July 9, 1984. The record shows that respondent was working on September 21, 1984 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3). Respondent was granted 4 hours annual leave on September 24, 1984, 8 hours of annual leave on September 25, 1984 and 8 hours annual leave on September 26, 1984. On September 27, 1984 petitioner placed respondent on unauthorized leave of absence without pay. On September 27, 1984 petitioner was advised by Roger Tanner, respondent's probation officer, that respondent had bean incarcerated in the Hamilton County Jail on September 26, 1984. Petitioner knew that respondent had 78.2 hours of accrued annual leave and 524.0 hours of accrued sick leave. Petitioner did not notify respondent that he had been placed on unauthorized leave without pay on September 27, 1984 until October 4, 1984 when petitioner delivered to respondent a letter from Skinner advising him that he had abandoned his position with the petitioner. Respondent had been incarcerated in the Hamilton County Jail on: (1) April 22, 1983 to July 5, 1983; (2) July 23, 1983; (3) August 11, 1983 to August 12, 1983; (4) September 22, 1983 to July 9, 1984; and (5) September 26, 1984 to October 6, 1984. The evidence reflects that respondent had a "drinking problem" of which petitioner was aware but did very little "counseling" with respondent in this regard. On October 1, 1984 Mr. Markham, Humphreys Resident Office Manager, contacted Judge John Peach's office and was informed by his secretary, after she discussed the matter with Judge Peach, that respondent's "problem would be resolved in a few days" or at least "by the weekend." Respondent worked with a survey crew taking final measurements and checking work in the field completed by the contractors. Respondent was assigned to this survey crew by Humphreys because respondent did not have a valid driver's license. Walter H. Skinner had been delegated authority to take this type action against respondent by Mr. Pappas, Secretary of the Department of Transportation and such delegation was in effect at all times material herein.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that it be found that respondent did not abandon his position and resign from the Career Service as contemplated under Rules 22A-7.1O(2)(a) and 22A-8.O2, Florida Administrative Code and that respondent be reinstated to his position of Engineer Technician III as of September 27, 1984. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald K. Hudson, Esquire Post Office Box 948 Jasper, Florida 32052 Daniel C. Brown Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul A. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla General Counsel 562 Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent’s employment should be suspended and terminated for the reasons set forth in the Amended Petition for Involuntary Resignation.
Findings Of Fact Respondent began her employment with Petitioner as a substitute teacher in November of 1997, and was later hired as a regular teacher in January of 2000. Respondent held a temporary teaching certificate which expired after the time period at issue in this case. Respondent was first assigned to teach at Santaluces High School and was later assigned to Bear Lakes Middle School, where she taught geography. On April 12, 2002, Respondent was injured in the line of duty while attempting to assist another teacher control unruly students. In that incident Respondent fell and injured both her back and her knee. Respondent was authorized by Petitioner’s workers’ compensation administrators to treat with both Dr. Wexler and Dr. Lichtblau for her injuries.1 Following the accident on April 12, 2002, Respondent continued to work at Bear Lakes Middle School until on or about November 11, 2002, when she was placed on a light duty assignment at another location. Respondent had been placed on light duty by Dr. Wexler because he felt it was medically necessary. Thereafter, Respondent was given several light-duty assignments to accommodate her physician-imposed work restrictions, including assignments to Conniston Middle School, Risk Management, JFK Middle School, Gold Coast Community, and the District’s substitute office. Respondent was placed on light-duty assignments by the Palm Beach County School Board (School Board) for a total of more than ten months. The light-duty assignments provided by the School Board are temporary assignments that are made available in lieu of workers’ compensation payments to employees who are able to perform light duty. They are not offered for an indefinite period of time, nor are they offered as a permanent employment option. Following some confused communications about Respondent’s certification status and some further confused communications as to whether Respondent had reached maximum medical improvement and could return to a seven-and-a-half hour per day classroom teacher position, Respondent was offered a job teaching full-time (seven-and-a-half hours per day) at Jeaga Middle School. Respondent was supposed to begin teaching at Jeaga Middle School in September of 2003. On September 10, 2003, Dr. Wexler, one of Respondent’s treating physicians wrote that he agreed with another physician’s assessment that Respondent had reached maximum medical improvement and could work eight hours per day with certain restrictions that could be accommodated in a classroom teaching setting. Later that month, Dr. Wexler explained that there had been some confusion on September 10, 2003, and that he was of the view that Respondent had not yet reached maximum medical improvement and that Respondent’s work hours should be restricted to four hours per day. Respondent declined the offer of the full-time teaching position at Jeaga Middle School and requested that the School Board offer further light-duty work assignments of no more than four hours per day. The School Board promptly informed Respondent that she would not be offered any further light-duty assignments and that if she was not going to accept the full- time position at Jeaga Middle School, she should apply for leave without pay in order to avoid being terminated by the School Board. At an earlier time following her April 12, 2002, injury, Respondent was on leave without pay for a period of time. During that period she received workers’ compensation benefits in lieu of wages or salary. During that period of time Respondent was dissatisfied with the workers’ compensation benefits she received. Because of that prior negative experience, Respondent did not want to again request leave without pay, which would require her to rely on workers’ compensation benefits until she reached maximum medical improvement. Respondent did not accept the full-time position at Jeaga Middle School and did not apply for leave without pay. Respondent did not apply for any other regular employment opportunities with the School Board. Respondent did continue to request assignment to a light-duty position for four hours per day. The School Board advised Respondent on several occasions that she would not be assigned to any further light-duty positions and that it would be in her own best interest to apply for leave without pay to avoid termination from the School Board. As a teacher employed by the School Board, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Classroom Teachers Association (CTA) and, at all times material to the instant case, has been covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School Board and the CTA (CTA Contract). The subject of unpaid leaves is addressed at page 55 of the CTA Contract, which includes the following language: SECTION C - UNPAID LEAVES: GENERAL PROVISIONS All absences of employees from duty shall be covered by leave applications which are duly authorized, a copy of which shall be provided employees upon request. Except for short-term leaves of absence, and intermittent political leave, unpaid leaves shall be timed such that the employee returns at the beginning of a new grading period. Except for extenuating circumstances, Sick Leave without Pay for Personal Illness or Illness/death of a Family Member, for more than ten (10) days, also shall be timed so that the employee returns at the beginning of a grading period. An employee taking an approved unpaid leave shall retain the same contractual and salary credit status as he/she had upon taking such leave and shall be returned to the same school, and within certification, to the same assignment he/she held prior to taking the leave, if said leave is for a duration of twelve (12) months or less. However, an employee while on an unpaid leave shall be subject to the Excessing Procedure and the Lay-Off/Call-Back Procedure of this Agreement the same as if they were not on leave. If these procedures become operative and affect the employee on leave, he/she may not be returned to the same position he/she held prior to taking leave. Likewise, employees while on an unpaid leave maintain their rights to apply for transfers and/or reassignments as provided by this Agreement. * * * SECTION D - UNPAID LEAVES: SPECIFIC PROVISIONS Short Term Leave of Absence - Any employee desiring short term leave of absence shall make written application for such leave to the Principal or immediate supervisor. Except in emergency situation, such applications shall be approved in advance. Leave for emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance, if prompt report is made to the proper authority. The first five (5) requested days of short term leave, whether covered by one (1) or more than one (1) request, will be approved. Requests for short term leave thereafter, regardless of length, will be granted or denied by the District in its discretion. Applications for more than five (5) working days will require that a reason be given and shall be subject to approval by the Superintendent. Employees shall not be gainfully employed during normal working hours while on such leave. Long Term Leave of Absence - A long term leave of absence is permission granted by the Board, at the District’s discretion, for an employee to be absent from his/her duties for specified periods of time with the right of returning to duty on expiration of the leave. Leave shall be officially granted in advance by the District and shall be used for the purpose set forth in the leave application. Such long-term unpaid leave, when granted, will be for the remainder of the school year, unless otherwise approved with the initial leave request. In addition, up to one (1) additional year of leave shall be granted upon receipt of a written request from the employee, unless the employee has not been reappointed in keeping with other provisions of the Agreement for the next school year. Such extension of long-term leave shall be timed such that the employee returns at the beginning of a new grading period. Once an employee has exhausted the leave privileges under this subsection (Long-term Leaves), the employee shall be required to return to duty for a full year before being eligible for another long-term unpaid leave. As a School Board employee, Respondent is subject to applicable School Board rules and regulations, including School Board Policy 3.80 and School Board Directive 3.27. School Board Policy 3.80 addresses unpaid leaves when an employee’s sickness has extended beyond all compensable leave. School Board Directive 3.27 addresses the general topic of separation from employment. Under the caption “Suspension/Termination” the directive provides: 3. The Principal/Department Head may recommend to the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Relations disciplinary action against an employee if the employee commits one or more of the following offenses, including but not limited to: * * * b. Willful absence from duty without leave in violation of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes (now § 1012.67, Fla. Stat.). * * * e. Incompetent to perform regular work duties. Incompetency is defined as incapacity to perform due to lack of emotional stability or physical ability; or lack of adequate command of the designated area of work. Employees are also incompetent when they repeatedly fail to perform duties prescribed by law and by this district. [2] Respondent was personally advised on numerous occasions that if she did not apply for a leave of absence, she would be absent without approved leave and would be subject to termination. Respondent was absent without authorization.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order terminating Respondent’s employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2005.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Vera Evans (Petitioner) was the subject of unlawful discrimination by Life Care Center of Altamonte Springs (Respondent) on the basis of disability, in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Since 1977, and at all times material to this case, the Petitioner has been employed as a licensed practical nurse (LPN). In 2003, the Petitioner began her employment as an LPN with the Respondent in their skilled nursing unit, where she remained employed until her termination from employment on March 26, 2015. According to the formal job description adopted by the Respondent for its LPNs, persons employed as LPNs by the Respondent must “practice dependable, regular attendance” because the essential function of the LPN position is to provide patient care. The Respondent must insure that adequate staffing is available and present to provide such care. The failure of an LPN to be present for work and to be prepared to carry out the functions of the position increases the workload of other staff and can negatively affect patient care. The Respondent has adopted formal policies related to various forms of leave, including routine sick leave as well as extended requests for leave related to medical issues, such as Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave. Additionally the Respondent’s formal policies encourage an employee to request an accommodation when medical impairments present challenges to the performance of the essential functions of an employee’s position. At the hearing, the Petitioner acknowledged that she was aware of the Respondent’s attendance and leave policies. The Petitioner previously requested and received a work accommodation in February 2014, when she was unable to work a full schedule due to a medical issue. In November 2014, the Petitioner took FMLA leave to address another medical issue. According to the documentation submitted by the Petitioner to the Respondent as part of her FLMA leave request, the period of the Petitioner’s incapacity was November 17, 2014, through February 28, 2015. The Petitioner requested and was granted 12 weeks of FMLA leave, which commenced on November 17, 2014. The end of the Petitioner’s 12-week FMLA leave period was February 9, 2015. The Respondent’s FMLA leave policy specifically provides that an employee must return to work on the next scheduled workday after the expiration of the leave period, unless the employee provides a doctor’s note and receives approval from the Respondent. The Respondent’s FMLA leave policy also requires an employee to periodically contact the Respondent during the leave period and report her status, including her intention to return to work. During the time that the Petitioner was on approved FMLA leave, the Petitioner failed to contact the Respondent to indicate when she would be available to return to work. Several times during the Petitioner’s absence, Jermaine Morris, the Respondent’s staffing coordinator, contacted the Respondent and attempted to determine when she would be able to return to work. Mr. Morris did so at the direction of Astrid Lopez, the Respondent’s Director of Human Resources. Mr. Morris’ attempts were unsuccessful because the Petitioner was unable to identify an anticipated return date during their conversations. The Petitioner’s approved FMLA leave expired on February 9, 2015, by which time the Petitioner had failed to communicate to the Respondent her intention to return to work. The Respondent’s adopted leave policy specifically requires that non-FMLA leave requests must be submitted in writing to the requesting employee’s immediate supervisor, and must state the purpose of the request and the proposed dates of absence. Although the Petitioner had not filed a written request for additional leave or submitted the required documentation prior to the expiration of her FMLA leave, the Respondent granted non-FMLA leave to the Petitioner when the Petitioner did not return to work. At the same time, Ms. Lopez also placed the Petitioner on an “as needed” work status (also known as “PRN” status). The PRN classification allowed the Petitioner to remain on the Respondent’s employment roster and required only that she work a single shift during a 60-day period. The Respondent’s leave policy provides that non-FMLA leave is limited to no more than six weeks. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s non-FMLA leave period continued through March 26, 2015. Ms. Lopez testified that, despite the Petitioner’s failure to submit a written request for non-FMLA leave policy, she decided to grant non-FMLA leave because the Petitioner was a valued employee of the Respondent. The Petitioner never submitted a written request for non-FMLA leave, but apparently after Ms. Lopez had already approved the non-FMLA leave, the Petitioner had a doctor’s note delivered to the Respondent. After the Petitioner filed her complaint of discrimination with the FCHR, the Respondent, in preparing to respond to the Petitioner’s complaint, located a note in the Petitioner’s personnel file, purportedly written by a physician on a prescription pad and signed February 19, 2015. The note indicated that the Petitioner would require an additional three months of leave. The Petitioner’s approved FMLA leave had expired prior to the date of the note. For reasons that are unclear, the note was never delivered to Ms. Lopez for her review. Ms. Lopez had approved the non-FMLA leave for the Petitioner prior to the date of the note. The Petitioner never contacted anyone in the Human Resources office to follow-up on the note, and apparently assumed that an additional three months of leave had been approved. The Respondent’s failure to respond to the note was inadvertent. Had the Petitioner actually submitted a written request for non-FMLA leave as required by the Respondent’s policy, the Respondent would have been made aware of the note. There is no evidence that the Respondent’s failure to respond to the note was purposeful or discriminatory against the Petitioner. The Respondent’s leave policy also sets forth the procedure and timelines by which the benefits of an employee on non-FMLA leave are suspended and a COBRA insurance notice issued. The Petitioner’s benefits were suspended and she received a timely COBRA insurance notice as provided by the policy. On March 26, 2015, at the conclusion of the approved non-FMLA leave period, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner’s employment. Prior to the termination, the Petitioner had failed to work a single shift as required by her PRN classification. Moreover, the Petitioner had failed to comply with state- mandatory LPN training requirements that had been imposed prior to the termination date. The Petitioner offered no evidence at the hearing that the Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment was at all related to disability. To the contrary, the Respondent approved the leave requested by the Petitioner, and in fact, granted additional leave to the Petitioner, without her request, so that she remained on the Respondent’s roster of employees. There is no evidence that the Respondent failed to provide any disability-related accommodation requested by the Petitioner. At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that she was not interested in returning to work for the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Prior to her termination and at all times material hereto, Petitioner was employed as a Senior Clerk for Respondent. At sometime prior to December 19, 1988, Petitioner purchased a nonrefundable airline ticket departing on December 23, 1988, and returning on December 30, 1988. Thereafter, Petitioner requested 40 hours of annual leave for the workdays of December 23, 1988, and December 27-30, 1988 and requested her personal holiday for the workday of December 28, 1988. On December 19, 1988, Petitioner was informed that she had 21.2 hours of available annual leave and was granted 16 of those hours for the workdays of December 23, 1988, and December 27, 1988. Petitioner's request to take her personal holiday on December 28, 1988 was denied, as was her request for annual leave for the period of December 28-30, 1988 denied. Upon being advised that a portion of her leave request had been denied, Petitioner told her supervisor about the airline ticket and that she "could not afford to lose my investment of my air-fare." Her supervisor, in turn, advised Petitioner that if she were absent December 28-30, 1988 she would be deemed to have abandoned her position. Notwithstanding such knowledge, Petitioner was absent from work without authorized leave for the three consecutive workdays of December 28-30, 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration issue a final order that the Petitioner abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service System as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of June 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-1185 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 2. Addressed in paragraph 3. Addressed in paragraph 3. Not pertinent nor necessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 3. Not supported by competent and substantial evidence. Not pertinent nor necessary to result reached. Not pertinent nor necessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in paragraph 4. Not pertinent nor necessary to result reached. Not pertinent nor necessary to result reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Thomas H. Bateman, III., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ms. Nancy M. Morrison 1925 Coolidge Hollywood, Florida 33020 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether the Petitioner abandoned his position with the Respondent and resigned from Career Service?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the Department of Corrections as a Correctional Officer I in the Food Service Department at the Union Correctional Institution. Prior to his termination, Petitioner had been employed by the Department of Corrections for approximately four years. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Mr. Norman Hedding, Food Service Director II at Union Correctional Institution. Sometime in April or May, 1987, Petitioner filled out a request for leave, requesting three weeks annual leave to be taken in July, 1987. The request for leave was placed on Mr. Hedding's desk. Mr. Hedding told Petitioner he would see what he could do and mentioned that other officers needed to take vacation time or they would forfeit the time. However, no other officer asked to take leave during the same period of time requested by Petitioner. On various occasions during May, June and July, Petitioner asked Wanda Phillips, Mr. Hedding's assistant, whether his leave had been approved. Ms. Phillips told him she had not heard anything. During one of the conversations with Ms. Phillips, Petitioner told her that he had purchased round-trip airline tickets to California. Petitioner and Mr. Hedding did not speak about the leave request until the Petitioner's last day at work prior to having two scheduled days off and then starting the 3-week period for which leave time had been requested. During this conversation, the Petitioner informed Mr. Hedding that he had confirmed round-trip tickets to California and his grandson had surgery scheduled for the time period in question. The testimony is conflicting as to what was said during this conversation. Mr. Hedding testified that he told Petitioner that the leave was not authorized. Petitioner testified that Mr. Hedding told him that the leave "had not been approved yet." Based on the testimony given at the hearing and the actions of Petitioner after his conversation with Mr. Hedding, I find that Petitioner was never told in unequivocal and clear terms that his leave had been disapproved. Petitioner assumed his leave would be approved and, before leaving work on his last day, he filled out pay slips in advance so that his payroll records would be accurate and told people at the office that he was going on vacation. Petitioner remained in town for the next four days, without reporting for work, and left for California. On August 6, 1987, upon his return from California, Petitioner received a certified letter from Mr. Hicks, an Assistant Superintendent II at Union Correctional Institution, informing Petitioner that he had been deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System. Petitioner then spoke with Mr. Ellis, the Superintendent at Union Correctional Institution, who told Petitioner he needed to talk with Mr. Hedding about getting his job back. Petitioner told Mr. Hedding he had not intended to abandon his position. The next day Mr. Hedding told Petitioner he would not take him back.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered ruling that the circumstances presented in this case do not constitute abandonment as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, and directing that Petitioner be reinstated to his former position as of July 20, 1987. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3828 The parties submitted-proposed findings of fact, which are addressed below. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Petitioner's posthearing filing is a document titled "Petitioner's Argument and Citation of Law." The first three paragraphs consist of factual information and will be considered as proposed findings of fact. Petitioner's proposed findings are generally accepted, as modified in the Findings of Fact to conform to the testimony and evidence presented at hearing. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent's Paragraph Number Ruling and RO Paragraph Accepted. RO 1. Accepted, as modified to reflect approximate dates. RO 2, 3. Rejected. Mr. Hedding assumed this to be the case. Accepted, generally as modified. RO 4. Accepted, generally. RO 5. Accepted, as modified to reflect approximate dates. RO 6. Accepted, as modified. RO 6, 7. First sentence accepted. RO 9. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant. Accepted, generally. RO 10. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Louis A. Vargas, Esquire 409 North East First Street General Counsel Post Office Box 628 Department of Corrections Alachua, Florida 32615 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Perri M. King, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Richard Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Adis Vila, Secretary 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
