The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Petitioner should receive a passing grade on the September 1997 Hearing Aid Specialist examination.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In September 1997, Petitioner was a trainee and candidate for licensure as a hearing aid specialist, pursuant to Chapter 484, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64B6-8, Florida Administrative Code. A trainee studying hearing aid dispensing must do so under the direct supervision of a “sponsor” who is an active Florida licensed hearing aid specialist with an established place of business. Section 484.0445, Florida Statutes; Rule 64B6- 8.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner’s sponsor was Gerald Amato, a hearing aid specialist of over 20 years’ experience. Mr. Amato was a franchisee of Beltone, a manufacturer of audiometric equipment, including hearing aids and audiometers. Beltone supplied all of the equipment used by Petitioner. An “audiometer” is a piece of equipment that measures a person’s ability to hear, and is regularly used by hearing aid specialists and trainees. Petitioner testified that, shortly before he commenced his training program, Beltone converted from manual audiometers to computerized audiometers. Petitioner contends that he was placed at an unfair disadvantage because the examination proctors would not allow him to plug in his computerized audiometer for use during the examination. Petitioner argued that the older, manual audiometers provide visual cues such as dials and meters even when they are not plugged in, cues that assist the trainee to successfully complete the examination. The computerized audiometer, on the other hand, presents nothing but a blank screen when it is not plugged in. Petitioner acknowledged that no one taking the exam was allowed to plug in an audiometer. However, he contended that this was a situation in which technology had outpaced the testing procedures, and that Respondent should have made provisions for persons with computerized equipment to take the exam on an even footing with persons using manual equipment. Ms. Wilma Ferrer, a psychometrician familiar with the hearing aid specialist examination procedures, testified that candidates were informed they could not plug in their audiometers at least three times before they sat for the exam. The “Candidate Information Booklet,” sent by mail to candidates about a month before the exam, expressly states: “Each candidate is required to bring an audiometer with recorded speech and/or live voice capability to be used during the candidate’s examination. Do not plug in audiometer during examination.” During the hands-on portion of the exam, candidates demonstrate proper procedures, using the proctors as their subjects. If the audiometers were plugged in, there would be some chance of damaging the proctors’ hearing during the exam. Ms. Mary Lou Lauster, an expert regarding hearing aid specialists, testified that the purpose of the audiometer portion of the exam is to permit candidates to demonstrate they know which buttons to push to perform each audiometer function, and that they know how to properly fit the headset. Ms. Lauster conceded that some of the older audiometers provide visual cues, but stated her opinion that Petitioner would not be disadvantaged by his use of the computerized audiometer, if he knew how to run it. According to Ms. Lauster, the exam is simply an opportunity for the candidate to talk his or her way through the procedures, and it should make no difference whether the audiometer is plugged in. In other words, the candidate should not need visual cues to successfully negotiate the examination. Ms. Lauster denied the implication that the examiners and the agency itself were unprepared to deal with Petitioner’s new equipment. She testified that other candidates have used the same computerized equipment with success and without incident. At the hearing, Petitioner suggested that a better policy might be to require all candidates to be tested on a single, standard audiometer, so that no candidate could be perceived to have an unfair advantage. Ms. Lauster disagreed with this suggestion, stating that candidates are generally more comfortable using the audiometers with which they were trained. It is found that Respondent’s decision not to allow candidates to plug in their audiometers during the examination was rational and supported by legitimate concerns for the proctors’ hearing. Petitioner was given ample notice that he would not be allowed to plug in his audiometer. Other candidates using the same or similar equipment have successfully completed the examination. All candidates were treated equally in this regard, and Petitioner was not entitled to a special exemption from Respondent’s clearly stated testing policy. Respondent was well aware of the trend in the industry away from manual audiometers, and considered the existence of newer, computerized equipment in deciding to maintain its testing policy of not allowing audiometers to be plugged in during the examinations. Petitioner suggested that his equipment presented a brand new situation that Respondent had not anticipated, but this suggestion was not supported by the evidence presented at hearing. Petitioner also claimed that the proctor engaged him in unnecessary conversation regarding his audiometer, and that this conversation distracted him during the examination. Even crediting Petitioner’s version of events, this conversation cannot be found to have caused Petitioner’s poor performance on the practical portion of the examination. For reasons that cannot be attributed to Respondent, Petitioner entered the examination anticipating that he would be allowed to plug in his audiometer. The undersigned does not doubt Petitioner’s assertion that his performance on the examination was adversely affected when he was not allowed to plug in his audiometer. However, the fault lies with Petitioner, not with Respondent. Petitioner is not entitled to the award of any additional points in the practical portion of the examination. In his challenge letter, Petitioner also contested Questions 1 and 20 of the written, multiple choice portion of the examination. At hearing, Petitioner withdrew his challenge of Question 20. Each of the written questions was worth one point. Petitioner failed the examination by three points. Thus, even if it were found that he should be awarded one point for Question 1, Petitioner would not achieve a passing score. Petitioner’s challenge of Question 1 will nonetheless be addressed, to ensure a complete record in this proceeding. Question 1 referred to the effect that the addition of an “air” vent would have on an earmold. Petitioner chose the answer that it would “accentuate the low frequencies.” The correct answer was that it would “reduce the feeling of pressure in the ear canal.” Ms. Lauster testified that, while venting may accentuate frequencies, it does not necessarily relate to high or low frequencies. A vent may accentuate high or low frequencies, depending on the size of the vent. The general tendency is for a vent to enhance high frequencies. Ms. Lauster's opinion was supported by a standard textbook on hearing instrument science and fitting practices. It was undisputed that the addition of an air vent does relieve pressure in the ear canal. Thus, the best answer to Question 1 was “reduce the feeling of pressure in the ear canal.” Respondent correctly found that Petitioner’s response to Question 1 was not the best answer, and correctly denied him credit for that question. Petitioner alleged that Question 1 was of such difficulty that it should either not be counted, or his answer should be counted as correct. Respondent demonstrated that 26 out of 50 candidates answered the question correctly, thus negating Petitioner’s contention in this regard. Question 1 was properly graded as a question of medium difficulty, and is a valid and acceptable item on the examination.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Health, Board of Hearing Aid Specialists, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s challenge to the grade assigned him for the September 1997 Hearing Aid Specialist licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry L. Allman, pro se 110 St. Lucia Loop Apollo Beach, Florida 33572 Anne Marie Williamson, Esquire Florida Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 6, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building Six, Room 240 1309 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. James Howell, Secretary Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Six, Room 306 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's license as a hearing aid specialist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaints filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the issues herein, the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists has been the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of hearing aid specialists and the regulation of the hearing aid provider profession in Florida. The Respondent has been a licensed hearing aid specialist in this state, holding license number AS 00010006. Stanley I. Williamson is an 84-year-old blind and arthritic retiree who has worn hearing aids since the early 1980's. He has known Mr. Conley since that time and has purchased his hearing aids from the Respondent both when the Respondent was working for other suppliers and when he went into business for himself. In the summer of 1997, Mr. Williamson went to the Respondent to get the wax cleaned out of his hearing aids. Mr. Williamson did not feel he needed new aids at the time. However, on June 6, 1997 Respondent Mr. Conley called him and tried to sell him some new aids. Mr. Williamson told the respondent he didn't want new aids because his were working well, but Mr. Conley suggested he bring them in anyway. Mr. Williamson went to the Respondent's office and tried the new ones the Respondent showed him but decided he did not want them because he felt they did not work properly. Nonetheless, on that same day, June 6, 1997, Mr. Williamson took them, signed a contract for the new aids, and gave the Respondent a check for $1,095. At that time, the Respondent told Mr. Williamson he could bring the aids back within 30 days if they were not acceptable. The Argosy hearing aids Mr. Williamson got from the Respondent on June 6 did not work properly, and when Mr. Williamson complained, the Respondent agreed to get him another pair. Mr. Williamson picked up this second pair of aids at the Respondent's office, Conley's Hearing Aid Center in Clearwater on June 20, 1997. At that time Mr. Williamson signed a second contract and gave the Respondent a second check for $1,095. On June 24, 1997, the Respondent had Mr. Williamson, who was still not satisfied with the performance of the Argosy aids, sign a third contract with his company under which the Respondent agreed to provide a pair of 3M Single Pro hearing aids for a total price of $3,390. The Respondent gave Mr. Williamson credit for the two prior payments of $1,095 each, and Mr. Williamson gave the Respondent an additional check for $1,200. According to Mr. Williamson, the 3M aids, which the Respondent delivered on July 8, 1997, also did not work to his satisfaction, so after just a few days, on July 10, 1997, he exchanged them for a different pair of 3M aids, Dual Pro. The sales receipt for the aids that the Respondent gave to Mr. Williamson on July 10, 1997 did not contain the buyer's signature, nor did it list the serial numbers for the hearing aids provided. Mr. Williamson thought he was getting the top of the hearing aid line but in fact, the Dual Pro aid was the middle line. According to a pamphlet he saw later, the top of the line is called Multi Pro; the middle, Dual Pro; and the bottom, Single Pro. Though a new contract was signed reflecting the Dual Pro aids, there was no additional charge. The Respondent guaranteed all hearing aids sold to Mr. Williamson to be acceptable or, if returned within 30 days of purchase, a full refund would be given. The Dual Pro aids also did not work to Mr. Williamson's satisfaction, and he returned them to the Respondent on or about August 4, 1997, an act witnessed by the Respondent's associate, Michelle Pfister. None of the hearing aid sets was kept by Mr. Williamson for more than 30 days. Mr. Williamson contends that when he returned the second pair of Argosy aids and received the 3M Single Pro aids in exchange, he asked Mr. Conley for a refund. At that time, Mr. Conley said he didn't have the money. When Mr. Conley delivered the Single Pro aids, and again when he delivered the Dual Pro aids, Mr. Williamson asked for a refund instead. Each time the Respondent claimed he didn't have the money. On October 4, 1997, Mr. Williamson wrote to Conley's Hearing Aid Center, the Respondent's business, and threatened recoupment action if the Respondent did not return the money he had paid for the aids he had returned. The hearing aids Mr. Williamson purchased were all returned to the Respondent, but no refund was ever made. According to Ms. Pfister, the returned hearing aids were subsequently sent back to the manufacturer for credit. The credit was not to her account with the manufacturer, however, and she does not know who received it. Ms. Pfister, also a licensed hearing aid specialist since 1998, bought Conley's Hearing Aid Center from the Respondent on July 27, 1997. At the time of the purchase, Ms. Pfister was not employed by the Respondent, but she had worked for the Respondent on and off since 1995. On June 26, 1997, the Respondent signed a form to sponsor Ms. Pfister as a hearing aid specialist trainee and served as her sponsor until she passed the examination and was licensed on June 23, 1998. Respondent continued to work on the premises after the sale until Ms. Pfister was licensed. When Ms. Pfister took over the business, the sales contract called for all hearing aids on site to be sold to her as inventory, She also received a statement from the Respondent that there were no unresolved issues with clients, and she did not assume any liabilities incurred by the business prior to her take over. When she assumed active management of the practice, Ms. Pfister received all of the Respondent's patient files. Katherine Sadilek is a 93-year-old retiree who purchased a pair of pre-owned 3-M Model 8200 hearing aids from the Respondent on April 8, 1997 for $1,800. The aids were paid for in full on April 9, 1997. The receipt for this sale that the Respondent gave to Ms. Sadilek did not contain the serial numbers of the aids, nor did it describe any of the terms and conditions of the sale or a guarantee. Ms. Sadilek returned the aids to the Respondent exactly 30 days after the purchase date because she was not satisfied with them. The Respondent did not refund her money but agreed to try to re-sell them for her. He offered her $100.00 for them, which she refused. The Respondent retained the aids and never returned them to Ms. Sadilek or paid her for them. A review of the documentation relating to the sales to both clients show them to be devoid of any information showing any improvement to the clients' hearing as a result of the hearing aids sold to them by the Respondent. A showing of improvement is required to form the basis for non-refund of amounts paid for hearing aids. The Respondent filed for bankruptcy in December 1998. The Respondent was licensed as a hearing aid specialist in Indiana in 1970 and in Florida in 1978. He has practiced in Florida for almost 20 years without any complaints being filed against him except those in issue here. The Respondent attributes most of his problems to his marriage dissolution in 1979, the settlement relating to which caused his financial problems and his bankruptcy. He claims he offered to make periodic payments to Mr. Williamson but Mr. Williamson refused that offer. The Respondent is 61 years old and presently receiving worker's compensation. Though he is not presently in the hearing aid business, he hopes to be in the future and needs to keep his license to earn a living.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists enter a final order suspending the Respondent's license for a period of six months and thereafter placing it under probation for a period of three years under such terms and conditions as may be deemed appropriate by the Board. It is also recommended that the Board impose an administrative fine of $3,000, and assess appropriate costs of investigation and prosecution. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary L. Asbell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Mail Stop 39 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Donald Conley 3377 Southwest Villa Place Palm City, Florida 34990 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact Ms. Joan Westhrin was accepted, over objection, as an expert hearing aid specialist, and her testimony as follows, is also accepted and adopted as findings of fact. Hearing aid specialists are licensed to perform audiometric testing. Audiometric testing is the function of presenting pure tones through headphones to establish a threshold of hearing. A threshold of hearing is the basis for the smallest amount of sound which the human ear can perceive. The testing is done by using air conduction by way of headphones and bone conduction. A comparison is made between the air conduction and the bone conduction results on the audiogram to determine if the client has a sensory neural hearing loss, meaning a loss in the nerve, or a mechanical function that would indicate that it is something that should be referred to a medical doctor for medical attention. During hearing examinations, the hearing aid specialist must also do an audioscopic examination, or a physical look into the ear canal, to rule out any anomaly that might be developing in order to determine whether the client is a candidate for medical testing. Ear mold impressions provide an exact duplicate of the ear canal so that a hearing aid may have an exact fit in the ear. A cotton block is used in the ear to prevent the impression material, silicone, from traveling down to the ear drum, and the material is left in the ear about five or six minutes to set properly. A hearing aid specialist must perform a complete audiological examination in order to provide a client with an appropriate hearing aid. Specific training is required for an individual to provide a safe examination, testing, ear mold impressions, and selection of a hearing aid for a client. Otherwise, an untrained individual may adversely impact on the client when performing the hearing test and providing a hearing aid. The parties' joint prehearing statement stipulated that the following are "facts which are admitted": The Respondent's name is Jack Lee Beckwith. The Respondent has been, at all times material hereto, a licensed hearing aid specialist in the State of Florida. The Respondent's hearing aid license number is AS 0001775. The Respondent's address is 14 Wildwood Trail, Ormond Beach, Florida 32174-4343. The Respondent is listed as a sponsor on the application of Jean Dewey for a hearing aid trainee and did not sponsor her until December 5, 1989. The Respondent is listed as a sponsor for David Dewey as a hearing aid specialist trainee and did not sponsor him until December 5, 1989. When Respondent became the Deweys' sponsor, he assumed responsibility for supervision of them as trainees. David Dewey is not guilty of canvassing, as set forth in Chapter 484. Jean Dewey is not guilty of canvassing, as set forth in Chapter 484. Despite the stipulations contained in sub-8 and sub-9 above, Petitioner presented, without objection, evidence geared to the issue of Respondent telling Mrs. Dewey to canvass. After Petitioner had rested, Respondent moved to dismiss the administrative complaint in part upon grounds that there had been no showing that Respondent had told Mrs. Dewey to canvass and upon the language of the stipulation, which was worded similarly to a prior request for admission. In response, Petitioner's counsel asserted that there had been no meeting of the minds in the stipulation because she thought she was only agreeing that Mr. and Mrs. Dewey had never been adjudicated guilty of canvassing. The motion to dismiss was taken under advisement for resolution in this recommended order (TR 134-135). The Jeanne Lyons Trust bought Brill's Hearing Aid Center in Daytona Beach in June, 1989. At that time, Jeanne Lyons was 100 percent owner of the Jeanne Lyons Trust and the Trust owned 100 percent of Brill's Hearing Aid Center, Inc. Jeanne Lyons is married to David F. Lyons. Mr. Lyons was not employed by the trust or by the hearing aid center corporation or by his wife in any capacity, but at all times material to this administrative complaint, he acted as "go-between" for all three. From 1988 to 1992, Mr. Lyons served on the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists. He is, and at all times material has been, a licensed hearing aid specialist. Respondent Jack Beckwith was an employee of the corporation, Brill's Hearing Aid Center, Inc., in Daytona Beach, Florida. He formed a separate management corporation with his wife, who is also a licensed hearing aid specialist. The management corporation was hired by the Jeanne Lyons Trust to manage Brill's in Daytona Beach and to help expand Brill's operations south into New Smyrna Beach and north into Palm Coast. The purpose of the management corporation was to avoid paying the Beckwiths as employees for the expansion work. In each of the new locations, a lease within an optometrist's office was negotiated by Mr. Lyons in approximately July, 1989. Respondent Beckwith is married to Kim Beckwith. Karen Martin was Mr. Beckwith's office manager at the Daytona Beach Brill's Hearing Aid Center. David James Jenkins is the son-in-law of David and Jean Dewey, a married couple. Mr. and Mrs. Lyons, Mrs. Beckwith, Ms. Martin, Mr. Jenkins and Mr. and Mrs. Dewey were not charged in the administrative complaint herein. Karen Martin had known Jean Dewey through prior employment. In July or August 1989, Ms. Martin set up a luncheon meeting for Mrs. Dewey and her husband, David Dewey, with Jack Beckwith. Mr. Beckwith ultimately introduced Mr. Dewey to Mr. Lyons sometime in August, 1989. The Deweys seemed good prospects to manage one of Brill's branch centers. On behalf of his wife and her trust and corporation, Mr. Lyons approved Mr. Beckwith's hiring the Deweys and becoming their sponsor to train as hearing aid specialists. At all times material, Mr. and Mrs. Dewey believed themselves to be in the employ of Respondent Beckwith and Mr. Lyons, operating as partners in Brill's. In negotiations with the Deweys, Mr. Beckwith estimated that Mr. Dewey could make $60,000.00 a year and Mrs. Dewey could make $40,000.00 a year based upon a 20 percent commission on gross deposits from hearing aid sales out of the New Smyrna Beach office after the Deweys became fully licensed as hearing aid specialists. He explained that licensure as a trainee and training were prerequisites to becoming fully licensed as hearing aid specialists. Both Mr. and Mrs. Dewey had a background in sales. Their testimony clearly reveals that they saw the selling of hearing aids from the perspective of marketing a product on a lucrative commission basis rather than from the viewpoint of a health care technologist. The commission arrangement proposed by Mr. Beckwith on behalf of the Jeanne Lyons Trust d/b/a Brill's Hearing Aid Center, Inc. was very attractive to them. They wanted to get started as soon as possible to make an increased commission over what they were being paid in other employments at the time they interviewed with Mr. Beckwith. They also found it attractive that they could work together near their home. Another factor motivating the Deweys to get started as soon as possible was that Mr. Dewey was employed at a marina which was about to close, and the marina closing would entirely eliminate Mr. Dewey's income. The Deweys were so enthusiastic about Mr. Beckwith's proposal that they nominated their son-in-law, David James Jenkins, to work in Brill's new Palm Coast office. During September 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Beckwith, with the approval of David F. Lyons, provided some free informal training sessions for Ms. Martin, Mr. Jenkins, and Mr. and Mrs. Dewey, just to see if they would really like hearing aid work and be adaptable to it before the Deweys and Mr. Jenkins quit their existing employments. This was not intended by Mr. Beckwith to be a real apprentice-type program. These sessions occurred twice a week and involved playing an instructional tape, handing out some printed statutes, rules, and technical materials, practicing with an audiometer, and learning to make ear molds. Each potential trainee was given his own audiometer to take home just for practice. On or about October 1, 1989, David Dewey signed an application to the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists to become a hearing aid trainee. His application for the trainee license listed Jack Beckwith as his sponsor. On or about October 1, 1989, Jean Dewey signed an application to the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists to become a hearing aid trainee. Her application for the trainee license listed Jack Beckwith as her sponsor. On or about October 2, 1989, Mr. Beckwith sent Mr. and Mrs. Dewey to operate Brill's Hearing Aid Center in space leased from Cady and Timko, optometrists, in New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The Deweys had precipitously quit their previous employment and had no income. Mr. Beckwith established what days of the week and hours they worked at Brill's, what they wore, and how they should be paid. He told them they could not be paid as employees until they were accepted and issued trainee numbers by the Department as trainees. Mr. and Mrs. Dewey were not paid any wages between October 1, 1989 and December 12, 1989. Due to the delay in receiving trainee licenses and numbers from the licensing agency and their lack of income, Mr. Dewey became infuriated and pressed both Mr. Beckwith and Mr. Lyons for action on licensing. As a result, he received sporadic checks from Brill's Hearing Aid Center. The amount of the checks apparently did not amount to projected commissions. The checks were signed by Jack Beckwith with the permission of David and Jeanne Lyons. The checks were referenced on their face as "loans". Mr. Dewey claimed that the purpose of this notation was so that Mr. Beckwith or others could avoid paying employee-related taxes. Mr. Lyons and Mr. Beckwith asserted that the notation was to insure that Mr. Dewey paid back Mrs. Lyons' advances after Mr. and Mrs. Dewey received their trainee licenses and went on the regular payroll. Mrs. Dewey received no checks. The lease Mr. Lyons had negotiated with Cady-Timko, O.D., P.A. provided for Brill's Hearing Aid Center, New Smyrna Beach to have ". . . [a]ccess to patient files to contact patients to tell them of hearing aid services available . . . [and] opportunity to confirm optometrist appointments and ask if they would like hearing test also." Sometime in October 1989, Mr. Beckwith also sent Mr. Jenkins to operate the newly leased office of Brill's Hearing Aid Center, Palm Coast, Florida. Mr. Jenkins claimed to have worked briefly at a Brill's Center in Ormond Beach, but there is no other evidence that there even was a Brill's Center in Ormond Beach. Mr. Jenkins quit the Palm Coast office approximately November 1, 1989 because no clients came there and he was "starving to death." He testified that he was instructed by Mr. and Mrs. Beckwith to make cold calls to potential hearing aid customers from all of the files in the adjacent optometrist's office in Palm Coast, but that he, Mr. Jenkins, so feared rejection that he asked his wife, Mrs. Jenkins, to make the calls. Mr. Jenkins also testified that he did some audiometric testing and that Mrs. Beckwith checked all the audiometric testing he did, but he was vague as to whether this was done at Brill's office in Palm Coast or during his pre-training. His testimony was unclear as to whether Mrs. Beckwith also personally supervised all his audiometric testing. Mrs. Beckwith was not charged with any violations. Respondent Beckwith was not charged in the pending administrative complaint with anything done by Mr. Jenkins. Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins were not charged with any violations. On or about October 15, 1989, Jack Beckwith signed and mailed to the Department of Professional Regulation a Brill's Hearing Aid Center, Daytona Beach check for $400.00 to cover trainee applications for Mr. and Mrs. Dewey, Mr. Jenkins, and Ms. Martin, at $100 apiece. The applications and check were not received or processed by the Department until December 1, 1989. The actual trainee licenses were issued for Mr. and Mrs. Dewey on December 5, 1989. Mr. Beckwith's clear testimony that he submitted the check and four applications together by mail on October 15, 1989 is credible and compelling as opposed to other witnesses' inferences of a December 1, 1989 submittal date because the check face references the four applications specifically, including Mr. Jenkins' application, and the evidence is unrefuted that Mr. Jenkins quit his association with Brill's on or about November 1, 1989. No motive or reasonable rationale was advanced as to why Respondent should mail in $100 of Brill's money to register Mr. Jenkins as a trainee on December 1, 1989, thirty days after Mr. Jenkins had already quit. As noted above, the parties have stipulated as fact that Jack Beckwith did not become the Deweys' sponsor until December 5, 1989. At all times material, the training course and apprenticeship program under a sponsor approved by the licensing agency took approximately six months to complete before the applicant could sit for the hearing aid specialist licensure exam. From all accounts, it appears that it was standard operating procedure in the industry for sponsors to allow trainees to perform all services under direct supervision of their sponsor from the date the application for trainee status was mailed to the licensing agency. In this case, that date would have been October 15, 1989. David Dewey and Jean Dewey were not registered as trainees with the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists until December 5, 1989. According to the testimony of Theresa L. Skelton, the Department's policy was to treat applicants as trainees as soon as it received their checks, which in this case was December 1, 1989. Apparently in 1989, the agency did no extensive background check on applicants, and trainee licensing was largely a ministerial act if the proposed sponsor was legitimate. As far as the Department was concerned, trainees could legally perform all services under sponsor supervision as soon as their application and check were processed. See also, Sections 484.0445(1) and (2) F.S. infra. In October 1989, when Mr. Beckwith sent Mr. and Mrs. Dewey to the Brill's office in New Smyrna Beach, he instructed them to sell batteries and make appointments for persons who answered a newspaper advertisement he had placed to announce opening that branch office. He also told them to telephone current patients of the Daytona Beach Brill's Hearing Aid Center who lived in New Smyrna Beach and tell them that they no longer had to travel to Daytona Beach but could be serviced more conveniently at the new New Smyrna Beach location. Mr. Beckwith testified that he also told Mrs. Dewey to telephone "recall patients" for the optometry office. Recall patients were patients of the optometry office who needed to be reminded to come in to pick up glasses already ordered or who were due for a new eye appointment. Mrs. Dewey was also told to announce the opening of the hearing aid center to any of the optometry recall patients whose records bore Dr. Cady's notation, "HL" for "hearing loss", and also simultaneously make appointments for hearing tests. Mr. Beckwith intended that all appointments would be made for Wednesdays when he would come to New Smyrna Beach to do hearing tests and fit and deliver hearing aids. This testimony is in accord with the conditions of Brill's lease with Cady-Timko O.D. P.A., negotiated by Mr. Lyons. Mrs. Dewey testified credibly that Mr. Beckwith approved a script for her use for these telephone calls. Nothing in the script clearly shows that she was calling exclusively optometric recalls, Brill's old patients, or making "cold" calls. However, it mentions nothing about existing eyewear or appointments, and it does offer a free hearing test. Mrs. Dewey further testified that Ms. Martin instructed her how to use Dr. Cady's files to make a list and call all of Dr. Cady's patients over a certain age, regardless of an "HL" notation, paying special attention to those with insurance coverage. Mrs. Dewey understood these instructions also came from Mr. Beckwith and made telephone calls pursuant to the method outlined by Ms. Martin. Mr. Beckwith denied giving these instructions or approving the script. Mrs. Dewey's testimony and the list show that after the first two pages going through Dr. Cady's files with names beginning with the B's and C's of the alphabet had been prepared by Ms. Martin and one appointment scheduled on Tuesday, October 17, 1989 and one on Wednesday, October 18, 1989, Mrs. Dewey started back at the A's and prepared a more extensive list of names. This suggests that Mrs. Dewey went behind Ms. Martin's work and selected from Dr. Cady's files some names which Ms. Martin had excluded. Comparison of the list with a 1989 calendar shows that Mrs. Dewey booked approximately 35 appointments for dates between October 2, 1989 and December 12, 1989, without regard to whether they fell on Wednesdays. Most of the appointments she booked were for days other than Wednesdays. They included days between December 5, 1989 and December 12, 1989 while Mr. Beckwith was listed as the Deweys' sponsor. Mrs. Dewey, whose background was in sales, considered what she was doing to be "telemarketing". Neither Dr. Cady's files nor Mrs. Dewey's list showed that any person she telephoned had expressed an interest in hearing aids before Ms. Martin or Mrs. Dewey contacted them. Mrs. Dewey's list clearly shows that most of the people called either did not acknowledge that they had a hearing loss or were not interested in a hearing test and/or hearing aids. Mr. Dewey testified that between October 2, 1989 and December 12, 1989, he performed unsupervised audiometric testing, the taking of ear mold impressions, and the sale and dispensing of hearing aids to 20-24 persons and that he did so either with the instructions or knowledge of Mr. Beckwith and outside Mr. Beckwith's presence because Mr. Beckwith remained in Daytona Beach except on Wednesdays. Mr. Lyons and Mr. Beckwith denied issuing such instructions and denied even any knowledge that this had occurred until Mr. Beckwith was served with the administrative complaint. Mr. Beckwith testified that when he was present on Wednesdays, Mr. Dewey would sit in with him and observe testing and delivery and that whatever he allowed Mr. Dewey to do in his presence was overseen by him and he signed the appropriate documentation. He denied knowing that Mr. Dewey was also practicing as a hearing aid specialist when he was not present. Mr. Dewey conceded that Mr. Lyons specifically instructed him not to make any deliveries, and it is clear from Mr. Dewey's testimony that he thought Mr. Lyons' instruction meant "no home deliveries to patients", instead of "no delivery of finished hearing aids to clients anywhere, including the office," which would be a partial definition of "no dispensing." Although Mr. Dewey has claimed to make sales of hearing aids, he also has, since 1989, consistently maintained that he never "delivered" a hearing aid to a client. His testimony at formal hearing does not render clear whether or not he actually fitted a completed hearing aid on a client or ever actually collected money for a "sale" without supervision by Mr. or Mrs. Beckwith. Mr. Dewey testified that Mr. Beckwith or Mrs. Beckwith signed all paperwork as being responsible for the tests, etc. which he performed in their absence. No documentation of hearing tests or hearing aid sales by Mr. Dewey were submitted; no clients Mr. Dewey allegedly serviced testified; no bank deposits showing income from the New Smyrna Beach location were offered; and Mrs. Beckwith did not testify. Mr. Beckwith testified he personally delivered no hearing aids from the New Smyrna Beach office. On or about December 6, 1989, but before the Deweys had received their trainee licenses or been informed that they had been licensed as of December 5, 1989, they invited George Selas, a competitor and a licensed hearing aid specialist, whom Mrs. Dewey had known for some time, into the New Smyrna Beach office of Brill's Hearing Aid Center. When they explained the "telemarketing" that Mrs. Dewey was doing, Mr. Selas informed them that it was illegal and that they should not be practicing as hearing aid specialists before trainee numbers were issued to them by the Department. The Deweys immediately notified the Department by telephone on December 6 and in writing on December 7, 1989 of everything they had been doing and disassociated themselves from Respondent Beckwith, Mr. and Mrs. Lyons, and Brill's. That would mean that after December 6 they no longer operated out of their sponsorship situation with Mr. Beckwith, despite any booked appointments. As of December 12 or 13, 1989, they formally changed their sponsorship to Mr. Selas. They finished their training and apprenticeship under his sponsorship and were licensed as hearing aid specialists in 1990. As a result of information received from Mr. Dewey and Mr. Selas, Dr. Cady gave notice he was terminating the lease for Brill's New Smyrna Beach office. Mr. Selas and Brill's, represented by Mr. Beckwith, were competing for the same contract with an HMO in 1989-1990. Respondent attributes all of Mr. Dewey's actions to collusion with Mr. Selas in order to obtain the HMO contract and rent the space occupied by Brill's in New Smyrna Beach. These inferences are based upon inadmissible hearsay from someone at the HMO who allegedly got an anonymous phone call, and Dr. Cady's understanding of something Mr. Dewey may have said either to Dr. Cady or to his office manager.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 484.056(1)(h) and (t) F.S., not guilty of all other charges, and revoking his license. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-3 Accepted, except as to the use of the word "employed." See the Conclusions of Law. 4 Rejected upon contrary evidence of greater weight and credibility in Finding of Fact 33. 5-7 Accepted. 8 Accepted as modified in Finding of Fact 21 to better conform to the record and statute. 9-10 Accepted, except that receipt of the check was testified to be December 1, 1989. Rejected in part as a conclusion of law. See Finding of Fact 21 and the Conclusions of Law. Rejected because misleading as stated. See Finding of Fact 33 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. Accepted. 14-16 Rejected only upon the word "employment" as a word of art. See Findings of Fact 15, 27-31 and the Conclusions of Law. 17 Rejected as a conclusion of law. See Findings of Fact 21, 27-31 and the Conclusions of Law. 18-22 Accepted, except for unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material and legal argument. Rejected as a conclusion of law. Covered in Findings of Fact 21, 27-33 and the Conclusions of Law. Accepted. 25-26 Covered only as necessary in Finding of Fact 22-25. 27-29 Accepted except as to word "employee." See Conclusions of Law. 30-31 Rejected as unnecessary or subordinate. Rejected as a finding of fact; see the Conclusions of Law. Rejected because misleading as stated. See Finding of Fact 9 and 15. 34-35 Rejected upon the greater weight of the credible evidence in Findings of Fact 15-16. Rejected as a mere recitation of nondispositive testimony. Rejected as not proven. Respondent's PFOF: 1-7 Accepted. Rejected as a conclusion of law. See Finding of Fact 20-21 and the Conclusions of Law. Sentence 1 is rejected as a legal conclusion. Sentence 2 is accepted in part in Finding of Fact 15-16 and 21 and otherwise rejected as a legal conclusion. The remaining sentences are accepted except that unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative material has not been adopted. 10-12 Accepted except that unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative material has not been adopted. The first sentence is rejected a mischaracterizing Mrs. Dewey's testimony. The second sentence is rejected upon the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole. Accepted. First 15 Rejected as not proven. Dr. Cady's deposition is vague on this point. See Findings of Fact 34-35. Second 14 The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected as a mischaracterization. The third sentence is accepted. Second 15 Rejected as legal argument. 16 Rejected as legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond Shope, Esquire Northern Trust Bank Building, Suite 225 4001 Tamiami Trail North Naples, FL 33940 Susan E. Lindgard, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Ste 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Ste 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Suzanne Lee, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Ste 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Craig Louis Schuette, committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaints in these cases, and if so what is the appropriate penalty to be imposed by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding Respondent has been a licensed hearing aid specialist in the state of Florida, having been issued license No. AS 2553 on June 9, 1994. Case No. 02-0520 On November 5, 1998, hearing impaired patient R.G., a resident of New York and part-time resident of Florida, visited Audiometric Hearing Center (Audiometric), a hearing aid establishment located on Fifth Avenue, North, in St. Petersburg, Florida. R.G. visited Audiometric after being contacted by postcard and telephone about a free hearing test offer. While at the Center on November 5, 1998, R.G. received a hearing test and signed an agreement to purchase a pair of hearing aids for $3,500.00. Respondent signed the sales receipt on behalf of Audiometric as the selling agent. R.G. paid the entire purchase price to Audiometric on November 5, 1998, by charging the entire amount on his Visa credit card. On November 20, 1998, R.G. returned to Audiometric to be fitted with the new hearing aids. At that time, R.G. noticed that the hearing aids he had purchased, as described in his contract, were a different model and smaller than the devices with which he was being fitted. Respondent persuaded R.G. to test the hearing aids, and R.G. took possession of the devices on that date. Twelve days later, on December 2, 1998, upon being dissatisfied with the hearing aids, R.G. returned to Audiometric with the devices and requested a refund. Audiometric accepted the hearing aids back and R.G. was advised for the first time that he would receive a refund within 90 to 120 days. Although R.G. was promised a refund of $3,125.00, on December 2, 1998, he never received it. R.G. made numerous attempts to obtain a refund but never received one. During an investigation of this matter by the Agency for Health Care Administration, Respondent did not accept responsibility for the refund. While Respondent agreed to assist the patient and provide a free refitting, he maintained that Audiometric was responsible for any and all refunds. Case No. 02-0522 Hearing impaired patient E.T., a resident of Canada who also resided in Florida part of the year, visited the Audiometric Hearing Center, a hearing aid establishment located on Walsingham Road, in Largo, Florida, on February 6, 1998. E.T. went to Audiometric for a free hearing test after being called and offered one by a telephone solicitor. E.T. received a hearing test on that date. On February 6, 1998, E.T. purchased a hearing aid for her right ear at Audiometric for $1,980.00. Respondent signed the sales agreement on behalf of Audiometric as the selling agent. He told E.T. she needed a hearing aid and showed E.T. three hearing aids. E.T. paid the entire purchase price on February 6, 1998, by charging it on her Visa credit card. On February 13, 1998, the patient accepted delivery of the hearing aid at Audiometric from someone other than Respondent. Upon experiencing an itching problem, E.T. returned the hearing aid to Audiometric on February 18, 1998, for a refund, stating that she was not satisfied with it. Someone at Audiometric, other than Respondent, accepted the returned hearing aid from E.T. and promised her a refund of $1,980.00. E.T. made numerous attempts to obtain the refund but never received any portion of it. In fact, she even filed a lawsuit and obtained a default judgment against Audiometric, but could not collect any of it. During an investigation of the matter by the Agency for Health Care Administration, Respondent denied responsibility for the matter, and indicated that Audiometric was culpable.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists enter a final order: Dismissing DOAH Case No. 02-0521 (DOH Case No. 98- 19487). Finding Respondent guilty as charged in the Administrative Complaints in DOAH Case Nos. 02-0520 (DOH Case No. 99-03437) and 02-0522 (DOH Case No. 98-20376). Imposing a letter of reprimand. Imposing a total fine of $1,000.00. Assessing costs of the investigation and prosecution not to exceed $500.00, and ordering Respondent to pay as corrective action $3,125.00 to patient R.G. and $1,731.00 to patient E.T., with all monetary payments to be paid within 90 days of entry of a final order. As to the corrective action, the Respondent should be ordered to provide proof thereof to the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists, Department of Health Compliance Unit within 90 days of the date of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary L. Asbell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Mail Stop 39 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Craig Schuete 12300 Park Boulevard, Unit 220 Seminole, Florida 33772 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Gary L. Asbell, Esquire Post Office Box 326 Lloyd, Florida 32337
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Donna A. Benoit, is a candidate for licensure as a hearing aid specialist. Her examination date was September 10-12, 1993. There were two sections to the examination for licensure: a practical portion that consisted of several subparts, and a written portion for which the minimum passing grade was 75.00. In order to achieve an "overall examination status" of passing, Petitioner was required to pass both sections. While Petitioner obtained a passing grade on the practical section, her grade on the written section was 74.00. Upon receipt of her test scores, Petitioner timely challenged the examination results. Initially, Petitioner listed twenty-two questions for which she received no credit as those to be challenged. At hearing, however, Petitioner elected to only challenge one: Question 10. The format for the written examination was multiple choice, and the instructions directed candidates to choose the best answer from among those suggested. Approximately 79 percent of the candidates taking the examination got Question 10 correct. Therefore, for statistical purposes, Question 10 should not be considered vague or ambiguous. An audiometric evaluation is required before a hearing aid can be fitted or sold. An audiometric evaluation consists of the following: puretone testing by air and bone conduction, effective masking when indicated, speech reception thresholds, speech discrimination scores, MCL and UCL, and selection of best fitting arrangement. An otoscopic examination of the ear is performed before the audiometric evaluation can be performed. An otoscopic examination does not, of itself, allow a hearing aid to be fitted or sold. Once the otoscopic examination is successfully completed such that a hearing aid may be fitted and sold, the audiometric evaluation must be performed. An audiometric evaluation as described in Section 484.0501, Florida Statutes, provides the minimal procedures in the fitting and selling of hearing aids. Petitioner's answer to Question 10, "D", was not the best selection from those available; consequently, the Department correctly scored Petitioner's response.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Hearing Aid Specialists, enter a final order denying Petitioner's challenge to Question 10 of the hearing aid specialists examination administered September 10-12, 1993. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 21st day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-0303 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: 1. Petitioner's one page letter filed March 28, 1994, has been considered argument and not in a format to allow rulings on specific facts. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 3, and 6 are accepted. The first two sentences and the last sentence of paragraph 4 are accepted; the remainder is rejected as irrelevant. The last sentence of paragraph 5 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as unnecessary or irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna A. Benoit 100 St. George Boulevard Apt. 402 Savannah, Georgia 31419 Vytas J. Urba Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Suzanne Lee, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Should Petitioner discipline Respondent's hearing aid specialist license for reasons alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint?
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding Respondent William D. Williston has been a licensed hearing aid specialist in Florida, having been issued license no. 1439 by the Florida Board of Hearing Aid Specialist, commencing April 1, 1983. At all times relevant to the inquiry Respondent operated a business known as the Sumter Hearing Center in Wildwood, Florida, from which hearing aids were sold and dispensed. At times relevant to the inquiry Respondent sponsored Darleen L. Sherman as a trainee at his business. Respondent also served as the designated hearing aid specialist to assist in the training of Ms. Sherman. Respondent served in the capacity of direct supervisor to Ms. Sherman in her attempt to learn the necessary skills to become a licensed hearing aid specialist. Respondent's initial sponsorship and supervision of Ms. Sherman's training, wherein Respondent had been designated to serve, was for the training period June 24, 1997 through December 23, 1997. Ms. Sherman completed that training program. Following the completion of her training she took the hearing aid specialist examination. She failed the written theory portion of the examination taken May 1, 1998 through May 3, 1998. Ms. Sherman and Respondent were made aware of those results by notice mailed to the candidate for licensure on June 4, 1998. On June 6, 1998, Ms. Sherman reapplied to participate in a training program sponsored and supervised by Respondent. This was a request to repeat the training. Ms. Sherman's application form submitted to Petitioner was accompanied by a form completed by Respondent as sponsor, also dated June 6, 1998. On June 8, 1998, a check was written by Ms. Sherman to Petitioner in the amount of $105 for the stated purpose of participation in the "second training program." On June 13, 1998, Ms. Sherman was officially registered for the repeat training program with Respondent serving as sponsor and a prospective examination date to gain her license as hearing aid specialist was provided. That date for examination was sometime in January 1999. The training program registration identified the repeat training program period as running from June 12, 1998 through December 11, 1998. Stage I to that training program was June 12, 1998 through July 11, 1998; Stage II July 12, 1998 through September 11, 1998, and Stage III September 12, 1998 through December 11, 1998. During the hiatus between being notified that Ms. Sherman had failed the May 1998 examination and the beginning date for the repeat training program, Ms. Sherman, with Respondent's knowledge, acted in behalf of Respondent's hearing aid specialist business in Wildwood, Florida. This took place on June 9, 1998, involving the patient C.D., outside Respondent's presence. On that date Ms. Sherman performed hearing aid testing on C.D. and sold C.D. new hearing aids manufactured by Rexton for a total price of $4,000. The first $2,000 to purchase was paid on that date. The sales receipt provided C.D. was signed by Ms. Sherman indicating that she was a hearing aid specialist, which she was not. C.D. also signed the receipt form. The receipt provided C.D. on June 9, 1998, indicated that the hearing aids were guaranteed by Rexton for a period of one year with a loss and damage provision available with a 25% deductible. C.D. was provided another document which he signed and dated June 9, 1998. That document was entitled "30-day trial agreement." By its terms it said: I agree to wear my new hearing aid for the full 30-day trial period, and will come in at least once a week for consultation and any adjustments that may be needed. If the hearing aids are returned to the laboratory for any modification, my trial period will resume upon refitting of the hearing aids. I realize that hearing aid fittings are individual in nature and that it is normal to expect adjustments to be made. It has taken a long time for my hearing loss to develop, and will take some time to once again begin to enjoy the sound of life. Respondent was aware of the use of this type form in his business and the type of sales receipt form utilized in the transaction with C.D. Contrary to Respondent's testimony it is not found that C.D. was provided a form with information entitled "30-day trial agreement terms and conditions" as of the purchase date June 9, 1998, or upon any other date. C.D. in his testimony disclaimed being presented the form "30-day trial agreement terms and conditions." His testimony is supported by his wife, V.D. Ms. Sherman does not recall whether the form "30-day trial agreement terms and conditions" was provided to C.D. The "30-day trial agreement terms and conditions" was used on occasion by Respondent and Ms. Sherman but not here. The form is similar to the notice requirements set forth in Section 484.0512, Florida Statutes, dealing with the statutory requirement for a 30-day trial period and money back guarantee, together with the opportunity to return the hearing aids or mail written notice of cancellation to the seller and Rule 64B-6.001, Florida Administrative Code, which further describes written notice requirements. On June 19, 1998, Ms. Sherman received from the factory the hearing aids purchased by C.D. They had the wrong circuitry. As a consequence Ms. Sherman returned the hearing aids for correction. On June 29, 1998, Ms. Sherman received the hearing aids a second time. On June 30, 1998, C.D. returned to Respondent's business and was provided the hearing aids and paid the $2,000 balance for the purchase. Respondent was in attendance on this occasion. No further documentation was provided C.D. concerning his purchase when he took delivery of the hearing aids. Shortly after receiving the hearing aids C.D. and his wife took a vacation in north Georgia. On July 14, 1998, C.D. wrote Ms. Sherman concerning the hearing aids in question. In that correspondence he said "Sorry, but these hearing aids just don't meet my needs. Please refund my $4,000." On that same date by registered delivery, return receipt requested, C.D. sent the hearing aids back to Respondent's Wildwood, Florida, business address. The hearing aids were received at that address on July 20, 1998. The hearing aids were eventually returned to the manufacturer for credit on Respondent's account with Rexton. This disposition occurred around August 10, 1998. On July 20, 1998, the same day that the hearing aids were received by Respondent's business, Ms. Sherman wrote C.D. at his Florida address in Lake Panasoffkee, Florida. In that correspondence she identified herself as being a hearing aid specialist and an office manager for Respondent's Sumter Hearing Centers, one of which was at the Wildwood, Florida, address. In this correspondence she stated: We are in receipt of your hearing aid. As we agreed when you purchased the hearing aid you would give the hearing aid a 30-day trial basis, therefore I would suggest that we delay canceling this order. My suggestion is again a 30-day trial basis effective upon your return. It is important that I know what kind of problems, 'not loud enough, too much background noise, whistling, fit uncomfortable or etc.' you are having so that I can make adjustments and have you try them again. I am confident that we can get you to hear better. Please contact me at 352-793-4422 regarding the above matter. On August 6, 1998, C.D. responded to the July 20, 1998 letter from Ms. Sherman by writing to her and saying: In reference to your letter of July 20th; be advised that I have purchased another hearing aid and I am happy with them [sic]. Please return the $4,000 I paid for the Rexton aids. In fact, C.D. had not purchased another hearing aid. He made this false statement as a further attempt to be reimbursed the purchase price for the Rexton hearing aids. C.D. made numerous attempts to obtain a refund for the hearing aids purchased, to no avail. Respondent was aware of these attempts. Among the efforts was contact by Randall M. Thornton, Esquire, C.D.'s attorney, who wrote to the Respondent's business address at Wildwood, Florida, and another business address in Bushnell, Florida, requesting a refund in the amount of $4,000. This correspondence from the attorney was dated October 9, 1998. Respondent's uncorroborated testimony that he refunded the $4,000 to C.D. is not credible.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which imposes an administrative fine of $2,000, assesses costs of investigation and prosecution, orders Respondent to refund $4,000 to C.D., and otherwise dismisses the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary L. Asbell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Mail Station 39 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William D. Williston 3131 Southwest College Road Suite 302 Ocala, Florida 34474 William D. Williston 1072 Southeast 155th Street Summerfield, Florida 34491 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Respondent committed the violations set forth in the administrative complaint dated May 16, 2003, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Leeds has been a licensed hearing aid specialist practicing in Coconut Creek, Florida. In 1997, Leeds, then age 77, contracted with patient M. M. to dispense and deliver patient M. M. a hearing aid. The hearing aid failed to perform in a satisfactory manner. The failure occurred because Leeds failed to discharge his professional duties in accordance with minimum performance standards for persons providing hearing aid services in Florida. In particular, Leeds failed to take an appropriate patient history; failed to conduct a physical examination which conformed to the minimum standards and procedures called for by the statutes and rules regulating persons licensed to dispense hearing aids; and failed to create and maintain an adequate patient record. By way of defense, Leeds testified that he performed certain tests which were not reflected in his patient records. This testimony was not credible. Even if Leeds had performed the tests he claimed to have performed, his failure to document them is, standing alone, a serious departure from minimal professional standards. Respondent has been reprimanded by the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists on three prior occasions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a final order be entered revoking Respondent's license to dispense hearing aids. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Hearing Aid Specialist Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Diane L. Guillemette, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barry L. Halpern, Esquire Law Offices of Barry L. Halpern 2650 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137
The Issue Has Respondent violated Section 484.056(1)(g), Florida Statutes as alleged in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what, if any, disciplinary action is appropriate?
Findings Of Fact In September of 1989, Mrs. Mary Louise Gibson, then in her late seventies, purchased "full-shell" Sonotone hearing aids at Hearing Aid Services in Temecula, California. The hearing aids were manufactured by TelStar Electronics, Inc., located in Longwood, Florida. The manufacturer's warranty covering the hearing aids expired on December 22, 1990. Some time after the purchase of the hearing aids, members of Mrs. Gibson's family began to tell her that she was not hearing well despite use of the hearing aids. In August, 1991, some eight months or so after the warranty had expired, Mrs. Gibson, thinking the hearing aids were still under warranty, visited the TelStar manufacturing facility in Longwood to see what could be done about her poor "hearing aid-assisted" hearing. At the manufacturing facility, Mrs. Gibson was referred to the manufacturer's retail store in an adjoining part of the building housing the manufacturer's operation. With Mrs. Gibson was her husband, who was also having trouble with his hearing aids, and her daughter, Mary A. Gibson. By virtue of the referral, the Gibsons and her husband went from the manufacturing end of the building to the manufacturer's retail store. Working as a hearing aid specialist in the manufacturing facility's retail store was Respondent, Nick Joseph Spina. At the time of Mrs. Gibson's visit, Mr. Spina was licensed by the Board of Hearing Aid Specialists as a hearing aid specialist in the state of Florida. His license number is AS 0001750. Mr. Spina continues to be and has been at all times material to this proceeding the holder of the hearing aid specialist license. Not a salaried employee of TelStar, Mr. Spina's pay at the TelStar retail store was based entirely on commissions from new sales. In any given sale, the commission was thirty per cent of the gross amount of the sale. Mr. Spina conducted an audiogram of Mrs. Gibson. He concluded that Mrs. Gibson needed a type of shell for her hearing aids different from the style she had been using: a "full-shell," which occludes the ear canal entirely. In Mr. Spina's professional opinion, Mrs. Gibson needed a helix-type shell which fills only the top of the ear and leaves the ear canal unoccluded. The Purchase Agreement executed by Mr. Gibson shows on the day the Gibsons consulted with Mr. Spina that Mrs. Gibson's husband, Horace Gibson, agreed to pay $450.00 for a recasing of Mrs. Gibson's hearing aids. The comments section of the order form states "Recased to helix aids," and shows a charge of $139.00. On August 28, 1991, Mrs. Gibson picked up the recased hearing aids. The invoice of the same date shows that TelStar Electronics, Inc., charged $139.00 for the recasing. Mrs. Gibson, as was agreed under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, paid $450.00 for the recasing. Approximately five months later, in January of 1992, Mrs. Gibson visited Mr. Spina again. Based on a second audiogram, Mr. Spina told her that she had experienced a dramatic change in her hearing since the August testing and needed another type of hearing aid. A purchase order form signed January 16, 1992, with an order date of January 13, 1992, shows that Mrs. Gibson agreed to pay $1078 for a hearing system described as "NEW" and being a Sonotone Model ITE, colored pink, with a warranty period from 1/16/92 to 1/16/94, a two-year warranty. The serial numbers for the new hearing aids are listed on the purchase agreements as 92F24064 for the hearing aid for the left ear and 92F24065 for the hearing aid for the right ear. The purchase order form is signed by Nick Spina. On the same date the "new" hearing system was ordered, January 13, 1994, Mr. Spina executed a second form, a repair order form. The repair order form ordered that M. L. Gibson's hearing aids bearing serial numbers 91F13666 and 91F13665, the helix-type hearing aids provided her the previous August by Respondent, be remade as "full shell" hearing aids. The order form for the repair of the helix hearing aids shows that Respondent ordered them to be assigned new serial numbers identical to those listed on the purchase order form for the new hearing aids, 92F24064 for the left ear and 92F24065 for the right ear, and be shipped back on January 15, 1992. This same form shows that a 2 year warranty was to be added to the hearing aids for the repair. An invoice dated January 15, 1994, shows a shipment by Sonotone Corporation, TelStar Division in Longwood, Florida, of Purchase Order number "Gibson TS R/M" of Order Number 60864, the order executed by Respondent on January 13, 1994. The hearing aids were remade to full shell hearing aids, reassigned the serial numbers ordered by respondent, and the circuit, microphone and receiver were changed. No charge was made for the remake of the helix hearing aids back into full shell hearing aids because the hearing aids were under warranty from the recasing accomplished the previous August. The remade hearing aids were not given an additional two-year warranty. It is not customary in the industry to give two-year warranties for remade hearing aids. A warranty for remade hearing aids is much less than two years, typically 6 months. Two-year warranties are reserved for new hearing aids. Mrs. Gibson picked up the hearing aids and paid $1078 for them, believing them to be new hearing aids. Mrs. Gibson's daughter, who accompanied her mother to all the transactions with Respondent, also was under the impression that brand new hearing aids had been provided her mother in January of 1992. Less than two months later, on March 10, 1992, Mrs. Gibson consulted Freddi M. Catlett, of the Arkansas Hearing Aid Center in Hot Springs, Arkansas, because her hearing aids were rubbing her ear so as to make it sore. Ms. Catlett sent impressions of Mrs. Gibson's ears as well as the hearing aids to the Sonotone factory in Florida. Instead of 92F24065, the serial number of Mrs. Gibson's right hearing aid, the order form lists the serial number of the hearing aids as 92-24065, substituting a "-" for the "F", the third digit in the serial number. Otherwise the number on the order form is identical to the serial number of the right hearing aid purchased by Mrs. Gibson in January of 1992 from Respondent. Both Mrs. Gibson and her daughter, despite the fact that Mrs. Gibson had two pairs of hearing aids, were sure that the hearing aids examined by Ms. Catlett were the "new" hearing aids purchased from Respondent in January of 1992. The hearing aids were returned to Mrs. Catlett from the Sonotone factory with an invoice charging $74.50 for a replating and recasing of the hearing aids. The service department notes on the order form shows that the warranty on the hearing aids, which should have been good until January of 1994 had the hearing aids been new in January of 1992, had expired on January 28, 1992. Upon being noticed that the warranty had expired, Ms. Catlett contacted Sonotone to inquire further. She was told that the hearing aids had been purchased in 1989 and that the warranty was no longer in effect. Ms. Catlett then questioned Mrs. Gibson and was assured that the hearing aids were the "new" hearing aids purchased from Respondent the previous January. The hearing aids examined by Ms. Catlett were the hearing aids purchased in January of 1992 from Respondent. The serial number listed on Ms. Catlett's order form mistakenly listed "-" as the third digit instead of "F". Contrary to Mr. Spina's representation, the hearing aids he sold to Mrs. Gibson in January of 1992 were not new, despite his marking on the order form that they would have a two-year warranty. The hearing aids sold as new hearing aids by Respondent in January of 1992 were simply a remake of the helix-type hearing aids that Mr. Spina had remade the August before. These hearing aids were new in 1989 not in 1992.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, and in keeping with Section 484.056(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent Nick Joseph Spina's license to practice as a hearing aid specialist be revoked and that Nick Joseph Spina be fined $1000. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Findings of fact in Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order 1, 3-19 are accepted. Finding of fact #2 in Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order is rejected to the extent it implies Mrs. Gibson was 83 in August of 1991. She was 83 at the time of her deposition in April of 1994. Otherwise the finding is accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan E. Landward Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite 60, Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Nick Joseph Spina, Jr. P. O. Box 214 Chipley, FL 32428 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Suzanne Lee Executive Director Hearing Aid Specialists 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0759
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since February 15, 1993, a Florida-licensed hearing aid specialist. He holds license number AS2453. For the past seven years, Respondent has owned Advanced Hearing Center, Inc. (Advanced Hearing), a hearing aid business located in North Palm Beach, Florida. W. J. is a hearing impaired hearing aid wearer. He and his wife of 32 years, F. J., reside in Florida (on Singer Island in Palm Beach County) part of the year (generally, January through the middle of April) and in New Jersey the remainder of the year. In late March of 1997, toward the end of their stay in Florida that year, W. J. contacted Respondent by telephone at Advanced Hearing to inquire about getting the hearing aid for his left ear repaired. W. J. had not had any previous dealings with Respondent. He had learned that Respondent was a hearing aid specialist upon reading the advertisement for Advanced Hearing in the Yellow Pages, and was "impressed" that Respondent had a Ph.D. During their telephone conversation, Respondent invited W. J. to visit Advanced Hearing with his wife. He told W. J. that, during the visit, he would look at the hearing aid that needed repair and, in addition, give W. J. a free hearing test. W. J., accompanied by his wife, visited Advanced Hearing on Tuesday, April 1, 1997. While waiting to see Respondent, W. J. was asked to read written "testimonials" from satisfied patients of Respondent's. W. J. and his wife were subsequently escorted to Respondent's office, where they remained for the duration of the visit. While in Respondent's office, W. J. filled out a medical history form. The information that W. J. provided on the form indicated that he did not have any significant medical problems warranting referral to a medical doctor. Respondent then used a video otoscope to examine W. J.'s ear canals. The ear canals were "normal looking" and, although there was some wax buildup, the eardrums were visible. As he performed the otoscope examination, Respondent explained to the J.s what he saw. He told them about the wax buildup and cautioned that the lack of adequate "cerumen management" could lead to "abnormalities or infections or a fungus c[ould] grow," conditions which would require medical attention. Inasmuch as W. J. had not reported any recent history of infection and the otoscope examination had not revealed any observable abnormality, Respondent proceeded to test W. J.'s hearing. He performed pure tone audiometric testing by air and by bone and recorded the results of such testing. Respondent's office, where the testing was done, was a "certified testing room," within the meaning of Section 484.0501(6), Florida Statutes. The air and bone tests revealed no significant difference or "gap" between W. J.'s air conduction hearing and his bone conduction hearing. After the testing, Respondent informed the J.s that he was unable to repair W. J.'s old hearing aid (for his left ear), and he suggested that they purchase new, "upgrade[d]" hearing aids for W. J. if they could afford to do so. Respondent recommended the Starkey Sequel Circuit, the "pinnacle product" of "one of the largest [hearing aid] manufacturers in the world" (Starkey), because he believed that it would help alleviate the "problems with distortion and loud noise" that W. J. had reported that he was experiencing. Respondent informed the J.s that he could sell them this Starkey product at a "great price." The J.s told Respondent that they were reluctant to purchase new hearing aids in Florida because they were planning on returning to their residence in New Jersey shortly, and that, in any event, they were interested in Siemens Music, not Starkey Sequel Circuit, hearing aids. Respondent replied that the Starkey Sequel Circuit was comparable to the Siemens Music and that any Starkey dealer would be able to service Starkey Sequel Circuit hearing aids purchased from his business. After considering Respondent's comments and discussing the matter with his wife, W. J. signed a written agreement to purchase Starkey Sequel Circuit hearing aids from Advanced Hearing for $3,800.00. W. J. paid the full purchase price, by credit card, before leaving. On the credit card receipt that W. J. received were written the words, "no refunds." The "purchase agreement" that W. J. signed had a "guarantee date" of "2 yrs." and contained the following provisions: Within a period of one year after delivery patient may have these instruments serviced at Advanced Hearing Center, Inc. without any cost under the terms of the guarantee issued by the manufacturer. As the degree of satisfaction is dependent upon user, motivation, diligent adherence to instructions, and proper use of this prosthesis, all warranties are confined to those issued by the manufacturer. Examination, test, and other representations are non-medical and for the sole purpose of fitting hearing aids. I hereby acknowledge that I have been provided information concerning the advantages of telecoils, "t" coils, or "t" switches; which included the increased access to telephones and assistive listening systems. I have been provided in writing with the terms and conditions of the 30-day trial period and money back guarantee; with notice of my right to cancel the purchase within 30 days of receipt of the hearing aid(s) for a valid reason based on a failure to achieve a specific measured performance such as sound improvements or improved word discrimination. It shall be the responsibility of the person selling the hearing aid(s) to maintain the audiometric documentation necessary to establish the measured improvement. If the hearing aid must be repaired, or adjusted during the 30- day[] trial period, the running of the 30- day trial period is suspended one day for each 24 hour period that the hearing aid is not in the purchaser's possession. A repaired, remade, or adjusted hearing aid must be claimed by the purchaser within three working days after notification of availability. In the event of cancellation within the 30-day trial period, the seller may retain a charge not to exceed $150.00 on a monaural fitting (one hearing aid) and $200.00 on a binaural fitting (two hearing aids) for earmolds and services provided to fit the hearing aids. In addition, the purchaser may be charged a cancellation fee not to exceed 5% of the total purchase price. If the hearing system improves word discrimination, which the seller has the right to test and document, no refund will be issued. If a problem arises you should return immediately to the office listed above. In the event a complaint concerning a hearing aid and/or guarantee cannot be reconciled, you may contact the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0783. Telephone Number (904) 488-6602. I understand that this purchase agreement comprises the entire agreement and no other agreement of any kind, verbal understanding or promise whatsoever will be recognized or be binding upon Advanced Hearing Center, Inc. THE USE OF A HEARING AID WILL NOT RESTORE NORMAL HEARING, NOR WILL IT PREVENT FURTHER HEARING LOSS. After the "purchase agreement" was signed, Respondent made earmolds to send to Starkey. The earmolds, along with a manufacturer's order form that Respondent had completed, were subsequently sent to Starkey. On the order form, Respondent provided information concerning the results of the air conduction testing, but not of the bone conduction testing, he had performed on W. J. The J.s left Advanced Hearing following their April 1, 1997, visit without taking a copy of the signed "purchase agreement" with them. At their request, Respondent mailed them a copy of the "purchase agreement," which they received sometime on or about Saturday, April 5, 1997, along with the following cover letter, dated April 1, 1997: Thank you both for coming to Advanced Hearing Center and mutually deciding to purchase your new hearing system. I am confident that the Starkey Sequels will improve your hearing, especially since it minimizes distortion of louder sounds as we thoroughly discussed. Your custom order is being processed and we will notify you when it comes in to set an appointment for the fitting and pick up of your new instruments. Also enclosed please find another copy of the purchase agreement. It was not long after the J.s had left Advanced Hearing on April 1, 1997, that they started having second thoughts about the purchase they had made. The next morning (April 2, 1997), they telephoned Respondent and advised him of their "doubts" and concerns regarding the purchase. Respondent "talked it out" with them, and, at the end of the conversation, the J.s expressed their willingness to "accept the delivery" of the hearing aids. W. J., again accompanied by his wife, returned to Advanced Hearing on Tuesday, April 8, 1997, to be fitted with the new hearing aids. He had not seen a medical doctor since his last visit to Advanced Hearing. When Respondent first fitted W. J. with the new hearing aids, W. J. told Respondent that he heard a whistling noise. Respondent thereupon removed the hearing aids and, using a "metal probe," took wax out of both of W. J.'s ears. He then again fitted W. J. with the new hearing aids. This time W. J. did not hear any whistling noise or other feedback. Respondent proceeded to test and measure W. J.'s hearing. The audiometric test results, which were reduced to writing and placed in the patient file Respondent maintained on W. J., revealed that, with the new hearing aids, W. J. enjoyed a significant improvement in hearing. Following the testing, the J.s accepted delivery of new hearing aids. Respondent provided the J.s with a copy of the "purchase agreement" that W. J. had signed during his previous visit to Advanced Hearing, on which Respondent had added the serial numbers of the new hearing aids and the date of delivery (April 8, 1997). W. J. left Advanced Hearing on April 8, 1997, wearing the new hearing aids. Sometime after leaving Advanced Hearing, W. J. began hearing the same whistling noises that he had heard when Respondent had first fitted him. After returning to New Jersey on April 9, 1997, the J.s brought the new hearing aids to a New Jersey audiologist to be serviced. The New Jersey audiologist told the J.s that to correct the whistling problem new earmolds would have to be made. She further advised the J.s that she "would have to charge [them] a considerable amount of money" to make these earmolds. Respondent was not furnished a signed written request from W. J. requesting that Respondent release to the New Jersey audiologist the records in the file Respondent maintained on W. J. Accordingly, Respondent never sent the New Jersey audiologist these records. On May 1, 1997, the J.s shipped the new hearing aids back to Respondent, along with a letter (dated that same day, May 1, 1997), in which they demanded a "full refund" based upon their claim that the hearing aids neither fit nor worked properly. On May 5, 1997, Respondent refused delivery of the package containing the hearing aids and the letter. Thereafter, on or about May 6, 1997, W. J. filed a complaint against Respondent with Petitioner. The J.s re-sent to Respondent the May 1, 1997, letter requesting a "full refund." The letter was delivered to Respondent on May 9, 1997. Respondent refused to provide the refund that the J.s had demanded because he believed that, inasmuch as he had the audiometric documentation necessary to establish that the hearing aids significantly improved W. J.'s hearing, the J.s did not have a "valid reason," under the existing law, to void their purchase of the hearing aids. Respondent did agree, however, to pay for a qualified person in New Jersey to make earmolds for W. J. so that the problem with the hearing aids could be corrected. He also offered to take the hearing aids back and exchange them for Siemens Music hearing aids. Neither of these offers, though, was acceptable to the J.s. Unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain a refund from Respondent, the J.s sought redress from their credit card company. The credit card company sent the J.s the following letter, dated May 30, 1997: This is in reference to the billing error from ADVANCED HEARING CTR in the amount(s) of $3,800.00. Based on the information you have provided, we have removed the item(s) from dispute and issued a credit to your current account. Please be advised that the merchant has the opportunity for rebuttal. If this occurs, we may need to contact you for further information if deemed necessary to support your case. However, if the merchant can provide documentation that proves the charge(s) to be valid, we will have no alternative but to place the charge(s) back on your account. If this is necessary, we will send you a written explanation. . . . Respondent, on behalf of Advanced Hearing, took advantage of the "opportunity for rebuttal" provided by the credit card company. The matter was finally resolved in October of 1997, with the credit card company siding with the J.s. The end result of the dispute resolution process was that the J.s were made whole and $3,800.00 was "charged back" to Advanced Hearing's account. In early December of 1997, Respondent discovered that there were several files missing from his office. He suspected a disgruntled former employee whom he had recently terminated. (The employee's personnel file was among the missing files.) Respondent contacted the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, which investigated the matter. The deputy that conducted the investigation found no signs of forced entry. No arrests were made as a result of the investigation. Following the completion of the investigation, Respondent found that there were other files, including W. J.'s patient file, that were missing. Respondent made an effort to recreate the documentation that was in W. J.'s file. He contacted Starkey and obtained, over the telephone, the test result information that he had included on the manufacturer's order form he had sent to Starkey. He recorded this information on an Audiometric Case History and Tests form that he uses in his practice. On the form, he wrote that this was "partial information obtained from manufacturer." In January of 1998, Respondent's secretary inadvertently charged the J.s' credit card account $3,800.00. The mistake was subsequently rectified. Sometime in 1998, the J.s mailed to Respondent the hearing aids they had purchased from Advanced Hearing the year before. This time Respondent accepted delivery. The hearing aids were "not in working order" when they were received by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2001.
