The Issue This hearing officer appeal under Section 4-505 of the City of Clearwater Community Development Code (Code) is the second of two administrative appeals available to and taken by Appellant, Deborah Groen Sobeleski (Sobeleski) under the Code. The issue in this second appeal is whether to sustain the decision of the City of Clearwater Community Development Board (CDB). The CDB's decision, made under Section 4-504 of the Code, was to allow Sobeleski's earlier Application for Administrative Appeal to the CDB from a Development Order (DO) issued by the City of Clearwater Community Development Coordinator (CDC) to remain on the CDB's consent agenda, which had the effect of denying the Application for Administrative Appeal and confirming the CDC's DO without a quasi-judicial hearing for receipt of additional evidence. The CDC's DO granted, with conditions, the Flexible Standard Development Application filed by Appellee, Christopher Mariani (Mariani, or Applicant), and subsequently amended, for a deviation to allow construction of a dock exceeding the 60-foot maximum length otherwise allowed by the Code.
Findings Of Fact On January 18, 2002, Appellee, Christopher C. Mariani (Mariani, or Applicant), filed a Flexible Standard Development Application for a deviation from Section 3-601.C.1.b.2 of the City of Clearwater Community Development Code (the Code) to allow construction of a 101-foot long dock (98 feet in length with a 3-foot step-down) where 60 feet would be the maximum otherwise allowed by the Code. The deviation from Code apparently was requested because a Pinellas County Department of Environmental Management Water and Navigation Report dated November 26, 2001, stated: Seagrass beds are located along this entire property, and extend out to a maximum of 65 ft. from the seawall in the area of the proposed dock although it becomes sparse at approximately 60 ft. It is the policy of this Department to limit structures over seagrasses to 4 ft. in width and to place the terminal platforms and boat slips beyond the limits of the seagrasses wherever possible. At the time the application was filed, Section 4-505 of the Code provided that, in an appeal to a hearing officer from a decision of the City of Clearwater Community Development Board (CDB), the record before the CDB could be "supplemented by such additional evidence as may be brought forward during the hearing"; and the appellant's burden was to show that the CDB's decision could not be "sustained by the evidence before the board and before the hearing officer." The "City of Clearwater Planning Department Staff Report for 2/14/02 DRC Meeting" recommended flexible standard development approval for a 92-foot long dock.3 The stated "Bases for approval" were: compliance with the flexible standard development criteria under Section 3-601.C.1.g.4 of the Code; compliance with the general applicability criteria under Section 3-913 of the Code; and compatibility with the surrounding area. The Staff Report noted: (1) "there are no navigational concerns with the proposed development"; and (2) "the proposal is more environmentally sensitive than the existing5 dock and constitute an improvement over existing conditions." The Report also stated that, since only one of the three criteria in Section 3- 601.C.1.g. need be met, similarity to surrounding dock patterns was not applicable but that "the proposed dock, as amended, will be similar to surrounding dock patterns." By letter dated March 5, 2002, Mariani amended his application to: decrease the length of the proposed dock to 95 feet; reduce the roof length over the larger capacity boat lift from 48 feet to 38 feet (to match the roof length over the smaller capacity lift); and reduce the total dock square footage to 476.25 square feet versus the 498 feet previously requested. On or about April 14, 2002, Mariani submitted to the City a set of "Dock Plans" for a 92-foot long dock.6 The document included "Diagram A Permittable Construction" and "Diagram B Proposed Construction." The apparent purpose was to contrast the dock Mariani would have been permitted to build in the absence of seagrasses with his proposed dock.7 On May 2, 2002, Section 4-505 of the Code was amended to provide that the appeal hearing before a hearing officer consists solely of reception of the record before the CDB and oral argument and that the burden on appeal to the hearing officer is for "the appellant to show that the decision of the [CDB] cannot be sustained by the evidence before the [CDB], or that the decision of the [CDB] departs from the essential requirements of law." Under the amendment, no other evidence is to be considered.8 By letter dated July 22, 2002, the CDC9 issued a DO stating concurrence with the DRC's "findings." Except for this reference, the record-on-appeal does not contain any evidence of the DRC's recommendation or any written findings by the DRC.10 But the CDC approved Mariani's application, as amended, upon the same "Bases for approval" contained in the "City of Clearwater Planning Department Staff Report for 2/14/02 DRC Meeting," with the following conditions: That a building permit for the proposed dock only be issued concurrently with, or subsequent to, building permit issuance for a principal, residential structure on the site; That the proposed dock be relocated farther east (with the dock head centered on the midpoint of the waterfront property line, as measured at the seawall) and constructed perpendicular to the waterfront property line; That the relocation of the dock meet all criteria under Section 3-601.C.1; and That revised plans reflecting conformance with condition #2 be submitted with the building permit application, to the satisfaction of staff. The DO then stated: "The approval is based on and must adhere to the site plan dated received April 15, 2002, or as modified by condition #2."11 On July 26, 2002, Sobeleski filed an Application for Administrative Appeal to the CDB from the CDC's decision. It included numerous exhibits. It appears that not all of the Application for Administrative Appeal and attachments were presented to the CDB for its consideration on August 20, 2002. One attachment was a letter dated March 27, 2002, from Sobeleski's attorney to the CDC and the City's Land Planner. This letter had 15 exhibits attached, but the CDC removed Exhibits 9-15 from the version of the letter presented to the CDB for its consideration. However, the letter stated that Exhibits 10-15 were attached for "ease of review," and the CDC separately presented copies of the documents contained in Exhibits 12-15 for the CDB's consideration. As for the other exhibits removed from the letter, Exhibit 9 was a computer diskette containing the photographs that were presented to the CDB for its consideration as Exhibits 1-8. Exhibit 10 was a letter dated March 6, 2002, from individuals named Blum to the City Planner stating no objection to the proposed dock. Exhibit 11 was a letter dated March 7, 2002, from Mariani to the CDC responding to opposition from Sobeleski and another individual to the proposed dock. While Exhibit 11 apparently was not presented to the CDB for its consideration, it clearly was adverse to Sobeleski's position and was addressed at length in the letter from Sobeleski's attorney dated March 27, 2002. In On August 20, 2002, the CDB considered the documents described in the immediately preceding Finding, together with a "City of Clearwater Planning Department Summary of Events," dated August 20, 2002, as well as oral presentations by the CDC, counsel for Sobeleski, and counsel for Mariani. The audiotape- recording of the oral presentations reveals that, upon the advice of the CDC and the Assistant City Attorney, the CDB attempted to limit the oral presentations to the question whether the CDB should remove Sobeleski's Application for Administrative Appeal from the CDB's consent agenda so as to cause a quasi-judicial hearing to be conducted, or should leave it on the consent agenda, which would result in upholding the CDC's decision. After being restricted by the CDB from addressing the merits, counsel for Sobeleski argued for a quasi- judicial hearing for reasons of "public policy." The CDB then allowed counsel for Mariani to address the merits in arguing that Sobeleski had made no showing as to why the CDC decision was incorrect so as to justify a quasi-judicial hearing.12 The Assistant City Attorney concurred that some such showing should be necessary to justify removal from the consent agenda. After the oral presentations, the CDB voted to leave Sobeleski's Application for Administrative Appeal on the CDB's consent agenda, thereby upholding the CDC's decision to issue the DO. On August 26, 2002, Sobeleski filed an Appeal Application from the CDB's decision. On September 20, 2002, the City referred the Appeal Application to DOAH under Section 4-505 of the Code. However, the referral letter from counsel for the City stated: Please note that I am not forwarding Exhibits 1-15 to the Appeal Application. Items 1-9 and 12-15 are already of record before the Board and are thus otherwise included. Items 10 and 11 were not of record below and are not being included, on that basis. Although the manner in which the record-on-appeal was prepared made it exceedingly difficult to ascertain, it appears that the referral actually failed to forward the entirety of Exhibit B to the Appeal Application, which consisted of letters from Appellant's counsel dated August 16 and March 27, 2002.13 The documents called "Exhibits" or "Items" in the referral letter actually were Exhibits 1-15 attached to the letter from Appellant's counsel dated March 27, 2002. As previously found, the CDC decided not to present to the CDB all attachments to the letter dated March 27, 2002. See Finding 9, supra. For that reason, the Assistant City Attorney "redacted" the Appeal Application by deleting the items not in fact presented (Exhibits 9, 10, and 11), as well as the items identical to documents separately presented (Exhibits 12-15), to the CDB for its consideration. See Finding 11, supra.14
The Issue Whether Appellant was wrongfully denied a variance of 21.33 feet to construct a second floor deck at 673 Bay Esplanade, Five Palms Motel Condo, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact John Shaw, a resident of Massachusetts, purchased the condominium for which the variance is here requested in December, 1988 without first visiting the property or inquiring about zoning restrictions. The unit purchased is on the second floor of a two story building earlier converted from a hotel or motel into condominiums. The seller told Shaw he could construct a deck over the existing deck on the ground floor condominium below the unit purchased by Shaw. While the construction of this deck was in progress it was discovered no permit had been pulled for the project and the work was stopped. The subsequent application for a permit was denied because the proposed deck encroached some 21.33 feet into the setback area. The application for a variance was denied by the Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board and this appeal followed. The two buildings comprising this complex were erected many years ago and are non-conforming, i.e., the buildings themselves violate the current Development Code. An existing deck extending into the setback area was constructed on the unit directly below the condominium purchased by Shaw and a similar deck extending to the seawall was constructed on an adjacent building. No permits are on file for those decks. Construction of the proposed deck would improve the livability of the condominium greatly by expanding the area usable for looking seaward. The condominium has been used without this deck for many years. This property is zoned CR-24 and the setback requirement is 25 feet from the water's edge.
Findings Of Fact John Taylor, III, Petitioner, owns property located at 1200 South Missouri Avenue in the City of Clearwater which is zoned CC (commercial center). The subject property consists of a mall and movie theater. On or about April 17, 1986, Michael Johnson, on behalf of Petitioner, applied for a variance to allow two message signs on the subject property and also to allow total message signage of 256 square feet. Without a variance, the subject property can have only one message sign which cannot exceed 192 square feet. The property presently has one message sign and total message signage of 176 square feet located on its marquee. At a meeting of the Development Code Adjustment Board on May 8, 1986, Petitioner's variance application was denied. The parties stipulated that Fusco Corporation is the manager of the mall located on Petitioner's property and further that Fusco is the owner of all improvements on the property. Further, Cineplex-Odeon has leased the theater located on the subject property and has renovated and expanded it from two to five movie theaters. Finally, Michael Johnson was employed by Cineplex-Odeon to install the changeable message sign which is the subject of this variance. The second message sign which is sought by this variance would be located 350 feet from Missouri Avenue, which runs north and south in front of the subject property. Specifically, it will be located in the front wall of the theaters next to the ticket counter, and will be 16 feet long by 4.4 feet high. The sign would actually be a display case, 6 inches deep, with five individual poster display cases, which would be used to display coming attraction posters. Each display case would have a hinged glass door, through which the poster could be seen. Coming attraction posters are 2 feet long by 3.3 feet high. The 6 inch depth of the display case extends equally into, and protrudes out of, the front wall of the theater. Petitioner has not established that a hardship would exist if this variance is not approved. Coming attraction posters can be, and in fact are, displayed in the theater lobby. During the renovation of the theater, the front wall could have been removed and a window installed to allow viewing of the lobby posters from outside the theater. Finally, the existing sign on the property could be used to advertise coming attractions, as well as movies which are currently playing. The display case for which this variance is sought on behalf of Petitioner is a "changeable message sign," as that term is used in Section 134.011(a), Land Development Code, since it would be a graphic communication or device which would be primarily used to convey information or advertise and would also be prominently visible from outside the theater.
The Issue The issue is whether petitioners' development is entitled to a favorable determination by respondent under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes (1989), and thus is exempt from development of regional impact review.
Findings Of Fact PETITIONERS' EXCEPTIONS In its Exception No. 1., Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's determination that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that Lee County Sheriff's Office, or any other local law enforcement officials strictly enforce Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51. Petitioners' exception is not supported by the record. Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51, requires that a vessel must proceed at idle speed, no wake, within five hundred feet of a water oriented structure, such as a seawall or dock. If enforced, the ordinance would require that boaters on the channel who venture closer than five hundred feet to the seawall which fronts a part of the island's shoreline or a dock located several hundred yards south of the collector canal, which is the site of Petitioners' proposed project, be obliged to travel no faster than idle speed, no wake in those areas. The Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced was based on the testimony of Lt. Graylish of the Florida Marine Patrol. Lt. Graylish appeared as a witness for Respondent and testified as to his opinion as a law enforcement officer on the impact of Lee County Vessel Control Ordinance No. 90-51 on vessel speeds in Estero Bay. During Lt. Graylish's direct examination when asked whether the Marine Patrol enforced the ordinance he replied: Well, we have the power to do it. The hardest problem for us is what in fact is that 500 foot distance. It's really hard on the water to come up with that, and then we've got a lot of transient traffic that goes through that area from out of state during season and part-time residents, and it's very difficult to enforce that when you don't have an actual sign placement indicating what in fact the condition is. [Tr. p. 118, Ins. 15-24] The lieutenant's testimony was uncontroverted. Petitioners produced no competent substantial evidence to refute Lt. Graylish's testimony. Likewise in its exceptions, Petitioners have failed to present competent substantial evidence to demonstrate why the Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced should be rejected. Accordingly, Petitioners' Exception No. 1. is therefore rejected as being contrary to the evidence presented. In its Exception No. 2, Petitioners object to the Hearing Officer's determination that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel (i.e., Coon Key Pass). Petitioners state that the parties only stipulated that "Estero Bay is an area that is, at least, frequented by manatees" and cites to the Transcript in support of its position. [See Petitioners' Exceptions] However, a review of the statement in the record which Petitioners rely on and which was made by Petitioners' own attorney at the hearing demonstrates that the Hearing Officer was correct in finding that the parties stipulated that manatees frequent the channel. In pertinent part the passage states: At this time I would like to stipulate to one thing that was omitted in here [i e., prehearing stipulation], is that we do stipulate that the areas are Outstanding Florida Waters and Class II waters, Estero Bay, and they are waters that are at least frequented by manatees . . . (emphasis added)[Tr. p. 8, Ins. 18-24] The Hearing Officer's finding that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel, which is part of Estero Bay, is consistent with the parties' stipulation. The exception is therefore rejected as unnecessary. In its Exception No. 3, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that since there was no evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced, DNR could not reasonably determine that Petitioners' project would not have an adverse impact on manatees. The issue in this case was whether Petitioners were entitled to a favorable determination under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, that their proposed project was located so that it would not adversely impact Outstanding Florida Waters or Class II waters an would not contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. It was Petitioners' burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were entitled to a favorable determination. It was therefore incumbent upon Petitioners to present competent evidence regarding the enforcement of Ordinance No. 90-51. This Petitioners did not do. Therefore, Petitioners' Exception No. 3 is rejected as either irrelevant or not being based on competent substantial evidence. In its Exception No. 4, Petitioners allege that Respondent's committed two discovery violations. These allegations are beyond the scope of what is permitted under the rules which deal with exceptions to recommended orders; however they will be addressed. Petitioners claim they were prejudiced by improper testimony from the Respondent's expert witnesses, Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. Petitioners state that these witnesses "allegedly re-examine Petitioners' project area on the afternoon prior to the hearing and alleged the discovery of new observations and conclusions at the hearings." [See Petitioners' Exceptions] Petitioners claim that this alleged re-examination precluded any opportunity for discovery and that therefore, "no testimony relating to this site visit should have been admitted into the record." However, Petitioners raised no such objection at the hearing and by not doing so have waived any right to do so now. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure that would preclude an expert witness from engaging in a review of information to be relied on at the hearing prior to the hearing. Additionally, for clarification only, it should be noted that there is no evidence in the record which would have led Petitioner to believe that Pat Rose visited the site prior to the hearing. In Exception No. 4, Petitioner further alleged that the Hearing Officer should have disallowed the testimony of Lt. Graylish, because his name "first appeared on the prehearing stipulation (not signed by Petitioners) approximately 48 hours before the hearing . . . ." However, Petitioners' did not object at the hearing to the testimony of Lt. Graylish and furthermore, stated on the record in reference to signing the prehearing stipulation: due to our, I guess you would say our geographic differences, the prehearing stipulation was submitted . . . without my signature; and at this time I would like to on the record confirm that I stipulate to that prehearinq stipulation that was jointly prepared and finally submitted by the Department. (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 4, Ins. 21- 25] In addition to having stipulated to Respondent's witnesses, which included Lt. Graylish, Petitioners had raised this very objection prior to the hearing and the Hearing Officer had conducted a telephonic hearing on the matter. The Hearing Officer ruled that the witness would be allowed to testify at the hearing subject to Petitioners' objections at that time. A review of the record of the hearing indicates that Petitioners made no further objections to the lieutenant's testimony. Exceptions as to alleged discovery violations are improper pursuant to the rules and in this case there is no competent substantial evidence to demonstrate the existence of any discovery violations. Exception No. 4 is therefore rejected as being improper. Finally, at Exception No. 5, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's application of law to the findings of fact to support a determination that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating that their proposed project would riot "contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees." Petitioners allegation that this conclusion be rejected is based upon Petitioners' argument, discussed above, that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced. As stated in Paragraphs Nos. 1. and 3., any such rejection of the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Petitioners allege that the Hearing Officer's "sole conclusion of possible manatee impacts from this project was based on what he determined to be a lack of evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced. Petitioners have narrowly construed the Hearing Officer's ruling. There is ample evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Petitioners had not met their burden. In fact, the Recommended Order demonstrates that the ruling was also based on competent substantial evidence presented by Respondent that this proposed project demonstrated a potential for harm to manatees. In that regard, the Hearing Officer's conclusion was based on testimony from both Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. It was their testimony which led the Hearing Officer to conclude that a "favorable determination for Petitioners would not lie." The record is replete with evidence the Hearing Officer could have reasonably relied upon to conclude that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof. [See Tr. p. 118, Ins. 6-9; p. 156 p. 1; p. 158, Ins. 4-6; p. 158. In. 9; p. 159, In.18; p. 176, Ins. 20-23; ; p. 218, Ins. 20-24; p. 219, In. 40p. 316, Ins. 22-23; DNR Exh. 17J Accordingly, Petitioners' exceptions to Conclusion of Law No. 5., is rejected as being contrary to Florida law and the evidence presented. RESPONDENT' S EXCEPTIONS Respondent alleges that Finding of Fact No. 15., should be rejected in its entirety inasmuch as it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. At finding of fact No. 15, the Hearing Officer implies that the Petitioners were "somehow surprised" on June 7, 1991, while the parties were preparing the Prehearing Stipulation to be filed at hearing on June Il, 1991, to learn that DNR intended to take the position at hearing that the proposed project would likely contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area frequented by manatees. In support of this finding the Hearing Officer refers to a comment made by DNR employee David Trimble at his June 5, 1990, deposition, during which he advised Petitioners that based upon the October 17, 1990 memorandum from the Division of Marine Resources he assumed that the manatee issue was "resolved" in Petitioners' favor. However, a review of the record reveals that at no time subsequent to November 8, 1990 or the date on which the unfavorable letter of determination was issued, could Petitioners reasonably claim they believed the issue regarding manatees was resolved. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is not based on competent substantial evidence and is rejected. At his deposition Mr. Trimble was asked who was responsible for making the final determination decision, to which he replied: I evaluate them and make a staff recommendation to my superiors. (emphasis added) [Tr. 22, Ins. 24-25] Q. So you go with your feeling - from what the letters say and - A. Not from my feeling, I go with what the letters say. [Tr. p. 23, Ins. 8-11] Furthermore, Trimble's statement at the deposition that he believed the manatee issue was resolved was given only after Petitioners specifically asked Mr. Trimble his opinion on the matter. Furthermore, Trimble was qualified to give only his opinion as to whether the manatee issue was resolved, not the agency's position which was memorialized in the November 8, 1991, letter of determination. Petitioners' claim that they believed the manatee issue was resolved and the Hearing Officer's subsequent finding that Petitioners' claim was meritious can not be supported on the basis of Trimble's answer to the following question: Q. Was, in your opinion - - and this is your opinion as the reviewer of the request - - was the manatee issue resolved . . . (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 26, Ins. 8-10] Further, the letter that was issued under the Executive Director's signature did not indicate that the manatee issue was resolved, quite the contrary. In fact, the Prehearing Stipulation at page 17, stipulated to by both parties after, the deposition of Trimble listed the following disputed issue for determination at the hearing: 2. Whether the DNR correctly determined that the proposed 132 wetslips in conjunction with the existing 161 slips, will contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. In order to find that Petitioners were somehow surprised by this "newly discovered revelation" (i.e., that manatees were going to be an issue at hearing) the Hearing Officer improperly attributed more weight to the deposition testimony of Trimble thanit was due. Trimble was merely the conduit through which information on the manatee issue from the Division of Marine Resources passed. As he himself stated, he was the reviewer of the information - - he was not the final decisionmaker. Once having reviewed the material sent to him from the other divisions, he merely drafted the unfavorable letter of determination for the Executive Director's consideration. The Executive Director then reviewed the material and issued the letter of determination under his signature.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent enter a final order confirming its earlier determination of November 8, 1990, under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of August 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1991.
The Issue The ultimate issue in this appeal is whether to approve, approve with conditions, or deny the Development Order issued to Appellee Pinellas Education Organization, Inc., d/b/a Enterprise High School (Applicant or School), by the Board on December 3, 2019. Specifically, the following issues must be resolved: Whether Appellants have standing to appeal the Development Order. Whether the issues raised by Appellants at the Oral Argument were properly preserved for appeal. Whether there is substantial competent evidence in the record to support approval of the Development Order.3 Whether the Board's decision departs from the essential requirements of the law. If the Development Order is affirmed, whether any additional conditions are appropriate. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Appellee School filed an application to renovate an existing building to operate a high school at 2495 Enterprise Road, in Clearwater, Florida.4 The Board held a quasi-judicial public hearing on the application on November 19, 2019 (Board Hearing). The Board approved the School's application with conditions and the City issued the Development Order on December 3, 2019. On December 4, 2019, two separate Appeal Applications were filed regarding the Development Order: (1) by 2521 Countryside Blvd., LLP, Countryside Property Principals, LLC, Bruce Levine, and Joan Levine; and by 2505 Enterprise, LLC, and Greg Willsey, and Sandra Willsey. The Appeal Applications were fairly similar and raised a number of issues: four issues pertaining to traffic and parking requirements; and one issue as to whether a high school is a compatible use with the surrounding area. The City referred the matter to DOAH on December 4, 2019, and it was 3 Section 4-505C states, "The burden shall be upon the appellant to show that the decision of the community development board cannot be sustained by substantial competent evidence before the board, or that the decision of the board departs from the essential requirements of law." 4 The School's application went through a Level Two approval process which requires a quasi-judicial public Board hearing to approve flexibility (i.e. deviation) from the minimum development standards set forth in the Code. See Code at §4-401. Level Two approvals must meet both the general applicability criteria and the flexibility criteria outlined by the Code. See Code at Art. 4, Divisions 1, 3, 4 and 6. assigned to an administrative law judge. On December 13, 2019, a telephonic scheduling conference was held to determine the record on appeal and set the oral argument hearing. During that conference the parties agreed not to submit pre-argument briefs, but rather, chose to file post-hearing proposed final orders. The Oral Argument was held at the Clearwater Library and was open to the general public. Applicant, the City, the Board, and all persons who were granted party status at the Board Hearing were allowed to present arguments at the Oral Argument. See Code at 4-505B. At the Board Hearing the following people were granted party status: Dr. Richard Gottlieb, who was represented by Todd Pressman; Sandra Willsey; Greg Willsey; and Todd Burch. The transcript of the Oral Argument was filed with DOAH on February 19, 2020. Pursuant to section 4-505D, the proposed final orders were due within 20 days after the filing of the transcript, or no later than March 11, 2020. Per the City's request, the parties were granted an extension to submit proposed final orders. The additional time was to allow the parties to collaborate on a master index to the record on appeal (Index), which they intended to cite to in their proposed orders. The Index and the proposed final orders were timely submitted on March 23, 2020.5 5 At the Oral Argument, the parties stipulated that the undersigned could take official recognition of the Code provisions and City of Clearwater Comprehensive Plan (Comprehensive Plan) found online. As such, the undersigned takes official recognition of the Code found at https://library.municode.com/fl/clearwater/codes/ community_development_code?nodeId=CODECO (last visited April 14, 2020); and of the Comprehensive Plan found at https://www.myclearwater.com/government/city- departments/planning-development/divisions-/development-review-zoning/comprehensive- plan (last visited April 14, 2020). FACTS IN THE RECORD Pursuant to section 4-505A, the record includes the application file of the Clearwater Planning and Development Department (Planning Department); the agenda packet of the Board Hearing; all exhibits accepted into evidence at the Board Hearing; and the streaming video of the Board Hearing.6 The following findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence found in the record. Parties and Property The School filed an application with the Planning Department to renovate a 16,696 square foot building located on a 1.730 acre site at 2495 Enterprise Road in Clearwater, Florida (proposed development). The proposed development is in a retail/office plaza known as Village at Countryside (Plaza), located on the east side of Enterprise Road, just south of Countryside Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida. The Plaza consists of 11 parcels, including a large vacant building that formerly housed a Toys-R-Us store. The Plaza is located within the US 19 Corridor Redevelopment Plan, and has a designation of "US 19 District, Regional Center sub-district" (US 19-RC). Property within US 19-RC is subject to the special zoning district and development standards found at Appendix B of the Code.7 The School seeks to operate Enterprise High School, a charter high school, at the proposed development site.8 As explained below, relevant to this appeal is the number of students at the School and whether there will be adequate parking for the proposed development as required by the Code. 6 See Video of Board Hearing held November 19, 2019, on Agenda FLD2019-8026 at time marker 9:25 at http://clearwater.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=50&clip_id=3782 (last visited April 1, 2020). 7 See Code at Appendix B – US 19 Zoning District and Development Standards, found at https://library.municode.com/fl/clearwater/codes/community_development_code?nodeId=APX BUS19ZODIDEST (last visited April 14, 2020). 8 Enterprise High School is an existing charter school which intends to move from its current location to the proposed development site. The School is subject to section 1013.33, Florida Statutes. Appellants own and operate property within the Plaza and adjacent to the proposed development site. Specifically, Bruce and Joan Levine own Appellants 2521 Countryside Blvd., LLP,9 and Countryside Property Principals, LLC. The LLP and/or LLC operate the Countryside Foot and Ankle Center.10 The Countryside Foot and Ankle Center's administrator, Todd Burch, was granted party status at the Board Hearing. Greg and Sandra Willsey own Appellant 2505 Enterprise, LLC, which is a property in the Plaza. The Willseys were also granted party status at the Board Hearing. At the conclusion of the Board Hearing, the Board voted to approve the School's application. On December 3, 2019, a Development Order was issued to memorialize the Board's action. Thereafter, Appellants filed the Appeal Applications with a document titled "Notice and Statement" which stated the following grounds for the appeals: The Neighbors assert that the decision of the Community Development Board ("the Board") was not supported by substantial competent evidence and was a departure from essential requirements of law. Specifically: The Board's decision was based upon a high school with two, 200-student shifts. However, the record below established that these student shifts would substantially overlap during the noon hour. In other words, the evaluation of the proposed change of use was based on impacts and site requirements that were substantially less than what would actually occur on the site. 9 The Appeal Application lists this entity as 2521 Countryside Boulevard Land Trust. 10 Although Appellants state that Bruce Levine was granted party status at the Board Hearing, there is no substantial competent evidence in the record supporting this statement. See Appellees' Proposed Final Order at p. 3; compare Tab 30 of the Index, Board Meeting Minutes for November 19, 2019, at p. 3 and 5. The Board's decision was based on a traffic analysis provided by the applicant that used a wrong ITE trip generation code - an elementary school instead of a high school - so it cannot be relied upon as a basis for the underlying decision. The change of use to a high school required that the applicant establish that it had one parking space per three students. There is no substantial competent evidence to establish that this parking requirement was satisfied. To the contrary, the substantial competent evidence establishes that the parking on the property failed to meet this requirement. In fact, granting this change of use would result in a substantial oversubscription of the available parking at the site. The proposed use would create tortured on-site parking and traffic circulation patterns that would substantially impact the existing medical office uses on the property, including a kidney dialysis office that serves a substantial elderly population. There is no substantial competent evidence to support the finding that the change of use would "have no impacts on the adjacent retail plaza." To the contrary, the change of use would have substantial impacts on the current retail and office plaza. The proposed change of use would have substantial negative impacts on the surrounding community and is incompatible with the existing surrounding retail, office and residential uses. At the Oral Argument, Appellants raised for the first time whether the operation of a school is an inconsistent use with: (1) an Amended and Restated Declaration of Establishment of Restrictive Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, and Grants of Easements dated December 7, 1983 (the "Parking Easement"); and (2) the Comprehensive Plan. The Studies The first four issues raised in the Appeal Applications are related to the Parking Study and Traffic Study (collectively referred to as the Studies) which were submitted by the School as part of its application. The Parking Study, dated September 2, 2019, consists of overall parking calculations; aerial photographs of the development site and surrounding areas; and the Parking Easement. The purpose of the Traffic Study was to analyze the impact of the development on the traffic intersection at Countryside Boulevard and Enterprise Road, as well as the full access drive at the site. The 50-page Traffic Study, dated October 18, 2019, included numerous charts, maps, and tables with underlying information and data relating to the traffic counts for the proposed development. Jerry Dabkowski, a local traffic engineer who prepared the Studies for the School, testified at the Board Hearing about the traffic and parking calculations. To rebut the Studies, at the Board Hearing Mr. Pressman presented a two-page letter from a professional engineer dated November 15, 2019, titled "Traffic Study Review." Relevant to the appeal, the letter finds fault in the number of students and the "ITE Code" used in the Traffic Study and in the Planning Department's Staff Report and Recommendation (Staff Report), dated November 19, 2019, which was also presented to the Board. These factors would affect the calculations for the number of parking spaces required for and the trip distribution caused by the proposed development. Number of Students Appellants argue the parking calculations should be based on the total number of students enrolled at the School, or 400 students. The Studies and the Staff Report calculated the traffic and number of parking spaces necessary based on two shifts with 200 students per shift. At the Board Hearing, Donna Hulbert, the School's Director, testified that unlike a traditional high school, the School operated in two shifts to allow the students to hold employment while completing their high school education. Although the School intends to enroll a total of 400 students, she explained, each of the two shifts would have a maximum of 200 students. Additionally, the students are eligible for a public transportation bus pass, which some students utilize instead of driving their personal vehicles. The Study establishes that "[t]o reduce the impacts during the AM and PM peak hours, the school intends to split the day into two shifts, each with 200 students attending." Although there was conflicting information between the School's application and Ms. Hulbert's testimony at the Board Hearing about whether the shifts would overlap, the Staff Report recommends approval of the application because, "[t]he applicant has provided the school will operate in two shifts . . . with no more than 200 students present per shift." There is substantial competent evidence that there will be only 200 students at the School at a time, and that this number was correctly used in calculating the required parking spaces and the trip generation for the proposed development. ITE Trip Calculation Appellants argue the Traffic Study utilized the wrong Institute of Transportation Engineers' (ITE) Trip Generation Code, 520, which is the code applicable to an elementary school. The Study, however, states it utilized ITE Code 530 from the Institute of Transportation Engineers' Trip Generation, 10th Edition for Office, to calculate the change in trips attributed to the proposed development. A copy of the ITE Code 530 was attached to the Traffic Study. Additionally, Mr. Dabkowski testified that ITE Code 530 was the correct code for high schools. There is substantial competent evidence that ITE Code 530 was used in calculating the change in trips for the Traffic Study which was relied upon in the Staff Report, and which was accepted by the Board. Parking Requirements Table 2 in section B-303, Permitted uses and parking, provides the following parking requirements relevant to this appeal. Use Regional Use Specific Standards Minimum Off-Street Parking Spaces Retail Plaza BCP[Level 1 Minimum Standard(Building Construction permit)] [Not included] 4/1,000 SF GFA Schools FLD [Level 2 Flexible Development (Board approval required)] 1. All off-street parking is located at least 200 feet from any property designated as residential in the Zoning Atlas 1 per 3 students Based on this criterion, the School would require 67 parking spaces (200 students/3 = 66.6667). The Staff Report and Studies establish the proposed site has 55 parking spaces, but five of these spaces cannot be used because they are within 200 feet from a parcel designated as Residential. Thus, there are 49 available parking spaces "on site," leaving 18 spaces to be designated. As stated earlier, the proposed site is one of 11 parcels in the Plaza. The Parking Study contains a copy of a Parking Easement that allows cross- parking among the parcels. Based on the square footage of the buildings on the parcels (including the proposed development site), the entire Plaza is required to have 975 parking spaces. The Plaza actually has 1,137 parking spaces, an excess of 162 parking spaces. The Code also requires off-street parking spaces be located within 600 feet of the principal and accessory uses they serve. See Code at § 3-1404A. Next to and within 600 feet of the proposed development site is currently a vacant building that formerly housed a Toys-R-Us store. That parcel has 228 parking spaces, but only 177 spaces are required for that building, leaving an extra 51 parking spaces. Based on the excess spaces available through the Parking Easement, there is substantial competent evidence supporting the City's staff finding of adequate parking spaces to satisfy the additional 18 spaces necessary for the proposed development, and the Board's approval of the same. Compatible Use The fifth issue raised in the Appeal Applications is regarding the use of the proposed development site as a charter high school. Whether this site is appropriate for the type of school operated by the Applicant was a topic of discussion among the Board members at the Board Hearing. At the Board Hearing, Planning Department Manager Mark Parry testified as an expert witness. Mr. Parry explained the nature of the US 19- RC standards and gave his opinion that the proposed development complies with all applicable provisions of the Code, including the use requirements. In contrast, Appellants expressed anecdotal fears that the types of students attending the School would disrupt Appellants' medical businesses. For example, at the Board Hearing, Mrs. Willsey expressed concern that the students at the School were known to have "behavioral problems." Mr. Burch spoke about the increased number of pedestrians in the Plaza and cited to a letter in the record from Dr. Levine: "For us to have to monitor and police our properties for trespassing students would be untenable." There was no actual evidence in the record that the School's operations would cause any problems such as increased crime or trespassing in the area. At the Oral Argument and in their proposed final order, however, Appellants' argument shifted away from the potential effects of the students in the area and instead offered the new arguments that the School was inconsistent with the Parking Easement which states the Plaza shall be used "for commercial purposes only, including without limitation the operation of merchandising establishments, restaurants, and professional offices."11 Regardless, as explained below, this argument is not appropriate on appeal because it was not raised at the Board Hearing or in the Appeal Applications. At the Oral Argument, Appellants also argued that the School is an inconsistent use with the Comprehensive Plan. Appellants cited a paragraph from the Staff Report: The proposal includes a new charter school with grades nine through 12 and constitutes a public educational facility as defined by Policy J.2.1.2. The school will be located within the US 19–RC future land use designation. The prior designation was Commercial General (CG). The intent is that all uses permitted in the CG are also permitted in the US 19–RC classification. The City is planning to update the Comprehensive Plan to reflect this. Schools are a listed permitted use in the CG classification. As explained below, this argument is also inappropriate because it was not raised at the Board Hearing or in the Appeal Applications. Appellants also argue the proposed development is an inconsistent use with the existing businesses because the adjacent properties are commercial in nature and the School is not commercial. The Code, however, clearly allows Schools as an allowable use in the US 19-RC zoning district, and in the 11 The Complete section of the Parking Easement titled "Uses" states: 2.1 Uses in General The Property, consisting of both the Building Area and the Common Areas, shall be used for commercial purposes only, including without limitation the operation of merchandising establishments, restaurants, and professional offices. No portion of the Property shall be used or operated as a discotheque, bar or cocktail lounge (except in connection with a restaurant) ... theatre, bowling alley, skating rink, roller disco or catering hall, funeral parlor, or for the sale of pornographic literature or material, or an adult book store or so called "head shop" or for a video or other game arcade, flea market, or for a use which would be noxious or immoral or otherwise constitute moral turpitude or constitute an undignified, disreputable use. previous zoning designation of CG. See Code at § B-303. Moreover, unlike the Parking Easement, the Code does not divide use categories into "Commercial" and "Non-Commercial." Rather, the uses are categorized as "Residential" and "Non-Residential." Id. Based on the Code and the review of the application submissions, the Staff Report concluded the School will be an appropriate use in the area. Based on Staff visits, aerial photographs and material submitted by the applicant it is evident that the proposal will be in harmony and consistent with the scale, bulk, coverage and character of adjacent properties and, generally, with properties in the greater neighborhood. The reuse of the 16,700 square foot building with a school will not result in any adverse visual impacts on adjacent properties. Since the character of the site will not change with the proposal, and it is currently similar in nature vis-a-vis placement of other uses in the area it is not expected to impair the value of those properties. The proposal will likely have no effect, negative or otherwise, on the health or safety of persons residing or working in the neighborhood. The testimony of Mr. Parry, coupled with the Staff Report, constitute substantial competent evidence supporting the Board's finding that the School is a compatible use with the area.
The Issue Is the City of Mexico Beach (the City or Applicant) entitled to the issuance of a joint coastal permit and consent to use of sovereign submerged land for the Mexico Beach Canal (Main Canal) and a municipal flushing outlet adjacent to 8th Street (8th Street outlet)? Those permits would be issued by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in response to DEP Application File No.: 0124938-001JC and DEP Application File No.: 0129039- 001JC, respectively.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Edmond Blount, Sr.; Edmond Blount, Jr.; and Robert Davenport are residents of the City of Mexico Beach, Florida. As residents they have access to the Main Canal, the public beaches adjacent to the Main Canal, and beaches adjacent to the 8th Street outlet. Edmond Blount, Jr., and Robert Davenport oppose the issuance of any permits by DEP which would allow the City to conduct dredging and the placement of dredge materials associated with the Main Canal. Those Petitioners and Edmond Blount, Sr., oppose the grant of necessary permits by DEP upon the application by the City to conduct occasional maintenance excavation at the 8th Street outlet to alleviate potential damage through erosion to properties adjacent to the 8th Street outlet. The City of Mexico Beach is a municipality in Florida which serves as the local government for that community. The City owns the Main Canal and 8th Street outlet. DEP is an environmental regulator with authority to issue or deny joint coastal permits and to grant or deny consent to use sovereign submerged lands belonging to the State of Florida. The joint coastal permitting authority and right to grant consent to use is pursuant to Chapters 161, 253, and 373, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 18-21 and 62B-49, Florida Administrative Code. In particular, DEP has joint coastal permitting authority upon sovereignty lands in the State of Florida below the mean high waterline (MHWL) of any tidal water of the State. The reference to sovereign land is an association with lands below MHWL held in trust by the State of Florida. The term tidal waters refers to waters in which there is an astronomical effect on the elevation of that water. The Gulf of Mexico which fronts the City is a tidal water of the State of Florida. The MHWL is established along the coastal regions in Florida, to include the Gulf coast that fronts the City. The MHWL is set based upon charting information concerning the local mean high tide, the average height of the high waters, and where this average intersects the land. PERMIT APPLICATION FOR MAIN CANAL On June 30, 1997, the City applied to DEP for a ten-year permit/water quality certification and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands owned by the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (the Trustees), which would allow the City to maintenance dredge the Main Canal entrance and place the dredge material on the beach east of the canal below the water's edge. This task would be accomplished by the use of hydraulic dredging device. In the course of these activities, approximately 660 cubic yards of material would be removed approximately four times a week. The application file number for the requested permit in the Main Canal project was: 0124938-001 JC. The City, through its application, provided a complete and appropriate application with adequate engineering data to support the proposed project. The Main Canal is located in the western part of the City and is partially located in sovereign submerged lands of the State of Florida where the canal intersects the Gulf of Mexico below the MHWL. On January 13, 1998, DEP gave notice of its intent to issue necessary permits for the activities to allow dredging and the placement of fill in association with the Main Canal. More specifically, the hydraulic dredge the City intends to use in the maintenance dredging of the Main Canal is a floating device which excavates the sand from the bottom of the entrance of the Main Canal and pipes the material onto the beach immediately east of the dredge site. The dredging activities may only be conducted in a manner designed to protect the beach-dune system, water quality and habitat for marine turtles. These restrictions in the conduct of the dredging are in accordance with the proposed joint coastal permit. The dredging activity is to remove and deposit clean beach sand that has been transported by coastal processes and deposited in the lee of the jetty within the Main Canal. There is no intent, nor permission under the proposed permit, that would allow disturbance of any sediments more landward of the extent of the canal. The dredging is necessitated because the entrance of the Main Canal slowly fills with sand being transported from west to east along the shoreline. The Main Canal is stabilized on both sides by jetties. The western-most jetty extends further out than the eastern-most jetty. The Main Canal has seawalls along its inside. A recreational area is located on the western side of the Main Canal. The Main Canal is highly utilized for purposes of commerce and recreation. The Main Canal constitutes an economic support for many residents of the City. The Main Canal in proximity to the Gulf and the Gulf itself are not considered outstanding Florida waters or aquatic preserves. The waters in the Main Canal and Gulf are Class III marine waters when considering the parameters for water quality under DEP statutes and rules. Competent evidence was presented concerning water quality sampling and results in the analysis of those samples for fecal coliform bacteria and total coliform bacteria in relation to the Main Canal at its entrance where dredging would take place under the terms of the permit. Some values for fecal coliform and total coliform exceeded the allowable limits for those parameters as envisioned by Section 62-302.530, Florida Administrative Code, as preexisting conditions. However, the dredge operations will not lead to further degradation of the existing Class III marine waters in the Main Canal and degradation of the Gulf. The relatively clean sand being excavated does not contain fines or organics, which, through the dredging and placement of the sand on the beach following the dredging, would contribute to degradation of water quality standards. The activity associated with the dredging and placement of those materials on the beach will not cause a significant adverse impact to the beach-dune system, nor will the transport of sand from west to east along the beach as it presently exists be interrupted by the dredging and placement of the sand. The dredged material is being placed immediately east of the dredge operation avoiding a disruption of the natural processes of transport. The proposed disposal area is located on the beach at least 100 feet east of the canal below the waters edge at approximately minus 0.5NGVD. Finally, the deposit of the sand on the beach contributes to beach stabilization as opposed to depriving the beach of sand. The proposed permit requires that the dredge pipeline be retracted upon a daily basis during marine turtle nesting season from May 1 until October 31 each year. By this limitation in the operation of the dredge pipeline, marine turtles are not hindered in their behavior nor is their habitat unduly disturbed. The placement of the dredged sand on the beach would not be in the dry upland where the turtles would typically nest. The DEP Bureau of Protected Species Management reviewed the permit application for any significant adverse impact on nesting sea turtles and recommends the approval subject to specific conditions such as have been described. The dredging of the sand from the Main Canal and placement of that material on the beach will not cause significant adverse impact to the property of others. The Main Canal project will not create any significant erosion or turbidity. Given the small volume and coarseness of the dredged sand, elevated turbidity levels are not expected. The dredging of material from the mouth of the Main Canal and placement on the adjacent beach does not block lateral access to the beach, because the hydraulic dredge pipeline is placed at the water's edge with a discharge of dredge material being made at the water's edge in the area of the intertidal zone where water comes up to the beach. The exact discharge point is seaward of the area described as the intertidal zone. Given that the project associated with the Main Canal is located in Class III marine waters, it must not be contrary to the public interest. The project is not contrary to the public interest. PERMIT APPLICATION FOR 8TH STREET OUTLET On June 13, 1997, the City applied to DEP for a ten- year permit/water quality certification and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands owned by the Board of Trustees. This would allow the City to conduct occasional excavation of the 8th Street municipal flushing outlet which connects to the Gulf, having in mind the alleviation of potential damage to adjacent beachfront properties. That potential damage would be expected to occur in the instance where there was an uncontrolled breach of the berm surrounding the 8th Street outlet due to high incidence of rainfall, thus eroding adjacent beachfront properties. With the advent of scheduled maintenance, excavation of the outlet that erosion is expected to be deterred. The application file number for the requested permit in the 8th Street outlet project was File No.: 0129039-001 JC. The City, in its application for necessary permits to conduct excavation at the 8th Street outlet, submitted a complete and appropriate application setting forth adequate engineering details. More specifically, the permit application contemplates the removal of approximately 20 to 40 yards of beach sand per excavation, with the material excavated being placed on the beach near the water's edge. The excavation would be approximately 4 to 5 feet wide, 50 feet long, and 2 to 3 feet deep. Ordinarily, the frequency of excavation would be one to two times per month. The excavation practices would be by the use of a backhoe other than in the sea turtle nesting season. While sea turtles are nesting, the plans contemplate excavation by hand by use of a shovel or similar tool. In addition, during the turtle nesting season the application contemplates that the excavation would be done during daylight hours, only twice a month, to reduce potential flooding of marine turtle nests due to a meandering outflow from the outlet. Other than in the marine turtle nesting season the excavation would be done on an "as needed" basis. On March 16, 1998, the DEP gave notice of its intent to issue a permit for the dredging at the 8th Street outlet. The conditions associated with the intended permit for dredging of the 8th Street outlet deter any significant adverse impacts to the beach-dune system. In the area of the 8th Street outlet, a large box culvert runs underneath U.S. 98, the main highway in the city. That highway runs parallel to the beach. Once the water flows through the culvert, it accumulates in the outlet south of the road. In the instance where rainfall is diminished, the flushing outlet does not flow to the Gulf and the beach berm, which accretes seaward of the outlet, traps the water that is being released via the culvert. By contrast, in instances where heavy rainfall occurs, the water in the outlet collects to a point that it begins to flow away from the culvert in the direction of the Gulf. If the beach berm has built up over time, the path of that flow in high incidence of rainfall can encroach on buildings that are adjacent to the culvert on the south side of U.S. 98. When the rainfall is sufficient, and the water begins to flow, it reaches a sufficient velocity to move sand as a bed load. Under those circumstances, when the water strikes a ridged object, like a house foundation, the local water velocity will act to carry away the sand more readily from that location where the house foundation is found, by scouring out the sand near the foundation, undermining the building and risking the collapse of the building onto the beach. In the course of this process the water breaches the beach berm and flows towards the Gulf. In the instance where the berm on the beach has been breached, the water that has been released begins to scour the beach and establish a pattern that can run down the beach roughly parallel to the Gulf for a distance before flowing into the Gulf. By contrast, the controlled release of water from the outlet would cause less of an impact, in that it would create an immediate access through the beach berm to the Gulf without creating the potential for harm to upland property or causing erosion or scouring of dunes and vegetation in beach areas, some of which might contain turtle nests. Unlike the circumstances with high incidence of rainfall where adjacent property is eroded and damaged, the use of controlled maintenance excavation to relieve the outlet would not cause significant and adverse impact to adjacent property owners. The controlled release of the water in the outlet, unlike the natural release of that water in high incidence of rainfall, is more in the interest of the public when considering adverse impacts to property. The introduction of the water in the outlet, and its constituents, onto the beach and its consequences, is no more a problem whether based upon the natural event of high incidence of rainfall or the routine release contemplated by the project. Therefore, the alternative method of releasing the water by use of scheduled excavation is not contrary to the public interest. If anything, the use of periodic excavation to relieve the outlet would limit the breadth of discharge and the amount of discharge. The 8th Street outlet and the Gulf area adjacent to that outlet are not within outstanding Florida waters or aquatic preserves. The project site for the 8th Street outlet and the Gulf are within Class III marine waters. The existing Class III marine water quality parameters for fecal coliform and total coliform when considered in accordance with Rule 62-302.530, Florida Administrative Code, have been exceeded in the 8th Street outlet. This is borne out by test results from samples gathered at the 8th Street outlet presented at hearing. However, as with the circumstance with the Main Canal, the effect of periodic excavation to relieve the outlet will not further degrade state waters found in the outlet. The results of water quality tests performed following sampling that relate to the amount of fecal coliform and total coliform in the Gulf that could be expected at the entrance of the Main Canal and as the discharge of water within the 8th Street outlet enters the Gulf show low values for those parameters. Therefore, it is not anticipated that the release of the water from the 8th Street outlet to the Gulf under controlled conditions contemplated by the permit application would cause a violation of the parameters for fecal coliform and total coliform in the Gulf, the receiving body of water, especially when compared to the existing release of water from the 8th Street outlet to the Gulf in high incidence of rainfall. This finding is also influenced by the fact that the most excessive values for total coliform and fecal coliform in the 8th Street outlet system were found 600 to 800 feet up the water course described as the 8th Street outlet. Similar to the Main Canal, the project contemplated at the 8th Street outlet would not require mitigation before being permitted by DEP. The 8th Street outlet project would not create significant adverse impacts on coastal sediment transport. The DEP Bureau of Protective Species Management reviewed the 8th Street outlet application and recommended approval with specific conditions. Those conditions offer adequate protection to marine turtles and their habitat. The conditions include project excavation that does not create parallel trenches in the sand that inhibit movement on the beach by sea turtles. The 8th Street outlet project will not create significant erosion concerns or turbidity concerns. The 8th Street outlet project does not block lateral beach access to the public, in that the excavation to relieve the outlet on a periodic basis is temporary, that is to say only in effect when the water is being released from the outlet to the Gulf. CONSENT TO USE SOVEREIGN SUBMERGED LANDS The 8th Street outlet project, as well as the Main Canal project, involves sovereignty submerged lands below the MHWL constituted of the beach and ocean bottom. The facts show that the City is entitled to consent of use to work on sovereign submerged lands in the Main Canal and 8th Street outlet projects.
Recommendation Based upon the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That DEP issue a final order granting the City the joint coastal permits and consent to use sovereign submerged lands in accordance with application File Nos.: 0124938-001JC and 0129039-001JC respectively, subject to specific conditions contained therein. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Edmond Blount, Sr. Post Office Box 13855 Mexico Beach, Florida 32410 Edmond Blount, Jr. Post Office Box 13854 Mexico Beach, Florida 32410 Robert Davenport Post Office Box 13926 Mexico Beach, Florida 32410 Gerard Murnan Post Office Box 13378 Mexico Beach, Florida 32410 Paul G. Komarek, Esquire Daniel and Komarek, Chartered Post Office Box 2547 Panama City, Florida 32402 Ricardo Muratti, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 John McInnis, City Manager City of Mexico Beach Post Office Box 13425 Mexico Beach, Florida 32410 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Diane Hashil, has been a toll booth attendant for the Harbormaster of the City of Clearwater since July, 1992. On or about April 2, 1993, she was given a Letter of Reprimand for speaking in a discourteous tone of voice to a customer passing through her toll booth on March 20, 1993, a Level 2 offense under paragraph 2, Guidelines for Disciplinary Action: "Discourtesy to persons with whom an employee comes into contact while in the performance of duties " On December 17, 1993, the City gave the Respondent written notice that she was being suspended for two days, effective December 21 through 22, 1993, on charges that she violated Rule 14, Section 1, paragraph (e), of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations of the City of Clearwater: "Has been offensive in his conduct or language toward his fellow employees, City officers, or the public." The specifications of the charge were: On November 11, 1993, Mr. Joe Lain, Water Safety Supervisor, in a memo to Mr. Held [the Harbormaster] and Mr. Hancock, related Ms. Hashil's continued unfriendly treatment of himself and other beachguards who pass through the toll plaza on a daily basis supervising Sand Key Park and Clearwater Beach. On November 17, 1993, Mr. Lee Achterhof, Lead Marine Facility Operator, wrote a memo concerning Diane Hashil's treatment of a customer. The customer lost quarters Ms. Hashil had given them and asked for more change. Ms. Hashil told them she had already given them change, turned her back on them and ignored them as traffic started backing up. This also is a Level 2 offense under paragraph 2, Guidelines for Disciplinary Action: "Discourtesy to persons with whom an employee comes into contact while in the performance of duties . . .." The guidelines provide for a letter of reprimand for the first such offense and a one- to four-day suspension for the second such offense. On the afternoon of Christmas day, December 25, 1993, a woman from Wesley Chapel named Sharon Kressl was driving her mother, Evelyn Campbell, and at least one friend sight-seeing on the Clearwater beaches. They became disoriented on Sand Key and found themselves approaching the Clearwater Pass Toll Bridge without money to pay the 75 toll. The Respondent was the attendant at the toll booth at the time. When Kressl tried to explain their predicament to the Respondent and ask to be allowed to turn around, the Respondent answered, in a manner considered by Kressl and Campbell to be curt and rude: "No. You have to pay and go through." She did not fully explain the City's policy that, after paying the one-way 75 toll and going over the bridge, they would be allowed to turn around and return across the bridge free of charge. She initially also did not explain the City's policy that someone without money to pay the 75 toll could agree to pay at a later date. When Kressl and Campbell asked if they could mail in the 75 , the Respondent got them an envelope and promise to pay that was pre-printed for that purpose. The Respondent got the car's license tag number to fill out the form and read them the part of it that said: "With my signature below, I do hereby agree that I was passed through the above mentioned toll facility without payment. I promise to pay $.75 within 72 hours or this slip will be turned over to the Marine Department for further action." Kressl, as driver, started to sign the form but saw that it was written for the signature of her mother, as owner of the vehicle, and signed her mother's name instead. After crossing the bridge onto Clearwater Beach, Kressl and Campbell realized that they could get home from Clearwater Beach without returning to Sand Key and that they did not have to turn around and return across the bridge. They drove across the bridge from Clearwater Beach to Clearwater and drove home along Alternate U.S. Highway 19. Both women were upset by what they considered to be the rudeness of the Respondent's curt manner. When they got back to their home in Wesley Chapel, Sharon Kressl decided to telephone a complaint. Kressl made at least two telephone calls that day, one to the police to get an address and telephone number for the supervisor of the toll booth attendants and one that by chance was answered by the Respondent, unbeknownst to Kressl. The Respondent told Kressl to call back the next morning to speak to a supervisor. The Respondent inquired as to the nature of the complaint. When Kressl explained it to her, the Respondent realized who Kressl was and that Kressl was complaining about the Respondent. After Kressl hung up, the Respondent wrote a memo denying any misconduct. Kressl made several telephone calls in the next several days trying to contact the Respondent's supervisor. Again, one of the calls was answered by the Respondent. This time, an argument ensued. The two women, in their testimony, gave diametrically opposed versions of the telephone call. The Respondent testified that she gave Kressl the telephone number of her supervisor, that the telephone call was conducted in a calm fashion and that, as soon as the Respondent identified herself to Kressl, Kressl hung up. Kressl, on the other hand, testified that, after the Respondent identified herself, a nasty argument ensued, during which Kressl threatened to have the Respondent fired, and the Respondent called Kressl a "bitch." It certainly would be a clear injustice if Kressl were lying about the telephone conversation. But, taking all of the relevant evidence into consideration, it is found that the two women did have an argument and that the Respondent did use the term "bitch" to describe either Kressl or her conduct. As for the incident on December 25, 1993, Kressl and Campbell assert that the Respondent was "discourteous" or "offensive"; the Respondent maintains that she was not. Those concepts are inherently difficult to define precisely. Gross discourtesy and grossly offensive conduct might be easy to recognize, but it is difficult to describe the precise borderline between acceptable manners versus manners that are discourteous and offensive. In addition, different people's perceptions of behavior may not be entirely objective. People can be overly sensitive and perceive as discourteous and offensive behavior that objectively is not; on the other hand, some people cannot recognize their own discourteous and offensive behavior and are oblivious to the effect it has on others. Bearing in mind these difficulties, it is found that, taking all of the relevant evidence into consideration, the Respondent's behavior towards Kressl and Campbell on December 25, 1993, was discourteous and offensive. It is found that she was curt and that she was not forthcoming in helping Kressl and Campbell resolve their dual predicament of not wanting to cross the Clearwater Pass Toll Bridge and not having the 75 to pay for the toll. She should have been more helpful and more polite.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the City of Clearwater Civil Service Board enter a final order suspending the Respondent without pay for three days. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1363 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 5.-6. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. First sentence, accepted but subordinate and not necessary. The rest is argument or subordinate and not necessary. Argument or subordinate and not necessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2 Accepted and incorporated. 3.-4. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as contrary to facts found and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that her "priors" "consisted mainly of" those things. Accepted that she was warned about those things, too, but subordinate and not necessary. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Rejected. (Her motivation was not established by the evidence.) Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Rejected as contrary to facts found that they asked to "back up" or that she explained the "U-turn" policy. (She said they could not turn around or back up and that they had to pay the toll.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 11.-15. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Last sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (The Respondent thought it was Evelyn Campbell because that was the name she had on her paperwork and she thought the driver was Campbell.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (Other City employees also assumed that Campbell was telephoning because her name was on the paperwork.) Accepted and incorporated (although Campbell did speak to City personnel at some point in the process.) 19.-21. Rejected that they were lying. They may have been confused. It is believed, as found, that Kressl began to sign her own name, saw that the form required her mother's signature, and signed her mother's name (contributing to the Respondent's confusion who was who), but it is possible that she passed the form to her mother to sign, unbeknownst to the Respondent (likewise contributing to the Respondent's confusion who was who.) 22. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. 23.-24. Accepted and incorporated. (After crossing the Clearwater Pass Bridge from Sand Key to Clearwater Beach, they went over the bridge from Clearwater Beach to Clearwater.) In part rejected as contrary to facts found (that they asked to back up); otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. Rejected as contrary to facts found and to the evidence. Accepted but subordinate and not necessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles A. Lance, Esquire Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater P. O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748 J. Robert McCormack, Esquire Wiggins & McCormack 3040 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard Suite 100 Clearwater, Florida 34619 Michael Laursen Secretary City of Clearwater Civil Service Board P. O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748
The Issue The issue in this appeal is whether the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board denying Petitioner's application for a variance is supported by the evidence in the record, or whether it departs from the essential requirements of law. See Section 137.014(f)(3), City of Clearwater Land Development Code.
Findings Of Fact On or about May 15, 1989, Branch Sunset Associates (Petitioner), the owner of certain property located at 1856 U.S. Highway 19 North, Clearwater, Florida (Section 6-29-16), applied for a variance to eliminate a condition previously imposed by the Development Code Adjustment Board on a prior variance. The property is zoned CC (Commercial Center), and is the site of a strip shopping mall. In March, 1988, the Board granted a variance allowing a tenant in Petitioner's mall, Workplace, to have a building identification sign which is larger than would be allowed under the Code without a variance. In November, 1988, Petitioner was granted a variance for the square footage of a pylon property identification sign with the condition that a Workplace sign not be placed on the pylon property identification sign located at the right of way. Petitioner and this tenant, Workplace, are now seeking removal of this condition in order to allow Workplace to be identified on the existing pylon sign, while leaving Workplace's large building identification sign in place. The Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's application for variance on June 8, 1989, and Petitioner timely filed this appeal of the Board's decision. Workplace is located approximately 800 feet off of U.S. Highway 19, and due to this distance, the prior variance of 97 square feet was granted in March, 1988, to allow a business identification sign of 225 square feet. The Code allows business identification signs up to 128 square feet without a variance. The letters spelling out "Workplace" are from 4 to 6 feet in height. Since opening in May, 1988, Workplace has experienced a steady growth in its business, and now completes approximately 1000 transactions per day. It is an office products store, and is open seven days a week. When the condition was placed on the variance for the pylon identification sign in November, 1988, the property owner agreed to this condition. At this time, it is primarily the tenant, Workplace, which is seeking this variance to eliminate the condition agreed to in November, 1988, by the property owner. Workplace seeks to be allowed to be included on the property identification sign, but is unwilling to immediately conform to Code on its building identification sign, a variance for which was granted in March, 1988, if this currently sought variance is approved. Thus, Workplace seeks to retain its variance for the size of its building identification sign, while also being included on the pylon property identification sign, which is larger than otherwise allowed due to the November, 1988, variance. The reason that the Development Code Adjustment Board approved the variance for Workplace in March, 1988, was that there was no property identification sign on site at that time, and the store was to be located so far off the right of way. This was a newly opening mall, and Workplace was one of the first new tenants to open for business. There are some prior tenants on this property that had business identification signs on their buildings that are in excess of the square footage allowed by the Code, but these are prior nonconforming signs which must be removed or brought into compliance by October, 1992. Section 134.015(c). However, when the property owner sought the variance in square footage limits to erect a pylon property identification sign in November, 1988, the Workplace business identification sign was already in place. Rather than allow Workplace to benefit from two variances, the Board conditioned the November, 1988, variance on precluding Workplace from being shown on the pylon sign. This was a reasonable condition under the circumstances, and was agreed to by the property owner. There was no showing of hardship on behalf of Workplace since business has been very good, and since any concerns about distance from the right of way were fully addressed by the March, 1988, variance.
