The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents are guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Lori Wilk has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0349551. The last license issued was as a broker in care of Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. At all times material hereto, Respondent Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., has been a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0253076. At all times material hereto, Respondent Wilk has been licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert, as owner, had listed for sale certain real property with Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc./Gil Amara. Respondents obtained LPS Investments, Inc., as purchaser pursuant to a sales contract which was accepted by the seller on March 14, 1989. LPS Investments is owned by Leo and Patricia Scarola. Patricia Scarola was a former salesperson for Respondents. That Contract for Sale And Purchase of Real Property provided that a total of $500 as deposit monies was to be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract which acknowledged receipt of the first $100 of the deposit monies. Respondents' escrow account deposit slips reveal the first $100 was deposited into Respondents' escrow account. No proof of receipt of the additional $400 exists among the escrow account deposit slips admitted in evidence; however, Respondent Wilk's testimony is accepted that Respondents received in trust a total earnest money deposit in the sum of $500. Thereafter, LPS Investments, Inc., refused to close, alleging misrepresentation by the seller of the property. Although the property had been advertised as a "handyman special" and the Contract provided that the property was accepted in an "as is" condition, the Scarolas who never saw the property before they entered into the Contract to purchase it discovered that it would cost more to improve the property than they had guessed. They decided not to close. Rather, Pat Scarola instructed Respondents to transfer the $500 earnest money deposit to another piece of property not involving Gwendolyn Taylor- Herbert. Without the prior knowledge or consent of the seller or of the listing broker, Respondents transferred the Scarolas' earnest money deposit to another transaction for the benefit of the purchaser (LPS Investments, Inc.) and not involving the same seller. This was done without even considering whether the seller or the seller's agent might have an interest in the deposit. At no time prior to the time that the Respondents' transferred the deposit to a different property did the Respondents give the listing broker or the seller an opportunity or notice to make a demand upon the Respondents for the deposit. After the transfer, and after the contract failed to close, the seller and the seller's agent made a demand that the $500 deposit be accounted for and delivered. It was not. On June 1, 1989, Respondents obtained an offer from Herb Sider, as purchaser, for the property owned by Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert. That offer was accepted by the seller. The Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property provided that a total deposit of $1,000 was to be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty. Respondent Wilk executed that portion of the Contract acknowledging that the first $100 of the earnest money deposit had been received by Respondents. That representation was false. Sider never gave Respondents the earnest money deposit specified in the Contract, and Respondents failed to advise anyone that the representation in the Contract was false. Although Respondent Wilk testified that she would "normally" keep $100 of Sider's money in her escrow account to be applied to the various contracts that he entered into through her, there is no evidence that there was $100 in Respondents' escrow account at the time or that it was available to be applied to this Contract. Rather, Respondent Wilk's testimony is accepted that she never received either the initial $100 or the additional $900 deposit monies from Sider for this property. Herb Sider refused to close. The seller, Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert, agreed to lower the sales price, and a modified contract was executed between Taylor-Herbert and Sider. Thereafter, Sider again refused to close. At no time did Respondents notify anyone that they did not have an earnest money deposit in escrow for the Taylor-Herbert/Sider transaction. Diane Quigley, branch manager of Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc., sent a letter dated July 11, 1989, to the Respondents transmitting release of deposit receipt forms and instructing Respondents to release the $500 earnest money deposit of LPS Investments, Inc., and the $1,000 earnest money deposit of Herb Sider to the seller Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert. Respondents ignored that demand letter. By letter dated August 25, 1989, Quigley again wrote to Respondents demanding the release of the Sider and the LPS Investments, Inc., deposits to the seller. That letter referred to the July 11th letter which Respondents had ignored and the numerous phone calls placed by Quigley to Respondents which had not been returned. On September 13, 1989, Respondents for the first time notified Petitioner of possible conflicting demands. That letter misrepresented the facts of the situation and suggested that the seller and buyer might still be able to strike a deal. On October 3, 1989, Respondents again wrote to the Florida Real Estate Commission advising that "there is now a conflicting demand" on the deposits relative to the Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert property. Respondents' letters reveal a lack of understanding of the basics of a real estate contract. Neither letter advised the Commission that Respondents did not have any of the monies in escrow at any rate. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Wilk made an offer to purchase real property from Bel-Properties, Inc., which offer provided that $100 earnest money deposit would be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., and an additional $2,050 earnest money deposit would be placed in the Stars and Stripes escrow account within 72 hours of acceptance. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property acknowledging that the initial $100 deposit had been received. That representation was false. The Contract which she prepared listed as the buyer "Lori Wilk, a lisenced [sic] real estate broker, and/or assigns." The offer was accepted by the seller on December 30, 1988. In connection with that offer, Respondent Wilk represented that she was the purchaser when, in fact, she was acting on behalf of the actual purchaser HBS Investments, Inc., a corporation owned, controlled, and operated by Herb Sider. Immediately upon the acceptance of Respondent Wilk's offer, she assigned the sales contract to HBS Investments, Inc. At no time did Respondent Wilk or HBS Investments, Inc., place the $2,150 earnest money deposit in the escrow account of Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., as represented by Respondent Wilk to the seller and as required by the Contract. Further, at no time did Respondents advise the seller that they did not have an earnest money deposit in the Stars and Stripes escrow account. On November 28, 1988, Respondent "Wilk, a lisenced [sic] real estate broker, and/or assigns" made an offer to purchase real property from Darlene Farris. Farris accepted that offer on December 6, 1988. That Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property provided that an initial deposit of $100 had been placed in the escrow account of Stars and Stripes Realty and that an additional earnest money deposit of $1,900 would be placed in escrow within 72 hours of acceptance. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract acknowledging that she had received the initial $100 earnest money deposit. That representation was false. In fact, Respondent Wilk never placed any of the $2,000 earnest money deposit in her escrow account and never advised the seller or the seller's listing broker that no earnest money deposit had been made. On or about February 2, 1989, Respondents solicited and obtained Willy Pearson as a tenant for the Farris property. Respondents represented to Pearson that the lessor was HBS Investments, Inc. Respondent Wilk prepared a Memorandum to Enter Into a Lease acknowledging the receipt of $550 as a deposit from Pearson, although Respondent Wilk only received $250 from Pearson. When Respondent Wilk received half of the rental deposit, she gave Pearson both a receipt and immediate possession of the property. Respondents obtained the tenant without the prior knowledge and consent of Darlene Farris, owner of the property. Further Respondents did not notify Farris or Farris' broker that Respondents had rented Farris' property until sometime after Respondents had received the $250 deposit from Pearson and had given him possession of Farris' property. Neither Respondent Wilk nor HBS Investments, Inc., ever closed on the Farris property. Further, Respondent Wilk never obtained authority from Darlene Farris to obtain or place a tenant in Farris' property.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them and revoking the licenses of Respondents Lori Wilk and Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2468 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-21 and 23-28 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 22 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 2-9, 19, and 23 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondents' proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 15, and 27 have been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 11, 12, 14, 16-18, 20-22, 24, 25, 28, and 30 have been rejected as not been supported by the weight of the credible, competent evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 13, 26, and 29 have been rejected as being irrelevant to determination of the issues involved in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section - Suite N-308 Hurston Building - North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Monte K. Rassner, Esquire Rassner, Malove, Rassner, Kramer & Gold Plaza 7000, Suite 500 7000 Southwest 62nd Avenue South Miami, FL 33143 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Scorpio, Inc. was incorporated to do business in this State on September 18, 1973 and was registered as a corporate real estate broker on 4/8/74 with certificate to expire 3/31/75. Laverne Pariso was a registered real estate broker and Active Firm Member for Scorpio, Inc. from 4/8/74 to expiration date of license 3/31/75. Michael W. Karpan was a registered real estate salesman from 10/1/74 to 9/30/76 the expiration date of his registration and was employed by Scorpio, Inc. About the time Scorpio, Inc. was registered as a corporate broker the real estate market was not conducive to the success of housing developments and, since the registration of Scorpio, Inc. was obtained to facilitate sale of the developed property and no development was started, Scorpio, Inc. did no business of the type for which it was registered. No listings were obtained, no sales were made, and no effort was put forth to do either. An escrow account was opened with an initial $50 deposit but during the time the registration was effective no deposits were made to, or withdrawals from, this escrow account. Ardina E. Karpan, the mother of Michael W. Karpan, owns all of the stock of Scorpio, Inc. Laverne Pariso, the APM, left the employ of Scorpio, Inc. in March, 1975 but did not notify the FREC or take steps to place her registration in an inactive status. Applications were made for renewal of the broker's license of neither Pariso nor Scorpio, Inc. when due, 3/31/75. By Corporate Resolution dated February 1, 1974 Scorpio, Inc. authorized the establishment of an escrow account at the Barnett Bank of Miami. An initial deposit of $50 was made to this account on February 6, 1974. The resolution authorizes Laverne Pariso and Michael W. Karpan or Ardina Karpan to sign checks on this account and notes that two signatures are required. The resolution further provided authorized signers "are both Laverne Pariso and Michael William Karpan, Jr., both signature are required". Scorpio, Inc.'s primary business was the management of shareholder's investments and real estate holdings. In May, 1975 Michael Karpan was approached by a business associate, whose daughter was a creditor of Chandelier of the Virginia Playhouse d/b/a Track and Turf Lounge, to assist in the negotiations for the sale of the business in order to pay off the creditors and salvage his daughter's loan. The purchaser was already at hand and Karpan was selected to hold funds advanced pending the closing of the deal. After the principals had agreed on the basic price to be paid for the business an earnest money deposit of $5,000 was given by the buyer to Karpan on or about May 21, 1975 and the agreement was memorialized in a letter of May 21, 1975 from Karpan, on Scorpio, Inc. letterhead to the buyer, Walker (Exhibit 25). Nowhere on this letter is reference made to either Karpan or Scorpio, Inc. being associated with real estate sales. The $5,000 received from Walker was deposited in Scorpio, Inc's escrow account on deposit slip dated May 21, 1975 and the bank statement (Exhibit 10) shows $5,000 deposited in this account 5/30/75. No other agreement between the parties was reduced to writing and signed by the buyer and seller. At no time during the negotiations did Karpan hold himself out to be a real estate salesman or broker or indicate he expected a commission for his services if the sale was consummated. On May 29, 1975 Karpan borrowed $5,000 from the Barnett Bank and used the $5,000 in the escrow account as cash collateral for the loan. The signature of Pariso was not on any paper to authorize the withdrawal of this money from the escrow account. The loan was placed in the regular account of Scorpio, Inc. c/o Michael Karpan and one check dated 5/30/75 in the amount of $3,699 was drawn on the account payable to the Intercontinental Bank of Miami and used to make interest payment owed by the Chandelier of the Virginia Playhouse. $1,301 was delivered to the manager of Track and Turf Lounge by Karpan (Exhibit 4). Karpan contends that the buyer, Walker, authorized him to make whatever payments were necessary out of the $5,000 deposit to insure that the liquor license would not be lost or the Track and Turf Lounge be placed out of business before the deal was consummated. Following the delivery of the $5,000 to Karpan the buyer brought his attorney into the proceedings. The property on which the Track and Turf Lounge is located was owned by D. Mitchell Investments, Inc. The lease arrangements (or lack thereof depending on which witness is more credible) were such that the sale could not be consummated. By letter dated June 12, 1975 the buyer, through his attorney, demanded return of the $5,000 deposit given to Karpan. No evidence was presented as to the date the $1,301 was given to Roy O'Nan, the manager at Track and Turf. The letter evidencing such payment is dated well after the transaction had fallen through and demand for return of the $5,000 had been made. A suit was subsequently filed by Walker and a default judgment was obtained against Scorpio, Inc. after a Motion to Strike Defendant's, Scorpio, Answer because Scorpio, Inc. was delinquent in paying the annual $5.00 filing fee required of Florida corporations, was granted. At the time the transactions here being contested occurred the registration of Laverne Pariso and Scorpio, Inc. had expired. Since Karpan can only work under the supervision of a broker, his license too was not operative. Ms. Pariso renewed her license as a broker-salesman with another realty office in September, 1975 but no evidence was presented that Scorpio, Inc. ever applied for registration renewal. During the period between March and September, 1975 Ms. Pariso did no real estate work. Numerous discrepancies appeared between the testimony and documents. Although the authorization for withdrawing funds from the escrow account provided that the signature of Pariso and Michael Karpan or his mother was required the bank apparently interpreted that to require any two of the signatures and then authorized one first deposit placed in the escrow account after the initial deposit to be withdrawn with only Karpan's signature. Several witnesses alluded to Track and Turf leasing the premises which they occupied but evidence was presented that no lease payments were to be made until 1978. Certainly the inability of the "tenant" to transfer the "lease" was a major factor in the failure of the sale to transpire. The sale here involved was the sale of a business as contrasted to the sale of real property.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the licensure and real estate brokerage and sales practice standards embodied in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is a licensed real estate broker, licensed under that chapter. The Respondent, Keith Ellis, while engaged in the business of real estate development, entered into a contract whereby he would purchase a parcel of land adjacent to U.S. Highway 90, the "Scenic Highway," in Pensacola, Florida. That agreement was entered into in February, 1985, with the Respondent's purpose being to commence development of the property, consisting of eight residential lots, into a single-family residential subdivision. Mr. Ellis, in embarking upon his development plan, after entering into the contract for purchase of the subject lots, found that he lacked capital necessary to finance construction of certain infrastructure for the subdivision. He sought additional funding and ultimately was referred to Robert Tegenkamp as a potential investor. He entered into discussions with Mr. Tegenkamp and ultimately the two agreed that Tegenkamp would invest $25,000 in the project. In return, as consideration, Mr. Ellis agreed to repay the $25,000 investment to Tegenkamp within six months. He also agreed to pay Tegenkamp a $25,000 profit within twelve months. He prepared a written agreement to that effect, executed March 1, 1985. The Respondent also proposed to give Mr. Tegenkamp an option on one lot, Lot Number 8, in the planned subdivision, as further consideration for Tegenkamp investing the necessary capital. This option was executed February 28, 1985. The subdivision totaled eight lots, all of equal value, as established by the opinion of the Respondent himself, who is experienced in appraising real estate, and by M. Eugene Presley, a licensed M.A.I. appraiser. It was the intent of both Ellis and Tegenkamp, at the time of the signing of the agreement, that Ellis would seek to sell all the eight lots, including the lot on which Tegenkamp held an option. Both those parties also understood that Tegenkamp could not be repaid unless the lots were sold. Tegenkamp had no desire to take title to any lot in the subdivision and understood from the outset that he would be entitled to Lot 8, (or any lot), only if Ellis was otherwise unable to repay him. The Respondent arbitrarily chose to indicate Lot 8 on the option contract, but Tegenkamp had no special desire to acquire any interest in that particular lot. The true intent of the parties was simply that Tegenkamp have an option on a lot in the subdivision to secure him, in the event the debt was not repaid by Ellis. In view of the fact that the value of each lot was identical, it did not matter to Tegenkamp on which lot he had an "option," or other form of security interest. He never expected to get title to a lot and was never told that he would, by the Respondent or any other person. The Respondent has always acknowledged that he owes the money in question to Mr. Tegenkamp and that he was obligated under the "option" to convey one of the lots to Tegenkamp, if he could not repay him. Ellis borrowed the funds for acquisition of the property, and for coverage of most development costs, from the First National Bank of Escambia County. Before the agreements between Ellis and Tegenkamp were signed, he told Mr. Tegenkamp, who also did his banking business at the same bank, of the bank's involvement in financing the project. The Respondent suggested that Tegenkamp contact the loan officers involved to reveal his interest in the project. This Tegenkamp failed to do, nor did he ever record his option agreement. Consequently, the bank acquired a first priority lien on the eight lots by the execution and recording of the mortgage from Ellis to the bank, for financing the purchase, installation of the infrastructure and payment of other development costs. When Mr. Ellis obtained the $25,000 capital from Mr. Tegenkamp, he proceeded with his development plans. He negotiated a sale of all the lots in the subdivision to Ray Lemon, a general contractor. On May 10, 1985, he entered into a written sales contract with Mr. Lemon as to all eight lots. This contract required Ellis to proceed to complete all improvements, such as paving and drainage provisions, as well as to obtain approval of the plat of the subdivision by the City of Pensacola. Mr. Ellis informed Mr. Tegenkamp of this agreement with Mr. Lemon. Thereafter, on May 28, 1985, Mr. Ellis closed the loan with First National Bank of Escambia County, giving that bank a first priority mortgage lien on the entire subdivision. Shortly thereafter, the plat of the subdivision was accepted by the City of Pensacola. Most of the improvements installed by Ellis were complete by late July, 1985. Mr. Lemon then indicated to Ellis that he was having financial difficulties and needed to delay the closing of his purchase of the eight lots. If Lemon had been able to complete his planned purchase of all eight lots on time, Mr. Ellis could have paid Tegenkamp the agreed upon $50,000 and still netted about $10,000 profit himself. In any event, shortly after Ellis learned of the delayed Lemon closing, he was approached by Dr. and Mrs. Tousignant, who were interested in purchasing Lots 7 and 8. Dr. Tousignant owned a neighboring parcel of property and wanted to preserve his view of Escambia Bay by acquiring ownership of Lots 7 and 8. The Respondent obtained Mr. Lemon's approval to sell Lots 7 and 8 to the Tousignants and also informed Mr. Tegenkamp of the proposed sale to the Dr. and his wife, as Mr. Tegenkamp himself admitted. Mr. Tegenkamp approved of Ellis selling the lots in question, and on August 25, 1985, Ellis entered into a written agreement to sell Lots 7 and 8 to the Tousignants. The sale was closed on September 17, 1985, but did not produce enough money for Ellis to pay off Tegenkamp. Tegenkamp had not demanded payment at this time anyway and the final time limit for repayment had not elapsed. Thereafter, Ray Lemon encountered more financial problems and for several months was unable to close the planned purchase of the remaining six lots. Eventually, Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 were sold to Ray Lemon and K. C. Hembree. These closings took place between January and March, 1986. The sales did not produce enough funds to pay off Tegenkamp because of development expenses which had to be covered, mortgage release amounts and interest attributable to each lot, which had to be paid to the bank holding the first mortgage. The Respondent thus retained ownership of only Lots 1 and 2 by the end of March, 1986. His ownership of these two lots was subject to the first mortgage to the bank, the principal balance of which remained at approximately $20,600. That mortgage was subsequently assigned to Ray Lemon who had payed off the bank. Lemon now holds that mortgage. The Respondent has attempted, without success, to sell the remaining two lots. Because of economic conditions prevailing, the value of each of the two remaining lots declined from an estimated $59,000 in March, 1985, to about $50,000 by April, 1986. Because Ellis did not timely pay the $25,000 required by the original agreement, Mr. Tegenkamp retained an attorney to represent him in seeking repayment. Attorney Miles Davis entered into various discussions with Ellis from November, 1985 through April, 1986. In December, 1985, Ellis had proposed to Davis that he deliver to Tegenkamp a quit claim deed conveying his interest in Lot 1 to Tegenkamp. Ellis could not give a warranty deed because title was then encumbered by the above-mentioned mortgage held by Lemon, as assignee of the bank, and because of a potential claim of lien by the paving contractor for $7,000 to $8,000. The contractor since failed to pursue and perfect his claim of lien. In February, 1986, Attorney Davis wrote to Ellis expressing a willingness to accept a quit claim deed on behalf of Tegenkamp. In April, 1986, Ellis delivered the quit claim deed to Davis, conveying his interest in Lot 1 to Tegenkamp. It was recorded in the public records of Escambia County. Davis then filed a civil suit against Ellis in May, 1986, on behalf of Tegenkamp. The parties since arrived at a settlement of that litigation whereby Tegenkamp is to receive approximately $25,000 and Lot 1 will be re-conveyed to Ellis. Tegenkamp's attorney, Miles Davis, testified that Ellis never denied owing the money to his client and every indication was that the Respondent was trying to sell the property as soon as possible to pay his obligation to Tegenkamp. Mr. Tegenkamp himself testified and acknowledged that the Respondent was not trying to take advantage of him, but was simply "someone who had gotten himself into a bad deal."
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0228 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of facts. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-41 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Danny L. Kepner SHELL, FLEMING, DAVIS & MENGE Seventh Floor, Seville Tower Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32598 Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Darlene F. Keller Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the real estate license of Keith Allen. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Allan M. Parvey, Esquire Goldberg, Rubinstein & Buckley, P.A. Post Office Box 2366 Fort Myers, Florida 33902
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Elliot Rosen Realty, Inc. was a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0218821 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate. Respondent Elliot Rosen held real estate broker's license number 0075258 issued by petitioner and was the qualifying officer of Elliot Rosen Realty, Inc. Respondents Stanleigh M. Franklin and Maria C. Franklin were licensed real estate salesmen in Rosen's office having been issued license numbers 0318042 and 0370308, respectively. The firm is located at 8120 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155. On an undisclosed date Robert W. and Carol A. Bush listed for sale with Elliot Rosen Realty, Inc., a residential property located at 8295 Southwest 153rd Street, Miami. The initial asking price was $119,000, but this was later reduced to $112,000. In April 1984, Joseph and Maria Yanes were in the process of selling their home and were consequently seeking to purchase a new residence. Both are educated persons, and Mr. Yanes has a college degree. Mr. Yanes read a real estate advertisement which advertised the Bush's property. They contacted Rosen Realty, Inc. and spoke with Maria Franklin. After inspecting the house with Maria, the Franklins met with the Yanes on April 15, 1985, for the purpose of preparing and executing an offer to purchase the house. Joseph Yanes made clear to Stanleigh Franklin that his primary concern was obtaining a mortgage with monthly payments that did not exceed $1000 per month. Otherwise, he would not be able to purchase the property. Stanleigh was familiar with a new mortgage loan program offered by a local lender (American International Mortgage Company) known as the "7.5 magnet mortgage" which offered a monthly payment for the first three years at a 7.5 percent interest rate. Stanleigh computed the principal and interest payments under this plan to be $711.55 per month. When estimated taxes and insurance were added in the total payment came to approximately $850 per month. He also advised that a mortgage insurance premium would be charged each month, which he estimated to be $50 to $60 per month. This still totaled less than the $960 or $970 which the Yanes stated their existing mortgage to be. The Yanes were told that because of the low interest rate (7.5 percent) during the first 36 months, there would be negative amortization during that period of time. In other words, the principal amount owed would actually increase rather than decrease during the first three years since interest on the note was accruing at a higher rate (13 percent). Finally, Franklin advised the Yanes that a 5 percent down payment was required with this type of mortgage and that their deposit should equal this amount to qualify for the loan. The Yanes did not indicate any dissatisfaction with this type of financing, or that they did not understand how the plan worked, particularly with respect to the negative amortization. They agreed to make an offer of $107,000 on the property, to give a $500 deposit that day, and an additional $4850 later on which equated to 5 percent of the purchase price. The contract itself made no reference to the 7.5 percent financing, but provided only that the buyers would obtain a new first mortgage for the balance owed on the $107,000 purchase price. Throughout these negotiations, there was no misrepresentation of facts by Franklin concerning the mortgage or amount of deposit required. The Yanes' offer was quickly presented by the Franklins to the sellers who accepted the offer within the next few days. The Yanes then gave an additional $4850 deposit around May 1 which was deposited in Rosen's escrow account. On May 7, they filed a loan application with American International Mortgage Company and gave a check in the amount of $185 to have an appraisal made and a credit report prepared. At that time, the loan officer explained to Joseph Yanes in detail how the magnet mortgage program worked and that there would be negative amortization under this plan. The meeting lasted for an hour and a half and Yanes did not express surprise at how the mortgage worked, or that he did not understand its concept. An appraisal was then made, and a credit check run on Mr. Yanes. However, the lender was unable to confirm any credit information on Mrs. Yanes because her employer refused to return the employment verification form. On June 20, 1984, the lender sent a denial notice to the Yanes because of its inability to obtain information regarding Mrs. Yanes. The Yanes made no other efforts to obtain financing on the property. After they executed the contract to purchase, the Yanes engaged counsel in early May to represent them at closing. Their attorney (Lisa Wilson) called all pertinent parties, including the Franklins and Rosen to learn the details of the mortgage. After having the details explained to them again, the Yanes advised counsel that they wished to cancel the contract. On May 23, 1984, Wilson sent a certified letter to Stanleigh Franklin advising that because the financing arrangements had been misrepresented to her clients they were cancelling the contract. She also demanded a return of their deposit plus interest. Just prior to the receipt of the certified letter, Joseph Yanes also telephoned Stanleigh Franklin and demanded a return of his deposit. This was the first time Franklin suspected the deal had gone awry. Shortly after this, the Yanes contacted petitioner to file a complaint against respondents. When Mr. Bush learned that the Yanes were not honoring the contract, upon advice of counsel, Bush made a claim on the $5,350 deposit for breach of contract. Faced with conflicting demands for the deposit, Rosen contacted petitioner to determine how the deposit should be disbursed. The matter was eventually referred by petitioner to its local office in Miami for investigation in October 1984. On November 27, 1984, counsel for petitioner advised Rosen that because of the pending complaint of the Yanes, petitioner could not issue an escrow disbursement order. However, he was told of the remaining two alternatives for resolving the dispute prescribed in Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. A complaint for interpleader was later filed in circuit court by agreement of counsel for the Yanes, Bush, and Rosen. That complaint is still pending. Rosen, as broker, was never personally involved in the transaction until a complaint with petitioner was filed. He stood to gain no commission on the sale since the Franklins were working on a "100 percent basis" and were to receive the entire commission. Rosen has been licensed for some thirty-one years and has had no prior disciplinary action in all that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1985.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, George Sherbon, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued broker's license number 0348688 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed as a salesman for V. P. Stone, Inc., a real estate firm located at 5905 Gulf Boulevard, St. Petersburg Beach, Florida. On April 1, 1987, Paul D. and Anna Martin entered into a listing agreement with Century 21 Spinning Wheel Ent., Inc. (Century 21) to sell their home at 2543 58th Terrace South, St. Petersburg, Florida. The listing agent was Cheryl Coudry, now known as Cheryl Hutton, a licensed salesperson with Century 21. On September 11, 1987 respondent solicited and obtained a contract for sale on the Martin property executed by Frank Dicenzo, a resident of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who had a daughter living in the St. Petersburg area. Dicenzo had responded to an advertisement run by Sherbon in a Pittsburgh newspaper. After a week or so of negotiations, the parties eventually agreed to a sales price of $92,500, and the final contract was executed on September 20, 1987. The contract called for Dicenzo to make an initial $100 deposit when the contract was executed and an additional deposit of $19,900 by September 25, 1987, or a total deposit of $20,000. Dicenzo gave respondent the initial $100 which was deposited into the escrow account of V. P. Stone, Inc. The contract provided further that the sale would be contingent on Dicenzo obtaining a $72,500 first mortgage. Finally, in accordance with Dicenzo's request, the contract provided that Dicenzo could take occupancy of the premises four weeks after the loan was approved. It is noted that Dicenzo initially asked for occupancy by October 16, 1987. On September 18, Sherbon introduced Dicenzo to Tony Black, a loan officer at Savings of America, a local lending institution, for the purpose of Dicenzo making a loan application. On September 24, or the day before the additional deposit was due, Dicenzo became ill with what he described as a bleeding ulcer and decided to return to Pittsburgh and stay at his mother's home. Before he left, Dicenzo did not make the additional deposit as required by the contract. According to Dicenzo, he placed no great significance on the September 25 due date and felt that if the deposit was made "within a reasonable time," it would be okay. Respondent was aware of the September 25 deadline and attempted to get a check for the $19,900 deposit from Dicenzo's daughter but was unsuccessful. Respondent contends he kept trying to contact Dicenzo in Pittsburgh during the next five week period but was unable to reach him. Dicenzo acknowledged he knew that Sherbon was trying to contact him but still made no effort to talk to Sherbon. Instead, he simply told his daughter he would take care of the matter when he returned to Florida in late October. Whether this message was conveyed to Sherbon is not of record. Sherbon prepared contemporaneous notes concerning the transaction and used these to refresh his recollection at hearing. He pointed out that such notes were kept on all real estate transactions. According to his notes, he telephoned Coudry and Black on September 24 concerning Dicenzo's illness and the fact that he was having difficulty obtaining the additional deposit from Dicenzo. Although Black recalled talking with Sherbon, he denied that Sherbon told him that there was no deposit and said such information was a material item that would have prompted him to stop processing the application until the deposit could be verified. Likewise, Coudry, who could not recall many aspects of the transaction, did recall speaking with Sherbon but remembered Sherbon simply telling her that he was in the process of showing Dicenzo various commercial properties and would be obtaining the deposit at that time. Their testimony is deemed to be more credible and persuasive and is hereby accepted. Coudry assumed that Sherbon had received the additional deposit since she was never specifically told otherwise by Sherbon. Accordingly, she did not contact the Martins until several weeks after the September 25 due date. Coudry did not learn that no deposit had been collected until mid-January 1988 when Anna Martin disclosed to her this fact. In the meantime, although the Martins knew the contract was contingent on Dicenzo obtaining a loan, they nonetheless assumed that Dicenzo would have no problem securing a loan and that such a loan would be approved in a week or so. Also, they knew the contract called for possession of the property by Dicenzo four weeks after the loan was approved. Because of these assumptions, and having received no advice from Coudry that the full deposit had not been made on September 25 as required by the contract, the Martins made application around September 28 to buy another home in a nearby modular home park and asked that the application be expedited. Unfortunately for the Martins, they were far more successful than Dicenzo in securing prompt approval of their loan application. Once approved, and after a closing was held, the Martins had the utilities hooked up, erected a storage shed, and incurred other expenses. Also, they began making mortgage payments on the second house. On October 24, 1987 the Martins telephoned Sherbon and told him their listing with Century 21 had expired. During the conversation, Sherbon did not mention that Dicenzo had failed to make the $19,900 deposit. Dicenzo's application with Savings of America was denied on October 30, 1987 because of Dicenzo's "ratio of ... expenses to ... total income." By this time, Dicenzo had returned to Florida and had spoken with Sherbon. At respondent's urging, Dicenzo reapplied to the same institution and was turned down a second time on November 12, 1987. In addition, at Coudry's suggestion, Dicenzo had already visited another lender in October but refused to pay a $250 application fee and consequently did not file an application. Also, through Sherbon, Dicenzo was given the name of a mortgage lender suggested by the Martins but, after three visits, decided not file an application. Information regarding the second Savings of America denial was conveyed to Coudry around mid-November but, for whatever reason, she did not contact Sherbon regarding the status of the contract. It is noteworthy that at that time Sherbon did not tell Coudry that Dicenzo had still failed to make an additional deposit as required by the contract. Despite the loan application denials, Sherbon encouraged Dicenzo to keep trying to arrange financing so that the deal could go through. Dicenzo agreed to do so but, as noted in the following finding of fact, at that point Dicenzo considered the contract to be "null and void." Sherbon's efforts to find financing continued until mid-January 1988. When the loan application was denied on November 12, Dicenzo construed the contract to be void since the financing contingency was not met. According to Dicenzo, he did not believe the property was tied up while his contract was pending, felt no obligation to make the $19,900 deposit because it meant he would have to transfer funds from a money market account he purportedly maintained in Pittsburgh, and felt no moral obligation to the Martins even though by then they had committed themselves to a second home. The Martins were advised by telephone on the evening of November 12 of the second turn down of Dicenzo's loan application. By then, however, they were already committed to the second purchase. They claimed they did not learn of Dicenzo's failure to make the $19,900 deposit until mid-January 1988 when Sherbon visited their home and disclosed this fact. This is also borne out by a letter from the Martins' attorney to Dicenzo on December 1, 1987 advising Dicenzo that the contract was void and a claim might be made on his deposit for damages. When the Martins learned that only $100 had been deposited, they filed a complaint with the Division. That prompted this proceeding. Because of the failed contract, the Martins were unable to maintain two mortgage payments and were ultimately forced to give up the second home at a substantial monetary loss. They have since returned to their first home. The evidence shows that in the real estate trade, it is not customary or proper for the buyer's realtor to personally contact the seller. Rather, the practice and custom is for the buyer's agent to advise the listing broker of all pertinent developments and the listing broker then relays any necessary information to the seller. Thus, Sherbon had no responsibility to personally advise the Martins of any information pertaining to the contract. Rather, this responsibility rested with Coudry. Respondent contended he kept Coudry abreast of all developments concerning Dicenzo and that he assumed Coudry would advise the Martins that no deposit had yet been collected. To the extent this version of events conflicts with previous findings, it is not accepted. Sherbon expressed sympathy for the Martins' plight but maintained he was not at fault. There is no evidence that Sherbon has been subjected to prior disciplinary action by the Division.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) to the extent noted in the conclusions of law and that his broker's license be suspended for three months. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4688 Petitioner: 1-2. Covered in finding of fact l. Rejected as being unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 2. 5-7. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 7. Rejected since respondent owed a duty to Coudry, and not the Martins, to keep her abreast of all pertinent matters. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 12. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 8. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in findings of fact 6 and 10. Rejected as being subordinate to other findings. Covered in finding of fact 11. 18-19. Covered in finding of fact 6. Respondent: Respondent's proposed order contains sections entitled "admitted facts", "unrebutted facts" and "uncontested facts". They are ruled upon in that order. Admitted facts: Covered in finding of fact l. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in background. Unrebutted facts: Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 15. Covered in finding of fact 10. 4-6. Covered in finding of fact 6. 7-8. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 12. Rejected since Sherbon learned of the loan denial even though he did not receive a written copy of the turn-down letter. Covered in finding of fact 13. Covered in finding of fact 8. Rejected since the testimony of Anna Martin is accepted as being more credible on this factual issue. Uncontested facts: Rejected as being cumulative. Partially covered in findings of fact 6, 7 and 16. The remainder is rejected as being cumulative, argument of counsel or not supported by the more credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Daniel B. Schuh, Esquire 248 Mirror Drive St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Darlene Keller, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Dan Lee Isaacs is a real estate broker/salesman with the Petitioner, Key Realty, Inc. He seeks in this proceeding to have approved his dual licensure as a broker for Key Realty Management, Inc., as well as to retain his broker/salesman licensure with the Petitioner, Key Realty Inc. In his capacity as a broker/salesman for Key Realty Inc., he works under the supervision of Mr. Les Epperson, who is the licensed broker for that entity. Mr. Isaacs owns no stock in the corporation, Key Realty Inc. He does own stock and would be sole manager of the separate corporation known as Key Realty Management, Inc. Key Realty Management, Inc., is not affiliated in a subsidiary or other relationship with Key Realty, Inc., although there is some commonalty of ownership in that Les Epperson is a minority shareholder. The President and majority stockholder of Key Realty, Inc., Les Epperson, would have no part in the management of the operations of Key Realty Management, Inc. Mr. Isaacs desires, for personal and financial reasons, to remain active in the real estate sales field as a broker/salesman under the supervision of broker Epperson. He would, as sole manager and broker with Key Realty Management, Inc., engage in no sales activities, but rather solely in the management and supervision of various rental properties for clients of that firm. The two corporations maintain and would maintain separate accounting books and records; and, as pertinent, separate escrow and trust funds and accounts. It is to the advantage of both firms, both financially and in terms of legal liability, to maintain these escrow funds and accounts separately because of the financial and operational differences characteristic of a real estate management firm, as compared to a purely real estate sales operation as conducted by Key Realty, Inc. The Petitioner has complied with all requirements for qualification as a real estate broker pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. In October, 1980, the Petitioner applied for the above described dual licensure. The Respondent denied the application on the basis that an individual cannot be a broker and a broker/ salesman simultaneously. The principals of both corporations, Mr. Epperson and Mr. Isaacs, have submitted the affidavits and agreements pursuant to Rule 2IV-6.06, Florida Administrative Code, attesting to the absence of any conflict of interest stemming from Mr. Isaacs' licensure as a broker of the separate corporation and that both of them agree and consent to the dual registration. There is no dispute between the parties that in essence a "salesman" and a "broker/salesman" perform some of the same real estate transaction functions under the supervision of a licensed broker, for instance, the depositing with the broker of any escrow or other funds involved in a given real estate transaction for appropriate disposition and disbursement by the broker and acting in all other pertinent operative capacities under the supervision of a broker, rather than independently. The parties also did not dispute that the real basis for the "broker/salesman" designation in the licensing scheme in Florida is to allow a licensee to demonstrate to the public that a broker/salesman is clothed with additional internship, educational and experience credentials and is thus possessed of a greater degree of expertise in real estate transactions and operations than one licensed as a salesman. The Respondent however, in its argument during and subsequent to the hearing, apparently takes the position that a "broker/salesman" and a salesman perform identical functions; and, therefore, are legally to be considered as the same type of license and licensee, for purposes of establishing its legal position that since a salesman's license may not be issued to a person registered as an active broker unless the active broker's license is surrendered that neither may a person be dually licensed as both a "broker/salesman" and a broker.
Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the pleadings and arguments of counsel, it is; therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting Dan Lee Isaacs a license as an active real estate broker for, and on behalf of, Key Realty Management, Inc., and allowing his retention of licensure as a broker/salesman with Key Realty, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Kirk Brown, Esquire Post Office Box 4075 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Randy Schwartz, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Robert A. Sempell, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 02178232 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Respondent, Virginia Bloise, was also a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0376974. Respondent, Home Shoppe, Inc., is a corporation registered as a broker having been issued license number 0229887. When the events herein occurred, the firm was located at 2610 North Federal Highway, Boynton Beach, Florida. Sempell operated as qualifying broker for Home Shoppe, Inc., from November 14, 1983, until October 12, 1984, Bloise was a salesperson with the same firm from July 9, 1984, until October 18, 1984, when she assumed the position of broker of record. Ilana Frank was the firm's only licensed salesperson, and she worked for the firm from 1983 until around January, 1986. In February, 1984, Frank represented Morgan King, an individual interested in purchasing a home located at 502 Northeast Second Street, Delray Beach, Florida. The property was listed with Douglas Rill and Associates, Inc., a West Palm Beach real estate firm. The home was owned by Joseph Michell, a Pratt-Whitney employee being transferred to Texas, and he had turned it over to TransAmerica Relocation Service, Inc. (TransAmerica), a firm that handled real estate sales for Pratt-Whitney employees who were relocating to other areas of the country. Deciding to purchase the property, King executed a standard contract on February 20, 1984 to purchase the home for $125,000. The contract contained a clause providing that the purchase was contingent on King obtaining a Veterans Administration (VA) loan in the amount of $122,250 at a 12 1/2 percent interest rate. 3/ A closing date of May 20, 1984, was established by the parties. The contract provided further that King would make a $1,200 cash deposit and that, pursuant to an addendum executed on February 22, he could rent the house until closing at a rate of $628 per month. Finally, the contract required that King give an extra $3800 to be deposited in escrow before moving into house, and within 45 days after the contract was executed, to 'submits' an additional $3,000. The addendum provided, however, that the $8,000 was "nonrefundable." After King signed the original contract, he gave Frank a $1,200 deposit. Frank, who was not a signatory on the firm's escrow account, carried the money to Sempell who placed his signature on the contract as an acknowledgment of receipt of deposit. Whether the money was deposited into the firm's escrow account is not of record. In any event, King did not have the extra $3800 needed to satisfy the initial deposit requirements of the contract. To ensure that a closing could be held, Frank approached Alan D. Mentser, a real estate salesman with another firm, Bob Railey's Realty, Inc., and asked if he would loan King the money until the anticipated closing on March 30, 1984. 4/ Mentser agreed to do so with the understanding that the $3800 would be placed immediately in an escrow account until closing. When he loaned the money, Mentser was under the impression that the money would be held in the escrow account of Douglas Rill, the listing broker. Because Mentser did not feel comfortable loaning the money to King, a person who he did not know, he required Frank to sign a promissory note on February 24, 1984 in the amount of $3800. At the same time, King signed an identical promissory note for $3800 payable to Frank. In addition, Frank orally agreed with Mentser that, for the use of his $3800 until March 30, 1984, she would pay him $1200 interest, or a handsome thirty percent return on his money. The $1200 was to be taken out of Frank's portion of the broker commission split. However, Mentser recognized that he was not a participating broker or salesman in the transaction and had no formal claim to the escrowed money in a realtor capacity. Indeed, the loan to Frank was personal in nature, and although Mentser intended it to be used as a part of the deposit, it was not considered a part of the real estate transaction. On February 24, Mentser gave Frank $3800 in cash which she promptly gave to Bloise the same day. Bloise was a signatory on the firm's trust account and had authority to make deposits and disbursements. After Bloise prepared a deposit receipt, Frank used $300 of the $3800 to purchase renter's insurance for King and deposited the remaining $3500 in Home Shoppe, Inc.'s escrow account at the Bank of South Palm Beaches in Lantana. The $300 deduction was made pursuant to an agreement by all parties. After King took possession of the property, he failed to qualify for a VA loan. Sometime later, he moved out of the house with no notice to the realtors or seller and gave no forwarding address. His whereabouts are unknown. TransAmerica later instituted eviction proceedings in order to legally take possession of the property. A final judgment of eviction was obtained on July 6, 1984. By now March 30, 1984, had come and gone and Mentser was eager to get his money. He initially contacted Frank but learned something had gone awry with the contract. When his informal requests to Frank were unsuccessful, Mentser engaged the services of an attorney who wrote a certified letter on May 4 to Sempell demanding a refund of his money from the firm's escrow account. After the letter was returned three times, the attorney had the letter hand- delivered to the firm's address where Frank signed for it. There is no evidence that Sempell was given the letter. After Mentser contacted Frank about his money, Frank spoke to Bloise on several occasions concerning Mentser's inquiry. The dates of these conversations are not of record. In any event, Bloise told her that a "dispute" had arisen over the escrow deposit and until it was resolved by the Division, Mentser could not get his money. This was not true since Bloise never turned the matter over to the Division for resolution. On July 12, 1984, the seller made a formal claim for the full deposit on the ground King had breached the contract and forfeited the deposit. Although there is no specific evidence as to the disposition of the claim, it may be reasonably inferred that TransAmerica's claim has not been honored. On August 6, 1984, Mentser obtained a default judgment against Frank in circuit court and was awarded $3800 in damages, prejudgment interest of $160, attorney fees of $300, and fees and costs of $50, or a total of $4310. He wisely did not request that he also be awarded the $1200 interest for the use of his money. The judgment has never been satisfied. Sempell went "out of the country" sometime in 1984 and was absent for much of the year. There is no evidence he received any demands for Mentser's money before he resigned as broker of record nor is there evidence that he was a signatory on Home Shoppe, Inc.'s escrow account. Indeed, the president of the bank in which the firm's escrow account was placed knew only that Bloise was a signatory on the account. Further, copies of cancelled checks written on the account and introduced into evidence reflected only Bloise's signature. The allegation that in October, 1984, Sempell absconded with certain funds from the firm's escrow account was not addressed at hearing and has been disregarded. Partial bank records of the firm's escrow account reflect that the $3500 was properly deposited into the account on February 27, 1984. As of December 28, 1984, the balance in the account had dropped to $1,688.98, which meant at least a part of the deposit had been spent for other purposes. Whether these expenditures occurred before or after Sempell resigned as broker of record is unclear. In any event, Bloise acknowledged to a Division investigator in May, 1987, that she had written a number of checks on the account for her own use. She justified this action by explaining that Frank had told her that the $3800 was their "own" money and could be spent "to run the business." Bloise also confirmed that, when this controversy arose, she was the only signatory on the firm's account and that Sempell had no authority to write checks or make disbursements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondents be found guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(b), (d) and (k), Florida Statutes (1983), and that the broker licenses of Bloise and Home Shoppe, Inc. be suspended for five years. Sempell's broker license should be suspended for one year. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1988.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility, and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Paul F. Savich is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0077390 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Ernest M. Haefele, is a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0517821 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. On October 1, 1984, the Respondents, purchasers in their individual capacities, entered into a contract for deed to a tract at the Tropical Acres Subdivision, with Tropical Sites, Inc., and Angie S. Crosby and Eugene T. Crosby, at a sales price of $9,046.50. Said amount to be paid at the rate of $90 per month until paid. Pursuant to the agreement, the Respondents agreed not to assign the agreement without the permission of Tropical Sites, Inc. A closing was held on May 8, 1990, and the Respondents transferred possession of the tract by assignment of contract to Leroy H. and Charlotte Beard. A mobile home on the real property was part of the purchase price for a total sales price of $39,000.00 The agreement called for a down payment of $2,000 to the Respondent Savich. The Beards also signed a mortgage note in favor of the Respondents Savich and Haffele, for $37,000. The note was payable at the rate of $373.15 per month. Upon payment in full, Respondents were obligated to deliver a good and sufficient deed to the property to the purchasers. At the closing, Respondent Haefele was not present. The Beards received two documents at closing, a contract for sale and one other document, but did not receive a copy of the original agreement for deed, a disclosure statement, or a title to the trailer on the tract. In addition, Respondent Savich did not seek permission of Tropical Sites, Inc., prior to the closing. Prior to the closing, the Beards moved onto the property, and subsequently began making monthly payments of $373.15 to Respondent Savich. The Beards had purchased two or three pieces of property in the past, but had always gone through a bank. In relation to this agreement, they understood the nature of the transaction at the time of the closing. In early 1991, Mr. Beard made a telephone inquiry to the County property appraiser's office as to the status of the property for homestead exemption purposes. He was advised that Tropical Sites, Inc. was the current owner of the tract, and that he was not eligible for homestead exemption. The Beards did not apply for homestead exemption at the appraiser's office. In August 1991, the Beards stopped making payments to the Respondents on the advice of their attorney, but continued to reside on the premises until December 1991. In November 1991, an attorney acting on behalf of the Beards made a demand upon Respondent Paul F. Savich for the return of the $2,000.00 deposit. The Respondents did not return the $2,000.00 deposit or otherwise pay the money claimed by the Beards. In his dealings with the Beards, Respondent Savich did not withhold information, lie or mislead the purchasers. They simply were unhappy with the agreement, and decided to get out of it when they recognized that they would not receive title to the mobile home and property until the note was paid in full. In early 1992, the Beards quitclaimed their interest to the property to Respondent Savich's former wife, and they were released from their obligations under the note.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondents Paul F. Savich and Earnest M. Haefele be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Adopted in substance: paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7(in part),8,9(in part)10,11,12,13 Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraphs 7(in part: the $2,000 was a down payment, not an earnest money deposit), 9(in part: the Beards moved on to the property prior to closing. Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Respondent submitted a proposed order with unnumbered paragraphs which partially recounted the testimony of several of the witnesses and combined facts and conclusions of law. Therefore, a separate ruling on Respondent's proposals are not possible. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Senior Attorney DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street #N-308 Orlando, FL 32801-1772 J. Stanford Lifsey, Esquire 101 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1465 Tampa, Florida 33602 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Steven Hall, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate salesman and broker. Upon February 15, 1984, he became licensed as a broker. The Respondent was registered with and employed by J. Arnold Ausley Realty from March 31, 1983 to February 15, 1984. J. Arnold Ausley was a licensed real estate broker and operated as Ausley Properties during times pertinent hereto. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensure and practice of realtors in the State of Florida and enforcing the practice standards for realtors embodied in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. On February 4, 1984, the Respondent, in his capacity as a licensed salesman for Ausley Properties, arranged a contract between Champak Bhoja and Kishor Patel, as purchasers of a certain piece of real estate owned by one John D. Gilbert. In connection with that contract the Respondent obtained a $2,000 check as a deposit from Mr. Patel. At Mr. Patel's request the Respondent held this check without negotiating it awaiting Patel's instruction that sufficient funds were on deposit to honor the check. The Respondent waited four weeks and received no such instructions from Mr. Patel. The Respondent therefore contacted Patel, who was in Nebraska at the time, to tell him that he felt legally obligated to deposit the check. The check was deposited and was returned for insufficient funds. On March 19, 1984, Mr. Patel gave the Respondent a replacement check in the amount of $2,000. Mr. Hall asked Mr. Patel to make the check out to him since he had in the meantime become a broker and wanted credit for this transaction in his own business. He also informed Mr. Patel that he would need to use the money for his own personal expenses, in the nature of a "loan." Mr. Patel, however, made the check out to the "Ausley Properties Escrow Account." The Respondent and Mr. Patel had been involved in other business ventures together during the course of which Mr. Patel had already lent the Respondent, on different occasions, a total of approximately $4,000. This course of dealing was continued in the present instance, from the Respondent's viewpoint, when the Respondent informed Mr. Patel that he needed the $2,000 for personal expense purposes and would pay it back as a loan. He believed Mr. Patel assented to that arrangement at the time. The sales contract at issue ultimately failed to be consummated due to Mr. Pate1 and Mr. Bhoja not meeting the required contingency regarding debt financing. Approximately fifteen days after the contract's closing date passed, Mr. Patel made a demand upon the Respondent for the return of the $2,000 deposit. The Respondent failed to return it at that time but assured Mr. Patel that he would repay the money and needed more time to obtain the necessary funds. The Respondent had not deposited the check in the Ausley Properties Escrow Account because such an account did not exist, although the Respondent had urged Mr. Ausley on a number of occasions to set up such an account. The Respondent rather cashed the $2,000 check and used the proceeds for his own benefit, as he had informed Patel he would do. He used the money to meet certain operating expenses and personal expenses, being in severe financial straits at the time. Pate1 knew he was experiencing financial difficulties and had lent him the previously mentioned $4,000 to help him with operating expenses and personal expenses during the pendency of the closing of their various other real estate ventures. The Respondent informed Patel he would use the subject $2,000 for similar purposes, however, the record does not clearly reflect that Patel consented to this, as opposed to his intent that the money be placed in an account as his deposit of consideration for the contract. His testimony to this latter effect is borne out by the fact that in spite of the Respondent's request that the check be made out to him personally, instead Patel made it out to the "Ausley Properties Escrow Account." That account did not exist but the method of drafting the check reveals his intent that the money was to be used as a deposit. In any event the Respondent made no misrepresentation to Mr. Patel as to what he intended to do with the money, but at the same time he did not deposit it in an appropriate account to be held as a deposit toward the purchase of the property involved in the sales contract. Patel made numerous demands for the money and each time Respondent acknowledged this and the other debt to Patel and promised to pay. He ultimately began paying back a small portion of the indebtedness to each of his creditors starting out at a rate of $10 per month. Ultimately, the Respondent paid the entire $2,000 predicated on receipt of his 1985 income tax return.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Petitioner finding that the Respondent has violated Section 475.25(1)(b),(d,)(e) and (k) only to the extent delineated in the above conclusions of law and that his real estate broker's license be subjected to a six months suspension. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of August, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Steven R. Hall 8880 Old Kings Hwy., Apt. 30-W Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Michael Sheahan, Esquire Two South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings Slocum Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Florida Rea1 Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected, although the evidence establishes that Patel intended the funds to be escrowed. Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected as not comporting with the charges in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact:* Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted, but irrelevant to the charges. Accepted Accepted Accepted as to the first sentence only. The second sentence concerning Patel's response is not clearly supported by record evidence. Accepted Accepted Accepted * Although Respondent is proposed findings are accepted, some are inculpatory, some are not material and some support the conclusion that no fraudulent conduct was committed.
