The Issue Whether Respondent's employment should be terminated "for being absent without approved leave," as recommended in the Superintendent of Schools of the School District of Palm Beach County's Petition for Involuntary Resignation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The School Board is responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) and support facilities within the jurisdictional boundaries of the School District. Systemwide testing programs in the School District are coordinated by the School District's Department of Research, Evaluation, and Accountability (DREA). At all times material to the instant case, Marc Baron headed DREA. DREA operates a test distribution center. Cherie Boone is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, in charge of the DREA test distribution center. Ms. Boone supervises four employees. As their supervisor, she is "responsible for [among other things, their] time and attendance." Respondent is employed as a materials handling technician with the School District. At all times material to the instant case, he was assigned to work in the DREA test distribution center under the direct supervision of Ms. Boone. As a materials handling technician employed by the School District, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 1227 (NCF&O) and, at all times material to the instant case, has been covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School District and NCF&O (NCF&O Contract). Article 7 of the NCF&O Contract discusses "employees['] contractual rights." It provides as follows: SECTION 1. Probationary Employees All newly hired or rehired employees may be subject to a probationary period of ninety (90) workdays. Employees who have not completed such period of employment may be discharged without recourse. Probationary employees shall not be eligible for any type of leave except accrued sick leave, annual leave, or short term unpaid leave (due to illness) not to exceed five (5) days. SECTION 2. Permanent Employees Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee status shall be continuous unless the Superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). In the event the Superintendent seeks termination of a continuous employee, the School Board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the termination. The appeals process shall be determined in accordance with Article 17 - Discipline of Employees (Progressive Discipline). Article 8 of the NFC&O Contract addresses the subject of "[m]anagement [r]ights." It provides as follows: NCF&O and its members recognize the responsibility of the District to operate and manage its affairs in all respects in accordance with its responsibilities as established by law and as delegated by the State Board of Education; and the powers of authority which the District has not officially agreed to share by this agreement, are retained by the District. It is the right of the District to determine unilaterally the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organization and operations. It is also the right of the District to manage and direct its employees, establish reasonable rules and procedures, take disciplinary action for proper cause, and relieve its employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, provided, however, that the exercise of such rights shall not preclude employees or their representatives from raising grievances, should decisions on the above matters have the practical consequences of violating the terms and conditions of this agreement in force. The District has the sole authority to determine the purpose and mission and the amount of the budget to be adopted by the School Board. The District and NCF&O agree that the District has and retains unaltered, its legal right to select, assign, reassign, or relocate any of its employees, and to carry out its mission under the law and State Board of Education Regulations, unless otherwise specifically enumerated herein. Except to the extent it has been done prior to May 26, 1998, no bargaining unit work which would result in the loss of jobs by members of the bargaining unit, shall be contracted out without prior consultation with the Union. It is understood that changes under this Article may not be arbitrary and capricious, and it is agreed that the District has those rights which are enumerated within Florida Statute 447; however, nothing herein shall relieve the parties of their ability to request impact bargaining. Among the "rules and procedures" that the School District, through the School Board, has established in exercising its "[m]anagement [r]ights" are School Board Directive 3.27 and School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80, which provide, in pertinent part, as follows: School Board Directive 3.27 * * * Resignations. If employees desire to be released from their employment contract the following procedures are to be followed: * * * c. When employees do not report for duty for three (3) consecutive days without notifying their supervisor, the principal/department head will initiate a certified letter to the employee stating that their resignations will be recommended to the School Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting. * * * Suspension/Termination. The Principal/Department Head may recommend to the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel Relations disciplinary action against an employee if the employee commits one or more of the following offenses, including but not limited to: * * * b. Willful absence from duty without leave in violation of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes.[2] * * * Employees included in a bargaining unit are subject to suspension/dismissal provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. * * * 6. When a recommendation for suspension and termination is made, the procedures listed in School Board Policy 3.27 shall be followed. * * * School Board Policy 6Gx50-3.80 A leave of absence is permission granted by the Board, or allowed under its adopted policies, for an employee to be absent from duty for specified periods of time with the right of returning to employment on the expiration of the leave. All absences of School Board employees from duty shall be covered by leave duly authorized and granted. Leave shall be officially granted in advance by the School Board and shall be used for the purposes set forth in the leave application. Leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. No leave except military leave shall be granted for a period greater than one (1) year. A new leave application may be filed and granted at the expiration of leave, but automatic renewals of leave shall not be allowed. Leave may be with or without pay and provided by law, rules of the State Board of Education, School Board policy, and negotiated contracts. If the terms of the collective bargaining agreement differ from this Policy, the language of the employee's agreement will take precedence. The following types of leave are available for School District employees: Leave for personal reasons Annual leave for 12-month personnel Sick leave Catastrophic leave Injury or illness in-line-of-duty leave Sabbatical leave Temporary military leave Regular military service leave Professional leave and extended professional leave Charter school leave Voluntary/extended military leave Leave of absence for the purpose of campaigning for political office Personal leave including maternity/ recovery and child care Paid Leaves * * * c. Sick Leave * * * iv. An employee requiring more than thirty (30) working days of paid leave for recovery may be required to submit medical evidence at reasonable intervals supporting the need for additional leave. * * * Sick leave claims shall be honored as submitted by the employee for personal illness, as well as illness or death of father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, child or other close relative or member of the employee's own household. Sick leave without pay may be granted for employees who have used all accumulated sick leave, but who would otherwise qualify for sick leave. The Superintendent may require a doctor's statement of verification of illness. A request to the Superintendent for a verification of claim may be initiated by the principal or supervisor. * * * Unpaid Leaves * * * e. Personal Leave -- An employee requesting short-term or long-term personal leave shall make written application to the supervisor, stating reasons for such leave. The Board shall satisfy itself in terms of the need of the requested leave. Personal leave may be used to extend a leave of absence due to sickness when that sickness has extended beyond all compensable leave for the duration of up to one (1) calendar year when supported by doctor's statements verifying the necessity of the extended leave. An employee requesting return to duty who has served efficiently and exhibited those qualities called for in the position held prior to such leave will be given every consideration for reemployment provided the conditions of employment have been met and the request is supported by a doctor's statement certifying that his physical condition is satisfactory to return to normal duties. * * * Article 17 of the NCF&O Contract, as noted in Article 7 of the contract, deals with the "[d]iscipline of [e]mployees." It provides as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Union, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. All disciplinary action shall be governed by applicable statutes and provisions of the Agreement. Further, an employee shall be provided with a written charge of wrongdoing, setting forth the specific charges against that employee as soon as possible after the investigation has begun. Any information which may be relied upon to take action against an employee will be shared promptly with said employee and his/her Union representative as soon as possible. Copies of any written information/correspondence that is related to the action of the employee or the investigating administrator(s) will be provided promptly to the employee and his/her Union representative. An employee against whom action is to be taken under this Article and his/her Union representative shall have the right to review and refute any and all of the information relied upon to support any proposed disciplinary action prior to taking such action. To this end, the employee and the Union representative shall be afforded a reasonable amount of time to prepare and present responses/refutations concerning the pending disciplinary action and concerning the appropriateness of the proposed disciplinary action. This amount of time is to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. Only previous disciplinary actions which are a part of the employee’s personnel file or which are a matter of record as provided in paragraph #7 below may be cited if these previous actions are reasonably related to the existing charge. Where just cause warrants such disciplinary action(s) and in keeping with provisions of this Article, an employee may be reprimanded verbally, reprimanded in writing, suspended without pay, or dismissed upon the recommendation of the immediate supervisor to the Superintendent and final action taken by the District. Other disciplinary action(s) may be taken with the mutual agreement of the parties. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable School Board rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With A Written Notation. Such written notation shall be placed in the employee’s personnel file and shall not be used to the further detriment of the employee, unless there is another reasonably related act by that same employee within a twenty-four (24) month period. Written Reprimand. A written reprimand may be issued to an employee when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article. Such written reprimand shall be dated and signed by the giver of the reprimand and shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file upon a receipt of a copy to the employee by certified mail. Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay by the School Board may be issued to an employee, when appropriate, in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. The length of the suspension also shall be determined by just cause as set forth in this Article. The notice and specifics of the suspension without pay shall be placed in writing, dated, and signed by the giver of the suspension and a copy provided to the employee by certified mail. The specific days of suspension will be clearly set forth in the written suspension notice which shall be filed in the affected employee’s personnel file in keeping with provisions of Chapter 119 and 231.291 of the Florida Statutes. An employee may be dismissed when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Article, including just cause and applicable laws. An employee against whom disciplinary action(s) has/have been taken may appeal through the grievance procedure. However, if the disciplinary action(s) is/are to be taken by the District, then the employee shall have a choice of appeal between either the Department [sic] of Administrative Hearings in accordance with Florida Statutes or the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. Such choice must be exercised within fifteen (15) days of receipt of written notification of disciplinary action being taken, and the District notified accordingly. If the grievance procedure is selected, the grievance shall be initiated at Step Three. Article 18 of the NCF&O Contract describes the grievance procedure available to bargaining unit members who allege a "misapplication or misinterpretation of the agreement." The described procedure consists of an "informal level" and four formal "levels," the final one being "arbitration before an impartial arbitrator, using the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services." Pursuant to Section 4B. of Article 18, "if NCF&O decides to withdraw its support of an alleged grievance, the individual may continue to process the claim on his/her own, so long as all costs are borne by that individual"; however, according to Section 4E. of Article 18, "[a]grievance, once [actually] withdrawn, may not be reopened without the mutual written agreement between the [School District] and [the] NCF&O." "[L]eave [w]ithout [p]ay" is the subject of Article 25 of the NCF&O Contract, which provides as follows: SECTION 1. Personal Leave of Absence Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent. An employee granted an unpaid leave of absence shall be returned to his/her former classification if the leave is less than ninety (90) days, notwithstanding the layoff provisions contained in this agreement. An employee granted a leave of absence and who wishes to return before the leave period has expired, may submit a request to return to the principal/department head. An employee granted a leave of absence in excess of ninety (90) days will be permitted to return to work provided there is an opening in the same job classification in the work unit. If the former position is not available, the employee, upon written request, shall be listed as an eligible applicant for a period of six (6) months. Group Life and Hospitalization Insurance coverage may be continued for a period equal to the authorized leave of absence, provided full premium payments, including the Board's payment, are kept current by the employee. SECTION 2. Return from Leave Failure to return to work at the expiration of approved leave shall be considered as absence without leave and grounds for dismissal.[3] This section should be subject to extenuating circumstances preventing timely return, as determined by the Superintendent.4 Section 2 of Article 35 of NCF&O Contract protects employees from "[h]arassment." It provides as follows: No employee shall be subjected to or be part of: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, offensive, lewd or suggestive comments. Also includes the creation of a hostile, intimidating, or offensive work environment. Verbal or physical abuse is submitted to by an employee. An adverse decision is made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. Verbal or physical abuse. An adverse decision shall not be made against an employee after such abuse is rejected. Racial/ethnic slurs, jokes, or other inappropriate conduct. There came a time when Respondent claimed, in a Level One grievance filed under the NCF&O Contract, that he was a victim, at the hands of Ms. Boone, of the "[h]arassment" proscribed by Section 2 of Article 35 of the contract. The grievance was filed (with the support of NCF&O) on or about April 8, 2004, several weeks following an incident in which Ms. Boone "yell[ed]" at Respondent for returning "a little bit late[]" from a delivery run. It contained the following "[g]rievance [s]tatement" and description of the "[r]elief [s]ought": Grievance Statement: (Include Date of Occurrence) Mr. Ellis fe[e]ls that he is working in a hostile work environment. He had meeting with the Dept. Head to express his feelings. On March 31, the employee was issued a written reprimand when there has never been any discipline for the employee. Relief Sought: The reprimand is withdrawn from all personnel files. All intimidation of the employee to cease immediately. Ms. Boone, on behalf of the School District, responded to the grievance by providing Respondent with the following written "disposition": After careful consideration of all available information, it has been determined that there has not been a violation, misapplication, or misinterpretation of the collective bargaining procedures. The grievance was not pursued beyond Level One. Since March 16, 2004, Respondent had not been reporting to work, notwithstanding that he had not received authorization to be absent. On or about April 5, 2004, Respondent submitted a request for leave of absence without pay for the period from April 5, 2004, to July 5, 2004. The type of leave without pay he requested was personal leave. By letter dated April 8, 2004, Mr. Baron advised Respondent that Respondent's request was being denied. In his letter, Mr. Baron wrote: You were absent without approved leave on April 5, 2004, April 6, 2004, and April 8, 2004. On Monday, April 5, 2004, you reported your intended absences and requested personal leave of absence starting April 5, 2004 through July 5, 2004. Pursuant to Article 25, Section 1, of the Agreement between The School District of Palm Beach County and National Conference of Firem[e]n & Oilers, "Personal leave of absence as described herein is leave without pay and may be requested by a member of the bargaining unit for purely personal reasons. A member of the bargaining unit may request short-term personal leave of absence within the school or department to which the employee is assigned. Personal leave as described herein shall be requested through the principal or department head for his/her approval and subsequently approved by the Superintendent." Your request for personal unpaid leave is denied. You are directed to return to work on Monday, April 12, 2004. Continued unapproved absences will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination. Respondent did not return to work on April 12, 2004, as directed. The matter of Respondent's unauthorized absences was then "turn[ed] . . . over to [the School District's] personnel [office]" to "deal with." The personnel office decided to ask the School Board to terminate Respondent's employment for his having been absent without authorization. Before the School Board took any action, Respondent submitted another request for leave of absence without pay. The type of leave without pay he requested this time was sick leave. On the request form, Respondent indicated that he wanted the leave period to begin on April 16, 2004, "but there was no end date" written in anywhere on the form. Without an "end date," the form could not be processed. Sherry Kleinman, a School District analyst assigned to the personnel office (whose job duties include processing "all the leaves of absence for School [District] employees"), telephoned Respondent and "asked him what end date he wanted" her to place on the form for him. During their telephone conversation, Ms. Kleinman and Respondent "agreed upon" a May 17, 2004, "end date." Ms. Kleinman inserted this "end date" in the appropriate space on the form and then completed processing Respondent's leave request. Respondent was granted leave without pay for the period starting April 16, 2004, and ending May 17, 2004. Moreover, the personnel office "pulled" its recommendation that the School Board terminate Respondent for his having been absent without authorization. Respondent did not report to work at any time following the expiration of his authorized leave on May 17, 2004, nor did he seek an extension of this leave. There has been no showing made that there were extenuating circumstances present preventing Respondent's timely return to work; nor has it been shown that the issue of whether such extenuating circumstances existed has ever been presented to the Superintendent for determination. Personnel office staff attempted to reach Respondent by telephone to encourage him to seek an extension of the authorized leave that had expired. These efforts were unsuccessful. Upon being advised of the situation by Ms. Kleinman, NCF&O business agent Carolyn Killings, who had helped Respondent in filing his "[h]arassment" grievance, offered to try to contact Respondent, but she too was unable to "reach him." By letter dated June 14, 2004, Ernie Camerino, the assistant director of the personnel office, advised Respondent of the following: You were recently notified by your supervisor of your failure to return to work. As a result of such action, Personnel is currently processing your involuntary resignation from employment with the School District. Please be advised that I will recommend at the July 21, 2004 meeting of the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, your involuntary resignation. Subsequent to the July 21, 2004 Board meeting you will have fifteen (15) days to file an appeal under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. Unless a timely request for an administrative hearing (DOAH) is made within fifteen (15) days stated herein pursuant to Section 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes the District will consider this matter closed. This action is taken in accordance with Section 1001.42 and 1001.51, Florida Statutes. Failure to timely request an administrative hearing shall waive all rights to request a DOAH hearing on such matters and shall be subject only to appeal rights under Section 120.[6]8, Florida Statutes. You have a choice of filing a grievance or requesting a hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). Questions regarding the appeals process should be referred to the District's Legal Department. If you find this letter inconsistent with the action taken above, you may contact Mr. Camerino immediately at . . . to resolve this matter prior to School Board Action. By letter dated July 8, 2004, Respondent informed the School District's legal department that he was "requesting an appeal" of Mr. Camerino's "involuntary resignation" recommendation. On August 23, 2004, the same day the Superintendent filed his Petition for Involuntary Resignation recommending that the School Board terminate Respondent's employment, the School District referred Respondent's appeal to DOAH.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order terminating Respondent's employment based on his failure to return to work following the expiration of his leave without pay on May 17, 2004. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2005.
The Issue The ultimate issue in the instant case is whether Petitioner abandoned his position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Petitioner was formerly employed as an Unemployment Compensation (UC) Adjudicator in Respondent's Miami UC office. In this capacity, he interviewed claimants seeking unemployment compensation and made initial determinations regarding the validity of their claims. Petitioner was often absent because of illness. When he was at work, however, he performed his duties competently. Petitioner and his fellow employees at the Miami UC Office were required to notify supervisory personnel no later than the beginning of the workday if they were going to be absent that day. Petitioner was made aware of this requirement on various occasions prior to the absences that led to the termination of his employment with Respondent. On Tuesday, September 5, 1989, Petitioner telephoned his supervisor and told her that he would be absent that day because of an ankle injury he had sustained. He did not indicate during the conversation whether he would be at work the following day. On Wednesday, September 6, 1989, and Thursday, September 7, 1989, Petitioner neither reported to work nor contacted his supervisor at any time during the day to give notification of his absence. On Friday, September 8, 1989, Petitioner again failed to report to work. He did, however, telephone his supervisor concerning his absence, but he did not do so until 4:50 p.m., 20 minutes after the shift to which he was assigned had ended. By letter dated September 11, 1989, Respondent notified Petitioner that it had determined that Petitioner had abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service effective the close of business September 8, 1989, in view of his unauthorized absence from work on September 6, 7, and 8, 1989. It is this determination that is the subject of the instant controversy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order sustaining Respondent's determination that Petitioner abandoned his UC Adjudicator position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of February 1990. STUART H. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact To the extent that Petitioner asserts in his letter that he contacted his supervisor on September 5, 1989, and again on September 8, 1989, his proposed findings of fact have been accepted and incorporated in substance in this Recommended Order. To the extent that he claims that he "did not have 3 consecutive days of unauthorized absences," his proposed factual findings have been rejected because they are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact First Sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second Sentence: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. First and second sentences: Rejected because they add only unnecessary detail; Third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First, second and fifth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third and fourth sentences: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Cooper 1601 Northwest 17th Street, #2 Miami, Florida 33125 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 William A. Frieder Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Security Berkeley Building, Suite 200 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue Whether the Petitioner abandoned his position with the Respondent and resigned from Career Service?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the Department of Corrections as a Correctional Officer I in the Food Service Department at the Union Correctional Institution. Prior to his termination, Petitioner had been employed by the Department of Corrections for approximately four years. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Mr. Norman Hedding, Food Service Director II at Union Correctional Institution. Sometime in April or May, 1987, Petitioner filled out a request for leave, requesting three weeks annual leave to be taken in July, 1987. The request for leave was placed on Mr. Hedding's desk. Mr. Hedding told Petitioner he would see what he could do and mentioned that other officers needed to take vacation time or they would forfeit the time. However, no other officer asked to take leave during the same period of time requested by Petitioner. On various occasions during May, June and July, Petitioner asked Wanda Phillips, Mr. Hedding's assistant, whether his leave had been approved. Ms. Phillips told him she had not heard anything. During one of the conversations with Ms. Phillips, Petitioner told her that he had purchased round-trip airline tickets to California. Petitioner and Mr. Hedding did not speak about the leave request until the Petitioner's last day at work prior to having two scheduled days off and then starting the 3-week period for which leave time had been requested. During this conversation, the Petitioner informed Mr. Hedding that he had confirmed round-trip tickets to California and his grandson had surgery scheduled for the time period in question. The testimony is conflicting as to what was said during this conversation. Mr. Hedding testified that he told Petitioner that the leave was not authorized. Petitioner testified that Mr. Hedding told him that the leave "had not been approved yet." Based on the testimony given at the hearing and the actions of Petitioner after his conversation with Mr. Hedding, I find that Petitioner was never told in unequivocal and clear terms that his leave had been disapproved. Petitioner assumed his leave would be approved and, before leaving work on his last day, he filled out pay slips in advance so that his payroll records would be accurate and told people at the office that he was going on vacation. Petitioner remained in town for the next four days, without reporting for work, and left for California. On August 6, 1987, upon his return from California, Petitioner received a certified letter from Mr. Hicks, an Assistant Superintendent II at Union Correctional Institution, informing Petitioner that he had been deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System. Petitioner then spoke with Mr. Ellis, the Superintendent at Union Correctional Institution, who told Petitioner he needed to talk with Mr. Hedding about getting his job back. Petitioner told Mr. Hedding he had not intended to abandon his position. The next day Mr. Hedding told Petitioner he would not take him back.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered ruling that the circumstances presented in this case do not constitute abandonment as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, and directing that Petitioner be reinstated to his former position as of July 20, 1987. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3828 The parties submitted-proposed findings of fact, which are addressed below. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Petitioner's posthearing filing is a document titled "Petitioner's Argument and Citation of Law." The first three paragraphs consist of factual information and will be considered as proposed findings of fact. Petitioner's proposed findings are generally accepted, as modified in the Findings of Fact to conform to the testimony and evidence presented at hearing. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent's Paragraph Number Ruling and RO Paragraph Accepted. RO 1. Accepted, as modified to reflect approximate dates. RO 2, 3. Rejected. Mr. Hedding assumed this to be the case. Accepted, generally as modified. RO 4. Accepted, generally. RO 5. Accepted, as modified to reflect approximate dates. RO 6. Accepted, as modified. RO 6, 7. First sentence accepted. RO 9. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant. Accepted, generally. RO 10. Rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Louis A. Vargas, Esquire 409 North East First Street General Counsel Post Office Box 628 Department of Corrections Alachua, Florida 32615 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Perri M. King, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Richard Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Adis Vila, Secretary 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner may lawfully discipline Respondent due to excessive absences from work.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner employed Respondent as a police officer in the Operations Division of the Cape Coral Police Department (Department) from October 5, 1987, through approximately April 27, 1998, when Petitioner terminated her employment. As detailed below, Petitioner monthly provides its employees with a specified amount of leave, based on their years of service. Petitioner credits all leave in a single account. Employees then draw on their leave account by taking scheduled and unscheduled leave. This case involves Respondent's use of allegedly excessive amounts of leave. In 1989, Respondent used 125.76 hours of unscheduled leave. On May 23, 1989, she received an interim performance evaluation noting that she was "below acceptable" in unscheduled leave time and needed to improve her relations with other employees. On October 13, 1989, she received an annual performance evaluation stating that she had had 18 days "sick leave" in the preceding 12 months and was below "operational standard" in attendance and relations with others; all of her other categories were marked as meeting operational standard. The attached narrative notes a "slight improvement" since her May 1989 interim performance evaluation. In 1990, Respondent used 198.5 hours of unscheduled leave. Her October 12, 1990, annual performance evaluation states that Respondent was again below operational standard in attendance with 23.25 days of "sick leave." She had raised her relations with others to operational standard and work habits to above operational standard. The narrative attached to the evaluation states that the evaluator has spent a sizable amount of time conferring with Susan regarding causes to her illnesses and resulting time off due to illness. Officer Von Halla does have problems with migraine's and when she experiences one, she is [less than] an effective part of the shift in fulfilling her normal duties. I have tried to understand why she experiences so many migraines and have suggested different activities (i.e. physical exercise, stress reduction). I am confident that despite the significant amount of time taken due to illness, when this officer calls in sick, she is sick and does not use this time for other unknown reasons. I feel, currently, Officer Von Halla is attempting to minimize the amount of times she calls in sick. Despite some improvement recently, Officer Von Halla still is in need of progress in this area so her time reserved starts reflecting this. The narrative concludes that Respondent can improve her weak point, which is attendance, by "finding new ways to minimize the migraine potential and making a genuine effort towards this." Another evaluative document speaks in a very different tone from the annual performance evaluation, which is signed by a sergeant who was Respondent's immediate supervisor. On October 2, 1990--only 10 days before the 1990 annual evaluation-- a captain reviewed Respondent's use of unscheduled leave and warned: you are hereby notified that this level of unscheduled leave time usage will no longer be tolerated. You will be required to achieve a level of usage that is consistent with the national and department average which equates to approximately sixty hours per year, or five hours per month. If you fail to maintain this rate between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1990 I will request that the Chief of Police consider terminating your employment effective January 1, 1991. If you are successful, you will be expected to maintain this average with the exception of documented major medical complications that require the use of extended leave. By memorandum dated December 14, 1990, from the captain to the police chief, the captain stated: On October 2, 1990, I advised Officer Von Halla that she would be required to maintain an acceptable level of unscheduled leave usage through December 31, 1990. The level of usage was established at five (5) hours per month, or a total of 15 hours for the period of October 2, 1990, through December 31, 1990. . . . Since October 2, 1990, Officer Von Halla has chosen to utilize forty (40) hours of leave. Thirty-two (32) hours were for illness as noted by her chiropractor and eight (8) for unexpected visitors. The captain's memorandum reasons: "In analyzing Officer Von Halla's unscheduled leave, it is clear that her utilization of unscheduled leave far exceeds any norms and Officer Von Halla is clearly abusing this city benefit." The memorandum states that, after consulting with the city attorney and city manager, the captain was recommending that Petitioner initiate termination proceedings against Respondent. By memorandum dated January 17, 1991, the captain asked a lieutenant to convene a Command Review Board to evaluate Respondent's excessive absenteeism and her violation of three groups of general orders prohibiting feigning of illness and failing to perform duties, abusing sick leave, and engaging in any conduct adversely affecting the morale and efficiency of the Department. The memorandum explains the last alleged violation as noting that the department had had to use 66 hours of overtime, at a cost of $1125, to cover shift shortages caused by Respondent's unscheduled absences. The Command Review Board sustained the allegation that Respondent had abused her unscheduled leave, but rejected the allegations of feigning illness and failing to perform duties and engaging in any conduct adversely affecting the morale and efficiency of the department. Accordingly, the Command Review Board recommended that the police chief suspend Respondent without pay for one day. By memorandum dated February 2, 1991, the police chief adopted the findings and determinations of the Command Review Board and suspended Respondent for one day. By memorandum dated February 14, 1991, Respondent protested the proposed discipline and demanded a hearing. The arbitrator entered a decision on June 24, 1991, that the police chief had just cause for suspending Respondent for one day without pay. Respondent served this suspension. The next annual performance evaluation is dated January 25, 1992. Respondent earned marks of above operational standard in job knowledge, quality of work, initiative, work habits, and appearance. Her only mark of below operational standard was in attendance. In the preceding 15.5 months, Respondent had used 18 days of "sick leave" and had one day without pay, due to her exhaustion of leave. From May 1990 through April 1991, Respondent used 148 hours of unscheduled leave. The evaluations and memoranda from 1992 through 1994 are largely the same: average or above-average performance in all areas but attendance. The records note only the excessive use of unscheduled leave, but do not attribute the use to fraud. From January 13, 1994 through December 26, 1997, Respondent used 691.72 hours of unscheduled leave. On February 12, 1995, the former captain, now a major, recommended that the Department suspend Respondent without pay for three days due to excessive use of unscheduled leave. By memorandum dated February 27, 1995, the police chief, "with some reluctance," concurred with the recommendation of three days' suspension. On April 18, 1995, a Departmental disciplinary review board met and failed to agree on corrective action. The board recommended only that the Department remove Respondent from field duty and place her in a noncritical position. Upon further deliberations, the board agreed upon a two-day suspension. Respondent served this suspension in June 1995, and the following month a quarterly evaluation dated July 1, 1995, notes that she was still using unscheduled leave. A memorandum dated September 10, 1995, notes that Respondent used 213 hours of unscheduled leave in the first eight months of 1995. By memorandum dated September 20, 1995, the major and three of his subordinates, including the person with immediate supervisory authority over Respondent, recommended to the police chief that the Department terminate Respondent due to excessive use of unscheduled leave. Rejecting the recommendation for termination, the police chief imposed a 30-day suspension without pay, based partly on the assurance of Respondent's physician that the cause of her constant illness had been corrected. Respondent served her suspension from November 22- December 21, 1995. Quarterly evaluations in June 1996 and March 1997 note some improvement in the use of unscheduled leave. From October 1996 through September 17, 1997, Respondent used 180 hours of unscheduled sick leave. From October 1, 1997, through January 26, 1998, Respondent used 82 hours of unscheduled leave. By memorandum dated January 26, 1998, the major advised the police chief of Respondent's continued use of unscheduled leave and recommended termination. By notice to Respondent from the police chief dated February 13, 1998, the chief advised Respondent that he was considering disciplinary action, including termination. The notice cites the following grounds from Article Seven, Section C, Ordinance 50-94: excessive unauthorized tardiness or absence from work, violation of Department work rules or operating procedures, actions or conduct detrimental to Petitioner's interests, or any other properly substantiated cause that adversely affects Petitioner. The notice alleges that Respondent's conduct also violates department General Order D-1.IV.36, which prohibits excessive use of unscheduled leave. The notice summarizes Respondent's past use of unscheduled leave and the discipline that she had received. The notice asserts that she had used 96 hours of unscheduled leave in the past four months. By letter dated March 12, 1998, Respondent advised the police chief that her ear, nose, and throat physician had placed her on Predisone, which had eliminated her debilitating headaches. By letter dated March 16, 1998, the police chief provided Respondent final notice of proposed disciplinary action for the four grounds mentioned in the prior notice. Respondent has raised an issue of disparate treatment. However, the record fails to reveal other, similarly situated employees with comparable patterns of usage of unscheduled leave. The record contains a detailed record of Respondent's relevant payroll history from January 1, 1994, through May 1, 1998, on which date Petitioner terminated her. By year, these records disclose the following totals of hours for unscheduled leave and leave without pay, the latter of which is due to Respondent's exhaustion of her granted leave: 1994--190 and 48.22; 1995--201 and 148; 1996--94 and 42; 1997--174 and 58; and 1998 (four months)--32.72 and 0. The respective totals are 691.72 and 296.22 hours. Respondent's use of unscheduled leave and leave without pay far exceed the averages for the Department. Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit, which is represented by the Florida State Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). Petitioner and FOP negotiated a collective bargaining agreement in effect from October 1, 1997, through September 30, 2000 (Agreement). Article 3, Section 1, of the Agreement provides: Except as specifically abridged or modified by a provision of this Agreement, City will continue to have, whether exercised or not, all of the rights, powers and authority heretofore existing, including, but not limited to, the following: . . . to hire, transfer, promote and demote employees; to direct employees, to take disciplinary action up to, and including, termination; to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; [and] to issue rules and regulations . . .. Article 10, Section 2, of the Agreement describes the forms of discipline as follows: In accordance with Police Department General Order D-1 (as dated April 1, 1993), forms of corrective action will be utilized by City with the approval of the Police Chief shall include: Counseling or Re-Training--to correct and improve employee performance; Reprimand--a written statement warning the employee of the consequence of future misconduct of a similar nature; Suspension-- suspension from duty without pay; Demotion--a change to a position of lesser responsibility and salary; and Termination--dismissal from the Police Department. Article 10, Section 3, of the Agreement provides that Petitioner shall use "[p]rogressive corrective action," unless the severity of the offense dictates a more severe action. Article 11 of the Agreement provides that Petitioner may take disciplinary action against an employee for "just cause." Article 15, Section 1(a), of the Agreement grants employees with five or less years of continuous service 25 days of annual leave per year. Article 15, Section 1(b), grants employees with 6-10 years of continuous service 30 days of annual leave per year. The remaining subsections grant more leave based on years of service. Article 15, Section 1(g), of the Agreement provides: The use of annual leave for other than illness must be scheduled with the employee's supervisor. In case of illness, an employee must notify his/her supervisor not later than two (2) hours before the beginning of the scheduled work day or in accordance with Police Department Rules and Regulations. The Agreement provides that Petitioner may discipline covered employees for "just cause," but does not identify what constitutes "just cause." Ordinance 50-94 (Ordinance) sets forth the rules and regulations governing all of Petitioner's employees. Article One, Section B.2, states that the Ordinance covers employees who are parties to a collective bargaining agreement, "except that in the event of a conflict between the terms of this Ordinance and the collective bargaining agreement, the collective bargaining agreement shall govern." Article Six, Section E, provides that an employee may be dismissed for "just cause," but that the department head must comply with the procedures in Article Seven prior to termination. Article Seven, Section B, requires progressive discipline for "the same or similar conduct by the employee," although Petitioner reserves the right to impose the most severe discipline as an initial measure "when circumstances warrant." Article Seven, Section C, cites several grounds for discipline, including "[g]ross neglect of duty or specific serious failure to perform assigned duties"; "[m]ental or physical impairment, normally as supported by written documentation from not less than two licensed physicians, that prevents the employee, even with reasonable accommodation, from performing the essential functions of his or her position"; "[a]bsence without leave, or failure to give proper notice of absence"; "[e]xcessive unauthorized tardiness or absence from work"; "[v]iolation of Department work rules or operating procedures"; "[a]ctions or conduct detrimental to the interests of the City"; or "[a]ny other properly substantiated cause which adversely affects the City." Article Seven, Section D, requires that the employee proceed with a grievance for proposed discipline under the ordinance or collective bargaining agreement. Section E.5 describes the hearing conducted under the ordinance, which is the procedure that Respondent elected, and states, at Subsubsection 7, that the Administrative Law Judge is to determine if Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence "just cause" for the discipline. Subsubsection 8 provides that the order is a final order. Subsubsection 9 provides for judicial review. Article Eleven describes attendance and leave. Section A.6.a provides that fulltime employees shall be present at their assigned jobs, "unless absence from duty is authorized by the Department Head as provided herein." Section A.6.c states in part: Excessive unscheduled absences or tardiness shall be grounds for disciplinary action. For purposes of this paragraph, "excessive unscheduled absences or tardiness" shall mean use which is in excess of the average number of hours and/or occurrences of unscheduled leave taken by other City employees in the same or similar positions . . .. Article Seven, Section E.3, defines unscheduled leave as that which the employee requests and the supervisor approves on the day that it is taken. This section states: "An employee's excessive use of unscheduled leave may be grounds for disciplinary action." Section E.1 contains a schedule for the accrual of leave, and the applicable monthly accrual rate, which increases with seniority, applies to the total of each employee's scheduled and unscheduled leave. Department General Order D-1 (General Order), as last revised on December 11, 1995, provides, at Section II, that it applies to [ALL] members of the Department. This section states that the police chief will use progressive discipline, "unless the severity of the offense dictates a more severe action." Section IV prohibits various acts, including feigning illness, avoiding responsibility, or failing to perform one's duties; "excessive use of unscheduled leave"; or engaging in conduct that adversely affects the morale and efficiency of the department. By memorandum dated July 20, 1987, a major in the Department advised all operations division personnel that absences, "regardless of cause," weaken the Department's ability to serve the public though personnel shortages, increase personnel costs due to overtime to cover absences, and increase burdens on other employees. The safety of the public and law enforcement officers requires a minimum staffing of law enforcement officers on each shift. The absence of a scheduled officer requires that the Department pay overtime for an unscheduled officer to report for duty. The record does not demonstrate that unscheduled absences of an officer, up to the total amount of granted leave, compromise the safety of the public or other officers. The contrary inference is precluded in part by the fact that, in the Agreement, Petitioner grants each officer a certain amount of leave and does not further restrict the officer's choice to use his or her granted leave as unscheduled leave. However, the use of unscheduled leave in excess of the granted leave is not anticipated by the Agreement and may compromise the safety of the public and other officers.
The Issue The issue in this case involves a consideration of whether the Petitioner has abandoned his job position with the Respondent as described in Rule 22A- 7.010, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact In the relevant time period which is associated with this case, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Revenue as an Appraiser II in the Jacksonville, Florida, office of the Northeast Region, Bureau of Field Appraisals, Division of Ad Valorem Tax. He worked with the Respondent agency beginning April 1980 until his dismissal from the agency on December 17, 1986, based upon the theory that he had allegedly abandoned his job within the meaning of Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. During his employment Petitioner operated out of his home, which was in Palm Coast, Florida. Douglas Drozd, an employee of the Respondent agency, was sent to the Jacksonville office of the Bureau of Field Appraisals, Division of Ad Valorem Tax to serve as a temporary Appraiser Supervisor for that office. This assignment occurred on October 6, 1986. On October 21, 1986, Albert Johnson, the former Appraiser Supervisor with the Jacksonville office, left that position. Following the departure of Johnson, Drozd became the permanent Appraiser Supervisor for the Jacksonville office. From October 6, 1986, through November 18, 1986, Drozd acted in the capacity as the immediate supervisor of the Petitioner. Beyond that date, Robert Worley, an Appraiser II in the Jacksonville office, took over the position of Appraiser Supervisor in the subject regional office. Worley served in the capacity of supervisor from November 19, 1986, until December 22, 1986, when he returned to his duties as Appraiser II. While Worley was serving as Appraiser Supervisor, Drozd took over the function of Property Appraiser, Duval County, Florida. On December 22, 1986, Drozd returned to his duties as Appraiser Supervisor for Respondent's Jacksonville office. On November 17, 1986, Petitioner asked the permission of his supervisor, Drozd, to take annual leave for days in December 1986. This request was not made in writing and was not responded to in writing. Although Rule 22A- 8.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, contemplates that leave shall be requested in writing, it gas the custom and practice of the Respondent agency for oral requests for annual leave to be made and approved orally. At the time of the conversation on November 17, 1986, between the Petitioner and Drozd concerning the request for annual leave, Drozd initially granted that request without any reservations or contingencies being applied to the permission given. Subsequently, on that same day, Drozd told Richards that he expected that all "field work" assigned to the Petitioner should be completed before leave was taken. This arrangement included work being done on vacant parcels of property as well as improved parcels. More particularly, "field work" includes: Completion of neighborhood analysis form Dr-549 Completion of structural elements form Dr-551 Measurements of all improvements Notes pertaining to subject property (condition of property, any unusual circumstances) Sketching and traversing (perimeter measurements for calculating square footage) Pictures Completion of factual change of physical characteristics forms. Worley was unaware on November 17, 1986, of the arrangement between Drozd and the Petitioner concerning conditions placed upon the permission for the Petitioner to take leave as set forth by Drozd. Petitioner's work assignment involved 180 parcels. Effective December 12, 1986, 27 parcels had "field work" which was incomplete, according to his flow chart of that date. Effective that date, Petitioner had turned in field folders for 88 of the 180 parcels. He kept 92 field folders for the remaining parcels. Thus, his supervisor was unable to verify whether Petitioner had completed his "field work" as summarized in his flow chart submitted on December 12, 1986. According to Petitioner's account set forth in his flow chart of December 12, 1986, which is part of Petitioner's Exhibit R submitted by the Respondent and admitted into evidence, the 27 parcels pertained to vacant land. Petitioner further conceded that other minor problems existed concerning the completeness of the "field work" pertaining to the improved parcels reported in his flow chart. Prior to Petitioner's departure from the Jacksonville office on December 12, 1986, Worley, who was then serving as the Appraiser Supervisor, did not have a detailed knowledge of the flow chart submitted by the Petitioner on that date. Worley had reviewed some of the Petitioner's files and noted shortcomings in the work; however, on balance, Worley took no issue with Petitioner's work progress. Worley acquiesced in the Petitioner's departure on the afternoon of December 12, 1986, as a prelude to the commencement of Petitioner's annual leave on December 15, 1986 This acquiescence was by a verbal expression to the effect that the Petitioner should have a nice holiday. By contrast, on December 12, 1986, Drozd became aware, upon examination of Petitioner's flow chart, that certain parcels had not been completed in terms of "field work." Drozd's observations about Petitioner's flow chart became significant when Worley and Drozd spoke to supervisors in Tallahassee, Florida, on the afternoon of December 12, 1986, in the person of Ben Faulk, Chief of the Bureau of Field Operations in the Respondent agency, and Eugene White, who was the Deputy Director of the Division of Ad Valorem Tax for that organization. In actuality, there were two conversations, and in the latter conversation Drozd participated in a discussion in which Faulk, White and Drozd determined that Petitioner should not be allowed to proceed with annual leave based upon his failure to comply with the contingency which Drozd had established on November 17, 1986, pertaining to Petitioner's wish to take annual leave, the contingency being completion of "field work." The latter conversation between Worley, Drozd, White and Faulk took place following Petitioner's departure from the Jacksonville office. At the time this conversation was held, Drozd was not a member of the Respondent agency. On the other hand, Faulk and White were appropriate officials within the Respondent agency with power to make determinations concerning the annual leave of a subordinate employee, in this instance, the Petitioner. Worley was also a proper source of policy in she management chain. It was decided that Worley should try to telephone the Petitioner and forestall the use of the annual leave by Petitioner. Emphasis is placed upon the fact that Faulk and White felt that this denial of Petitioner's annual leave based upon Petitioner's failure to meet a contingency concerning his "field work" was an appropriate disposition of the case. Around 6:00 p.m., Worley was able to reach Petitioner by telephone while Petitioner was at his daughter's home, preparing to leave for a trip to Washington, D.C. In placing the telephone call to Petitioner, Worley did not favor the revocation of leave opportunity. Nonetheless, he did revoke the leave while acting as supervisor for the Northeast Region, at the behest of Drozd and upon authority of Faulk and White. In the conversation with Petitioner on December 12, 1986, by telephone, Worley told Petitioner that his leave had been revoked and that Petitioner should report to his job assignment at 8:00 a.m. on Monday, December 15, 1986, or be considered on unauthorized leave. Further, it was explained to Petitioner that he would be considered to have abandoned his job position if he had not returned to work by 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, December 17, 1986. These remarks by Worley were not equivocal, and Petitioner understood the significance of those instructions and the implications of his failure to attend his duties on the dates described. This understanding of the explanation of unauthorized leave and potential abandonment of his job position was held by the Petitioner at the point of the conversation at approximately 6:00 p.m. on December 12, 1986. Instead of reporting to work on December 15, 1986, at 8:00 a.m., Respondent absented himself from his job assignment on that date and on December 16 and 17, 1986. For those three consecutive days in which Respondent did not attend his job, his nonattendance was without authorization to take any form of leave and in the face of having been advised that he was in the posture of unauthorized leave. The days that Petitioner was missing from his job were work days. Petitioner's choice to go forward with his vacation plans and ignore the instruction of his supervisor concerning returning to his job position was made knowingly, with volition, with intent and showed willful disregard of a legitimate order of a superior. Petitioner had decided that since he had longstanding plans for taking annual leave in Washington, D.C., and given the fact that his wife was already there awaiting the arrival of the Petitioner and his daughter, he would go forward with his plan on the expectation that someone in his employment system would not allow a conclusion to be drawn that he had abandoned his job position. In furtherance of the assertion that the Petitioner would be considered to have abandoned his job position if he didn't return before the conclusion of the work day on December 17, 1986, a memorandum was sent to the Petitioner at his residence on December 15, 1986. A copy of that memorandum may be found as Respondent's Exhibit Q admitted into evidence. Petitioner did not become aware of this memorandum until returning from his vacation. When he returned, he signed for service of correspondence of December 18, 1986, which constituted the Respondent agency's notice of claimed abandonment and notice of rights to administrative hearing to contest that claim. A copy of that notification may be found as part of the Respondent's Exhibit M admitted into evidence, together with the return receipt signed by the Petitioner on December 29, 1986. A timely petition requesting consideration of the agency's claims of abandonment was filed by the Petitioner on January 5, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Barbara Calhoun, Respondent, is a Career Service employee with permanent status. She has been employed by the Petitioner since approximately 1969 and is presently employed in the capacity of a Resident Lab Assistant (RLA). Mary Ellen Weaver, Nursing Director at Sunland Center at District VII, is in charge of the nurses and other staff personnel at the Sunland Center in Orlando. Mrs. Weaver testified that she approved initially the recommendation by Mrs. Calhoun's supervisor that she be suspended for a continued pattern of absenteeism which had been documented by three previous reprimands, the first of which occurred approximately September 16, 1976. The first reprimand was an oral reprimand of September 16, 1976, and was based on an excessive pattern of sick leave in conjunction with days off. The second one occurred on November 29, 1976, and was submitted by a Mrs. Renner, R.N. and the reviewing officer on that reprimand was Mrs. Graham, R.N. III. The third reprimand occurred on February 5, 1977, a written reprimand the basis therein was excessive absenteeism, with the reviewing officers being Mrs. Renner and Mrs. Graham. (See Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1, 2 and 3.) Documentary evidence introduced reveals that from February 11, 1976, to June 23, 1977, the Petitioner accumulated approximately 19 days of unscheduled absences with the majority of such absences occurring in conjunction with days off and most of which were leave without pay (LWOP) because during the Respondent's approximately eight year employment tenure, she had accumulated no annual or sick leave. (See Joint Exhibit 1.) Without going into a recitation of all of the numerous days in which the Respondent was absent, the following is illustrative. On February 11, 1977, Respondent called in sick which was also without pay because she had accrued no leave. The following day the Respondent called in sick and again this absence was without pay and unscheduled. On March 6, 1977, Respondent had a friend call to advise that she was sick with the flu and again a message was sent the following day, on March 7, 1977. On March 26 the Respondent called in sick which was before she was off for two days. On April 18 the Respondent again called in ill. On May 2 Respondent requested annual leave, which was granted. On May 3 the Respondent called in sick and obtained permission to use annual leave since there was no more sick leave accrued. On May 12 Respondent called in sick and again there was no annual leave accrued to cover the absence. The following day the Respondent called in sick, which was prior to her weekend off. On June 1, 1977, Respondent called in sick after being off on May 30 and May 31. On June 16, 1977, Respondent was off and used an annual leave day, which was unscheduled and without prior approval. On June 23 Respondent called in sick, which was unscheduled. It was at this juncture that Respondent's supervisor recommended a suspension, which was approved by Mrs. Weaver and ultimately sent to a Mr. Windsor for final approval. The Respondent offered no explanation to explain, refute or otherwise contradict the numerous absences nor did she offer any proof of any kind to establish that she was in fact sick in such a sporadic form which occurred in conjunction with her days off. 1/ In view of the above, the undersigned concludes that there is competent and substantial evidence to support the Petitioner's disciplinary action directed toward the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended the personnel action of the Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, be sustained. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of July, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 1978.
Findings Of Fact From July 1946 until his retirement from the state career service system on June 30, 1983, Petitioner was an employee of the Department of Labor and Employment Security or its predecessor agencies (the Florida Industrial Commission, the Department of Commerce, and the War Manpower Commission), hereinafter collectively referred to as the Department. The Department, at the time of Petitioner's initial employment, established and administered its own leave policies. Subsequently, the Florida Merit System was expanded to cover all state agencies, including the Department, and uniform personnel policies and practices, including the accumulation of annual leave, were established. Effective July 1, 1957 the accumulation of annual leave for employees of the Department, as with employees of all state agencies, was limited to 240 hours. Initially, Merit System leave regulations provided that leave accumulated by employees of agencies with existing leave regulations, such as the Department, would be credited to their accounts as of July 1, 1957, but any accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours would become void after December 31, 1959. At the behest of the Department, the deadline within which excess accumulated leave had to be utilized was extended to December 31, 1961. Essentially employees were afforded four and one-half years within which to utilize their excess accumulated annual leave or forfeit it. Upon his retirement June 30, 1983, Petitioner was paid for, and had computed as part of his Average Final compensation; the annual leave he had accumulated up to a maximum of 240 hours in accordance with Rule 22A-8.10, F.A.C. That rule, or its predecessor, has contained the same 240-hour limitation since December 31, 1961. Petitioner asserts that he had accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours on December 31, 1961. While the evidence does establish Petitioner had excess leave on that date, there was no competent evidence presented from which his actual leave balance could be established. The actual amount of Petitioner's excess leave is not, however, significant since any annual leave he had in excess of 240 hours was void after December 31, 1961. Notwithstanding the voiding of his excess annual leave, Petitioner asserts that his entitlement to such leave still exists because of certain assurances he received from his supervisors. According to Petitioner, he was unable to utilize his excess leave between July 1, 1957 and December 31, 1961, because he was on "special assignments" for the Department which precluded his absence from work. Consequently, Petitioner says, `his supervisors "assured" him that they would see to it that he "got his excess leave." It is worthy of note that the supervisors who purportedly gave such assurances have been dead for over a decade, that there exists no corroborating evidence of Petitioner's assertions, and that at no time during the ensuing 23 years did Petitioner raise any issue concerning, or attempt to use, the leave which had been forfeited. It is further worthy of note that while purportedly assured he would "get his excess leave," Petitioner received no assurance he would be paid for it upon retirement. It is unnecessary to decide whether such assurances were in fact given. The evidence is clear that the supervisors in question had no authority, real or apparent, to bind the State by such assurances. Further, any reliance Petitioner may have placed on such assurances would not have been reasonable, since such assurances were contrary to existing regulations.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment on the basis of a perceived disability, in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2004),2 the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Seiden's Relevant Employment. Petitioner Jane Seiden is an individual who was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections at Broward Correctional Institute (hereinafter referred to as "BCI") from December 1988 until the end of March 1999 as a licensed practical nurse. From April 1, 1999, until October 7, 2001, Ms. Seiden continued to work at BCI, but was employed by a private business, Prison Health Services. On October 8, 2001, Respondent Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Wexford") took over responsibility for providing medical services at BCI. Ms. Seiden became an employee of Wexford as of that date, after having received a letter dated June 20, 2001, signed by Wendy Mildner, as Wexford's Director of Human Resources/Risk Management, offering her employment with Wexford effective October 8th. Ms. Seiden accepted the offer of employment on June 25, 2001. Wexford is a provider of health care services to correctional facilities, including BCI. Throughout Ms. Seiden's employment at BCI, she received excellent work performance reviews. Wexford's Leave Policies. Wexford's policies concerning employee "Family and Medical Leave" at the time of Ms. Seiden's initial employment with Wexford were contained in the Wexford Health Sources, Inc. Employee Handbook (Respondent's Exhibit 9) (hereinafter referred to as the "Employee Handbook"). The Family and Medical Leave policy was, in relevant part, as follows: Employees who are eligible for Family and Medical Leave may take up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job protected leave. Employees are eligible if they have worked for at least one year, and for 1,256 hours over the previous 12 months. Reasons for taking unpaid leave are: . . . . ? for a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the employee's job. . . . . The Wexford Employee Handbook, Revised 09/01/04 (Petitioner's Exhibit 9) (hereinafter referred to as the "Revised Employee Handbook"), established policies governing "Time Off" in Section 5. Pursuant to Policy 5.3, all employees are allowed to apply for a leave of absence for medical reasons. The period of the absence is limited, however, to 12 weeks, consistent with the Family and Medical Leave Act (hereinafter referred to as the "FMLA"), unless the employee is eligible for "income replacement benefits," for example for a short-term disability pursuant to Section 4.5, which provides the following: Wexford provides some income protection for employees who are unable to work for an extended period of time due to illness or injury through its Short-Term Disability Leave (STD) insurance program. You are eligible for STD benefits if: You Have completed one year of continuous service You work a minimum of 30 hours per week and are covered by health insurance. Eligible employees are entitled to short- term leave for up to 26 weeks in a rolling 12-month period. The rolling 12-month period is calculated by counting backwards from the date of the leave request. For example, if you request a leave in November, the rolling 12-month period is from November of the previous year to November of the current year. You will be required to provide a medical doctor's certificate to qualify for short- term disability leave. STD runs concurrent with the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Your weekly benefit is 50% of your weekly salary to a maximum of $300, whichever is less. . . . . Thus, Wexford policies, at the times relevant, allowed eligible employees to take up to 12 weeks of leave pursuant to the FMLA and 26 weeks of what Wexford termed "short-term disability" leave, the latter to run concurrently with the 12 weeks of family medical leave. Policy 5.3 describes Wexford's policy concerning "When Return to Work is Not Possible": If following 26 weeks of medical leave you remain unable to return to work your employment will be terminated. If you are able to work at a later point in time, you are welcome to reapply for employment. Your past history and work background will be taken into consideration for reemployment purposes. Consistent with this policy, Wexford does not grant extensions of the 26 week, short-term disability maximum absence. Also consistent with the policy, Wexford treats an employee as terminated at the end of the 26 week short-term disability absence if the employee does not return to work. Policies 5.3 and 5.4 provide the procedural requirements for applying for a medical leave of absence (forms to file, providing health care professional certifications of illness, etc.) and other procedures and the conditions for which FMLA leave will be granted. Of relevance to this matter, one of the conditions for which FMLA leave will be granted is: "a serious health condition that makes you unable to perform the essential functions of your job." Policy 5.4. Policy 5.7 of the Revised Employee Handbook is the established procedure for "Personal Leave of Absence - Unpaid." That Policy provides, in pertinent part" With the approval of management and the Vice President of Human Resources, you may be granted an unpaid personal leave for unusual, unavoidable situations requiring an absence from work. The unpaid personal leave is for a pre-determined period of time. Unpaid personal leaves of absence are awarded at the discretion of management and cannot be presumed or guaranteed. You must use all available PTO [personal time off] before requesting personal leave. . . . As reasonably interpreted by Wexford, the Unpaid Personal Leave of Absence policy is not used or intended for use as a method of taking off time in addition to the time off allowed by Wexford's policies governing FMLA leave and short- term disability leave. Ms. Seiden's Absence from Wexford. Ms. Seiden, who acknowledged receipt of, and responsibility for reading, the Employee Handbook at the time she was employed by Wexford, was diagnosed with kidney carcinoma in 2004. As a result of her illness she did not rest comfortably and, therefore, woke up during the night, she could not sit for long periods of time, and, although not fully developed in the record, she required hospitalization. As a result of her illness, Ms. Seiden was, due to a "serious health condition," "unable to perform the essential functions of [her] job." As a consequence, the last day that Ms. Seiden worked at BCI was April 26, 2004. Ms. Seiden was provided a Memorandum dated May 6, 2004, from Tara M. DeVenzio, Risk Management/Leave Compliance Assistant (hereinafter referred to as the "May 6th Memorandum"). The May 6th Memorandum, which Ms. Seiden read, states that Wexford had been notified that she was requesting a leave of absence and is "in need of Family Medical Leave (FML) and Short Term Disability (STD) forms." Those forms were included with the May 6th Memorandum. The May 6th Memorandum goes on to explain the procedures Ms. Seiden was required to follow in making her request for leave and the extent of leave available to her. The May 6th Memorandum also informed Ms. Seiden that, consistent with Wexford's written leave policies, the "[m]aximum amount of time allotted for Short Term Disability is 26-weeks on a rolling twelve (12) month period . . ." and that "[i]f you do not return when your leave has ended, you will be considered to have voluntarily terminated employment." Consistent with the May 6th Memorandum and the policies of the Employee Handbook, Ms. Seiden completed the forms required by Wexford to apply for FMLA and short-term disability leave to begin in April 2004, and end in October 2004. Ms. Seiden executed a Wexford Family / Medical Leave of Absence Request (hereinafter referred to as the "Initial Leave Request") on May 10, 2004. (Petitioner's Exhibit 14). On the Initial Leave Request Ms. Seiden checked a box which indicated her reason for requesting leave was "Serious health condition that makes me, the employee, unable to perform the functions of my position." A space on the Initial Leave Request for "Date Leave of Absence to End" was left blank. Also provided to Wexford with the Initial Leave Request, was a Certification of Health Care Provider (hereinafter referred to as the "Certification"), as required by Wexford's leave policies. The Certification was from Nine J. Pearlmutter, M.D. Dr. Pearlmutter reported on the Certification that Ms. Seiden's "serious health condition" was a "renal mass" and that hospitalization was necessary. Dr. Pearlmutter also stated "yes at this time" in response to the following question on the Certification: If medical leave is required for the employee's absence from work because of the employee's own condition (including absences due to pregnancy or a chronic condition), is the employee unable to perform work of any kind? Ms. Seiden's Initial Leave Request was approved and she was provided a Memorandum dated May 25, 2004, from Ms. DeVenzio, memoralizing the approval. Ms. DeVenzio informed Ms. Seiden that her leave was approved "to commence on April 26, 2004." Ms. Seiden's 26-week period of leave began on April 26, 2004, ended October 25, 2004. Throughout this period, Ms. Seiden remained absent from BCI. On October 22, 2004, a Friday, Ms. Seiden telephoned Ellie Zeigler a Human Resources Generalist for Wexford, and spoke to her about the pending end of her approved leave. Ms. Seiden informed Ms. Zeigler that she wanted to request an extension of her leave, which Ms. Zeigler had not authority to grant or deny. Ms. Zeigler, who had not authority to approve or disapprove the request for an extension, told Ms. Seiden that she would send her forms, which she would have to file in order to request additional leave. Ms. Zeigler also explained to Ms. Seiden that the maximum leave available to her had been exhausted, and that, because her physician had not released her for return to work, her employment with Wexford would be considered terminated if she did not return to work the following Monday. Ms. Zeigler also told Ms. Seiden that a letter to that effect would be sent to her. Ms. Zeigler, as promised, sent Ms. Seiden a Wexford Family / Medical Leave of Absence Request. On Wednesday, October 27, 2004, two days after Ms. Zeigler's approved absence ended, Ms. Seiden executed the Wexford Family / Medical Leave of Absence Request (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Leave Request") which Ms. Zeigler provided to her. Again, she checked as the "Reason for Leave" the box indicating "Serious health condition that makes me, the employee, unable to perform the functions of my position" and the "Date Leave of Absence to End" space was left blank. A second Certification of Health Care Provider form (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Certification"), executed by Dr. Pearlmutter was provided with the Second Leave Request. Dr. Pearlmutter listed, among other things, carcinoma of the kidney as Ms. Seiden's illness. While Dr. Pearlmutter indicates a "2 month" duration for one of the listed conditions, she did not indicate when Ms. Seiden would be able to return to work at the end of two months. Again, Dr. Pearlmutter answered "yes" to the question quoted in Finding of fact 18. The Second Leave Request, which was sent by certified mail on Thursday, October 28, 2004, three days after the end of Ms. Seiden's approved leave, was received by Wexford on Monday, November 1, 2004, seven days after the end of her approved leave. The Termination of Ms. Seiden's Employment. On October 25, 2004, the last day of Ms. Seiden's approved absence, Arthur Victor, Wexford's Human Resources Manager, and Ms. Zeigler exchanged e-mails concerning Ms. Seiden. In response to an inquiry from Mr. Victor, Ms. Zeigler informed Mr. Victor that October 25, 2004, was the last day of Ms. Seiden's approved leave. In response to Ms. Zeigler's information, Mr. Victor wrote "[t]hen there is no extension. Six months is up 10/30/04. You need to talk to Ron Miller re. termination." This decision was consistent with Wexford’s written policies and was based upon Ms. Seiden's failure to return to work on October 25, 2004. Given Mr. Victor's statement that "there is no extension," it is found that Mr. Victor had been informed that Ms. Seiden intended to request an extension of her approved absence. It is also found that Wexford was aware of the reason for Ms. Seiden's absence: kidney cancer. Finally, it is found that, by terminating Ms. Seiden's employment, Wexford denied the requested extension. After receiving Mr. Victor's e-mail indicating that Ms. Seiden would be terminated, Ms. Zeigler wrote to Ron Miler and Judy Choate, Ms. Seiden's supervisor, and informed them of the following: I received a call from Jane last friday [sic] requesting an extension for her fmla. Jane's 26 weeks for her std/fmla has expired as of today (10/25/04). I just spoke with Jane and inform [sic] her that her Dr. has not released her for full duty and that she was exhausted all of her authorized fmla/std leave and that Wexford considers her to have resigned from her position. I told Jane that Judy will be sending her a letter confirming her of the above. To Ms. Choate, Ms. Zeigler continued: The letter should be sent from you. Attached you will find a copy of the letter that Art has drafted for your [sic] to send to Jane regarding her std/fmla. . . . . Also, please complete the "Termination Processing From" and forward it to the Pittsburgh office so I can term her out of the system. The draft termination letter provided to Ms. Choate and dated October 26, 2004, was signed by Ms. Choate and sent to Ms. Seiden. The letter (hereinafter referred to as the "Termination Letter") states, in part: As you are aware, you have exhausted all authorized Family and Medical/Short Term Disability leave. You were to return to work on October 25, 2004. Since you have not returned, Wexford Health Sources, Inc. considers you to have resigned your position as a Licensed practical [sic] Nurse, effective October 25, 2004. If you are in disagreement with this letter, please contact me immediately but no later than 4:00pm, on 10/28/02004 at If it is determined that there were extenuating circumstances for the absence and failure to notify, you may be considered for reinstatement. . . . . Ms. Seiden received the Termination Letter on November 3, 2004. She did not contact Ms. Choate about the matter. Although she had been informed on October 22, 2004, that she would be terminated by Wexford during her telephone conversation with Ms. Zeigler, November 3, 2004, constitutes the first official notice of Wexford's adverse action which Ms. Seiden received. The effective date of Ms. Seiden's termination was October 25, 2004. The Reason for Ms. Seiden's Termination. Ms. Seiden was terminated because, consistent with written Wexford policies which Ms. Seiden had been informed of on more than one occasion, Ms. Seiden had exhausted the maximum family medical leave and short-term disability leave she was authorized to take. Having used the maximum authorized medical leave, Ms. Seiden was still unable to perform any of the functions and duties required of her position. Due to her illness, she was simply unable to perform any work at all during the period relevant to this case, a fact Wexford was aware of. While she testified at hearing that she had been told by her physician that she would be able to return to work in January 2005, that testimony constitutes hearsay upon which a finding of fact will not be made. More significantly, Wexford was never informed by Ms. Seiden or her physician that she would be able to work. Wexford's policies gave Ms. Seiden leave in excess of the 12 weeks required by the FMLA. Wexford was not required to do more. Ms. Seiden's Claim of Discrimination. Ms. Seiden filed her Employment Complaint of Discrimination with the FCHR on November 30, 2005, or 392 days after being informed that she had been terminated and 401 days after her actual October 25, 2004, termination date. After a Determination: No Cause was issued by the FCHR, Ms. Seiden filed a Petition for Relief in which she alleged that Wexford had "violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 by terminating [her] based upon a perceived disability." No allegation of failure to provide an accommodation for her disability was alleged in the Petition. Summary. The evidence proved that Ms. Seiden failed to file her complaint of discrimination with the FCHR within 365 days of the discriminatory act. She offered no explanation as to why she did not do so. Ms. Seiden failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination. While she did prove that she suffered from kidney cancer and that, as a result of her illness she was unable to perform the duties of her position, which may constitute a disability, she ultimately failed to prove that she was a "qualified individual" with or without an accommodation. From April 2004 through October 22, 2004, when she orally informed Wexford that she desired an extension of leave, her termination from employment on October 25, 2004, and on November 1, 2004, when her formal request for an extension of leave was received by Wexford, Ms. Seiden, along with her physician, reported to Wexford that she was unable to carry out her employment duties. Ms. Seiden also failed to prove that she was terminated because of her illness, on the basis of a perceived disability. Finally, Wexford proved a non-pretextual, non- discriminatory reason for terminating Ms. Seiden's employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Jane Seiden. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner was employed by Respondent beginning in 1985 and, at all times material hereto, was supervised by Dr. Frank A. Coliazzi. Petitioner had been made aware of the rules and policy of the Respondent in regard to unauthorized leave of absence. Specifically, Petitioner was counselled in this regard on March 26, 1986, by Dr. Frank A. Colliazzi for his unauthorized leave of absence on March 25, 1986. Petitioner knew, or should have known, that un-authorized leave of absences could result in disciplinary action or the loss of employment through abandonment. Prior to April 14, 1986, Petitioner had a history of unauthorized leave of absences. In fact, Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on April 9 & 11, 1986, after being counselled as late as March 26, 1986 in this regard. Petitioner was absent without authorized leave on April 14, 15 & 16, 1986. Petitioner appeared briefly at the work place on April 15, 1986 but did not go to work and left immediately when requested to work by Dr. Colliazzi, with a promise to return to work the next morning, April 16; 1986, at 8:00 a.m. The Petitioner did not request a leave of absence at this time and did not return to work on April 16, 1986 as promised. Respondent's certified letter of April 16, 1986, informing Petitioner that Respondent considered him to have abandoned his position because of his three (3) consecutive days of unauthorized leave was not received by Petitioner until April 24, 1986 due to Petitioner's failure to notify Respondent of his change of address. However, Petitioner was made aware of the letter and its contents by Maxine Fields on April 21, 1986. Petitioner's failure to return to work on April 17 & 18, 1986, lends support to Respondent's contention that Petitioner had abandoned his job since Petitioner was not aware of Respondent's position on his abandonment until April 21, 1986. At no time relevant to this proceeding was leave requested by Petitioner or granted by Respondent. Although Petitioner received notice of the hearings, he failed to appear at either one and present evidence in rebuttal to Respondent's position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the action of the Respondent in deeming the Petitioner to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service was correct and affirming such action. RESPECTFULLY ENTERED and SUBMITTED this 25th day of November, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2604 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(1), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner: Petitioner did not submit any Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 & 8. 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6 & 7. 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Judy Waldman, Esquire General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 Barbara Wingo, Esquire Associate General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 James H. Foster 3216 Lancastor Lane Tampa, Florida 33619 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to receive benefits pursuant to Option 3 as retirement earned by his deceased wife, Susana T. Fabian.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Howard Fabian, is the spouse of the late Susana T. Fabian. Mrs. Fabian was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The Fabians were married for approximately 14 years and have two children from their union. The girls, now teenagers, reside with Mr. Fabian and depend on him for their financial support. The Respondent, DMS, is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the FRS. Benefits payable to FRS participants are tendered pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and DMS rules. Mrs. Fabian was employed as a teacher in the Miami- Dade County Public Schools on or about December 17, 1984. As such, she was eligible to participate in the FRS. In fact, Mrs. Fabian's employer made contributions to the FRS for her benefit throughout her employment with the school system. Such contributions continued for over 13 years. It is undisputed that Mrs. Fabian was "vested" and was, therefore, entitled to receive retirement benefits from the FRS. Unfortunately, Mrs. Fabian became ill in 1997 and was unable to teach. She requested an extended sick leave for the period August 31, 1997 through May 31, 1998, which her employer granted. Mrs. Fabian returned to teaching the following year and was able to perform her duties until January 2000. At that time her medical condition worsened. Her request for unpaid leave through June 2000 was granted. Despite her best efforts to regain her health, Mrs. Fabian did not improve. Each time her employer asked whether she would return to work, forms were returned seeking an extension of leave. The employer continued to grant the extension requests and approved sick leave without pay for the period through June 14, 2002. Mr. Fabian filled out a leave form seeking leave on his wife's behalf through June 2003. By letter dated May 14, 2002, the school system denied that request. Whether or not the employer correctly calculated the time Mrs. Fabian received unpaid leave is unknown. The Petitioner asserts that had Mrs. Fabian received credit for "hardship leave and dire emergency leave" in 1997 and 2000 (for which the union contract provided), the leave request in June 2002 would or could have been granted. The record is clear that the Respondent did not have any part in the internal workings of the Miami-Dade County School District and did not have knowledge as to whether Mrs. Fabian could have been granted additional unpaid leave. The employer's decisions regarding this employee were unknown to the Respondent until the instant action. However, about the time the employer denied the last leave extension request, Mr. Fabian received a FRS application for disability retirement. The application was completed on or about June 2002. The form signed by Mrs. Fabian was out- of-date and did not have a designation of beneficiary space. Pursuant to its policy, DMS accepted the out of date form and sent Mrs. Fabian a form for designating a beneficiary. The form for designating a beneficiary listed four options: Option 1, Option 2, Option 3 and Option 4. All (Options 1-4) were clearly and unambiguously described. However, only two of the options had estimates included on the form sent to Mrs. Fabian. Estimates for Options 3 and 4 were not noted. Under Option 1 the form indicated a monthly benefit of $895.28. Option 2 indicated a monthly payment of $824.89. At that point in time DMS did not have sufficient information to calculate Options 3 and 4. To calculate Options 3 and 4 DMS must have information regarding a "Joint Annuitant." Had Mr. Fabian included information for Options 3 and 4 those amounts would have been calculated. In this case, the Respondent could not know Mrs. Fabian was married, as the initial (outdated) form did not provide that information. The Respondent could have become aware of Mrs. Fabian's marital status as a result of a telephone call from Mr. Fabian to DMS in August of 2002. At that time DMS still needed information to put Mrs. Fabian on the retirement payroll. The request for information unambiguously listed information needed for a "joint annuitant." The first notice to Mrs. Fabian, dated July 11, 2002, asked for the proof of birth for the joint annuitant. Similarly, the SECOND REQUEST-RETURN WITHIN 30 DAYS (Respondent's Ex. 12) dated September 4, 2002, indicated the following: Your name cannot be placed on the retired payroll for the reason(s) indicated below: BIRTH VERIFICATION Please see the enclosed memo outlining the acceptable means of proving your birth date. BIRTH VERIFICATION OF BENEFICIARY If you elect Option 3 or 4, we will need proof of birth for your joint annuitant. FRS-11o, OPTION SELECTION FORM The enclosed Option Selection Form is needed. If you elect option 3 or 4, we will need proof of birth for your joint annuitant. You may wait until an estimate of benefits is provided before selecting your option. FORM FST-12, BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION This form must be completed to designate a beneficiary. You must designate a beneficiary to receive any benefits due at your date of death. [Emphasis in original] Nevertheless, when the Option Selection form was submitted to DMS, Mr. Fabian, exercising a power of attorney provided by his wife, chose Option 1. Mr. Fabian claims he did not know Option 3 was available. The Option Selection form clearly and unambiguously listed all four options available to Mrs. Fabian. Mr. Fabian is an educated professional. He has taught school for the Miami-Dade County School District and has operated a real estate office for approximately 20 years. The Option Selection form signed by Mr. Fabian for himself and for his wife on September 3, 2002 (Petitioner's Exhibit. 7) required the Petitioner to complete a "Spousal Acknowledgement," recognizing that the member had chosen Option 1. The section must be completed if the FRS member is married and if Option 1 or 2 is elected. Clearly, the Petitioner knew or should have known that the form contemplated a permanent decision. In fact, the Petitioner acknowledged by signing beneath the section that stated: . . . I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited, or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program participation begins. DMS received the Beneficiary Designation Form and Option Selection forms on September 12, 2002. The completed file was referred to payroll and Mrs. Fabian then received monthly retirement benefits under Option 1 (the option selected by her husband pursuant to his power of attorney). It is undisputed the first payment was negotiated upon its receipt. Prior to cashing the first payment Mrs. Fabian could have changed her option selection. On December 24, 2002, Mrs. Fabian passed away. The Respondent then notified Mr. Fabian that the option he had selected did not provide for continuing benefits beyond the month of Mrs. Fabian's death. Additionally, Mr. Fabian was advised that he was not entitled to a refund of any contribution Mrs. Fabian paid to FRS as she had not made any. The employer paid 100 percent of the contributions to Mrs. Fabian's account. Retirement benefits under the FRS are not equivalent to life insurance. That is, the retirement payments are payable to the employee who "earned" benefits or to those who may be "joint annuitants" as defined by law. At all times material to this case, the employer paid the full amount credited to Mrs. Fabian's retirement account, approximately $84,046.51. Obviously, Mrs. Fabian sought the benefits from her account prior to her anticipated retirement date. DMS allows disability retirement under such circumstances. Therefore, Mrs. Fabian's eligibility to claim her disability retirement is not disputed. The deposition testimony of Nina Barron was admitted into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 5. Ms. Barron reviewed the retirement options with the Petitioner prior to the time the form was submitted to FRS. Ms. Barron also calculated the amounts payable to Mrs. Fabian pursuant to each option. Ms. Barron also believes she spoke to Mrs. Fabian regarding the options. Ms. Barron mailed the calculated estimates for each option to the Petitioner. The Petitioner's allegation that he was confused regarding the options and which election would best protect his family's interests has not been deemed persuasive in light of the testimony of Ms. Barron. The witness provided an unofficial estimate to Mrs. Fabian that included all 4 options.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's request. S DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplande Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Richard M. Ellis, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
