The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner should be permitted to run for office in the Florida House of Representatives without resigning her position as a state career service employee with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Findings Of Fact Mary C. Jackson (Ms. Jackson) is a career service employee of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) in HRS District VII, in Orlando, Florida. She has been employed by HRS for twenty years. Ms. Jackson is, and has been at all times relevant here, a human services program analyst, a non-supervisory position in the District VII background screening office. It is uncontroverted that the program in which Ms. Jackson is employed is funded by federal grant monies and is covered, therefore, by the federal Hatch Act. Ms. Jackson followed the proper procedures in requesting permission to run for the state legislature, for the office of State Representative. There is no dispute that this is a partisan political office. Paul Snead, Jr., HRS, District Administrator for District VII, denied Ms. Jackson's request with a memorandum dated January 10, 1994. The denial is based on career service rule 60K-13, F.A.C., which prohibits employees subject to the Hatch Act from becoming candidates in partisan elections, and which also permits employees to hold or be a candidate for a local public or political office, with necessary approval.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered denying Mary C. Jackson's request to be a candidate for the state legislature while she remains an employee of the state. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 6th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: James Sawyer, Jr., Esquire Laurie Lashomb, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 7 Legal Office South Tower, Suite S827 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mary C. Jackson 1406 Peg Lane Orlando, Florida 32808 Robert L. Powell, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent County is guilty of an unlawful employment practice pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is female, and within a class protected by Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent County is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claimed that Respondent treated her disparately from male employees on the basis of her gender in the areas of pay during her probationary period, reprimands and discipline, provision of equipment, poor performance evaluations, and training. Petitioner's initial relationship with Respondent was as an independent contractor at Respondent's Sanitary Landfill under a written contract entered into on September 15, 1989. In this capacity, she acted as a "spotter." As an independent contractor, she received $250 per month and salvage rights to whatever material customers brought to the Respondent's Sanitary Landfill. Effective August 14, 1990, the State Division of Personnel and Retirement required Respondent to put all contractual people on the County payroll. Thereafter, Petitioner was paid $350 per month and continued to have salvage rights only at the sufferance of the Respondent. After that date, Petitioner earned retirement and social security benefits. Withholding of federal taxes and deduction of social security benefits were also provided.(P-12). The value of the salvage rights were never calculated by anyone. While she was employed as a "spotter," Petitioner was the only female "spotter." Petitioner was on probation as an employee from August to December 1990. Petitioner was paid $1.442 per hour from August 12, 1990 through October 1990, and $1.63 per hour from October 1990 through December 3, 1990. At that time, her rate of pay was raised to $3.85 per hour. The record contains no evidence of what was paid to any male employee similarly situated during this period. Without proof that similarly situated male spotters were consistently paid better, there is no proof of gender discrimination in pay during Petitioner's probationary period.3 Mark Hawes, a male, was hired as a spotter on June 1, 1993. He was paid $4.35 per hour while on probation. Willie George, also male, was hired as a spotter on October 1, 1993, and was paid $4.4805 per hour while on probation. There is no evidence of how much Petitioner was being paid during this period, so there is no means of assessing disparate treatment in pay, if any, during this period.4 During the period that Petitioner was employed as a "spotter," there was no statute or rule requiring that "spotters" receive formalized training or be certified in any field. During Petitioner's employment, no spotter were provided more than a printed Job Description and on-the-job oral instructions. They were expected to use courtesy and common sense in dealing with the public. Two employees (gender unspecified) who were not spotters were sent to train at a state "school" to become Certified Landfill Operators. A State Rule was enacted after Petitioner was terminated which required that all spotters must have eight hours of specialized training. Thereafter, the Respondent provided such training to spotters. At all times material to any Personnel Citations, Petitioner was a union member, and all benefits of her union's collective bargaining agreement with the Respondent accrued to her. No performance evaluations were submitted in evidence. With the exception of the events related within the following findings of fact, no witness found any fault with Petitioner in the performance of her job description as a "spotter" at Respondent's landfill. (P-1) Wayne Hardee, Director of the Landfill, issued a Personnel Citation against Petitioner early in her employment on the basis of lack of personal hygiene. The citation was later removed from Petitioner's personnel file as an act of good will. On or about January 16, 1994, Petitioner admitted to an immediate supervisor that her carelessness with a hand-held CB radio had resulted in loss of the radio. She offered to pay for the radio. Mr. Hardee did not require her to pay for the radio, but issued a written Personnel Citation to her on January 20, 1994 for her carelessness. This Personnel Citation simultaneously cited Petitioner because Mr. Hardee had received complaints that Petitioner was overly concerned about other spotters doing their jobs. In this Personnel Citation, Mr. Hardee warned Petitioner to do her job without complaining about other employees. Petitioner admitted that she signed this citation and that she did not grieve it through her union. The radio was later recovered, but the citation remained in Petitioner's personnel file. (P-2) On Saturday, July 9, 1994, Petitioner called her union's senior shop steward, Jessie Ellzey, to the landfill to complain about items left at her spotter station. Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner was accusing another employee of putting the items in the wrong place. Petitioner also told Mr. Ellzey that another employee had threatened her. After investigation and interviews the following week, Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Hardee determined that the items had been brought by a landfill customer to the landfill between shift changes. Mr. Hardee's and Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner had unfairly complained about another spotter, Willie George, not doing his job. At least three days and two meetings were involved in this investigation and counseling procedure. Mr. Hardee issued a written Personnel Citation against Petitioner for complaining about a co-employee. (P-3) Petitioner also was suspended without pay for one day and warned that if the problem was not corrected, further disciplinary action would be taken against her. Petitioner did not grieve this citation through her union. Based on all of Mr. Ellzey's credible testimony, due to reputation testimony about Mr. Ellzey's standard operating procedure, and because Petitioner was actually suspended for one day without pay, I reject as not credible Petitioner's testimony that she never knew of this citation in time to grieve it. On August 13, 1994, Ann Harrell, a landfill customer, filed a written complaint of rudeness against Petitioner. (P-9) A written complaint of rudeness by Petitioner was also filed by another customer, Mr. Richburg, at about the same time. Mr. Hardee considered courtesy to customers to be an unstated policy of County government and further perceived rudeness to customers to be an on-going problem in Petitioner's relationship with the public. Due to the foregoing written complaints and many similar oral complaints he had received, Mr. Hardee assigned Petitioner two days' suspension without pay by a written Personnel Citation issued August 15, 1994. The citation also warned Petitioner she would be terminated if there were another complaint about her. Petitioner refused to sign this citation. (P-4) On August 25, 1994, Petitioner grieved the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation through her union. (P-5) A hearing was held in response to Petitioner's grievance. All concerned agree that Mr. Ellzey, the union representative advocating Petitioner's position, and not a representative of management, kept Petitioner from testifying. Chester Humphries testified on Petitioner's behalf at the grievance hearing that he had been unable to hear what Mr. Richburg said but could hear what Petitioner said to Mr. Richburg. From this, Mr. Hardee inferred that Petitioner had raised her voice to Mr. Richburg. Mr. Hardee assessed Petitioner's character witnesses in Petitioner's favor but noted that they knew nothing about the specific incident between Petitioner and Mr. Richburg. Ultimately, Mr. Hardee relied on Mr. Richburg's testimony concerning the incident. (P-6) Mr. Hardee denied Petitioner's grievance and disciplined Petitioner in accord with the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation. Upon advice of her union steward, Petitioner did not appeal the grievance hearing result. It was further agreed that if Petitioner's behavior resulted in no more complaints against her for 30 working days, the August 15, 1994, citation would be removed from her personnel file. Petitioner met this requirement, and the citation was removed from her personnel file. (P-6; P-7). Petitioner's December 13, 1994, charge of discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations listed August 11, 1994, as the last date of alleged discrimination. No witness at formal hearing herein, including Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Humphries, both of whom also had been present at the grievance hearing, confirmed Petitioner's perception that her gender had affected the result of her grievance hearing. Another female employee (not a landfill spotter) currently works in Respondent's administrative offices. That female employee also has had employment disputes with Mr. Hardee which she attributes to his gender bias, but the type of dispute was not clearly specified on this record. Therefore, no similarity to Petitioner's situation can be discerned and no pattern of gender bias was proven on that basis. This female employee is still employed by Respondent. A different female employee (also not a spotter) employed by Respondent's Emergency Medical Services (EMS) was terminated by Mr. Bill Beddow, EMS Director, for failing to timely report (or complain about) her immediate supervisor for "doing something [Mr. Beddow] thought he shouldn't be doing with drugs." The male supervisor resigned for "personal reasons." The female employee was rehired by Mr. Beddow after intercession by her union. This means another female not similarly situated to Petitioner was terminated for not complaining about a male employee's job performance and was then hired back, whereas Petitioner was progressively disciplined with reprimands and suspensions for repetitive unsubstantiated complaints about male employees' job performances. Petitioner seeks to have the conclusion drawn that female employees were disciplined both for reporting and for not reporting male employees' misbehavior. However, the two isolated situations are so dissimilar as to develop no pattern recognizable at law. I accept as credible and unrefuted Petitioner's testimony that all of the complaints she initiated about other employees were oral. However, Petitioner's testimony that she did not complain about other employees' performance of, or failure to perform, their jobs and her assertion that her complaints were only motivated by the requirements of her Job Description to "inspect loads" and "report all problems" was not corroborated by any other witness. Petitioner's testimony that her concerns were directed not at individual employees but at addressing hazardous wastes also was not corroborated by any other witness.5 Petitioner's middle level supervisor acknowledged that Petitioner told him that other employees had improperly handled hazardous materials as well as non-hazardous materials but that he did not cite anyone as a result of Petitioner's complaints about hazardous wastes because it was impossible to prove who was responsible. He counseled all subordinates about each incident whenever he considered counseling appropriate. Otherwise, all witnesses with reason to know the situation generally acknowledged that Petitioner's oral complaints were recurring almost daily and were directed to other employees' job performances rather than hazardous materials. It is the repetitive and personal nature of Petitioner's complaints rather than their being oral that management found offensive. The evidence also generally shows that all employees orally complained about each other and that Petitioner's two immediate supervisors, Felippe McCelroy and Robert Murray, orally reprimanded everybody who complained or who was complained about as they each saw fit within their supervisory discretion on individual occasions. No gender pattern is to be discerned from the foregoing. Only on those occasions that either an oral or written complaint reached Mr. Hardee was anyone written up and/or disciplined. Petitioner complained about not being assigned or provided with one of Respondent employer's trucks when other male employees were provided trucks. With the exception of the following findings related to the Respondent's trucks, there is no relevant evidence in this record concerning employees' use of trucks. All employees were cautioned against carelessness. Tommy Dean, a male employee, dented one of Respondent's trucks. He was not disciplined for careless driving. There is no evidence the dent was caused by Mr. Dean's careless driving. In February 1995, Charles Kennedy, a male spotter, filed a written complaint or incident report. Therein, he claimed that Petitioner had attempted to prohibit his bulldozing landfill material out of the way because Petitioner was trying to remove salvageable items. He further alleged that Petitioner had thrown a jar of grease at him. Petitioner was requested to file a written account of the incident. In her written account, she basically admitted the incident but not any intent to hit Mr. Kennedy with the grease jar. Mr. Kennedy was not disciplined for filing the written complaint/report. Petitioner was not disciplined for the actions complained about by Mr. Kennedy. Instead, as of February 3, 1995, landfill spotters were prohibited from salvaging at the landfill. (P-13) Petitioner desires that the conclusion be drawn that male spotters who complained in writing about other employees were not disciplined for complaining but that Petitioner, a female, was disciplined for making oral complaints. However, it appears Respondent addressed Mr. Kennedy's written complaint in much the same way as it had addressed Petitioner's oral complaint against Willie George, by giving each participant in the dispute a chance to state his or her position, before management decided who should be disciplined. The difference was that Mr. Kennedy was not a chronic complainer and management's investigation revealed some fault on both sides, so a neutral solution was found rather than discipline being imposed. There is no evidence beyond Petitioner's assertion that she was ever asked to do more work or heavier work than male spotters. From this point on, the dates that events occurred or their chronology is not entirely clear from the record. However, approximately April 14, 1995, there was an occasion when Petitioner was asked to move metal pieces in a wheelbarrow-sized pile over a three-hour period. The largest piece weighed 21 pounds. The next day, Petitioner reported a workers' compensation back injury or aggravation. She was then off work until approximately May 11, 1995, when she returned to "light duty." She worked for awhile for only four hours per day. Respondent hired someone to help her. It is disputed whether Petitioner was reinjured or whether Mr. Hardee just sent her home. However, on or about July 8, 1995, Mr. Hardee discussed the situation with "the workers' compensation people," and it was agreed there was not enough light duty work for Petitioner. Three months later, Petitioner returned to full duty. Because a spotter had been hired to do her work, Petitioner was assigned to a variety of jobs. She worked at the dog pound, the recycling building, and even washed Mr. Hardee's truck.6 One day, Petitioner's immediate supervisor ordered her to cut out the top of a metal drum. At formal hearing, Petitioner asserted that this was heavier work than she should have been required to do on light duty, but there is no evidence the supervisor's order was motivated by gender bias. There also is no evidence a full-time male spotter was never required to do similarly heavy work. Petitioner advised her supervisor that she had hurt her arms and elbows and she went home on sick leave. Petitioner had complained over the term of her employment about not being provided one of Respondent's trucks so that she could conveniently get from her sector of the landfill to a restroom. After her workers' compensation injury, Respondent arranged for male employees to drive Petitioner to the restroom. Eventually, Respondent provided Petitioner with a portable toilet in her work sector. Mr. Hardee maintained that no spotter had ever been assigned a truck but that all spotters, including Petitioner, had access to one. There is evidence to show that male employees drove the trucks and Petitioner did not, but insufficient evidence to show this was an active management decision or that Mr. Hardee acquiesced in male employees preempting trucks as a result of any gender bias. On or about November 13, 1995, Petitioner informed Mr. Hardee that she was permanently physically disabled and would have to be on light duty indefinitely. After consultation with his "workers' compensation people," Mr. Hardee terminated Petitioner as of that date. 7 At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted Respondent was still paying her workers' compensation benefits and that her workers' compensation claim has not been settled.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding no discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1997.
Findings Of Fact After the motion for continuance was again denied, petitioners declined to offer any evidence and petitioners announced that they would be pursuing certain supposed federal remedies.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Chapter 447. Whether the Petitioner is an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Chapter 447. Whether there is a sufficient showing of interest as required for the filing of a representation election petition under Florida Statutes, Chapter 447. Whether the employee organization is a properly registered organization with the Public Employees Relations Commission. What is the appropriate unit of public employees in the cause before the Public Employees Relations Commission. HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT The five issues were discussed at the hearing with the following results: It was agreed that the City of Rockledge is a public employer. It was agreed that the Petitioner is an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Chapter 447. It was agreed that there is a sufficient showing of interest as required for the filing of a presentation election petition under Florida Statutes, Chapter 147. It was agreed that the employee Organization is a properly registered organization with the public Employees Relations Commission. The appropriate unit of public employees in the cause was in dispute. The Petitioner stated that the Association wanted to represent the dispatchers, patrolmen, sergeants, lieutenants and the detectives. The Public Employer requested that only patrolmen and detectives should make up the unit.
Findings Of Fact The Petition, styled Brevard County P.B.A, Petitioner, and City of Rockledge, Public Employer, seeks a certificate of representation as the exclusive bargaining agent for Officers of the City of Rockledge, Florida, including patrolmen, sergeants, dispatchers lieutenants and detectives. Excluded are captains and the chief of police. The city Counsel of the city of Rockledge, Florida, in the minutes dated April 2, 1975, agreed to follow guidelines under "Section 300" (8H300) of the Florida Administrative Code. See "Exhibit (1)". An envelope furnished by PERC containing authorization cards for the Brevard County P.B.A., alphabetized list of employees provided by the employers, notice of appearance forms for the attorneys, request to appear forms by the public, registration file (original) for the Brevard County P.B.A, original petition file including Petition, affidavit of registration, affidavit for 30 per cent showing interest, was circulated and without objection entered into evidence. See "Exhibit (2)". There are eighteen (18) men in the proposed bargaining unit: nine (9) patrolmen, two (2) detectives, three (3) dispatchers, three (3) lieutenants and one sergeant. A copy of the official job description of the City of Rockledge Police Department effective prior to the instigation of these proceedings was requested to be examined by both parties and submitted to the Hearing Officer and was submitted and marked as Supplement to the Record" and is made a part of this file. The major functions of personnel as delineated in the job descriptions submitted are as follows: Lieutenant: This is supervisory work in coordinating police activities on an assigned shift or specialized division of the department. The employee is responsible for the overall supervision of the subordinate personnel (patrolmen, dispatchers, etc.) engaged in police activities on an assigned shift or a specialized division. Part of the duties are to assign, direct and supervise the work of subordinate personnel engaged in routine police activities or criminal investigations. This employee reviews and makes recommendations for disciplinary action of subordinate personnel of the department. Sergeants: This is supervisory and specialized police work in the field and in police headquarters. An employee in this classification may also assume the total responsibilities as assigned to a regular shift commander. An employee in this classification may also be assigned the duty of coordinating the communication operators (dispatchers). When working as a shift commander the duties are the sane as listed for a lieutenant's duties. Patrolmen: This is general duty police work in enforcing laws and ordinances of the federal, state and local governments. Specific assignments are received from superior officers and carried out in accordance with the established rules and procedures. Personnel must be able to act without direct supervision in emergencies. Primary duties are to enforce the laws and ordinances and investigate and see whether these laws and ordinances are being violated. Detectives: The major functions of the detective is specialized police work but also includes enforcing the laws and ordinances of the federal, state and local governments. Major duties include the conducting of surveillance assignments to help detect crime and general investigative work. Communication operator or dispatcher: This is specialized work receiving, screening and dispatching messages of police communication systems. His duty largely is the operation of the radio transmitter for the purpose of dispatching patrol and detective units and receiving messages. In accordance with Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, no recommendations are submitted. August 8, 1975. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Williams, Vice President Brevard County P.B.A. 978 Beacon Road Rockledge, Florida 32955 Vernon Weekly, Past President Brevard County P.B.A. 700 Sandgate Street Merritt Island, Florida 32952 Dale Dixon, President Brevard County P.B.A. 2460 North Coutenay parkway Suite 216 Merritt Island, Florida 32952 John A. Hipp, City Manager City of Rockledge Post office Box 488 Rockledge, Florida 32955 Jim Gilliard 993 Pinson Boulevard Rockledge, Florida Ronald F. Ray Post office Box 206 Rockledge, Florida Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 105 2005 Apalachee parkway Tallahassee, Florida
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to costs and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to section 106.265(6), Florida Statutes (2016),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.0045.
Findings Of Fact Linda Yates is an elected member of the city commission for North Port, Florida. Ms. Yates was first elected to the North Port city commission in 2010, and was re-elected to the same office in 2014. On August 22, 2016, Kathy Schure, who at all times relevant hereto was a resident of the City of North Port, filed a Complaint with the Elections Commission alleging, in material part, the following: Sunshine Law and Ethics Violations by City of North Port Commissioner Linda M. Yates covering the period June 1, 2012 to July 20, 2016. * * * This writing is to bring a formal complaint and a request for investigation into illegal and unethical activity of Commissioner Linda M. Yates through the use [of] personal email servers, Tor Browsers, relay internet list servers, and intermediaries to knowingly violate FL 286 – Open Meetings Law and FL 119 – Florida Public Records Law. Additionally, Commissioner Jacqueline Moore appears to have participated in “secret meetings and communications” with Commissioner Yates as recipient of emails and texts directly and through intermediaries. On the complaint form, Ms. Schure identified Ms. Yates as a “candidate” for the city commission for the City of North Port. Although Ms. Yates was a member of the city commission on August 22, 2016, she was not a candidate for this office as noted by Ms. Schure in the Complaint. The complaint form used by Ms. Schure to assert her allegations against Ms. Yates directs the complainant (Ms. Schure) to “[p]lease list the provisions The Florida Elections Code that you believe the person named above may have violated [and that] [t]he Commission has jurisdiction only to investigation [sic] . . . Chapter 104, Chapter 106, and Section 105.071, Florida Statutes.” The Complaint filed by Ms. Schure makes no reference to chapter 104, chapter 106 or section 105.071. The Complaint does, however, reference chapters 286 and 119, Florida Statutes, and case law dealing with Florida’s open government laws.2/ By correspondence dated August 25, 2016, the Elections Commission informed Ms. Yates that Ms. Schure filed a complaint against her and that she had “14 days after receipt of the complaint to file an initial response,” and that the Elections Commission would “not determine the legal sufficiency of the complaint” until expiration of the referenced 14-day response period. On August 28, 2016, Ms. Yates hired Douglas A. Daniels, Esquire, an attorney in good standing with The Florida Bar, to represent her before the Elections Commission. Mr. Daniels charged Ms. Yates $400.00 per hour for work related to the Complaint filed by Ms. Schure. By correspondence dated October 20, 2016, the Elections Commission informed Ms. Schure of the following: The Florida Elections Commission has received your complaint alleging violations of Florida’s election laws. I have reviewed your complaint and find it to be legally insufficient. This complaint was received by the Florida Elections Commission on August 22, 2016. The cover page, which was an FEC complaint form, named Linda Yates as the Respondent. Attached to the complaint form was [a] second complaint form indicating a different Respondent (Jacqueline Moore), as well as a narrative of the allegations against Ms. Yates. You did not indicate anywhere in the documents that you intended to file two complaints, so the Commission accepted the entire document as a complaint against Respondent Linda Yates. The essential allegations of your complaint are that Respondent violated Florida’s open meetings and public records laws, Chapter 286 and 119, Florida Statutes, respectively. The jurisdiction of the Florida Elections Commission is limited to alleged violations of Chapter 104 and 106, Florida Statutes. As such, I find your complaint to be legally insufficient. If you have additional information to correct the stated grounds(s) of insufficiency, please submit it within 14 days of the date of this letter. If we do not receive additional information that corrects the stated grounds of insufficiency, this case will be closed. For your convenience, enclosed is a form for your use in submitting additional information. If you submit an additional statement containing facts, you must sign the statement and have your signature notarized. In addition, any additional facts you submit to the Commission must be based on either personal information or information other than hearsay. Ms. Schure offered no additional information in support of her allegations and the Elections Commission, by correspondence dated December 30, 2016, informed Ms. Yates that the Complaint was dismissed due to legal insufficiency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order denying the Petition for Costs and Attorney’s Fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 2017.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to credit for her answers to questions 55 p.m. and 56 p.m. on the Fundamentals of Engineering portion of the engineering licensure examination given on April 15, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The examination for licensure of an engineer in the State of Florida is administered by the Florida Engineers Management Corporation, a not-for-profit corporation, created under Section 471.038, Florida Statutes. A written examination is authorized by Rule 61G15-21.001, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent contracts with the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying to provide engineering licensure examinations. This practice is approved by Section 455.217, Florida Statutes, and Rule 61G1 5-21.005, Florida Administrative Code. The National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying develops standardized tests given for licensure throughout the United States and ensures that the questions are not ambiguous through a number of methodologies. A candidate for licensure as an engineer intern must attain a "scaled" score of 70 to pass the examination. On the examination taken by Petitioner, the minimum "raw" score required to attain a "scaled" score of 70 was 107; Petitioner's "raw" score was 105. Petitioner had initially challenged five questions; at the hearing, Petitioner withdrew her challenge to three questions; the two remaining challenged questions (55 p.m. and 56 p.m.) were "ethical" questions, i.e., they dealt with questions of engineering ethics. The challenged questions were multiple-choice questions. The test gives the following directions: "Each of the questions or incomplete sentences below is followed by four suggested answers or completions. Select the one that is the best in each case and then fill in the corresponding space on the answer sheet." (Emphasis added.) The challenged question 55 p.m. deals with an engineer hired to prepare a report on the design, manufacture, and assembly of a structure. The report contains references to "shoddy workmanship." Petitioner states that while she agreed that answer A [the graded "correct" answer] is correct, she believed that the inclusion of the word "also" in answer B included answer A in answer B by reference and therefore she chose B as her answer. Petitioner acknowledges that the word "also" in answer B could be referring to language in the question rather than in answer A. Answer A specifically refers to "engineering issues" which the engineer is "qualified to assess"; answer B indicates that the references to "shoddy workmanship" are "personal opinions" and "not professional opinions". An engineer is obligated by his license not to give an opinion for which he does not have expertise. An engineer should not render a personal opinion in a report in which the engineer gives a professional opinion. The challenged question 56 p.m. deals with an engineer who lacks expertise dealing with space frames but designed structures which included same. Regarding challenged question 56 p.m., the Petitioner acknowledged that answer A (the graded "correct" answer) could have been the correct answer as well as the answer she chose, answer D. Answer D indicates that the engineer was unethical because he did not refer that matter to the Registration Board. An engineer should not contact the Registration Board and report to the Board that someone has asked him to do something unethical; it is incumbent upon an engineer to practice engineering ethically without the input of the Board. In both instances in answering the challenged questions the Petitioner failed to provide the "best" answer and at hearing acknowledged that the graded "correct" answer by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveyors was a "correct" answer even though she chose a different answer.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Engineers Management Corporation enter a final order denying Petitioner's challenge to questions 55 p.m. and 56 p.m. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Yvette Bowman 3401 North Lakeview Drive Apartment 216 Tampa, Florida 33618 Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Florida Engineers Management Corporation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dennis Barton, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Natalie A. Lowe, Esquire Vice President for Legal Affairs Florida Engineers Management Corporation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact We find the Administrative Law Judge’s findings of fact to be supported by competent substantial evidence. We adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s findings of fact. Conclusions of Law We find the Administrative Law Judge’s application of the law to the facts to result in a correct disposition of the matter. We adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law. Exceptions Petitioner filed exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order in a document entitled, “My statement on the Recommended Order by Judge Robert S. Cohen,” along with some attachments. Petitioner’s exceptions take issue with facts found, and not found, by the Administrative Law Judge, and with the inferences drawn from the evidence presented at Recommended Order, 13, { 15, 20, and at various places in the Recommended Order in which the Administrative Law Judge makes reference to Respondent’s efforts to provide accommodation and find Petitioner a position. The Commission has stated, “It is well settled that it is the Administrative Law Judge’ s function ‘to consider all of the evidence presented and reach ultimate conclusions of fact based on competent substantial evidence by resolving conflicts, judging the credibility of witnesses and drawing permissible inferences therefrom. If the evidence presented supports two inconsistent findings, it is the Administrative Law Judge’s role to decide between them.’ Beckton v. Department of Children and Family Services, 21 F.ALR. 1735, at 1736 (FCHR 1998), citing Maggio v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 9 F.ALR 2168, at 2171 (FCHR 1986).” Barr v. Columbia Ocala Regional Medical Center, 22 F.A.L.R. 1729, at 1730 (FCHR 1999). Further, there is no indication on Petitioner’s exception document that it was served on Respondent by Petitioner as is required by Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.110. Petitioner’s exceptions are rejected. Dismissal The Petition for Relief and Complaint of Discrimination are DISMISSED with prejudice. The parties have the right to seek judicial review of this Order. The Commission and the appropriate District Court of Appeal must receive notice of appeal within 30 days of the date this Order is filed with the Clerk of the Commission. Explanation of the right FCHR Order No. 05-039 Page 3 to appeal is found in Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.110. DONE AND ORDERED this St day of [UW FOR THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HU Filed this a day olan eh 2005, in Tallahassee, Florida. Violet Crawford, Clerk 4 Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, FL 32301 (850) 488-7082 Copies furnished to: Eulalio Centeno 3275 South John Young Parkway, Suite 219 Kissimmee, FL 34746 Eulalio Centeno 794 Royal Palm Drive Orlando, FL 32743 Orange County, Florida Public Utilities c/o P. Andrea DeLoach, Esq. Assistant County Attorney 435 North Orange Avenue, Suite 300 Orlando, FL 32801 FCHR Order No. 05-039 Page 4 Robert §. Cohen, Administrative Law Judge, DOAH James Mallue, Legal Advisor for Commission Panel I HEREBY CERTIFY that a oe of the foregoing in been mailed to the above listed addressees this day of Cheri scot the ff he Florida Commission on Human Relations
The Issue application from Sydney McCray on the basis of race or national
Findings Of Fact The City is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act. Mr. McCray is a male African-American, and he is a member of a protected class. In his complaint, Mr. McCray claims that on April 4, 1994, the City discriminated against him by failing to hire him for the position of laborer (maintenance worker). Specifically, Mr. McCray alleged that in response to a newspaper advertisement for a laborer’s position, he and his sister, Alice Larkins, contacted the City Manager’s office for the purpose of submitting their employment applications. Both Mr. McCray and Ms. Larkins asserted that they arrived at the office of Mr. Whitson, the City Manager, at the appointed time, and that they waited over an hour to see Mr. Whitson. After waiting an hour, both Mr. McCray and Ms. Larkins left without ever meeting Mr. Whitson. Mr. McCray asserts that Mr. Whitson failed to meet with him or receive his employment application because of his race. The City disputes Mr. McCray’s claims for several reasons. First, the City provided evidence to contradict Mr. McCray’s position that he first learned of the laborer position through an advertisement. Several city employees testified that the City only advertises skilled positions and that the unskilled positions, such as maintenance positions, are handled through the Public Works Department without advertisement. With regard to the Public Works Department, testimony was also received that indicated the process for receiving applications for laborer positions. In particular, it was stated that applications for laborer positions are processed by the Public Works Department and that once the applicant has been interviewed, all qualified applicants are placed on a list for future vacancies. The record is clear that Mr. McCray never applied for a laborer position through the established procedure. Second, even if the position was advertised as stated by Mr. McCray, the City disputes that Mr. Whitson’s office would have ever made an appointment for Mr. McCray. As indicated above, the prospective laborers are processed by the Public Works Department. Mr. Whitson testified that he plays no role in screening laborer applicants and that he is purposefully insulated from the hiring process. Therefore, it makes no sense that his office would have arranged an interview as asserted by Mr. McCray. Third, in addition to Mr. Whitson’s lack of involvement in the employment process for prospective laborers, all the testimony received at the hearing supports a finding that Mr. McCray did not have an appointment with the City manager. Specifically, several City employees, including Mr. Whitson’s personal secretary, testified that neither Mr. McCray nor his sister ever had an appointment with Mr. Whitson. They also testified that neither person appeared at Mr. Whitson’s office on April 4, 1994. When pressed on the date and time of the alleged appointment with Mr. Whitson, Mr. McCray was unable to articulate consistently when the meeting was to take place. Mr. McCray appeared confused and his answers varied from his earlier deposition testimony and the testimony of his sister. Furthermore, based on the records maintained by the City of Milton, Mr. McCray never submitted an application for the position of “Laborer” with the Public Works Department of the City of Milton. Mr. McCray attempts to supplement his claim of discrimination by establishing that the City of Milton has systematically discriminated against him by failing on more than one occasion to hire him. Specifically, Mr. McCray stated that prior to April 4, 1994, he applied for other positions with the City of Milton, and he was denied such positions. In particular, Mr. McCray stated that he applied for the position of mechanic and technician. In both instances raised by Mr. McCray, however, it appears, based on the record, that he either failed to adequately complete his job application or he failed to possess the minimum qualifications for the positions sought. As further evidence supporting his claim, Mr. McCray offered the testimony of his sister, Alicia Larkin. Ms. Larkin testified that she, like her brother, was the subject of discrimination by the City. The undersigned dismissed her testimony as lacking relevancy and more importantly lacking credibility. First, Ms. Larkin has a claim pending against the City alleging similar discriminatory practices and she appears to have a bias against the City. Second, Ms. Larkin’s testimony lacked consistency and lacked credibility. No evidence was presented to indicate that the City of Milton discriminated in its employment practices. Furthermore, the City presented testimony that it has and continues to develop fair employment practices relating to minorities. Specifically, the City of Milton, through Mr. Whitson, has met with the NAACP for the purpose of continuing to improve race relations between the City and the African-American community in Milton. In summary, the City has effectively rebutted the allegations raised by Mr. McCray. The City offered a series of witnesses that had personal knowledge of the employment policies and hiring practices of the City and each corroborated the other. Those witnesses collectively support a finding that the City did not discriminate against Mr. McCray.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing this claim with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Committee, Esquire 8870 Thunderbird Drive Pensacola, FL 32514-5661 Post Office Box 586 Milton, FL 32572 Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road
The Issue The issue presented is whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority."
Findings Of Fact The following facts have been stipulated by the parties: Petitioner, Brian L. Blair, is a Respondent in a case before DOAH styled, Florida Elections Commission v. Brian L. Blair, Case No. 09-2069, wherein the Florida Elections Commission ("Commission") has charged Mr. Blair with two counts of willfully accepting campaign contributions in excess of $500.00 in violation of Subsection 106.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner filed a Petition to Determine Invalidity of Existing Rule on August 28, 2009, wherein he alleges that the Commission Rule, Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. As a person subject to Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, and accused of willfully violating one of its prohibitions, Mr. Blair is substantially affected by the Commission's application of Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 to his case and, therefore, has the requisite standing to bring this action. In 2007, the Florida Legislature repealed Section 106.37, Florida Statutes (2006), which contained a definition of "willfulness" for purposes of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes. That section was repealed by CS/HB 537 (Section 51, Chapter 2007-30, Laws of Florida), effective January 1, 2008. Contemporaneous with the repeal of Section 106.37, Florida Statutes, the same legislation amended Subsection 106.25(3), Florida Statutes, to provide that willfulness is "a determination of fact." (§ 48, Chap. 2007-30, Laws of Florida, effective January 1, 2008). Subsection 106.25(3), Florida Statutes, currently provides: (3) For the purposes of commission jurisdiction, a violation shall mean the willful performance of an act prohibited by this chapter or chapter 104 or the willful failure to perform an act required by this chapter or chapter 104. Willfulness is a determination of fact; however, at the request of the respondent, willfulness may be considered and determined in an informal hearing before the commission. (Emphasis added.) The 2007 Legislative Session ended on May 4, 2007; CS/HB 537 was signed and approved by the Governor on May 22, 2007. On May 24 and 25, 2007, Barbara Linthicum, executive director of the Commission at the time, engaged in the following exchange via email with the Commission's attorney, Edward A. Tellechea, counsel of record in this case, regarding Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002: Ms. Linthicum: "Do you think we have authority to add chapter 106 to the willfulness rule?" Mr. Tellechea: ". . . Someone will challenge it[,] but what the heck[,] I'm game." Ms. Linthicum: "But, if you are game, I think we should definitely go ahead before January 1 comes along. You certainly do have a good track record defending our rules" The amendment of Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 was effective December 25, 2007. The repeal of the definition of "willfulness" in Section 106.37, Florida Statutes, became effective January 1, 2008. The proposed rule amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002 that is the subject of this proceeding was reviewed in 2007 by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee of the Florida Legislature, pursuant to Section 120.545, Florida Statutes, prior to its adoption, and the Committee made no written comments or filed any written objections. In order to determine whether willful violations of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, have occurred, the Commission employs the definition of "willful" contained in Florida Administrative Code Rule 2B-1.002, when making the factual determination of willfulness.
The Issue Does correspondence dated August 18, 1997, from John M. Awad, Ph.D., District Administrator for District II, State of Florida, Department of Children and Family Services, directed to Theodore R. Buri, Jr., Regional Director, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal employees, AFL-CIO, identify Respondent’s agency policy? If yes, is that policy a “Rule” as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996)? If a “Rule," has Respondent promulgated the policy in accordance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996)? If the policy is a “Rule” that has not been promulgated, does a statutory basis exist for its promulgation?
Findings Of Fact The individual Petitioners are employed at the Florida State Hospital. This is a mental health facility operated by the Respondent. The individual Petitioners have contact with the clients who reside in the hospital. Because those individual Petitioners have client contact in performing their employment at the hospital, Respondent, as their employer, is responsible for screening the employees to ascertain whether those individual Petitioners have been convicted of or pled guilty or nolo contendere to certain offenses set forth in Sections 435.03 and 435.04, Florida Statutes (1995). Such a finding would disqualify the employees from working directly with the clients. The requirement for screening is in accordance with Section 110.1127(3), and Section 394.4572, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Florida Public Employees Council 79, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), represents the individual Petitioners in collective bargaining between those Petitioners and the State of Florida. Each of the individual Petitioners received notification from Robert B. Williams, Hospital Administrator, Florida State Hospital, that each person had been declared ineligible to hold a position of “special trust” based upon certain offenses attributable to the Petitioners. The basis for the disqualifications was Chapter 435, Florida Statutes (1995). This meant that the individuals could not have client contact. As a consequence, Petitioners were told, through the correspondence notifying them of their disqualifications, that they could seek exemption from disqualification and/or contest the accuracy of the records declaring their disqualifications. All Petitioners sought relief from Respondent in accordance with Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes (1995), by requesting exemption from disqualification before the Respondent. Bobby Jones, Clarence Cornell Simmons, Freddie Lee, and Frank Lawrence Dickens were denied exemption. Whether those Petitioners have contested the preliminary decision by Respondent denying their exemption through hearing procedures set forth in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes is not known. The other Petitioners were granted exemption from disqualification by action of the Respondent. Before Respondent made its preliminary determination on eligibility, on August 13, 1997, Theodore R. Buri, Jr., Regional Director of AFSCME Florida Council 79, wrote to Dr. John Awad, District Administrator, District II, Department of Children and Family Services. The purpose of the letter concerned the disqualification of the individual Petitioners to continue work in positions of “special trust” by having contact with clients at Florida State Hospital. That correspondence stated: The above referenced employees have been previously notified of disqualification, allegedly under the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. These employees have notified Council 79, through their local union, that they are scheduled for a hearing on a possible exemption from the provisions of Chapter 435 on August 27, 1997. I have reviewed the documents of these individuals and I have found, without exception, that the charges which served as the basis of potential disqualification all occurred prior to October 1, 1995. As I am sure you are aware the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes, did not become effective until October 1, 1995. Further, the notations are consistent throughout Chapter 435, indicating that the provisions of Chapter 435 shall apply only to offenses committed subsequent to October 1, 1995. It appears that these, and other, employees are being improperly required by the Department to defend themselves against provisions of Florida Statutes which do not apply to them. I wish you would immediately review this concern with your legal department and direct Florida State Hospital to immediately make the affected employees whole and to terminate the pending actions against these employees. Your prompt attention in this matter is very much appreciated. On August 18, 1997, Dr. Awad responded to Mr. Buri’s inquiry through correspondence, in which Dr. Awad stated: The concerns expressed in your letter dated August 13, 1997, concerning background screenings were reviewed approximately a year and a half ago by an agency statewide workgroup, which included several background screening coordinators, District Legal Counsels, and attorneys from the General Counsel’s office. The legal research from that group resulted in the issuance of Agency policy addressing this and other statewide issues. In response to a question similar to that raised in your letter, Agency policy is that although Section 64 of Chapter 95-228, Laws of Florida, states that “this act shall take effect October 1, 1995, and shall apply to offenses committed on or after that date,” it applies only to the new criminal offense of “Luring or enticing a child” created by Section 1 of the law and does not apply to screening provisions. Therefore, in accordance with established principals [sic] of statutory construction, a person being rescreened after 10-1-95, must meet the requirements of the law in effect as of the date of the rescreening, which includes the broadened offenses, just as a new job applicant must meet such requirements. If you have any further questions concerning this matter, you may wish to have your attorney discuss this with the Agency’s General Counsel. The exemption hearings before Respondent were held on August 27, 1997, leading to the grant of exemptions for some Petitioners, and denial for others. Through their Petition to determine the invalidity of a “Rule," Petitioners allege and request the following relief: Although Chapter 435 of the Laws of Florida concerning employment screening specifically states that it applies to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1995, the Respondent applies employment screening to all employees and to all offenses regardless of the date of the offense. The Respondent articulated this policy of application in correspondence addressed to Theodore R. Buri from John Awad dated August 18, 1997,. . . The Respondent’s policy, as more fully described above, is a 'Rule' within the meaning of Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, because it is an 'agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of the agency.' Id. This rule should be declared an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority for the following reasons: The above described rule has not been adopted in substantial compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes; The Respondent has no statutory or rule authority to adopt the above described rule as applied to offenses predating October 1, 1995, thus the rule violates Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The rule imposes a civil penalty against the individually named Petitioners for which there is no specific statutory authority. The rule is arbitrary and capricious as applied to offenses predating October 1, 1995, and thus violates Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The rule adversely affects the Petitioners' substantial interest in continued employment in a position of 'special trust.' The rule is an unconstitutional impairment of the contract of employment. It unfairly burdens the Petitioners and others similarly situated with the duty to timely request and prove by clear and convincing evidence that [sic] either an entitlement to an exemption from disqualification or that the records are inaccurate. It is an oppressive and unreasonable condition of employment. As a penalty attached to an offense committed prior to October 1, 1995, the Rule is unlawful as an ex post facto law. The immediate removal from a position of trust before an employee may be heard denies the employee due process. The rule attacks a protected property and liberty interest of the individually named Petitioners and those similarly situated. The Agency’s actions against the Petitioners based on the Rule stigmatizes the employee. Petitioners also request that they be granted costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Section 120.595(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Chapter 95-228, Laws of Florida, referred to by Dr. Awad in his August 18, 1997, correspondence to Mr. Buri, created Chapter 435, Florida Statutes.
