Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original Notice of Appeal with the agency Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
Appeal For This Case This order is final agency action. Any party who is adversely affected by this order has the right to seek judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by filing a notice of administrative appeal pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the Clerk of the Florida Elections Commission at 107 West Gaines Street, Suite 224, Collins Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 and by filing a copy of the notice of appeal with the appropriate district court of appeal. The party must attach to the notice of appeal a copy of this order and include with the notice of appeal filed with the district court of appeal the applicable filing fees. The notice of administrative appeal must be filed within 30 days of the date of this order is filed with the Commission. The date this order was filed appears in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the order. ; Copies furnished to: Eric M. Lipman Assistant General Counsel Eric Ruiz, Respondent (certified mail) Division of Elections, Filing Officer
Findings Of Fact After the motion for continuance was again denied, petitioners declined to offer any evidence and petitioners announced that they would be pursuing certain supposed federal remedies.
The Issue Whether Respondent, when he voted April 18, 2002, as a member of the Palm Beach Gardens City Commission, on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, relating to Parcel 6 and Parcel 24, respectively, of the Mirasol development project, knew that these measures would inure to the special private gain or loss of a principal by whom he was retained and thereby violated Section 112. 3143(3), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order Finding Probable Cause, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the public hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the factual stipulations set forth in the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation2: Each of the "Sabatello construction companies" referred to in the parties' Stipulations of Fact 3 and 4 was wholly owned by Carl Sabatello and his brothers Paul, Theodore, and Michael Sabatello (Sabatello Brothers), with each brother owning an equal (25%) share of the company. Of these companies, only one, Sabatello Development Corporation IV (SD IV) was involved in the Mirasol Project. SD IV has been in continuous existence since its formation in or around the 1980's. Carl Sabatello serves as its president, "oversee[ing] all [of its] functions." SD IV is a Subchapter S corporation. As such, its profits are passed through to the Sabatello Brothers, its four shareholders, in equal amounts. Respondent is a certified public accountant. Since 1989, through his accounting firm, he has provided tax preparation services to SD IV and the Sabatello Brothers. His firm has derived "anywhere from 15 to 25%" of its total income from the monies received for providing these services. Before establishing his accounting firm in 1989, Respondent was SD IV's chief financial officer and one of its shareholders. Taylor Woodrow Communities (Taylor Woodrow) was the master developer of the Mirasol Project. Taylor Woodrow's Craig Perna had "overall responsibility for every aspect of the [Mirasol] development" project, including the "selection of builders." The builder selection process started with Mr. Perna getting the names of "prominent builders in the Palm Beach Gardens market" having "excellent reputation[s]" and then contacting them to inquire as to their interest in participating in the Mirasol Project. Carl Sabatello was among those Mr. Perna contacted. He was contacted (by telephone) in mid-May of 2000, and advised Mr. Perna he was "very interested" in having his company, SD IV, considered for selection as a builder in Mirasol. SD IV, was one of at least ten or 12 builders vying to be selected to participate in the Mirasol Project. Over a period of approximately eight months (from mid-May 2000, to mid-January 2001), Taylor Woodrow requested and obtained from SD IV and from the other would-be participants in the project (Other Builders) information and documents in order to evaluate these builders' qualifications for selection. In the latter part of 2000, prior to any selection having been made, Carl Sabatello requested the Palm Beach Gardens City Attorney, Leonard Rubin, Esquire, "to provide a [written] legal opinion as to [Mr. Sabatello's] obligation to abstain from voting in [his] official capacity on matters relating to Mirasol that come before the [Palm Beach Gardens] City Council." In response to Mr. Sabatello's request, Mr. Rubin prepared a written memorandum, dated December 5, 2000, which was provided, not only to Mr. Sabatello, but to all members of the Palm Beach Gardens City Council, including Respondent, as well as to the Interim City Manager. The memorandum read as follows: You have indicated that the Sabatello Companies, of which you are a principal, is currently in negotiations with the developers of the Mirasol Planned Community District ("PCD") to become a builder of homes within that community. Your activities as a builder would be limited to specific parcels or pods within the PCD. You asked this office to provide a legal opinion as to your obligation to abstain from voting in your official capacity on matters relating to Mirasol that come before the City Council. Voting conflicts for members of the City Council are governed by section 112.3143, Florida Statutes. Subsection (3)(a) provides that a municipal officer shall not vote in an official capacity on any measure that "would inure to the special gain" of the officer, a principal by whom the officer is retained, or a relative or business associate of the officer. According to the state Ethics Commission, the determination of whether the officer receives a special private gain is based upon the size of the class of persons affected by the vote at issue. The Mirasol PCD encompasses a variety of residential, commercial, recreational and community uses. The residential uses range from low density single family homes to high density multi-family apartments. It is anticipated that your company's activities will be limited to the construction of single family dwellings within a specific, identifiable parcel for which a site plan has already been approved. Because of this limited involvement, there does not appear to be any requirement that you abstain from every vote relating to the approval of plats, parcels and site plans within the entire Mirasol PCD. See CEO 85-62 (city council member not prohibited from voting on rezoning of property within a large redevelopment area where member's corporation owns a parcel of land within the same area). By way of example, the City Council's approval of the site plan for the fire station or the plat for Jog Road in no way inures to your or your company's special private gain. You would, however, be required to abstain from any additional votes relating to the specific parcels or pods within the community in which your company possesses or acquires an interest by virtue of a contractual relationship with the master developer. Where a conflict of interest exists, you are required to state the nature of your interest prior to the vote and file a voting conflict memorandum with the City Clerk, within 15 days. The existence of a voting conflict does not necessarily require you to abstain from all discussion relating to the matter (although you are free to do so). If you plan to participate in discussion of a matter in which you know you have a conflict, you must file a written conflict memorandum before the public meeting. You have also expressed concern that upon learning that your company will be building homes within Mirasol, members of the public may perceive a conflict of interest in all matters relating to Mirasol. To avoid the appearance of impropriety, it would be appropriate to make the following disclos[ure] prior to any vote: "While it is anticipated that the Sabatello Companies will be building homes within Mirasol, the matter before the City Council does not concern the areas in which such construction will take place and is wholly unrelated to any interest held by me or my corporations." Should you have any questions or be in need of additional information, please do not hesitate to contact this office. In January of 2001, Taylor Woodrow selected SD IV to build on Mirasol Parcel 4.3 It sent Carl Sabatello a letter dated January 22, 2001, advising him of the selection, along with a Parcel Builder Agreement and Exclusive Agency Brokerage Agreement for Mirasol Parcel 4. These agreements were fully executed in February of 2001. Sometime thereafter SD IV began building on Mirasol Parcel 4. SD IV was one of first builders to start construction in Mirasol. SD IV eventually purchased all 46 lots in Mirasol Parcel 4, constructing homes on each. All of the homes it built were sold. On or about October 18, 2001, at Respondent's request, Mr. Rubin prepared and distributed to Respondent and the other members of Palm Beach Gardens City Council a written memorandum designed to provide "clarification and confirmation from [the City Attorney's] office regarding a Council Member's obligation to vote on an item before the City Council." In this memorandum, Mr. Rubin made the following points: A council member must vote in the absence of a voting conflict or conflict of interest. Section 28[6].012, Florida Statutes, requires a member of the City Council, who is present at a meeting, to vote on an item before the Council unless there is, or appears to be, a conflict of interest or voting conflict pursuant to the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. * * * A voting conflict arises when the vote inures the Council member's own special private gain or loss of the special private gain or loss of the Council member's principal, family member or business associate. * * * The special private gain to the Council member depends on the size of the class of persons affected and is fact-specific. * * * The special private gain to the Council member must be direct and proximate. * * * In the event of a voting conflict, a Council member must disclose the nature of the conflict and abstain from voting. Mr. Rubin's memorandum "reinforced what [Respondent] already knew about the law." On April 18, 2002, the Palm Beach Gardens City Council voted on and passed two measures concerning the Mirasol Project, one, Resolution 54, 2002, dealing with Mirasol Parcel 6 (a 10.11 acre site within the development), and the other, Resolution 57, 2002, dealing with Mirasol Parcel 10 (a 14.6-acre site within the development). As the summary statement on its first page reflects, Resolution 54, 2002 was: A resolution of the City Council of the City of Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, providing for the approval of a site plan to allow for the development of 41 semi-custom homes, known as Mirasol Parcel 6, located within the Mirasol Planned Community District (PCD), as more particularly described herein; providing for conditions of approval; providing for waivers; providing for severability; providing for conflicts; and providing for an effective date. Section 5 of the resolution granted the following waivers: From Section 78-498 of the LDRs, to permit a 45-foot wide right-of-way. The code requires a minimum right-of-way width of 50 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a minimum lot width of 60 feet. The code requires a minimum width of 65 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit lot coverage of 50%. The code requires a maximum lot coverage of 35%. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a building side setback of 3 feet 1 inch on a "zero" side and 6 feet 11 inches on a "non-zero" side. The code requires a minimum side setback of 7.5 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a screen/accessory side setback of 3 feet 1 inch on a "zero" side and 5 feet on a "non-zero" side. The code requires a minimum side setback of 7.5 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a screen/accessory rear setback of 3 feet. The code requires a minimum setback of 10 feet. As the summary statement on its first page reflects, Resolution 57, 2002 was: A resolution of the City Council of the City of Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, providing for the approval of a site plan to allow for the development of 26 custom homes, known as Mirasol Parcel 10, located within the Mirasol Planned Community District (PCD), as more particularly described herein; providing for conditions of approval; providing for waivers; providing for severability; providing for conflicts; and providing for an effective date. Section 5 of the resolution granted the following waivers: From Section 78-498 of the LDRs, to permit a 45-foot wide right-of-way. The code requires a minimum right-of-way width of 50 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit lot coverage of 45%. The code requires a maximum lot coverage of 35%. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a building/screen side setback of 10 feet. The code requires a minimum side setback of 12 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit an accessory structure setback of 5 feet. The code requires a minimum side setback of 12 feet. From Section 78-141 of the LDRs, to permit a screen/accessory rear setback of 3 feet. The code requires a minimum setback of 10 feet. The "waivers" that were granted by Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002 were from the requirements of the Palm Beach Gardens Code that Taylor Woodrow, or whichever builder(s) it subsequently selected to build on the affected parcels, would otherwise have to meet. At the April 18, 2002, Palm Beach Gardens City Council meeting, Carl Sabatello orally announced to those in attendance, including Respondent, that he was going to abstain from voting on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, explaining that he was involved in discussions regarding the possible purchase of the two parcels that were the subject of these measures. At the time of the vote on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, although he may have been aware of the investment Mr. Sabatello's company had made in Mirasol Parcel 4, Respondent had no knowledge of any connection that Mr. Sabatello or his company may have had with Mirasol Parcel 6 and Mirasol Parcel 10 other than what Mr. Sabatello had told the audience at the meeting about the matter. As far as Respondent knew, neither Mr. Sabatello nor his company owned or had a contract to purchase Mirasol Parcel 6 or Mirasol Parcel 10. Respondent did not attempt to engage Mr. Sabatello in conversation or otherwise seek to find out more about the discussions Mr. Sabatello had referred to in his abstention announcement. Respondent did, however, consult with the Palm Beach Gardens City Attorney to determine whether or not he should vote on the resolutions. Respondent "knew [that the law required him] not to vote [on] things that a client had an interest in," but, based on what Mr. Sabatello had said at the meeting, he believed that Mr. Sabatello was merely "in a discussion phase" regarding the acquisition of an interest in Mirasol Parcel 6 and Mirasol Parcel 10 and that there had not been any agreement reached on the matter. He therefore voted on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, consistent with the advice that the Palm Beach Gardens City Attorney had given. Approval of the site plans for Mirasol Parcel 6 and Mirasol Parcel 10 (which the passage of Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, respectively, accomplished) was needed before any permits for building on those two parcels could be obtained. Mr. Sabatello, on April 18, 2002, filled out a voting conflict form (Form 88, Memorandum of Voting Conflict) explaining why he did not vote on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002. On the form, he indicated that these votes "inured to the special gain of Sabatello Development Corp, IV, Inc, by whom I am retained," and then added that this "company," of which he was "an officer and owner[,] [was] in the process of negotiating [the] purchasing of Pod 6 & Pod 10." At the time he cast his votes for Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, Respondent was "not privy" to the contents of Mr. Sabatello's completed voting conflict form. On April 30, 2002, 12 days after the votes on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, SD IV entered into an agreement with Taylor Woodrow to purchase all of the lots in Mirasol Parcel 6. It closed on lots 10, 11, 32, and 33 on September 25, 2002, and on the remaining lots in the parcel on January 3, 2003. SD IV built a home on every lot it purchased in Mirasol Parcel 6, and it sold every home it built. SD IV received a contract to purchase Mirasol Parcel 10, but it never executed the contract and therefore never acquired an interest in the parcel.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a public report finding the evidence presented at the public hearing in this case insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent violated Section 112.3143(3), Florida Statutes, by voting at the April 18, 2002, Palm Beach Gardens City Council meeting on Resolution 54, 2002 and Resolution 57, 2002, and dismissing the complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Arlene Schwartz, willfully violated Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes, which prohibits an officer or employee of the state, or of any county or municipality, from using his or her official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or a nomination of office, or coercing or influencing another person's vote or affecting the results thereof.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, documentary evidence, entire Transcript of Proceedings, and the facts admitted in the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent, Arlene Schwartz, as Mayor of the City of Margate, Florida, was a municipal officer on October 27, 2000, when she wrote a letter signed by her as Mayor, Margate, Florida, on official City of Margate stationery, endorsing Howard Forman for Clerk of Court, Broward County, Florida. Respondent has 10 years of experience as a candidate, elected official or member of municipal boards. Eugene Steinfeld was City Attorney, City of Margate, for 24 years; as such he gave advice to the Mayor and Commissioners of the City of Margate about their responsibilities under the Florida Ethics Code and Elections Laws. In 1994, in his capacity as City Attorney, Mr. Steinfeld authored a City of Margate Resolution which authorized the Mayor, Vice Mayor and City Commissioners "to use a facsimile of the official seal of the City of Margate in correspondence, promotion, or advertising when they are promoting the City of Margate. " On January 24, 2000, in his capacity as City Attorney, Mr. Steinfeld sent an inter-office memorandum to Respondent and others advising "there is no prohibition for endorsing a candidate for City Commission by another candidate for City Commission . . . ; it is only where a candidate expends money for another candidate or contributes things of value to another candidate that is prohibited, pursuant to FS. 104.071." In September 2000, Mr. Steinfeld had a conversation with Respondent wherein she asked if she would be permitted to endorse a candidate for a board position in a development district. In advising her that she could, he recalled saying, "You do not lose your freedom of speech when you become an elected official." On October 23, 2000, Respondent attended a meeting of the Margate Democratic Club where Howard Forman, a candidate for Clerk of Court, Broward County, spoke. As a State Senator, Mr. Forman had assisted the City of Margate even though Margate was not in his Senate District. Respondent orally endorsed Mr. Forman at the meeting and offered her assistance. On October 25, 2000, Respondent's office received a telephone call from Iris Siple who worked in Mr. Forman's campaign. Respondent returned the call on October 26, 2000, and was asked to write a letter endorsing Mr. Forman on city stationery. The letter was written on October 27, 2000, and later faxed to Mr. Forman's campaign headquarters. Mr. Forman's campaign reproduced the letter and mailed approximately 700 copies to potential voters. Respondent received no remuneration or benefit for writing the endorsement letter. Respondent acknowledged that she had no specific discussion with the City Attorney regarding the appropriateness of using city stationery in the endorsement letter. Nevertheless, she believed that writing the endorsement letter was something that she could do without violating the law. Based on the evidence presented, including the resolution allowing the use of the seal in correspondence promoting the city, the memorandum and advice given by the City Attorney, and her reliance on the request made by Mr. Forman's campaign office for a letter on city stationery, the undersigned finds that Respondent's belief that she had done nothing inappropriate in writing the endorsement letter to be credible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, Arlene Schwartz, did not violate Subsection 104.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: J. David Bogenschutz, Esquire Bogenschutz & Dutko 600 South Andrews Avenue Suite 500 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-2802 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent, Raul Aguilera, committed the violation alleged in an Administrative Complaint, DPBR Case Number 2007-065018, issued by Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation on January 12, 2009, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of community association management pursuant to Chapters 455 and 468, Florida Statutes. Raul Aguilera is and was at the times material to this proceeding a licensed Florida Community Association Manager (hereinafter referred to as a “CAM”), having been issued license number CAM 6844. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Aguilera’s address of record was 2200 Northwest 102nd Avenue, Apartment 5, Miami, Florida. Courts of Birdwood Condominium Association. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Aguilera served as the Manager of SPM Group, Inc., and as the CAM for the Courts of Birdwood Condominium Association (hereinafter referred to as the “Association”). The Association’s 2007 Election. On or about October 16, 2007, the Department received a petition package from residents of the Association requesting the appointment of an election monitor (hereinafter referred to as the “Petition”), an Association election that had been scheduled for November 7, 2007. The Petition was reviewed and determined to be complete. At the time of receipt of the Petition, Danielle Carroll was the Department’s “Condominium Ombudsmen.” See § 718.5011, Fla. Stat. Among other powers, Section 718.5012(5), Florida Statutes, grants the following power to the Condominium Ombudsmen: (5) To monitor and review procedures and disputes concerning condominium elections or meetings, including, but not limited to, recommending that the division pursue enforcement action in any manner where there is reasonable cause to believe that election misconduct has occurred. Section 718.5012(9), Florida Statutes, establishes the Condominium Ombudsmen’s authority with regard to elections disputes: (9) Fifteen percent of the total voting interests in a condominium association, or six unit owners, whichever is greater, may petition the ombudsman to appoint an election monitor to attend the annual meeting of the unit owners and conduct the election of directors. The ombudsman shall appoint a division employee, a person or persons specializing in condominium election monitoring, or an attorney licensed to practice in this state as the election monitor. All costs associated with the election monitoring process shall be paid by the association. The division shall adopt a rule establishing procedures for the appointment of election monitors and the scope and extent of the monitor's role in the election process. Pursuant to the foregoing quoted charge, Ms. Carroll first verified that 15 percent of the Association’s residents had signed the Petition requesting the appointment of a monitor. Once Ms. Carroll had verified that she was authorized and, indeed, required to appoint an election monitor for the Association, she sent a letter dated October 7, 2007, addressed to the “Board of Directors” of the Association notifying them that the Petition had been received, that it had been determined to be complete and sufficient, and that she had, pursuant to the authority of Section 718.5012(9), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61B-00215, “appointed an election monitor to attend and conduct the election of directors at your association’s annual meeting.” Ms. Carroll also informed the Association that “all costs associated with the election monitoring process shall be paid by the association.” Once a request for an election monitor has been received and verified, the Condominium Ombudsmen will not cancel the monitor unless the scheduled election is cancelled. In response to Ms. Carroll’s October 7, 2007, letter, Mr. Aguilera spoke with Ms. Carroll by telephone on or about October 25, 2007. During this conversation, Mr. Aguilera told Ms. Carroll that “the Board members aren’t running for re- election and so there wasn’t going to be an election.” In fact, while the dispute that had led to the filing of the Petition had been resolved, the November 7, 2007, election had not been cancelled, which Mr. Aguilera was fully aware of. In a letter dated October 29, 2007, from Mr. Aguilera to Ms. Carroll, Mr. Aguilera confirmed that there would be no election: IN RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER DATED OCTOBER 25, 2007 [NOT OFFERED AT HEARING], I MUST ADVISE THAT THERE WAS NO ELECTION BEING HELD DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE PRERSON THAT FILLED [SIC] PETITION FOR RLECTION MONITOR WILL BE ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AUTOMATICALLY. NO MEMBERS OF THE PRIOR BOARD OF DIRECTORS SIGNEDUP FOR THE ELECTIONS [SIC]. . . . . Mr. Aguilera’s representation to Ms. Carroll in the October 29, 2007, letter was only partially correct, as Mr. Aguilera was fully aware. What had actually happened was that the Petition had been signed and filed because the residents who signed it were upset with the current Board of Directors. The persons on the Association’s Board of Directors who the residents signing the Petition were upset with decided not to run for re-election. This decision eliminated the concern which had generated the Petition. Additionally, Mr. Aguilera was concerned about the costs associated with having a monitor at the election. In an effort to avoid the costs of the monitor, Mr. Aguilera simply told Ms. Carroll that the election had been cancelled. Despite Mr. Aguilera’s representations to the contrary, the election of the Association’s Board of Directors was held as scheduled on November 7, 2007. Seven candidates were listed on the election ballot and five of those individuals were elected. Because the number of candidates exceeded the number of positions, the election was necessary. See § 719.112(2)(d)1., Fla. Stat. In a letter dated December 10, 2007, from Mr. Aguilera to the Department’s Bureau Chief-Investigations, Mr. Aguilera admitted that he “made a wrong decision and wrote a letter to give some answers to the (DPBR) request.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order finding that Mr. Aguilera committed the violation described in this Recommended Order and imposing the following penalties: Probation for 12 months, beginning upon the entry of the final order in this case; Payment of an administrative fine in the amount of $750.00; Attendance at 12 hours of continuing education in CAM practice to be completed within his probation period; and Payment to the Department of costs of $316.12. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip F. Monte, III, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Raul Aguilera 2200 Northwest 102nd Avenue Apartment 5 Miami, Florida 33172 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Anthony B. Spivey, Executive Director Regulatory Council of Community Association of Managers Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Ms. Spence-Jones committed the offenses set forth in the Order of Probable Cause, filed September 1, 2006, and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact FEC received a sworn complaint against Ms. Spence-Jones from Mr. Dunn on or about January 20, 2006. Mr. Dunn alleged the following in his sworn complaint: Michelle Spence-Jones violated F.S. 104.271 with false and malicious charges against and about me on November 26, 27, 28, & 29th [sic] with thousands of campaign literature distributed to residents in the City of Miami, District 5. Along with a radio commercial with slander on radio stations . . . in Miami on November 29th election day by her campaign manager/advisor . . . The Michelle Spence-Jones campaign paid for individuals to vote for Michelle Spence-Jones $50 per vote! . . . F.S. 104.061. The City of Miami, Manager . . . violated F.S. 104.31 as documented in the Miami New Times article attached. Affidavits, campaign literature, and photograph were attached to the sworn complaint. Mr. Dunn’s sworn complaint asserted factually specific violations that Ms. Spence-Jones, in her campaign literature that was distributed on dates certain, made false and malicious charges against and about him; that, on election day, radio commercials by her campaign manager/advisor contained slander; that her campaign paid individuals to vote for her; and that the City of Miami’s Manager violated a specified statutory provision as documented in a news article, attached to his sworn complaint. Further, his sworn complaint cited statutorily specific violations for the factually specific violations— Sections 104.271, 104.061, and 104.31, Florida Statutes. An investigator with FEC investigated Mr. Dunn’s sworn complaint. After the investigation, a Staff Recommendation was prepared. The Staff Recommendation was submitted to FEC. The Staff Recommendation recommended that probable cause be found for the following: two counts for violating Sections 106.12(3), Florida Statutes; three counts for violating Section 106.143(1)(a), Florida Statutes; two counts for violating Section 106.1439(1), Florida Statutes; and one count for violating Section 106.19(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Further, the Staff Recommendation recommended that no probable cause be found for the following: violating Sections 104.061(2),104.271(2), and 106.15(3), Florida Statutes. On September 1, 2006, FEC filed an Order of Probable Cause finding probable cause to charge Ms. Spence-Jones with the following: Count 1: On or about November 28, 2005, [she] violated Section 106.12(3), Florida Statutes, prohibiting a person from spending petty cash on unauthorized items, when [she] spent $22,910 to pay campaign workers with cash. Count 2: On or about November 28, 2005, [she] violated Section 106.12(3), Florida Statutes, prohibiting a person from spending petty cash on unauthorized items, when [she] spent $1,090.75 cash for food and other supplies to several vendors. Count 3: Between November 23 and November 29, 2005, [she] violated Section 106.143(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by failing to mark prominently the political advertisement with the correct disclaimer, when she published the ad “Will a man rob God?” on the radio without the proper disclaimer. Count 4: Between November 23 and November 29, 2005, [she] violated Section 106.143(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by failing to mark prominently the political advertisement with the correct disclaimer, when she published the ad “Michelle Spence-Jones is a strong black woman...” on the radio without the proper disclaimer. Count 5: On or about November 26, 2005, [she] violated Section 106.143(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by failing to mark prominently the political advertisement with the correct disclaimer, when she published the flyer “Don’t Gamble on Rev. Richard Dunn” without the proper disclaimer. (Exhibit 15 attached to Report of Investigation). Count 6: Between November 23 and November 29, 2005, [she] violated Section 106.1439(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to mark prominently the electioneering communication with the correct disclaimer, when she published the ad stating, “... Again, I’m Michelle Spence- Jones, candidate for City of Miami Commission District Five. Happy Thanksgiving. May God continue to bless you and keep you well...” without any disclaimer. Count 7: Between November 23 and November 29, 2005, [she] violated Section 106.1439(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to mark prominently the electioneering communication with the correct disclaimer, when she published the ad stating, “...I’m Michelle Spence-Jones, candidate for City of Miami Commission District Five. As we recover from this year’s hurricane season, we were encouraged by the kindness of others who have given to their neighbors in their time of need...” without any disclaimer. Count 8: On or about November 28, 2005, [she] violated Section 106.19(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by making or authorizing an expenditure prohibited by Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, when [she] authorized her campaign treasurer to spend $24,000 to pay campaign workers and to purchase food with cash and subsequently ratified those cash expenditures by signing the 2005 termination report. Further, the Order of Probable Cause found no probable cause to charge Ms. Spence-Jones with the following: Section 104.061(2), Florida Statutes, prohibiting a person from giving or promising anything of value to a person intending to buy that person’s or another’s vote or to corruptly influence that person or another in casting his vote; Section 104.271(2), Florida Statutes, prohibiting a candidate from making false and defamatory factual statements with malice about an opposing candidate; and Section 106.15(3), Florida Statutes, prohibiting a candidate from using the services or any municipal officer or employee during working hours for furthering her candidacy for nomination or election to public office. Ms. Spence-Jones disputed the Order of Probable Cause and requested a hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings. On January 16, 2007, Ms. Spence-Jones filed a Motion to Dismiss Proceeding for Lack of Jurisdiction or for Summary Final Order, together with one exhibit. On January 24, 2007, FEC filed a Response in Opposition, together with five exhibits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order dismissing the Order of Probable Cause, Counts one through eight, for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2007.
The Issue Whether the Respondent violated Section 106.09(1), Florida Statutes, by accepting four cash contributions in excess of the legal limit.
Findings Of Fact 1. Respondent was a candidate for the Orlando City Commission, District 5, in the March 2010 election. 2. On July 13, 2009, Respondent filed his 2009 Q2 campaign treasurer’s report covering the period of April 1, 2009, through June 30, 2009. Respondent certified that the report was true, correct, and complete. Respondent’s report listed four $100 cash contributions received on May 15, 2009.' The four cash contributions were from Virginia Howell, Enrique Howell, Judith White, and Sam Cahman. 3. On July 20, 2009, Alana Brenner, the Orlando City Clerk, sent Respondent a letter notifying him that she discovered what appeared to be several items on his 2009 Q2 report which may be election law violations. Ms. Brenner listed the four excessive cash contributions as possible violations. . 4. On the bottom of page 23 of the June 2008 Candidate’s Handbook (Handbook), it states in bold letters that effective January 1, 2008, the maximum contribution a person can accept in cash or by means of a cashier’s check is $50. 5. Respondent testified in his November 5, 2009, affidavit that he possessed and had read the Handbook. | 6. On August 29, 2009, Respondent sent the Commission’s investigator, Cedric Oliver, a letter that stated: In response to Commission Daisy Lynum’s complaint to the election office in regards to the acceptance of four cash contribution[s] of $100.00, the Vibert White Campaign committee has taken steps to reverse this benign and small error. Due to our mistake in following the guidelines of an older election manuscript that allows for $100.00 cash gifts we failed to consult the newer " Respondent mislabeled the 2009 Q2 report as a G1 report. Faa004 (7/09) instructional guide that allows for only $50.00 cash offerings. Thus, we are sending the contributions back to the donors. 7. Despite Respondent’s promise to send back the excessive cash contributions, there was no record of the cash being returned to the contributors. 8. On October 12, 2009, after the complaint was filed in this case, Respondent filed an amended 2009 Q2 campaign report. Respondent certified the report was true, correct, and complete. On the report, Respondent changed the four May 15, 2009, $100 cash contributions to four August 11, 2009, $100 check contributions. 9. There was no record of the four checks being deposited in Respondent’s campaign bank account. 10. Respondent’s conduct was willful. Respondent accepted the four excessive cash contributions while showing reckless disregard for whether he was prohibited from accepting cash contributions in excess of $50.
Conclusions For Commission Eric M. Lipman General Counsel 107 W. Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, FL 32399 For Respondent Frederic O’Neal - PO Box 842 Windermere, FL 34786
Appeal For This Case This order is final agency action. Any party who is adversely affected by this order has the right to seek judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by filing a notice of administrative appeal pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the Clerk of the Florida Elections Commission at 107 West Gaines Street, Suite 224, Collins Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050, and by filing a copy of the notice of appeal with the appropriate district court of appeal. The party must attach to the notice of appeal a copy of this order and include with the notice of appeal filed with the district court of appeal the applicable filing fees. The notice of administrative appeal must be filed within 30 days of the date of this order is filed with the Commission. ‘The date this order was filed appears in the upper right-hand corer of the first page of the order. Copies furnished to: Eric M. Lipman, General Counsel Vibert White, Respondent (certified mail) Frederic O’Neal, Attorney for Respondent (certified mail) Daisy W. Lynum, Complainant Florida Division of Elections, Filing Officer Faa004 (7/09) ae
