The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner's Petition for Relief is untimely, and if not, whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act against Petitioner contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact S.M.A.R.T. is a company that provides mechanics, electricians, avionics inspectors, sheet metal laborers, and other technical employees to aircraft maintenance and repair companies on a temporary basis. In 1996, S.M.A.R.T. supplied Respondent with temporary contract laborers at Respondent's aircraft maintenance facility in Lake City, Florida. For example, S.M.A.R.T. supplied Respondent with approximately 25 percent of its 450 mechanics. Respondent did not maintain personnel files or conduct performance evaluations on S.M.A.R.T.'s contract laborers. Respondent provided S.M.A.R.T. with the number of man-hours that contract laborers worked so that S.M.A.R.T. could pay its employees. In 1996, Petitioner worked for S.M.A.R.T. as a contract laborer at Respondent's Lake City facility. Petitioner's work as a parts researcher required him to make sure that Respondent's customers, owners and operators of aircraft, had the right parts for their aircraft. On March 28, 1996, S.M.A.R.T. terminated Petitioner's employment due to a lack of work at Respondent's Lake City facility. Being laid off from a contract job as a parts researcher at a specific site was not unusual when an aircraft owner or operator stopped sending planes to the facility and the temporary labor company had no other work available for its employee. After being laid off by S.M.A.R.T., Petitioner was unemployed for a time. In November 1996, Kitty Hawk Air Cargo (Kitty Hawk) was Respondent's customer at the Lake City facility. Pursuant to a contract between Respondent and Kitty Hawk, some of Kitty Hawk's aircraft were being changed into freighters. Kitty Hawk had a separate contract with Allen Aircraft Radio Corporation (AAR) for customer-supplied parts. Under the contract, AAR acted as a parts vendor and supplied Kitty Hawk with parts researchers. Respondent did not have a role in Kitty Hawk's choice of AAR as a supplier of parts. Sometime after he was laid-off by S.M.A.R.T., Petitioner applied for employment with AAR as a parts researcher. Petitioner had an interview with AAR for a job at Respondent's Lake City facility. After the interview, Petitioner was under the impression that AAR had hired him for that job. Petitioner subsequently learned that he did not have a job with AAR. AAR never told Petitioner why he was not hired. Petitioner did not know the name, age, or qualifications of the person that AAR hired for the position at issue here. Petitioner did not know whether AAR had hired anyone for the position he was seeking. AAR's contract with Kitty Hawk terminated in 1996 except for aircraft then in Respondent's facility. The last of Kitty Hawk's aircraft departed Respondent's facility in March 1997. At that time, any employees of AAR at the Lake City facility would have either been laid off or transferred to another AAR job site. Respondent hired Dick Perkins on July 20, 1995, as a Manager of A & P Mechanics. Since that time, AAR has promoted Mr. Perkins to Director of Maintenance. Mr. Perkins had no involvement with AAR when it was working on Kitty Hawk's aircraft at the Lake City facility. Mr. Perkins had no responsibility over the Kitty Hawk contract in 1996. Petitioner did not personally overhear Mr. Perkins make a statement about him. Rather, Petitioner relies on statements allegedly made by Mr. Perkins, overheard by Doug Yormick, repeated to Tom Welcome, then relayed to Petitioner. At times relevant to this case, Mr. Yormick and Mr. Welcome were employees of S.M.A.R.T. Competent evidence indicates as follows: (a) Mr. Perkins does not know Petitioner; (b) Mr. Perkins never made a statement to anyone that he did not want that "old son-of-a-bitch" working on Respondent's property; (c) Mr. Perkins never made any statement relating to Petitioner's age; (d) Mr. Perkins never talked with anyone at AAR regarding the person AAR would hire as a parts researcher; (e) Mr. Perkins never talked with Keith Wild/Wilder, Bob Sorrentino, or Bob Sonne/Sonner at AAR. After November 19, 1999, Petitioner worked for several other companies, including but not limited to, Piping Design Systems in Orlando, Florida, and a company in Mexico.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
Findings Of Fact Documentary evidence was received that Hangar Two, Inc. was chartered on April 4, 1980, and had "Hangar Two, Inc." and its unique logo registered as a service mark on June 18, 1980. See Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 6. Documentary evidence was received that Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was incorporated on November 25, 1980. See Exhibits 4 and 5. Wallace I. Garrick testified on behalf of Hangar Two, Inc. Garrick has been the attorney for Carl Knight for a number of years and handled the incorporation of Hangar Two, Inc. for Knight. For several years, Knight has been engaged in the business of repairing, rebuilding and maintaining aircraft. Garrick has been to Knight's place of business many times. The business was located at North Perry Airport for a number of years and did business as Hangar Knight was forced to move his business and incorporated his business as Hangar Two, Inc. The business of the corporation is the repair and maintenance of aircraft. Knight moved his business to a building on the southeast corner of the same airport, which he caused to be identified and marked with his service mark "Hangar 2." See Exhibit 6. Located in this building when Knight moved there was an aircraft repair and maintenance business operated by George Ritch. Thereafter, Ritch retained a one-room office and leased a small portion of the floor space for his business use. Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was incorporated by Milton Margulies, a local attorney. Its primary Director and agent for service of process is Jean S. Morse, an employee of Margulies. Garrick was advised by Margulies that he had incorporated Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. for George Ritch, and that he had no further relationship with the corporation or with Ritch. Incorporation of Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was sought after the date that Knight's business moved into the same building occupied by Ritch and after the date Knight's business was incorporated in the name Hangar Two, Inc. Incorporation of Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. was not in good faith. Both corporations are engaged in the same business, aircraft repair and maintenance, and their principal places of business are located in the same building at the same airport. Garrick has seen bills and other mail intended for Ritch's business delivered to Knight's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of State revoke the reservation for the corporate name Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Wallace I. Garrick, Esquire Concord Building, Suite 1000 66 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Jean S. Morse, Registered Agent Hanger Two Aviation, Inc. 2020 NE 163rd Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Stephen Nall, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George Firestone, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Thomas A. Baggett, was at all times material hereto licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot in Tampa Bay. On May 15, 1984, Captain Baggett was employed to undock the M/V Hybur Tropic (Tropic) from Berth 264, Port of Tampa, and to pilot her outbound through Tampa Bay. The Tropic is 238 feet long, with approximately a 32 foot beam, and a draft of over 7 feet. She is powered by a direct drive diesel engine and backs to port. Because the Tropic is direct drive, it takes a minute to a minute and a half to shift the direction of the engine; and another minute to a minute and a half to make headway in the opposite direction. At slow astern, the Tropic will achieve a speed of 2-3 knots in less than two ships' lengths. At or about 1820 hours, May 15, 1984, Captain Baggett ordered the Tug Dorothy to make up a hawser to the center chock aft of the Tropic and pull the stern of the Tropic, which was moored port side to Berth 264, away from the dock. Captain Baggett maneuvered the Tropic's stern around the bow of the M/V Carib Haven which was moored within 100 to 150 feet of Berth 264 on the south side of the slip, and positioned the Tropic in the center of the west end of the slip. Captain Baggett then ordered the Tug Dorothy to pull the Tropic backward out of the slip and ordered the Tropic's engine to slow astern. As the stern of the Tropic exited the slip into Ybor Channel, Captain Baggett ordered the Tug Dorothy to pull the stern of the Tropic to the north, but did not order any engine change. Finally, as the bow of the Tropic cleared the slip, and was in the Ybor Channel, Captain Baggett ordered the Tropic's engines to slow ahead. When she entered the Ybor Channel the Tropic was making a minimum of 2-3 knots, and with the assist provided by the Tug Dorothy more probably 4-5 knots. Captain Baggett's handling of the Tropic placed the Tug Dorothy in a position of peril, and rendered her ineffectual. By continuing slow astern, after ordering the tug to pull the Tropic's stern to the north, the Tropic's tendency to back to port worked against the tug's efforts. By continuing to back the Tropic's engine until her bow had cleared the slip, the Tropic backed past the tug and began to trip her. With water coming over the tug's port side, and the danger of tipping over imminent, the tug's deckhand released the hawser to the Tropic, and the Tropic backed past her into the side of the barge IOS 3301, which was moored on the east side of the Ybor Channel immediately east of the slip the Tropic exited. Captain Baggett's assertion that a collision would have been avoided if the Tug Dorothy had not released the hawser is unpersuasive. At the time the hawser was released, Captain Baggett's handling of the Tropic had already rendered the tug ineffectual, and a collision with the barge 105 3301 inevitable. When Captain Baggett finally ordered the Tropic's engine slow ahead, her bow had cleared the slip and she was moving astern at a minimum of 2 knots. By that time, the Tropic's stern was only 180 feet from the side of the barge 105 3301. At 2 knots the Tropic would cover 200 feet in one minute. Accordingly, before the Tropic's engine could even start ahead, she had backed into the barge. Captain Baggett sought to justify his backing of the Tropic through testimony that he used the Tropic's tendency to back to port to keep her bow from falling down on the M/V Carib Haven. However, by the time the Tropic's stern exited the slip, her bow was already clear of the M/V Carib Haven. Further, Captain Baggett conceded that the Tug Dorothy, even with existing shipping in the slip, was capable of safely towing the Tropic into the Ybor Channel without any assist from the Tropic's engine. Captain Baggett failed to offer any persuasive evidence which would exculpate him. 1/ Wind, weather and current conditions were not unfavorable at the time of the collision, and the Tropic did not experience any mechanical problems.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by Thomas P. Crapps, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondent, Lee Auto Group, Inc., be granted a license to sell motorcycles manufactured by Astronautic Bashan Motorcycle manufacturer Co. Ltd. (BASH) at 8181 Mainline Parkway, Fort Myers (Lee County), Florida 33912, upon compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. Filed September 24, 2012 9:17 AM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this 3 ( day of September, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ulie Baker, Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this o | day of September, 2012. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jc Copies furnished: Meiredith Huang Peace Industry Group (USA), Inc. 6600 B Jimmy Carter Boulevard Norcross, Georgia 30071 Kyle A. Lee Lee Auto Group, Inc. 8181 Mainline Parkway Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Chauncey Solinger Ride Green, Inc. 5686 Youngquist Road Fort Myers, Florida 33912 Thomas P. Crapps Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Respondent, Thomas A. Baggett has been licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot in Tampa Bay for fifteen (15) years and at all times pertinent to this proceeding was licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot. On February 5, 1984, at about 0620 hours, while Captain Baggett was piloting M/V Triton C outbound from the Gardinier Wharf in Hillsborough County, Florida, the M/V Triton C ran aground outside the prescribed limits of CUT D in Tampa Bay on the east side. The M/V Triton C is a Liberian bulk carrier with an approximate length and width of 576.7 feet and 81 feet, respectively, with a gross tonnage of 17,823 tons. At the time of grounding, the M/V Triton C had a forward draft of 29 feet, 11 inches and an aft draft of 30 feet and 1 inch. The M/V Triton C was experiencing no engine or navigational equipment problem before it ran aground. All aids to navigation, including ranges and buoys, were in place and working properly at the time of the grounding. The M/V Triton was travelling at a speed of 11.7 knots. Range lights, when properly aligned, provide a way for the pilot or anyone navigating a vessel to know the vessel is in the center of the channel. On the morning of February 5, 1985, shortly before the grounding of the M/V Triton C, Captain Baggett gave orders for the turn from CUT E into CUT D, or from a heading of 198 degrees to a heading of 213 degrees. Captain Baggett ordered the wheel 20 degrees to starboard and then eased to 10 degrees. Captain Baggett then ordered the quartermaster to midship the wheel and steady the vessel on 213 degrees. He gave no instructions to the quartermaster concerning the use of the range lights for navigating the center of the channel. At this point the confusion begins. Captain Baggett testified that the M/V Triton C steadied up on 213 degrees, an appropriate course for the transit of CUT D, while he was present and he observed the M/V Triton C as being on the ranges for about 2 minutes before going into the chart room. As he stepped back into the chart room, he glanced at the compass and observed that the vessel was on a heading of 213 degrees. Captain Baggett gave no further instructions or orders other than "hard to starboard" when he came out of the chart room 15-20 seconds later and noticed the bow swinging to port, the rudder indicator showing 20 degrees rudder and the ranges being already opened. Captain Baggett testified that upon giving the order "hard to starboard" the quartermaster pulled the wheel and went "hard to port" and the vessel almost immediately went aground. The mate and quartermaster tell a different story. The master was below and not present on the bridge at the time of grounding. The mate testified that Captain Baggett went into the chart room while the compass was swinging through 210 degrees and before the vessel steadied up on 213 degrees, and that Captain Baggett remained in the chart room for 40 seconds to 1 minute and came out as the vessel went aground. The quartermaster testified that Captain Baggett went into the chart room immediately upon the vessel steadying up on 213 degrees, and did not stay to watch the course or range for 2 minutes. He further testified that Captain Baggett was in the chart room for 5-6 minutes; that he came out of the chart room as the vessel went aground; and, Captain Baggett gave no order of "hard to starboard". The quartermaster at the time of the grounding was Maheswaran Gnanasundran and the mate was Siburs Ioannas. As evidenced by the depositions, both were foreign; neither spoke English and each required an interpreter at the deposition. The master of the M/V Triton C on the day of grounding was Stamatios Stanou, a citizen of Greece, and required an interpreter for his deposition. Captain Baggett experienced a communication problem with quartermaster Gnanasundran in the beginning of the turn out of CUT E to CUT D, and earlier with another quartermaster at the beginning of the turn out of Hilisborough A CUT into Hillsborougn C CUT who was on duty just prior to quartermaster Gnanasundran. The M/V Triton C was at a heading of 206 degrees immediately after grounding and did not move significantly from that heading while grounded. Both the mate and the quartermaster testified that the M/V Triton C, after steadying up, stayed on the course heading of 213 degrees during the entire time and was on the same course heading when the vessel went aground. The mate testified that as the M/V Triton C began to run aground it began to list to the right, and its heading as it finally came to rest aground was 206 degrees. The master of the M/V Triton C testified that the wind was out of the northwest at 15 knots, with full tide, and the current being with M/V Triton C at about 2 knots. Captain John C. Hanson, an investigator for petitioner, testified that at the time of grounding, based on tidal information and weather reports, the wind was out of the northwest and there was an ebb tide running in a southerly direction which would tend to set the M/V Triton C in a southerly direction to the east of CUT D. Captain Hanson further testified that these conditions would have an effect on navigation. Captain Baggett testified that there was an ebb tide in a southwest direction and that it would tend to set to the southwest but at that point in time, it would have had very little effect on the M/V Triton C. Therefore, he did not make any allowances for the tide, wind, or a combination of them. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 shows the mean lower low water depth outside of the confines of the channel in the area of grounding to be 24 feet to 25 feet. Captain Hanson testified that the chart was current but that the depth of the water in a Particular area could be deeper, depending upon tides and winds. Captain Baggett testified that soundings taken on February 5, 1985, during the morning of grounding, put the depth of the water at the bow (point of grounding) and stern to be 25 feet and 37 feet, respectively and, that he visually observed, after daylight the stern of the vessel as being located in the ship channel of CUT D. The ship channel in CUT D has an approximate width of 400 feet with shoaling on both sides. Captain Hanson boarded the M/V Triton C 3 days after the grounding and testified that he plotted the position where the vessel went aground by taking "crossbearings of fixed structures, (no floating aids) and one radar range to one of the radar structures." Captain Hanson plotted the position of the M/V Triton C to be on the east side of CUT D, at a point 450 feet from the centerline of the CUT D approximately 1325 yards from a midpoint between buoys 1E and 2E. For an exact position see Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The crossbearings used to locate the exact position of the M/V Triton C are shown on the chart on the right side of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The left side of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 is an enlargement of CUT D prepared by Captain Hanson showing the various courses the M/V Triton C could have taken from a point abeam of buoys 1E and 2E to the position of grounding based on the speed of the M/V Triton C at 11.7 knots. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates that if the point of grounding was 450 feet from the centerline of the channel, as Captain Hanson testified, and, the M/V Triton C grounded on the heading of 206 degrees, then, at that heading, the stern of a vessel 576.7 feet long could not have reached the channel. Captain Hanson's testimony concerning his method of locating the position of the M/V Triton C, the crossbearing used and the calculations went unrebutted. With a vessel drafting 29 feet 11 inches forward and the point of grounding being 450 feet from the centerline of the channel, the depth of the water outside the confines of the channel along the heading taken by the M/V Triton C was deeper than 25 feet or the grounding would have occurred sooner and at a point closer to the east bank of CUT D. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of the quartermaster that the M/V Triton C steadied up on 213 degrees after making the turn from CUT E to CUT D and steered that course for five to six minutes while Captain Baggett was in the chart room is incorrect as to how long Captain Baggett was in the chart room, because the vessel would have travelled beyond the point of grounding in 5 to 6 minutes. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of the mate that Captain Baggett went into the chart room while the compass was swinging through 210 degrees and before the vessel steadied up on 213 degrees and that the vessel went aground within 40 seconds to 1 minute while Captain Baggett was still in the chart room is incorrect as to how long Captain Baggett was in the chart room because the vessel could not have travelled to the point of grounding in 40 seconds to 1 minute from the time it made the turn out of CUT E into CUT D. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of Captain Baggett that the vessel steadied up on a heading of 213 degrees in the center of CUT D and that he viewed the ranges in line for 2 minutes before going to the chart room and that "almost immediately" upon coming out of the chart room 15 to 20 seconds later the vessel went aground was incorrect as to how long he stayed after the vessel steadied up before going into the chart room because in that time frame the turn, causing the vessel to go aground would have been so sharp the vessel would have gone aground at a heading significantly less than 206 degrees. The most believable evidence demonstrates that Captain Baggett was in the chart room 2-3 minutes prior to grounding. Captain Baggett went into the chart room to make his time and distance calculations because light was more readily available. Captain Baggett could have made the time and distance calculations without going into the chart room. While Captain Baggett was in the chart room, he was facing away from the chart room entrance and did not look at the rudder indicator, the ranges, or otherwise determine if his orders were being properly carried out. Captain Baggett's expertise as a pilot was available to the mate and quartermaster while he was in the chart room had either of them been aware of a problem and requested his assistance. But, his expertise as a pilot was not totally available to the vessel due to his position in the chart room. Where the crew is unfamiliar with the harbor and its lights and there is a language problem, courses are usually given on compass rather than instructions on the range lights.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by John D. C. Newton, II, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Notice of Dismissal, a copy of which is attached, and incorporated by reference, in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Respondent, Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC, be granted a license to sell motorcycles manufactured by Astronautical Bashan Motorcycle Manufacturer, Co., Ltd. (BASH) at 1805 West Fairbanks Avenue, Winter Park (Orange County), Florida 32789, upon compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. Filed April 20, 2012 8:11 AM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this _]4 thday of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Julie Baker, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this 19th day of April, 2012. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/re Copies furnished: R. Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin Forehand Brandes, LLP Suite 1B 800 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 N Meiredith Huang Peace Industry Group (USA), Inc. 6600 B Jimmy Carter Boulevard Norcross, Georgia 30071 Jonathan Rupp Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports 1805 West Fairbanks Avenue Winter Park, Florida 30071 John D. C. Newton, I Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
Findings Of Fact In the Spring of 1978, Roach purchased 1965 Piper aircraft No. 3406W from an out-of-state broker. On the assumption that sales tax had been collected, and not being familiar with Florida's Sales/Use tax laws, Roach took no other action. This aircraft was sold in August of 1978 and 1972 Piper No. 5309T was purchased in September of 1978; this aircraft was purchased under the same circumstances. No records were kept of the purchase price of either aircraft. DOR wrote Roach in August and September of 1978 regarding 3406W, without result. Thereafter, DOR used the average book value of $19,000 to arrive at a tax due of $760.00 Roach paid $720 tax on July 15, 1979; he contended that 3406W had $1000 less equipment than the average book valued aircraft. Prior to this time Roach became aware that tax was due but indicated he was financially unable to pay. On July 18, 1979, DOR sent Roach the proposed assessment for $40.00 tax, $190.00 penalty and $83.60 interest. Meantime, DOR was writing Roach regarding the second aircraft, 5309T, with no response being received until August 8, 1979. A proposed assessment was issued for $1500 tax, $375 penalty and $394.93 interest on September 10, 1979. During the subsequent informal conference, Roach advised that the tax due was in fact $1520, which was paid on October 4, 1979. Revised assessment dated October 22, 1979, was for $380 penalty and $400.20 interest. DOR's witness, Assistant Area Supervisor, Collection and Enforcement Division, received the matter from higher headquarters in December of 1979. He merely indicated that someone else in DOR used the "blue book" to determine value; he presented no evidence contrary to Roach's estimated value of $18,000 for the first aircraft or regarding the imposition of the penalty.
