Findings Of Fact The Southland Corporation is a corporation engaged in the operation of convenience food stores under the name "Seven Eleven Food Stores." Petitioner, Richard V. Ballard, was employed by Southland in March of 1984. Michael Jones, Supervisor of Southland, hired Ballard. Jones interviewed Ballard and reviewed his application prior to hiring him. At the time he interviewed Ballard, Jones noticed a gap on the application in Ballard's employment which he asked Ballard about. Ballard stated he had some operations on his arm and leg and that he had omitted a job with Huntley Jiffy Foods Stores where he had been terminated unfairly and had filed a handicap complaint against them. Jones asked him if he had left anything else out, to which Ballard replied no. Ballard had been previously employed part-time at Citgo, another convenience food store, and failed to reveal this on his application. He also failed to tell Jones about this previous employment when Jones questioned him prior to his being hired by Southland. Southland was aware that Ballard was handicapped when he was hired. In fact, Jones had a discussion with Ballard at the time he was hired about any possible limitations which would have an affect on his job performance. Ballard has cerebral palsy. Jones hired Ballard knowing that he was handicapped and knowing that he had filed a handicap complaint against Huntley Jiffy Foods. After he was employed, Ballard received two raises including a $0.20 merit increase, which was the highest increase for which he was eligible, and the increase was approved by Jones on May 25, 1984, effective May 11, 1984. Subsequent to his receiving the merit increase, Ballard was counseled for several incidents involving his job performance. On September 14, 1984, Jones became aware through a conversation with a former supervisor of Ballard's that Ballard had worked for Citgo previous to his working with Southland. Jones double-checked Ballard's application and found that he had omitted his employment with Citgo from his application and he had failed to disclose the Citgo employment to Jones during the interview. Ballard was suspended on September 14, 1984, pending a meeting with Jones on September 17, 1984. At the meeting on September 17, 1984, Ballard admitted that he had worked for Citgo and that he had omitted it from his application because he did not think he would be hired if he put it on his application because he would have been terminated from two previous jobs. Ballard had omitted two previous jobs in his application, Huntley Jiffy Foods and Citgo. The application which Ballard filled out contained the statement "I certify the facts set forth in my application for employment are true and complete. I understand that, if employed, false statements on this application shall be considered sufficient cause for dismissal." Southland has a policy prohibiting falsification of applications and providing for termination of employees for falsifying their applications. Southland had terminated employees other than Ballard for falsification of applications. While Ballard alleges that he was terminated because he had filed a discrimination complaint against Citgo, in fact, Jones had no knowledge at the time he terminated Ballard that Ballard had filed a charge against Citgo. Southland did not learn that Ballard had filed a discrimination charge against Citgo until sometime in October, 1984, after it terminated Ballard. Southland learned of the charge against Citgo from the documents Ballard filed charging retaliation in this case. Southland purchased a part of City Service (Citgo) in September, 1983, including the Kwik Mart facilities where Petitioner had worked previously. However, it did not incur liability for charges filed against City Service. The discrimination charge filed by Ballard against City Service is being defended by City Service. Southland is not involved in the that matter in any way.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether the Petitioner, Lee C. Smith, was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, Food Lion, Inc., on the basis of his marital status.
Findings Of Fact At all times in issue, Respondent, Food Lion, Inc., operated its food supermarket, No. 728, in Tampa, Florida. Petitioner, Lee C. Smith, was employed by Respondent as manager. Petitioner was discharged from employment with the Respondent on December 2, 1990. The "constructive advice memo" supporting the discharge indicated the action was being taken because of "dishonesty - fraud - reputation of manager." The background to the charge related that 9 checks, totalling $1,100.00 were cashed by Petitioner's wife and "possibly endorsed or OK'd by Mr. Smith." The memo went on to further state that the decision [to discharge] was based on current evidence "and also failure to maintain mgt. role." The memo further indicated that while in management training, Mr. Smith had a problem with returned checks and "was documented on same." The memo was signed by Mr. Legett and was also signed by the Petitioner on December 5, 1990. Petitioner claims that when he first learned of the check situation, during the period March through June, 1990, when he was a management trainee, on his own initiative and without prompting by anyone in authority, he notified his store manager and assistant manager of the situation and suggested they call in a tel-alert advising all Food Lion stores in the area not to cash any checks for his wife. He was not discharged at that time. He also claims that after he was promoted to manager, his wife again started passing bad checks without his knowledge. When he found out about them, in October and November, 1990, before he was discharged, he paid some of them off. He also instituted another tel-alert through the Dunedin store, where some of the checks had been written, but he did not alert the people in his own store not to cash them. Apparently, Mrs. Smith cashed some checks in Store 728 but only one was approved by Petitioner. An area-wide listing of dishonored checks shows some that were cashed by Mrs. Smith. This listing is sent to each store and probably came to Petitioner's store. Petitioner admits he may have seen it but most of the checks written by Mrs. Smith were approved by the assistant manager. Whenever he saw a check listing with his wife's name on it, he redeemed that check, but the listing he saw was for his store only. He claims not to have seen listings from other stores, but from time to time, the manager of other stores would call him to ask if they could take her checks. He claims always to have said no. None of the checks relied upon by Respondent in the discharge action were admitted in evidence. Petitioner claims that at the time in issue, he had no knowledge his wife was writing the bad checks. During this period, he and his wife were having domestic difficulties. Some of the time they were living together and some of the time they were separated. Even when they were separated, she continued to come into the store for purchases and to cash checks. Petitioner claims that as a result of his discharge by the Respondent he has been damaged in a total amount of between $452,122.55 and $518,122.55, including legal fees. These sums are based on his salary at the time of his discharge, modified by certain assumptions regarding sick pay, bonus, profit sharing and holiday pay. At the time of his discharge, Petitioner was earning $550.00 per week and claims he was due an increase to $610.00 per week. Therefore, he claims, his base salary for December, which he was not paid, would have been $2,440.00. Added to that, he claims is 2 percent for sick pay totalling $572.00, a 2 percent bonus of $572.00, a 15 percent profit sharing pay out of $4,290.00 and holiday pay for 6 days at $110.00 per day, for $660.00. This additional amount totals $6,094.00 which, when added to the base salary claimed due amounts to $8,534.00 for December, 1990, not paid to him because of his termination. His base salary of $610.00 per week for calendar year 1991, would have totaled $31,720.00 and his insurance benefit would have been an additional $1,242.60. This totals $32,962.60. Added to that, he claims are the bonuses, sick pay, profit sharing, profit forfeiture, holiday pay at $122.00 per day for 6 days, and two weeks vacation ($1,220.00) for a subtotal of $9,566.00. When this figure is added to his base for 1991, he claims his total income from Respondent would have been $42,528.60 for the year. However, when his actual earnings from Kash & Karry, with whom he found employment after he was discharged by Respondent, in the amount of $13,941.58 are deducted, his actual loss for calendar year 1991 is, he claims, $28,587.60. Following the same formula, using identical factors but with slightly different amounts for each due to a projected increase in weekly salary, the net loss to Petitioner is claimed to be $19,903.32 for calendar year 1992, and through March 5, 1993, the date of the hearing, his calendar year 1993 loss is claimed to be $6,474.39. The sum total of the yearly losses is $71,109.77 to which Petitioner has added a 1 percent per month interest figure which totals $19,910.73 for the 28 months in issue. The sum of these figures is $91,020.50. To this Petitioner has also added a 4 year loss of projected profit sharing pay outs had he stayed with Food Lion which he estimates at between $30,000.00 to $45,000.00 per year. At $30,000.00 the total would be $120,000 to which Petitioner has added an unexplained $200,000.00. Adding this to the $120,000.00, and the $91,020.50 amounts to $411,020.50 to which Petitioner has added 10 percent legal fees of $41,102.05 for a grand total of $452,122.55. Applying the same calculations to a loss of profit sharing figure of $45,000 per year for 4 years, and the unexplained $200,000.00 addition, with similar 10 percent legal fees and the actual claimed out of pocket loss described above, his claim amounts to $518,122.55. In support of his claim of Food Lion earnings, Petitioner submitted only one pay slip, for the period ending 12/01/90 which showed his regular earnings to be $1,100.00 and special earnings of $650.00 for the period. The evidence he presented is insufficient to support his monetary claim. His earnings at Kash and Karry are not questioned. Petitioner's wife's bad check activity first came to light when he was a manager trainee and he paid those checks off immediately. However, in the latter part of 1990, a loss prevention investigation was initiated into alleged cash shortages and bad checks at Petitioner's store. Mr. Satterfield, the Area Perishable Supervisor was told by the investigator that Petitioner was aware of his wife's passing of bad checks. Mr. Satterfield also talked to other employees. One of these, Mr. Koonce, cashed several checks for Mrs. Smith which had been approved by one of the managers. Petitioner was one of those approving managers on only one occasion. Based on that one approval, which he does not know to have been for a subsequently dishonored check, he merely assumed the Petitioner approved the others. An unsworn written statement to the investigator, Mr. Greer, by Kimberly Lantrip, an employee of another Food Lion store, indicates that Petitioner told the grocery manager it was OK to cash his wife's checks and hid the bad check register bearing his wife's name for several weeks when it came in. This evidence is clearly double and even triple hearsay evidence, however, and though admissible here, is of minimal probative value. Furthermore, neither were the checks themselves nor photocopies thereof were offered. Mrs. Smith, by sworn affidavit, also hearsay, indicated that at no time did Petitioner have any knowledge she had written checks in Food Lion stores, nor did he ever approve any for her or tell anyone else to cash them. This statement carries little evidentiary weight. Petitioner clearly had knowledge of his wife's prior check writing activity and, in fact, paid off several. He obviously failed to take appropriate action to correct her activity or to preclude her writing other checks at Food Lion stores. After the investigation, Satterfield met with Petitioner and other supervisors, and as a result of that meeting, where at least one supervisor recommended termination, Mr. Satterfield, who had observed Petitioner over the months in both training and as assistant manager and saw him do nothing wrong, nonetheless decided to put the Petitioner on indefinite suspension with pay pending further investigation. Mr. Satterfield then notified the Regional Supervisor and Mr. Legett, the Area Supervisor, of what he had done. The next he heard about it was when the constructive advice memo terminating Petitioner was issued. He thereafter had nothing more to do with the matter. Mr. Legett was satisfied at the way Petitioner took care of the first series of bad checks written by Petitioner's wife in the Spring of 1990. However, based on what he was told by Mr. Satterfield, and the information contained in the loss prevention investigation, he concluded that Petitioner was aware of the second series of bad checks his wife was writing and did not attempt to stop them. Based on this, which he found showed fraud and dishonesty on Petitioner's part, he decided to discharge Petitioner Before doing so, however, he discussed the matter with Food lion's Vice President for Personnel who agreed with the decision to discharge. While Petitioner's failure to take corrective action to preclude his wife from cashing any further checks at Food Lion stores reflects on his management ability and may support termination for that reason, absent a clear showing of his conspiracy with her, his encouragement of her actions, or his knowing acquiescence in her misconduct, it does not rise to the level of fraud or dishonesty. Regarding Petitioner's claim for damages, Mr. Legett indicates a proposed raise of $60.00 per week in 1990 is not justified. A maximum raise is $20.00 per 6 month increment based on performance. Not all managers get raises each year. In addition, continuing employees do not get paid for holidays they don't take off. If the time is not taken, it is lost. However, if a person is terminated, any unused accrued vacation time for that year is paid. By the same token, sick days are not compensated. Employees receive 2 percent of salary as a sick pay bonus at the end of the year unless too much sick leave is taken. In general, a sick day taken once a week results in a net loss, not earned bonus. Also, profit sharing is not a constant but varies year by year. In 1990 and 1991, the amount was 15 percent. The amount for 1992 had not been determined as of the hearing, but 15 percent is a maximum. In any case, employees do not become eligible to participate in the profit sharing plan until they have been with the company for 5 years. If the employee leaves before the five years are up, the accrued but unpaid profit sharing maintained in his name is forfeited and paid on a pro rata basis to other employees. The most Mr. Legett, an individual relatively high up in management, ever got was 2 percent. He has never received anywhere near 5 percent of his salary. Effective January 1, 1993, employees contribute $21.00 per month for insurance. Prior to that time, there was no contribution.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, recommended that Lee C. Smith's Petition for Relief from Unlawful Discrimination based on marital status, relating to his discharge from employment by Respondent, Food Lion, Inc., be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-6047 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: None submitted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Respondent's counsel submitted Proposed Findings of Fact but failed to number them. They will be treated paragraph by paragraph, however, in this appendix. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and, except for references to hearsay evidence, incorporated herein. Mr. Koonce, the only individual interviewed by the investigator who appeared at hearing indicated he had seen Petitioner approve only one check for his wife and assumed from that, he had approved others. The balance of the hearsay evidence, though admissible for a limited purpose, is considered of minimal probative value. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but more a comment on the state of the evidence. Accepted only as to the showing that the issue of Petitioner's knowledge of his wife's check writing activities was a part of the related case involving discrimination based on race. Irrelevant to the issues herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee C. Smith P.O. Box 260922 Tampa, Florida 33685-0922 Steven C. Ellingson, Esquire Arnold & Anderson 1200 Peachtree Center Cain Tower 229 Peachtree Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Margaret Jones Clerk Commission of Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether or not, between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, the licensees or their agents, servants or employees allowed the license premises to be kept, set up, maintained or operated for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of Section 509.032(1), Florida Statutes, and Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. Whether or not, between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, Ulysses Brown, the licensee and/or operator of the licensed premises had been convicted of letting the premises for prostitution and keeping a disorderly place, thereby violating Section 509.261(4)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the notice to show cause, Alma Mae Young and Ulysses Brown were the holder of license No. 23-7079H held with the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants. This license was held to do business as Young's Rooming House, located at 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue, Miami, Florida. The facts in this case show that on October 23, 1976, Officer Otis Chambers, of the Dade County Public Safety Department, Dade County, Florida, went to the licensed premises known as Young's Rooming House located at 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue, Miami, Florida. At that time, Officer Chambers was operating in the capacity of an undercover plainclothes officer investigating vice matters. He was in the company of a prostitute and when he approached the desk in the licensed premises, he spoke with the licensee, Ulysses Brown. In the conversation with Mr. Brown, he identified the woman in his company as being a prostitute, as shown by the remarks to Brown, and Brown acknowledged this information and rented a room to the officer. Subsequent to the events that transpired in the conversation between Officer Chambers and the licensee Brown, Brown was arrested and charged with violations of Section 796.06, Florida Statutes, which pertains to renting space for prostitution and with a violation of Section 796.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes, which is an allegation of receiving, offering or agreeing to receive, any person into any place, structure, building or conveyance with the purpose of prostitution or permitting any person to remain in those locales for such purpose. The licensee was found guilty of both offenses and placed on a period of probation for six months. Evidence of this finding by the Court may be seen as Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. It was also shown in the course of the hearing that a number of complaints have been made by neighbors who live in the area of the licensed premises, to the effect that the licensed premises was a place in which prostitution was occurring; The comment was also made by these individuals that men and women were seen in the licensed premises who were not wearing clothes. The opinions were testified to by Officer John Wilson of the Dade County Public Safety Department who had spoken with a number of the residents of the area where the licensed premises is located. Although Ulysses Brown has claimed that he is no longer involved with the licensed premises, a recent inspection by Agent John H. McKinnon of the Division of Hotels and Restaurants reveals that Ulysses Brown is still working in the licensed premises. According to Brown, and in keeping with what the agent actually observed about the licensee's intention, Brown is to work and take care of the licensed premises and Young is to be the owner. Based upon the facts as reported, the Petitioner has brought two charges in the notice to show cause. The first charge alleges that between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, the licensees, their agents, servants or employees, allowed the premises to be kept, set up, maintained or operated for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of Section 509.032(1), Florida Statutes, and Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. Section 509.032, Florida Statutes, states the duties of the Petitioner in the following language: 509.32 Duties.- (1) GENERAL.- The division shall carry out and execute all of the provisions of this chapter and all other laws now in force or which may hereafter be enacted relating to the inspection or regulation of public lodging and public food service establishments for the purpose of safe- guarding the public health, safety, and welfare. The division shall be responsible for ascertaining that no establishment licensed by it shall engage in any misleading advertising or unethical practices as defined by this chapter and all other laws now in force or which may hereafter be enacted. The division shall keep accurate account of all expenses arising out of the performance of its duties shall file monthly itemized statements of such ex- penses with the Department of Banking and Finance together with an account of all fees collected under the provisions of this chapter. A reading of this paragraph of this section leads to the conclusion that its purposes are to create the authority in the Petitioner to implement regulations to enforce the provisions of the overall Chapter 409, Florida Statutes. It is not read to be a substantive law which would empower the Petitioner to take action based upon the language of that section per se. Therefore, an violation of Section 796.07, Florida Statutes, would not promote the right to take action against the licensees under Section 509.032, Florida Statutes. The second count in the notice to show cause pertains to an allegation that between the periods of January 1976 and August 1977, the licensees and/or the operator, and in this instance that person is Ulysses Brown, has been convicted for letting the premises for prostitution and keeping a disorderly place which is in violation of Section 509.261(4)(a), Florida Statutes. That provision of the statutes reads as follows: 509.261 Revocation or suspension of licenses; fines; procedure.- (4)(a) Any person interested in the operation of any such establishment, whether owner or operator, has been convicted, within the last past 5 years in this state or any other state or the United States of soliciting for prostitution, pandering, letting premises for prostitution, keeping a disorderly place, illegally dealing in narcotics, or any other crime involving moral turpitude. The term "convicted" shall include an adjudication of guilt on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the forfeiture of a bond when charged with a crime. As stated before, Ulysses Brown, one of the licensees, was found guilty of Sections 796.06 and 796.07(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Those violations were established through an entry of the judgment finding the licensee guilty on January 20, 1977. That finding was reached within five years of the date of the action for suspension or revocation. This finding by the Court, coupled with the continued involvement by Ulysses Brown in the operation of the licensed premises and the background problems which have been prevalent in the licensed premises, would justify action being taken against both licensees, to-wit, Alma Mae Young and Ulysses Brown. The action spoken of was the right of action under Section 509.261(4)(a), Florida Statutes, and is the right of direct action against Ulysses Brown and a right of indirect action against Alma Mae Young for her knowledge, negligence or lack of due diligence in the operation of the licensed premises.
Recommendation It is recommended that the license held by the Respondents Alma Mae Young and Ulysses Brown to trade as Young's Rooming House located at 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue, Miami, Florida, license No. 23-7079H be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Alma Mae Young Ulysses Brown Youngs Rooming House 7000 N.W. 21st Avenue Miami, Florida
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a preneed sales agent should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, the following relevant Findings of Fact are made. Petitioner seeks a license as a preneed sales agent so that she may work at Good Shepherd Memorial Gardens Funeral Home (“Good Shepherd”). Petitioner plans to work as a family service advisor to help families with preneed services. A preneed sales agent assists families with planning for funeral or burial needs prior to death. Petitioner anticipates she would conduct meetings with potential customers at the cemetery or in their homes. Petitioner worked with Good Shepherd from January 2018 until June 2018. Although Petitioner is currently not employed at the funeral home, she anticipates that Good Shepherd would allow her to return to work if her application for licensure is approved. Respondent is the state entity responsible for regulating licensure of persons who provide preneed sales services under chapter 497, Florida Statutes. When applying for any license under chapter 497, Respondent considers whether the applicant has a criminal record. An applicant must disclose any felony offense that was committed within 20 years immediately preceding the application. The Board then considers the applicant’s criminal history and whether the applicant would pose an unreasonable risk to members of the public who might deal with the applicant in preneed transactions. Petitioner has a criminal history involving an incident that occurred two years ago. In September 2016, Petitioner’s husband placed Petitioner’s then eight-year-old daughter in a dog cage because the daughter had allegedly mistreated the family dog. Petitioner returned home from work, found her daughter in the dog cage, and removed her. In a separate but related incident, Petitioner watched her husband take her daughter to her bedroom. Petitioner entered the daughter’s bedroom and saw her husband spanking her child with a flip-flop sandal on her behind. At no point did Petitioner attempt to protect her daughter from her husband’s abusive actions or report him to the appropriate authorities. The abuse was ultimately reported by a roommate who lived in the home. On June 12, 2017, Petitioner (age 28) pled nolo contendere to one count of child neglect without great bodily harm, a third-degree felony, in violation of sections 827.03(1)(e) and 827.02(2)(d), Florida Statutes. The court sentenced Petitioner to: one day of jail time with credit for time served, probation for 24 months, 100 hours of community service (within the 18 months of probation), and peaceful contact with her daughter. Petitioner was also ordered to pay court costs and fees and fines in the amount of $937.00. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. Petitioner’s husband, who was not the child’s biological father, pled guilty to two counts of child abuse without great bodily harm. Among other things, he was ordered to have no contact with the child. Prior to the criminal offense at issue in this matter, Petitioner had no criminal history. In addition, Petitioner has had no known contact with law enforcement since the criminal offense. In a Notice of Intent to Deny issued on April 26, 2018, Respondent notified Petitioner that her application for a preneed sales agent license had been denied as follows: On June 7, 2017, Ms. Hoff pled no contest to a felony charge of child neglect without great bodily harm and was sentenced to 24 months of probation, 100 hours community service, assessed court costs and fines in the amount of $937.00, and her parental rights were terminated. The [A]pplicant stated that her criminal probation will not be completed until June 2019. The Applicant stated that she has not yet paid the fines and fees assessed in this [criminal] matter. The Applicant stated that she is still married to the gentleman she was married to at the time of the arrest. This gentleman was involved in the criminal allegations of child neglect. On May 1, 2018, Petitioner timely requested a hearing disputing the factual basis for the denial of licensure. Petitioner has completed 40 hours of the 100 hours community service requirement. She anticipates that she may be eligible for early termination of her probation after she completes the community service hours. Petitioner did not present any evidence of community service other than court- ordered community service. Prior to submitting her application, Petitioner completed approximately 150 to 175 hours of training in preneed sales, covering family planning, death certificates, Veterans Affair benefits, types of burial products, and financial plan development. Petitioner provided no explanation regarding why she did not protect her daughter from abuse. In addition, Petitioner continues to live with her husband and indicated that she has not yet divorced him due to financial reasons. Petitioner has not presented sufficient evidence to meet her burden to prove that she is not a danger to the public.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Funeral, Cemetery, and Consumer Services enter a final order denying Shayla Hoff’s application for licensure as a preneed sales agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2018.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner (complainant) is entitled to recover $1,340.50 or any part thereof against Respondent dealer and Respondent surety company.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a grower of watermelons and qualifies as a "producer" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc. is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. is listed as surety for Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc. The amount and period of the bond have not been established. The time material to the amended complaint is June, 1994. Two or three weeks before Petitioner's melons were ready for harvest, Steve Helms personally came to Petitioner's home and requested to ship Petitioner's melons for ultimate retail sale. Petitioner requested to be paid "up front." Mr. Helms would not agree to pay all the money "up front" but agreed to pay some. He also agreed to pay within 14 days of the first shipment. Petitioner had had a bad experience two years previously, so he got Mr. Helms to promise to "clean up" his field. This expression is subject to some interpretation, and although Petitioner initially stated that the agreement was for Respondent broker-shipper to buy all his melons regardless of condition, Petitioner later modified his statement to say that Mr. Helms only promised not to take the best melons and leave the rest. Harvesting began May 15, 1994. Until June 10, 1994, Petitioner's usual contact with Respondent broker- shipper was Frank Favuzza, who oversaw all weighing and loading and assessed the Petitioner's melons on behalf of Respondent broker-shipper. On June 10, 1994, Mr. Helms was again personally in the field. Petitioner told Mr. Helms that he had to get the remainder of the melons off the field by Sunday, otherwise the heat would ruin them. Mr. Helms said he would wait until Monday. Petitioner believes that if the melons had been harvested by Sunday, June 12, 1994, three truckloads could have been harvested. On Monday, less than a full truckload was in good enough condition to be loaded onto a truck. A lot of melons were going bad and were left in the field to rot. On Tuesday, June 14, 1994, Petitioner's melons were weighed at Romeo, Florida and the poundage established at 29,330 pounds. Frank Favuzza estimated to Petitioner that his melons would only bring $.04/lb. From this conversation, related by Petitioner, it may be clearly inferred that Petitioner knew he would not be paid until after Respondent broker-shipper received payment from the ultimate retailer at the other end of the transaction. Petitioner's amended complaint alleged the amounts due as follows: "On June 1, 1994, #92111, 700 lbs. at $.07 equals $49.00, not $490.00; June 3, 1994, #92117, 900 lbs. at $.07 equals $63.00, not $630.00; and June 3, 1994, #92120, 790 lbs. at $.07 equals $55.30, not $553.00. Therefore Item (12) Complaint Total is amended to $1,340.00." The amendments did not alter the original claim for 6-14-94, invoice 92157 for 29,330 lbs. of melons at $.04 for $1,173.20. There was no claim for the melons that rotted in Petitioner's field. Weight tickets and Respondent's corresponding broker-shipper's bills of lading were admitted in evidence. These showed the following amounts were received by Respondent broker-shipper: 6/1/94 INVOICE 92111 46,020 net weight melons 6/3/94 INVOICE 92117 45,580 net weight melons 6/3/94 INVOICE 92120 44,720 net weight melons 6/14/94 INVOICE 92157 29,330 net weight melons Petitioner testified, without refutation, that he was present at each weighing and that he had agreed to take $.07 per pound on all loads except for the June 14, 1994 load for which he was claiming $.04 per pound. The bills of lading support Petitioner's testimony as to the price per pound. The bills of lading also clearly show that the price per pound was "to farm minus labor." This notation means that the net amount to be paid Petitioner by Respondent was subject to a prior deduction for labor, but it cannot reasonably be inferred to include a deduction for shipping. Petitioner's last load of 29,330 lbs. of melons weighed on June 14, 1994 was less than a full truckload, so Respondent added melons from another farm to that truck to make up a full load. Respondent broker-shipper did not pay Petitioner for 700 pounds of the June 1, 1994, invoice 92111 truckload; for 900 pounds of the first June 3, 1994 invoice 92117 truckload; for 790 pounds of the second June 3, 1994 invoice 92120 truckload; or for any (29,330 pounds) of the June 14, 1994 invoice 92157 truckload, upon grounds that those melons were not saleable at their destination. Petitioner put in evidence Exhibit P-3 which is an accounting Respondent had sent him. It shows that Respondent broker-shipper had deducted $690.30 for labor on invoice 92111 and claimed 700 pounds could not be sold; had deducted $683.70 for labor on invoice 92117 and claimed 900 pounds could not be sold; had deducted $670.80 for labor on invoice 92120 and claimed 790 pounds could not be sold; and had paid Petitioner nothing on a June 14, 1994 truckload, invoice 92159. Invoice 92157, which corresponds to Petitioner's June 14, 1994 partial truckload of 29,330 pounds of melons, is not listed or otherwise explained in the exhibit. The exhibit is conclusionary and inexplicably is dated 1993. There is no back-up evidence to support Respondent's making these deductions. No inspection certificate or labor charges are in evidence. Petitioner's initial complaint, which he put in evidence as P-1, constitutes an admission by him. In the complaint, Petitioner contended (1) that he was selling "direct" to Respondent broker-shipper; (2) that he was selling "f.o.b."; and (3) that he was selling "Fob shipping point excectance (sic) after final inspection." Petitioner also stated therein that he was given an inspection sheet showing 46,310 lbs. of watermelons had failed inspection and he did not feel the melons that failed inspection were his melons because Frank Favuzza approved of all melons loaded from Petitioner's field and the inspection sheet did not say that the bad melons were Petitioner's melons. Somewhat contrariwise, Petitioner testified at formal hearing that he had asked Respondent broker-shipper for a government inspection certificate showing that his melons were bad and never got it. From the credible evidence as a whole, it is inferred that Petitioner sold his watermelons on the June 14, 1994 truckload at $.04 per pound contingent upon the melons arriving at their ultimate destination in saleable condition per a federal inspection. It is further inferred that the prior three loads at issue also were sold contingent upon their arriving in saleable condition. The evidence as a whole also supports a finding that Petitioner's melons left the weigh station in a condition capable of being sold for the respective prices agreed upon between Petitioner and Respondent broker-shipper. Any deterioration of melons between June 10, 1994 when Petitioner requested that the broker-shipper take the last load and June 14, 1994 when the last load actually was weighed and shipped is attributable to Respondent broker-shipper, but that fact is not significant since the lesser rate of $.04/lb. was agreed upon prior to shipping and after Respondent broker-shipper had seen and approved the loaded melons. Petitioner's foregoing evidence of delivering saleable quality melons to Respondent broker-shipper is unrefuted. The presumption is thereby created that but for some failure of Respondent broker-shipper, the melons would have arrived at their ultimate destination in saleable condition. There is no evidence of record to support Respondent's deductions for "labor," or for melons which allegedly could not be sold upon delivery at the ultimate destination. Petitioner moved ore tenus to further amend his complaint to include a prayer for reimbursement for the cost of the melons which rotted in his field and became unsaleable between June 10 and June 14, 1994 due to Respondent broker-shipper's delay in loading and to assert a claim for interest on the $1,340.50 claim. This motion was denied as too late.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order awarding Petitioner $1,340.50, and binding Respondents to pay the full amount of $1,340.50, which in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.'s case shall be only to the extent of its bond. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of June, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-6189A The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-2 Accepted. Rejected as unnecessary Rejected as subordinate and mere argumentation. 5-6 Rejected as mere argumentation. Rejected as these were not the dates testified. Rejected as mere argumentation. Respondent Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc.'s PFOF: 1 Accepted. 2-4 Rejected as not proven. Accepted as to the June 10-14, 1994 load. Rejected as not proven. Not proven in whole. Covered to the extent proven. While one inference might be that a different invoice number was assigned to the combined load, that is not the only reasonable inference based on the evidence submitted. Likewise, although Petitioner apparently got some inspection certificate, that certificate is not in evidence. There is no record evidence as to what it covered. It is not reasonable to infer or guess that it covered four loads on four trucks on three dates or that there is any way to calculate from it that the only bad melons were Petitioner's melons and not those mixed in from another farm on June 14, 1994. See FOF 19-20. 8-15 Rejected as not proven. Respondent Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.'s PFOF: None filed COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Favuzza, President Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc. Post Office Box 1682 Auburndale, Florida 33823 Tom Morton Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. Post Office Box 94-5010 Maitland, Florida 32794-5010 L. C. Stevenson 333 NW 46th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34482 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact The facts stated in the Joint Stipulation of the parties to the extent set forth below are hereby adopted as findings of fact: On December 21, 1990, Petitioners, each of which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dean Foods Company ("Dean"), were each convicted of a one-count felony charge brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. On January 7, 1992, Respondent filed and Petitioners received notices of intent to each Petitioner pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)1, F.S. On January 28, 1992, Petitioners, pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(e)2, F.S., filed a petition, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S., requesting an order determining that it is not in the public interest for Petitioners to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. Petitioners' convictions arose out of an investigation initiated by the Florida Attorney General into possible bid-rigging of school milk requirements contracts in Florida by dairies and distributors. In 1988, the Attorney General filed a civil action against these dairies and distributors, including Petitioners. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.c, F.S., establishes "[t]he degree of culpability of the person or affiliate proposed to be placed on the convicted vendor list" as a factor to be considered in the decision whether to place such person or affiliate on such list. The State of Florida's complaint alleged that the bid-rigging and contract allocation scheme began at least as early as 1978. According to the State's attorneys, the illegal activities actually started as early as the 1960's in southeastern Florida (McArthur Dairy's principal market area) and the 1970's in central and southwestern Florida (T.G. Lee Foods' principal market area). Dean purchased Petitioners in 1980. According to the State's attorneys, Jack Wells and James Clark, former sales managers at McArthur Dairy and T.G. Lee Foods, respectively, participated in such conspiracies during the 1960's and 1970's and fraudulently concealed their efforts from the former owners of T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy, from Dean and from the school boards. Thus, Dean unknowingly bought into these on-going conspiracies. While the fact that Dean bought into these preexisting schemes was not a legal defense, it is relevant to the issue of culpability. This fact and Dean's early settlement offer were given favorable consideration by the State of Florida during settlement discussions. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.d, F.S., establishes "[p]rompt or voluntary payment of any damages or penalty as a result of the conviction" as a factor mitigating against placement on the convicted vendor list. Dean promptly paid on behalf of Petitioners all civil damages owed the State arising out of such activities. In a press release dated August 1, 1988, the Attorney General confirmed Dean's payment in full settlement of the charges brought by the State of Florida against Petitioners. A federal grand jury sitting in Tampa, Florida also investigated this matter. Dean and Petitioners cooperated fully with that investigation. Pursuant to plea and settlement agreements dated September 12, 1990, entered into by each of Petitioners with the United States Department of Justice, Dean and Petitioners agreed to a comprehensive settlement. Said settlement required that Petitioner plead guilty to a one-count criminal information and pay $1 million each in criminal penalties and $175,000 each in civil damages to the federal government. Such civil liabilities and criminal penalties were paid to the federal government, as reflected in a letter from the federal prosecutor to officials of the United States Defense Logistics Agency dated February 21, 1991, which letter appears as Exhibit A to the Memorandum submitted by Dean to the Defense Logistics Agency. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.e, F.S., establishes "[c]ooperation with state or federal investigation or prosecution of any public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. Petitioners agreed to and did cooperate fully with the State of Florida in connection with its investigation. Petitioners also cooperated fully with the federal grand jury investigation. This cooperation was confirmed in the letter from the federal prosecutor referred to above, which states: We have found McArthur & T.G. Lee and their attorneys to have been most cooperative in this matter. We believe both the companies and their attorneys have shown a high degree of responsibility by agreeing to settle this matter in an expeditious manner. The negotiated settlement with these defendants resolves all matters relating to their operations in Florida. As a final point, we believe the early agreement by these companies and their counsel to settle this matter for a substantial sum gave the incentive for other corporate defendants to come forward and also offer substantial criminal and civil settlements. Several of those cases have now been favorably concluded. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.f., F.S., establishes "[d]isassociation from any other person or affiliate convicted of the public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. Jack Wells and James Clark, the only individuals at McArthur Dairy and T.G. Lee Foods implicated in the wrongdoing that give rise to the convictions in question, were terminated. The investigations conducted by the State of Florida and the Department of Justice disclosed no involvement or knowledge on the part of any other employee of Petitioners, Dean or any of Dean's other subsidiaries, as reflected in a letter form attorneys representing the State of Florida to Dean's attorney dated June 29, 1988. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.g, F.S., establishes "[p]rior or future self- policing by the person or affiliate to prevent public entity crimes' as a mitigating factor. All of Dean's subsidiaries, including Petitioners, have an active antitrust compliance program. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.k, F.S., establishes "demonstration of good citizenship" as a mitigating factor. Petitioners have been involved in civic and philanthropic affairs throughout the years. For example, T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy have spearheaded fundraising events for Edgewood Children's Ranch, a non-sectarian foundation for the support of under-privileged and abused children. T.G. Lee Foods and McArthur Dairy have also donated milk to the Ranch for a number of years. McArthur Dairy has made substantial contributions to organizations such as the University of Miami, and Miami Dade Junior College.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: In January, 1990, the Respondent filed an application for credit with the Petitioner. The terms and conditions of the credit application provided: "All written 'Terms and Conditions of Sale' on invoices, statements, contracts or other written agreements must be observed and performed as stated." Further, the application provided: Payment of all amounts due shall be made not later than 30 days from the billing date. Amounts in default will be subject to a SERVICE CHARGE of 1 1/2 % per month (18 % Per Annum) on the unpaid balance. Failure to make payment within terms will result in cancellation of credit. Following acceptance of that application, Respondent sought to purchase sod from Petitioner's LaBelle sod farm. Invoices issued by Petitioner to Respondent at the time of the delivery of the sod provided that the amounts owed would be payable upon receipt of invoice. Further, the printed invoice required the purchaser to make claims within 24 hours of delivery or pick up. The invoices reiterated the 18 percent service charge for past due accounts. From December, 1990, through January 17, 1991, Respondent purchased and accepted in excess of $45,000 worth of sod from the Petitioner. The invoices for those purchases are identified in this record as Petitioner's exhibit 2. From January 30, 1991 until March 4, 1991, Respondent purchased and accepted $4,664.00 worth of sod from the Petitioner. The invoices for those purchases are identified in the record as Petitioner's exhibit 3. In February, 1991, when the Petitioner became concerned about nonpayment for the amounts claimed, contact with the Respondent was made for the purpose of resolving the matter. When those efforts failed to secure payment, the Petitioner instituted action through the Department of Agriculture against the Respondent's bond. The Petitioner claimed $45,080.25 was due for the invoices prior to January 30, 1991. The Petitioner claimed $4,664.00 was owed for the invoices subsequent to January 30, 1991. Subsequent to its claims, Petitioner received payments from the Respondent in the following amounts: $5,000.00 on March 11, 1991; $5,000 on March 26, 1991; and $2,000.00 on April 30, 1991. Applying the total of those payments ($12,000) to the indebtedness on the first claim reduces that amount to $33,080.25. Prior to the claims being filed, Respondent had notified Petitioner that some sod deliveries had been unacceptable because of the quality of the sod or the amount. Respondent claimed the Petitioner had "shorted" the square footage amounts per pallet so that Respondent was being charged for a pallet that did not contain the requisite square footage of sod. On one occasion, in January, 1991, the Petitioner gave Respondent a credit in the amount of $1,173.75 for either refund on poor quality sod or a shortage. The Respondent continued to purchase sod from Petitioner until its credit was no longer accepted by Petitioner, i.e. March 4, 1991. Respondent did not, within 24 hours of receipt of sod, make a claim regarding the quality of the sod or the amount. By letter dated March 14, 1991, the Respondent, through its attorney, advised Petitioner as follows: St. Amour Sod Services, Inc., does not dispute the balance due to you as set forth in your letter and they will pay same in payments that are being determined now. For your information, the balance accrued because of the loss of several of our customers resulting from the poor quality of sod purchased from your firm. Respondent did not timely challenge the quality of the sod accepted, and did not present evidence regarding its alleged poor quality.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order finding that Respondent is indebted to Petitioner in the amounts of $33,080.25 and $4,664.00, with service charge to be computed through the date of the final order; directing Respondent to make payment of the amounts to Petitioner within 15 days following the issuance of the order; and, notifying all parties that if such payment is not timely made, the Department will seek recovery from Respondent's surety, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1992. APPENDIX TO CASE NOS. 91-6388A AND 91-6389A RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY PETITIONER: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 4 are accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT: Paragraph 1 is accepted. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence or unsupported by the record in this case. With regard to paragraph 5, that portion of the paragraph which states the amount of payments made by Respondent ($12,000) is accepted. Otherwise, rejected as stated in 2. above. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry L. Miller P.O. Box 1966 Orlando, FL 32802 Gary A. Ralph 2272 Airport Rd. South, Ste. 101 Naples, FL 33962 Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Dept. of Agriculture & Consumer Svcs. The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Aetna Casualty & Surety Company Attn: Legal Dept. 151 Farmington Ave. Hartford, CT 06156
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner should be entitled to an extension of the shelf life on its milk and milk products from a ten day period to a twelve day period.
Findings Of Fact Testimony offered by Jay Boosinger, Director of Dairy Industry, for the Department of Agriculture and Gene Smith, Supervisor of Dairy Products Inspection Enforcement, indicated that the Respondent had investigated the request for extension of shelf life from ten days to twelve days on the milk and milk products of the Petitioner and based on the laboratory analysis of the test samples, they felt that the request should be accepted. Jay Boosinger has as his duty the direction of the program which is designed to regulate the quality of dairy products within the State of Florida. Gene Smith is, as his title indicates, charged with the function of inspection and enforcement of the laws and regulations associated with the dairy industry in the State of Florida. Testimony was offered in this hearing which indicated that certain samples of the Petitioner's milk and milk products had been collected at the Petitioner's Tampa, Florida plant and the Petitioner's trucks. These samples were collected by a dairy plant specialist of the Respondent, and then in turn were taken to a laboratory of the Respondent for analysis. The laboratory analysis was designed to ultimately determine the number of days that the samples would be acceptable beyond the code expiration date found on the container, which expiration date would have been at the ten day point. There is an exhibit, which is Respondent's Exhibit #1 that identifies the product, collection point, the established expiration date, the laboratory evaluation date and the days that the product was found to be acceptable beyond the ten day established expiration date. In addition this exhibit contains the laboratory analysis of the products together with attendant correspondence on the issue of the extension of the shelf life. The test samples in Respondent's Exhibit #1 show in the date acceptable pass column, how many days past the ten days the product would have held up without losing flavor and becoming unacceptable in terms of shelf life. The laboratory analyses and summary of those analyses showed available shelf life above the ten day life expressed in the regulation found in Chapter 5D-104 (7)(d), Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent grant a shelf life of twelve days on the milk and milk products identified in the course of the hearing held on the question of the petition. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: R. D. Saunders, Zone Manager Sealtest Foods 109 Governors Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Jack Shoemaker, Esquire Resident Counsel 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was an employee of Petitioner, and at the time of her suspension on February 17, 1982, she was employed as a teacher. In December 1977, Respondent filed an application with the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services pursuant to the food stamp program. On that application, she listed George Fishburne as the applicant and named herself as the applicant's spouse. In the section entitled "Household Composition," she listed George Fishburne as the head of the household, herself as his wife, three persons as their children and Clestine [sic] Edwards as a niece. In the section entitled "Earned Income," Respondent listed as the only source of income a gross salary for George Fishburne of 90 a week working at Dixie Cleaners. She also signed George Fishburne's name to the application on the line entitled "Signature of Head of Household or Spouse. At the time that Respondent completed and submitted the application for food stamps, she and George Fishburne were divorced. Although he on occasion stayed at Respondent's home, George Fishburne lived elsewhere and was, therefore, neither the head of Respondent's household nor a member of her household. At the time that Respondent completed and submitted the application for food stamps, Celestine Edwards stayed at Respondent's house on an irregular basis and, therefore, was not a member of the household. At the time that Respondent completed and submitted the application for food stamps, Respondent failed to report both her employment with Petitioner and her gross monthly income of $646.60. Based upon Respondent's application, the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services commenced paying benefits to Respondent. No changes to the information contained in that application were ever reported by Respondent. The information provided by Respondent in her application entitled her to benefits in excess of the benefits she would have beer, entitled to had she been truthful. Between December 20, 1977, and September 30, 1980, Respondent received $5,670 in excess of the benefits to which she was entitled. Prior to felony criminal charges being filed against her, Respondent was given an opportunity to make arrangements with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to repay the excess in benefits which she had received. The Department waited for two months, but Respondent failed to make any contact to discuss repayment. Accordingly, the matter was referred to the State Attorney's office, and felony charges were filed. Thereafter, Respondent agreed to make restitution, and she was not brought to trial on the charges of public assistance fraud. Pursuant to the terms of Respondent's agreement made in court, she was referred to the Advocate Program, a program for first offenders. She agreed to repay the sum of $3,500 as restitution and to perform 50 hours of volunteer work. At the time of the final hearing in this cause, Respondent bad completed her 50 hours of volunteer work and had repaid the sum of $525. She was still "being supervised", through that program and would not be released from supervision until the agreed upon amount of restitution had been paid in full or until further order of the court which placed her in that program. All of Respondent's witnesses were character witnesses. They all believe that Respondent is either a good or excellent teacher and is an admirable person because of her extensive involvement in church and community volunteer work over the years. One of those witnesses, however, became aware of the public assistance fraud charges against Respondent and of Respondent's suspension and possible dismissal from employment by Petitioner through reading about it in the newspapers. At the time Respondent applied for benefits under the food stamp program, she knew that neither George Fishburne nor Celestine Edwards were members of her household, and she further knew that she was employed and not unemployed. She intentionally gave false information on her application in order to obtain benefits to which she was not entitled. Her December 1977 initial application reflects that she had previously been a recipient of food stamps, from which fact it can be assumed that she had some familiarity with the operation of the program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of immorality, affirming her suspension effective February 17, 1982, dismissing Respondent from employment with the School Board of Dade County, and denying Respondent's request for back pay. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Esquire 3000 Executive Building, Suite 800 3050 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137 Sarah Lea Tobocman, Esquire 1782 One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Sampson Oliver, Esquire 2930 Lenwood Avenue, SE Atlanta, Georgia 30317 Phyllis O. Douglas, Esquire Dade County Public Schools Lindsey Hopkins Building, Room 200 1410 NE Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132
