Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed real estate salesman and held such license at all times material to this proceeding. She was a salesman with Miller, Cowherd and Kerver, Inc. Realtors (MCK) at the time of the transactions relevant to this proceeding. Complainant Loretta Fram listed her home in Ft. Lauderdale with Respondent and utilized her services as realtor in the purchase of a condominium apartment in Plantation. Another member of the MCK firm had previously prepared a contract for Fram to purchase the same condominium unit, but it was not executed. The first condominium contract included a contingency clause that required return of Fram's $5,000 deposit if she did not sell her house prior to the condominium closing. This clause was not included in the contract prepared by Respondent even though Fram told her she could not make the condominium down payment due at closing without the proceeds from the sale of her house. Respondent assured Fram the house would be sold in time or that she would work something out. Just prior to the scheduled condominium closing, Respondent arranged a 90-day "swing loan" for $15,000, since funds from the house sale were not forthcoming. Without this loan, Fram would not have been able to close on the condominium and may have had to forfeit her deposit. The swing loan interest and fees amounted to $2,030. Fram paid this amount in January, 1980, on Respondent's assurance that she would be reimbursed. Respondent reduced such assurance to writing in a document dated January 8, 1980 (Petitioner's Exhibit 6). However, after three years, Fram has not been reimbursed. At the time Fram attempted to move into her condominium unit, she was refused admittance by the condominium association. Respondent has reasonably relied on an acceptance the association issued in conjunction with the initial contract. The association thereafter held a meeting and ratified its earlier decision to accept Fram.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's license as a real estate salesman for a period of three years. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Joel S. Fass, Esquire 626 Northeast 124th Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Edward Oddo, Esquire 2660 Northwest 32nd Street Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether the Petitioner lawfully revoked John Brotherton’s exemption for the repair or replacement of a dock in submerged lands and whether Respondent timely requested a hearing.
Findings Of Fact Intervenor is the successor by merger with Bankers Real Estate Investment Company. References to Intervenor shall include Bankers Real Estate Investment Company. Intervenor submitted to condominium ownership the property that, following condominium construction, has become known as Sportsman’s Riverside Townhomes Association (Sportsman’s). This property borders the Homosassa River. Subject to the legal effect of the transactions described below, Sportsman’s owns the riparian rights to the area upon which a dock owned by Respondent is located. By warranty deed dated February 1, 1984, David J. Steward acquired Sportsman’s condominium unit five. The deed contains no reference to a dock, but conveys only unit number five and an undivided share in the common element. However, by letter to Mr. Steward dated June 19, 1984, the Chairman of Bankers Real Estate Investment Corp. agreed that, in consideration of Mr. Steward’s execution of amended condominium documents, the developer “will” assign Mr. Steward more parking spaces and “[y]our boat dock will remain permanently assigned to your unit as a limited common element reserved for use by your unit.” On October 12, 1990, David J. Steward conveyed Sportsman’s condominium unit number five to Respondent. The deed conveyed “items of personal property including the private dock thereon.” On April 20, 1993, Respondent applied to Petitioner for an exemption to repair the dock that Mr. Steward had sold him. The dock had been damaged in a storm the prior month. The application includes a copy of the warranty deed to Respondent. The deed reveals that Respondent owns only a single unit of a condominium project, but the application does not name the condominium association as an adjacent property owner. Respondent checked the form on the application stating that he was the record legal owner of the “property on which the proposed project is to be undertaken.” The application states that the dock is a floating dock for the private docking of Respondent’s boat. The application reports that the dock is 128 square feet in area. By letter dated June 1, 1993, Petitioner granted Respondent the requested exemption from permitting, “[b]ased solely upon the documents submitted to the Department ” The letter adds that the exemption constitutes “authorization from the Board of Trustees Pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement entered into on November 23, 1992.” The letter warns that Petitioner may revoke the exemption determination “if the basis for the exemption is determined to be materially incorrect . . ..” The Memorandum of Agreement dated November 23, 1992, (MOA) is between the predecessor agency to Petitioner and the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board of Trustees). In the MOA, the Board of Trustees authorizes the use of state-owned submerged lands for all activities (subject to irrelevant exceptions) for which Petitioner grants exemptions from environmental resource permitting. By letter dated April 24, 1996, Petitioner informed Respondent that it had learned that Respondent had supplied “materially incorrect” information in the application submitted with the April 20, 1993, letter. The April 24 letter explains that Respondent asserted in the application that it was the record owner of the property, but the warranty deed revealed that he was not. The April 24 letter gives Respondent 21 days from receipt within which to file a petition requesting a formal administrative hearing. Respondent timely filed his request for a hearing. The facts do not establish a waiver of Respondent's right to demand a hearing. Petitioner did not rely on Respondent’s representation that he was the owner of the property on which the dock was located. The warranty deed attached to the application clearly revealed that Respondent owned only a condominium unit and undivided interest in the common element. Petitioner also knew that the state owned the submerged land at the dock.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order dismissing the proceeding seeking the revocation of the exemption from the Department and consent from the Board of Trustees. ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on June 10, 1997. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 10, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Albert E. Ford, II, Esquire Mail Station 35 3000 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 John Brotherton 6304 North Otis Avenue Tampa, Florida 33604 Robert G. Southey, Esquire Delano & Southey Post Office Box 15707 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701-5707 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Steven Hall, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate salesman and broker. Upon February 15, 1984, he became licensed as a broker. The Respondent was registered with and employed by J. Arnold Ausley Realty from March 31, 1983 to February 15, 1984. J. Arnold Ausley was a licensed real estate broker and operated as Ausley Properties during times pertinent hereto. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensure and practice of realtors in the State of Florida and enforcing the practice standards for realtors embodied in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. On February 4, 1984, the Respondent, in his capacity as a licensed salesman for Ausley Properties, arranged a contract between Champak Bhoja and Kishor Patel, as purchasers of a certain piece of real estate owned by one John D. Gilbert. In connection with that contract the Respondent obtained a $2,000 check as a deposit from Mr. Patel. At Mr. Patel's request the Respondent held this check without negotiating it awaiting Patel's instruction that sufficient funds were on deposit to honor the check. The Respondent waited four weeks and received no such instructions from Mr. Patel. The Respondent therefore contacted Patel, who was in Nebraska at the time, to tell him that he felt legally obligated to deposit the check. The check was deposited and was returned for insufficient funds. On March 19, 1984, Mr. Patel gave the Respondent a replacement check in the amount of $2,000. Mr. Hall asked Mr. Patel to make the check out to him since he had in the meantime become a broker and wanted credit for this transaction in his own business. He also informed Mr. Patel that he would need to use the money for his own personal expenses, in the nature of a "loan." Mr. Patel, however, made the check out to the "Ausley Properties Escrow Account." The Respondent and Mr. Patel had been involved in other business ventures together during the course of which Mr. Patel had already lent the Respondent, on different occasions, a total of approximately $4,000. This course of dealing was continued in the present instance, from the Respondent's viewpoint, when the Respondent informed Mr. Patel that he needed the $2,000 for personal expense purposes and would pay it back as a loan. He believed Mr. Patel assented to that arrangement at the time. The sales contract at issue ultimately failed to be consummated due to Mr. Pate1 and Mr. Bhoja not meeting the required contingency regarding debt financing. Approximately fifteen days after the contract's closing date passed, Mr. Patel made a demand upon the Respondent for the return of the $2,000 deposit. The Respondent failed to return it at that time but assured Mr. Patel that he would repay the money and needed more time to obtain the necessary funds. The Respondent had not deposited the check in the Ausley Properties Escrow Account because such an account did not exist, although the Respondent had urged Mr. Ausley on a number of occasions to set up such an account. The Respondent rather cashed the $2,000 check and used the proceeds for his own benefit, as he had informed Patel he would do. He used the money to meet certain operating expenses and personal expenses, being in severe financial straits at the time. Pate1 knew he was experiencing financial difficulties and had lent him the previously mentioned $4,000 to help him with operating expenses and personal expenses during the pendency of the closing of their various other real estate ventures. The Respondent informed Patel he would use the subject $2,000 for similar purposes, however, the record does not clearly reflect that Patel consented to this, as opposed to his intent that the money be placed in an account as his deposit of consideration for the contract. His testimony to this latter effect is borne out by the fact that in spite of the Respondent's request that the check be made out to him personally, instead Patel made it out to the "Ausley Properties Escrow Account." That account did not exist but the method of drafting the check reveals his intent that the money was to be used as a deposit. In any event the Respondent made no misrepresentation to Mr. Patel as to what he intended to do with the money, but at the same time he did not deposit it in an appropriate account to be held as a deposit toward the purchase of the property involved in the sales contract. Patel made numerous demands for the money and each time Respondent acknowledged this and the other debt to Patel and promised to pay. He ultimately began paying back a small portion of the indebtedness to each of his creditors starting out at a rate of $10 per month. Ultimately, the Respondent paid the entire $2,000 predicated on receipt of his 1985 income tax return.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Petitioner finding that the Respondent has violated Section 475.25(1)(b),(d,)(e) and (k) only to the extent delineated in the above conclusions of law and that his real estate broker's license be subjected to a six months suspension. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of August, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Steven R. Hall 8880 Old Kings Hwy., Apt. 30-W Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Michael Sheahan, Esquire Two South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings Slocum Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Florida Rea1 Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected, although the evidence establishes that Patel intended the funds to be escrowed. Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected as not comporting with the charges in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact:* Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted, but irrelevant to the charges. Accepted Accepted Accepted as to the first sentence only. The second sentence concerning Patel's response is not clearly supported by record evidence. Accepted Accepted Accepted * Although Respondent is proposed findings are accepted, some are inculpatory, some are not material and some support the conclusion that no fraudulent conduct was committed.
The Issue Whether or not the Respondent, Michael H. Cohen, based on conduct set forth hereinafter in detail, is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, false promises and breach of trust in a business transaction in the State of Florida, in violation of subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979). Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, the transcript of the proceedings, and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant:
Findings Of Fact By its Administrative Complaint filed herein signed September 29, 1981, the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission (herein called the "Commission" or "Petitioner") seeks to suspend, revoke, or take other disciplinary action against the Respondent as licensee, and against his license as a real estate broker under the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent is a licensed real estate broker who has been issued license No. 0209033. On February 17, 1978, Michael Rappaport sold ten townhouse units in Collonade Condominiums, 2275 N.E. 122nd Street, North Miami, FLORIDA, to the Respondent. The Respondent purchased the townhouses, by deed, in the name of his mother-in-law, Luz Sanabria. At the time of this conveyance, Michael Rappaport owed $2,400 in condominium assessments to the Collonade Condominium Association and, at that time, foreclosure proceedings by the mortgagee, Dade Federal Savings and Loan Association, were pending for failure to pay the mortgages (by Rappaport). Respondent, as agent for Ms. Sanabria, contacted the condominium association and made promises to pay the past due assessments. As stated, following transfer of the title to the Respondent, there remained owing to the condominium association past due assessments by the Respondent. The Respondent negotiated a settlement with the condominium association for payment of the delinquent assessments; however, the Respondent defaulted on the terms of the settlement for payment of the delinquent assessments. On September 25, 1979, Collonade Condominium Association obtained a judgment against Respondent for $7,094.40 which remained unsatisfied at the time of the hearing herein. It is based upon the above-referred to facts that the Petitioner contends that Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, false promises and breach of trust in a business transaction in the State of Florida in violation of subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979). Respondent takes the position that (1) he was not the real party in interest inasmuch as he was attempting to execute a favorable transaction on behalf of his mother-in-law, and (2) that he attempted to strike deals, negotiate settlements and that to do otherwise, either in his capacity as a real estate agent or as a son-in-law, he would be remiss. To support his position, Respondent points to the fact that he retained a knowledgeable mortgage broker to remove these properties from foreclosure proceedings and to attempt to renegotiate, restructure or otherwise put these mortgages, which were in foreclosure, back into current status. Additionally, Respondent avers that there is nothing improper respecting his attempt to negotiate a settlement with the condominium association, which was an everyday common practice. Respondent admits that he personally agreed to repay the condominium association, which agreement was defaulted and resulted in a judgment being entered against him. However, Respondent's position is that these were matters of a personal nature and were in no manner conduct amounting to fraud, misrepresentation, concealment and false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device or any other acts of conduct which subject him to disciplinary action pursuant to Section 475.25, Florida Statutes, Subsection 1(b) thereof.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore J. Silver, Esquire 9445 Bird Road Miami Florida 33165 Walter F. McQuade, Esquire 700 Northeast 125th Street North Miami, Florida 33161 William Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation - Legal Section P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. C. B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility, and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Paul F. Savich is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0077390 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Ernest M. Haefele, is a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0517821 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. On October 1, 1984, the Respondents, purchasers in their individual capacities, entered into a contract for deed to a tract at the Tropical Acres Subdivision, with Tropical Sites, Inc., and Angie S. Crosby and Eugene T. Crosby, at a sales price of $9,046.50. Said amount to be paid at the rate of $90 per month until paid. Pursuant to the agreement, the Respondents agreed not to assign the agreement without the permission of Tropical Sites, Inc. A closing was held on May 8, 1990, and the Respondents transferred possession of the tract by assignment of contract to Leroy H. and Charlotte Beard. A mobile home on the real property was part of the purchase price for a total sales price of $39,000.00 The agreement called for a down payment of $2,000 to the Respondent Savich. The Beards also signed a mortgage note in favor of the Respondents Savich and Haffele, for $37,000. The note was payable at the rate of $373.15 per month. Upon payment in full, Respondents were obligated to deliver a good and sufficient deed to the property to the purchasers. At the closing, Respondent Haefele was not present. The Beards received two documents at closing, a contract for sale and one other document, but did not receive a copy of the original agreement for deed, a disclosure statement, or a title to the trailer on the tract. In addition, Respondent Savich did not seek permission of Tropical Sites, Inc., prior to the closing. Prior to the closing, the Beards moved onto the property, and subsequently began making monthly payments of $373.15 to Respondent Savich. The Beards had purchased two or three pieces of property in the past, but had always gone through a bank. In relation to this agreement, they understood the nature of the transaction at the time of the closing. In early 1991, Mr. Beard made a telephone inquiry to the County property appraiser's office as to the status of the property for homestead exemption purposes. He was advised that Tropical Sites, Inc. was the current owner of the tract, and that he was not eligible for homestead exemption. The Beards did not apply for homestead exemption at the appraiser's office. In August 1991, the Beards stopped making payments to the Respondents on the advice of their attorney, but continued to reside on the premises until December 1991. In November 1991, an attorney acting on behalf of the Beards made a demand upon Respondent Paul F. Savich for the return of the $2,000.00 deposit. The Respondents did not return the $2,000.00 deposit or otherwise pay the money claimed by the Beards. In his dealings with the Beards, Respondent Savich did not withhold information, lie or mislead the purchasers. They simply were unhappy with the agreement, and decided to get out of it when they recognized that they would not receive title to the mobile home and property until the note was paid in full. In early 1992, the Beards quitclaimed their interest to the property to Respondent Savich's former wife, and they were released from their obligations under the note.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondents Paul F. Savich and Earnest M. Haefele be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Adopted in substance: paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7(in part),8,9(in part)10,11,12,13 Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraphs 7(in part: the $2,000 was a down payment, not an earnest money deposit), 9(in part: the Beards moved on to the property prior to closing. Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Respondent submitted a proposed order with unnumbered paragraphs which partially recounted the testimony of several of the witnesses and combined facts and conclusions of law. Therefore, a separate ruling on Respondent's proposals are not possible. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Senior Attorney DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street #N-308 Orlando, FL 32801-1772 J. Stanford Lifsey, Esquire 101 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1465 Tampa, Florida 33602 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether Respondents' licenses as real estate brokers should be suspended or revoked, or the licensees otherwise disciplined, for alleged violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated September 28, 1981. This proceeding is based on an administrative complaint filed by Petitioner, Board of Real Estate, alleging that Respondents, while engaged in a rental service business which advertised and sold rental property information or lists, for an advance fee to prospective lessees, utilized a contract or receipt agreement which included language defining when a "rental has been obtained" that was contrary to the intent of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, and that therefore Respondents had violated Subsection 475.453 and 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. It further alleged that Respondents failed to refund 75 percent of an advance fee to specific prospective tenants as required by Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes and therefore constituted a violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties submitted a Proposed Stipulation of facts which was accepted by the Hearing Officer and constitutes the Findings of Fact hereinafter. No witnesses testified at the proceeding nor were any exhibits entered in evidence other than the four exhibits attached to the Stipulation. (Exhibit 1)
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jack Braunstein is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0146924. The last known address of this Respondent is 916 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304. Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., is a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0133234. The last known main office address of Rent Aid, Inc., is 916 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304. At all times material herein Respondent Braunstein was the sole active broker of and for Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., doing business at the corporate main office located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. As said active broker, Braunstein was responsible and liable for the acts and/or omissions of the associates of Rent Aid, Inc. performed in the scope of their employment; and was responsible and liable for the acts and/or omissions of Rent Aid, Inc. At all times material herein, Respondent Rent Aid, Inc., was engaged in a full service real estate brokerage business which included representing potential buyers and sellers of real property and potential landlords and tenants with regard to rental properties. As part of the business Rent Aid, Inc. entered into contracts with prospective tenants for an advanced fee, as shown by Exhibit "A" to the Complaint and incorporated herein by reference. That the contract or receipt agreement forms provided by the Respondents, have inserted therein additional language as to specifically stating that "a rental has been obtained when company provides a guaranteed available rental unit upon the terms specified and requested by member. On or about September 16, 1980 Jan Spear and Deborah Nigro entered into the contract, an accurate copy of which is appended to the Complaint as Exhibit "A", with Rent Aid, Inc. That under the terms of the contract, Respondent had the discretion to refuse any and all refunds if they had shown to the prospective tenant an available rental unit which met the terms specified and requested by the prospective tenant, even if the prospective tenant declined to rent said unit and demanded a refund of the paid fee within the required time frame. That Respondent's practice was to refuse demands for refund made where, in Respondent's opinion, a bona fide effort had been made to obtain a rental, which efforts had been unsuccessful through no fault of Respondent's. Jan Spear and Deborah Negro made written demand upon Respondent's for a partial refund of the fifty ($50) fee which they had paid Respondent's pursuant to the contract. This demand was made within thirty days of the contract date as shown by therefund refusal dated October 12, 1980, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference as true and accurate. The contract utilized by Respondent's does not strictly conform to the refund required by Rule 21V-10,30 in that the conditions under which a refund would be payable are restricted beyond the scope of said Rule, and SS 475.453(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent utilized the Contract form in question in reliance upon advice received from his prior counsel, Gregory Jones, as shown by a letter dated April 1, 1980. A true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Sal Carpino, attorney for the Department of Professional Regulation, had been provided with a copy of the form utilized by Respondent and had approved the format of said form without approving a discrepancy of the language in question in this proceeding, to wit: "a rental has been obtained with company (Rent Aid, Inc.) provides a guaranteed available rental unit upon the terms specified and requested by members." In response to this proceeding, Respondent has made full and complete refund to Jan Spears and Deborah Nigro and has agreed to voluntarily stop all use of the Contract form in question, and use only such a form as strictly complies with 475.453(1) and Rule 210-10.30 and to furnish a copy of said form to the Department conformance with said Rule."
Recommendation That the Board of Real Estate issue a private reprimand and impose a $100 fine against Respondents Jack Braunstein and Rent Aid, Inc. for violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33306 John P. Gaudiosi, Esquire 3801 North Federal Highway Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C.B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the real estate license issued to the Respondent, Kathi L. Kitts, should be revoked or otherwise penalized based upon the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact: Brickell Grove Realty Corporation ("Brickell Grove") is a licensed real estate brokerage corporation in Florida having been issued license number 0245921. From at least May 1988 through September 1, 1988, the sole qualifying broker for Brickell Grove was Frederick Morrison, Jr. (Morrison). At some point in mid to late 1988, (the exact date was not established by competent substantial evidence) Morrison was hospitalized with a terminal illness and his subsequent involvement in the real estate brokerage business was limited. Morrison died on September 1, 1988. Respondent, Kathi L. Kitts (formerly known as Kathi L. Abassi), was licensed by Petitioner as a salesman with Brickell Grove beginning on or about August 13, 1986. Respondent completed the required course for a real estate broker's license in April of 1988. On September 19, 1988, she passed the state exam required to obtain a broker's license. The evidence did not establish when Respondent first filed an application for a broker's license. After passing the exam in September of 1988, Respondent submitted an application which she thought would enable her to become the sole qualifying broker for Brickell Grove. The evidence did not establish the date that application was submitted. That application was not signed by the qualifying broker of Brickell Grove and/or the owner so it could not serve to qualify Respondent as the sole qualifying broker for Brickell Grove. On October 1, 1988, Petitioner issued Respondent a broker/salesman license as an employee of Brickell Grove. That broker/salesman license was revoked in November of 1988 when it was discovered that the corporate registration of Brickell Grove was cancelled effective September 30, 1988 as a result of the death of Morrison and the non-renewal of the corporate license. The exact date of the revocation was not established by competent substantial evidence but it was apparently on or after November 1, 1988. Prior to receiving the revocation notice, Respondent was advised by an investigator employed by Petitioner that her application to become the qualifying broker was deficient because it was not signed by the owner or broker. On October 20, 1988, Respondent filed another application to become licensed as the qualifying broker for Brickell Grove and to change the name on her license from Kathi Abassi to Kathi Kitts. This second application contained the signature of the owner of Brickell Grove. On November 4, 1988, Respondent sent a letter to the Division of Real Estate indicating that Mr. Morrison was seriously ill and that it was urgent that her application to be the active broker for Brickell Grove be approved as quickly as possible. Respondent did not, however, discover that Mr. Morrison had died on September 1, 1988, until sometime in the middle of November when she was advised by Petitioner's investigator. Petitioner approved Respondent's second application to become the qualifying broker for Brickell Grove on November 22, 1988. The approved broker's license was backdated to establish an effective date of October 20, 1988. Effective October 20, 1988, the corporate registration of Brickell Grove Realty Corporation was reinstated upon the Respondent becoming its sole qualifying broker. Respondent admitted that at least during the time period from September 1, 1988 through October 20, 1988, she operated as a salesman in the office of Brickell Grove Realty without any supervision from another broker in the office. However, no competent substantial evidence was offered to establish the nature or extent of business conducted by that office or by Respondent during this time period. Respondent did not open bank accounts or advertise as a broker until after October 20, 1988. While Respondent contends that she thought Mr. Morrison was continuing to carry on as the active broker for Brickell Grove during the time period he was hospitalized and continuing through November (after his death), she admitted that she only saw him on occasion and could not recall when he was last in the office. The limited contact between Respondent and the licensed broker for Brickell Grove is reflected by her lack of knowledge of his death until almost two months after it occurred. While there is hearsay testimony that Mr. Morrison was in the hospital for several months prior to his death and that his involvement with Brickell Grove Realty during the several months preceding his death was limited, or nonexistent, no competent substantial evidence was offered to establish the nature or extent of the business conducted by Respondent without the benefit of supervision by a licensed broker during the time period prior to September 1, 1988. Petitioner had previously initiated an investigation into unlicensed practice by one of the owners of Brickell Grove, Mahmoud Abassi (Respondent's former husband) in July of 1986. That investigation resulted in an August 29, 1986 affidavit executed by Mahmoud Abassi to cease and desist unlicensed real estate brokerage activity. However, no competent substantial evidence was offered to prove any involvement by Respondent in the activities which led to the execution of that affidavit nor was any evidence offered to show that Mahmoud Abassi was actually running Brickell Grove at any point subsequent to the execution of the affidavit. Moreover, no competent substantial evidence was offered as to Respondent's activities and/or supervision during the period from the execution of the affidavit until September 1, 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Kathi Kitts, guilty of operating as a broker without a license during the period from September 14, 1988, to October 1, 1988, reprimanding her and placing her on probation for one year. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of December 1989. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1989.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, was the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation of the real estate profession and for the licensing of real estate professionals. Respondent was, at all times material to the issues herein, a licensed real estate salesman in this state. He was issued salesman's license 0419038 and from August 27, 1990 through September 2, 1991, was an active salesman with Scarlett Faulic & Associates located in Indian Shores, Florida. From September 3, 1991 through September 30, 1991, he was a salesman with Arn Realty Group, Inc., also in Indian Shores. Effective October 1, 1991, his license became inactive due to non-renewal and remained in that status until he renewed it on April 16, 1992 when he affiliated as a salesman with First Gulf Beach Realty, Inc. in Indian Rocks Beach, Florida. From July 28, 1992 to the date of the hearing, he was an active salesman with Bobby Byrd Real Estate, Inc. in Clearwater. Sometime prior to June 13, 1991, Ted Plihcik, presently a resident of Coram, New York and formerly the owner/occupant of the property in issue which is located in Pinellas County, Florida, met the Respondent at a garage sale at Respondent's home. Because Mr. Plihcik intended to move out of the area, he entered into a listing agreement with Respondent on behalf of Arn Realty's predecessor, under which the firm was either to rent or sell the property. This agreement was to expire on December 31, 1991, and there is no evidence it was cancelled prior to expiration. Sometime after Mr. Plihcik moved to New York, he received a telephone call from Respondent in which Respondent said he had a couple to rent the property for the rental amount previously stipulated, $650.00 per month, from which Respondent was to get a commission of 10%. Respondent indicated he would take a deposit from the tenants and that he had a signed lease. Prior to his departure, Mr. Plihcik had started to make some renovations to the property's garage. He had redone the bathroom area and was planning to make another room out of the garage. However, he never got around to completing the job or to putting in the windows. He had decided to change it back into a garage, and in fact the prospective tenants wanted a garage rather than another bedroom, so he directed Respondent to hire someone to finish the reconversion. At Plihcik's request, Respondent got several estimates for the work which Plihcik felt were too high. At that point, Respondent offered to do the work himself. Plihcik agreed and gave Respondent authorization to use the deposit money to pay for necessary materials and consistent with that agreement, on September 14, 1991, by letter, Plihcik authorized Arn Realty Group to release money to Danley for the "alterations and repairs he is doing to my property...." Because the Isabelles did not pay the full two month deposit, Mr. Plihcik later revised the authorization to allow Respondent to use rent money as well, but he did not relieve Respondent from the requirement to turn any money received as rent over to Arn Realty upon receipt and thereafter get payment from the company. It is obvious that Plihcik was under the opinion that the deposit money Danley had received from the tenants had been turned over to the broker, Arn Realty. Mr. Plihcik tried unsuccessfully repeatedly to contact the Respondent requesting a copy of the lease agreement, copies of receipts for materials purchased for the garage work, or anything else pertinent, even sending at least one letter by certified mail, the receipt for which bore what Plihcik recognized as Respondent's signature. He received no responses. Sometime in early August, 1991, Deborah Isabelle and her husband rented Mr. Plihcik's house through Respondent and put up a [portion of the 1st and last month rent. They also signed a lease which called for rent at $525.00 per month but, notwithstanding many requests for one, never received a copy. Each time they asked, Respondent would say he would get them one but he never did. At the time they rented the property, the garage was under repair and, after some negotiation, it was orally agreed upon that the work would be completed by move-in time, September 1, 1991. At one point, Respondent asked the Isabelles to pay the rent in cash because it would be easier for him to buy the things needed for the repair work he was to do. They acceded to this request for a while, writing some checks to the supermarket for cash to pay Respondent, but got only one receipt. Because they were uncomfortable with this cash arrangement, they asked Respondent for the name of the owner of the property and he replied, merely, "Ted." On one occasion, mail for Mr. Plihcik from a real estate agency came to the house. Ms. Isabelle thereafter got Mr. Plihcik's New York address from the County records, contacted him, and asked him if he had received his rent. She received a negative reply. She also asked him about the lease they had signed and he related he had not received one of those, either. In fact, when she called, Mr. Plihcik didn't know who she was he had never heard their name. During that conversation, Ms. Isabelle advised Mr. Plihcik that they had not received any of the things Respondent had promised; that he was also asking them for cash; and was frequently at the house. Mr. Plihcik said he'd take care of it but no more was done. In November, 1991, Ms. Isabelle set up a three way telephone call between the Isabelles, Mr. Plihcik and the Respondent. During that call, Respondent claimed he was doing the work promised; that he had mailed Mr. Plihcik some money in cash several weeks previously and could not understand why it had not been received. The lease agreement, at paragraph 6, dealing with maintenance and grounds upkeep, purports to require the Isabelles "... to help convert 3rd bedroom back to garage in lieu of $650.00 rent." Though Respondent contends the rent was reduced from $650.00 per month, as was called for in the listing agreement, to $525.00, conditioned upon the tenants' help with the work on the garage conversion, there is no evidence that Mr. Plihcik ever agreed to accept less than the $650.00 per month rent. In addition, Ms. Isabelle claims they did not agree to do any work and the lease did not contain that provision at the time they signed it some 2 or 3 weeks after they moved in. It is found that Respondent's contention is without merit even though Mr. Isabelle did take down some 2x4's so he could install his tool bench. Over the period of their occupancy, the Isabelles paid Mr. Danley a total of $1,531.50 by check directly or by check written for cash and turned over, as well as an additional $400.00 in cash. Six hundred dollars of the checks were made payable to Arn Realty, and it appears they were deposited to that company's account. The balance of the checks and the cash were either payable to Respondent directly or, in the case of the Kash & Karry checks, written for cash to give to him. Of the $400.00 Arn Realty check, $300.00 was paid over by company check to Respondent for repairs to the instant property on the same day as the Isabelles' check was deposited to the company account. Respondent admits he received a total of $1,355.00 from the Isabelle's, either directly or indirectly, but claims all of it was used for work on the house. He also claims he is still owed $1,001.00 from Mr. Plihcik which includes $630.00 in real estate commission owed the broker. Nonetheless, Mr. Plihcik claims he received none of the money paid to Respondent, nor has Respondent presented any evidence to show the money was spent on either materials or labor for the garage reconversion. Mr. Arn, the broker supervising Respondent during the time is issue here claims he had no knowledge Respondent had obtained a tenant for Mr. Plihcik before he got Plihcik's letter. His records show a listing agreement for the property which calls for a rental commission in the event the property were leased by the company. In this case, the commission would be paid to the company, not the salesman, and would be deposited to the company's escrow account for later split with the associate involved. At no time would it be appropriate for the sales associate to collect and disburse funds without going through the broker and he would not do it that way. He did not authorize it here. Mr. Arn admits to having written at least one check to Respondent from money's received from the tenant for work to be done on the Plihcik property. He released that money only after he received a letter from Mr. Plihcik authorizing the release of funds to Respondent. All the money he received from the checks he received in August, 1991, in the amount of $600.00, was paid out to Respondent for repair costs. When he subsequently received a letter from Mr. Plihcik regarding cash which Respondent claimed he had mailed directly but which was not received, Mr. Arn replied in writing that he had not authorized Respondent to either receive or disburse funds directly. The Isabelles moved out of the house in either December, 1991 or January, 1992. By that time, Respondent had done very little work on the property. Some building materials were still on the property which Mr. Plihcik said he had left there. They are sure Respondent had not provided it. Mr. Carl Carpenter, a registered contractor and home inspector examined the property in question in March, 1992 for a potential purchaser. At that time, he found the garage in the process of being converted to a room. The framing had been installed as had the windows, and the sheet rock was partially installed. There was also a small bathroom which was not operating properly. It was his opinion that the construction was progressing from garage to room, and not the opposite. Mr. Carpenter was also of the opinion that to convert the room back to a garage would cost somewhere in the range of $600.00 and should take about 2 days. It would about double that to reinstall the bath. The bath he saw on the property was old. Respondent offered an estimate to reconvert the garage from a contractor obtained in August, 1991 which showed a total price of $1,606.00. While this is substantially more than the price cited by Mr. Carpenter, whose estimate seems rather out of line, cost is not the issue. The important part of Carpenter's testimony relates to his belief that the work in progress seemed more of conversion to a room rather than return to a garage and tends to indicate Respondent had done little if any work on the property. Ms. Sutton, the Division's investigator, interviewed Respondent 3 times regarding this matter and found his statements to be inconsistent. While he claimed he had done some work on the property and had not finished it, he could not give her the exact amount he had received from the Isabelles. He also gave her a list of what he had spent the money he had received on, but had no receipts from workers or suppliers to back it up. Mr. Danly claimed he had sent cash to Mr. Plihcik but denied receiving any cash payments from the Isabelles. He claimed he gave them receipts for what they gave him, but they have no memory of receiving any. Mr. Danley takes no issue with the facts as outlined by Ms. Isabelle except as to the remodeling of the garage which he claims is not covered by the restrictions contained in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. He claims that the payments made by the Isabelles were authorized by Mr. Plihcik to be kept by him as compensation for the repair work on the garage and not to be transmitted to Plihcik as owner because the work needed to be done and Plihcik did not have the money to pay to have it done. He also asserts that the lease was signed by the Isabelles with the requirement in it that they would help with the work as a condition of reducing the rent. He delayed starting on the remodeling until he got the money from Mr. Arn, which, at least in part, was as early as August 29, 1991. When he got that check, he started work. Originally, he states, he hired 2 young men to do the dry-wall, but the bathroom had to be framed before the dry wall could be installed. Then the water heater was installed and the power line installed for that, all of which he claims he did himself. The framing and closing up of the old door to the kitchen was done by Respondent with the assistance of a contractor. All of this, he asserts, was done in September and October, 1991, contrary to the Isabelle's claim that the only work done prior to their departure was the installation of some dry wall. Some materials were already in place but some of that had been damaged and had to be replaced. He claims he had 3 helpers to do all this work and paid them in cash. The sink was put back into its original position and he got the material to reinstall the toilet which he was unable to do because of back problems. Mr. Danley denies ever asking the Isabelles for cash or loans. He claims the only payments he received were in the form of checks payable to him or to Arn, and all money received from them was used for the work. He also admits to collecting the rent due in October which, he claims, was used for the restoration project. The only checks introduced into evidence not payable to Arn or Danley are 3 payable to Kash & Karry and of these, two are endorsed by Daniel Isabelle and one bears no endorsement at all. These are the checks which Ms. Isabelle claims were made to provide cash for Respondent at his request. Taken together, the evidence as presented by both sides tends to support Ms. Isabelle's story. Mr. Danley claims he did not finish the work because he could not find a door for the garage. He claims to have called many places but was unable to find a single garage door. A call to a Scotty's building supply store in that area revealed a single garage door was readily available, though by special order. Finally, he bought one from a builder in St. Petersburg for $235.00 which was paid in cash. The price included installation the following morning, and the site was already prepared. However, the builder never showed up with the door and he lost the payment. On balance, Respondent's account of the matter, unsupported as it is by any direct evidence beyond his own testimony, is found to be less than credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, recommended that a Final Order be issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission suspending Respondent, Paul Andrew Danley's license as a real estate salesman in Florida for a period of 3 years under such terms and conditions as are considered appropriate by the Commission; imposing a total administrative fine of $2,000.00; and imposing a reprimand. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-5598 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. Accepted. 6. - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. 9. Accepted and incorporated. 10. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. & 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. Accepted but redundant with 4. 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. - 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. 23. Accepted. 24. & 25. Accepted. 26. Accepted but not material to any issue. 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. 28. - 30. Accepted and incorporated herein. 31. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. 34. Accepted and incorporated herein. 35. Accepted but mot material to any issue. 36. & 37. Accepted and incorporated herein. 38. - 40. Accepted. 41. Accepted and incorporated herein. 42. Accepted and incorporated herein. 43. - 46. Accepted and incorporated herein. 47. Accepted. 48. - 53. Accepted and incorporated herein. 54. - 56. Accepted and incorporated herein. 57. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. A - E. Considered more to be either argumnent on the state of the evidence or conclusions of law. Not accepted as a statement of fact as finally found. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Gilbert P. McPherson, Esquire 1822 Drew Street, Suite 8 Clearwater, Florida 34625 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
