Findings Of Fact Respondent Paul N. Fjell is a 45-year-old graduate of Eastern Illinois University. In 1970, he was employed as a teacher by Petitioner, the School Board of Dade County, Florida. He subsequently was placed on continuing contract and continued in his capacity as a teacher for Petitioner until December 5, 1990, when he was suspended from his employment and this termination proceeding was commenced. Respondent has a long history of alcohol abuse. Since 1984, Petitioner has encouraged Respondent to avail himself of the services offered by Petitioner's Employee Assistance Program (hereinafter "EAP"). Respondent has been referred on a number of occasions to the EAP by his supervisors since his alcohol problem appeared to be a fitness-related problem. On April 25, 1986, Respondent was admitted to the Addiction Treatment Program at Mount Sinai Medical Center, where he remained hospitalized for 28 days. His admitting diagnosis was poly-drug dependency and alcoholism. Respondent had been referred to that program by Petitioner's EAP. During the 1988-1989 school year Respondent again came to the attention of the Office of Professional Standards when he was removed from his position at Horace Mann Middle School because of absences and a resulting referral to EAP. Respondent was next assigned to two Cope Centers (North and South). He was assigned to work one-half day at each Center as a Work Experience Coordinator. Respondent's duties were to teach a class of young, pregnant students, locate part-time jobs for them, and monitor them at their places of employment. A Work Experience Coordinator occupies a highly visible position since the Coordinator must visit businesses and other organizations in the community in order to locate jobs for students. After approximately two months, Respondent was removed from his position at both Centers because of his non- performance and because of complaints from students, staff, faculty, and a School Board member that Respondent had the odor of alcohol on his breath at work. Respondent was next assigned to the Office of Vocational, Adult, Community, and Career Education (hereinafter "OVACCE"). The offices of OVACCE are located in the School Board Administration Building; consequently, Respondent had little contact with students or the public. While he was assigned there, Respondent was repeatedly absent, did not produce any work that could be used, and his supervisor detected an alcohol odor about Respondent. As a result, prior to the end of the 1989-1990 school year, Respondent was removed from OVACCE and relocated to the Dorsey Skill Center for a few months to complete the school year. In August, 1990, Respondent was arrested and charged with driving under the influence, leaving the scene of an accident, and violation of driving restrictions. On August 15, 1990, a conference-for-the-record was held in Petitioner's Office of Professional Standards (hereinafter "OPS"). At that time, Respondent's arrest record and employment history were reviewed, and he was given specific directives as to the procedures he must thereafter follow regarding absences. Respondent was then placed on alternate assignment pending court disposition of his DUI arrest. Respondent was temporarily placed in the Physical Education Department at the School Board Administration Building at the end of August, 1990. His duties were essentially clerical in nature: stuffing envelopes, collating documents, distributing mail, and re-arranging the mail boxes. Within five weeks, his supervisor requested that OPS remove Respondent from that work assignment. His supervisor complained that Respondent reported late for work, left early, took long breaks, and was frequently absent. He also complained that other workers in the area were becoming demoralized because Respondent did not carry his share of the work. On one occasion Respondent's supervisor thought he smelled alcohol on Respondent's breath. Several times during this period Respondent was observed taking his shoes and socks off and elevating his feet to relieve swollen joints. Even after being instructed to not remove his shoes and socks and elevate his feet while at work, Respondent did so again and was observed by the Deputy Superintendent. Respondent was next placed in Petitioner's Security Investigative Unit (hereinafter "SIU"), where he performed clerical chores. On November 2, 1990, Respondent reported to his work location in an impaired state. This was discovered when other employees at the work site noted that Respondent was talking to himself, his clothing was disheveled, his speech was slurred, he had bloodshot eyes which he was trying to conceal by wearing dark glasses, he kept repeating himself, the content of his speech was nonsensical, and he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. Later that morning, a blood specimen was drawn from Respondent, which upon analysis showed an ethanol content of at least 50 milligrams per deciliter. During October, 1990, it had been determined that further psychological evaluation of Respondent was medically indicated, and he was directed by OPS to submit to further evaluation. An appointment was scheduled for him by OPS. Respondent, however, rescheduled that appointment several times and never did submit for further evaluation. Respondent disregarded directives given to him by OPS on August 15, 1990, regarding absence and leave procedures. Between November 5 and 14, 1990, Respondent was absent from work and failed to contact OPS regarding his absences in accordance with the directives previously given to him. Respondent understood that he was to contact OPS. The reason that Respondent did not contact OPS when he failed to report to work between November 5 and 14 was as a result of his drinking and not as a result of any lack of understanding of the directives which he had been given. Petitioner's EAP has had 140 contacts directly with Respondent or with his medical providers in an attempt to assist Respondent in dealing with his fitness-related alcoholism. Respondent is generally non-compliant with the recommendations made to him by professionals for dealing with his alcohol problem. Recommendations for long-term residential treatment have been ignored. Although Respondent has voluntarily admitted himself for treatment in hospital mental health units, his stays there are short and do not appear to be assisting him in dealing with his long-term alcohol problem. Although Respondent is currently attending daily AA meetings, his attendance may be related as much to his pending traffic charges and this termination proceeding as to any commitment on his part to finally resolve his alcohol problem. When Respondent was a patient at Mount Sinai, once he was detoxified, he exhibited no personality disorder or psychiatric condition. His problem was alcoholism and poly-drug dependency; his behavior was secondary to that problem. Based upon protocols established by the American Society of Addiction Medicine, a physician cannot, with certainty, diagnose a mental condition while the patient is still under the influence of alcohol or other mind-altering drugs. Although Respondent has been receiving treatment from a psychiatrist on an irregular basis over the last few years, that physician's opinion that Respondent suffers from a manic depressive disorder requiring the administration of anti-depressant medication is rejected. That physician has not had the benefit of seeing Respondent on a regular basis. It is uncertain whether that physician has had the benefit of treating Respondent in a detoxified state since approximately 1985. Although it is believed that Respondent has been in a detoxified state during certain time periods since 1985, there is no assurance that the recovery program Respondent has created for himself is working. Respondent received acceptable annual evaluations for the 1988-1989 and 1989-1990 school years and was recommended for reemployment at the conclusion of each of those school years. Each year's annual evaluation was based upon one classroom observation only. Although fitness-related issues such as active alcoholism appear to be included within Category VII, Professional Responsibilities, on Petitioner's annual evaluation form, principals completing annual evaluations of teachers are prohibited from considering fitness-related issues. By union contract, only the Office of Professional Standards can deal with issues relating to a teacher's fitness for duty. Over the years, Respondent's drinking problem has become known to more and more students, staff, medical professionals, and members of the community. His failure to ultimately resolve his alcohol problem has achieved some degree of notoriety.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Respondent's suspension as of December 5, 1990, was proper and dismissing Respondent from his employment as a teacher for the School Board of Dade County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of May, 1991. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-10 13-15, and 17 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 11, 12, and 16 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 5-7, and 9 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 8, and 11 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 10 and 12-14 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel or conclusions of law. transmitting transcript, together with Petitioner's exhibits numbered 1-14 and Respondent's exhibits numbered 1-4. COPIES FURNISHED: Octavio J. Visiedo, Superintendent Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 William Du Fresne, Esquire Du Fresne and Bradley, P.A. 2929 Southwest Third Avenue Suite One Miami, Florida 33129 James C. Bovell, Esquire 75 Valencia Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Honorable Betty Castor, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Jerry Moore, Administrator Professional Practices Services 352 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Conclusions Section 561.15, Florida Statutes (1983), governing Division action on license applications provides in pertinent part: "(1) Licenses shall be issued only to persons of good moral character who are not less than 19 years of age. . . . (2) No license under the Beverage Law shall be issued to any person . . . who has been convicted in the last past fifteen (15) years of any felony in this state, or any other state or the United States. . . . However, Section 112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part: (b) A person whose civil rights have been restored shall not be disqualified to practice, pursue, or engage in any occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business for which a license, permit, or certificate is required to be issued by the state, any of its agencies or political subdivisions, or any municipality solely because of a prior conviction for a crime. However, a person who has had his civil rights restored may be denied a license, permit, or certification to pursue, practice, or engage in an occupation, trade, vocation, profession, or business by reason of the prior conviction for a crime if the crime was a felony or first degree misdemeanor and directly related to the specific occupation, trade, vocation, profession, or business for which the license, permit, or certificate is sought. In this case, parts of both statutes cover the same subject matter -- licensure of convicted criminals. They should be read together and, if possible, in harmony. But the statutes are plainly contradictory. Both cannot be given the full effect of their plain language under the facts of this case. 16 The rule of statutory construction that the more specific statute governs over the more general statute is not conclusive or even particularly helpful in determining the legislative intent of these two statutes. It is true that Section 561.15(2) deals specifically with beverage licenses while Section 112.011(1)(b) deals with all licenses. And Section 561.15(2) deals specifically with convictions within the last past fifteen (15) years while Section 112.011(1)(b) deals with all past convictions (whether or not within the last 15 years) But, on the other hand, Section 112.011(1)(b) deals specifically with convicted criminals whose civil rights have been restored while Section 561.15(2) deals with all convicted criminals (whether or not their civil rights have been restored) And Section 112.011(1)(b) deals specifically with the question whether crimes "directly relate" to the subject matter of the licensure proceeding while Section 561.15(2) does not differentiate. Therefore, each statute is more specific in some respects and more general in others. Besides, under another rule of statutory construction, a later enactment controls over an earlier enactment with which it conflicts regardless whether the later enactment is more specific or more general. Compare Berkley v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 358 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), with Laramore v. State, 342 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The legislative history of these two statutes is complicated but important to the question of the legislative intent: Language substantially the same as the language of the present Section 561.15(2) was first enacted by Chapter 57-420, Laws of Florida (1957). It was slightly changed by enactment of Chapter 61-219, Laws of Florida (1961). Language substantially the same as the language of the present Section 112.001(1)(b) was first enacted by Chapter 75-115, Laws of Florida (1971). In 1972, the Legislature amended Section 561.15 without significant change. Chapter 72-230, Laws of Florida (1972). In 1973, the Legislature slightly amended the language of Section 112.011(1)(b) by enactment of Chapter 73-109, Laws of Florida (1973). In 1973, the Attorney General opined that Section 112.011(1)(b) changed the law and prohibited licensing authorities from denying a license because of a conviction unless the crime was a felony and directly related to the subject of the licensure proceedings. AGO 073-355 (1973) The Legislature did not enact any laws affecting either of the two statutes until 1977. In 1977, Section 561.15(2) was amended to delete reference to a conviction "in any other state or the United States, of any offense designated as a felony by such state or the United States" in favor of the current language referring simply to "any felony in this state or any other state or the United States." Chapter 77-471, Laws of Florida (1977). In 1977, the Legislature also amended Section 561.15(1) to change the age of majority to 18 from 21. Chapter 77-121, Laws of Florida (1977). In 1980, the age of majority in Section 561.15(1) was raised to 19 from 18. Chapter 80-74, Laws of Florida (1980) In 1981, the Legislature rewrote Section 561.15(3) and amended Section 112.011(2)(a). Chapters 51-166 and 81-24, Laws of Florida (1981) In 1984, the Legislature amended parts of Section 561.15 other than subsection (2). Chapter 54-262, Laws of Florida (1984). By the end of 1973, it must be concluded under the applicable rules of construction that Section 112.011(1)(b) was intended by the Legislature to control over conflicting pro- visions of Section 561.15(2). See Berkley v. Department of Environmental Regulation and Laramore vs. State, supra. See also Section 23.13, Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1972) (implied modification of earlier laws to the extent of any conflict with a comprehensive revision of the subject matter) In addition, the Attorney General had opined such a modification in 1973. Opinions of Attorney General, while not legally binding on courts, are persuasive and entitled to weight in construing statutes. Leadership Housing, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 336 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). And between 1973 and 1977, the Legislature made no effort to express a contrary legislative intent that Section 561.15(2) should control. Meanwhile, other statutes involving the licensure of convicted criminals were being enacted in conformity with, or amended to conform with, Section 112.011(1)(b). See generally, e.g., Chapters 455 through 494 and 633, Florida Statutes (1983). But in 1977, the Legislature amended Subsection 2 of Section 561.15 without conforming it to Section 112.011(1)(b). This reenactment of Section 561.15(2) reflects a legislative intent that it should be given its full effect notwithtanding Section 112.011(1)(b). In effect, Section 561.15(2) became the later enactment and, under the rules of statutory construction, became controlling. See Berkley v. Department of Environmental Regulation, supra; Laramore v. State, supra. See also Shaver v. The Hotel Corp. of America, 144 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1962); Kiesel v. Graham, 388 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The subsequent legislative history of the two statutes outlined in paragraph 17 of the Conclusions Of Law, above, does not alter the preeminence of Section 561.15(2). Since Section 561.15(2), Florida Statutes (1983) controls, no license under the Beverage Law can be issued to Pericles regardless whether the crime for which he was convicted "directly related to the specific occupation, trade, vocation, profession, or business for which the license, permit, or certificate is sought."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverage and Tobacco, enter a final order denying the application of petitioner John Paul Pericles, Sr., d/b/a Big John's Amoco, for an alcoholic beverage license, series 2-APS. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of February, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1985.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Action, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Respondent operated a restaurant, Atlantic Street Station, located in Delray Beach, Florida. Since 1998, Respondent has held a Special Restaurant License (license number 60-11520 4COP SRX), authorizing it to sell alcoholic beverages on the premises of Atlantic Street Station. During the months of January and February 2000, $66,729.49, or slightly less than 33% of Atlantic Street Station's total gross revenues of $205,679.76, came from the retail sale on the licensed premises of food and non-alcoholic beverages.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that DABT enter a final order finding Respondent violated Section 561.20(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Action, and disciplining Respondent therefor by revoking its license "without prejudice to obtain any other type of license, but with prejudice to obtain the same type of special license for 5 years," and fining Respondent $1,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ____________________________ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2001.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are: Whether Respondent sold alcoholic beverages on two occasions when the service of full course meals had been discontinued; Whether Respondent offered or allowed the operation of a football pool on the licensed premises; and If so, what disciplinary action is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Arthur A. Peloso, doing business as Peloso's Spaghetti House, currently operates, and at all relevant periods was operating, under alcoholic beverage license number 59-129 SRX, Series 7-COP, a "special restaurant license." The premises are located at 1709 West Vine Street, Kissimmee, Florida. The premises consist of the main part of the restaurant, accessible by a door fronting the street; a lounge in the rear, accessible from the main restaurant and by a side door; and a kitchen, accessible to employees from both the lounge area and the main restaurant. The bar counter is located on the far end of the lounge, opposite the side entrance and adjacent to the kitchen. On September 22, 1986, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Beverage Agent Ronald P. Sullivan, visited the premises at the direction of his supervisor. The marquee in front read: "Restaurant Closed-Vacation. Lounge Open, 4-2." Sullivan entered through the side entrance and went back to the bar, where he was served a beer by the bartender, "Pat." Pat was serving drinks, mixing drinks and ringing up sales on the cash register. Sullivan asked what he could get to eat and Pat's response was, "popcorn." There was some conversation regarding the owner being on vacation and wanting to make some changes in the facility and that the kitchen was closed down. At the hearing, Sullivan identified Patrick Plunkett, also present, as the bartender. The same Beverage Agent returned to the licensed premises around 6:00 p.m. on September 25, 1986. Again, Pat was behind the bar and served him a beer. Again, Sullivan asked what he could get to eat and the response was, "popcorn." Pat also said he had a football pool that "Dale" who worked in a car lot helped him get going. Pat said it was Dale's idea and he pointed Dale out in the lounge. Pat pulled a sheet (Exhibit #3) from other sheets behind some whiskey bottles and showed Sullivan how to play. Sullivan filled it out and gave Pat $10.00. Sullivan returned on October 7, 1986. A woman identified as "Tina" was working behind the bar. Pat was not there. Sullivan asked Tina who won the football pool, and she replied that some guy at the car dealership won $350.00. Tina also told Sullivan that the restaurant had reopened after a three- week vacation, and a cook was on duty. On the occasions of his visits, Sullivan did not notice menus or meal set-ups on the tables in the lounge. He had to pass the tables to get to the bar, where he sat. He never tried to order food, as on the first two visits he had been told all they had was popcorn. On the third visit, he accepted the fact that the kitchen was open. He saw evidence of the football pool only on one occasion, the 25th of September; he did not see Arthur Peloso, or Peloso's son, the manager, on any occasion. In the three visits, Sullivan saw a total of six or seven people drinking in the lounge, but not eating. In his testimony, Patrick Plunkett admitted that he told Sullivan that only popcorn was available. The bartenders and waitresses are trained to cook and serve food and have been told to provide food to patrons when requested during business hours. Pat admitted that he did not serve food to Sullivan as the cook did not show up and he (Pat) was "too lazy to serve it." Pat also admitted that he assisted patrons in playing the football pool, but that he was doing it as a favor for a friend from the Pontiac dealership. This was a short-term arrangement and Pat did not receive a commission or any monetary gain from his participation. To Pat's knowledge, neither Peloso nor his son, the manager, were aware that food was not being served in the lounge during their vacation, nor were they aware that the football pool was being conducted. In his opinion, the Pelosos would have taken immediate corrective measures. This was confirmed by Arthur S. Peloso, Peloso's son, who serves as manager of the business. Their business is primarily food and they could not remain in business without the food. Their intent was that the lounge should serve as additional seating for the restaurant. He conceded that the restaurant was briefly closed, but insisted that the kitchen was never closed and the waitresses and bartender should have served food as they had been instructed. Captain Jack B. Wallace from the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco described the policy of the agency with regard to investigations, enforcement and civil penalties for violations. The non-rule policy is to assess a $500.00 civil fine for a first-time offense. He said that the two counts relating to the sale of alcoholic beverages without food should be treated as a single violation. No testimony or other evidence of prior violations by Respondent was presented, and the two witnesses for Petitioner knew of none.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the agency, finding Respondent guilty of violation of Rule 7A-3.015, Florida Administrative Code, not guilty of violation of Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and assessing a civil penalty of $500.00. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0844 The following constitute my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in paragraph #1. Adopted in paragraph #3. Adopted in substance in paragraphs #4 and #7. Rejected as unnecessary Adopted in substance in paragraphs #4 and #7. Adopted in paragraph #5. Adopted in part (as to availability of only popcorn) in paragraph #5; otherwise, rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in substance in paragraph #5. Adopted in paragraph #6. Adopted in paragraph #12. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact #1 and #2 The essential facts proposed here are adopted in my findings of fact #3, #9, #10 and #11, however, these facts alone are not dispositive of the issues in the proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. Klein, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Arthur A. Peloso 1960 Southeast 19th Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33062 Daniel Bosanko, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 James Kearney, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
The Issue The primary issue in this disciplinary proceeding is whether Respondent, which operates a convenience store and sells alcoholic beverages on the premises under a license issued by Petitioner, permitted a sale of drug paraphernalia to occur in the store, in violation of the statutes governing holders of beverage licenses. If Petitioner proves the alleged violation, then it will be necessary to consider whether penalties should be imposed on Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Respondent Moti's, Inc., d/b/a Continental Market ("Continental"), has held a license to sell alcoholic beverages at retail. Consequently, Continental is subject to the regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction of Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division"). On December 12, 2006, two undercover agents of the Division, together with a detective from the Broward County Sheriff's Office, conducted a "sting" operation at the convenience store that Continental owns. The sting was arranged in response to complaints that the Sheriff's Office had received regarding sales of drug paraphernalia (specifically "crack pipes" used for smoking crack cocaine), which were allegedly taking place at this store. The purpose of the sting was to purchase a "crack pipe" and arrest anyone involved in the sale. Pursuant to the plan, Special Agent Ralius Thompson entered the store in an undercover capacity. He was wearing a "wire" (concealed microphone) and a hidden camera. These devices, which were monitored by the other agent and the detective (both of whom remained outside the store), allowed the ensuing transaction to be recorded on a videotape. Once inside, Thompson headed first to the cooler, where he took a six-pack of beer from the shelf. He then proceeded to the counter, to purchase the beer. As the clerk, Aziar Baig, was ringing up the sale, Thompson whispered, "Got any pipes? Got any pipes?"i Baig reached down behind the counter and pulled up a "love rose." (A love rose is a trinket, a tiny fake flower encased in a thin glass tube, which latter is about 4 inches long. Though the tube containing a love rose can be used as a pipe, love roses are not necessarily drug paraphernalia; they can be legally sold, purchased, and possessed.) "You're talking about here?" Baig asked, displaying a love rose. "Yeah, smoke my crack in, man, smoke my crack in," replied Thompson. "A pipe——got a stem?" "Huh?" said Baig. "A stem," repeated Thompson. (According to the evidence, the term "stem" is street talk for filter. Filter material is inserted in one end of the pipe to prevent the user from inhaling the burning cocaine "rock.") "This one?" Baig inquired, holding up a Chore Boy® copper scrubber. (Chore Boy® scrubbers are clearly legal merchandise having an obvious, non-nefarious purpose. According to the evidence, however, the metal in these pot scrubbers can be used illicitly as a crack pipe filter.) "Yeah," said Thompson, who then paid $6.75 for the items. Shortly after making this sale, Baig was arrested on the charge of delivering drug paraphernalia, which is a third- degree felony under Section 893.147(2), Florida Statutes. The evidence presented in this case is sufficient, for present purposes, to support the inference——which the undersigned draws——that Baig either knew or reasonably should have known that his customer (Thompson) intended to use the love rose and copper scrubber to fashion a makeshift crack pipe.ii Thus, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Baig committed the crime of delivering drug paraphernalia. There is, on the other hand, no persuasive evidence (or any evidence of any quality, for that matter) establishing that the corporate licensee (as opposed to its employee Baig) committed any misconduct, e.g. negligent failure to train or supervise employees; failure to exercise due diligence in attempting to prevent unlawful sales; or fostering or condoning such sales, for which the Division could impose discipline against Continental pursuant to Section 561.29(1), Florida Statutes. It is determined, therefore, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Continental is not guilty of the pending charge, namely permitting the sale of drug paraphernalia on the licensed premises.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order finding Continental not guilty of the instant charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.stae.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2007.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether disciplinary action should be taken against the Respondent's medical license based on an alleged violation of section 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, concerning his ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety by reason of illness, substance abuse, or mental or physical condition.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the practice of medicine as delineated in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. The Board of Medicine is organized within the Agency and charged with determining and issuing final orders in disciplinary cases involving physicians within its jurisdiction. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Murtha has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida, holding license no. 0037467. As a licensed physician in the State of Florida, Dr. Murtha is subject to the licensure and medical practice regulatory jurisdiction of the Board of Medicine of the Agency of Health Care Administration. Dr. Murtha, at the time of the Agency's investigation, was approximately 42 years of age. He received his medical degree in 1978 from the University of Florida and completed his residency at the University of Tennessee. In 1981, he became board certified in internal medicine. He has been on the staff of St. Joseph's Hospital in Tampa, Florida for the ten years prior to the initiation of this action. In August 1995, the Agency filed a complaint against Dr. Murtha alleging that two episodes affected Dr. Murtha's ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of use of alcohol. The first episode related to a charge of driving under the influence. On May 2, 1994, Dr. Murtha was involved in a minor traffic accident and charged with driving under the influence (DUI). On August 24, 1994, Dr. Murtha pled no contest to the charge, and he received 12 months probation, six months revocation of his driver's license, a $250.00 fine, required attendance of DUI school, and court costs. 7/ The officer who investigated the May 2, 1994 accident and who also charged Dr. Murtha was not available for the hearing and did not testify. The second episode alleged by the Agency relates to the allegation that Dr. Murtha practiced medicine while intoxicated. Specifically, the Agency alleged that Dr. Murtha saw patients while intoxicated. Relating to the second factual allegation, Nurse Georgia Jacinta Paille testified that on January 30, 1995, she encountered Dr. Murtha visiting a patient at St. Joseph's Hospital. Ms. Paille is the day charge nurse at St. Joseph's Hospital in Tampa, and she appeared as the first witness for the Agency. Nurse Paille testified that on January 30, 1995, she encountered Dr. Murtha and that he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. She further testified that Dr. Murtha was acting angry and inappropriate and that he raised repetitive questions relating to care given to one of his patients. While Nurse Paille noticed the odor of alcohol, she did not notice if Dr. Murtha's speech or gait was affected by the alcohol. Furthermore, Nurse Paille could not testify that Dr. Murtha acted like someone who had been drinking. Nurse Paille reported her observations of Dr. Murtha to her manager, Margie Butler, who in turn made a report to Dr. Gilbert J. Pitisci, the Hospital Administrator. Gilbert J. Pitisci is a medical physician and the Senior Vice President for Medical Affairs at St. Joseph's Hospital in Tampa, Florida. In addition to various administrative duties, Dr. Pitisci is authorized to summarily suspend a physician's privileges at a hospital. On January 30, 1995, the same day that Nurse Paille observed Dr. Murtha, Dr. Pitisci encountered Dr. Murtha. Dr. Pitisci also noticed the odor of alcohol on Dr. Murtha's breath, and he noticed that Dr. Murtha had a slight slurring of his speech and that there was a slight tremor in his hands. Dr. Murtha declined Dr. Pitisci's invitation to discuss his condition in private. Rather, Dr. Murtha insisted that the discussion be held publicly at the nurses' station. Based on Dr. Murtha's physical appearance and based on the odor of alcohol on his breath, Dr. Pitisci summarily suspended Dr. Murtha as a potentially impaired physician and directed him to leave the hospital. Subsequently, Dr. Pitisci notified the state that it had a physician with a potential impairment with alcohol abuse. Other than detecting the odor of alcohol on Dr. Murtha's breath, Dr. Pitisci had no information as to the amount of alcohol consumed by Dr. Murtha. On or about March 24, 1995, the Agency received notification of Dr. Murtha's suspension from St. Joseph's Hospital. In response, the Agency opened an investigation that led to the filing of an order compelling physical and mental examination. Subsequently, Dr. Murtha received an order from the Agency compelling him to submit to both a physical and mental examination. The Agency chose the physician and directed Dr. Murtha when to appear for his appointment. On June 6, 1995, Dr. Murtha complied with the Agency order compelling his mental examination, and he was evaluated by Daniel J. Sprehe, M.D. Daniel J. Sprehe, M.D. is a psychiatrist licensed in the State of Florida. He has been qualified by various Florida courts as an expert in clinical and forensic psychiatry and was accepted as an expert in the area of psychiatry on behalf of the Agency. Dr. Sprehe's examination and testing of Dr. Murtha lasted approximately three hours. Dr. Sprehe obtained and prepared a detailed social and medical history of Dr. Murtha, administrated the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Psychological Test (MMPI) and MMPI II, administered the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (MAST), and administered a Beck Depression Inventory. He also questioned Dr. Murtha and performed a mental status examination. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine Dr. Murtha's medical condition and to make any recommendations for treatment concerning his fitness to practice medicine. Dr. Sprehe completed a written evaluation, including a written opinion based on the evaluation. In addition to the aforementioned tests, Dr. Murtha was given a blood test that revealed no alcohol or drugs in his system. Dr. Sprehe's report indicated that Dr. Murtha scored rather low, a score of 7 (out of a possible 30), on the MAST test. He stated that the MAST is a self-reporting test and that a score of five or more places the subject in the range to be considered an alcoholic. Later, Dr. Sprehe indicated that based on the facts presented in other reports relating to Dr. Murtha, he would have modified Dr. Murtha's score to 9. Still later at the hearing, Dr. Sprehe again revised his scoring of Dr. Murtha's MAST test and concluded that he scored a 20. Dr. Sprehe surmised that Dr. Murtha did not answer the test questions candidly and that his score should have been higher. Dr. Sprehe also found that Dr. Murtha minimalized his abuse of alcohol. Based on the MAST test, Dr. Sprehe found that Dr. Murtha fell into the alcoholic range. For reasons fully stated in paragraphs 26, 27, and 41, the undersigned declines to adopt, as a finding of fact, any diagnosis of Dr. Murtha based on the MAST test. Dr. Sprehe explained the differences between the definitions of abuse and dependence. Subsequently, Dr. Sprehe opined, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the Respondent was an alcohol abuser. Based on his opinion, Dr. Sprehe recommended that Dr. Murtha consider a diversionary program such as the Physicians Recovery Network. Dr. Sprehe also opined that Dr. Murtha suffered from narcissistic personality disorder, which can complicate the diagnosis of alcoholism. A person with narcissistic personality disorder tends to deny defects in themselves. Dr. Sprehe's diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder was made after a one-hour examination of Dr. Murtha. Dr. Sprehe could not state with certainty that Dr. Murtha could not practice with reasonable skill and safety. Dr. Sprehe did opine, however, that "there is at least a question in my mind as to [Dr. Murtha's] ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety." Dr. Sprehe opined that the results of the MAST test and the mental examination, coupled with Dr. Murtha's history, placed Dr. Murtha in the high risk category. No where in the written report to the Agency did Dr. Sprehe advise the Agency that Dr. Murtha was not able to practice medicine with skill and safety. Dr. Sprehe also opined, based on a hypothetical question, that Dr. Murtha "is not in a position to practice medicine safely to patients." The hypothetical question, however, was based on the testimony of Dr. Murtha's ex- wife which has been found to lack consistency. (See paragraphs 28-30). Therefore, for the reasons stated in paragraphs 28-30, the undersigned declines to adopt, as a finding of fact, Dr. Sprehe's opinion which was based on a factually deficient hypothetical question. On August 9, 1995, sixty-five days after Dr. Sprehe's examination and report, the Agency issued an Emergency Suspension Order against Dr. Murtha's license to practice medicine. Dr. Murtha called Mark Stuart Goldman, Ph.D. as his sole witness. Dr. Goldman is a clinical psychologist and distinguished Professor of Psychology at the University of South Florida. Dr. Goldman specializes in the area alcohol research and is currently the director of the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Institute at the University of South Florida. Dr. Goldman was accepted as an expert witness in the field of alcohol and alcoholism, and he testified on behalf of Dr. Murtha. Dr. Goldman testified to the issue of alcoholism and discussed in detail the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (MAST). As discussed earlier, Dr. Sprehe relied on the MAST to help make his diagnosis that Dr. Murtha is dependent on alcohol. Dr. Goldman testified that the MAST can be skewed and that the very accusation of alcohol abuse can result in the subject having points scored against him. Dr. Goldman stated that tests such as MAST are crude devices used for screening alcohol problems but are not designed for the purpose of making diagnosis. To make this point, Dr. Goldman cited the Handbook of Alcoholism Treatment Approaches, by Hester and Miller, for the purpose that screening tests such as MAST should not be used for the purpose of making a diagnosis and that to do so represents a violation of professional and ethical standards. The undersigned is persuaded by Dr. Goldman's position that tests such as MAST should be used as screening not diagnostic tools. As such, any opinions based on results from the MAST test are rejected as not supported by credible evidence. Dr. Goldman examined Dr. Murtha on two separate occasions. Dr. Goldman obtained and reviewed Dr. Sprehe's report, and he reviewed the results of the MMPI and the MAST. Based on his review of the materials generated by Dr. Sprehe and on his own examination of Dr. Murtha, Dr. Goldman could not offer an opinion as to whether Dr. Murtha is safe to practice medicine. In addition, Dr. Goldman felt the record was incomplete to offer an opinion as to whether the Respondent was dependent on alcohol. In summary, Dr. Goldman found that a conclusive diagnosis would take considerably more time and would involve additional examination techniques. The undersigned adopts Dr. Goldman's position that inadequate information was available to render an opinion regarding Dr. Murtha's ability to safely practice medicine. In addition to the expert testimony received at the hearing, the Agency also offered the testimony of Dr. Murtha's ex-wife, Donna Gail Murtha. Mrs. Murtha is a registered nurse employed at James A. Haley Veterans Administration Hospital, and she was married to Dr. Murtha for 23 years until their divorce in December of 1994. Mrs. Murtha was offered for the purpose of establishing that Dr. Murtha was an abuser of alcohol and that he regularly consumed alcohol while engaging in the practice of medicine. Mrs. Murtha offered conflicting testimony relating to the quantity of alcohol Dr. Murtha consumed during their marriage. At the hearing she stated that he consumed "at least a pint [of liquor] a day. During the discovery deposition, however, she stated that "she couldn't state an amount [of alcohol consumed]." She also denied ever stating that he [Dr. Murtha] drank a fifth a day. Mrs. Murtha offered additional conflicting testimony as it related to Dr. Murtha's use of alcohol while on call at the hospital. At the hearing she testified that Dr. Murtha consumed alcohol while on call. During the discovery deposition, however, she testified that she knew of no specific incident when Dr. Murtha used alcohol on call. She also stated that she could not recall any instance when Dr. Murtha went to the office after having consumed alcohol. Mrs. Murtha's testimony is rejected because it is inconsistent and it lacks reliability 8/ At no time during or prior to the Agency's investigation had any complaints been received against Dr. Murtha.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED: That a final ordered be entered dismissing with prejudice the complaint filed against the Respondent in DOAH Case No. 96-0567. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM A. BUZZETT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1996.
The Issue Whether Respondents' alcoholic beverage license should be disciplined for the reasons stated in Petitioner's Notice to Show Cause dated September 14, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented, the following facts are determined: The Long Branch was operating under DABT License No. 74-878 in License Series 4-COP-SRX. This type of license requires food and nonalcoholic beverage sales to constitute at least 51 percent of all sales. Audit of the Long Branch's records, which were examined on a month-by- month breakdown of the sales for the period July 1 1981, to July 1, 1982, showed food and non- alcoholic beverage sales at 7.7 percent and alcoholic beverage sales at 92.3 percent of total sales. For the period July 1 through July 27, 1982, the ratio was 4.3 percent to 95.7 percent. At no time during the more than one year period audited did the food sales reach the required 51 percent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondents' License No. 74-878 be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas M. and Sandra J. Spera Long Branch 600 South Yonge Street Ormond Beach, Florida Mr, Howard M. Rasmussen Director, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr Gary R. Rutledge Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Aki-San held an alcoholic beverage license which expired October 1, 1977. Only on January 10, 1978, did Aki-San make application for "delinquent renewal" of its license. In the unlicensed interim, one of respondent's truckdrivers continued to deliver Kirin beer to Aki-San. At all pertinent times, respondent was licensed as a distributor of alcoholic beverages. Respondent employs numerous truckdrivers to distribute alcoholic beverages to some 2,000 licensees under the beverage law. Each driver has a route book containing the license number of each of the customers for which he is responsible. The truck drivers have standing instructions to insure, before delivering alcoholic beverages, that the licensees they serve have renewed their licenses for the year. Posted on a bulletin board on respondent's premises, in October of 1977, was a notice reminding the drivers to ascertain whether their customers' licenses had been renewed.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the notice to show cause issued in this case. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of November, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Clifford Distributing Company 990 S.W. 21st Terrace Ft. Lauderdale, Florida Mary Jo M. Gallay Staff Attorney 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his age as stated in the Petition for Relief, in violation of Subsection 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following facts were established by clear and convincing evidence: Respondent, Phantom Fireworks, is a retailer and wholesaler of consumer fireworks and employs more than 15 persons. Petitioner, Joseph A. Zemba, Jr., was hired as an assistant manager at the Cocoa, Florida, location on March 21, 2007. At the time he was hired, he was 57 years old and the oldest of four applicants for the position. On or about August 16, 2007, Petitioner was discharged from his employment with Phantom Fireworks by the Cocoa, Florida, manager, Joseph Mele. Mr. Mele advised Petitioner that he was discharged for violating company policy regarding the unauthorized use of alcohol on company property or while on the job. Petitioner testified that he believes the discharge for alcohol abuse was a "cover up" for the real reason that he was discharged. Petitioner "believed" that he was discharged because of his age. Petitioner presented no direct or circumstantial evidence that his discharge was based on age. He did not deny his use of alcohol while on company premises and on company time. On July 1, 2007, after receiving customer complaints regarding the smell of alcohol on Petitioner's person, Mr. Mele counseled him about the smell of alcohol on his person and raised the issue of the impropriety of drinking alcohol during work hours. Prior to the customers approaching Mr. Mele, two employees told him, independently and at different times, that they observed the odor of alcohol on Petitioner's person. Petitioner acknowledged having used alcohol during working hours and indicated it would not happen again. On August 2, 2007, Mr. Mele again received complaints of Petitioner having the odor of alcohol on his breath. Based on these complaints, Mr. Mele verbally counseled Petitioner a second time regarding the use of alcohol while on company premises and during company time. Petitioner again acknowledged he was drinking and stated that he "had a beer for lunch" and that it would not happen again. Mr. Mele again verbally counseled Petitioner on August 6, 2007. On August 3, 2007, Kathy Daley, a co-worker whose testimony confirmed the incident, told Mr. Mele that when she and Petitioner worked together on that day, Petitioner left the showroom to do some banking, a task that usually takes ten or 15 minutes. Petitioner, however, was gone for over one hour before he returned. When he returned, Kat Daley smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Petitioner's breath. She reported this after Petitioner had left for the day. Petitioner was next scheduled to work on August 6, 2007, at which time Mr. Mele counseled him for a third time regarding complaints of the smell of alcohol on his person. When questioned about his whereabouts, Petitioner told Mr. Mele that he could not remember where he went. Mr. Mele contacted his regional manager, Ira Schwartz, on August 7, 2007, to discuss the alcohol issue regarding Petitioner. Ira Schwartz advised Mr. Mele to contact Amy Witzeman, director of Human Resources for Phantom Fireworks. After considering the facts and consulting with the director of Operations and General Counsel, a decision was made to terminate Petitioner based on his abuse of alcohol. Petitioner was terminated from the company, effective August 16, 2007.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, Phantom Fireworks, did not discriminate against Petitioner, Joseph A. Zemba, Jr., and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Anthony Donofrio, Esquire B.J. Alan Company 555 Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard Youngstown, Ohio 44505 Joseph A. Zemba, Jr. 39 Burlington Avenue Rockledge, Florida 32955
Findings Of Fact It was stipulated that Respondent, Eugene Coney, is a licensee, and that he received due notice of said hearing. It was also stipulated that Robert Coney conducted 90 percent of the business activities of the business, writing checks, paying bills, and similar functions. Exhibits 1-6 were identified by James A. Harris, Jr., custodian of the Miami District Office Records, and were received into evidence. Beverage Agent James R. Bates testified that on May 8, 1974, he inspected the premises at 9:30 p.m. Robert Coney was present on the premises. Then asked to produce the beverage license, Robert Coney searched under the counter and produced the license. When asked to produce invoices for the sale of wine and malt beverages, Robert Coney produced those for that day but could not produce such invoices for the past six (6) months or for the past three (3) years. Bates did discover an old eviction notice and various other bills. In response to Bates' questions Robert Coney stated that he handled most of the business. Bates testified, and it was confirmed by the Coneys, that permission to keep invoices of wine and malt beverage sales off of the premises had not been requested. A copy of an eviction notice from the Court files was received as Exhibit 7. Beverage Agent Edward Pfitzenmaier inspected the licensed premises on April 9, 1975 and found the premises in the charge of Geneva Bell. Pfitzenmaier asked to see the beverage license and again it was found under the counter of the grocery. Robert Coney stated be was the brother of Eugene Coney, the licensee, and was employed at his brother's licensed premises as the manager. His duties included paying bills, clerking, protecting the business property, receiving beverages, selling beverages, and accounting for the business receipts. He had no written contract with his brother but it was their oral agreement that he could take food from the store's stocks and that the profits would split evenly between them. In addition, according to Eugene Coney, if Robert Coney required more than 50 percent of the profits to support his needs he was authorized to take so much of the profits as he required to support his basic needs. Robert and Eugene Coney both stated that Eugene had opened the business, had executed the lease with the landlord, and was in the premises at least every 7-8 days. Eugene Coney did relieve his brother when he was sick or as necessary, however, Eugene Coney had a full time job as a truck driver which required him to be out of town for several days at the time. Eugene testified that he had opened the business to provide his brother with employment because of Robert's heart condition, but that he (Eugene) was the owner, had absolutely final say in the conduct of the business, and could discharge Robert at any time. Eugene stated, however, that Robert was manager and could run the business as he wanted to run it. Both brothers testified that the store had been burglarized and vandalized on many occasions and that this had resulted in the destruction of many business records to include wine and malt beverage invoices. Similarly, their beverage license had been destroyed or disfigured during these burglaries which is why it was not displayed. Robert testified that after the inspection by Bates, he had found a box of business records which he had forgotten about which included some of the invoices in question. The Hearing Officer requested that the Petitioner's agents inspect these records and advise the Hearing Officer of the results of their inspection by affidavit which would be received as a late filed exhibit. Said affidavit is made a part of the record.
Recommendation Having found that the charges of falsifying the lease affidavit, the failure to keep records of sales of wine and malt beverages for a period of three (3) years, the failure of the applicant to show the alleged business interest of Robert Coney in his application were not proven, the Hearing Officer recommends these charges be dropped. Having found that the licensee failed to conspicuously display the beverage license, but having found some mitigating factors, the Hearing Officer recommends a minimal penalty of one week suspension or a civil penalty of $50. Having found the licensee in violation of Rule 7A-3.17, F.A.C., the Hearing Officer recommends that the licensee receive a light penalty of two weeks suspension or a civil penalty of $400. The suspensions are recommended to run consecutively. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles L. Curtis, Esquire Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida Barnett Pletz, Esquire 335 N. W. 54th Street Miami, Florida 33127 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF BEVERAGE DIVISION OF BEVERAGE, Petitioner, CASE NO. 75-1627 LICENSE NO. 23-951 EUGENE CONEY d/b/a 62nd STREET GROCERY, Respondent. /
