The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether the Petitioner should issue a cease and desist order and/or impose sanctions against the Respondent on the basis of allegations that the Respondent, by failing to have its books, accounts, and documents available for examination and by refusing to permit an inspection of its books and records in an investigation and examination, has violated Sections 520.995(1)(a), (f), and (g), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Sometime during the month of February of 1991, Ms. Jennifer Chirolis, a Financial Investigator from the Department of Banking and Finance, visited the offices of the Barat Company. She spoke with Mr. Roque Barat and determined that the Barat Company was conducting retail installment sales without being licensed to do so under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. Mr. Chirolis advised Mr. Roque Barat that he needed a license and asked him to cease operations until he obtained the necessary license. The Barat Company thereafter obtained the necessary license and was still licensed as of the time of the formal hearing. Thereafter, the Department received a complaint about the Barat Company from a customer. The customer's complaint was to the effect that the Barat Company had made misrepresentations concerning the fee paid by the customer. The Department initiated an "investigation" of the customer's complaint and also decided to conduct an "examination" of the Barat Company. On April 22, 1992, a Department Examiner, Mr. Lee Winters, went to the office of the Barat Company to conduct the "examination" and "investigation". The Barat Company is operated out of a small office with two employees and a few filing cabinets. When Mr. Winters arrived, employees of the Barat Company were conducting business with two customers. Mr. Winters identified himself to the employees and informed them that he had been assigned to conduct an "examination" and "investigation" of the Barat Company. A Barat Company employee, Mr. Fred Vivar, said that he could not produce the company's records without express authorization from Mr. Roque Barat, that Mr. Roque Barat was out of the country, that he could not get in touch with Mr. Roque Barat at that moment, but that when he did get in touch with him, he would advise Mr. Roque Barat of Mr. Winter's desire to examine the company's books and records. Following a number of telephone calls over a period of several days, on May 1, 1992, Mr. Vivar advised Mr. Winters that he had received authorization from Mr. Roque Barat for the Department to inspect the books and records of the Barat Company. An appointment was made for the Department to inspect the books and records on May 6, 1992, beginning at 10:00 a.m. On May 5, 1992, a letter from an attorney representing the Barat Company was hand delivered to Mr. Winters. The letter included the following paragraph: It is my understanding that you have requested the opportunity to view the records of the above-referenced company, said inspection to take place on May 6, 1992. Please be advised that if this "inspection" is purportedly being done by your agency's authority, pursuant to F.S. 520.996, that no records will be produced absent compliance by your department with F.S. 520.994 including, but not limited to, the Barat Company exercising its right to challenge said subpoena. The Department concluded from the letter of May 5, 1992, that the Barat Company not only refused to produce records without a subpoena, but that, even if served with a subpoena, the Barat Company would resist compliance with the subpoena unless and until ordered to comply by a court. For that reason the Department did not pursue the issuance of a subpoena. Mr. Winters has been involved in over one hundred "examinations" under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. In the course of those "examinations" there have been only two licensees that did not produce their records. Those two licensees were the Barat Company and another company known as Phase One Credit. Mr. Roque Barat is an officer and director of both Phase One Credit and the Barat Company. The license of Phase One Credit was revoked for its failure to produce its books and records. The refusal to produce the books and records of the Barat Company was occasioned by an effort on the part of Mr. Roque Barat to avoid payment of "examination" fees authorized by Section 520.996, Florida Statutes. In the summer of 1992, the Barat Company filed for bankruptcy, closed down its business operations, and is currently winding up the business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charge that the Barat Company has violated Section 520.995(1)(a), Florida Statutes; Concluding that the Barat Company has violated Sections 520.995(1)(f) and (g), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; Imposing a penalty consisting of: (a) an administra-tive fine in the amount of one thousand dollars, and (b) revocation of the Barat Company's license; and Ordering the Barat Company to cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5620 The following are my specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance, with the exception of the last five words. The last five words are rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case and as, in any event, not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 8: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inaccurate description of letter. (The relevant text of the letter is included in the findings of fact.) Last sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary evidentiary details. Paragraph 9: Rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 10: First two sentences rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Last two sentences accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 13: Accepted. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: As noted in the Preliminary Statement portion of this Recommended Order, the Respondent's proposed recommended order was filed late. The Respondent's proposed recommended order also fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, in that it fails to contain citations to the portions of the record that support its proposed findings of fact. A party's statutory right to a specific ruling on each proposed finding submitted by the party is limited to those circumstances when the proposed findings are submitted within the established deadlines and in conformity with applicable rules. See Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, and Forrester v. Career Service Commission, 361 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), in which the court held, inter alia, that a party is not entitled to more than a reasonable period of time within which to submit its proposals. Because the Respondent submitted its proposals late and because those proposals fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is not statutorily entitled to a specific ruling on each of its proposed findings and no such specific findings have been made. (As noted in the Preliminary Statement, the Respondent's proposed recommended order has been read and considered.) COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Brenner, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue Suite 708-N Miami, Florida 33128 Louis J. Terminello, Esquire 950 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 Michael H. Tarkoff, Esquire 2601 South Bayshore Drive Suite 1400 Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Copies furnished continued: William G. Reeves, General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Until December of 1974, respondent William W. Lambert did business as a general contractor under the corporate name of Lambert Enterprises, Inc. As qualifying agent for the corporation, he built homes, poured concrete, laid sod, and did other general contracting. During 1974, respondent was in the process of acquiring a sod farm, as well as being engaged in the general contracting business. Lambert Enterprises, Inc. dealt largely with other contractors. When The Commonwealth Corporation went bankrupt, other contractors, notably the Collins brothers, also ended up in bankruptcy, and unable to make good on outstanding obligations to Lambert Enterprises, Inc. Respondent caused a voluntary petition in bankruptcy to be filed on behalf of Lambert Enterprises, Inc., on November 22, 1974. At that time he held all the stock in Lambert Enterprises, Inc., and served both as president and as a member of the board of directors of the corporation. Respondent Lambert has never been interested in any other corporation that has been declared bankrupt, and has never gone into bankruptcy personally. Mr. William E. Wingate, an investigator for the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, checks bankruptcy records twice monthly. By looking through bankruptcy records, he has learned of ten to twelve bankruptcies, in the Northern District of Florida, involving contractors in the last two years. He may have missed some, but every time he finds out about a contractor's bankruptcy, he reports it to the Board's Jacksonville office. On July 31, 1975, he first learned of respondent's corporation's bankruptcy. He obtained certified copies of pertinent papers which he then forwarded to other Board staff in Jacksonville. After Lambert Enterprises, Inc. failed, respondent obtained a general contractor's license as an individual, which is currently in force. Since December of 1975, respondent has been employed by Century Construction, first in Tallahassee, then in Jacksonville, where he is now a project manager for the company. Permits for work performed by Century Corporation are not pulled on respondent's license. Respondent's financial condition is now stable, and he is financially sound.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent be reprimanded. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of April, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida COPIES FURNISHED: Barry S. Sinoff, Esquire Blackstone Building, Suite 1010 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Daniel J. Wiser, Esquire Post Office Box 10137 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. J. K. Linnan Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board 1010 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent, George May, was a licensed real estate broker, having been issued license number 0056693 by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation (Petitioner's Exhibit 27). Respondent, Marie L. Bundick, was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0185873 by Petitioner (Petitioner's Exhibit 29). During the time the events herein occurred May was the active broker with, and Bundick a salesman for, Commercial Equity Corporation, 2450 East Commercial Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Between December, 1976, and June, 1977, May formed the following corporations: A-1989 Corporation, Future 5 Corporation and 8-Villas Corporation (Petitioner's Exhibit 30). He served as president of these corporations until they were involuntarily dissolved by the Department of State for failure to pay fees due that Department. In early 1976, May ran an advertisement in a Fort Myers newspaper expressing a desire to purchase acreage in that area. In response to that advertisement, Henry Minster, a Bonita Springs real estate broker, contacted May and advised him he had various parcels of property for sale in Lee County, including undeveloped acreage. In May, 1976, Minister, May and an undisclosed third party visited an unimproved tract of land in what is known as the East Bonita Drainage District. The property in question is approximately 4 air miles northeast of Bonita Springs and is located within Sections 16 and 21, Township 475, Range 26E, Lee County, Florida. It lies around 8 air miles from the Gulf of Mexico; by automobile the distance is approximately 17 miles. Because the area was not surveyed, and there were few, if any, signs on the property in that area, a common starting point to view the property was a television tower in the northeast quarter of Section 30, where the graded road ended. In order to reach the boundary of Section 21, one had to travel approximately one mile east- northeasterly from the tower through Section 29 on trails and other undeveloped land. Section 16, which lay directly north of Section 21, was virtually inaccessible by automobile or on foot. Access from the tower to the lower corner of Section 21 could not be had in a conventional automobile without exceptional weather; however, Minster, May and the other person were in a 4- wheel drive vehicle and proceeded generally east-northeasterly approximately one mile on a trail until they reached a point very close to the southwest corner of Section 21. Then they got out of the vehicle and viewed the property in the immediate area. Although they were at or very close to the western boundary of Section 21, May was never shown any property further eastward, nor was he taken to Section 16 which was approximately one mile north of there. However, Minster did point out the general area where the property in Sections 16 and 21 were located, and the type of topographical characteristics to be found in both Sections. He further advised May that there was no reasonable access to the property, no roads had been built, that it was covered with cypress and that the land was under water during part of the year. Minster also advised May that if he planned to subdivide the property, certain registration requirements with the State must be met, and that zoning requirements with Lee County must be adhered to before development of the property could begin. The property that May was to subsequently purchase was approximately 17 feet above sea level, and was generally covered in varying degrees with cypress, pine trees and palmetto (Petitioner's Exhibit 25). U.S. Geological Maps indicate the predominate characteristic of Sections 16 and 21 to be a swamp or marshland (Petitioner's Exhibit 5). There is no dispute that much of the property was under water during the rainy season. On August 23, 1976, May negotiated the purchase of 100 acres in Section 16 from Minster (Petitioner's Exhibit 6). On January 23, 1977, an additional purchase of 85 acres in Section 16 was made by A-1989 Corporation, of which May was president (Petitioner's Exhibit 7). On July 21, 1977, A-1989 Corporation purchased another 40 acres in Section 16 (Petitioner's Exhibit 8). Future 5 Corporation, of which May was president, made a purchase of 100 acres in Section 21 on October 6, 1977 (Petitioner's Exhibit 9). A final purchase of an undisclosed number of acres in Section 21 was made by 8 Villas Corporation, of which May was president, on February 27, 1978 (petitioner's Exhibit 10). A sixth contract to purchase land in August, 1978, in Section 10 was entered into by the parties but the sale was never consummated (Petitioner's Exhibit 12). Collectively, the above purchases of land roughly encompassed the southern one-half of Section 16 and the southern one-third of Section 21, Township 47S, Range 26E. After May began making purchases of the acreage from Minster, he initiated a sales campaign through newspaper advertisements to sell the property in 2 1/2 acre tracts to the general public. These sales were conducted through his realty firm, Commercial Equity Corporation. Although it is alleged that advertisements appeared in "various news publications in and about Broward County", only the following advertisements in the Pompano Beach Shoppers' Guide were made a part of the record: "2 1/2 acres: Invest for tomorrow today, miles of spectacular beaches, south Florida's fastest growing area. Near golf, best fishing,..." "2 1/2 acres in sun and fun Florida, watch yourmoney grow, $65.91 per month $950 down near beaches..." "Live again, get away, beautiful home site, near beaches, good fishing, exc. schools. South Florida,..." "2 1/2 acres, no qualifying, booming South Florida near beautiful beaches, only 7 pct. interest, low payments, $65.91 month. Parks, boating, highway and tax deductible. Be smart, buy today." (Petitioner's Exhibit 20) Under each of the above advertisements were telephone numbers which enabled the caller to reach either May or his secretary. After the caller gave his name and number, an associate was instructed to return the call and arrange a meeting. The above advertisements, or ones similar thereto, were read by, inter alia, William C. Park and Rahlyn Ramsaran who made inquiries concerning the possible purchase of land. Park was referred to Marie L. Bundick while Ramsaran was referred to Edmond Martell, both of whom were salesman for Commercial Equity Corporation. In June, 1978, Park, Bundick and another Commercial salesman (Bill Soloman) visited the area in question to view the property. They first drove to the television tower in Section 30, and then continued eastward on a "farm access road" until they reached a drainage canal. After following the drainage canal for approximately one-half mile they reached what purportedly was property similar to that which was for sale. It was represented to Park that they were "very close" to where Park's property was actually located, but in no event were they more than a 5-acre tract away. Park noticed a flooded area approximately 1/4 mile away and inquired of Bundick if the property he was buying was within the flooded area; she answered it was not. Based upon these representations, Park later agreed to purchase two tracts of acreage (5 acres) in Section 21 for $14,000 from 8-Villas Corporation (Petitioner's Exhibit 24). Park, a professional diving instructor, purchased the property with the expectation of eventually constructing a diving school on the land. These hopes eventually evaporated upon discovering the true character of his land. In December, 1978, Park received a telephone call from Department Investigator Stevens who advised Parks that other investors had complained of misrepresentations by May and were attempting to get refunds from May on their purchases. He asked Park to show him the property he had been shown by Bundick in June. Park and Stevens visited the area on December 6, 1978, and after seeing the property a second time in conjunction with maps, Park concluded the property shown to him and that actually purchased were not the same. He also concluded that a diving school could not be built on such low-lying property. Park later received a refund on his purchase from May after a Department investigator visited May concerning the sale. After responding to May's advertisement, Ramsaran visited the property in question in April or May, 1977, with Edmond Martell, a salesman for Commercial. They drove to the television tower in Section 30, and then walked approximately one mile into the rough terrain. Martell advised Ramsaran that the property he was going to purchase began within a couple of hundred feet from where they were standing. Based on that representation Ramsaran purchased three tracts of property in Section 16 for $35,000 on May 11, 1977 (petitioner's Exhibit 26). Because Section 16 was at least one mile north of where Ramsaran and Martell had originally stood when viewing the property, the representation by Martell to Ramsaran was clearly false. Ramsaran revisited the Bonita Springs area on several occasions shortly after that and began making inquiries concerning where his property was actually located. He also studied a map of the area to pinpoint its exact location. After becoming concerned that he may have bought something different from what he had been shown, he called Martell who advised him not to worry and to meet with May to discuss the matter. On May 18, 1977, Ramsaran visited May's office to complain that he had been "taken". May told him it was not a swamp, that it was high and dry and was "good property". He confirmed this representation in a letter given to Ramsaran which stated as follows: "This land is nor is it under water. This land is approximately 17 feet above sea level. The land is wooded and is situated approximately one and three-quarters miles northeast from the T.V. tower in Bonita Springs." (Petitioner's Exhibit 23). Having received this representation from May, Ramsaran's concerns were temporarily allayed until Department Investigator Stevens visited him several months later. That visit prompted Ramsaran to contact a Bonita Springs real estate broker to see if a survey of property could be made. When advised that the property was under water, Ramsaran returned to May and requested a refund of his money. May refused to do so until he was reminded he had guaranteed the property by letter previously given Ramsaran on May 16; May then agreed to make a refund. In March, 1979, after receiving "pressure" from Department investigators concerning the land sales that were being made, May quitclaimed all of the properties purchased back to Minster (Petitioner's Exhibits 13-17) . By letter he concurrently advised each of the investors to begin making their monthly payments to Minster rather than to May. Although Minster was not forewarned that May was going to convey the property back to him, Minster has retained ownership of the property since that time, and has continued receiving the monthly payments from May's former customers. Martell was taken by May to the property on three separate occasions to orient him concerning its location and characteristics. Minster also accompanied them on at least one occasion. They went to the television tower in Section 30, and from there traveled east-northeastly for about 3/4 of a mile along a trail into an area covered by pines, cypress and palmetto. After stopping, May pointed out the general direction in which the property was located and described it to Martell as being "high and dry". Despite asking both May and Minster for more specific instructions on several subsequent occasions, Martell was never actually told the precise location of the property being sold. When Martell began working for May, he was given pictures of the property and told to discuss the general growth of the area with customers and point out its location on a map. When visits were made to the property with prospects May told Martell to drive the prospects to the television tower, and to walk eastward from that point into the woods as far as possible. However, Martell acknowledged he was never sure where the property he was selling was actually located. Both May and Minster told Martell the property was high and dry and 17' above sea level. There were no inaccurate representations made by May to Martell concerning the local zoning ordinance or access to utilities. Bundick met May through a friend who was employed by Commercial. She began working as a salesman for Commercial in March, 1978, and continued in that capacity until January, 1979. Although Bundick had no experience in selling raw acreage, and preferred to sell residential and commercial property, May encouraged her to sell land. He did not take Bundick to the property in question; instead he gave her a map on which he had traced the directions. After unsuccessfully attempting to find the property on one occasion, Bundick again asked May to show her the property. May told her his secretary would accompany her to the exact location the next time she took a client to inspect the land. Sometime later, Bundick and May's secretary, Deborah Kemph, visited the property at which time Kemph told her the property they were standing on was that purchased from Minster. In all future dealings with customers, Bundick used that location as a reference point for selling property, and assumed that what was being shown and what was being sold were the same. To this date, she still does not know the exact location of the property that she sold. She claims she simply relied upon the advice given by May, and believes that if incorrect advice was given customers, the fault lies with May. During her association with Commercial, Bundick acknowledged that besides the sale to Park, she also sold 'several other' parcels of property to various customers. May stated he was inexperienced in the land sales business when he purchased the property from Minster. He claimed he was "setup" by Minster, an experienced broker, who used Commercial Equity Corporation to merchandise his property; however, this claim was not substantiated. May also claimed he was deceived when he was initially shown the property, and that the exact location of the property being sold was never shown to him. He further stated he deeded the property back to Minster only after drugs had been placed in his food by his secretary, and he did not understand the nature of his actions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent George May be found guilty of misrepresentation for instructing his sales associates to inform prospective purchasers that the land being sold was high and dry as set out in paragraph 2 of Count III. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent Marie L. Bundick be found guilty of misrepresentation in her dealings with purchaser William Park as set forth in Subparagraphs 3(b) and (c) of Count VI. It is further RECOMMENDED that all other charges against Respondents be DISMISSED. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent May's real estate broker's license be suspended for 6 months, and that Respondent Bundick's real estate salesman license be suspended for 30 days. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of September 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1981.
The Issue Whether the respondent is indebted to the complainant for the sale of Florida-grown agricultural products, and, if so, the amount of the indebtedness.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Rose has a grove of lychee trees on his property; each year he harvests the lychee nuts for sale, but the sale of agricultural products is not his sole source of income. In mid-June, 1996, Mr. Rose heard that the Growers Association was offering $3.50 per pound for lychees, the highest price of which he was aware. Mr. Rose took his fruit to the Growers Association on June 18, 1996. Mr. Rose had not done business with the Growers Association previously but had sold his fruit to another company. Mr. Rose received a grower's receipt showing that, on June 18, 1996, he had brought in 298 pounds of fruit, that 14 pounds were culls, and that the Growers Association had packed 27.9 ten- pound boxes of fruit. The Growers Association packed only marketable fruit. Ninety-nine percent of the tropical fruit grown in Florida is handled in pools.1 According to industry practice, the "handler" does not purchase the fruit outright but is responsible for packing, storing, selling, and shipping the fruit and for accounting for and remitting the proceeds of sale, minus expenses, to the members of the pool on a pro rata basis. The pools are composed of all growers whose fruit is packed during a designated period of time. Prices initially quoted to growers participating in a pooling arrangement are not guaranteed because the actual sales price may vary, depending on market conditions. It was the practice of the Growers Association to handle lychees under a pooling arrangement, and the receipt Mr. Rose received from the Growers Association contained the notation "P- 407LY," which designated the pool to which Mr. Rose's fruit was assigned. The Lychee P-407LY pool to which Mr. Rose's fruit was assigned consisted of fruit packed by the Growers Association between June 15 and 21, 1996. Mr. Rose was told on several occasions by employees of the Growers Association that he would receive $920.70 after expenses for the sale of his lychees. This amount was reflected in a Pool Price Report generated by the Growers Association on July 10, 1997, which also showed that a total of 107.6 pounds of fruit was included in the pool and that the Growers Association anticipated receiving a total of $4,088.65 for the sale of the fruit in the pool. The Growers Association maintained in its files a work order showing that 83 ten-pound boxes of lychees were sold to Produce Services of America, Inc., at a price of $38.00 per box and that the fruit was shipped on June 21, 1996. According to the July 10 report, the Growers Association had received payment of $932.90 for 24.55 ten-pound boxes of lychees sold to "L & V" on June 21, 1996, at $38.00 per box, but there is no indication in the report that the anticipated payment of $3,154.00 had been received from Produce Services of America. Mr. Rose repeatedly called the Growers Association during July and August to inquire about when he would receive payment for his fruit. In accordance with the information he had consistently been given by employees of the Growers Association, he expected to receive $920.70. When he received a check from the Growers Association dated August 29, 1996, in the amount of $367.48, he called the Growers Association for an explanation of why he had received that amount rather than the $920.70 he was expecting. Ultimately, he spoke with Mr. Kendall in early September, who told him that the $367.48 was all he was going to receive as his pro rata share of the pool because Produce Services of American had not paid in full for the 83 boxes of fruit it purchased. As reflected in the Pool Price Report dated September 19, 1996, the Growers Association received a total payment of only $1,847.42 for the fruit in the pool, rather than the $4,088.65 shown in the July 10, 1996, report. After the Growers Association's expenses were deducted, a total of $1,417.25 was distributed to the five growers in the pool. Although a copy of this final price report for the P-407LY pool should have accompanied Mr. Rose’s check, it did not. According to the information contained in the September 19 Pool Price Report, the shortfall in the amount received for the sale of the fruit in the pool is attributable to the Growers Association's receiving only $913.00, or $11.00 per box, for the sale of the 83 boxes of lychees to Produce Services of America, instead of the anticipated $3,154.00. The $913.00 was paid to the Growers Association by check dated August 19, 1996. Mr. Rose did not present sufficient evidence to establish that he had a contract for the outright sale of 27.9 ten-pound boxes of lychees to the Growers Association. Rather, the evidence establishes that Mr. Rose's fruit was handled by the Growers Association under a pooling arrangement and that, consistent with the practice in the tropical fruit industry, the Growers Association assumed responsibility for packing, storing, selling, and shipping the fruit. The Growers Association failed to offer any credible evidence to explain why Produce Services of America paid only $11.00 per box for the 83 boxes of fruit shipped from the pool, notwithstanding that the agreed sales price was $38.00 per box.2 Even if the fruit was damaged or in poor condition when it was delivered to Produce Services of America, the Growers Association packed 27.9 ten-pound boxes of marketable fruit on Mr. Rose’s account, and, once packed, it had complete control of the fruit in the pool. The Growers Association failed to offer any evidence to establish that it acted with reasonable care in fulfilling its responsibilities under the pool arrangement. Consequently, it bears the risk of loss rather than Mr. Rose and is indebted to him for $553.22, which is the difference between the $920.70 Mr. Rose would have received as his pro rata share of the pool had Produce Services of America paid the agreed-upon sales price of $38.00 per box and the $367.48 which the Growers Association paid to Mr. Rose by check dated August 29, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order finding that the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., is indebted to Mike Rose for the sale of agricultural products and ordering the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., to pay Mike Rose $553.22 within fifteen (15) days of the date its order becomes final. The Final Order should also provide that, in the event that the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., fails to pay Mike Rose $533.22 within the time specified, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, as surety for the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., must provide payment under the conditions and provisions of its bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1997.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 475.25(1)(b), (1)(d)1, and (1)(e), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a licensed Florida real estate salesperson, issued license number 0530788 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was an involuntary inactive salesperson at 2156 Turnberry Drive, Oviedo, Florida 32764. On or about April 13, 2000, an Administrative Law Judge entered a Recommended Order finding Respondent guilty of violations of Subsections 721.11(4)(a), (h), (j), and (k), Florida Statutes (1995), by making oral misrepresentations in his sales pitch to timeshare purchasers. On or about June 15, 2000, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, issued a Final Order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge and rejecting all of Respondent's exceptions. In the Final Order, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, ordered Respondent to cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 721, Florida Statutes, and ordered Respondent to pay a penalty of $28,000. As of September 24, 2002, Respondent had failed to pay the penalty pursuant to the terms of the Final Order of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes. On or about July 22, 2000, a uniform disciplinary citation was issued to Respondent for failing to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission of his current mailing address or any change of the current mailing address in violation of Rule 61J2-10.038, Florida Administrative Code. Pursuant to proper authority, the Florida Real Estate Commission penalized Respondent $100 for the violation. At the time he received the uniform disciplinary citation, Respondent was advised as follows: "You have a total of 60 days from the date this citation was served upon you to pay the fine and costs specified. This citation automatically becomes a Final Order of the board if you do not dispute this citation within 30 days of the date this citation was served upon you. As a Final Order, the fine and costs shall be due to the board within 30 days of the date of the Final Order. After this citation has become a Final Order, failure to pay the fines and costs specified constitutes a violation of a Final Order of the board and may subject you to further disciplinary action." On or about August 22, 2002, the citation became a Final Order. As of September 24, 2002, Respondent had failed to pay the penalty pursuant to the terms of the Final Order of the Florida Real Estate Commission. Respondent had more than 20 years' experience selling timeshare units as a salesman, sales manager or sales director; he had worked in sales at various Central Florida timeshare resorts since 1979. Between July 1995 and March 1997, Respondent was employed as a salesman and sales director by Vocational Corporation, the owner/developer of Club Sevilla, a timeshare resort property. On October 24, 1995, Respondent participated in a sales presentation to Raymond and Charlene Sindel at Club Sevilla, which resulted in their purchase of a timeshare. During the sales presentation, Respondent made the following false, deceptive and misleading statements which induced the Sindels to purchase the timeshare: (1) the Sindels would become members of Interval International, a timeshare exchange program, in which they could exchange their timeshare and/or utilize another timeshare for $79 or $99 a week 52 weeks per year; and (2) representatives of Tri Realty would sell their existing timeshare before the end of the year. On October 24, 1995, Respondent participated in a sales presentation to Clarence and Maxine Shelt at Club Sevilla, which resulted in their purchase of a timeshare. During the sales presentation, Respondent made the following false, deceptive and misleading statement which induced the Shelts to purchase the timeshare: the Shelts would become members of Interval International, a timeshare exchange program, in which they could exchange their timeshare and or utilize another timeshare for $79 a week 52 weeks per year. On June 26, 1996, Respondent participated in a sales presentation to Eugene and Mildred Plotkin and their son, Daniel, at Club Sevilla, which resulted in the purchase by Eugene and Mildred Plotkin of a timeshare. During the sales presentation, Respondent made the following false, deceptive and misleading statements which induced the Plotkins to purchase the timeshare: (1) a timeshare owned by the Plotkins in Las Vegas, Nevada, would be sold within two months; (2) the Plotkins would receive a low-interest credit card with which they would finance the purchase of the Club Sevilla timeshare and that their Las Vegas timeshare would be sold quickly enough that they would not have to pay any interest on the credit card; and (3) the Plotkins would become members of Interval International, a timeshare exchange program, in which they could utilize another timeshare anywhere for $149 a week. On July 26, 1996, Respondent participated in a sales presentation to Robert and Susan Bailey at Club Sevilla, which resulted in their purchase of a timeshare. During the sales presentation, Respondent made the following false, deceptive and misleading statements which induced the Baileys to purchase the timeshare: (1) they would receive a low-interest credit card within ten days with a $20,000 credit limit with which they could finance the timeshare purchase; and (2) the Baileys would receive a prepaid 52-week membership in Interval International, a timeshare exchange program. In September 1996, Respondent participated in a sales presentation to Thomas and Betty Prussak at Club Sevilla, which resulted in the purchase of a timeshare. During the sales presentation, Respondent made the following false, deceptive and misleading statements which induced the Prussaks to purchase the timeshare: (1) timeshares owned by the Prussaks in Westgate and Club Sevilla were valued at $12,000 each and that these timeshare units would be sold if the Prussaks purchased a new timeshare unit at Club Sevilla; (2) that the new Club Sevilla timeshare unit would be a "floating" unit (could be used anytime); and (3) that the new Club Sevilla timeshare would be rented and that the Prussaks or their daughter would be able to take "getaway" weeks and stay at any RCI timeshare for $149 per week. On December 11, 1996, Respondent participated in a sales presentation to Larry and Carla Eshleman at Club Sevilla, which resulted in their purchase of a timeshare. During the sales presentation, Respondent made the following false, deceptive and misleading statements which induced the Eshlemans to purchase the timeshare: (1) the Eshlemans would receive a low-interest credit card with which they could finance the timeshare purchase; (2) the Eshlemans would become members of Interval International, a timeshare exchange program, in which they could exchange their timeshare and utilize another timeshare for $149 a week; and (3) the timeshare the Eshlemans owned prior to their purchase of the Club Sevilla timeshare would be sold in three months or would be rented for $1,650 per week.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Subsections 475.25(1)(b) and (e), Florida Statutes, and that Respondent's license as a real estate salesperson be revoked, that he be fined $2,000 and be required to pay the costs of the investigation and prosecution of the case. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher J. Decosta, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Hurston Building, North Tower Orlando, Florida 32801 William S. Walsh 13079 South Taylor Creek Road Christmas, Florida 32709 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Buddy Johnson, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Nancy P. Campiglia, Chief Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner because of her sex and/or age, and/or by retaliating against her for engaging in a protected activity.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a female, is a former employee of Respondent. At the time her employment with Respondent was terminated on December 31, 2015, she was 60 years old. Petitioner was a salesperson for Respondent, a company that sells specialty medical devices to medical providers and facilities. Petitioner’s background gave her technical knowledge regarding the cardiac-related product line, as she had obtained a certification as a perfusionist in 1978. A perfusionist operates the heart-lung bypass machine during open-heart surgery. By 1985, Petitioner moved into sales and has focused on cardiac products because of her background. Petitioner began her employment with Arrow, Teleflex’s predecessor, as a salesperson for the cardiac unit in August 2003. At some point, Arrow was acquired by Teleflex; the record is unclear as to exactly when this occurred, but it may have been sometime in late 2007. Petitioner testified that the product line has changed over the years, as there used to be artificial heart-related products, which were her “great loves” (R. Exh. 28 at 44), and why she started working there, but the company got rid of those programs. Under Teleflex, the main big-ticket piece of capital equipment sold by salespersons in the cardiac unit is the intra-aortic balloon pump. In addition, salespersons sell disposable products, such as catheters and cannulas used with the pump, in cardiac surgeries, and catheterization lab procedures. The organization and composition of the cardiac unit’s sales territories and the salespersons assigned to them were subject to change and did change throughout Petitioner’s time with Arrow and then Teleflex. Likewise, the organization and composition of sales divisions/regions and the managers assigned to be in charge of them were subject to change and did change throughout Petitioner’s employment. Sales divisions and sales territories within divisions were created, combined, split up, and reconfigured, and both salespersons and managers were added, eliminated, and reassigned. Petitioner attempted to recount the history of changes in sales territories that affected her during her years at Arrow and then Teleflex.1/ When Petitioner started in 2003, her sales territory was most of the state of Florida up to Tallahassee, and all of the cardiac unit’s sales representatives were under the supervision of a single manager. At some point, separate sales divisions were created, and a new manager was assigned to supervise Petitioner and others in her division. At another point, when a sales associate was let go, Petitioner’s sales territory was expanded to add the Florida panhandle and part of Alabama (to Mobile). At another point, separate sales territories were combined, and the sales associate who covered sales in Georgia and Alabama was let go. At the request of her new manager, Petitioner helped train a new sales associate to cover Georgia and Alabama. Petitioner was successful in sales for Arrow, and received several honors and awards for her achievements. At the end of her first year of employment in 2004, she was honored as “rookie of the year.” She received the chairman’s club award twice, in 2005 and 2007, for ranking in the top 10 percent of sales company-wide. Finally, she received the circle of excellence award in 2007, for having achieved her sales quota numbers three years in a row. Petitioner was promoted to executive sales representative, although she cannot remember exactly when that was. Her sales role was not changed, but she got a pay increase and some increased duties in the area of training new sales associates. When Teleflex acquired Arrow, the sales associate trained by Petitioner for the Georgia-Alabama sales territory was let go. Both Georgia and Alabama were added to Petitioner’s territory. From her home base in Florida (she lived in Spring Hill), she covered the three-state sales territory of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. Another change affecting Petitioner occurred when the state of Georgia was reassigned to a salesman in North Carolina and Petitioner’s territory was reduced to Alabama and Florida. Later, that salesman was promoted to manager for the eastern division, and Georgia was added back to Petitioner’s sales territory. It is unknown when these changes occurred, but from that point until early 2014, Petitioner’s sales territory remained the three-state area of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. Somewhere along the line, Petitioner experienced another changeover in management, with Christine Mazurk assuming the position of eastern regional manager. Ms. Mazurk supervised Petitioner from approximately 2010 to 2013. Petitioner was evaluated annually using a standardized format called the performance management process (PMP). The most heavily weighted area in the PMP is the annual formulation of business objectives and target goals, expressed in terms of sales revenue dollars by product line. In addition to business objectives, other categories evaluated include competencies and development. The objectives and target goals are established annually in the first quarter of the calendar year. The process begins with the employee who creates and submits the objectives and goals to his or her manager, who must accept them. At the end of the year, the employee performs a self-evaluation, rating each category as 1 (does not meet), 2 (partially meets), 3 (fully meets), or 4 (exceeds), while the manager similarly rates the employee in each category. The manager’s ratings are used to calculate an overall “final rating.” The final rating scale is as follows: between 1 and 1.4 means “does not meet”; between 1.5 and 2.4 means “partially meets”; between 2.5 and 3.4 means “fully meets”; and between 3.5 and 4 means “exceeds.” In 2011, Petitioner rated herself at 2 for business objectives, which she believed were partially met. She rated her overall performance at 3.0. In contrast, from her manager’s perspective, Petitioner did not meet her business (sales revenue) objectives, achieving only 73 percent of her revenue target for 2011. The manager gave Petitioner the lowest rating of 1 in business objectives, and an overall final rating of 2.4, partially meeting performance expectations. Petitioner added the comment in her PMP that the economy really hurt sales in 2011. Petitioner’s performance was worse in 2012, according to the PMP that she and her manager, Ms. Mazurk, completed. Once again, Petitioner’s self-evaluation was higher than her manager’s. Petitioner’s overall rating for herself was 2.9, but her manager’s overall rating and the final rating on her PMP was 2.0, a little lower than in the prior year in the range of only partially meeting her performance expectations. In this PMP, Petitioner offered the following comment: “Really feel the baseline numbers were off.” At some point in 2012, a business profile of Petitioner was prepared. Although the source of this profile was not entirely clear, Petitioner said that she thought it had been prepared by her manager (who, at the time, was Ms. Mazurk) in connection with a promotion that Petitioner was seeking. The profile reported that Petitioner had been employed at the company for nine years, and gave her sales performance in relation to her target goals for 2008 through 2011. The profile also identified Petitioner’s “developmental needs” in the following three areas: Communication skills (email and verbal with support team) Emotions run high Sales Training Petitioner did not receive the promotion, and continued as an executive sales representative in the sales territory of Florida, Alabama, and Georgia, under Ms. Mazurk’s management. In 2013, Petitioner’s PMP was not completed, apparently because Petitioner was out for two weeks with an injury, and then later in the year was out for two months for a surgical procedure and recovery. In the nine and one-half months that she worked (almost 80 percent of the year), she reportedly achieved sales revenues of 54 percent of her target revenue goal for that year. A reorganization at the end of 2013 resulted in a new manager for Petitioner, James Phillips. Mr. Phillips was the manager for the western North America sales region, but served temporarily as Petitioner’s manager, from January to May 2014, while the company was looking to bring in someone new to manage the eastern region. Mr. Phillips met with Petitioner in the beginning of 2014 to inform her of another realignment of sales territories, which would go into effect in March 2014. Insofar as the changes affected Petitioner, a new sales territory was being created, called the “south Florida” territory, and the company’s plan was to hire a new salesperson for the new territory. More accurately, the newly created sales territory covered more than just south Florida; it included all of the east coast from Jacksonville south, the west coast up to Tampa-Saint Petersburg, and part of central Florida, including Orlando. At the same time, the state of South Carolina would be added to Petitioner’s reconfigured sales territory. The impetus for creating the new south Florida territory was evidence showing that this highly populated market had been underpenetrated. In other words, Petitioner, who had been the area’s sole sales representative for more than 10 years, was not accomplishing the level of sales expected for this market. Accordingly, the business judgment was that splitting up the state and assigning the underpenetrated south Florida market to a new salesperson would promote increased market penetration by making that market the sole focus of the new salesperson.2/ Petitioner disagreed with splitting the state into two territories, but said that she could understand why the company wanted to create a new south Florida sales territory; as she stated, that market is very different from north Florida. However, solely from the perspective of the lost sales opportunities for herself, she voiced her disagreement with the line-drawing for the new territory. In a letter she sent to her new manager, as well as to three members of upper management, she requested that management reconsider how to split the territory within the state of Florida, and asked that she be allowed to retain the Orlando market. Petitioner’s letter also reported that she was “very excited” about the addition of South Carolina to her sales territory. Petitioner’s letter did not result in a reconsideration of the March 2014 territory realignment. Therefore, beginning in March 2014, Petitioner’s sales territory included the Florida west coast, central Florida north of Tampa/St. Petersburg from Ocala north to the state line, and the Florida panhandle, plus all of the states of Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. When the decision was made to create a new south Florida territory, a specific salesperson had not been identified for that new territory. Petitioner claims that she asked to be assigned to the new territory, but was refused. No evidence was presented to substantiate her claim; instead, the letter she wrote to her superiors about the realignment only asked that the territories be redrawn so that she could retain the Orlando market, while expressing her enthusiasm about acquiring the state of South Carolina. In May 2014, John Bowman was brought on board for the position of eastern regional manager, covering eastern United States and Canada. He was hired by the president of the company because the eastern region was underperforming. Mr. Bowman was charged with improving the business performance of the sales team so that sales would reach and sustain expected goals, which Mr. Bowman said is his forte. Mr. Bowman is very direct with the sales representatives under his charge. He is results-oriented and does not mince words when it comes to identifying deficient performance and making corrective “suggestions” that may sound more like demands. Thereafter, if he observes a continuation of the performance deficiency he has tried to correct, he is quick to point that out. That is his management style, and why he believes he has been effective in achieving results: “In sales you’re constantly measured by your results. You’re paid on your results. You’re measured on your results. You’re ranked on your results. I am as well and so is my president. And I make that very clear with sale individuals and always have.” (Tr. 138). As part of the management transition, Mr. Phillips provided Mr. Bowman with his assessment of Petitioner as a salesperson. Mr. Phillips had not served as Petitioner’s manager long enough to conduct a formal year-end PMP evaluation, and so the assessment was characterized as a “personal assessment” and was not placed in Petitioner’s personnel file.3/ While both positive and negative qualities were described in the assessment, there was more bad than good; however, Mr. Bowman set the assessment aside so that he could form his own opinions. He considered the points raised by Mr. Phillips as simply identifying some issues that he should look out for. Mr. Bowman was not based in the same city or even the same state as Petitioner. He did not meet with her until after he had been employed as her manager for just over one month. As Petitioner acknowledged, he had much ground to cover, as his region included all of North America east of the Mississippi from Florida up into Canada, and as she put it, “he tried to be fair with everyone.” (Tr. 100). Before Mr. Bowman ever met Petitioner, he fielded complaints from two different customers who called the Teleflex toll-free number to track down Petitioner’s manager. Both complaints were perceived by Mr. Bowman to be communication problems, i.e., the issues would not have arisen if Petitioner had communicated better with the customers. One of the customers complained to Mr. Bowman that Petitioner was “useless in giving us the information we needed.” (R. Exh. 10). Petitioner’s attempted explanation of the two incidents tended to lend credence to Mr. Bowman’s assessment and the customer’s comment. Ultimately, she sought to minimize their significance by characterizing them as only two isolated incidents during her long tenure. However, from Mr. Bowman’s perspective, these were two customer complaints that he had to field in his first month as Petitioner’s manager, unlike what he faced with any other sales representative there. When Mr. Bowman met with Petitioner on July 1, 2014, he talked with her generally about her background and abilities, which he complimented, and he addressed the concerns he had from the two customer complaints. He also identified two other areas where he thought her performance required improvement. In an email sent the following week, he summarized their discussion (including the compliments) and the three areas where he wanted to see her improve. These were: her interaction and communication with customers, evidenced by the two recent incidents requiring him to intercede; her communications with internal Teleflex personnel, where her failure to provide clear, complete, and precise information resulted in “elongated email strings” and confusion; and her too-frequent requests to him for low pricing approval. Petitioner was taken aback by these criticisms, which she took as demeaning and condescending, because she viewed herself as a proven performer who was highly respected. She did not react well to the email summary of these points, which she viewed as a paper trail intended to bring her down.4/ Nonetheless, Mr. Bowman’s points were shown to be valid, and, indeed, consistent with similar comments made by prior managers, including the manager who noted in Petitioner’s profile in 2012 that Petitioner needed to work on her verbal and e-mail communication skills. Mr. Bowman was clear in his meeting with Petitioner, in the e-mail summary of that meeting, in subsequent discussions, and in his testimony at hearing that he fully expected Petitioner to learn from his constructive criticisms and improve her performance. Moreover, he did not view her performance deficiencies as extreme enough to warrant formal action, such as placing her on a performance improvement plan. Instead, he quickly and consistently pointed out to Petitioner each time he saw a continuation of the behavior he had criticized, and he repeated the criticism while noting that he was repeating prior criticism, as was his way. Mr. Bowman testified credibly that he treated all of the sales representatives under his charge the same way, and was consistent in the way he communicated both positive capabilities and performance issues requiring improvement. Petitioner offered no evidence to prove that Mr. Bowman treated her any differently from the way he treated other sales representatives. One of Mr. Bowman’s first tasks as the new eastern region manager was to participate in interviews for a new salesperson to be assigned to the new south Florida territory. After interviews by Mr. Bowman, the president of the company, the director of finance, the director of marketing, and another manager, and after a third-party psychological exam, Eric Patton was hired in August 2014 as a sales representative for the new south Florida territory. At the time he was hired, he was approximately 34 years old. Although the territory changes went into effect in March 2014, Petitioner continued to cover sales in the new south Florida territory, for which she was compensated, until September 2014 when Mr. Patton assumed coverage of the territory. Petitioner was asked to provide Mr. Patton with information on her contacts in the new territory, and she did so. Petitioner also spent several hours with Mr. Patton at her home to demonstrate how she made her sales pitches, and she also gave him a script. Thereafter, she took a couple of day trips with him to introduce him to some customer contact persons in his new territory. These were meet-and-greet sessions only, not extended visits involving actual sales presentations. Petitioner’s view is that it was not fair that she lost the pipeline of sales opportunities in the south Florida territory to Mr. Patton. When it came to losing this, or any, sales territory, Petitioner complained that she was losing out on the “pipeline” of sales opportunities that she had cultivated but not yet closed. However, when Petitioner gained sales territory, she complained about the disadvantage of starting out from scratch in a new area. Neither viewpoint appears to comport with the reality that every time sales territories are changed, the new salesperson has some head start by virtue of the work of the predecessor salesperson. But there was no basis shown for Petitioner’s sense of “entitlement” to the benefits of a sales territory after the territory is assigned to someone else. That is particularly true here, where Petitioner did not refute the legitimate business purpose of an underpenetrated market that led to the territory reconfiguration. The company compensation system for sales representatives was based on revenue recognized from sales, not on unrealized “pipelines” for future business. Petitioner claimed that in one instance, she believes that Mr. Patton was treated more favorably than her while they were both working in sales in their respective territories. Petitioner and several other salespersons (both male and female) had closed some pump sales with contingency clauses written in the contracts whereby the customer would be allowed to return the pump and upgrade to a new model at no additional cost if a new model became available within 18 months after the sale. The company determined that under federal law, the revenue from those sales could not be recognized, but rather, had to be held in escrow until the contingency period had passed. Since sales commissions were paid on the basis of sales revenue recognized by the company, sales commissions were deferred as well. Mr. Bowman explained credibly that these deferred compensation sales had been allowed under a policy in place before he was employed, but that Petitioner’s deferred sale was the last of several allowed before the policy was discontinued. Petitioner testified that Mr. Patton told her that one year after her deferred compensation sale, he made a sale in which he was allowed to offer verbal, but not written, assurance that an upgrade to a new model would be allowed, and his commission was paid on the sale. However, Petitioner offered no non-hearsay evidence to substantiate her description of what she was told, and her description was refuted by Mr. Bowman’s credible testimony. In any event, Petitioner’s unsupported description did not establish two sales that would be considered the same so as to require the same treatment regarding payment of commissions. No finding can be made that Mr. Patton was treated more favorably than Petitioner in this regard, as claimed. Petitioner and Mr. Bowman completed Petitioner’s PMP evaluation for calendar year 2014. The evaluation was similar to those for Petitioner in 2011 and 2012. Petitioner rated her performance either the same or more favorably than her manager did, with the result that her overall final rating was 2.2, compared with her self-evaluation of 2.4. In mid-2015, the company lost a large contract with HPG, which is a large group purchasing organization (GPO)-- probably the largest in the country, according to Petitioner. Instead of contracting again with Teleflex, HPG entered into a sole source contract with Teleflex’s competitor. As Petitioner acknowledged, the recent advent of GPOs had dramatically changed the sales business, because the GPOs control access to potential purchasers. Purchasers using the GPOs are no longer free game for salespersons to explore new sales opportunities. For Teleflex, this meant that as of mid-2015, its salespersons could not solicit new sales from potential purchasers using HPG, because HPG would direct those purchasers to Teleflex’s competitor pursuant to the new sole source contract. As Petitioner acknowledged, the loss of the HPG contract was a substantial loss for Respondent, with the significant impact coming in the loss of growth opportunity to develop new business. In June 2015, the president of the company raised the possibility of a reorganization to consolidate the north Florida and south Florida territories, in light of the loss of the HPG contract. Mr. Bowman began discussions with senior management about possible changes to the sales territories. In late September 2015, Mr. Bowman provided senior management with a Power Point presentation that set forth a proposed reorganization of the southeast. His proposal was to reconfigure the two existing territories, to create a single Florida territory and a separate “Tidewater” territory covering Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. As he proposed the reorganization, the two sales representatives--Petitioner and Eric Patton--would cover the two reorganized territories. Meanwhile, Mr. Bowman continued to critique Petitioner’s performance in some fairly strident emails and conversations. In an incident on September 30, 2015, Petitioner submitted a quote request for a new pump for one Baycare hospital, while another Baycare hospital was also considering a new pump. According to Petitioner, the issue was not the price to quote for the new pumps, as she stated that the price had been set and was “already on a contract.” (R. Exh. 28 at 154). Instead, Petitioner said that the issue was whether the hospitals would get a credit for the cost of unusual repairs being made to their existing pumps. In contrast, according to Mr. Bowman, the company had already agreed that the repair costs would be applied to the purchase price, but the issue was what price should be quoted for the new pump, which he said had not been set by any contract. Mr. Bowman found the price requested by Petitioner to be too low, and instead of approving her price request, he sent her an email at 5:35 p.m. on September 30, 2015, questioning her price approval request, while noting the same price would have to be given to both Baycare hospitals. He ended the email as follows: “Call me tomorrow to discuss.” (R. Exh. 14 at 1). Instead of acknowledging Mr. Bowman’s email and waiting to talk to him first, Petitioner sent an email to the customer, with a copy to Mr. Bowman, the next morning. The email apologized for “not getting you the outright purchase quote yesterday,” explaining that the delay was because “[t]he outright quote required management approval[.]” (R. Exh. 14 at 2). After reading his copy of the email, Mr. Bowman called Petitioner and reacted harshly, telling Petitioner that she threw him under the bus by sending the email to the customer without discussing it with him first, and that she had committed a fire- able offense. While harsh, Mr. Bowman’s reaction was not off- base. Petitioner’s email tends to undermine her testimony that the issue was not the purchase price which she claimed was fixed by contract. And while Petitioner testified that she tried to call Mr. Bowman that afternoon or evening before she sent the email the next morning, Petitioner did not mention the email from Mr. Bowman. Surely, when waiting to hear from her manager, she would have read his incoming email before sending the email to the customer. Petitioner failed to explain why she did not follow her manager’s instruction to discuss the matter with him.5/ Following their telephone conversation, Petitioner called the human resources department and spoke with the manager, Jennifer Robichaud, to complain about Mr. Bowman. The essence of her complaint was that at 60 years old and close to retirement, she felt that Mr. Bowman was gunning for her and trying to push her out.6/ She complained about the March 2014 territory realignment, which she though was unfair because a large part of her territory was given to the new sales representative, “a young guy.” She told Ms. Robichaud that she has always been a top performer, and although she recently had not been closing sales on pumps, that was because she was starting from scratch in a new territory. She said that until Mr. Bowman came on board, she never had any issues with her past managers. Although she acknowledged that she and Mr. Bowman have very different styles, she felt that Mr. Bowman did not accept her for who she is. Ms. Robichaud assured Petitioner she would investigate. They spoke on a Thursday; Ms. Robichaud was able to discuss the matter with Mr. Bowman the following Tuesday, October 6, 2015. She relayed Petitioner’s complaints that she felt that Mr. Bowman was trying to push her out, and her feeling that it was unfair to give her pipeline to Mr. Patton. Mr. Bowman denied that he was trying to push Petitioner out of the company, and said, instead, he wants her to succeed. With regard to her perception about pipeline fairness, Mr. Bowman responded that all sales representatives are expected to have a pipeline of business opportunities, but that it is closing the business that matters. In the days thereafter, he sent Ms. Robichaud information pertinent to the investigation, including email communications with Petitioner, the assessment from Petitioner’s prior manager, and information about the customer complaints. Ms. Robichaud also investigated Petitioner’s annual PMP ratings and her performance through September 2015. She also sought and later received the data supporting the decision to realign the Florida territory in 2014. As before, Mr. Bowman continued his practice of addressing Petitioner’s performance on issues that had previously surfaced, which he had previously addressed with Petitioner. Thus, on October 9, 2015, Mr. Bowman criticized Petitioner for her email communications with customer service in which she asked for free replacements of medical supplies to be sent to her home for a customer, without giving sufficient information. The response from the customer service representative stated he was “a bit confused” by the request, and asked for more information: “Donna, your input is appreciated here.” The representative had to ask questions to get the information necessary to handle the request appropriately, such as whether the supplies were being provided for free to respond to a complaint. Mr. Bowman’s criticism was that Petitioner’s email request to customer service was “an example of a lack of professionalism and clarity in your communications. I have addressed this issue with you multiple times over the past year and unfortunately, you have not demonstrated improvement.” (R. Exh. 15). On Monday, October 12, 2015, Petitioner forwarded Mr. Bowman’s email criticism to Ms. Robichaud and asked her to call. They spoke Tuesday morning. Ms. Robichaud told Petitioner that she had been looking into Petitioner’s concerns and had spoken with Mr. Bowman. Ms. Robichaud told Petitioner that Mr. Bowman was not trying to push Petitioner out of the company, but was looking for performance results, and Ms. Robichaud did not find any reason to believe Petitioner was being treated unfairly. Ms. Robichaud said that Petitioner and Mr. Bowman needed to talk, because in Ms. Robichaud’s opinion, the problem appeared to be a clash of styles, which is not uncommon with a change in managers, and that they needed to learn to adapt. Ms. Robichaud talked to Mr. Bowman afterwards. She encouraged him to reach out to Petitioner, hear her concerns, and try to understand her perspective. She reminded him that he has acknowledged that he is very direct, and “perhaps a few small changes in how he communicates with her can have a positive impact.” (R. Exh. 18 at 2). Mr. Bowman contacted Petitioner, and they agreed to meet in person. The meeting took place on October 16, 2015, in Tampa. Before the meeting, Petitioner requested a copy of her personnel file from Ms. Robichaud. Petitioner testified that at the meeting, Mr. Bowman was very civil and respectful to her. He said that he thrives on diversity and enjoys the challenge of working with different kinds of people. He assured her that any decisions that are made are always going to be about performance. Petitioner reacted curiously to this: she testified that she realized that nothing was going to change, while admitting that Mr. Bowman was acting completely differently than he had before. Petitioner said that he was “extremely scripted,” and probably had been coached on what to say by the human resources manager. Yet she also complained, inconsistently, that the human resources department did nothing to help her or to facilitate a meeting with Mr. Bowman. According to Mr. Bowman, Petitioner said that she did not think she would be able to meet the objectives set for her. According to Petitioner, she said that he should just stop (being civil to her), that she knew what he was doing, and knew that he wanted her to go away. Regardless of which lead-in is accurate, Petitioner went on to offer that she would resign her employment at the end of the year if the company paid her the deferred commissions, and her salary and benefits for six months. Mr. Bowman was genuinely surprised by Petitioner’s offer. Shortly after Mr. Bowman’s meeting with Petitioner, Mr. Bowman was informed by his superiors that his proposal to retain but reconfigure two sales territories with two sales representatives in the southeast had been reviewed, but was rejected because it would not be a viable solution to address the loss of the HPG contract. Instead, the decision was made to consolidate the southeastern states--Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina--into a single sales territory, covered by one salesperson. Mr. Bowman was told to extract metrics for the time period that Petitioner and Mr. Patton were both working sales in their respective territories, including their recognized sales revenues compared to their quotas, pump sales, and 2014 PMP rating. He was also told to add non-metric qualitative considerations regarding any business practice and customer interaction issues. Mr. Bowman pulled the data, and on October 23, 2015, he provided his superiors with his performance comparison of Mr. Patton and Petitioner. For the period of September through December 2014, Mr. Patton’s first quarter with the company, the quantitative metrics were mixed. Mr. Patton’s overall PMP performance rating of 2.7 was better, falling within the “fully meets expectations” range, whereas Petitioner’s overall rating of 2.2 only partially met her performance expectations. Mr. Patton sold one balloon pump during his first few months with the company. Petitioner was credited with zero sales of balloon pumps during this time, although she noted that she had at least one deferred sale that was not counted during this time. Petitioner achieved 104 percent of her overall sales quota from September to December 2014, although the revenue recognized was from disposables and not pump sales. Mr. Patton achieved 73 percent of his sales quota in his first few months with the company, but that included recognized revenue from a pump sale. For the first three quarters of 2015 (Mr. Bowman was able to extract data through the end of September 2015), the quantitative metrics were decidedly in Mr. Patton’s favor. During this period, Petitioner had zero pump sales, while Mr. Patton had seven pump sales, and Petitioner achieved 83 percent of her sales quota through sales of disposables, whereas Mr. Patton achieved 112 percent of his sales quota, largely from pump sales. On the qualitative considerations, Mr. Bowman summarized the issues he had been addressing with Petitioner in an attempt to bring about improvements, including communication issues with customers and internal personnel, as well as his concerns about her frequent requests for low pricing approval. He also noted a recent situation where Petitioner lost a pump sale to a hospital in Alabama. When he had asked Petitioner why she thought she did not get the sale, she explained to Mr. Bowman that the chief of perfusion “may have felt I was too aggressive,” that Petitioner “felt there was tension between he and I,” and “obviously something happened here.” (R. Exh. 22, last page). Petitioner acknowledged in her deposition that what Mr. Bowman said was true, but that the tension was due to extenuating circumstances. In contrast, for Mr. Patton, Mr. Bowman reported no issues of concern in just over one year of managing him. As Mr. Bowman testified at hearing, Mr. Patton was an excellent sales representative and Mr. Bowman found no performance deficiency issues to address with him. Petitioner offered no evidence to the contrary, stating that she had no knowledge of Mr. Patton’s performance or the quality of his salesmanship. Based on the performance comparison, Mr. Bowman recommended that Mr. Patton should be retained as the salesperson to cover the consolidated southeastern sales territory. Mr. Bowman’s recommendation was reasonable. Mr. Bowman’s recommendation was accepted and the decision made by senior management was to retain Mr. Patton as the salesperson for the consolidated sales territory and to terminate Petitioner’s employment due to elimination of her sales position. Petitioner presented no evidence to refute the reasonableness of Respondent’s business judgment to consolidate sales territories and reduce one sales position after the loss of the HPG contract. Instead, Petitioner only pointed to the suspicious timing of the decision in relation to her complaint to the human resources department about Mr. Bowman.7/ Petitioner does not contend that anyone other than Mr. Bowman himself discriminated against her or retaliated against her. The evidence does not support Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Bowman discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her age or her sex, nor does the evidence support Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Bowman retaliated against Petitioner because she complained about him to the human resources department. Instead, the evidence established that when Respondent’s diminished business growth prospects caused it to make the reasonable business decision to reduce its sales positions in the southeast states, Petitioner lost out in a fair comparison on the merits of her performance compared to the other salesperson’s performance. Petitioner’s flagging job performance evident from 2011 forward, while not bad enough to warrant immediate action to terminate her, was not good enough to withstand comparative assessment with Mr. Patton. Petitioner’s view that the choice to retain Mr. Patton must have been a pretext for discrimination or retaliation is in keeping with Petitioner’s inflated view of her own performance. At the same time, Petitioner’s view is also an unfair discredit to Mr. Patton, when the unrebutted evidence was that he was an excellent sales representative. Petitioner admitted that she knows nothing about the quality of his sales work or the quantitative achievements he garnered in just over one year with the company. Although findings on the subject of damages are unnecessary in light of the above findings, even if Respondent had been found guilty of unlawful employment practices, the undersigned would have to find that Petitioner failed to prove her actual economic damages that would have been caused by those employment practices. Petitioner did not present proof of her earnings, and offered only limited evidence of her attempts to mitigate damages with other income and efforts to look for a comparable job. Indeed, in Petitioner’s PRO, this shortcoming appears to be admitted because Petitioner requested an opportunity to submit support for damages. Petitioner’s opportunity to present evidence to support her case was at the final hearing before the evidentiary record closed. There was no request for a bifurcated hearing to address liability, followed by a separate evidentiary hearing on damages if needed. Thus, Petitioner had her opportunity, and failed to prove damages.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief by Petitioner, Donna Earley, against Respondent, Teleflex, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2017.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent violated sections 475.25(1)(e), 475.42(1)(b), and 475.42(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2011), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2- 14.009, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of the real estate industry in the state of Florida, pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed real estate sales associate having been issued license number 3101946. During the time relevant to this case, Respondent was a sales associate affiliated with Bahia Real Estate ("Bahia"), a brokerage company owned by Raul and Ricardo Aleman, with offices located in Miami, Orlando, and Tampa, Florida. Respondent was employed in Bahia's Miami location. In 2010, Respondent acted as a sales associate on behalf of Michael Perricone for a real estate transaction involving the purchase of a condominium in the Blue Lagoon Towers ("Blue Lagoon") in Miami which was purchased as an investment. Mr. Perricone's sister, Francesca Palmeri, and her husband, Santo Palmeri, were present at the closing where they met Respondent for the first and only time. During the closing, which lasted approximately one hour, the Palmeris indicated to Respondent that they would be interested in making a similar purchase of investment property if another comparable condominium unit became available at Blue Lagoon. The Palmeris had no further interaction with Respondent until he contacted them at their home in Pueblo, Colorado, in 2011 to advise them of the availability of a condominium for sale at Blue Lagoon. On or about October 6, 2011, Respondent faxed a partially completed Bahia form "'AS IS' Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase" to Mrs. Palmeri for the Palmeris to use in making an offer on a condominium unit located at 5077 Northwest Seventh Street, Miami, Florida. Prior to forwarding the document to Mrs. Palmeri, Respondent wrote on the form the property description, the escrow agent name and address, the initial escrow deposit amount and additional deposit, the time for acceptance, the closing date, and listed himself as the "Cooperating Sales Associate" with "Bahia Realty Group, LLC." The Palmeris decided to offer a $125,000.00 purchase price. Respondent directed Mrs. Palmeri to complete the contract and provide a ten percent escrow deposit. Mrs. Palmeri entered a purchase price of $125,000.00, initialed each page, and signed the form as "Buyer." Respondent provided Mrs. Palmeri with instructions on how to wire the funds for the escrow deposit. On October 7, 2011, Mr. Palmeri wired $12,000.00 to J.P. Morgan Chase, which was then deposited in an account for Bonaventure Enterprises, LLC ("Bonaventure").1/ The Palmeris had no knowledge of Bonaventure, but, based upon the representations of Respondent, they understood the money they were asked to wire to the J.P. Morgan Chase account of Bonaventure was an escrow deposit for the property they intended to purchase at Blue Lagoon. The Palmeris had no discussion with Respondent regarding the reason for sending the escrow deposit to Bonaventure. They assumed that Bonaventure was somehow related to the seller or its title company. The condominium unit in question was bank owned; however, the Palmeris were not informed of this. No evidence was presented that Respondent had an ownership interest in Bonaventure. However, Bonaventure is owned by Respondent's brother and sister-in-law. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the managing member of Bonaventure. Bonaventure is not a licensed real estate broker. Bahia does not maintain an escrow account, and its sales associates are authorized to use title companies of their choice for receipt of escrow deposits. Respondent was aware that he was unable to accept the escrow deposit of the Palmeris in his own name, because, as a licensed real estate sales associate, he is prohibited from receiving the money associated with a real estate transaction in the name of anyone other than his broker or employer. In fact, Respondent was disciplined in 2010 for a similar violation.2/ Respondent claims that the Palmeris entrusted him with their $12,000.00 to hold for possible investments, not necessarily related to real estate transaction, and he was doing it as a favor for them as "friends." Respondent contradicted himself by stating his intention in directing the Palmeris to deposit their money into the Bonaventure account was to help them have cash on hand in Florida in order to meet the Blue Lagoon condominium seller's requirements to make the escrow deposit with the seller's title company within 24 hours after an offer was accepted. The Palmeris had no knowledge of the seller's unique restrictions on the escrow money. Further, Respondent's asserted motive in requesting the $12,000.00 to have cash on hand in Florida is undermined by the fact that, if the Palmeris could wire $12,000.00 to Bonaventure's bank account, they could also wire the funds directly to a title company chosen by the selling bank after acceptance of their offer. Shortly after returning the contract to Respondent and sending the escrow deposit, Mrs. Palmeri discussed increasing the purchase price by $1,000.00 for a total of $126,000.00. Based upon the language of the proposed contract, the Palmeris expected a response to their offer within 24 hours. Immediately thereafter, Respondent told the Palmeris that they were "in negotiations." However, almost a month passed before they heard from Respondent regarding the status of the purchase of the condominium. On or about November 4, 2011, Respondent contacted Mrs. Palmeri and stated that he had "good news." He indicated that the seller would be willing to sell the property for a price of $129,500.00. According to Respondent, the seller requested documentation from the Palmeris' bank indicating their ability to pay. Mrs. Palmeri indicated that this was not an acceptable counter-offer. Respondent suggested that he could negotiate a sales price of $129,000.00, but he needed the Palmeris to send an additional $9,000.00 to put into escrow. Mrs. Palmeri told Respondent that she was no longer interested in the property because their maximum offer was $126,000.00. During the same conversation, Mrs. Palmeri asked for the return of her deposit. Respondent expressed agitation that she was retreating from the possible purchase because he had done "so much work." Respondent clearly anticipated he would receive a commission if the deal was consummated. The Palmeris did not get an immediate return of their escrow deposit. Mrs. Palmeri called Respondent repeatedly and received no answer. She also sent an e-mail to J.P. Morgan Chase trying to find out the status of the deposit and received no reply. Mrs. Palmeri again attempted to contact Respondent on November 18, 2011, and left him a message that he needed to call her regarding the deposit. After receiving no response, she contacted Bahia and spoke with Ricardo Aleman. Mrs. Palmeri explained to Aleman that she had signed a real estate contract with Respondent on October 6, 2011. She no longer wanted to pursue this real estate transaction and wanted the escrow deposit returned. Aleman was unaware that Respondent was negotiating a real estate transaction for the Palmeris or had accepted their deposit money. Aleman contacted Respondent who confirmed by email that the Palmeris were no longer interested in purchasing the condominium at Blue Lagoon. Respondent wrote, "After a month of hard work . . . the client decided to drop. It was a little bit problematic. I lost time and money because the offer was already accepted and she had no reason to negotiate." Respondent assured Aleman he would return the deposit to the Palmeris. In accordance with Bahia's policies and procedures, its sales associates are required to complete a deposit form at the time of receipt of funds for escrow. No such receipt was received by Bahia from Respondent with regard to the transaction involving the Palmeris. However, it was not unusual for Bahia not to receive information regarding real estate transactions conducted by their sales associates until the time of closing. After discussing the matter with Aleman, Respondent advised the Palmeris that he could return their money within ten days. Respondent advised Mrs. Palmeri that he would send her two checks for the total amount--one check which she could cash immediately and a second check which would be postdated. In order to get a return of their deposit, Mrs. Palmeri agreed. On or about November 28, 2011, the Palmeris received two checks, each in the amount of $6,000.00, including one postdated for December 16, 2011. These checks were written on the account of Bonaventure and signed by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a final order imposing on Alfonso Miranda an administrative fine in the amount of $6,000.00 and suspending the real estate sales associate license of Alfonso Miranda for a period of two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 2014.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondents owe Petitioner approximately $2,018.33 for a quantity of watermelons which Petitioner alleges he sold to Respondents; secondarily, 1 The name of Co-Respondent U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. has been added to the style in this case and the name of the Florida Department of Agriculture deleted as a party in correction of obvious error in the previous titling of the case. resolution of this issue requires a determination of whether Respondents acted as an agent for Petitioner as opposed to a direct purchase of Petitioner's melons by Respondents.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a farmer who produces agricultural products, including watermelons. Respondent Southern Farms is a dealer of such products in the course of normal business activity. Respondent U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company is the bonding agent for Respondent Southern Farms, pursuant to Section 604.20, Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s testimony at the final hearing establishes that Respondent Southern Farms, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner for the total sum of $2,018.33 with regard to purchase of 47,350 pounds of watermelons belonging to Petitioner on or about June 17, 1996. In the absence of presentment of any evidence at the final hearing in support of the claim of Respondent Southern Farms, as set forth in Southern Farms’ “Answer Of Respondent” filed on November 1, 1996, that no business dealings had been had between Petitioner and Southern Farms, such claim is not credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents are indebted to Petitioner for the total sum of $2,018.33 with regard to purchase of 47,350 pounds of watermelons belonging to Petitioner on or about June 17, 1996.DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bo Bass 2829 Southwest SR 45 Newberry, FL 32669 Southern Legal Farms, Inc. Legal Department Post Office Box 1975 Salisbury, MD 21802 Elizabeth Stosur US Fidelity and Guaranty Co. Post Office Box 1138 Baltimore, MD 21203-1138 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Charles Astore, Jr. is guilty of violation of Section 475.25(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Charles Astore is a registered real estate salesman. Charles Astore was employed by International Land Services Chartered, Inc. He was paid by International Land Sales Chartered Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Charles Astore Jr. as a registered real estate salesman. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Charles Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Charles J. Astore, Jr. 501 N.W. 93rd Terrace Pembroke Pines, Florida 33023 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION Plaintiff, CASE NO. 2952 DOAH CASE NO. 77-201 CHARLES J. ASTORE, JR., Defendant. /
