The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaints filed by the Petitioner against the Respondents are correct and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensure and regulation of limited surety agents (bail bondsmen) operating in the State of Florida. The Respondents are individually licensed as limited surety agents in Florida and are officers and directors of "Big John Bail Bonds, Inc.," a bail bond agency. In November of 1999, Gustavo Porro contacted the Respondents regarding bail for Jessie James Bray, a friend of Mr. Porro's son. Mr. Porro did not know Mr. Bray. Based on the charges against Mr. Bray, four bonds were issued, two for $1,000 each and two for $250 each, for a total bond amount of $2,500. The $1,000 bonds were related to pending felony charges and the small bonds were related to pending misdemeanor charges. Mr. Porro signed a contingent promissory note indemnifying American Bankers Insurance Company for an amount up to $2,500 in the event of bond forfeiture. Bray did not appear in court on the scheduled date and the two $1,000 bonds were forfeited. For reasons unclear, the two $250 bonds were not forfeited. The contingent promissory note signed by Mr. Porro provided that no funds were due to be paid until the stated contingency occurred, stated as "upon forfeiture, estreature or breach of the surety bond." After Bray did not appear for court, the Respondents contacted Mr. Porro and told him that the bonds were forfeited and he was required to pay according to the promissory note. On April 15, 2000, Mr. Porro went to the office of Big John Bail Bonds and was told that he owed a total of $2,804, which he immediately paid. Mr. Porro was not offered and did not request an explanation as to how the total amount due was calculated. He received a receipt that appears to have been signed by Ms. Vath. After Mr. Porro paid the money, Ms. Vath remitted $2,000 to the court clerk for the two forfeited bonds. The Respondents retained the remaining $804. Bray was eventually apprehended and returned to custody. The Respondents were not involved in the apprehension. On July 11, 2000, the court refunded $1,994 to the Respondents. The refund included the $2,000 bond forfeitures minus a statutory processing fee of $3 for each of the two forfeited bonds. On August 9, 2000, 29 days after the court refunded the money to the Respondents, Mr. Porro received a check for $1,994 from the Respondents. Mr. Porro, apparently happy to get any of his money back, did not ask about the remaining funds and no explanation was offered. In November of 2000, Ms. Vath contacted Mr. Porro and informed him that a clerical error had occurred and that he was due to receive additional funds. On November 6, 2000, Mr. Porro met with Ms. Vath and received a check for $492. At the time, that Ms. Vath gave Mr. Porro the $492 check she explained that he had been overcharged through a clerical error, and that the additional amount being refunded was the overpayment minus expenses. She explained that the expenses included clerical and "investigation" expenses and the cost of publishing a notice in a newspaper. There was no documentation provided of the expenses charged to Mr. Porro. At the time the additional refund was made, there was no disclosure that the two $250 bonds were never forfeited. At the hearing, the Respondents offered testimony asserting that the charges were miscalculated due to "clerical" error and attempting to account for expenses charged to Mr. Porro. There was no reliable documentation supporting the testimony, which was contradictory and lacked credibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order requiring that the Respondents be required to refund $318 to Mr. Porro, which, combined with the previous payments of $1,994 and $492, will constitute refund of the total $2,804 paid by Mr. Porro to the Respondents. It is further recommended that the limited surety licenses of Matilda M. Vath and John L. Vath be suspended for a period of not less than three months or until Mr. Porro receives the remaining $318, whichever is later. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street, Room 612 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first licensed as a ball bondsman in 1961 or 1962. In 1969 (Exhibit 2), Petitioner was charged with being incompetent and untrustworthy as a bail bondsman, found guilty and placed on one year's probation which was successfully completed. In 1973, Petitioner was again charged with conducting himself in a manner unbecoming a bail bondsman (Exhibit 3). These charges alleged failure to return the premium paid on a supersedes bond when the prisoner was not released from jail on the bond and failure to maintain his office open to the general public as required. In the Final Order issued in this case, Petitioner was fined $850 and placed on probation for two years. Upon failure of Petitioner to comply with the terms of the Final Order, his license was revoked for a period of ten months after which the revocation was set aside and his license restored. In 1979, a hearing was conducted by the undersigned Hearing Officer on charges alleging that Petitioner had failed to maintain the minimum requirement for permanent office records and failed to maintain a place of business accessible to the public and be actively engaged in the bail bond business in violation of Chapter 64B, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was found guilty as charged, and the recommendation that his license be revoked was adopted by the Commissioner of Insurance in the Final order. In 1986, Petitioner was arrested for operating a donut shop in Tampa utilizing topless waitresses in violation of Tampa Ordinance 24-11. These charges were dismissed on appeal to the circuit court (Exhibit 5). Witnesses called by Petitioner included the attorney who prosecuted the 1979 case (Exhibit 4) against Respondent; the investigator who investigated the 1979 charges for the Department, and a sitting circuit court judge who filed an appeal of the 1979 revocation order on behalf of the Petitioner At the time the charges which led to the revocation were preferred, Respondent was without power to write bonds, but still had an obligation to service bonds still outstanding. The two witnesses who testified in these proceedings on the status of a licensed bail bondsman without power to write new bonds both concurred that this places a bail bondsman in the anomalous position of one who has no need for an office to provide bail bonds for the public but who still needs to be accessible to those clients for whom he has outstanding bonds. This distinction was not clarified at the 1979 hearing. All three witnesses who testified on behalf of Petitioner were aware of nothing that would disqualify Petitioner as a bail bondsman at this time. No evidence was submitted that Petitioner was convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, except for the admission by Petitioner that on or about August 11, 1966, he pleaded guilty to uttering a check without sufficient funds on deposit with which the check could be honored. This offense occurred more than 20 years ago and prior to Petitioner twice being found qualified for licensure by Respondent as a bail bondsman.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Robert Mitchell Thomas, was licensed and eligible for licensure and appointment as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed as manager/agent of the Fort Myers office of Hamilton Bonding, Inc. (Hamilton). At hearing respondent represented he has been licensed as a bail bondsman for approximately fifteen years. The facts which underlie this dispute are as follows. On November 16, 1989, Debra Rahn, a resident of Cape Coral, Florida and the wife of Richard A. Rahn, had Richard arrested for possession of a controlled substance and/or narcotic paraphanelia. She did this so that Richard could be placed in a drug treatment program. His bond was thereafter set in the amount of $2500. In order to get Richard released from jail and placed in the drug program, Debra contacted respondent at Hamilton's Fort Myers office and, after conferring with respondent, agreed to enter into an indemnity agreement with Thomas wherein respondent, acting as agent for Hamilton, agreed to post a $2500 surety bond with the Lee County Sheriff's Department for the release of Richard. In return for this service, Debra paid respondent a premium in the amount of $250. In addition to paying the foregoing sum of money, Debra was asked to sign a blank security agreement, notice of lien and power of attorney, and to deliver to respondent the title to her 1983 Chevrolet Chevette. After doing so, she received a receipt for the premium and automobile title. Finally, Debra was told there would be no other fees for this service. A few weeks later, Debra decided she wanted off of the bond because Richard was not responding favorably to the drug treatment. She accordingly telephoned Thomas who offered her several alternatives. One alternative suggested by respondent was for Debra to file new charges against Richard so that he would be arrested and shown to be in violation of the terms of the bond. Acting on respondent's advice, in early January 1990 Debra filed additional unspecified charges against her husband. On January 10, 1990, Ronald W. Millette, a licensed bail bondsman who had worked for respondent on previous occasions, was told by respondent that Debra wanted off of the bond and to pick up Richard and return him to the Lee County jail. He was paid a $50 fee for this service. That evening Millette went to Debra's house and advised her to go to respondent's office because Richard might seek retribution against her. Later on that evening, Millette apprehended Richard and carried him to respondent's office. Respondent and Millette then transported Richard to the jail. It may be reasonably inferred from the evidence that on a later date, the obligation of the surety on the bond was released by the court. In accordance with Millette's instructions, Debra went to respondent's office the evening of January 10 and was told by respondent that Richard was handcuffed in the next room. Whether this statement was accurate is not of record. In any event, respondent told Debra she must pay an additional $250 pick-up fee or he would not return her automobile title. This amount was derived by taking ten percent of the original $2500 bond. Respondent requested this fee even though there is no evidence that he forfeited any portion of Richard's bond or that the court ordered any fees. Debra replied she did not have the money but would return on Saturday to pay the money due. On a later undisclosed date, Debra's Chevette was "totaled" in an automobile accident. Because of this, she claimed she was unable to promptly pay the $250 fee. Even so, respondent continued to make demands for the money. The record does not show whether the automobile title was returned to Debra although Millette believes another employee in respondent's office did so at a later date. On May 29, 1990, respondent sent Debra a letter in which he again demanded payment of the $250 fee. However, based upon advice from a Department employee, he apologized to her for calling the fee a "pick-up fee" and instead characterized the charge as a "principal's apprehension fee" for expenses incurred in having Millette place Richard in custody on January 10. The record reflects that on June 10, 1990, Debra sent respondent a $10 check as partial payment on the demand but the check was never cashed. There is no evidence that respondent's license has ever been disciplined during his lengthy tenure as a bail bondsman.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsections 648.44(1)(g), 648.45(2)(d), (g), (j), (l), and 648.45(3)b) and (d), Florida Statutes (1989), and that his license be suspended for ten days and a $500 administrative fine be imposed. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1991.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of a violation of bail bondsmen disciplinary statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bondsman. He operates Freedom Bail Bonds in Orlando, Florida. On May 28, 1988, law enforcement officers of the Orange County Sheriff's Office arrested John P. Moody and placed him in the Orange County jail. Mr. Moody had never previously been arrested. After he was arrested, Mr. Moody contactedRespondent about obtaining a bail bond in order to get out of jail. Respondent agreed to come to the jail and interview Mr. Moody to determine if Freedom Bail Bonds could provide him a bond. When Respondent arrived at the jail on the evening of May 28, he was informed by an officer of the three charges that were pending against Mr. Moody. The bond was $1000 per charge, and the premium was 10% of the bond. Respondent met with Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had any assets to secure the bond. Mr. Moody explained that he had no assets such as a car, cash, or cash equivalent. However, he said that he owned jointly with his mother some land in Orange County. At the conclusion of the interview, Respondent had decided to write the bond. Respondent then learned from the booking officer that another charge had been added. Following a brief conversation between Respondent and Mr. Moody concerning the new charge, Respondent learned from the booking officer that a fifth charge had been added. After another conversation with Mr. Moody, Respondent learned in this manner that a sixth, and final, charge had been added. In all, Mr. Moody was charged with one count of failing to return a hired automobile and five counts of fraudulent bank deposits. Each charge carried a $1000 bond, so Mr. Moody now required a total bond of $6000, which in turn required a total premium of $600. Due to the increased amount of the bond, Respondent informed Mr. Moody that he would have to secure the bond with a mortgage on the property jointly held with his mother. Mr. Moody agreed, but asked Respondent not to contact Mr. Moody's mother immediately. It was the middle of the night, and Mr. Moody's mother is an invalid. Respondent agreed to allow Mr. Moody to contact his mother later and obtain her signature on a mortgage. Because Mr. Moody lacked the funds, a friend, Marion Reed Johnson, agreed to pay the premium. Knowing that Mr. Moody would not be able to obtain that evening his mother's signature to a mortgage, Respondent insisted on some interim security and agreed to accept six $1000 promissory notes from Mr. Johnson. These notes were payable on demand, but, according to their terms, became void if Mr. Moody appeared in court when ordered to do so and discharged all of the obligations of the bail bond. Respondent gave Mr. Johnson receipts for the $600 premium and six $1000 notes as soon as Respondent received these items. At the same time, also on the evening of May 28, Respondent completed a bail bond application and indemnity form, on which Mr. Moody provided certain background information. Mr. Moody and Mr. Johnson also signed indemnifications in favor of the surety. The application form states that the surety: shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. The application form also provides: In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearances, and for reason other than as enumerated below is paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the Surety hereunder, and the Surety shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal, and principal shall have no right to any refund of premium whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the Surety or its Agent. * * * If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. * * * The application and indemnities were signed. Mr. Johnson paid the $600 premium and executed and delivered the six $1000 demand notes. Respondent then caused Freedom Bail Bond to issue the bond. Mr. Moody was released from the jail during the evening of his arrest (actually during the predawn hours of May 29). May 28 was a Saturday. The following Monday, Respondent gave one of his employees a copy of the warranty deed from Mr. Moody's mother to herself and Mr. Moody. Mr. Moody hadgiven a copy of the deed to Respondent during their initial interview in order to allow Respondent to prepare the mortgage that Mr. Moody had agreed to provide. Respondent instructed the employee to use the legal description from the warranty deed to prepare a mortgage and send it to Mr. Moody for execution by his mother and him. The employee did as instructed and promptly mailed the mortgage to Mr. Moody with instructions for execution, witnessing, and notarization. After about a week, Respondent asked the employee if she had received the executed mortgage. She replied that she had not and proceeded to telephone Mr. Moody. When she asked him about the mortgage, Mr. Moody did not express any unwillingness to sign it, but said that he had not received it. Confirming the mailing address, the employee agreed to send him another mortgage and did so on June 6, 1988. Several times after mailing the second mortgage, the employee contacted Mr. Moody and discussed the need to get the document fully executed and delivered to Freedom Bail Bonds. On one occasion, Mr. Moody agreed to return the executed mortgage on June 22. But on the last of these conversations, Mr. Moody informed the employee, for the first time, that he had no intention of providing the mortgage. The employee told Respondent what Mr. Moody had said and returned the file to Respondent for further action. At about the same time that Respondent's officehad sent the mortgage to Mr. Moody the second time, Mr. Moody's sister telephoned Respondent. Estranged from her brother, she was concerned that Mr. Moody, whom she believed had misused funds of their invalid mother in the past, might try to obtain their mother's signature on a mortgage to secure a bond in order to get out of jail. Mr. Moody's sister informed Respondent that her brother was not authorized to obtain their mother's signature on the mortgage. She said that her brother was not to be trusted, had improperly removed money from their mother's trust in the past, and had defaulted on at least one debt so as to require the creditor to lien the jointly held property in order to be repaid. At about the same time, a different employee of Respondent received an anonymous telephone tip that Mr. Moody was about to depart, or had already departed, on a trip to Alabama with another man. The informant described what turned out to be a vehicle owned by Mr. Johnson, with whom Mr. Moody had been living since his release from jail on May 29. Several attempts by Respondent's employees to reach Mr. Moody over the next two to four days were unsuccessful. In fact, Mr. Moody had gone to Alabama, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Orange County Circuit Court. On July 18, 1988, one of Respondent's employees contacted the Clerk of Court's office and learned that Mr. Moody had not qualified for the services of a Public Defender. In addition, the employee had been notified on or about July 6, byreceipt of a notice of hearing on a Determination of Counsel, that Mr. Moody had not been diligent in obtaining counsel. After determining that other Determination of Counsel hearings had been and were being set by the Court, the employee reasonably concluded that Mr. Moody was not diligently trying to obtain counsel or independently resolve the pending criminal matters. The employee communicated this information to Respondent on July 18. Respondent contacted Mr. Moody by telephone on July 18 and asked when he was going to supply the executed mortgage. Mr. Moody responded that he had determined that Respondent did not need the additional security and was not going to provide it. At this point, Respondent concluded that it was likely that Mr. Moody had in fact left the state without permission. Respondent also concluded that Mr. Moody no longer represented an acceptable risk. Respondent thus directed another employee to join him to arrest Mr. Moody and surrender him to the Orange County Sheriff's Office. Respondent and his employee immediately visited Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had left the state. Mr. Moody admitted doing so. Respondent and the employee then arrested Mr. Moody and returned him to jail. Mr. Moody remained in jail for 63 days until he pleaded guilty to the charges. He was sentenced to the time served, placed on probation for four years, and required to makerestitution, which he has done so far in accordance with the schedule. Following his release from jail, Mr. Moody returned to live with Mr. Johnson and gradually repaid him the $600 that he owed him. Although Mr. Moody demanded return of the $600, he never offered any proof of payment to Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson never demanded the return of the money. Respondent has retained the $600 premium. The six $1000 notes were automatically voided when Mr. Moody was arrested on July 18.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399 (904) 488 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney David D. Hershel Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney Alan B. Robinson 56 East Pine Street Orlando, FL 32801
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated sections 648.442(1), 648.442(2), 648.442(4), 648.571(1), 648.45(2)(e), 648.45(2)(h), 648.45(2)(j), 648.571(3)(b)1., and 648.571(3)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2007),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69B-221.145(4)(a) and 69B- 221.145(4)(b), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating insurance and insurance-related activities, including limited surety (bail bond) licensees in Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Wilson has been licensed in this state as a limited surety (bail bond) (2-34) agent, license number D012026. Mr. Wilson is the owner of Against All Odds Bail Bonds (Against All Odds), which is located in Tampa, Florida. As a bail bond agent, Mr. Wilson's duties include writing bail bonds for defendants who are incarcerated; ensuring the defendants appear for court dates; arresting defendants who fail to appear in court and returning them to jail; and returning collateral to defendants when requested. In 2007, Mr. Wilson was the only limited surety agent working at Against All Odds. In May 2007, Michael Wisher (Mr. Wisher) was arrested for driving under the influence, and his bond was set at $2,000. Mr. Wilson was contacted to post a surety bond on Mr. Wisher's behalf. On May 12 or 13, 2007, Mr. Wilson met Mr. Wisher at the Hillsborough County Jail, where Mr. Wisher was being held. Mr. Wilson advised Mr. Wisher that the premium for the bail bond was $200 and that an additional $1,800 for collateral was required. Mr. Wisher agreed to the arrangement and gave Mr. Wilson permission to use his credit card for the payment. Mr. Wilson used Mr. Wisher's credit card at the jail to pay for the premium and collateral for a total of $2,000. Mr. Wilson secured an appearance bond with United States Fire Insurance Company on May 13, 2007. Mr. Wilson was released and accompanied Mr. Wilson to the office of Against All Odds, where he executed an Indemnitor/Guarantor Check List dated May 12, 2007. Two of the provisions of the checklist provide: I understand that my collateral cannot be released until all bonds posted on my behalf for defendant have been exonerated and written notice form the court received by the bail agency. I understand that it is my [Mr. Wisher's] responsibility to request return of any collateral provided. There may be a delay of return of collateral until the bail agency has researched the exoneration date and verified the bail bond status with the appropriate courts. The process may be done faster if I obtain written verification of the bond exoneration from the court and provide it to the bail agency. Mr. Wilson did not issue a receipt to Mr. Wisher, showing that Mr. Wisher had paid $2,000. Based on Mr. Wilson's testimony, the Indemnitor/Guarantor Check List is not the receipt. Mr. Wilson claims that he did issue a collateral receipt, but that receipt did not show the credit card fee that was being imposed. According to Mr. Wilson, the copy of the receipt was destroyed in a fire. Mr. Wisher's testimony is credited that he did not receive a receipt. Computer records of the Clerk of Hillsborough Circuit Court show that on September 18, 2007, the bond was deactivated and a certificate of discharge of bond was issued in Mr. Wisher's case. Mr. Wilson claims not to have received the certificate of discharge, and no certificate of discharge was entered in evidence. Mr. Wisher contacted Mr. Wilson on December 17, 2007, requesting that his collateral be returned. Mr. Wisher advised Mr. Wilson that the bond had been discharged. Mr. Wilson was aware that the bond had been discharged because he had checked the computer records of the Clerk of the Hillsborough Circuit Court and saw the record showing the discharge of the bond. Mr. Wilson sent Mr. Wisher a money order for $500 on January 3, 2008. He sent Mr. Wisher another money order dated January 31, 2008, for another $500. Mr. Wisher did not agree to have his collateral returned in installments. By the end of January 2008, Mr. Wilson still owed Mr. Wisher $800. Mr. Wisher made numerous telephone calls to Mr. Wilson in an attempt to get the remaining amount of his collateral. In June 2008, Mr. Wisher wrote Mr. Wilson two times in an attempt to get his collateral returned. Both letters were returned by the United States Postal Service as unclaimed. Mr. Wisher did not receive any additional money from Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson claims that he mailed Mr. Wisher an additional $400, but the evidence does not support his claim. He submitted a copy of an envelope addressed to Mr. Wisher with a first class stamp on it. The envelope did not bear a post mark. The exhibit also had a portion of a customer receipt from the United States Postal Service, which states return of collateral in the section entitled "Pay To" and Michael Wisher in the section labeled "C.O.D. or Used For." The receipt contains no date and does not specify what service or goods for which the receipt was issued. Additionally, it appears that the receipt is not complete based on the wording at the bottom which states serial number; year, month, day; post office; and amount. Such wording would suggest that additional information would be part of the receipt, but the receipt provided by Mr. Wilson did not contain the additional information. In addition to the premium of $200, Mr. Wilson charged Mr. Wisher $400 for a credit card fee. This amount represented percent of the total bond amount, not just the collateral amount. The credit card fee which Mr. Wilson charged was more than the fee which the credit card company charged him for use of the credit card. Mr. Wilson claims that he was taught at the bail bond school held in Fort Lauderdale that up to 20 percent of the total bond amount could be charged to the client for the use of a credit card. The Department did not establish that Mr. Wilson failed to have a sign in his office posting the credit card fee schedule when Mr. Wisher visited his office. However, Mr. Wisher was not provided a copy of the credit card fee schedule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Mr. Wilson did not violate sections 648.442(1), 648.442(4), and 648.571(3)(b)2.; finding that Mr. Wilson violated sections 648.442(2), 648.571(1), 648.571(3)(b)1., 648.45(2)(e), 648.45(2)(h), and 648.45(2)(j) and rules 69B-221.145(4)(a) and 69B-221.145(4)(b); suspending Mr. Wilson's license for six months; imposing an administrative fine of $5,000; and requiring Mr. Wilson to return the remainder of Mr. Wisher's collateral to him. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN BELYEU KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2011.
The Issue Whether the Respondent's license as a limited surety agent should be suspended, revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Background At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent Harris was licensed as a limited surety agent and continues to be eligible for licensure and appointment in Florida. On June 2, 1988, Respondent executed a bail bond agreement with Indiana Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance Company (Indiana Lumbermen's) as the insurer of the surety bonds, Underwriters Surety, Inc. (Underwriters) as its agent, and Jim Fowler, Jr. d/b/a Fowler Enterprises (Fowler) as its representative indemnitor and supervising representative. Under the terms of the agreement, Indiana Lumbermen's agreed to act as surety on bail bonds solicited and signed in its name by Respondent Harris. In turn, he agreed to charge, collect and remit all bond premiums through Fowler, who has a separate agreement with Indiana Lumbermen's and Underwriters regarding those duties. Additionally, Respondent agreed to hold Indiana Lumbermen's, Underwriters, and Fowler harmless for all bond forfeitures and court costs expended by any of them for bail bonds issued in Indiana Lumbermen's name by him. Because Fowler was also required to indemnify Indiana Lumbermen's and Underwriters against bond forfeitures and court costs resulting from bonds issued by Respondent Harris, a $10,000 mortgage was placed against Respondent's home as collateral for such losses by Fowler. Indiana Lumbermen's and Underwriters also required Respondent Harris to place two per cent of the face amount of each bond in an indemnity fund. The agreement states that after each indemnification is finally determined and satisfied, the remaining portion of the indemnity fund will be delivered to the Respondent or to Fowler. Fowler and the Respondent agreed that when the indemnity fund built up to $25,000.00 in reserved funds, Fowler would release the mortgage. Respondent could also request that the amount of money he was required to place into the indemnity fund for subsequent bond executions be reduced to one per cent of the face of the bonds. After the bail bond agreement was executed by all parties and the Respondent's wife in June of 1988, the bail bonds service office was opened in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. Bond Forfeitures On December 12, 1988, two final judgments were entered in Hillsborough County which required the forfeiture of Surety Bond Power No. BB1-168638 and No. BB1-168639 due to the failure of Charles Douglas, Jr., to appear to answer criminal charges for which the bonds had been issued. Each bond was in the principal amount of $1,000.00 and was issued by Respondent Harris as Attorney- In-Fact for Indiana Lumbermen's. The sum of the two judgments was $2,000.00 and $169.00 and court costs. Warren H. Dawson, attorney for the Defendant, motioned the court to vacate the judgments on January 24, 1989. Instead vacating the judgments, the court stayed the enforcement of the judgments until April 26, 1989. At the chose of the time period, Charles Douglas, Jr., was not located, ad the bond funds were forfeited to the State of Florida for the use and benefit of Hillsborough County. These funds, totalling 2,000.00, were paid to the Clerk of Court by Harry Hamner Enterprises on May 18, 1989, as agent for Fowler. Court costs of $84.50 were paid by Respondent Harris, and $84.50 in court costs remain outstanding. The funds paid to the Clerk of Court on behalf of Fowler were issued to a low Fowler to comply with the bail bond agreement as super representative. Respondent Harris is still obligated to indemnify Fowler for the payment. On December 3, 1990, a remittance of $1,000.00 was given to Fowler because Defendant had been located. As this hearing took place only three days later, it is unknown if a check for the other S1,000.00 was forthcoming to Fowler. If the failure to remit the owner $1,000.00 was an oversight, it could be easily corrected by the Clerk of Court as the location of the Defendant would allow we return of these funds as well. On June 4, 1989, a final judgment was entered in Hillsborough County which required the forfeiture of Surety Bond Power No. BB1-200214 due to the failure of Ivan R. Jacob to appear in court to answer the criminal charges for which the bond had been issued. The bond was in the principal amount of $1,000.00 and was issued by Respondent Harris as Attorney-In-Fact for Indiana Lumbermen's. The judgment was for $1,000.00 and $84.50 in court costs. Warren H. Dawson, attorney for the Defendant, motioned the court to vacate and set aside the judgment and costs on July 12, 1989. The motion was granted on August 24, 1989, except that the payment of $84.50 in court costs was still required. The outstanding court costs of $84.50 were paid by Rubin C. Bazarte, Bail Bonds, on behalf of Indiana Lumbermen's on August 28, 1989. Respondent Harris has not indemnified Indiana Lumbermen's for those funds expended to pay the court costs as required by the bail bond agreement. He is still obligated to do so. On June 14, 1989, a final judgment was entered in Hillsborough County which required the forfeiture of Surety Bond Power No. BB1-197205 due to the failure of William A. Evans to appear to answer criminal charges for which the bond had been issued. The principal amount of the bond was $500.00. It was issued by Respondent Harris as Attorney-In-Fact for Indiana Lumbermen's. The sum of the judgment was $500.00 with court costs of $84.50. The judgment and court costs were satisfied by Rubin C. Bazarte, Bail Bonds, on behalf of Indiana Lumbermen's on August 28, 1939. Respondent Harris has not indemnified Indiana Lumbermen's for the funds expended, as required by the bail bond agreement. On June 21, 1989, a final judgment was entered in Hillsborough County which required the forfeiture of Surety Bond Power No. BB1-197204 due to the failure of Williams A. Evans, Jr., to answer criminal charges for which the bond had been issued. The principal amount of the bond was $500.00, and it was issued by Respondent Harris as Attorney-In-Fact for Indiana Lumbermen's. The sum of the judgment was $500.00 plus court costs of $84.50. On August 28, 1989, the judgment and court costs were satisfied by Rubin C. Bazarte, Bail Bonds, on behalf of Indiana Lumbermen's. Respondent Harris has not indemnified Indiana Lumbermen's for the funds expended, as required by the bail bond agreement. Respondent has not received funds to pay for the bond forfeitures from any source. Bond Net Premiums As part of his duties regarding the issuance of bonds for Indiana Lumbermen's, Respondent was required to regularly report the execution of bail bonds to Fowler and Underwriters. The net premiums were to be paid to either of these agents for Indiana Lumbermen's. According to the business records maintained by Fowler, the Respondent failed to remit the required net premiums owed with reports numbered 35, 36, 37 and 38. The amount of money owed for these premiums is $2,370.00. For April 7, 1989, Rosettia Jacobs paid Respondent $1,000.00 to obtain two bonds for the pretrial release of her son, Andre Hudson. Two bonds, with a face value of $5,000.00 each were executed by Respondent that day. The net premiums for two bonds with a face value of $10,000.00 were listed on bail bond execution report number 36, but the net premium was never paid to Fowler or Underwriters from the cash received from Rosettia Jacobs for that purpose. In July 1989, Melvin Rolfe met with Respondent's son, who represented he could accept funds on behalf of his father for the bail bond business. Melvin Rolfe gave Respondent's son $250.00 for a bail bond in order to obtain the pretrial release of his brother, Joseph Rolfe. Of these funds, $100.00 was for payment of the gross premium and $150.00 was collateral. The bond for $1,000.00 was executed by Respondent on August 1, 1989. The collateral given to Respondent's son was not noted on bail bond execution report number 35. The net premium for the $1,000.00 bond for Joseph Rolfe was not sent to Fowler or Underwriters from the cash delivered by Melvin Rolfe for that purpose. On August 1, 1989, Melvin Hamilton gave the Respondent $250.00 for two bonds in order to obtain the pretrial release of his brother, Mark Hamilton. One bond premium was $100.00 and the other bond premium was $50.00. The additional $100.00 was collateral. Bonds with the total face value of $1,250.00 were executed by Respondent on August 1, 1989. The collateral was not noted on the bail bond execution report number 35, and the net premiums were not sent to Fowler or Underwriters from the funds delivered by Melvin Hamilton for that purpose. On August 4, 1989, Charles Rodriguez paid $350.00 for bond premiums to Respondent in order to obtain the pretrial release of his wife, Tina Dunn. The total gross premium amount was $450.00. Respondent extended credit to Charles Rodriguez and issued three bonds with the total face value of $4,500.00 on August 4, 1989. Although the bonds were issued and noted on bail bond execution report 35, the net premiums were not sent to Fowler or Underwriters from the funds delivered by Charles Rodriguez for that purpose. On September 13, 1989, Fowler, as supervising representative for Indiana Lumbermen's and Underwriters, sent a formal demand to Respondent for the $2,370.00 due for premiums not included with reports numbered 35-38. Respondent has failed to pay any of the funds actually received for those premiums to Fowler, Underwriters, or Lumbermen's. Mitigation Respondent has made some attempts to locate defendants whose bonds have been forfeited to the state. Respondent extended credit to some people seeking bail bonds so he never collected some of the money owed to Indiana Lumbermen's for premiums.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, which demonstrates that Respondent misappropriated net bond premiums owed the insurer on four occasions between April and early August 1989, it is RECOMMENDED: The limited surety license of Rudolph Harris, Respondent, be suspended for one year, pursuant to Section 648.49(1), Florida Statutes [1987]. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of February 1991. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 90-4689 Petitioner's proposed finding of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #1. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See #18-#23. Also, irrelevant as to charging document which claimed Respondent misappropriated bond forfeiture funds. Rejected. Irrelevant as to charging document which claim Respondent misappropriated forfeiture funds. See HO $14-#17. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #8-#13. Accepted. See HO #35. COPIES FURNISHED: Gordon T. Nicol, Esquire Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Rudolph Harris 812 E. Henderson Avenue Tampa, FL 33602 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's insurance licenses based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed in Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman). On September 15, 1989, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent seeking disciplinary action against Respondent's license as a result of his alleged employment of a convicted felon identified as Ira Stern. That case, Department of Insurance Case No. 89-L-650RVE, was settled pursuant to a Consent Order entered on January 2, 1990, pursuant to which Respondent was fined $500 and placed on probation for one year. Respondent also agreed not to employ any individual disqualified by Section 648.44(7)(a) to work at his bail bond agency and agreed that no unlicensed person employed by his bail bond agency would be permitted to engage in any activity for which a license was required. The Consent Order incorporated a Settlement Stipulation which specifically provided that the settlement was entered to avoid the costs and uncertainty of litigation and did not constitute an admission by Respondent of any violation of the insurance code. At the time of the hearing in this case, Respondent's license was apparently under suspension pursuant to an Emergency Order of Suspension issued by the Department in Department Case No. 93-ESO-005JDM. The Emergency Order of Suspension is not referenced in the Administrative Complaint and no copy of that Emergency Order has been provided. The basis for entry of that Emergency Order was not established in this case and the parties stipulated that the Emergency Order was not a part of this proceeding. For at least two years prior to the hearing in this case, Respondent was appointed to write bail bonds by American Bankers Insurance Group ("American Bankers"). Respondent previously operated a company known as Barry's Bail Bonds. Apparently as a result of some unsatisfied judgements, Respondent did not issue any bail bonds in his name or in the name of Barry's Bail Bonds during the first 6 months of 1992. At the time of the transactions alleged in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was married to Linda Ratner. Linda Ratner was a qualified and appointed agent of American Bankers. She was also the principle of Linda's Bail Bonds, Inc. The evidence established that Respondent was a primary contact for American Bankers on behalf of Linda's Bail Bonds. It appears that Linda's Bail Bonds and Barry's Bail Bonds were operating out of the same office in Fort Lauderdale for some periods during 1991 and 1992. Other businesses were also apparently operated out of this office. The evidence established that an individual by the name of Ira Stern was involved in the operations of that office during late 1991 and the first nine months of 1992. The evidence was inconclusive as to who actually employed Ira Stern. The evidence did establish that Respondent and Ira Stern primarily handled the day to day operations of the office, including the bail bond business transacted out of the office. No evidence was presented that Ira Stern was a convicted felon and/or that he was the same individual identified in the prior Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent. Respondent solicited and issued bail bonds through Linda's Bail Bonds on several occasions from January 1992 through July 1992. The evidence established that Linda Ratner signed several American Banker's power of attorney forms in blank. As discussed in more detail below, Respondent utilized several of these forms on behalf of clients during the time period in question. Respondent's authority to write bonds for American Bankers was terminated by American Bankers on or about July 24, 1992. At that same time, the authority of Linda Ratner and Linda's Bail Bonds, Inc. was also terminated. At some point after this termination, Respondent turned over to American Bankers certain tangible collateral that had been held in a safe deposit box. This collateral was turned over sometime between July and September of 1992. The exact date was not established. On September 11, 1992, employees of American Bankers accompanied by a Department investigator, went to Respondent's office and collected all of the files and tangible collateral in the office relating to the outstanding bonds written by Respondent and/or Linda's Bail Bonds for American Bankers. No cash collateral was recovered in connection with those files. Upon arriving at the office, representatives of American Bankers and the Department investigator dealt exclusively with a man who identified himself as Ira Stern and who claimed to be the office manager. As noted above, Respondent was previously disciplined by Petitioner for employing an Ira Stern, who was allegedly a convicted felon. No direct evidence was presented to establish the identity of the person in the office on September 11, 1992 nor was there any evidence that the person who identified himself as Ira Stern was a convicted felon and/or the same individual whom Respondent was accused of improperly employing in the previous disciplinary case. Moreover, no conclusive evidence was presented to establish who actually employed the individual in question. On or about July 9, 1992, Anna Agnew and her husband called Linda's Bail Bonds to obtain a bond to get their nephew out of jail. Respondent responded to the call and told the Agnews that he would issue a bond in return for $100 cash and the delivery of a $1,000 check which was to serve as collateral for the bond. Respondent told the Agnews that he would hold the check as collateral without cashing it until their nephew's case was resolved. To obtain the release of the Agnews' nephew, Respondent submitted American Bankers power of attorney number 0334165 which had been signed in blank by Linda Ratner and filled out by Respondent. The amount of the bond was $1,000. Shortly after the Agnews' nephew was bonded out of jail, Mrs. Agnew discovered that the check they gave to Respondent had been cashed. After the Agnews' many attempts to contact Respondent regarding the check were unsuccessful, Mrs. Agnew wrote to the Department complaining of the situation. On August 17, 1992, the Agnews' nephew's case was resolved. Respondent failed to return the Agnews' collateral within the time provided by law. In an attempt to retrieve their collateral after their nephew's case was completed, Mrs. Agnew testified that her husband unsuccessfully attempted to contact Respondent at his office on a least one occasion. At the time of Mr. Agnew's visit, Respondent's office was allegedly not open. No conclusive evidence was presented as to who cashed the Agnews' check or what happened to the proceeds. On or about January 8, 1993, the managing general agent for American Bankers returned $1,000 to the Agnews in repayment of the collateral. On or about June 21, 1992, American Bankers' power of attorney form number 0333494 was submitted to the Broward County Circuit Court to obtain the release from jail of Wentworth McNorton. The amount of the bond was $1,000. The power of attorney form had been signed in blank by Linda Ratner and was filled in by Respondent. Mr. McNorton's mother, Linnette, arranged for the issuance of the bond by paying Respondent $100 in cash. In addition, she gave Respondent a diamond ring appraised in excess of $10,000 as collateral for the bond. Linnette McNorton asked Respondent to hold the ring as collateral until she could arrange to substitute some other collateral. Liability on Mr. McNorton's bond was discharged by the court on July 14, 1992. Respondent did not return Mrs. McNorton's ring within twenty-one days of discharge of liability on the bond as required by law. Linnette McNorton continued to call Respondent for several months after her collateral was due to be returned. At no time during this period did Respondent return Mrs. McNorton's calls or inform her of the whereabouts of her ring. Approximately five months after Wentworth McNorton was released, Linnette McNorton and her husband went to Respondent's home and confronted him. Respondent advised the McNortons that he did not have the ring and that it had been turned over to the insurance company. Sometime prior to September of 1992, employees of American Bankers took possession of Mrs. McNorton's ring along with other tangible collateral held by Respondent in a safe deposit box. As noted in paragraph 9 above, the evidence did not establish the exact date American Bankers took control of the collateral in the safe deposit box. At the time, Mrs. McNorton's ring was marked improperly and the staff of American Bankers was unable to identify which file it belonged with. Mrs. McNorton's ring was finally returned to her on April 15, 1993 by American Bankers after they had determined that the mislabelled and unidentified ring in their possession was Mrs. McNorton's. On or about March 13, 1992, American Bankers power of attorney numbers 0295546, 0295547, and 0295548 were executed for the issuance of three bail bonds on behalf of Kevin Krohn, the principle. The total face value of these three bonds was $3,000. The powers of attorney had been signed in blank by Linda Ratner. The other handwriting on the powers of attorney appears to be Respondent's, however, the circumstances surrounding the execution and delivery of these powers was not established. The records obtained from Respondent's office on September 11, 1992 indicate that Jeanette Krohn, the indemnitor, paid $300 in premiums for the three bail bonds described in paragraph 24 and also put up $3,000 in cash collateral. The handwriting on the collateral receipts appears to be Ira Stern's however, the circumstances surrounding the execution of these documents was not established. The last of the bonds described in paragraph 24 was discharged by the court on April 22, 1992. In July of 1992, the Department received a complaint that Jeanette Krohn was unable to obtain the return of her $3,000 cash collateral. The Department notified American Bankers of the complaint and a representative of the insurance company contacted Respondent who advised that the collateral had been repaid on June 22, 1992 by check no. 1021 drawn on the trust account of Linda's Bail Bonds. June 22, 1992 was well beyond the twenty-one days provided by law for return of the collateral. The check which Respondent told the insurance company was issued to return Ms. Krohn's collateral was purportedly signed by Linda Ratner. The check was dishonored by the bank. The signature of Linda Ratner on the check given to Ms. Krohn was forged. The evidence was insufficient to establish who forged the signature. American Bankers paid Jeanette Krohn $3,000 on or about January 8, 1993 as repayment for the cash collateral placed for the bonds. In March of 1992, M. T. Heller contacted Respondent to procure a bail bond. Respondent arranged for the issuance of the bond. When the bond was discharged, Mr. Heller returned to Respondent's office, where he dealt with Ira Stern in attempting to obtain return of the collateral.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, II, and III of the Administrative Complaint and dismissing Counts IV and V. As a penalty for the violations, an administrative fine of $1,500 should be imposed and the license issued to the Respondent, Barry Seth Ratner, under the purview of the Florida Department of Insurance should be suspended for a period of two years, followed by a two year probationary period. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of October, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 9. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20 and 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 31. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 32. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 33. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 34. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1 and 3. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. The second sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. The third sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 11 and 15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 17-23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24-30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2 and 31-34. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph D. Mandt, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Joseph R. Fritz, Esquire 4204 North Nebraska Avenue Tampa, Florida 33603 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent.
Findings Of Fact On July 22, 2002, Petitioner signed, under penalty of perjury, a statement declaring that his application for a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent was true. In the application, Petitioner answered "no" to the question: Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory, or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered?" By Information dated February 28, 1971, the State of Florida charged Respondent with "unlawfully and feloniously break[ing] and enter[ing]" into a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony--namely, grand larceny. By Order entered October 15, 1971, the court acknowledged that Respondent had entered a plea of guilty to "breaking and entering with intent to commit a misd[demeanor]," withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Petitioner on three years' probation. By Order entered August 15, 1974, the court terminated Petitioner's probation, noting that he had successfully completed it.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a license as a limited surety/bail bond agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Santiago Lavan-dera Law Office of Pena and Lavan-dera 7950 Northwest 155th Street, Suite 201 Miami Lakes, Florida 33016 Eduardo Federico Godoy 969 East 29th Street Hialeah, Florida 33013 Ladasiah Jackson Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
