The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' Motions for Attorney's Fees should be granted, and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the papers filed herein, and the underlying record made a part of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this attorney's fees dispute, Petitioners, Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. (Anderson Columbia) (Case No. 00-0754F), Panhandle Land & Timber Company, Inc. (Panhandle Land) (Case No. 00-0755F), Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. (Support Terminals) (Case No. 00-0756F), Commodores Point Terminal Corporation (Commodores Point) (Case No. 00-0757F), and Olan B. Ward, Sr., Martha P. Ward, Anthony Taranto, Antoinette Taranto, J.V. Gander Distributors, Inc., J.V. Gander, Jr., and Three Rivers Properties, Inc. (the Ward group) (Case No. 00-0828F), have requested the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully challenging proposed Rule 18-21.019(1), Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). In general terms, the proposed rule essentially authorized the Board, through the use of a qualified disclaimer, to reclaim sovereign submerged lands which had previously been conveyed to the upland owners by virtue of their having filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved the submerged lands. The underlying actions were assigned Case Nos. 98- 1764RP, 98-1866RP, 98-2045RP, and 98-2046RP, and an evidentiary hearing on the rule challenge was held on May 21, 1998. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a Final Order in Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 21 F.A.L.R. 3844 (Div. Admin. Hrngs., Aug. 8, 1998), which determined that, except for one challenged provision, the proposed rule was valid. Thereafter, in the case of Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court reversed the order below and determined that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners then filed their motions. Fees and Costs There are eleven Petitioners seeking reimbursement of fees and costs. In its motion, Anderson Columbia seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute" while Panhandle Land seeks identical relief. In their similarly worded motions, Support Terminals and Commodores Point each seek fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute." Finally, the Ward group collectively seeks $9,117.00 in attorney's fees and $139.77 in costs. In the Joint Stipulations of Fact filed by the parties, the Board has agreed that the rate and hours for all Petitioners "were reasonable." As to all Petitioners except the Ward group, the Board has further agreed that each of their costs to challenge the rule exceeded $15,000.00. It has also agreed that even though they were not contained in the motions, requests for costs by Support Terminals, Commodores Point, Anderson Columbia, and Panhandle Land in the amounts of $1,143.22, $1,143.22, $1,933.07, and $1,933.07, respectively, were "reasonable." Finally, the Board has agreed that the request for costs by the Ward group in the amount of $139.77 is "reasonable." Despite the stipulation, and in the event it does not prevail on the merits of these cases, the Board contends that the four claimants in Case Nos. 00-754F, 00-755F, 00-0756F, and 00- 757F should be reimbursed only on a per case basis, and not per client, or $7,500.00 apiece, on the theory that they were sharing counsel, and the discrepancy between the amount of fees requested by the Ward group (made up of seven Petitioners) and the higher fees requested by the other Petitioners "is difficult to understand and justify." If this theory is accepted, it would mean that Support Terminals and Commodores Point would share a single $15,000.00 fee, while Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land would do the same. Support Terminals and Commodores Point were unrelated clients who happened to choose the same counsel; they were not a "shared venture." Each brought a different perspective to the case since Commodores Point had already received a disclaimer with no reversionary interest while Support Terminals received one with a reversionary interest on June 26, 1997. The latter event ultimately precipitated this matter and led to the proposed rulemaking. Likewise, in the case of Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land, one was a landowner while the other was a tenant, and they also happened to choose the same attorney to represent them. For the sake of convenience and economy, the underlying cases were consolidated and the matters joined for hearing. Substantial Justification From a factual basis, the Board contends several factors should be taken into account in determining whether it was substantially justified in proposing the challenged rule. First, the Board points out that its members are mainly lay persons, and they relied in good faith on the legal advice of the Board's staff and remarks made by the Attorney General during the course of the meeting at which the Board issued a disclaimer to Support Terminals. Therefore, the Board argues that it should be insulated from liability since it was relying on the advice of counsel. If this were true, though, an agency that relied on legal advice could never be held responsible for a decision which lacked substantial justification. The Board also relies upon the fact that it has a constitutional duty to protect the sovereign lands held in the public trust for the use and benefit of the public. Because lands may be disclaimed under the Butler Act only if they fully meet the requirements of the grant, and these questions involve complex policy considerations, the Board argues that the complexity and difficulty of this task militate against an award of fees. While its mission is indisputably important, however, the Board is no different than other state agencies who likewise are charged with the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The Board further relies on the fact that the rule was never intended to affect title to Petitioners' lands, and all Petitioners had legal recourse to file a suit to quiet title in circuit court. As the appellate court noted, however, the effect of the rule was direct and immediate, and through the issuance of a disclaimer with the objectionable language, it created a reversionary interest in the State and made private lands subject to public use. During the final hearing in the underlying proceedings, the then Director of State Lands vigorously supported the proposed rule as being in the best interests of the State and consistent with the "inalienable" Public Trust. However, he was unaware of any Florida court decision which supported the Board's views, and he could cite no specific statutory guidance for the Board's actions. The Director also acknowledged that the statutory authority for the rule (Section 253.129, Florida Statutes) simply directed the Board to issue disclaimers, and it made no mention of the right of the Board to reclaim submerged lands through the issuance of a qualified disclaimer. In short, while the Board could articulate a theory for its rule, it had very little, if any, basis in Florida statutory or common law or judicial precedent to support that theory. Although Board counsel has ably argued that the law on the Butler Act was archaic, confusing, and conflicting in many respects, the rule challenge case ultimately turned on a single issue, that is, whether the Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and the Butler Act of 1921 granted to upland or riparian owners fee simple title to the adjacent submerged lands which were filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved. In other words, the ultimate issue was whether the Board's position was "inconsistent with the . . . the concept of fee simple title." Anderson Columbia at 1066. On this issue, the court held that the State could not through rulemaking "seek to reserve ownership interests by issuing less than an unqualified or unconditional disclaimer to riparian lands which meet the statutory requirements." Id. at 1067. Thus, with no supporting case law or precedent to support its view on that point, there was little room for confusion or doubt on the part of the Board. E. Special Circumstances In terms of special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust, the Board first contends that the proposed rule was never intended to "harm anyone," and that none of Petitioners were actually harmed. But the substantial interests of each Petitioner were clearly affected by the proposed rules, and the appellate court concluded that the rule would result in an unconstitutional forfeiture of property. The Board also contends that because it must make proprietary decisions affecting the public trust, it should be given wide latitude in rulemaking. It further points out that the Board must engage in the difficult task of balancing the interests of the public with private rights, and that when it infringes on the private rights of others, as it did here, it should not be penalized for erring on the side of the public. As previously noted, however, all state agencies have worthy governmental responsibilities, but this in itself does not insulate an agency from sanctions. As an additional special circumstance, the Board points out that many of the provisions within the proposed rule were not challenged and were therefore valid. In this case, several subsections were admittedly unchallenged, but the offending provisions which form the crux of the rule were invalidated. Finally, the Board reasons that any moneys paid in fees and costs will diminish the amount of money to be spent on public lands. It is unlikely, however, that any state agency has funds set aside for the payment of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (1999).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Terry G. Jewell, (Jewell) is now and was at all times material to this case a licensed real estate broker-salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0131811 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. He has held this license since 1974, even though he has worked in the real estate business only off and on since that time. In November, 1984, Jewell started Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., with E. M. Coullias and another investor. Jewell owned 32 1/2 shares of the corporation and was an employee of the corporation. Coullias was president and chief operating officer of the corporation. Jewell's duties included managing sales, advertising, development of sales materials, preparation of house plans and procurement of mortgage financing for customers. Coullias was in charge of field supervision of construction of the homes, keeping the books and records of the corporation, and paying all accounts. The corporation had another employee, Joan Mead, who acted as a secretary and sales person. On March 25, 1986, Anne and Frank Koblinski entered into a contract with Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., to have a house built. After the execution of that contract, an account was opened at the Gainesville State Bank in Gainesville, Florida, jointly between Jewell, representing the corporation, and Willern Koblinski, representing his parents. The Koblinskis deposited $48,000 into that account. At the time the contract with Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., was executed by the Koblinskis, they were living in the Fort Myers area, so they designated their son, Willern Koblinski, as the person authorized to disburse funds from the joint account on their behalf. Willern Koblinski lived across the street from the property where the home was to be built. He regularly inspected the building site and determined whether Sun Country was entitled to a draw in accordance with the draw schedule contained in the contract. Generally, Joan Mead, the secretary for Sun Country, would call Willern Koblinski on his pager to request a draw. After he inspected the property, Willern Koblinski would draw a check on the joint account and drop it off at the corporation's office. During the course of construction, the following draws were made from the account and were disbursed by checks made payable to Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., and were signed by both Jewell and Willern Koblinski: Date Amount 5/8/86 (1st draw) $ 9,570.00 5/21/86 (partial 2nd draw) $16,000.00 The following draws were made from the account payable to Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., but were never signed by Jewell: Date Amount 6/10/86 (balance 2nd draw) $ 3,140.00 6/25/86 (partial 3rd draw) $ 3,000.00 7/11/86 (balance 3rd draw) $ 6,570.00 7/30/86 (partial last draw) $ 5,000.00 The total draws were $43,280. Each draw was deposited in the general operating account of Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc. On July 19, 1986, Jewell took a vacation and was out of town until July 30, 1986. When he returned, he discovered that some of the homes under construction were behind schedule. Jewell also discovered that several subcontractors and suppliers had not been paid. Jewell left messages for the president of Sun Country Homes, E. M. Coullias, and attempted to contact Coullias to discuss the problems with the construction schedules on several homes and the subcontractors who had not been paid. Jewell and Coullias had a large confrontation regarding the homes that were behind schedule and the non-payment of subcontractors Shortly after that confrontation, Jewell resigned as an officer and employee of Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc. Even after his resignation, Jewell personally went to the job site of the homes being construction for Waters, Ross, and Koblinski, and completed these homes so that the buyers could occupy them. At the time of Jewell's resignation from Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., there was $5,332.00 remaining in the joint account for the Koblinskis' house. As soon as Jewell realized that Coullias had spent the funds previously paid to Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., and could not pay the subcontractors, Jewell advised Mrs. Koblinski and Willern Koblinski to withdraw the remaining funds from the joint account and to use those funds to pay any subcontractors or suppliers who had not been paid. Jewell signed a blank check in order to permit Willern Koblinski to withdraw those funds. During the time that Jewell worked for Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., the corporation sold and constructed approximately 25 homes. Before the situation arose on the Koblinski contract, Jewell knew of no other incidents where Sun Country Homes failed to pay subcontractors or suppliers. During the entire time that Jewell worked for Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., Coullias was President of the corporation and controlled and managed the collection and deposit of receipts of the company and disbursement of these funds. Jewell first learned of unpaid subcontractors and suppliers after he returned from vacation on July 30, 1986. After his resignation from Sun Country Homes, Jewell attempted to help the Koblinskis in completing their house. He came to their house and finished a "punch list." Jewell received no payment from Sun Country Homes for any of these efforts. The Koblinskis used part of the funds disbursed to them to pay the air conditioning and plumbing subcontractors. They have about $1,062 left from these funds. After subcontractors and suppliers were not paid, Coullias told Willern Koblinski that they would be paid. He also told Jewell to have no further contact with the Koblinskis. However, Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., closed its doors without paying the subcontractors and suppliers. Apparently Coullias has left the area and cannot be located. There are at least four subcontractors who worked on the Koblinski house who have not been paid: Sun Coast Insulation $1,191.00 Landmark Truss $1,322.39 Dyson Cabinet Millwork $4,029.79 Myers Brothers Septic Tank $ 785.00 Dyson and Myers have filed liens against the Koblinski home for the amount of their respective bills. Jewell did not receive any funds disbursed to Sun Country Homes for the Koblinski house. The only funds he received from the corporation were salary and reimbursement for expenses. He did not receive any bonuses or cash loans. If the funds paid to Sun Country Homes of North Florida, Inc., for the Koblinski draws were not used to pay the bills on the Koblinski construction, Jewell did not receive any benefit in any way from those funds.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Terry G. Jewell. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2192 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Terry G. Jewell Respondent's proposed findings of fact 1 - 30 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 - 28. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 William C. Andrews, Esquire Post Office Drawer C Gainesville, Florida 32602 Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact By application dated September 10, 1987, petitioner, John K. Whitaker, III, sought licensure as a real estate salesman by examination with respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). The application was received by the Division on September 14, 1987. Question six on the application requires the applicant to state whether he or she "has ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld." Petitioner gave the following response: Yes. DUI and DWI 1981 and 1982. Upon further investigation by the Division, it learned that Whitaker had been arrested for a DUI in 1982 and that no arrest had occurred in 1981. However, it also learned that Whitaker had been arrested for the following incidents: March 17, 1984 - Arrest for resisting police officer with violence. April 17, 1984 - Arrest for forgery - possession of forged or altered driver's license August 31, 1984 - Burglary of a dwelling; adjudication withheld. August 31, 1984 - Grand larceny; adjudication withheld. August 31, 1984 - Arson; adjudication withheld. Armed with this new information, respondent advised petitioner by letter dated December 2, 1987 that his application had been denied. This decision was later reaffirmed by letter dated February 4, 1988 and cited respondent's "criminal record" as the basis for the agency's denial. That prompted this proceeding. Petitioner, who is now twenty-nine years old, is a December, 1982 graduate of Florida State University with a degree in economics. After graduation, he worked eight months as a stockbroker for Alan Bush Brokerage Company in West Palm Beach, Florida. In 1983 petitioner began receiving medical treatment for what he thought was depression. As a part of the treatment, he took an antidepressant drug. He later learned he had a manic-depressive condition, a more serious mental illness, and the antidepressant medication was actually aggravating this condition. Before his real illness was discovered, Whitaker experienced manic episodes which were manifested by grandiose ideas, slurred speech and extremely poor judgment. As a result, Whitaker was arrested in 1984 for the series of incidents enumerated in finding of fact 3. The first two charges were dismissed while adjudication of guilt was withheld as to the remaining three charges. For those latter charges, Whitaker was placed on five years' probation, or to and including August, 1989. Whitaker stated he did not intend to lie about these matters and did not list the 1984 arrests on his application because he thought that if a charge was dropped, or adjudication of guilt withheld, he did not have to disclose the matter. Since having his illness properly diagnosed in 1984, Whitaker has taken medication (lithium) to prevent the recurrence of the symptoms and sees a physician at least once a month. He must remain on medication for the rest of his life in order to control the illness. With the exception of one flare-up about a year ago, his condition has stabilized. After his arrests in 1984, Whitaker was hospitalized for a period of time and then moved into a halfway house. He now lives in his own apartment. He has held several jobs, including a food service job in a West Palm Beach hospital and a timeshare unit salesman for his uncle in California. Presently, he is employed in a public relations capacity for a consumer club in West Palm Beach. He eventually wants to enter the real estate business, and for this reason, desires a license. Because his mother is a broker-realtor in Palm Beach Gardens, he expects no difficulty in obtaining a real estate position. Petitioner presented the testimony of his mother, a retired business executive and a family friend who is also a real estate salesman. The mother described the nature of petitioner's illness while the retired executive recalled petitioner as having "industrious," self-motivating" and "honest" characteristics and being a terrific salesman. The family friend described petitioner's present conduct to be normal now that he had controlled his illness. Finally, a number of letters were offered by various local businessmen, including one from a professional golfer and businessman (Jack Nicklaus), a physician, a stockbroker and a financial planner. However, all letters predate petitioner's arrests and therefore are irrelevant to the issue in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of John K. Whitaker for licensure as a real estate salesman by examination be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, I recommend that the information filed herein be dismissed in it's entirety. Done and Entered this 24th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Walsh and Associates By Gerald M. Walsh, Esquire 404 Courthouse Square Building 200 Southeast Sixth Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Findings Of Fact On October 3, 1975, Respondent filed an application with Petitioner for registration as a real estate broker (Stipulation, Petitioner's Exhibit 2). That said application contained therein Question 8 which is set forth in paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint and to which Respondent answered "No." (Stipulation, Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) That thereafter the application was approved and the Respondent subsequently received his registration as a real estate broker and has been continuously registered the Petitioner as a broker since December 22, 1975 (Stipulation.) That at the time of the execution of the application, as aforesaid, Respondent'S answer to Question 8 was incorrect in that he failed to reveal, disclose and fully explain a Complaint filed against him on August 6, 1973, in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Pinellas County, by one Kenneth Beard, an individual, which complaint alleges false representations on the part of the Respondent in a business transaction. A judgment of the aforesaid Circuit Court in the above-mentioned action was in the process of appeal at the time Respondent filed his application for registration as a real estate broker (stipulation.) Respondent testified at the hearing substantially as follows: After the civil action had been filed against him, he sought the advice of counsel who informed him that the complaint therein was defective as a matter of law. He was therefore of the opinion that there was not a viable suit against him at the time he filled out his application, and thus was not attempting to mislead or hide any facts from the Petitioner. He also felt that, since he had not, in fact, committed any fraud or misrepresented any matters to the purchaser of the business in question, a negative answer on the question in the application was justified. However, upon reflection at the hearing, he conceded that, probably he had misread the question and misconstrued its meaning. Respondent's good reputation for truth and veracity in the community and in his business dealings was attested to by past officials of the Clearwater, Largo, Dunedin Board of Realtors (Testimony of Merhige, Blanton).
Recommendation That the Complaint against Respondent, William D. Folz, be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick W. Jones Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Richard B. Moritz, Esquire 801 West Bay Drive Suite 704 Largo, Florida 33540
Findings Of Fact Louis W. George has been registered as a real estate broker in Florida for seven years; he holds license No. 0030981. At all pertinent times, he has done business as Apollo Realty of Miami, and has been, in addition, co-owner with Allen Scherer of Karma Properties, Inc. In an effort to sell a house he owned at 1105 Sharazad Boulevard in Opa locka, Florida, John F. German placed a classified advertisement in a newspaper. Seeing the ad, respondent George telephoned Mr. German and offered his services as a real estate broker. As a result, Mr. German eventually signed an agreement listing the house with Apollo Realty of Miami for 90 days, which elapsed without a sale, in late 1978 or early 1979. In June of 1979, Mr. German again visited respondent, telling him he would let the property go for $25,000. The following day respondent telephoned Mr. German to say, "I'll take it," to which Mr. German replied, "That was yesterday." Later in the telephone conversation, however, Messrs. George and German agreed on a price of $25,000. On June 29, 1979, respondent presented Mr. German with a form "Deposit Receipt." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Mr. German lined through $23,500, substituted $25,000, initialled the alteration, and signed the document. Respondent had already signed. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 recites: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of the sum of . . .$500.00. . .from KARMA PROPERTIES, INC. proceeds to be held in escrow by APOLLO REALTY OF MIAMI subject to the terms hereof. . . This offer is subject to obtaining an FHA commitment of not less than $35,000.00 if commitment is less than-the above $35,000.00 this offer will be null and void . . . [I]n case of default by the purchaser. . .the seller may at his option retain one-half of the deposit herein paid as consideration for the release of the purchaser. . . These written provisions notwithstanding, respondent told Mr. German that he would give the $500 deposit to his attorney, rather than place it in Apollo Realty's escrow account. The deal fell through. On November 19, 1979, Albert I. Caskill, Esquire, wrote Apollo Realty of Miami, on behalf of Mr. German: Demand is herewith made upon you for the $500 deposit being held in your escrow account in relation to the above-referenced transaction. We have been notified by the attorney for the purchasers, Lawrence M. Weiner, that his clients will not be going forward with the purchase, and, accordingly, their failure to complete the transaction pursuant to the contract constitutes a breach of the agreement. Please forward all deposit moneys to this office, same being made payable to the seller, John German. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. The house was off the market from June until the end of November. Mr. German never received any money on account of the transaction. (He did not even get the keys back.) Respondent never deposited any money anywhere on account of this transaction, nor did he pay Mr. German any money directly. He testified that he instructed Allen Scherer, the other principal in Karma Properties, Inc., to deposit $500 with Lawrence Weiner, Esquire; that he read Mr. Caskill's letter of November 19, 1979, and passed it on to Mr. Scherer with instructions to "correct" (T. 36) the situation; but only learned that there was no money in escrow when he received the administrative complaint with which these proceedings began. In these particulars, respondent's testimony has not been credited. The parties stipulated that Mr. Weiner would testify, under oath, that he "never held or received any money in connection with the subject transaction." Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order which has been reviewed and considered. The proposed findings of fact have been adopted in substance for the most part. Proposed findings of fact not adopted have been rejected as immaterial or as inconsistent with the weight of the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reprimand respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Joel S. Fass, Esquire 626 Northeast 124 Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Adam Kurlander, Esquire 1820 Northeast 163 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Peter P. Sedler, at all times material to the complaint, has been licensed as a real estate broker, holding license 0079017. He was last licensed as a broker c/o Marshall & Sedler, Inc., 7771 St. Andrews, Lake Worth, Florida 33467. Marshall & Sedler, Inc., at all times relevant to the complaint, had been registered as a Florida real estate broker, holding license 0250511, its last licensed address was 7771 St. Andrews, Lake Worth, Florida 33467. Peter P. Sedler was the qualifying broker and officer for Marshall & Sedler, Inc. On about July 3, 1987, Tom Teixeira was employed as a salesman by Cartier Realty, of 11852 42nd Road North, Royal Palm Beach, Florida. Cartier Realty had solicited, through a direct mailing, listings for property in the Royal Palm Beach area. Ms. Mary Myers, an older woman of about 70 years of age, responded to the advertisement, and gave Mr. Teixeira an open listing for real property which she owned. While Mr. Teixeira placed a Cartier Realty "For Sale" sign on the property, the sign was somehow removed shortly thereafter, and no party dealing with Ms. Myers during the months of July, August and September of 1987 would have been placed on notice that Cartier Realty had any listing on the property. Mr. Sedler had nothing to do with the disappearance of the sign. Ms. Myers had originally acquired the property from her daughter. Long before Ms. Myers gave a listing to Cartier Realty, William Kemp and his wife Gina DiPace Kemp had told Ms. Myers that they were interested in purchasing the property, which is adjacent to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Kemp. When Mr. and Mrs. Kemp first contacted Ms. Myers, she had wanted to keep the property, in the belief that she might eventually convey it back to her daughter. Mr. Teixeira brought to Ms. Myers an offer from David R. and Maureen C. Rose to purchase the land for $11,900. Ms. Myers did not accept that offer, but the Roses accepted Ms. Myers' counteroffer on July 24, 1987, to sell it for $12,300. The sale was contingent upon the buyers obtaining financing; they applied for a loan, and ordered both an appraisal and a survey. The closing was to be held by September 1, 1987. (Contract, paragraph VI.) The closing date passed, without the buyers obtaining the necessary financing, so the contract was no longer effective. On about September 8, 1987, Mr. Teixeira attempted to contact Ms. Myers. He had obtained no written extension of the contract but hoped the sale might yet close. Ms. Myers told Teixeira that she was still willing to sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Rose. In the meantime, Mr. and Mrs. Kemp became aware that Ms. Myers wanted to sell the property, because they noticed Mr. and Mrs. Rose coming to look at the land, and had engaged them in conversation. Ms. Kemp then contacted Ms. Myers to remind her that they were still willing to purchase the property, and also to say that they would offer more than the current offer on the property. On about September 11, 1987, Ms. Kemp contacted Cartier Realty to say that she also wished to make an offer on the Myers' lot. For a reason which was never adequately explained at the hearing, Teixeira, who should have been working on behalf of the seller, refused to take the offer, even though it was for a higher price. After this rebuff by Teixeira, Ms. Kemp contacted Marshall & Sedler, Inc., in order to try to find a broker who would convey their offer to Ms. Myers and spoke with Patricia Marshall, Ms. Marshall referred her to her partner, Peter Sedler. The Kemps told Sedler that Ms. Myers had told them that she had received a $9,000 offer on the lot. Why Ms. Myers told the Kemps that the Rose offer was $9,000 is not clear, for the actual offer had been $12,300, but Sedler did not know this. There was no listing of the lot in the local board of realtors multiple listing service book, and Mr. Sedler found the address of Ms. Myers through the public records. Mr. Sedler knew from his conversations with Ms. Kemp that Cartier Realty had some involvement with an offer on the property. He called Cartier Realty and tried to speak with the broker handling the matter. He spoke with a man named Tom, who he thought was a brother of the owner of Cartier Realty, Pete Cartier. Mr. Sedler actually talked with Tom Teixeira. Sedler believed he was dealt with rudely by Teixeira, who had hung up on him. Sedler then called Pete Cartier directly to find out whether there was an outstanding contract on the property, and Cartier told Sedler that he would call Sedler back. When Cartier called Sedler, Cartier warned Sedler that he should stay out of the deal. Mr. Sedler became suspicious about Cartier Realty's failure to bring a higher offer to the attention of the seller, and on September 16, 1987, filed a complaint against Tom Cartier with the Lake Worth Board of Realtors. Mr. Sedler then traveled to Pompano Beach to meet with Ms. Myers at her home, and brought with him a contract for sale and purchase of the property, already signed by the Kemps and dated September 14, 1987. While at the door, Ms. Myers asked Peter Sedler if he was "Tom." Ms. Myers knew that she had been dealing with a "Tom" at Cartier Realty, but all her dealings were on the phone, and she did not know what Tom Teixeira looked like. Sedler replied "Yes, but you can call me Pete." Sedler merely intended the comment as humor. At that time Sedler gave Ms. Myers his pink business card and specifically identified himself as Pete Sedler of Marshall & Sedler, Inc. Mr. Sedler asked Ms. Myers if she had any paperwork, such as the prior contract for the sale of the lot which had expired on September 1, 1987, but she did not. While Sedler was with Ms. Myers, she agreed to sell the property to the Kemps for $12,500 and signed the Kemp contract. The Kemps had put the purchase price of $12,500 into the Marshall & Sedler escrow account. Three days later, on September 18, 1987, Mr. Sedler, in the company of his wife Bonnie, presented a post-dated check to Ms. Myers in the amount of $11,020, the net amount due to Ms. Myers for the lot, based on the purchase price of $12,500. When they met this second time he introduced himself again as Pete Sedler and offered Ms. Myers his card for a second time. The post-dated check was conditioned by an endorsement making it good upon a determination that the title to the lot was good. A quit claim deed to Mr. and Mrs. Kemp was executed by Ms. Myers and witnessed by Bonnie Sedler. The post-dated check was given to Ms. Myers because she was about to leave on vacation. The check was given as a sort of security for good title, in return for the quit claim deed which closed the transaction. Mr. Sedler had structured the transaction in this way because he was concerned that someone at Cartier Realty might also attempt to purchase the property from Ms. Myers on behalf of one of their clients. At that time, Mr. Sedler held the reasonable belief that no other party had a subsisting contract to purchase the property from Ms. Myers. Sedler had no reason to believe the Roses would or could pay more for the property than the Kemps offered. Ms. Myers knew that Tom Teixeira from the Cartier realty firm represented a distinct business entity from Marshall & Sedler or Pete Sedler. After a title search showed that Ms. Myers had clear title to the property, the check which Mr. Sedler had given to Ms. Myers on September 18, 1987, with the restrictive endorsement was replaced. Later Mr. and Mrs. Rose tried to close their purchase, but found they could not. Ms. Myers had failed to inform them of the sale she made to the Kemps through Mr. Sedler. Mr. Teixeira, in retribution, filed an ethics complaint about Mr. Sedler with the West Palm Beach Board of Realtors.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint against Peter P. Sedler and Marshall & Sedler, Inc., be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of March, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6183 Rulings on findings proposed by the Department: 1. Rejected as unnecessary. 2 and 3. Adopted in Finding 1. 4 - 6. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 3. Implicit in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 5. Adopted in Finding 6. Implicit in Finding 6. This does not mean that the contract subsisted, however. Rejected. Ms. Myers was willing to sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Rose after the contract expired, but she was not under any obligation to do so. Adopted in Finding 7. Rejected, because there was no pending contract. Teixeira never obtained a written extension of the closing date and Ms. Myers was free to sell elsewhere. Rejected. No one could have truthfully told Sedler there was a pending contract. None existed. Rejected, because Mr. Sedler had no reason to believe that there was a subsisting contract for the sale of the property; there was none. Admission number 20 is not to the contrary. Adopted in Findings 10 and 11. Rejected. See, Findings 9 and 10. Rejected as unpersuasive. Rejected as cumulative to Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 14. Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Frank W. Weathers, Esquire Frank W. Weathers, P.A. Post Office Box 3967 Lantana, Florida 33465-3967 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Respondent's real estate broker's license should be disciplined based upon the allegations that Respondent was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent David William Tricker is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0270690 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to the Respondent was as a broker in care of Florida Country Clubs International, Inc., 555 Estates Place, Longwood, Florida, 32779, a Florida corporation. Respondent became the broker for Henro, Inc. (hereinafter Henro) and Henro Realty, Inc. early in 1993 and served until approximately October 21, 1993, when Respondent submitted his letter of resignation to the Florida Real Estate Commission ("FREC"). The Henro companies were owned by a British couple, David and Marion Moth, who also did business in the United Kingdom as Henro Land Leisure Limited. On or about July 8, 1993, Henro negotiated a verbal contract with Gilman Pool Services to maintain and provide pool cleaning services at homes managed by Henro on behalf of its owners. The contract was followed up with a letter dated the same date from Henro and signed by Marion Moth, as vice president. The fee for the service was $65.00 per month for each pool cleaned. Payment terms were to be on 30-day invoice. Heather and Peter Shimmin operated the pool service, and relied upon Henro to pay them for their services. There was no clear and convincing evidence that the Shimmins relied upon Respondent to pay them for their services, or that Respondent was aware of this contract between Gilman Pool Services and Henro. The July 1993 bill to Henro was $5,227.40. On September 1, 1993, Henro issued check #2123 in the amount of $5,227.40 to Gilman Pool Services. This check did not clear and was later made good by Henro by payment in cash to Gilman Pool Service. The August 1993 bill was in the amount of $6,352.36 was not paid. The September, 1993 bill, which amounted to $5,887.00 and the October, 1993 partial bill in the amount of $1,595.00 remains due, owing and unpaid. On October 31, 1993, Henro went out of business. At the time Henro closed, Henro owed Gilman Pool Services $13,061.76, in unpaid maintenance and pool cleaning services. Gilman Pool Services made no demand upon Respondent for past due invoices. The testimony of the witness, Hal Klein, was not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue and file a Final Order finding the Respondent not guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and DISMISSING the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3(in part), 4(in part), 5(in part), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10(in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of credible evidence: paragraphs 3(in part), 4(in part), 5(in part),10(in part), 11, 12. Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3(in part), 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12(in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraph 3(in part). Rejected as argument: paragraph 12. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack McRay, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Senior Attorney Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section - Suite N 308 Hurston Building North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 David W. Tricker (pro se) 555 Estates Place Longwood, Florida Stephen T. Ball, Esquire Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A. Two South Orange Plaza Post Office Box 633 Orlando, Florida 32802-0633
