The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (''FCHR''), and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Petitioner began working for Respondent as a part-time Self-Checkout Host on February 1, 2017. Upon hiring, her initial rate of pay was $9.00 per hour. After three months of employment, Petitioner’s pay was increased to $10.00 per hour in May of 2017. Subsequently, Petitioner received pay increases raising her hourly rate to $11.00, and then $11.50. In April of 2018, Petitioner was promoted to the full-time position of Customer Service Manager (''CSM''). Along with the promotion, Petitioner also received a raise, bringing her rate of pay to $13.65 per hour. In April of 2019, Respondent gave Petitioner another raise, resulting in hourly pay of $13.90. Respondent maintained a Statement of Ethics, of which Petitioner was aware. The Statement of Ethics explained that Respondent’s overall operations were guided by four core Beliefs, which were: Respect for the Individual; Service to our Customers; Striving for Excellence; and Act with Integrity. Based on what she heard from her coworkers, Petitioner believed that she was entitled to a market-adjustment pay increase in April of 2019. She sought information about the pay increase from her store manager and others. Petitioner reported her belief that she was entitled to a pay increase, which she had not received, to Respondent’s Associate Relations Department (''Department''). After what was described as a thorough review of Petitioner’s concerns, the Department closed the matter. Petitioner testified that a white male named Chance was making more money than she, based on conversations between Petitioner and Chance. Chance worked as a Money Manager Associate, a position that Petitioner never held during her employment with Respondent. Ms. Durocher testified that Chance was not paid more than Petitioner. In 2019, there were ten individuals who held the position of CSM at the store where Petitioner worked. In addition to Petitioner, those who worked in CSM positions included multiple African-American females and one African-American male. Petitioner did not present any evidence to suggest or establish that any male, or non-African-American, employee was paid more than she was for performing similar work. On October 26, 2019, Petitioner discussed the problem she perceived with her rate of pay with Ms. Durocher. During their conversation, Petitioner raised her voice and the interaction escalated to the point that another employee went to enlist the assistance of the Store Manager. When the Store Manager arrived, he joined the conversation with Petitioner and Ms. Durocher. Ms. Durocher expressed to Petitioner that she believed that Petitioner was being paid commensurate with her skills and duties; and that her rate of pay had been investigated and was determined to be appropriate. Throughout the conversation, Ms. Durocher perceived Respondent’s conduct to be disrespectful. Ms. Durocher and the Store Manager repeatedly encouraged Petitioner to calm down, but their attempts were unsuccessful. On the same day, Petitioner’s employment was terminated by Respondent for violating the core Belief of Respect for the Individual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 2021. Jamie Rotteveel, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Jeruscha Toussaint 5835 Northwest Lomb Court Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986 Allison Wiggins, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Littler Mendelson, P.C. 2301 McGee Street, 8th Floor Kansas City, Missouri 64108 Kimberly Doud, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801 Nancy A. Johnson, Esquire Littler Mendelson, P.C. 111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1750 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Clifford McCullough (Petitioner) was the subject of unlawful discrimination by Nesco Resources (Respondent) in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2015)1/.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a company that refers pre-screened job candidates to employers upon request by an employer seeking to fill a specific position. The Petitioner is an African-American male, born in 1959, who sought employment through the Respondent. The Respondent does not make the hiring decision. The actual decision is made by the employer requesting referrals from the Respondent. The Respondent is compensated by the employer if and when the employer hires an applicant referred by the Respondent. On occasion, the Respondent publishes advertisements seeking applications to fill specific positions, such as “forklift drivers.” The fact that the Respondent seeks applications for specific positions does not mean that an employer has contacted the Respondent seeking referrals for such positions. The advertisements are used by the Respondent to create an inventory of applicants who can be referred to employers. On December 20, 2013, the Petitioner submitted a job application to the Respondent seeking a “forklift driver” position. At that time, the Petitioner indicated to the Respondent that he was available to perform “warehouse, packing, production, shipping and receiving tasks.” Several weeks prior to the Petitioner’s application, the Respondent had referred job candidates to an employer seeking to fill an available forklift driver position. The employer filled the position by hiring an African-American male born in 1961 who was referred to the employer by the Respondent. As of December 20, 2013, the Respondent had no pending employer requests seeking referrals to fill forklift driver positions. The evidence fails to establish that the Respondent had any employer requests at that time which were consistent with the Petitioner’s skills. The Respondent’s general practice when contacted by a prospective employer is to recommend applicants who have maintained ongoing contact with the Respondent’s staff after the submission of an application. There was minimal contact between the Petitioner and the Respondent after the Petitioner submitted his application in December 2013. The Respondent presumes that some people who submit applications subsequently relocate or obtain employment elsewhere. Accordingly, the Respondent requires that previous applicants periodically submit new employment applications so that the Respondent’s inventory includes only active job seekers. On April 8, 2014, the Petitioner submitted another application to the Respondent. Also in April 2014, an employer contacted the Respondent to obtain referrals to fill another forklift driving position. The employer filled the position by hiring an African- American male born in 1964, who was referred to the employer by the Respondent. Prior to his referral for the forklift driver position, the successful applicant routinely contacted the Respondent’s staff, in person and by telephone, regarding available employment opportunities. The evidence fails to establish whether the Respondent was included within the applicants who were referred to the requesting employer. There is no evidence that the Respondent’s referral process reflected factors related to any applicant’s race, color, sex, or age. The Petitioner has also asserted that his application should have been referred to an employer who, on one occasion, was seeking to fill an available cleaning position. The position was a part-time job paying an hourly wage of $10. The Petitioner had not submitted an application for such a position. Nothing in the information provided by the Petitioner to the Respondent indicated that the Petitioner was interested in such employment. Through the Respondent’s referrals, the employer filled the cleaning position by hiring an African-American male.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2016.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's race in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Subsections 760.02(6) and (10). Petitioner is a 41-year-old African-American male, who was terminated from his employment with Respondent on September 9, 2008. Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of Subsection 760.02(7). Respondent is a company engaged in the business, in relevant part, of distributing food from a warehouse in Fort Myers, Florida. Respondent employed Petitioner as a warehouse worker from some time in the fall of 2006 through September 9, 2008. On September 9, 2008, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment because of Petitioner's race. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment for non-discriminatory reasons. Petitioner worked the evening shift from 3:00 p.m. until some time between 10:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m., depending on the requirements for unloading trucks each day and manpower availability. Mr. Courtney Ward supervised the evening shift. All other supervisors left the warehouse by 6:00 p.m. each workday. In the fall of 2008, product shortages began to appear at the warehouse. Management investigated the shortages and focused the investigation on the evening shift because that shift was relatively under-supervised. During the investigation, corporate security officers interviewed all employees in the evening shift, including Petitioner; Mr. Ward; and warehouse workers, Mr. Don Kane and Mr. Mike Petersen. All of the named workers except Petitioner are Caucasian. On September 4, 2008, each warehouse worker submitted a written statement regarding the worker's knowledge or participation in product shortages. Petitioner admitted in his statement to taking product from the floor regularly and trading it once or twice for marijuana. Petitioner also admitted to drinking beer on the job. It is undisputed that Petitioner knew that taking product and drinking beer were offenses for which Petitioner could be terminated from his employment. The practice had been tolerated by a previous supervisor of Mr. Ward. However, the new supervisor had issued a memorandum advising employees to terminate the practice, but Petitioner continued the practice. On the same day that Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment, Respondent terminated the employment of Mr. Ward. Mr. Ward admitted in his statement to drinking beer on the job and to knowing that Petitioner consumed alcohol and used marijuana on the job. Even though Mr. Ward did not admit to taking product or using marijuana, Respondent held Mr. Ward to a "higher standard" because Mr. Ward was a supervisor. Respondent did not terminate either Mr. Kane or Mr. Petersen from employment. However, Respondent had valid, non-racial reasons for its action. Mr. Kane did not admit in his statement to taking product off the floor, and Respondent had no independent proof to dispute the denial. While Mr. Kane did admit to consuming alcohol on the job, there was no independent proof that Mr. Kane used marijuana on the job. Respondent placed Mr. Kane on "final warning" for one year. The final warning required Mr. Kane to submit to mandatory counseling in the company's Employee Assistance Program and to submit to random drug and alcohol testing. Mr. Petersen was "cleared from any involvement" in the product shortages during the investigation. He was also "cleared" of any allegations of drinking on the job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations against Respondent and dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully terminated the employment of Petitioner, because of his age in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner by terminating him on October 3, 2005, after Petitioner filed a complaint with human resources alleging a hostile work environment.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Leviton Manufacturing Corporation manufactures electrical equipment and components. It is a New York corporation licensed to do business in the State of Florida. Inter allia, Respondent employs a sales force that covers the entire State of Florida. Respondent is an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"). Respondent has implemented an employee handbook aimed at fostering a work environment that is free from harassment, discrimination and retaliation. Respondent's policies contain reporting and investigation procedures that encourage employees to report any and all incidents of perceived discrimination or harassment, and ensure that all reported incidents are investigated. Petitioner was employed with Respondent from June 1995 until November 2003, and from July 2004 through October 3, 2005. At the time of his termination, Petitioner was 49 years old. Petitioner first began working for Leviton in 1995 as a Service Representative. He received merit pay raises and promotions until November 2003, when Respondent laid-off 150 people in the retail division, including Petitioner. Petitioner was rehired in July 2004, as a Sales Representative. Upon rehire, Petitioner was supervised by District Manager Scott Robbins ("Robbins"). Petitioner presented the testimony of three of Respondent's managers, one retired, who supervised Petitioner for various periods of Petitioner's nine and one-half year career with Respondent. Each of them testified that Petitioner was dedicated and professional in which ever position he was assigned, including two assignments as a manager. Scott Robbins, Petitioner's supervisor immediately prior to Goodman, recommended Petitioner for re-hire as a Sales Representative following a lay-off, and was satisfied with his work in that position. Petitioner also presented the testimony of 12 customers of Respondent, in the territory that he covered between July 2004 and October 2005. Each of them expressed their opinion that Petitioner was an honest, diligent, and professional sales representative for his employer. Respondent presented the testimony of one customer who was not satisfied with Petitioner's performance as a sales representative. In January 2005, District Manager Warren Goodman ("Goodman") replaced Robbins and assumed his territories as well as his role as Petitioner's supervisor. At the time Petitioner was terminated, Goodman was 48 years old. Goodman supervised, and currently supervises, at least, 12 Sales Representatives, the majority of whom are over the age of 40, to wit: Name Age Name Age Roy Boykin 59 Mickey Ferrell 49 Don Yeager 59 Jose Monzon 40 Michael O'Reilly 56 Duane Bishop 38 Dave Lenoir 37 Kevin Bouton 34 Ken Davis 54 Paul Dube 41 Brad Taylor 10. When Goodman 52 took over as District Manager, it became readily apparent that Goodman's management style was distinctly different from Robbins. Goodman is demanding, blunt and aggressive, and closely manages his sales representatives. He expected prompt and accurate responses to his requests from his sales representatives. Petitioner was required to fulfill the same job expectations that were demanded of all other Sales Representatives. It included, but was not limited to, the timely submission of complete and accurate paperwork, client follow up, and travel to specific areas within his designated territory. Petitioner's area extended from Lakeland, Florida, to Thomasville, Georgia. Goodman expected Petitioner to visit customers in his territory at least every three weeks, staying at least two to three days on each trip at each location. Goodman's job as District Manager is to oversee his sales force and to enforce Leviton's guidelines, as he interprets them. Moreover, Goodman is charged with measuring his employees' compliance with Leviton's policies and procedures. Over the course of his tenure, Petitioner failed to abide by company rules and policies, as well as the terms of his employment, as understood by Goodman. On more than one occasion, Petitioner failed to provide expense reimbursements in an appropriate and timely manner. He also failed to travel with the frequency required by his sales position. Additionally, on numerous occasions, Petitioner failed to verify the accuracy of orders he placed for customers. On May 2, 2005, Goodman sent Petitioner an email addressing the importance of administrative responsibility and consistency. Goodman had just reviewed Petitioner's expense reports and noted that they covered a ten-week period, clearly in violation of the requirement that they be submitted within 30 days. Goodman also noted that the expense reports reflected no travel over a two-month period to the Thomasville/Tallahassee area, which composed a large portion of Petitioner's territory. Goodman requested that, thereafter, Petitioner forward his itinerary weekly, attaching as an example a copy of itineraries submitted by Petitioner's colleagues. Petitioner responded, apologizing for the late expenses. He attributed his tardiness in part to a change in his cellular telephone carrier. Petitioner set forth all his travel dates within the northern portion of his territory since his re-hire. The dates provided demonstrated that he was not in compliance with the travel requirements established for all Sales Representatives. Goodman responded and reminded Petitioner of the importance of adhering to guidelines for travel and paperwork submission. He encouraged Petitioner to improve his performance and to do what was necessary to satisfy Goodman's expectations of the proper skills necessary to do his job effectively. On May 9, 2005, Petitioner sent Goodman an email indicating his car was being repaired. The repair estimates attached to the email evidenced that Petitioner had been driving a 12-year-old vehicle, which was not within Respondent's car policy guidelines. Petitioner had reviewed and signed the car policy guidelines on January 12, 2005, and began receiving monthly payments (including retroactive payments), effective February 11, 2005. On May 18, 2005, Petitioner received and signed an Employee Warning. Significantly, Petitioner signed the Employee Warning indicating that he read and understood it. The Employee Warning cited violations for substandard job performance and violations of company policies or procedures, with specific reprimands for: (1) failure to timely submit expense reports; (2) failure to travel as specified and agreed to; (3) sloppy submission of paperwork; (4) lack of involvement with customer; and (5) failure to maintain a proper company vehicle in accordance with company policy. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner purchased a new truck for the purpose of meeting the company vehicle policy. On May 31, 2005, Goodman reviewed numerous quotes submitted by Petitioner for review and renewal. Goodman informed Petitioner that upon review, the quotes prepared by Petitioner were inaccurate and required various revisions and corrections. Some quotes were priced higher than stock; different prices were entered for the same item in a different color (when there should have been no price difference); there were items on quotes that were never purchased; and there was no increase in items ordered/quoted. In August 2005, Goodman advised Petitioner that his sales goals were not ambitious enough and that Petitioner needed to re-evaluate and re-consider his year-end goals. Petitioner indicated that he would do as instructed. In mid-August 2005, Petitioner once again submitted an incomplete quote to Goodman for approval. When brought to Petitioner's attention, he added the items missing from the quote, offering no explanation for this oversight. On August 30, 2005, Petitioner submitted order adjustments to Goodman's administrative assistant for completion. When the request was forwarded to Goodman, he immediately reminded Petitioner that all changes were required to be submitted to him, not his assistant. Moreover, the requested changes contained errors. Goodman requested that Petitioner review the complete order and re-submit it when it was accurate. Three days later, Petitioner still had not acknowledged or responded to Goodman's request. Goodman completed and submitted Petitioner's performance review on July 25, 2005. Due to the fact that no prior goals or skills development were accomplished by Petitioner, his review was deferred until the end of 2005. Based upon his seven-month assessment of Petitioner, Goodman felt that Petitioner only partially met expectations. Rather than precluding a merit increase in salary, Goodman gave Petitioner an opportunity to improve his performance by deferring his review for several months. Petitioner signed this July review, indicating that Goodman discussed the review and appraisal with him. On September 5, 2005, (Labor Day, a holiday) Goodman sent an email to all of his Sale Representatives, which required a response to specific inquiries no later than 5:00 p.m. Petitioner did not respond until September 7, 2005, at 4:15 p.m. This was clearly past the deadline. Goodman reprimanded Petitioner in his responsive email, specifically advising Petitioner that his continued employment was in jeopardy. He invited Petitioner to call Goodman the next day to discuss Petitioner's lack of diligence and timeliness. Only after a telephone call on the morning of September 9, 2005, did Petitioner, for the first time raise the issue of unfair treatment, but he did not raise age as a factor. Petitioner requested, via email, that Goodman assist Petitioner in filing a complaint against Goodman with Leviton's Human Resource Department for creating a hostile work environment. In this same email, Petitioner informed Goodman that Petitioner had involved clients in his grievance by requesting that the clients evaluate Petitioner's performance and provide their input to Respondent. Based upon the preceding client involvement, Goodman advised Petitioner on September 12, 2005, that he was suspended immediately, with pay, pending the outcome of Respondent's investigation regarding Petitioner's inappropriate conduct. Petitioner was therefore instructed to maintain contact with only the Human Resources Department (HR) until further notice. Thereafter, Petitioner corresponded, via email, with Shephard. On September 13, 2005, Petitioner forwarded his May 5, 2005, email exchange with Goodman to Kimberly Shephard, Respondent's Corporate Human Resource Manager. On that same day, Petitioner sent another email to Shephard containing a list of items that were still incomplete and required follow up. In forwarding this lengthy "to do" list, Petitioner demonstrated his inattention to detail and inability to complete administrative tasks. On September 16, 2005, Shephard drafted Petitioner's allegations in memorandum format, the accuracy of which Petitioner verified and signed on September 20, 2005. Goodman was given a copy of the allegations and provided a written response on September 19, 2005, refuting each of Petitioner's allegations. Meanwhile, HR conducted interviews with a random selection of Goodman's employees in the district and noted each employee's assessment of Goodman. Goodman was determined by each of the interviewed employees to provide equal treatment to all employees. The employees interviewed ranged in age from 35 to 58. On or about September 20, 2005, Shephard completed her investigation of Petitioner's complaint and determined that there was no basis that Goodman created an unlawful hostile work environment. Rather, it was determined that Goodman set the same standards for all of his employees; treated them all the same; and that accordingly, there was no basis to conclude Petitioner was singled out. Petitioner was ultimately terminated on October 3, 2005. The reasons cited by Respondent were based on Petitioner's unsatisfactory job performance. The specific reasons given for Petitioner's termination were: (1) his inability to perform the tasks associated with the Sales Representative position; (2) his failure to develop end-users sufficiently; (3) his administrative inadequacies; (4) his failure to meet deadlines and failure to follow instructions; and (5) his choosing to enlist customers in an internal company matter pertaining to Petitioner's poor job performance. Although Respondent determined that Petitioner's involvement of customer's in an internal dispute was grounds for immediate termination, Respondent determined it would investigate Petitioner's complaint prior to taking other action, since it occurred at the same time as the allegations of improper conduct by Goodman. At no time was Petitioner's age raised as a factor in any of the terms and conditions of his employment by Respondent. Nor was it a factor in any work related complaints regarding his deficiencies. Petitioner never informed any member of Respondent's management that he believed he was treated differently during his employment because of his age, or that he had been terminated due to his age. After Petitioner was terminated, Respondent did not hire anyone to replace him. Rather, Respondent re-assigned Petitioner's territory to existing salesmen. Paul Dube ("Dube"), aged 41, inherited the majority of Petitioner's territory. Goodman did not require that Dube travel to, or invest time in customers that only did a nominal amount of business with Respondent. Petitioner attempted to establish that he was unable to respond to several of Goodman's inquiries in a timely manner, or at all, because Petitioner's computer was being repaired by Respondent's IT department. Nevertheless, Petitioner had access to his work email via Respondent's webmail program during this period. Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was terminated by Respondent because of his age. Respondent failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was subject to retaliation after he filed a hostile work environment complaint with Respondent's HR department.
Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying Petitioner's Petition for Relief and dismissing his charge with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2007.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his race contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a lumber mill in a community known as Cypress near Marianna, Florida. In 2007, Respondent hired Petitioner, an African-American male, to operate a 966 Caterpillar loader (the loader) at the mill. Melvin Lewis is an African-American male. Mr. Lewis is a second-shift supervisor. At all times relevant here, Mr. Lewis was Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Mr. Lewis reports directly to Ross Jackson, a white male. Mr. Jackson has been Respondent's general manager since January 2008. In May 2008, Mr. Lewis told Petitioner that the loader was slowly leaking brake fluid. Mr. Lewis instructed Petitioner to always check the loader to ensure that it had brake fluid. On or about Thursday, May 28, 2009, between 2:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., Petitioner was involved in an accident while operating the loader. Petitioner told Mr. Lewis that a log fell onto the loader, the brakes failed, and the loader went over a retaining wall. After the accident, Mr. Lewis immediately checked the brake fluid reservoir. He found the reservoir empty. Petitioner knew or should have known the standard procedure to follow when, and if, a log rolled onto a loader. In that event, the loader operator was supposed to immediately call his supervisor on the two-way radio and request help. At the time of the accident, Petitioner and Mr. Lewis had working two-way radios. Petitioner used the radio to call Mr. Lewis right after the accident. He did not call for help when the log first rolled onto the loader. On May 28, 2009, Petitioner was operating the 966 loader on a ramp that is 75-feet long and 40-feet wide with a retaining wall on each side of the ramp. At the high end of the ramp is a flat area where Petitioner was picking up logs from a pile. To get off of the flat part of the ramp, Petitioner had to accelerate backwards to then go down the ramp. When the accident occurred, Petitioner had traveled almost all of the way down the 75-foot ramp and then turned the loader 90 degrees toward the retaining wall. To go over the one and one-half foot retaining wall, the loader must have been traveling at a fairly high rate of speed. The accident tore the transmission off of the loader. The loader was inoperable and had to be repaired. The cost of the repairs was over $14,000. After the accident, Mr. Lewis told Petitioner that "this is really bad." Mr. Lewis first directed Petitioner to clock-out and go home. Mr. Lewis then told Petitioner to stay until Mr. Jackson arrived at work at 5:00 a.m. When Mr. Jackson came in to work, he told Petitioner that he would be suspended until Mr. Jackson and Mr. Lewis had a chance to review the situation. Mr. Jackson told Petitioner to report back on Monday, June 1, 2009. Mr. Lewis decided that Petitioner should not be allowed to operate equipment for the following reasons: (a) Petitioner failed to keep brake fluid in the loader as instructed; (b) Petitioner failed to call for help on his radio when the log rolled onto the loader; and (c) with the log on the loader, Petitioner accelerated backward down the ramp, turned the loader 90 degrees, and drove the loader fast enough to hit the retaining wall and bounce over it. Mr. Lewis recommended termination of Petitioner's employment. Mr. Jackson concurred. Petitioner was terminated on June 1, 2009. No evidence indicates that the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment was based on his race. There was no persuasive evidence that Respondent gave any white employee more favorable treatment under similar circumstances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric J. Holshouser, Esquire Fowler, White and Boggs, P.A. 50 North Laura Street, Suite 2800 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Gary Powell 6782 Bumpy Lane Grand Ridge, Florida 32442 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, JR Conway Enterprises, LLC (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes,1 by terminating Petitioner, Tina Garner (Petitioner), in retaliation for her reporting sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, JR Conway Enterprises, LLC, owns a number of businesses. Jeff Conway is Respondent’s managing member. Petitioner was hired by Respondent near the end of July 2018, to work as a bookkeeper doing payroll and accounts for Respondent’s real estate office known as Sunshine State Deals. In September 2018, Respondent opened a Smoothie King in the Spring Hill, Florida area. As the date for opening the Smoothie King grew closer, Petitioner took on more responsibilities and helped open and operate that store. Morgan Katocs was hired in September 2018 to work at the Smoothie King. Ms. Katocs was 17 years old at the time she was hired. Ms. Katocs brother, Hunter McGhee, was also hired to work at the Smoothie King. The Smoothie King store opened on September 18, 2018. Petitioner had no authority to hire employees for Respondent. Apparently, all hires to work at the Smoothie King were made by Brandon Berlinrut, who was a friend of Jeff Conway and recruiter for Respondent. While Petitioner had no hiring authority, during the time she worked at the Smoothie King, she supervised Ms. Katocs. As the Smoothie King was opening, there was work that needed to be completed. Respondent hired his friend, Constantine Tremoularis, as an independent contractor to install security cameras, work on the point of sale, and conduct various work at the location. Mr. Tremoularis was given access to areas at the Smoothie King store where only employees were permitted. While working at the Smoothie King, Ms. Katocs had physical limitations due to a back condition caused by a car accident. When Ms. Katocs requested assistance in lifting a mop bucket, Mr. Tremoularis responded, “I bet men like to say that they broke your back,” in a context inferring injury during sex. Ms. Katocs interpreted the comment as an unwelcome sexual comment and was offended and upset. Ms. Katocs reported the unwanted sexual comment to Ms. Garner within an hour after the comment was made. Later, while Petitioner was at Respondent’s real estate office, both Ms. Katocs and her mother called her on the telephone from the Smoothie King office and asked her to set up a meeting with Mr. Conway to discuss the unwanted sexual comment. They both expressed a desire for Petitioner to be present during the meeting. Ms. Garner told Mr. Conway of Ms. Katocs and her mother’s desire to have a meeting with him to discuss the unwanted sexual comment, and of their request that Petitioner be present at the meeting. Mr. Conway met with Ms. Katocs and Ms. Katocs’s mother on October 4, 2018, to discuss the incident. Mr. Conway did not invite Petitioner and Petitioner did not attend the meeting. Although he did not tell Ms. Katocs or her mother, the reason that Mr. Conway did not want Petitioner in the meeting is because he had already decided to terminate Petitioner’s employment for reasons unrelated to the reported unwanted sexual comment from Mr. Tremoularis. At the meeting, Ms. Katocs, her mother, and Mr. Conway discussed the unwanted sexual comment. During the meeting, Mr. Conway agreed to make changes and provide sexual harassment training for Respondent’s employees. On October 4, 2018, the day after the meeting between Ms. Katocs, her mother, and Mr. Conway, Mr. Tremoularis apologized to Ms. Katocs. Although he was allowed to stay at the Smoothie King location from several days to over a week to finish the job, Mr. Tremoularis made no further unwanted sexual comments to Ms. Katocs. On Saturday, October 6, 2018, Mr. Conway called Petitioner on the telephone and advised her that she was terminated. Mr. Conway terminated Petitioner because he perceived her as rude, argumentative, and combative. Mr. Conway also believed that Petitioner was responsible for hiring her daughter, Tina Rowlands, to work at the Smoothie King store even though Petitioner knew that Mr. Conway did not approve of the hire. Mr. Conway’s perceptions of Petitioner’s aberrant behavior were consistent with those observations reported by Karen Stapleton in her testimony at the final hearing. Karen Stapleton, who worked with Mr. Conway’s companies as a consultant and in accounting, worked with and helped train Petitioner at Respondent’s real estate office in September 2018. Ms. Stapleton also observed Petitioner scream at an employee at Respondent’s Smoothie King store. When Mr. Conway terminated Petitioner, he also terminated Petitioner’s daughter, Ms. Rowlands, as well as Petitioner’s daughter’s boyfriend, Jake Fryar. Although Mr. Conway approved of Jake Fryar’s hire, he decided to terminate Mr. Fryar as well because of his association with Petitioner and Petitioner’s daughter. Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was made because of Mr. Conway’s perceptions about Petitioner’s combative behavior and Mr. Conway’s belief that Petitioner was responsible for hiring her daughter. Although in close proximity to the time of Petitioner’s termination on October 6, 2018, Mr. Conway had already decided to fire Petitioner prior to Petitioner’s report of the unwanted sexual comment made to Ms. Katocs and Mr. Conway’s meeting with Ms. Katocs and her mother to discuss the incident. As confirmed by the testimony of a locksmith, who was contacted on September 28, 2018, to change locks on Respondent’s offices and the Smoothie King store, Respondent’s decision to terminate Petitioner was made in late September 2018. Although the locks were not changed until October 6, 2018, the timing of the lock change request and Mr. Conway’s credible testimony confirm that the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment was unrelated to her report of unwanted sexual comments. Following the October 4, 2018, meeting between Ms. Katocs, her mother, and Mr. Conway, Morgan Katocs continued her employment at the Smoothie King store until she voluntarily left at the end of December 2018. Ms. Katocs testified that she left Smoothie King because, in her view, nothing changed; she felt uncomfortable about remaining employed there, the promised sexual harassment training never occurred, and another employee was making inappropriate sexual remarks to other female employees. Ms. Katocs also did not like a manager that was hired after Petitioner was terminated, who, according to Ms. Katocs, was a bully and abusive. Ms. Katocs further testified that neither she, nor her brother, who was also employed at the Smoothie King, received negative repercussions from her report of the unwanted sexual comment from Mr. Tremoularis. Ms. Katocs’s brother remained employed at the Smoothie King until voluntarily leaving in April 2019.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S James H. Peterson, III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Jeff Conway JR Conway Enterprises, LLC Post Office Box 15389 Brooksville, Florida 34604 William Sheslow, Esquire Whittle & Melton, LLC 11020 Northcliffe Boulevard Spring Hill, Florida 34608 Erik DeL'Etoile, Esquire DeL'Etoile Law Firm P.A. 10150 Highland Manor Drive, Suite 200 Tampa, Florida 33610
The Issue Whether Respondent, Milos, illegally terminated Petitioner based on her race (Black), in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant fact: Petitioner is a Black female who worked for Milos as a line cook. Respondent is a Greek restaurant located in Miami, Florida. On January 12, 2016, Respondent hired Petitioner for a line cook position. Petitioner was interviewed and hired by Arsan. Arsan supervises all back-of-the-house staff and was Petitioner's supervisor throughout her entire 20-month period of employment. On May 30, 2016, approximately four and a half months after Petitioner's hire at Milos, Arsan gave Petitioner a raise in pay because he felt that she was performing well. Many of the employees Arsan supervises at Milos are Black. PETITIONER'S PERFORMANCE ISSUES AT MILOS On September 23, 2016, Petitioner was suspended for insubordination and violating company policies and procedures. Resp. Ex. 7 and 8. More specifically, Arsan was notified by the sous chef that there had been an argument between Petitioner and a coworker. Arsan attempted to investigate the dispute and found Petitioner to be very emotional and aggressive during the investigation. She was asked to leave but refused. Eventually, she left the premises. This incident came on the heels of another similar incident involving a verbal argument with a coworker, which occurred on September 17, 2016. Subsequently, on April 28, 2017, Petitioner was involved in another workplace argument with an employee named Rosa Salazar ("Salazar"). Resp. Ex. 10. The manager on duty intervened and attempted to resolve the dispute and calm the parties down. After he did so, Petitioner left work without permission and left early the following day as well. On June 27, 2017, a third employee named Ishay (a.k.a., Ayse Akbulut) complained that she could not work with Petitioner at their assigned station because Petitioner was "being rude and territorial." Resp. Ex. 11. Arsan spoke to Petitioner and resolved the matter between the two employees. However, he documented the incident as other employees had previously complained about Petitioner creating a hostile working environment. On June 30, 2017, Petitioner reportedly was involved in yet another workplace incident with Sonya Cabret ("Cabret"). Cabret complained that Petitioner made racially charged and demeaning comments to her based on Cabret's Haitian national origin. More specifically, Cabret complained that Petitioner called her an "ignorant Haitian," a "f ing Haitian," and stated that Cabret does not know how to speak English and that Cabret could not find a job anywhere else. Two months prior, Salazar had also complained that Petitioner made derogatory remarks to her based on Salazar's Latin ethnicity. Resp. Ex. 12 and 13. Salazar recounted that Petitioner had called her a "f ing Latino." Arsan disciplined Petitioner by counseling her and sending her home for the day. Each of the above incidents occurred prior to Hurricane Irma in September 2017. The undersigned finds that these incidents, and their related warnings and discipline, are relevant to the ultimate decision to discharge Petitioner and have some bearing on the propriety and necessity for termination. PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO RETURN TO WORK AFTER HURRICANE IRMA At some point in time on Wednesday, September 6, 2017, Arsan informed all employees that Milos would be closed at the end of the work day due to the approaching landfall of Hurricane Irma. Petitioner had been scheduled to report to work on September 6, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., but she did not do so. At 12:40 p.m. on September 6, 2017, Petitioner texted Arsan that she could not report to work because she was evacuating to Georgia due to Hurricane Irma. However, she hoped to return to work the following Tuesday (September 12, 2017). Resp. Ex. 14. After the hurricane had passed, on September 10, 2017, Arsan sent a group text message to all back-of-the-house staff alerting them that the restaurant was "closed for Monday" (September 11, 2017) and "we will be probably open for Tuesday" (September 12, 2017). Resp. Ex. 15. Petitioner received this text message. Petitioner never informed Arsan that she would not be back from Georgia by September 12, 2017, as she mentioned in her text message on September 6, 2017. Believing Petitioner would be back in Miami on September 12, 2017, Arsan scheduled Petitioner to work Wednesday, September 13, 2017. Resp. Ex. 16. On September 13, 2017, Petitioner did not call in or report for work. That same day, Arsan called Petitioner to find out why she did not report to work. Petitioner did not answer or return Arsan's call. On September 14, 2017, Petitioner again failed to call in or report for work. Arsan again attempted to reach Petitioner by telephone, but she did not answer. Arsan then sent Petitioner a text message notifying her that she was scheduled to be at work. Petitioner responded to Arsan's text messages on September 14, 2017, and the following discussion ensued: Arsan: "Denise you are scheduled to work today[.]" Petitioner: "Nobody called me and told me anything I cannot get out until Tuesday or Wednesday I'll [sic] area was hit bad and the bus is [sic] down here start running Wednesday[.]" Arsan: "Denise everybody is at work except you. How the bus starting [sic] on wednesday, [sic] half of staff is using the bus and they are here, The buses working [sic] fine." Petitioner: "When you come to my family I don't care about no job [sic] that's not my life we had an emergency down here we don't have any lights some of the buses is not running my house got water in it I am coming from Georgia so I might not be back until Thursday I have a lot of stuff to take care of in my house[.]" Arsan: "Please help let [sic] me understand your situation are you in Miami? or Georgia? Petitioner: I will be in Miami tonight I still have a lot of stuff to do at my. . . . Resp. Ex. 14. Arsan and Petitioner did not have any further communications after this text message exchange. Further, Petitioner did not initiate or attempt to send any more text messages to Arsan after the September 14, 2017, exchange. Petitioner did not report for work scheduled on September 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, or 20. Petitioner testified that she did not report to work from September 13, 2017, to September 20, 2017, because she was attending to damage to her home caused by the hurricane. Based on Petitioner's text message that she does not "care about no job [sic]," Arsan, after consulting with Milos' outside contracted human resource company, removed Petitioner from the schedule for the week of Monday, September 18, 2017, to Sunday, September 24, 2017. On September 21, 2017, Petitioner showed up at Milos to work. Arsan believed Petitioner had abandoned her job and did not expect her to report to work again. After she arrived, Arsan directed Petitioner to speak to Faundez, Milos' outside human resource representative at Eleva Solutions. Contrary to what Petitioner told Arsan (i.e., that she missed work because she was attending to damage in her home from the hurricane), Petitioner gave Faundez three different reasons for her failure to call in or show up for work the preceding week: she did not know that she was supposed to be at work; there was no bus transportation; and (c) Petitioner had to be evacuated. Faundez concluded that Petitioner's reasons for failing to appear for work were inconsistent and conflicted with each other. She also did not believe that Petitioner had provided a definitive or plausible answer explaining why she had not returned to work. After consultation, Faundez and Arsan decided together to terminate Petitioner's employment. Arsan was not the sole decision-maker with respect to Petitioner's termination. Prior to her termination and despite having received Respondent's antidiscrimination policy and complaint procedures, Petitioner never complained that Arsan was discriminating against her because of her race. During the course of the hearing, Petitioner was unable to identify any employee(s) outside of her protected class who engaged in the same conduct and were not terminated from employment. Specifically, on cross-examination, Petitioner admitted that she was unable to identify a single non-Black employee who failed to show up for work following the hurricane and who was not terminated from employment. The evidence Petitioner offered to support her race discrimination claim was vague, unpersuasive, and included only conclusory and general allegations by her that Arsan "was a racist" and is a "nasty human being." There were no emails, texts, documents, or other direct evidence from Petitioner or Arsan supporting her claim that she was fired by Milos because of her race. Likewise, Petitioner called no witnesses to offer any compelling facts or circumstances to support her claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice and find in Respondent's favor. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in discriminatory employment practices, or subjected Petitioner to harassment based on his race, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), when, as alleged in the Petition, Petitioner’s supervisor committed a battery against Petitioner with unwanted touching.
Findings Of Fact UWF is a public university within the Florida State University System. See § 1000.21(6)(f), Fla. Stat. Since January 2012, UWF has employed Mr. Lee, an African-American male, as an environmental services technician in the Building Services Department. His employment duties consist of custodial-type work. The Building Services Department is one of UWF’s departments that fall under the supervision of the Facilities Operations Department. 5 Associate Vice President, Administration and Facilities Operations Dr. Melinda Bowers (White Female) Vice President and CFO Dr. Steve Cunningham (White Male) At the time of Mr. Lee’s complaint, his supervisory chain of command, in descending order, was as follows: Director, Materials and Grounds Mr. Myles Sampson (African-American Male) Coordinator, Building Services Ms. Frankie Carlson (White Female) Environmental Services Supervisor Ms. Brenda Rivers (African-American Female) Environmental Services Technician Mr. Billy Ray Lee (African-American Male) The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) union at UWF represents the environmental service technicians and other employees in the facilities area. Mr. Lee became the president of the AFSCME union at UWF in the fall semester of 2014. Mr. Lee’s Petition focuses on an incident that occurred on May 16, 2017. On that date, Dr. Melinda Bowers conducted, as she did every quarter, a meeting for the environmental services technicians and others in the Building Services Department. When Dr. Bowers mentioned an update concerning an issue with the AFSCME union during this meeting, Mr. Lee interrupted and argued with Dr. Bowers.1/ Dr. Bowers asked Mr. Lee to meet with her after the meeting, or to set up a meeting to discuss his concerns at a different time. Mr. Lee left the meeting room, but returned shortly after the meeting concluded to speak with Dr. Bowers about the AFSCME union issue, or to schedule a meeting to discuss this issue. Dr. Bowers testified that when he returned, Mr. Lee was irate, raised his voice, and was spitting as he spoke. In an effort to calm Mr. Lee, Dr. Bowers briefly touched Mr. Lee on the arm with an “open hand.” Dr. Bowers wanted to understand what Mr. Lee was frustrated about and how she could help. Based on the testimony and evidence presented, Dr. Bowers did not impede or otherwise prevent Mr. Lee from leaving the meeting room. Dr. Bowers and others testified that she was a “touchy person.” The totality of this testimony demonstrated that Dr. Bowers routinely touched other employees in a benign manner, regardless of race or sex. That same day, Mr. Lee filed a report with the UWF Police Department, in which he contended that Dr. Bowers committed a battery against him.2/ Mr. Lee’s report did not indicate that he believed that the Dr. Bowers committed the alleged battery because of Mr. Lee’s race. Rather, it stated, “Dr. Bowers grabbed my arm to get me to continue to talk to her.” UWF Police Sergeant Walter Davis immediately investigated Mr. Lee’s report. As part of his investigation, Sergeant Davis met with all identified witnesses and took statements from each witness. After conducting his investigation, Sergeant Davis found there was a lack of probable cause that a battery occurred. Sergeant Davis’s report also stated: The alleged touching by Dr. Bowers was a form of a communicative gesture that was witnessed by Witnesses. Witnesses also stated Dr. Bowers touching of Lee consisted of an open hand, fingertip touch on his arm. When Dr. Bowers was told by Billy Lee not to touch him, Dr. Bowers ceased touching Lee. On May 16, 2017--and after the incident that formed the basis of Mr. Lee’s police report--Dr. Bowers met with her superior, Dr. Steve Cunningham, and Jamie Sprague of Human Resources, to discuss her concerns with Mr. Lee’s behavior and demeanor that day. During this meeting, the parties discussed that there were other incidents concerning Mr. Lee specifically related to his demeanor or temper that had occurred in the period of approximately one month previously. Those incidents included: April 10-21, 2017: Subcontracted painters that UWF hired complained that Mr. Lee harassed them while working; April 19, 2017: Mr. Lee confronted UWF employee Tiffany Nisenwonger off campus and, with an aggressive tone, told her that he believed there was unfairness at UWF; and May 8-15, 2017: On May 8, 2017, Mr. Lee interrupted a meeting between employees and their supervisors that he was not entitled to attend. On May 9, 2017, Mr. Lee interrupted a meeting between Frankie Carlson and Myles Sampson, and accused Ms. Carlson of illegally recording conversations with employees with her headphones. On May 9 and 15, 2017, Dr. Bowers received letters from UWF employees concerning Mr. Lee’s unprofessional behavior. Based on these incidents, on May 17, 2017, Dr. Cunningham decided to place Mr. Lee on administrative leave, with pay, pursuant to UWF Policy HR 18.02-06/16(5)(i), to allow time for an investigation. During this leave period, UWF prohibited Mr. Lee from entering UWF property without written permission from Dr. Cunningham.3/ Ms. Sprague conducted the investigation, which included a meeting with Mr. Lee to review each of these incidents. On June 8, 2017, Dr. Cunningham informed Mr. Lee, in writing, that Ms. Sprague had completed the investigation, and that Mr. Lee was permitted to return to work on June 12, 2017. Ms. Sprague’s investigation concluded that Mr. Lee violated several aspects of UWF Policy HR-22.00-2004/07 because of his behavior and demeanor. On June 29, 2017, Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Bowers submitted a memorandum to Ms. Sprague, after reviewing Ms. Sprague’s investigative report. Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Bowers found that Mr. Lee repeatedly violated UWF Standards of Conduct in HR-22.00, including: use of poor judgment; insubordination; lying/misleading; threatening or abusive language; and conduct unbecoming a university employee. Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Bowers recommended that UWF suspend Mr. Lee without pay for five working days, and require him to take and complete an anger management course. On June 30, 2017, UWF informed Mr. Lee that it intended to suspend him for five working days without pay, and provided him the right to a predetermination conference. Thereafter, UWF suspended Mr. Lee for five working days without pay. UWF made this decision after Mr. Lee filed his June 7, 2017, charge of discrimination with FCHR. Mr. Lee has not experienced any change in position or title since May 16, 2017. UWF presented evidence that it has awarded Mr. Lee with pay increases on several occasions. Mr. Lee presented no persuasive evidence that UWF’s decision concerning, or actions affecting, him, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by race-based discriminatory animus. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful race discrimination. Mr. Lee presented no persuasive evidence that UWF’s actions subjected him to harassment based on his race, and that such actions were sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the terms and conditions of his employment to create a hostile or abusive work environment. There is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record upon which the undersigned could make a finding of unlawful race harassment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Billy Ray Lee, did not prove that Respondent, University of West Florida, committed unlawful employment practices against him by engaging in discriminatory employment practices or subjecting Petition to harassment based on his race, and dismissing his Petition for Relief from unlawful employment practices. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this cause is whether Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices of discrimination against Petitioner, for the reason of her being a female, by denying her management training during her employment tenure and by subsequently terminating her employment, in violation of Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003).1
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes; and stipulations of the parties, the following relevant and material facts, arrived at impartially based solely upon testimony and information presented at the final hearing, are objectively determined: Petitioner, Kelly McKean, is a Caucasian female and, at all times pertinent to this proceeding, was an employee at one of Respondent's, Econo Auto Painting, Inc., business locations, located at 1822 West Memorial Boulevard, Lakeland, Florida, from February 12, 2001, until she was terminated on June 23, 2003. Petitioner had approximately six years of non-continuous employment at several of Respondent's business locations before beginning her employment at the above Lakeland business site. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a "taper," the person who is responsible for taping cars after body repairs and before painting. The taping of cars consisted of aligning strips of tape to specific areas of each automobile to prevent the taped area from being painted by the painter. Petitioner was an "aggrieved person" as defined by Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. The evidence of record establishes the fact that during all times pertinent, Respondent's Lakeland location employed nine employees comprised of: two females and seven males (five Caucasians/three Hispanics/one African American). Of the nine employees, one Caucasian female and one African American male were in managerial positions. Both were employed through contractual services of Selective HR Services (SHRS), an independent contractor and co-employer of Petitioner. Respondent is an automobile body shop business specializing in automobile body repairs and painting the exterior of cars and, at all times pertinent to this proceeding, was an "employer" as defined by Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. During all times pertinent to this proceeding, SHRS was responsible for providing human resources management services for Respondent's employees.4 At all time pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent hired the shop managers for its several auto body repair shops through SHRS. At no time pertinent to this proceeding did Respondent promote employees to management positions from within. At no time pertinent to this proceeding did Respondent permit, offer, or have in place a management training program for the training and promotions of employees from within the ranks of its shop employees to management positions within the company. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, and, on Monday, June 23, 2003, Marquez Green was the shop manager and Ron Link was the assistant manager of Respondent's Lakeland branch body shop during Petitioner's last term of employment at that location. Basis for Petitioner's Termination Several weeks preceding her termination, on June 23, 2003, the assistant shop manager, Mr. Link, noticed and personally discussed with Petitioner her repeated improper taping of some cars in the assembly line processes. Mr. Link spoke with Petitioner about this problem particularly stressing the fact that each car not properly taped required repainting which resulted in a slowdown of the repair, sanding, taping, and repainting process. It was made clear to Petitioner that repainting due to improper taping was causing the shop to lose profit. During the days following notice of the problem regarding incorrectly taped cars, Petitioner failed and/or refused to improve her work habits. The lack of improvement by Petitioner of her work habit of taping cars apparently became of some concern with management, in view of Petitioner's experience and over seven years of service as a taper with Respondent's business. Added to this disturbing trend, some time later, both the shop manager and assistant manager observed Petitioner in the manager's office reading business documents. Management confronted Petitioner with this violation of its policy that "none management" personnel were not allowed to read/review business documents. Petitioner gave an excuse for her conduct stating that the prior manager permitted her to review office documents when she was caught up with her work. Other than her statement, Petitioner failed to provide the identity or the testimony of the prior manager who allegedly granted her permission to review office documents when she had completed her work assignments before the end of the day. Petitioner presented no corroborating evidence in support of her assertion of prior managerial permission for her to review office documents. Petitioner's allegation of "prior permissive authority" was thus not credible. Mr. Green gave undisputed testimony that during a third occasion, he observed Petitioner and a non-employee male friend of Petitioner walking and talking in the work area restricted to employees only. Mr. Green approached the couple and immediately brought the rule infraction of no non-employees within the restricted work area to Petitioner's attention, ending by instructing Petitioner to tell her male friend to leave the restricted workshop area immediately. Under these circumstances, and in the presence of a non-employee, Petitioner said to her shop manager: "He'll leave when I want him to leave." Following Petitioner's refusal to obey the shop manager's direct order accompanied by her disrespectful comment, Mr. Green moved to call the local police, and only then did Petitioner's male friend leave the premises. Mr. Green subsequently discussed this matter, as well as the profit loss due to improper taping of cars, with Mr. Link, and they jointly decided not to take disciplinary action against Petitioner at that time. Notice of Termination On Monday, June 23, 2003, Petitioner reported to work at approximately 7:35 a.m. and five hours later, at approximately 12:35 p.m., she had completely taped all nine cars in the shop for repair and painting that day. Petitioner sought out Mr. Link, inquiring what he would have her do next; assist other employees in the shop or go to lunch? Mr. Link instructed Petitioner to go home for the remainder of the day. After her departure, Mr. Link and Mr. Green discussed Petitioner's continuing hurried work habits, her attitude toward management when given a direct order, and her unauthorized presence in the manager's office reviewing business documents. Management considered the following: (1) Petitioner's continued episodes of improper taping was causing an increase in cost and a decrease in profits, (2) Petitioner's negative attitude toward management, and (3) Petitioner's unauthorized presence in the manager's office looking at managerial business documents. Management determined that the above conduct was sufficient basis for her termination as an employee. In the afternoon of June 23, 2003, Mr. Link, with authorization from Mr. Green, telephoned Petitioner and informed her that she was terminated because of her repeated and costly taping errors and her failure to correct those errors. The telephonic notice of termination was followed by a written termination letter with check marks beside the boxes "refusal to perform job duties" and "unable to perform job."5 This document formed the factual basis for Petitioner's termination as an employee. Background and Employer's Policy On February 12, 2001, before she began working at Respondent's Lakeland job site, but while she was working for Respondent at another job site, Petitioner executed an Employment Acknowledgement packet containing the policy(s) and procedures she agreed to follow in the event there occurred any employment disputes, including any type of discrimination. Petitioner also agreed to resolve employment disputes through use of SHRS' Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedure. Prior Complaints Made by Petitioner While working at Respondent's Longwood, Florida, job site, but before working at the Lakeland job site, Petitioner made one verbal complaint of sexual harassment to Betty Branham, SHRS compliance supervisor, regarding sexual comments regarding her buttocks made by male co-workers. The record does not contain evidence whether this complaint was pursued or dismissed. Petitioner neither made complaints nor did she make any reports of sexual harassment or discrimination, gender or otherwise, at the Lakeland job site during her February 12, 2001, to June 23, 2003, employment tenure there. Petitioner did not file a report with SHRS claiming discrimination because of her gender and/or because she was denied management training opportunities and opportunities for promotion into management. Other Employees Terminated by Respondent During the early hours of June 24, 2003, one day after Petitioner's termination, Mr. Link terminated a male employee, Edward Burgess. Mr. Burgess was a "sander," and he was terminated for "refusal to perform job duties" and "unable to perform job." According to Mr. Link, Mr. Burgess was "taking two-to-three times longer than what he should to sand cars." During the evening hours of June 24, 2003, Mr. Green terminated another male employee, Mr. Link. Mr. Link was terminated, as he recalled, "because another male employee made accusations that while walking behind him Mr. Link bumped into his rear and made sexual gestures." Mr. Link admitted he could not recall, that is, he could not confirm, argue or deny, the other party's versions of what actually occurred and what was said at the time of his bumping into the other employee. The unnamed other employee did not testify. Petitioner, through the testimony of witnesses, of record, and exhibits admitted into evidence, failed to produce a scintilla of substantial and competent evidence to establish: that she was subjected to an adverse job action when, in fact, she was terminated for poor job performance and disrespectful conduct toward management on June 23, 2003; that because of her gender, female, she was treated differently than similarly situated male employees, who were not terminated after violation of work place policy(s); and (3) that she was qualified for the job as managerial trainee but was denied an opportunity for employee managerial training which was provided by her employer to other employees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and the Charge of Discrimination filed in this cause by Petitioner, Kelly McKean. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Haverty's is a corporation that employs many more than 15 employees in many stores. Haverty's sells furniture. The store in which the allegations of this complaint arose is located at 1175 Eglin Parkway in Shalimar, Florida. Unless noted elsewhere, when Haverty's is mentioned, the reference is to the Shalimar store. Ms. Jester is a woman who resides in Niceville, Florida. She obtained a job at Haverty's and began working there as a sales associate on June 16, 2003. She was hired by Gary Hodge, who was the store manager. She was a sales associate during the entire time that she was employed by Haverty's. A sales associate works on a straight commission and the commission is not paid until the furniture is delivered. A sales associate, after the first three months on the job, is required to sell at least $40,000 in product each month. There are generally ten to fifteen sales associates on the floor at any given time. The environment is highly competitive. There is a computer numbering system in place, called the "up" system, which is used to determine who may approach a customer who walks into the store. If a sales associate initially helps a customer and later the customer is helped by another sales associate, the commission, if a sale is made, is split between the two. During Ms. Jester's time as a sales associate she grossed about $26,000 per year. Ms. Jester noticed shortly after she began her employment that there existed at Haverty's a clique of salespersons, including Michael Herring, Charles McEwen, Buzz Howard, and "Travis." Also in this clique was a woman named "Melanie" and another named "Trudy." This loosely affiliated group was sometimes referred to by Ms. Jester and others, as the "Good Old Boys Club," even though women were members of the group. Members of "Good Old Boys Club" would say unpleasant things to her, would make comments about her, and would sometimes make her feel uncomfortable. Sometimes sexual comments were made about her, and sometimes sexual comments were made about other female employees. On occasion, however, Ms. Jester made sexual comments. The "Good Old Boys Club" falsely accused her of stealing sales on occasion. Sometimes persons in the alleged "Good Old Boys Club" would get her so upset that she would have to leave the floor. Her absence resulted in them making more sales, and thus, more money. If a product is sold at a discount, or if a particular item is given to a person without charge to enhance a sale of other items, the official listed price must be overridden in the store computer by using an override code. A sales associate is not usually provided with the code and if, on a particular occasion, a sales associate is given the override code, it is subsequently changed by management. On one or more occasions Charles McEwen did overrides on his own, and at least twice he entered codes for Ms. Jester. Buzz Howard used an override code once. Managers at the store made exceptions to the override policy. Lee Keiran, who was a sales associate, was also a "keyholder," and he had at all times, the authority to make overrides. However, the manager, Mr. Hodge or Michael Herring, when he was promoted to floor manager, would generally enter override codes. Obtaining someone to enter an override often added additional time to completing a sale, and personally having an override code gave the holder a slight advantage over a sales associate who did not have one. Ms. Jester was never provided with her own override code. She believed, incorrectly, that this was because of her gender. Sales meetings were held at Haverty's every Saturday morning at 8:30 a. m. All sales associates were required to attend. At these meetings the manager reiterated rules and informed employees about new rules. New merchandise would be discussed and products being specially advertised would be discussed. During the time of Ms. Jester's employment, the meetings would usually be conducted by Mr. Hodge, the store manager. On one occasion, in or near the month of January 2005, Mr. Herring conducted the sales meeting. There were twelve or thirteen sales associates at this meeting. Mr. Herring, after addressing other subjects, discussed the rules concerning checking out fabrics. He reiterated the rule that sales persons must "check out" fabric samples prior to allowing customers to depart the store with them. "Checking out" fabric requires a credit card slip signed by the customer. Thereafter, Mr. Herring grasped some fabric and raised it over his head and said to Ms. Jester, "Alma, come get your fabrics." Ms. Jester rose from her chair and walked in front of everyone and took the fabric from his hand. As she walked away he said, "Unacceptable." This was at the conclusion of the meeting. Ms. Jester found this to be humiliating. Ms. Jester placed the fabrics on her desk and went straight to Mr. Hodge to complain. She and Mr. Hodge had a conversation. He inquired as to what she wanted him to do about it. She said she wanted Mr. Herring to apologize and he said, "I'll have him talk to you." Ms. Jester informed Mr. Hodge that she was sick and was going home. Mr. Herring never apologized to her. During the time Ms. Jester worked at Haverty's no men were singled out and criticized at sales meetings. During the aforesaid time, some of the men have allowed customers to take fabrics out of the store without being "checked out" and no evidence was adduced that they were rebuked either privately or publicly. Charles McEwen came to work late on more than one occasion. On one occasion when he reported late, an odor of alcohol could be detected on his person. However, he was not under the influence of alcohol. He was never reprimanded for being late or smelling of alcohol. On Sundays sales associates were required to come to work at 11:30, one-half-hour before opening, to clean, and straighten up the store. Employees would enter the building on Sundays through a side door, which was propped open by a rock. On one occasion Ms. Jester reported to the building five minutes late. The rock had been removed and the door was closed. She beat on the door and eventually someone opened it. Ms. Jester believed that she was locked out purposefully, but the evidence indicates only that someone moved the rock, causing the door to close, which resulted in her inability to enter the building immediately upon arrival. Male sales associates "Trent" and Bob Humphries were often late. Male sales associate "Travis" often left early. None of these men were disciplined for tardiness or for departing early. Ms. Jester complained to Mr. Hodge about male sales associate Michael Herring. She informed him that Michael was a male chauvinist pig. Mr. Hodge agreed and suggested that she get over it. Once Buzz Howard called her a stupid liar on the sales floor in front of three people. Ms. Jester was upset about this. She complained to Mr. Hodge. He suggested to her that Mr. Howard's intent was to get her off the sales floor so she couldn't compete with the other sales associates. He said she should, "Cowboy up." In April 2005, a woman named Ashley Bloomfield walked into the store. Ms. Jester spent an hour and a half showing her bedroom suites. Ms. Bloomfield eventually indicated that she was going to cogitate about the purchase, and departed the store. Before she left Ms. Jester gave her a business card so that she could ask for her when she returned. Customers often spend a lot of time looking at furniture, depart, and subsequently return. These customers are called, "be-backs." Sometimes "be-backs" return, and sometimes they don't. A few days after her visit, Ms. Bloomfield called for Ms. Jester on the telephone. She spoke to sales associate Bob Humphries who told her that Ms. Jester was not present. On Wednesday, April 20, 2005, Ms. Bloomfield returned to Haverty's and was assisted by Buzz Howard. Mr. Howard told her that he would ring up the sale but would credit the sale to Ms. Jester. The transaction was completed, but Ms. Jester was not given any credit for the sale. On a Thursday subsequent to Ms. Bloomfield's visit Ms. Jester entered the side door of the store and observed Buzz Howard at the office with Ms. Bloomfield. The office is the place where customers arrange payment for purchases. Mr. Howard informed Ms. Jester that when Ms. Bloomfield walked in the door she asked for Mr. Humphries, that he, Mr. Howard helped her, and that he, and Mr. Humphries, were going to split the commission. Pursuant to policy, Ms. Jester should have gotten half of the commission and a three-way split is not, she believes, possible. Ms. Jester complained to Mr. Hodge about this. Mr. Hodge explained that Ms. Bloomfield had called when she was absent and Mr. Humphries had spoken with her on the telephone. Mr. Hodge said the commission would be subject to a three-way split. The next day Ms. Bloomfield called Ms. Jester to inquire why Mr. Humphries' name was on the sales slip and not hers. When she learned that Ms. Jester was not going to get credit for the sale, she asked Ms. Jester what to do. Ultimately, Ms. Jester told her she should call "management" in Pensacola and gave her the number for "management." Specifically, she referred her to Hunter Wrisley or Zack Mattson. Ms. Bloomfield did call "management" and spoke to Zack Mattson who in turn called Ms. Jester. Mr. Mattson told Ms. Jester, "Don't do anything about this. I will get back to you." Although Ms. Bloomfield testified that Mr. Mattson intimated that Ms. Jester would get all of the commission if she was working solely with Ms. Bloomfield, this did not occur. When Ms. Bloomfield learned that Ms. Jester did not get all of the commission, she announced that she would return to the store, return the merchandise previously purchased, and then would re-purchase it from Ms. Jester. Ms. Jester called Mr. Mattson and left a message on his voicemail informing him of Ms. Bloomfield's plan of action. He did not respond to her immediately. Ms. Bloomfield returned to the store and the office manager, "Michelle," with the assistance of Ms. Jester, deleted the previous sale, and thereafter modified the transaction to reflect Ms. Jester as the seller. Mr. Mattson determined that this event ran afoul of his instruction to, "Don't do anything about this. I will get back to you." Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hodge called Ms. Jester to his office. Mr. Mattson was on the speaker phone. Mr. Mattson announced that she had deliberately disobeyed a direct order. After Mr. Mattson terminated his participation in the conversation, Ms. Jester told Mr. Hodge that she was too upset to continue working that day and that she must go home. Thereafter, she departed the premises. The next day Mr. Hodge directed that Ms. Jester report to his office and she did as requested. Mr. Hodge, in the presence of Lee Keiran, required her to sign a disciplinary form which recited that she had been insubordinate and had discussed commissions with a customer, an activity which is against Haverty's policy. The form further informed that she was suspended with no pay for three days. She signed the form and went home. When Ms. Jester returned to work she asked Mr. Hodge if she could have leave so that she could go on vacation. He denied her request. She submitted a letter of resignation to Mr. Hodge on May 20, 2005. The letter stated that she had put up with being mistreated by the "Good Old Boys Club" for the last time. However, this is not found to be a constructive termination. She gave two weeks notice but Haverty's discharged her on May 22, 2005, in accordance with their policy on notice of termination. Ms. Jester also sent a letter of resignation to a Mr. Smith of Haverty's corporate office in Atlanta. The corporate office did not respond. Haverty's employee Charles McEwen once told a customer named Schneider to ask for Ms. Whalls when she returned on a Wednesday after a Tuesday visit because he would not be working on the proposed return date. He asked Ms. Whalls for her business card to give to Ms. Schneider so that she would be sure and remember to ask for Ms. Whalls. There was some minimal discussion of commission splits at this time. However, this discussion did not result in any further involvement by the customer in the commission structure. Although evidence was adduced indicating that some of the sales associates engaged in underhanded methods designed to deprive their fellow workers of commissions, and that some had their own override codes, and others had tardiness excused, there was no evidence that any other sales associate at Haverty's involved a customer in a dispute over commissions. Although during the time of Ms. Jester's employment no one other than Ms. Jester was rebuked in front of the sales associates, being rebuked is not the type of employment practice that can be an adverse employment action. The facts in this case demonstrate that being a sales associate at Haverty's is extremely competitive. Because of the highly competitive, straight commission sales environment, employees engaged in activities designed to subvert the efforts of their fellow employees to earn commissions. Sales associates often made crude and inappropriate remarks that were upsetting to those who were the targets, in an effort to reduce competition. Ms. Jester's supervisors tolerated this behavior. Undoubtedly, a tough environment existed at Haverty's, but this should not be confused with discrimination. The sometimes unfortunate and mean employment practices permitted at Haverty's were not grounded in gender discrimination or some other prohibited basis. There is no evidence in the record that any employee of Haverty's received favorable treatment, or unfavorable treatment, because of their gender. After Ms. Jester's employment at Haverty's came to an end, she made an unsuccessful attempt to go into business for herself. For about eight months subsequent to her departure from Haverty's she was absolutely unemployed. She received unemployment compensation in the amount of $257.00 per week for four months after her departure from Haverty's. Then she went to work for the Shoe Salon for $9.50 per-hour for three weeks. Ms. Jester did not indicate how many hours per-week she worked at the Shoe Salon. Thereafter she found employment with Massey Wholesale about three months before the hearing, and at the time of the hearing she was still employed there. Her wages at Massey Wholesale compare closely to what she was receiving when working for Haverty's. Massey Wholesale will soon pay for her health insurance. She paid $387.00 per month for health insurance pursuant to COBRA for a period of three months subsequent to leaving Haverty's then secured a policy for which she pays a premium of $250.00 per month.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition of Alma W. Jester. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 W. Douglas Hall, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 John W. Wesley, Esquire Wesley, McGrail and Wesley 88 Northeast Eglin Parkway Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32548 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
