The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner's application for a medical license by endorsement should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The Findings of the Facts of tbe Recommended Order are adopted by the Board of Medicine as being based on competent substantial evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered certifying petitioner's application to the Department of Professional Regulation, for licensure by endorsement with, should the Board be persuaded that such is appropriate, placement of petitioner on probation for such term and subject to such conditions as the Board may reasonably specify. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of April 1991. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April 1991.
Findings Of Fact As of the end of July, 1983, Petitioner had completed all the course work required for her master's degree in counseling psychology at Wheaton College. She had not, however, taken and passed a mandatory test in the New Testament required by the college of all degree candidates prior to award of the degree earned. This test in no way concerned any academic matters relating to her specialty but was strictly limited to a knowledge of the New Testament. At the time, Petitioner had satisfactorily completed all the academic courses relating to her specialty. Because of her failure to take and pass this test, however, she was not awarded her degree at that time. Petitioner took the required test in October, 1987 and was found to have passed it and to have met all requirements for her master's degree on February 8, 1988. However, because Wheaton College does not date or award degrees until the next regularly scheduled commencement exercise, she was not actually awarded the master's degree until May 12, 1988. Transcripts of course work completed indicate Petitioner has completed more than 21 hours of graduate work with course content in human development theory and personality thereof, psychotherapy, and abnormal psych-personality courses. However, she did not offer any official course outlines, course descriptions, or course syllabi or any testimony, outside her own, to indicate that her course work meets the requirements of the statute and the Board's rule indicating the necessary course work. Petitioner has worked under the supervision of Dr. Vinod K. Bahtnagar, a Board certified psychiatrist, since June 1, 1987. Dr. Bahtnagar's credentials meet the requirement set forth in the statute and rules. The degree of supervision is also acceptable. Upon completion of her course work at Wheaton College, Petitioner interned at the Manatee Mental Health Center and then worked as a counselor there for two years. From there she went to Sarasota Palms hospital for several years where she worked under Dr. Bahtnagar's supervision and since 1987, she has worked directly for the Doctor. In each of her working years, she worked more than 1500 hours of which at least 750 was face to face dealings with clients.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure as a mental health counselor by examination be denied. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of March, 1989 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-5247 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER Accepted and incorporated herein.* Accepted and incorporated herein.* Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the evidence. Rejected as not established. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. *This does not concede Petitioner's course work meets the statute or rule requirements. FOR THE RESPONDENT Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Moore, Esquire Kanetsky, Moore & DeBoer, P. A. P.O. Box 1767 227 Nokomis Avenue South Venice, Florida 34285 David M. Maloney, Esquire Asst. Attorney General Suite 1603, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kenneth A. Easley, Esquire General Counsel DPR 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Linda Biederman Executive Director Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact At all times material to these proceedings, Petitioner received his salary from two sources: the University of South Florida College of Medicine and the James A. Haley Veterans Administration Medical Center (Haley V.A.). As a special condition of his employment with the University, Petitioner also received a salary supplement which was derived through the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan. In consideration for the supplement, Petitioner agreed to assign all rights to fees or other compensation for medical services rendered by him during his employment term to the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan (Practice Plan). In spite of the wording of the employment contract with the University, Petitioner has never been expected to assign his salary from his position at the Haley V.A. to the Practice Plan. V.A. salary is excluded from the assignment process because of the relationship between the Haley V.A. and the University. The Haley V.A. is an institution that operates as a "Dean's Hospital". Essentially, this designation means that a V.A. Hospital and a College of Medicine in the same locale operate under a personnel and resource sharing policy. For example, if a surgeon is needed by both the Haley V.A. and the University, the two institutions will share in his or her appointment. The individual's salary is paid proportionately by each institution based upon their respective need for his or her services in a forty hour work week. The time is broken down into segments measured by eighths (8ths) known as full time equivalents (FTEs). A forty hour work week consists of 8/8 FTEs. The dual appointments of a physician under the sharing agreement customarily occur in the following manner: An advisory board known as the "Dean's Committee" at the College of Medicine recommends the dual appointment to the V.A. Hospital. The Professional Standards Board at the hospital evaluates the applicant after he or she has completed a separate application for employment with the Veterans Administration. Once a recommendation for appointment and salary level from the Professional Standards Board is received by the Medical Center Director, the applicant is either granted or denied the V.A. appointment. If an appointment occurs, the University then enters into an employment contract for the remaining FTEs with the physician. Although the two institutions work together and have parallel staffing in many of their Departments, each institution is responsible for hiring and managing its own employees. This autonomy is required because the institutions have different missions. The Petitioner accepted dual appointments to the University's College of Medicine and the Haley V.A. in 1979. His original appointments were for 5/8 FTEs as Staff Surgeon in Peripheral Vascular Surgery at the Haley V.A. and 3/8 FTEs as an Associate Professor of Surgery at the University. Petitioner's employment at the Haley V.A. began on June 1, 1979. His employment at the University began on September 1, 1979. Petitioner's clinical competence, research and development accomplishments, surgical skills and teaching abilities are unassailable in both institutions. The attempted attacks on these talents during hearing were ineffective. When Petitioner assumed his responsibilities at both institutions, he eventually became head of the vascular surgery program at the Haley V.A. and Director of the Division of Vascular Surgery with the College of Medicine, a parallel position. Although Petitioner's services were originally allocated as 5/8 FTEs to the Haley V.A., both institutions knew his career goals were always focused upon his teaching position at the University and his administrative responsibilities there as Director of the Division of Vascular Surgery. During his early years at both institutions, Petitioner's responsibilities at each facility grew and became more demanding. Petitioner naturally focused on his primary career goals at the University and delegated many of his V.A. responsibilities to extremely competent physicians under his direction. In 1986, the Chief of Surgery at the Haley V.A. took steps to enforce the required tours of duty for academic doctors with V.A. appointments. Audits at another Dean's Hospital had revealed that the academic staff there had been lax in fulfilling the time requirements demanded by their individual employment contracts. This administrator did not want a similar occurrence at his hospital. On November 16, 1986, the Chief of Surgery asked the V.A. doctors he supervised to sign an affirmation of intent to work the amount of hours required by their individual appointments. Petitioner signed the affirmation and acknowledged that he would work 50 hours at the Haley V.A. during every two week time period, in accordance with his 5/8 FTEs V.A. appointment. Petitioner was unable to meet these hourly requirements during the biweekly time allocations. He voluntarily reduced his V.A. appointment from 5/8 to 4/8 FTEs, effective May 8, 1988. After his V.A. appointment reduction, Petitioner was still unable to meet the biweekly time requirement of 40 hours at the Haley V.A. Administrators at the V.A. wanted him to be physically present in the hospital during the time he spent on V.A. matters. Petitioner believed he was unable to comply with this requirement because of his obligations at the University. As Director of Vascular Surgery, he was responsible for the vascular surgery portion of the Residency Program at the Bay Pines V.A. Hospital in St. Petersburg and the Tampa General Hospital in downtown Tampa. On June 15, 1988, the Acting Director of the Haley V.A. corresponded with the Chairman of the Department of Surgery at the University. The Chairman at the University was notified by letter that a decision had been made to terminate Petitioner's V.A. appointment. The anticipated termination date was July 16, 1988. A discussion with the Chairman regarding this matter was requested by the Acting Director at the V.A. The Chairman replied to this letter on June 28, 1988. He advised the Acting Director that he had placed the matter on the Surgery Mini-Dean's Committee meeting scheduled for July. Petitioner did not receive copies of the correspondence between the Acting Director at Haley V.A. and the Chairman of the Department of Surgery at the University. Petitioner was not aware of the discussions between the University and the V.A. regarding the further reduction of his FTEs at Haley V.A. On August 23, 1988, Petitioner was advised in writing that his salary for the 1988/89 academic year had been budgeted at $145,000.00. This figure included his salary from the Haley V.A., the State of Florida and other funds within the USF Department of Surgery which were derived through the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan. He was also approved to receive a salary supplement of $30,000.00 should his productivity and funds in the Division of Vascular Surgery allow for this additional amount. These additional funds would have come from profits made within the Division and assigned to College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan, according to the usual operating procedure. On August 24, 1988, Petitioner was offered his tenured 3/8 FTEs at the University. The length of the appointment was from August 8, 1988 to August 7, 1989. His salary from the Florida Legislature funding lines was scheduled as $23,801.00. As a special condition of employment, he was advised that his salary may be supplemented with funds derived through the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan, in consideration of his agreement not to engage in patient case activities other than as a faculty member. Petitioner accepted the contract on September 1, 1988. On September 27, 1988, Petitioner was advised by the Chairman of the Department of Surgery at the University that the Haley V.A. wanted to make changes in his appointment at that institution. On November 21, 1988, the Chief of Staff at the Haley V.A., the Dean of the College of Medicine and the Chairman of the Department of Surgery had a meeting regarding Petitioner's 4/8 FTEs at Haley V.A. Petitioner was not aware of the meeting nor was he invited to attend. The chief of staff at the V.A. advised the University that he was going to ask Petitioner to resign 3/8 of his remaining FTEs at the V.A. effective December 4, 1988. If he had failed to agree, the action would be taken administratively. The Dean told the Chairman of the Department of Surgery that he would approve supplementing Petitioner's total salary from funds received through the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan. The Dean and the Chairman agreed to restore Petitioner to the salary level he would have received that academic year if he had not had 3/8 FTEs from the Haley V.A. removed from his compensation. Although a letter was sent to Petitioner requesting resignation of a portion of his FTEs, he did not resign his 3/8 FTEs on December 4, 1988. On December 5, 1988, his V.A. appointment was converted to an intermittent appointment of 1/8 FTE by the Director of the Haley V.A. The Dean of the College of Medicine authorized a salary adjustment for Petitioner at the University. Petitioner was to be paid a salary equaling the level of salary he had expected for the year prior to the V.A. action. This additional salary compensation was derived through the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan. During the 1988/89 academic year, Petitioner was allocated the same total amount of compensation from all sources after his V.A. FTEs were reduced because of the approved increase in his compensation from the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan. Petitioner filed a grievance against the University for the reduction of his V.A. FTEs on February 3, 1989. The grievance filed with the University has no basis in law or fact because the Haley V.A. has the right to reduce the FTEs of its own employees. When one of the parties to the "Dean's Hospital" personnel sharing policy decides it does not want to continue to assign a certain number of FTEs to an employee, the other institution does not have a concomitant responsibility to provide that employee with a forty hour work week. The shared employee has two separate employment contracts. Petitioner has been continuously aware that his employment at the Haley V.A. was separate from his employment at the University. In his Memorandum to the Chairman of the Department of Surgery dated October 3, 1988, he wrote: ". . . that any decision regarding changing (sic) in my appointment status with the V.A. is entirely their responsibility." After the Haley V.A. reduced Petitioner's appointment to an intermittent 1/8 FTE, he was required by the Chairman of the Department of Surgery to cooperate with the Haley V.A. in the establishment of its vascular lab. He was also instructed to assist in the assignment of shared lab technicians under the "Dean's Hospital" sharing agreement. These two tasks were part of his duties as Director of the Division of Vascular Surgery. A meeting between Petitioner, the Department Chairman and administrators from the Haley V.A. on February 1, 1989, did not bring about a resolution of the conflicts between Petitioner and the V.A. regarding the hospital's creation of its own vascular lab. The Chief of Staff at the Haley V.A. wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Department of Surgery and made a proposal regarding the proposed sharing agreement on the vascular lab directly to him. This letter was received by the Department of Surgery on February 14, 1989. On March 1, 1989, the Chairman of the Department of Surgery had a meeting with Petitioner. By way of memorandum dated March 1, 1989, Petitioner was directed by the Chairman to pursue activity that would lead to a resolution of the problems between his Division and the Haley V.A. In particular, Petitioner was directed to assist in the establishment of a vascular laboratory at that facility. He was given four weeks to demonstrate he was complying with these directives. He was also advised that if the Chairman did not have evidence that these directives were being followed, he would ask Petitioner to step down as the Director of the Division of Vascular Surgery. On April 27, 1989, Petitioner was informed by the Chairman of the Department of Surgery that he was being removed as Director of the Division effective May 1, 1989. The reason given for his removal was that the Chairman had not detected any significant resolution of the problems cited in the memorandum. On May 1, 1989, the Chairman took over the administrative duties of the Division. The Chairman of the Department of Surgery had the authority and discretion to remove Petitioner as Division Director. Petitioner filed his second grievance on May 18, 1989, to challenge his removal as Division Director. This grievance urges that his removal as Director was an improper action based upon the following: 1) His removal was an act of retaliation in response to his filing the earlier grievance; 2) The Chairman of the Department of Surgery was incorrect in his determination that Petitioner had not attempted to resolve his differences with the Haley V.A.; and 3) The action was unconstitutional in that it interfered with his academic freedom and freedom of speech. Petitioner's removal was not related to the filing of the first grievance. There was no evidence presented at hearing to demonstrate that Petitioner took affirmative steps to resolve the conflict with the Haley V.A. about the V.A. vascular lab after he was directed to do so by the Department Chairman. Petitioner's academic freedom and freedom of speech were not violated by the Chairman's directives issued to Petitioner in his role as an administrator. The directives were given because the Division of Vascular Surgery was not fulfilling its obligations under the sharing agreement between the two institutions. When the directives were given, the Chairman advised Petitioner that his faculty position would not be affected by his response or lack of response to these administrative directives. The controversy with the Haley V.A. about the creation of its own vascular lab was the only problem Petitioner was directed to cure to maintain his position as Director. Based upon that representation from the Chairman, the allegations about other misdeeds or misconduct are rejected as matters which are irrelevant and immaterial. Petitioner did not have contract, tenure or traditional academic rights in the administrative appointment as Director of the Division of Vascular Surgery. Division Directors within the Department of Surgery serve at the will of the Chairman. A reasonable explanation was presented for Petitioner's removal from his administrative position. There was just cause for the Chairman's action. Petitioner's perception that his removal from the directorship was a disciplinary action is without merit. It was an administrative decision predicated upon the University's need to comply with the sharing agreement. One of the main reasons Petitioner objected to the establishment of a vascular lab at the Haley V.A. was that the lab would compete with the University lab and reduce its income. This, in turn, would affect the budget of the Division of Vascular Surgery and the contributions it would be able to make to the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan. All of the money previously received in Petitioner's Division from the vascular lab work done on behalf of the Haley V.A. would remain in house. As a result, the salary supplements received by Petitioner through the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan, would decrease in amount. Petitioner actually received $145,000.00 in salary from the state funding line and the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan during the 1988/89 academic year. In negotiations regarding Petitioner's annual salary for the 1989/90 academic year, the Chairman of the Department of Surgery agreed to pay him a salary of $145,000.00. These funds were to be provided through state funds at 3/8 FTEs and funds derived from the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan. The Chairman had the discretion to disburse the Faculty Practice Plan funds in this manner. Petitioner relied upon the representation that he would receive $145,000.00 as his salary when he began the 1989/90 academic year at the University on August 9, 1989. A written employment contract for the 1989/90 academic year was not placed into evidence. In order to receive a salary of $145,000.00, Petitioner's state salary had to be supplemented monthly with $9,326.33 in Faculty Practice Plan funds. This occurred during the first quarter of the academic year. On September 22, 1989, the Chairman sent a written memorandum to Petitioner which advised him that an adjustment was being made to reduce the amount of money he received from the Faculty Practice Plan by $1,893.33 per month for the remaining three quarters of the 1989/90 academic year. This would amount to a salary reduction of $17,039.97. As his reason for the reduction, the Chairman cited the financial condition of the Division of Vascular Surgery and Petitioner's removal as Director. A third grievance was filed by Petitioner after he received the memorandum about his salary reduction. The Petitioner has continuously predicted that the Division's financial condition would suffer as a result of the loss of two vascular surgeons and the loss of the profits from V.A. vascular lab business that was formerly conducted at the University lab. Ordinarily, the Chairman has the discretion to adjust monthly salary supplements derived through the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan based upon the financial condition of a Division and its contributions to the Plan. This occurs because salary supplements are given to the medical faculty if they have contributed to the Practice Plan and the money is available. In this case, however, the Chairman had earmarked salary funds for Petitioner through the Plan. These funds were not a supplement, they were part of Petitioner's total salary compensation from the University. The College of Medicine chose to compensate Petitioner in this manner instead of using 8/8 FTEs provided by the State Legislature. The University has the right to decide how Petitioner's employment at the institution is funded. Petitioner is entitled to an additional $17,039.97 in salary compensation derived through the College of Medicine Faculty Practice Plan for the 1989/90 academic year.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: The first grievance should be dismissed as the University lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Chairman's decision to remove Petitioner as Director of the Division of Vascular Surgery in the second grievance should be upheld. Petitioner does not have a protected property interest in the position. Petitioner should be awarded $17,039.97 in salary pursuant to his employment contract with the University during the 1989/90 academic year. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of November, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact in his suggested Recommended Order are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #6. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #1-#2. Rejected. Insufficient evidence. See HO #52. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #29-#33. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted for the academic year 1989/90. See HO #49-#58. Rejected. Contrary to the evidence. See Conclusions of Law. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #39 and #46. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #32-#33, #39 and #40. Rejected. Contrary to fact and law. See HO #43-#44. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #40. 15. Accepted 1988/89 and 1989/90. See HO #48 and #58. 16. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See Conclusions of law. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Current employment status beyond the scope of this hearing. Otherwise, accepted. See HO #6. Generally accepted. See HO #3-#5. Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #49-#50. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #22, #25 and #45. Accepted. See HO #20. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted as to Division Directors. The rest is irrelevant. See HO #35. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #40. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Rejected. Self serving and irrelevant. Petitioner was not required to defend against such allegations in this proceeding. See HO #7. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Petitioner was not required to defend against such allegations in this proceeding. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. See HO #14. Rejected. Hearsay. Irrelevant. See HO #5. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #23. Accepted. See HO #23. Accepted. Rejected. Immaterial. See HO #7 and #14. Rejected. Improper conclusion. Petitioner was not required to defend against such allegations in these proceedings. Accepted that Petitioner's V.A. FTE reduction was a V.A. decision. Accepted. See HO #5. Rejected. Irrelevant. See HO #22 and #24. Rejected. Irrelevant. See HO #22 and #24. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #22 and #24. Accepted. See HO #25. Accepted. See HO #47. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #47. Accepted. See HO #47. Rejected as to causation. Not sufficiently established at hearing. Accepted. See HO #30. Accepted. See HO #32. Accepted. See HO #35 and #40. Rejected. Immaterial. See HO #7 and #42. Accepted. See HO #33 and #39. Rejected. Not established at hearing. See HO #7 and #42. Accepted. See HO #25. Rejected. Speculative. Rejected. Irrelevant. See HO #42. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #49-#58. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #49-#58. Rejected. Immaterial. See HO #42, #55-#56. Rejected. Immaterial. See HO #7 and HO #42. Accepted. See Conclusions of Law. Accepted. See HO #26. Accepted. See HO #36. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #55. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeremy E. Gluckman, Esquire Gluckman & Newman, P.A. 100 Twiggs Street, Suite 220 Tampa, FL 33602 William M. Blackshear, Jr., Department of Surgery, MDC, Box 16 12901 North 30th Street Tampa, FL 33612 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire Robin E. Greiwe, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Tampa, FL 33601 Joline Micelli-Mullen, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 E. Fowler Avenue Tampa, FL 33620 Bryan Burgess, General Counsel University of South Florida ADM Building 250 4202 Fowler Avenue Tampa, FL 33620-6250 Jeannette Abin Marcus, Clerk Univeristy of South Florida Administration, Room 250 Tampa, FL 33620-6250 Francis T. Borkowski, President University of South Florida Administration, Room 250 Tampa, FL 33620-6250 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Board of Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine and respiratory care. Respondent is, and has been at times material hereto, a licensed respiratory care practitioner in Florida, having been issued license number TT 0002632. As a condition of renewal of her certificate/ registration to practice respiratory care, Petitioner requires licensed registrants, as Respondent, to periodically demonstrate their professional competency by completing at least twenty-four (24) hours of continuing education every two (2) years, of which at least three (3) hours shall concern Human Immune Deficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The criteria for and content of the continuing education courses are required to be approved by the Board prior to a registrant obtaining credit for such courses. To be accepted, Petitioner requires the registrant to demonstrate, inter alia, that the course was either presented by a live faculty or it was approved by the Board's Advisory Council. As part of her effort to renew her certificate, on or about December 16, 1988, Respondent signed the following statement which was thereafter submitted as part of her renewal request to practice respiratory care: I hereby affirm that I have earned the CONTINUING EDUCATION UNIT hours required by the DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION to renew my license. I understand within the next two years I maybe required to submit a listing of my courses along with proof of completion if my license number is selected for audit. I also understand that it is my responsibility to maintain for a review by the DEPARTMENT, all CONTINUING EDUCATION DOCUMENTATION referenced herein. I affirm that these statements are true and correct and recognize that providing false information may result in a fine, suspension, or revocation of my license as provided in F.S. 455.2275, F.S. 775.082, or F.S. 775.084. The above statement was required to be completed by Respondent as part of her renewal process for the licensing period from January 1, 1987 through December 31, 1988. Petitioner relied on Respondent's affirmation that she completed the required courses when her renewal application was considered. Without executing that statement, Respondent could not have renewed her license to practice respiratory care in Florida. Respondent successfully renewed her license application to practice respiratory care in Florida, which renewal was, in part, based on Respondent's execution of the above-referenced statement regarding completion of the required continuing education credits. Subsequently, Respondent was the subject of a random audit by Petitioner to verify her continuing education credits for the period in question. On or about June 26, 1990, Respondent submitted verification for twenty-four (24) hours of continuing education. However, four (4) of the courses submitted by Respondent were self-study courses given by videotape, were not approved by the Board, and did not qualify for the required continuing education. The courses that Respondent took through the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in Gainesville did not have a provider number from either the AMA, AARC, RJRCTE, nor any other approval body or accredited association. The Advisory Council for Respiratory Therapy never indicated or agreed to accept or use HRS hours for continued education units from Respondent which were not approved. Eight (8) of the hours submitted by Respondent for satisfaction of the continuing educational requirement, in addition to the HRS hours, do not have an appropriate certified provider number. Respondent did not maintain or provide to Petitioner the required documentation for the Board's random audit to verify that she successfully completed the continuing education requirements for the biennium in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: (1) Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00) payable to the Board of Medicine within thirty (30) days of entry of its Final Order, (2) Petitioner impose a requirement in such Final Order that Respondent demonstrate compliance with two (2) future bienniums with additional continuing education requirements in each biennium, and (3) Petitioner issue a written reprimand to Respondent. 1/ DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of September, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 1991.
Findings Of Fact In February, 1984 Petitioner applied to Respondent for licensure by examination under Section 458.311(2), F.S., but after review of said application at a meeting held on June 10, 1984, Respondent issued an Order dated July 21, 1984 denying said application. Petitioner received a degree which is designated Doctor of Medicine on May 2, 1983 from the Universidad Techologica de Santiago, (UTESA), Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. He has been in residency at Orlando Regional Medical Center since June 28, 1983. Various required clerkships were performed by Petitioner between August 2, 1982 and February 28, 1983 in hematology, obstetrics and gynecology, pediatrics, dermatology and ENT/0phth., and were performed completely, or partially at osteopathic hospitals, or under the supervision of osteopathic physicians. An additional one month elective clerkship was also performed in April 1983 at Southeastern College of Osteopathy. Petitioner passed the exam given by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) on March 15, 1983, but has not been certified due to the need for additional institutional verification. Respondent informed Petitioner of the decision of ECFMG to withhold verification of certification and also informed Petitioner of its duty to approve or deny an application for licensure within ninety (90) days, unless waived by the applicant. Petitioner declined to consent to a waiver and requested Respondent to act on his application without verification of an ECFMG certificate.
The Issue Whether Michael Lindskog (Respondent) should be terminated from his employment with the School District of Seminole County, Florida (School District).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a duly-constituted entity charged with the responsibility and authority to operate, control, and supervise the public schools within the Seminole County Public School District. As such, it has the authority to regulate all personnel matters for the School District. See § 1001.32, Fla. Stat. (2009).1 Bill Vogel (Vogel) is the superintendent of the public schools for the School District. Vogel has the authority to recommend suspension and/or termination of employees for alleged misconduct. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent was an employee of the Board. Respondent held a professional service contract for the 2009-2010 school year as a math teacher at Sanford Middle School. Respondent also coached the boys’ volleyball team. At all times material to this case, the principal at Sanford Middle School was Mark Russi (Russi). With the exception of the matters alleged in this case, Russi found Respondent to be a satisfactory teacher and coach. Prior to the incident described in this case, Respondent had no previous disciplinary infractions and enjoyed a “clean record” with the School District. As of the date of hearing, Respondent was certified to teach mathematics by the Florida Department of Education. There is no indication that the Florida Education Practices Commission has ever disciplined Respondent regarding any educator’s deficiency. On December 29, 2009, Respondent was arrested by Officer Kelly Stead (Stead) in the City of Tampa, Florida, for the offenses of: possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), and refusal to submit to the DUI test. When Respondent returned to Sanford Middle School after the holiday break, he immediately sought out Russi and reported the arrest incident, and the charges that had been levied against him. In turn, Russi reported the allegations to the Board’s Human Resources Professional Practices head, John Reichert (Reichert). The notifications (Respondent to Russi, Russi to Reichert) were done in accordance with Board policy. Respondent appropriately self-reported the incident. To follow-up on the report, Reichert went into fact- finding mode and contacted the police in Tampa, Florida, to get a copy of the pertinent police documents. Reichert wanted to confirm that the information given to the School District was accurate and that any decision the Board might consider would be supported by a record. Subsequently, Reichert drafted a letter, that was signed by Vogel, dated January 8, 2010. Reichert then provided the letter (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1) to Russi on January 11, 2010. On the same day, Russi called Respondent to the office, provided the letter to him, and directed that he sign the second page acknowledging receipt of the letter. In summary, the letter provided that Vogel would recommend to the Board that Respondent be suspended with a further recommendation of termination of Respondent’s employment with the School District. Additionally, the letter gave Respondent a point of entry to challenge the Board’s decision through the administrative process. Respondent timely elected to challenge the Board’s decision to suspend him without pay and terminate his employment. Concurrently, the criminal proceedings against Respondent were in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, Florida. By Information, Case No. 2009-CF-021466, the state attorney charged Respondent with possession of cocaine in violation of Subsection 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes; driving under the influence in violation of Subsection 316.193(1), Florida Statutes; and refusal to submit to testing in violation of Subsection 316.1939(1), Florida Statutes. Subsequently, Respondent entered a plea to the second and third charges and was adjudicated guilty. Respondent executed a Drug Court Agreement that allowed him admission to the Pre-trial Intervention Drug Court Program. The program requires Respondent to participate as directed for a period of 18 months. If Respondent successfully completes the program, as determined by the state attorney, the charge of possession of cocaine will be dismissed. Based upon the date the agreement was executed, the time for such completion will not end until approximately September 2011. Respondent considers himself to be a good teacher and does not believe this type of incident will happen again. Respondent maintains he attends NA and AA classes regularly and has a sponsor helping work toward recovery. Other than the charges described above, Respondent has never had criminal charges filed against him. Respondent took responsibility for the incident complained of, admitted to having cocaine in his pocket, and has complied with all directives of the court with regard to drug testing, counseling, community service, payment of fees associated with the Drug Agreement, and attendance at meetings as ordered. Respondent fully cooperated in reporting the incident and completing work assignments before leaving school. Respondent enjoyed success, as a teacher, at Sanford Middle School. Nevertheless, Russi, Reichert, and Vogel expressed grave concerns regarding allowing Respondent back into the classroom. Russi does not have confidence that Respondent can exercise the judgment necessary to deal with the rigors of teaching inside and outside of the classroom. Additionally, Reichert opined that Respondent failed to maintain the high standard of ethical and professional conduct expected by Petitioner. Essentially, Petitioner is not in a position to trust Respondent given its profound disappointment at the lack of judgment Respondent displayed. Reichert has recommended termination for other Board employees who have had cases involving cocaine. According to Reichert, no facts in this case warrant a different result. Given the limited time of Respondent’s sobriety (six months as of the date of hearing), Petitioner avers that Respondent’s lack of judgment makes it difficult to justify putting Respondent back into the classroom. Entrusting the education and well-being of students to someone who has lost effectiveness as a teacher (per Vogel) is not appropriate in this case. Vogel maintains that Respondent cannot serve as a role model when he has demonstrated such poor judgment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Seminole County School Board enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment with the School District. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2010.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to sit for the examination for licensure as a physician assistant.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an applicant to sit for the examination for licensure as a physician assistant in Florida. Petitioner relies on the provisions of Section 458.347(7)(b), Florida Statutes, which provide, in pertinent part, as follows: 1. . . . [T]he department shall examine each applicant who the board certifies: Has completed the application form ... Is an unlicensed physician who graduated from a foreign medical school listed with the World Health Organization ... Has applied for certification as a physician assistant in this state between July 1, 1990, and June 30, 1991. Was a resident of this state on July 1, 1990. . . Petitioner's application to sit for the examination for licensure as a physician assistant was denied by an Order entered by the Board of Medicine on March 12, 1992. The Order cited the following four grounds for the denial: The applicant (Petitioner) does not have a medical degree as required by Sections 458.347(b)1.b. and 458.311(1)(f)3.a., Florida Statutes. The applicant has been unable to provide adequate evidence that he was a resident in Florida on July 1, 1990. The applicant has failed to account for all time and activities on his application from July 1981 - May 1982. The applicant has failed to list all employment activities on his application when compared to the Resume of Qualifications he submitted. Petitioner attended medical school at the Universidad Central del Este (UCE) in the Dominican Republic from 1975 to 1981. Petitioner testified that he completed his assigned curriculum and that he participated in graduation exercises. Petitioner did not receive a diploma or a medical degree from UCE because he owed the university for tuition. In response to an inquiry from Respondent, the Dean of Medicine of UCE provided the following information: ... [W]hile it is true that [Petitioner] completed the curriculum of our School of Medicine, he has other requisites to be completed. Among these is an outstanding debt for registration fees at our University. Until this debt is satisfied he cannot be awarded the degree of Doctor of Medicine, nor can any documents be issued. Petitioner's application and the documentation he initially submitted in support thereof did not establish that Petitioner met the residency requirements of Section 458.347(7)(b)1.d., Florida Statutes. The evidence submitted at the formal hearing established that Petitioner was a resident of the State of Florida on July 1, 1990, and at all other times pertinent to this proceeding since that time. Petitioner, in his application for licensure, failed to set forth his activities between July 1981 and May 1982./1 Petitioner has subsequently provided that information to the Respondent. During that time, Petitioner was unemployed and studying for his medical examinations. Petitioner, in his application for licensure, failed to completely set forth his employment history, including his work as a medical health counselor and as a mental health supervisor. His employment history is required by the application form and should have been included as part of his application package. All information pertinent to his employment has now been provided by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application on the grounds that he is not a graduate of a medical school recognized by the World Health Organization. DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1993.
