The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's assessment of sales tax against Petitioner pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes, should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: By Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings dated October 15, 1990 (the "Assessment"), Respondent, Department of Revenue (Department), determined that taxes imposed under Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes, were due from Petitioner, Jose A. Espino, for the unlawful sale, use, consumption, distribution, manufacture, derivation, production, transportation or storage of a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine. Specifically, the notice provided Petitioner with a "Notice of Assessment of tax, penalty, and interest on the deficiency" as follows: Date of Transaction or Incident (On or About) August 22, 1990 Estimated Retail Price 2 Kilo Cocaine $25,000.00 25% Surcharge [s.212.0505(1)(a), F.S.] $12,500.00 25% Surcharge [s.212.0505(1)(b), F.S.] $ 6,250.00 Penalty of 5% per month, maximum of 25% of Tax and Surcharge Due [s.212.12(2), F.S.] $ 937.50 Additional Penalty of 50% [s.212.12(2), F.S.] $ 0 Interest of 1% per month [s.212.12(3), F.S.], accrues at the rate of $6.16 per day. INTEREST computed thru 9/21/90 $ 49.28 Total Amount Due with this Notice $19,736.78 The factual basis for the Assessment was Petitioner's involvement in the transactions described in Findings of Fact 4-9 below. Petitioner filed a timely Petition to Challenge the Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings. The only basis for the challenge set forth in the Petition was a contention that Petitioner was not engaged in the unlawful transportation of cocaine and that Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes was not applicable under the facts and circumstances of this case. During discovery and at the formal hearing in this case, Petitioner also challenged the estimated retail price used by Respondent in making the calculations set forth in the Assessment. Petitioner has not contested the mathematical accuracy of the Assessment nor has Petitioner contested the form of the Assessment or presented any evidence that the procedures for issuing the Assessment were improper. No evidence was presented that Petitioner has paid the sales tax assessed by Respondent or that the sales tax assessed has been paid by another individual on his behalf. In August of 1990, Petitioner, Jose A. Espino, was the owner of a paint and body shop located at 12524 S.W. 128th Street, Miami, Florida. Petitioner was present at the paint and body shop on August 22, 1990. On this date, he had agreed to meet with an individual who was working as a confidential informant for the Metro-Dade Police Department. Petitioner had previously negotiated with this confidential informant to sell four (4) kilos of cocaine at $30,000 per kilo. On August 22, 1990, Jerry Hull, a senior narcotics detective with the Metro-Dade Police Department, and the confidential informant drove to Petitioner's place of business. Detective Hull was seated on the passenger side of the front seat and observed the Petitioner coming out of the building carrying a maroon utility bag. Petitioner approached the vehicle occupied by Detective Hull and the confidential informant. Detective Hull got out of the vehicle and allowed Petitioner to get into the front seat. Detective Hull got into the back seat and the confidential informant drove the car east on S.W. 128th Street. As the confidential informant drove the vehicle, Detective Hull introduced himself to Petitioner and asked if he "brought the merchandise..." Petitioner stated that he had and inquired if Hull had the money. By his statements, Petitioner acknowledged his readiness to sell the cocaine he brought into the van. After inquiring about the money, Petitioner opened the utility bag he had carried into the van and showed Detective Hull a package. Petitioner gave the package to Hull and opened a cut previously made in the wrapping exposing a white substance inside. Detective Hull asked Petitioner for a sample. Based on his experience, Detective Hull identified the substance in the package as cocaine. Petitioner has, by virtue of the Respondent's Request for Admissions, admitted the substance he was carrying was cocaine. Petitioner told Detective Hull he had two (2) kilograms of cocaine in the bag. The Request for Admissions confirm that Petitioner carried two (2) kilograms of cocaine into the vehicle. Shortly after Petitioner showed Detective Hull the cocaine, a police car pulled up behind the van driven by the confidential informant. The police stopped the van and Petitioner was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine. No evidence was presented as to the disposition of the criminal charges. A copy of the police arrest report was forwarded to the Department of Revenue. As noted above, the Department of Revenue issued the Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings on October 15, 1990. This Assessment was issued based upon the information contained in the Metro-Dade Police arrest report. As set forth above, the Assessment was issued in the amount of $19,736.78. The estimated retail price used by the Department of Revenue in calculating the tax due was $12,500 per kilogram. This estimate of retail price was derived from a price list compiled by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). The price appearing in the FDLE report is based upon average prices for various types of illegal narcotics sold throughout Florida. The FDLE price list used by DOR in preparing the Assessment is segregated by the type of drug and by various regions of the state. The price used in this Assessment was based upon the FDLE report compiled from information available as of June 7, 1989 for the Miami region. This region included Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties and included prices for transactions involving the sale of one (1) kilo or more of cocaine. Thus, the report reflects the economic fact that larger quantity purchases occur at relatively lower prices. The price of cocaine rose sharply between 1989 and 1990. A subsequent update of the FDLE report utilizing information available as of August 1, 1990, revealed prices in the Miami region rose to $22,000 for kilogram size sales of cocaine. Thus, it appears the price used in the Assessment in this case is significantly lower than either the anticipated sales price of the parties ($30,000 per kilo) or the price reported by the FDLE in its later report (August 1, 1990). If anything, the Assessment was based on a conservative estimate of actual retail prices in the Miami area at the time. Petitioner has not provided any persuasive evidence to show the Department of Revenue's estimated price of $12,500 per kilo is inappropriate. Interest on the Assessment continues to accrue at the rate of $6.16 per day since September 28, 1990.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a Final Order in this case concluding that the Petitioner, Jose A. Espino, is liable for taxes, penalties, and interest pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes (1989), and assessing the amount of such liability at $19,736.78, plus interest at the rate of $6.11 per day since September 28, 1990. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of July, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1992. APPENDIX Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 and in the Preliminary Statement. Rejected as constituting legal argument. While the Petition in this case did not challenge the mathematical accuracy of the tax assessment, Petitioner asserted in discovery and at the formal hearing that the estimated retail value utilized by Respondent in making the Assessment was not accurate. This suggestion is rejected. As set forth in Findings of Fact 12 and 13 and Conclusions of Law 12, the estimated retail value utilized by Respondent in this case was reasonable. Rejected as vague and constituting legal argument rather than a Finding of Fact. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12 and 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5 and addressed in Conclusions of Law 10. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in the Preliminary Statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. 12. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. 13. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 14. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. 15. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. COPIES FURNISHED: Vicki Weber, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thomas Herndon, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Angel M. Gonzalez, Esquire 28 W. Flagler Street Suite 806 Miami, Florida 33130 James McAuley Assistant Attorney General Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is liable for payment of sales and use taxes.
Findings Of Fact The Department conducted an audit of the business records of Petitioner, a Florida corporation operating a food catering business, covering the audit period of June 1, 1985 through May 31, 1990. As a result of that audit, the Department determined that Petitioner had failed to collect and remit sales taxes due to the Department and was liable for the payment of those unpaid sales taxes. The Department issued an assessment determining that Petitioner owed the amount of $213,683.87 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalty for the audit period. On October 9, 1992, the Department issued its second revised audit assessment based upon its redetermination of Petitioner's tax liability. On that date, the Department reduced Petitioner's liability to the amount of $147,924.45, which sum includes the unpaid tax, the penalty therefor, and interest through that date. Based on its revised calculations, the Department also determined that interest would accrue at the rate of $27.06 per day until the date of payment. Through the date of the final hearing in this cause, Petitioner has made no payments to satisfy or reduce the amount of assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner liable for the payment of sales tax, penalty, and interest through October 9, 1992, in the amount of $147,924.45 together with the amount of $27.06 interest per day until the date of payment. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 1 and 6-8 have been adopted in substance in this Recommended Order. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-5 and 9-16 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or recitation of the procedural context of this case. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric J. Taylor, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Richard J. Hays, Esquire 7100 West Commercial Boulevard Suite 109 Lauderhill, Florida 33319 Mark D. Cohen, Esquire 121 Southeast First Street Suite 600 Miami, Florida 33131 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Florida with its sole place of business located at 6186 Southwest 8th Street, Miami, Florida. Petitioner operates a delicatessen and restaurant in the same building at the above location. Petitioner's restaurant prepares food to be served to paying customers who consume that food at tables provided in the restaurant for that purpose. This food is served by waiters and waitresses who prepare guest checks which separately indicate the amount of sales tax charged thereon. Petitioner's delicatessen sells unprepared food to customers who do not consume that food on the premises and for whom no eating facilities are provided. The items sold by Petitioner's delicatessen are grocery-type items. A common cash register serves the two facilities, which cash register has a separate key for the sale of delicatessen items and a separate key for the sale of restaurant items. The restaurant and delicatessen occupy the same general space and are not separated by a wall or other physical barrier. Petitioner's Exhibit 4 contains a list of those items sold on the delicatessen or grocery side of Petitioner's business. The accuracy of that list was not challenged in this proceeding and it is found as a matter of fact that those items on Petitioner's Exhibit 4 accurately reflect the items sold by Petitioner across his delicatessen counter. That list includes items such as bread, rolls, bagels, milk, beer, soda, catsup, canned goods and various meats such as salami, bologna, franks, fish and ham. Petitioner collects sales tax for those items sold in the restaurant portion of the business and does not collect sales tax on those items sold in the delicatessen portion of the business. The taxable and nontaxable items are segregated and distinguished on the cash register tapes. Petitioner has so conducted his business from its inception in 1959 through the audit period in question. Throughout that period of time Petitioner regularly maintained separate and distinct records sufficient to allocate sales between taxable restaurant sales and nontaxable delicatessen or grocery sales. Petitioner's tax returns have reflected this behavior for the above period of time. When the business first opened Mr. Leo Hoffman, the owner of Petitioner corporation, contacted the Department of Revenue by telephone and was told that the foregoing method of operation was proper. Petitioner has always filed tax returns reflecting this activity and such returns were apparently not questioned until the audit at issue here. The period of time for which Petitioner was audited in this cause was January 1, 1976, to December 31, 1978. On March 12, 1979, Respondent issued a proposed sales and use tax delinquency assessment against Petitioner in the amount of $40,018.14. This assessment was based on the total sales revenue generated by both of Petitioner's enterprises and did not allocate sales revenue between the delicatessen portion of the business and the restaurant portion of the business. On May 10, 1979, the Respondent issued a revised proposed sales tax delinquency assessment against Petitioner in the amount of $33,259.20. This revised assessment was based on the total sales revenue generated by both of Petitioner's separate enterprises and did not allocate sales revenue between the delicatessen portion of the business and the restaurant portion of the business. Petitioner did pay approximately $12,000 in sales tax for the subject audit period. That was the sales tax Petitioner believed he owed for the restaurant portion of his business. The additional assessment is apparently the sales tax (with penalty and interest) Respondent believes is owed for the delicatessen portion of Petitioner's business. The items sold on the delicatessen side of Petitioner's business represent approximately 75 percent of his gross revenue. The items sold on the restaurant, or taxable side of Petitioner's business, represents approximately 25 percent of his gross revenue. The assessment by Respondent against Petitioner was based, at least in part, upon Rule 12A-1.11(1), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner holds a restaurant license from the State of Florida, Division of Hotels and Restaurants. Petitioner also holds a retail sales license from Dade County for its delicatessen operation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: To the extent that the assessment for unpaid sales tax is based upon sales made by the delicatessen or grocery side of Petitioner's business, such assessment is invalid and should be withdrawn. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June 1980 in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark J. Wolff, Esquire Sparber, Shevin, Rosen, Shapo & Heilbronner, P.A. First Federal Building, 30th Floor One Southeast Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Petitioner ("DEPARTMENT") is entitled to assess sales or use taxes, penalties, and interest against Respondent ("VOLPE") pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as set out in its Notice of Proposed Assessment dated March 20, 1980.
Findings Of Fact During 1975-1977, VOLPE was a general contractor engaged in the construction of a United States Post Office and Vehicle Maintenance Facility at Miami, Florida. In connection with that construction project, VOLPE purchased materials from numerous subcontractors, including Hardware Lighting and Emporium, and Jemco, Inc. (Testimony of Alford, Danca; P.E. 2, 3) On March 8, 1979, after audit of VOLPE's records, the DEPARTMENT proposed to assess VOLPE for delinquent sales and use tax, together with interest and penalties thereon, which it claimed were due from VOLPE's purchase of materials from various subcontractors. The DEPARTMENT's proposed assessment was based on its inability to verify, to its satisfaction, that sales and use tax due from those sales transactions was paid by VOLPE to the vendors, and subsequently remitted to the DEPARTMENT. (Testimony of Alford, P.E. 3.) With the DEPARTMENT's encouragement, VOLPE then wrote its vendors in the various sales transactions requesting proof that the requisite Florida sales or use tax had been remitted to the DEPARTMENT. In response, two vendors, Ohio Medical Products and Power Wash, remitted tax vendors, (collected from VOLPE at time of sale) to the DEPARTMENT, in the amounts of $10,070 and $1,635.50, respectively. In addition, VOLPE discovered that it had not paid the requisite tax to a vendor in one transaction and remitted a payment to the DEPARTMENT in the amount of $1,442.53. (Testimony of Danca, Alford, P.E. 1.) These late tax payments made by Ohio Medical Products, Power Wash, and VOLPE in partial satisfaction of the DEPARTMENT's March 8, 1979, proposed assessment consisted only of the tax due on the individual sales, including interest thereon. No penalty payments were made because Salvatore Danca, VOLPE's comptroller involved in collecting the sales tax from the various vendors, reasonably and in good faith believed that the DEPARTMENT would waive penalties if late tax payments were promptly submitted. Although Louis A. Crocco, the DEPARTMENT's representative, by affidavit denies making such a representation, he admits that the possibility of adjusting the penalties, otherwise due, was discussed with Danca. In the absence of more explicit evidence from the DEPARTMENT concerning those discussions, or attacking the credibility of Danca's testimony, it is determined that, based on discussions with DEPARTMENT representatives, Danca reasonably and in good faith believed penalties would be waived. (Testimony of Danca; P.E. 1, 6, R.E. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.) As a result of partial payments and adjustments made to the DEPARTMENT's proposed sales and use tax assessment, the DEPARTMENT issued a fourth revision of the proposed assessment on March 20, 1980. By that revision, the DEPARTMENT asserts VOLPE, as of March 20, 1980, is liable for payment of tax, interest, and penalties as follows: Sales Transaction Sales And Use Tax Due Interest Penalties (25 Percent) Jemco, Inc., sale of mechanization equipment to VOLPE, per agreement dated December 5, 1975. $16,229.53 $4,047.88 Hardware, Lighting and Emporium, sale of finished hardware and accessories to VOLPE per VOLPE Purchase Order dated October 2, 1975. 1,556.10 389.02 Ohio Medical Products' Power Wash's, and unidenti- fied vendor's sale to VOLPE for which late payments of tax due and interest have been made. -0- 2,737.43 TOTAL: $17,856.10 $5,779.42 $7,174.33 (Testimony of Alford, Danca, 3.) Stipulation of Counsel; P.E. 1, 2, [AS TO JEMCO, INC./VOLPE TRANSACTION] By its standard Agreement dated December 5, 1975, VOLPE agreed to purchase from Jemco, Inc., of Fort Worth, Texas, post office mechanization equipment for the contract price of $347,900. Subsequent change orders resulted in an adjustment to $405,689.70. In order to minimize on-site installation problems, Jemco, Inc., was required to maximize assembly of the mechanization equipment at its out-of-state plant prior to shipping to the Miami job site. (Testimony of Danca; P.E. 2, R.E. 1.) The written sales Agreement, including attachments, between Jemco, Inc., and VOLPE expressly states, in three separate places, that the total contract sales price includes Florida sales tax. The DEPARTMENT admits that VOLPE has paid all monies due Jemco, Inc., under the contract. By virtue of its full payment of the contract price which expressly included sales tax, it must be concluded that VOLPE paid the requisite sales or use tax to Jemco, Inc. (Stipulation of Counsel; P.E. 2.) VOLPE's standard form, entitled "Subcontractor's Application for Payment" was used as a basis to make incremental payments to Jemco, Inc., pursuant to the Agreement. That form required the subcontractor to certify that, among other things, it had complied with state tax laws applicable to performance of the Agreement. (Testimony of Danca; R.E. 11.) VOLPE's actions in connection with the Jemco, Inc., sales transaction were consistent with its standard practice when entering contracts with vendors or subcontractors. That practice is to require that the sales price include the payment of necessary sales tax, the vendor or subcontractor is required to remit the required tax to the appropriate government entity. After performance of the contract, the subcontractor is required to certify that these requirements have been satisfied. The certification is in the form of a General Release which discharges VOLPE from all claims, debts and liabilities which the subcontractor may have against VOLPE because of the contract. In this case, Jemco, Inc., executed such a General Release in favor of VOLPE. (Testimony of Danca; R.E. 1.) The DEPARTMENT has not audited Jemco, Inc.'s records, thus, it does not know whether the tax it seeks to assess against VOLPE has already been remitted by Jemco, Inc. (Testimony of Alford.) The DEPARTMENT offered no affirmative evidence to contravene VOLPE's assertion that it had paid the requisite sales or use tax to Jemco, Inc. Its claim rests solely on the fact that VOLPE's evidence of payment does not contain a sales invoice or other documentation which itemizes, or separately states the amount of sales tax due from VOLPE. [AS TO HARDWARE AND LIGHTING EMPORIUM TRANSACTION] By purchase agreement dated October 2, 1975, VOLPE agreed to purchase finished hardware from Hardware and Lighting Emporium of Miami, Florida, for the contract price of $23,877, which expressly included Florida state sales tax. Each billing invoice issued by Hardware and Lighting Emporium separately itemizes and states the Florida sales tax due. In applying for payment under the agreement, Hardware and Lighting Emporium completed the VOLPE "Subcontractor's Application for Payment" forms certifying compliance with state sales tax laws in performing the agreement. VOLPE has fully satisfied its payment obligations under the purchase agreement. (Testimony of Danca; P.E. 3, R.E. 9, 10.)
Conclusions Conclusions: VOLPE established by a preponderance of evidence that it previously paid to its several vendors the sales and use tax which the DEPARTMENT now seeks. Accordingly, the proposed tax assessment, with penalties and interest thereon, cannot be sustained. Recommendation: That the DEPARTMENT's Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties, and Interest, under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, dated March 20, 1980, be DISMISSED. Background By written notice issued on March 20, 1980, Petitioner ("DEPARTMENT") proposed to assess Respondent ("VOLPE") taxes, penalties, and interest allegedly due pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In response, VOLPE claimed that it had previously paid the tax in question, and requested an opportunity to submit proof at a formal hearing. On April 17, 1980, the DEPARTMENT forwarded VOLPE's request to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and asked that the requested hearing be conducted by a hearing officer. On May 15, 1980, final hearing was set for July 18, 1980. On June 17, 1980, the DEPARTMENT filed a motion to realign the parties. As grounds, it stated that VOLPE had the burden of proof, and the duty to present a prima facie case at hearing since VOLPE requested the hearing and was the party seeking relief. At the DEPARTMENT's request, ruling on its motion was withheld until presentation of arguments at final hearing. At hearing, the DEPARTMENT's motion was denied for the reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law below. In support of its proposed assessment against VOLPE, the DEPARTMENT called Marvin P. Alford, a tax examiner, as its only witness, and offered Petitioner's Exhibits 1/ 1 through 6, inclusive, each of which was received into evidence. VOLPE called Salvatore Danca, its comptroller, and Harold G. Gregory, its branch manager, as its witnesses, and offered Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 11, inclusive, each of which was received. At the conclusion of hearing, the parties were granted the opportunity to submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and memoranda within ten (10) days after filing of the transcript of hearing. The post-hearing submittals were filed by August 21, 1980. Based on the evidence submitted at hearing, the following facts are determined:
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the DEPARTMENT's Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties, and Interest, Under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, dated March 20, 1980, be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of September, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1980.
The Issue The issue posed herein is whether or not the Petitioner remitted to Respondent, pursuant to Chapter 212.05(1), Florida Statutes, the, proper amount of sales tax on the boat "Captain Deebold" which was purchased on November 29, 1976. A related issue, assuming that the proper sales taxes were not remitted by Petitioner, is whether or not a levy of penalty and interest is warranted under the circumstances.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, legal memoranda submitted by the parties and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Petitioner purchased the vessel "Captain Deebold" on November 29, 1976, and alleged that the purchase price of the boat was $20,000.00. Accordingly, Petitioner remitted to the Department sales taxes based on the declared value of $20,000.00. Respondent maintained that the subject boat was purchased for the sum of $75,000.00 and has, therefore, issued an assessment against Petitioner for the additional taxes, penalty and interest. By letter dated November 29, 1978, Respondent's Revenue Investigator, Leslie J. Smithling, advised Petitioner that a routine verification concerning his purchase of the subject boat revealed a transaction amount of $75,000.00 upon which the four percent Florida Sales Tax is $3,000.00. Petitioner was further advised therein that his remittance in the amount of $4,202.00 was due no later than December 15, 1979. Taxes, penalties and interest were calculated as follows: Purchase Price $75,000.00 Tax Rate 4% Tax $ 3,000.00 Minus Tax Paid (Based on $20,000.00) $ 800.00 Tax Due $ 2,200.00 Administrative Penalty (Ch. 212.12[2], F.S.) $ 550.00 Fraud Penalty (Ch. 212.12[2], F.S.) $ 1,100.00 Interest: 1% per month from 8/1/77 to 12/1/77 16% Plus $.72 daily thereafter Total Interest Accrued $ 352.00 Total Tax, Penalties & Interest Due $ 4,202.00 In support of its position that the true purchase price of the boat was only $20,000.00, Petitioner points out that the seller of the boat, Frank Deebold, had neglected the boat and had only made repairs that were absolutely necessary to operate the vessel. Thus, when Petitioner purchased the vessel, numerous repairs were made to make it seaworthy including 1) repaired electrical wiring; 2) sealed the deck seams; 3) reconnected the port fuel tank; 4) repaired the clutch in the port engine; 5) repaired leaks in the starboard stern quarter; 6) replaced and rebolted the chines; 7) replaced a section of the keel; 8) rebuilt the main clutch; 9) caulked deck; 10) replaced or repaired the winch on the anchor; 11) reworked and/or repaired the engine room, including insulation, lighting, lining, painting and hauling. To perform these repairs, Petitioner places the value on materials utilized at approximately $18,000.00. Additionally, Petitioner estimated that the value of his labor involved in making the approximately $25,000.00. The articles of agreement for the purchase of the boat provides in pertinent part as follows: Witnesseth, that if the said party of the second part shall (purchaser) first make the payments and perform the covenants hereinafter mentioned on his part to be made and performed, the said party of the first part (seller) hereby covenants and agrees to convey and assure to the said party of the second part, his heirs, personal represent- atives or assigns, clear of all encumbrances, whatever by a good and sufficient bill of sale the Oil Screw vessel, Captain Deebold, o/n294675, gross tons-36, its equipment, hull, machinery, present insurance policies and business including fifty or more used rods and reels, one 3.5 KW Lister auxiliary generator, used and in need of repair, spare Jabsco water pump (used and in need of repair), spare 24 volt DC alternator, spare 24 volt DC main engine starter, spare stub shaft, three spare propellers (used and in need of repair) and a spare UHF Pierce- Simpson radio transceiver (used and in need of repair) and the said party of the second part hereby covenants and agrees to pay to the said party of the first part the sum of seventy-five thousand and 00/100 ($75,000.00) dollars in the manner following. . . . Nevertheless, Petitioner stressed that inasmuch as the Articles of Agreement provided that the seller only required Petitioner to maintain insurance coverage in the amount of $50,000.00 indicating that the purchase price was something less than $75,000.00 and in fact was no more than $50,000. Pursuant to the Articles of Agreement, the amount insurance coverage required was $50,000.00. Petitioner also declared that included in the $75,000.00 purchase price were other items which included the business (dock space), and reduced prices for miscellaneous supplies and fuel prices. In this regard, an examination of the Articles revealed that these items were provided Petitioner on a cost plus basis and the dock space was leased for an amount based on a rebate of the percentage of ticket sales or charter fees received. Petitioner ultimately sold the boat for 95,000.00. Petitioner initially tried to sell the boat for the sum of $105,000.00 of which $10,000.00 represented the value he (Petitioner) placed on the business. An examination of the accounting records introduced indicated that Petitioner placed the sum of $75,000.00 as the purchase price for the boat. Petitioner thought that his estimation of the labor and materials necessary to properly repair the boat were items that could be used as a setoff to reduce the amount of taxes due. Petitioner testified that he, in no way, intended to defraud the Respondent of taxes properly due and owing. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner remit to the Respondent the proper interest as set forth herein in paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner remit to the Respondent an administrative penalty of 5 percent of the aggregate taxes due as set forth herein in Paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner not be held liable for payment of for allegedly filing a "false or fraudulent" return for reasons set forth herein in Paragraph 6 of the Conclusions of Law. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of February 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February 1981.
The Issue The issue presented is whether the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene provided for in Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, is subject to Florida sales and use tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. STIPULATED FACTS Petitioner is a for-profit Florida corporation that sells perchloroethylene and other dry-cleaning supplies to the dry-cleaning industry. It is a "wholesale supply facility" as that term is defined in Section 376.301(17), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a member of the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition, a state-wide trade association whose members consist of the owners/operators of dry-cleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities. In 1993 and prior to and during the 1994 Florida legislative session, the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition employed lawyers-lobbyists to suggest and seek passage of amendments to Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, commonly known as the Florida Dry-Cleaning Solvents Cleanup Program. In 1994, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 94- 355, Laws of Florida, which amended Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Chapter 94-355 created Section 376.3078(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides that: All penalties, judgments, recoveries, reimbursements, loans, and other fees and charges related to the implementation of this section and the tax revenues levied, collected, and credited pursuant to ss. 376.70 and 376.75, and registration fees collected pursuant to s. 376.303(1)(d), shall be deposited into the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, to be used upon appropriation as provided in this section. Charges against the funds for dry-cleaning facility or wholesale supply site rehabilitation shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this section. Chapter 94-355, Laws of Florida, also created Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, which provides, in part, as follows: Beginning October 1, 1994, a tax is levied on the privilege of producing in, importing into, or causing to be imported into the state perchloroethylene (tetrachloroethylene). A tax of $5.00 per gallon is levied on each gallon of perchloroethylene when first imported into or produced in the state. The tax is imposed when transfer of title or possession, or both, of the product occurs in this state or when the product commingles with the general mass of this state. Petitioner's corporate secretary and 50 percent shareholder is David J. Pilger. He contributed financially to the employment by the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition of lawyers- lobbyists charged with seeking passage of amendments to Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and met several times with those lawyers- lobbyists in Tallahassee. He was assured during those meetings that it was the opinion of those lawyers-lobbyists that there was no danger of Florida sales tax being applied to the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The Department conducted an audit of Petitioner for the period of January 1, 1993, through January 31, 1998. At no time prior to the Department's audit of Petitioner's financial records did Petitioner receive from the Department materials of any kind indicating that Florida sales and use tax would apply to the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The Department had, however, adopted emergency Rule 12BER94-2, effective October 1, 1994, and Rule 12B-12.003(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 19, 1995. The 1998 Florida Legislature amended Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, by enacting Chapter 98-189, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1998, which added a sentence regarding the $5.00 per gallon tax, as follows: "This tax is not subject to sales and use tax pursuant to ch. 212." The Department has assessed and/or collected from certain taxpayers Florida sales and use tax on the sales price of perchloroethylene and the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The sales and use taxes are deposited into the general revenue fund pursuant to Section 212.20(1), Florida Statutes. The $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene is deposited into the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, pursuant to Section 376.3078(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner on October 22, 1998, assessing sales and use tax of $39,098.66, penalties of $19,549.64, and interest of $11,184.10 through October 22, 1998, with interest of $12.85 to accrue per day. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner on October 22, 1998, assessing indigent care surtax of $2,128.98, penalties of $1,064.48, and interest of $611.97 through October 22, 1998, and interest of $.70 to accrue per day. Petitioner charged its customers and remitted to the Department the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene provided for in Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, but neither collected from the customer nor remitted to the Department sales and use tax on this $5.00 per gallon tax. The $5.00 per gallon tax collected by Petitioner from its customers was reflected at the bottom of Petitioner's invoices as "the ENVRN TAX." Petitioner charged its customers and remitted to the Department the excise tax provided for in Section 206.9935(2), Florida Statutes, but neither collected from its customers nor remitted to the Department sales and use taxes or indigent care surtax on this excise tax. This tax was reflected at the bottom of Petitioner's invoices as "PERC TAX." Petitioner does not contest the Department's assessment of sales and use taxes and indigent care surtax on the water quality tax provided for in Section 206.9935(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not dispute that its sales to its customers during the audit period were paid for by its customers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered sustaining the assessment against Petitioner, together with interest, but compromising the entire penalty amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire John Mika, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Fred McCormack, Esquire Landers & Parsons, P.A. 310 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business and domicile in Texas, has an obligation to collect and remit Florida sales taxes on sales it made to a Massachusetts-domiciled corporation, in view of the facts found below.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a Delaware Corporation whose principal place of business is in Austin, Texas. The Petitioner designs, develops, and markets portable computer equipment, chiefly portable "tablet" personal computers with related "peripherals," which it sells and delivers in multiple states, including Florida. It sells these products to "re-sellers" and distributors, as well as to "end users." The Petitioner, by the Department's admission in Exhibit "A" (audit) does not maintain a physical presence in the State of Florida. It does employ one sales person for business in Florida, but maintains no warehouse or other facilities, vehicles nor other indicia of physical locations or operation in the state of Florida. The Petitioner is registered as a "dealer" with the State of Florida, Department of Revenue under the Florida Sales and Use Tax Law. The Petitioner does engage in some sales to Florida "end customers" or to re-sale purchasers in Florida. These transactions, however, are not at issue in this case. The dispute solely relates to transactions between the Petitioner and Advantec Computer System, Inc., of Marlboro, Massachusetts. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the regulation, control, administration, and enforcement of the sales and use tax laws of the State of Florida embodied in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Chapter 12A-1. The Respondent conducted an audit of the books and records of the Petitioner, resulting in this proceeding, for the audit period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2006. That audit was conducted by Xena Francis, and revealed, according to the Department's position, a purported sales tax payment deficiency on the part of the Petitioner in the above-referenced amounts. The Department, upon completion of the audit, issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, thus advising the Petitioner of the amount of the tax penalty and interest it was assessing as a result of the audit. The transactions which the Department maintained were questionable, in terms of taxes not being paid with regard thereto, were those where the Petitioner sold computer products to entities who did not produce to the Petitioner a certificate of exemption from collection of sales tax by Florida on that transaction, and where the product was shipped by the Petitioner into Florida by common carrier. The Department essentially takes the position that, since the Petitioner has a state sales and use tax "dealer certificate," that it is responsible to prove any transactions as being exempt from the relevant taxing provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and the above rule chapter. The Department apparently presumes as a part of this position that the fact that the product in question was shipped to ultimate users in Florida by common carrier from the Petitioner's place of business outside the state that such were Florida sales tax transactions. It thus contends that the burden is on the Petitioner to prove that they are exempt from such tax and collection. After it was advised of the audit findings and the basis for the assessment, the Petitioner provided to the Department certain exemption certificates for a number of the entities and transactions for which shipment had not been made into Florida. The Department accepted these and the assessment was adjusted downward to reflect the exempt status of those transactions, pursuant to the further information provided the Department by the Petitioner. The other disputed transactions for which no exemption certificate was provided by the Petitioner, were deemed by the auditor to be taxable. In essence, the auditor took the position, as does the Department, that every person making sales into the State of Florida is subject to sales and use tax unless specifically exempt and that it is incumbent upon the selling dealer (which it maintains is the Petitioner) to establish the exempt status of the transaction, at the time of sale, with a supporting re-sale certificate or some documentation to support the transactions, exempt status.1/ The sales which are the subject of this dispute are exclusively those between the Petitioner and Advantec Computer Systems, Inc. Advantec is a Massachusetts Incorporated and domiciled corporation. It apparently does not possess a Florida "re-sale certificate" or "dealer certificate." The Petitioner sold various computers and related products, as shown by the invoices in evidence, to Advantec. The invoices and the testimony adduced by the Petitioner established that those sales were between the Petitioner and Advantec, the Massachusetts corporation. Advantec, in turn, sold the products or some of them to Florida customers. Those customers did not pay the Petitioner for the sales, but paid Advantec. Advantec directed that delivery from the Petitioner be made not to Advantec itself, but to its Florida-end customer via common carrier from the Petitioner's out-of-state location or from its overseas supplier. In any event, delivery was made from outside Florida to the Florida Advantec customers by common carrier. The Petitioner billed no Florida customer and had no relationship with any Florida customer of Advantec. Instead it invoiced and billed Advantec for the price of the products involved on a "net 30-day" basis. Advantec would then pay the Petitioner for the amount invoiced by the Petitioner to Advantec. As to the Advantec sales at issue, there was no nexus, substantial or otherwise, between the Petitioner and Advantec's customers in Florida, except that the product was "drop shipped" from the Petitioner's relevant location out of the State of Florida to the Florida customer by common carrier, not by any vehicle owned, leased, or operated by any person or entity affiliated with the Petitioner. In fact, the deliveries in question were made by Federal Express as a drop shipment. Advantec's principal business activity is the re-sale and distribution of computers and related products. It has no presence in Florida and is not a registered dealer in Florida. When the Petitioner made the sales to Advantec Computer Systems, as shown by the invoices and testimony in evidence, it billed Advantec for the sales and did not collect sales tax. While the Petitioner has in its possession Advantec's Massachusetts-issued tax-exempt certificate, the Petitioner does not have a Florida tax-exempt certificate on-file for Advantec, because Advantec is not registered in Florida, and the sale by the Petitioner to Advantec is a Massachusetts sale with no Florida nexus. The Petitioner offered three Technical Assistance Advisements (TAA) into evidence, which it obtained from the Department in support of the fact that the transactions in question are not taxable. (See Exhibits 2, 3, 4 in evidence.) These exhibits were admitted on a limited basis over the Department's objection as being possibly material to a determination as to the weight and credibility of the Department's evidence in this case, but not as being legally binding or constituting legal precedent, which last quality is precluded by Section 213.22(1), Florida Statutes (2006). Additionally, the Petitioner offered and had admitted Petitioner's Exhibit 7, which was an e-mail received from a representative of the Department, in response to an inquiry by the Petitioner. This was admitted over hearsay objection as a party statement offered by the opposing party.2/ In that exchange between the Petitioner and the Department, the Petitioner, as shown by testimony and the exhibit, related the facts involved in the sales to Advantec. The Department's response indicated that, if indeed, the buyer and seller were both located outside the State of Florida and the goods when purchased were outside the State of Florida, then the sale is not a Florida sale, between the out-of-state buyer and the out- of-state seller (the Petitioner). If the goods were then delivered by common carrier to the out-of-state buyer's ultimate customers in Florida, from the Petitioner's out-of-state location, then the transaction between the Petitioner and the out-of-state buyer is not subject to the Florida sales tax law and, in essence, is non-jurisdictional, not as a "Florida nexus sale." In summary, the Petitioner sold the goods in question to Advantec and invoiced Advantec at its Massachusetts domicile and address on "net 30-day" term. No Florida customer, person, or entity was billed for the sales in question, nor was any payment collected from any individual or business entity located in the State of Florida. Once the sale was consummated between the Petitioner and Advantec, the Petitioner merely "dropped shipped," by common carrier, the goods purchased by Advantec to Advantec's ultimate customer located in the State of Florida.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue, vacating and dismissing the assessment of the subject sales tax and interest to the Petitioner, Motion Computing, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is engaged in the cattle business and sells these cattle to in-state and out-of-state buyers who purchase the cattle at Clewiston, Florida, and have them transported either by the purchaser's own equipment or by a commercial carrier to their in-state or out-of-state destination. Those sales determined to be out-of-state sales are not included in the numerator of the fraction used to compute what percentage of Petitioner's income results from Florida sales and is therefore subject to Florida income tax. In making the determination respecting out-of-state sales Respondent applies the destination test if the cattle are shipped by common carrier but treats all other carriers as agents of the buyer to whom the cattle are delivered at Clewiston, thereby making such sales in-state sales. It is this policy determination which Petitioner contends is a rule. The policy has not been promulgated in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and, if this interpretation constitutes a rule, it is invalid because it was never promulgated as required. In determining whether certain sales are subject to the Florida sales tax, the Legislature in Section 212.06(5)(a), Florida Statutes, excluded from tax that tangible property imported or manufactured for export and provided such tangible property shall not be considered as being manufactured for export unless the manufacturer delivers the same to a licensed exporter for exporting or to a common carrier for shipment outside the State or mails the same by United States Mail to a destination outside the State. The rationale of the sales tax provision is used by Respondent in determining whether the sales are in-state sales for the purpose of computing Florida income tax. Respondent has promulgated, to its auditors, as a policy and as an interpretation of the statute, the directive to apply the destination test in determining out-of-state sales only when the merchandise sold is shipped by common carrier to a destination out of state. It is this policy determination or interpretation of the statutes that Petitioner contends is a rule and attacks in these proceedings. In the testimony Respondent acknowledged that this policy determination is uniformly applied. It also has application both within and outside the agency. Respondent further testified that if the merchandise (here cattle) had been delivered by Petitioner to the buyer outside the State of Florida by any means of transportation Petitioner chose, it would have treated the sale as an out-of-state sale.
Findings Of Fact Certain hospital equipment ("Equipment") was sold in 1973 and 1974 by Hospital Contract Consultants ("Vendor") to F & E Community Developers and Jackson Realty Builders (hereinafter referred to as "Purchasers") who simultaneously leased the Equipment to Petitioner. These companies are located in Indiana. At the time of purchase, Florida sales tax ("Tax") was paid by the Purchasers and on or about March 18, 1974, the tax was remitted to the State of Florida by the Vendor. However, the Tax was paid in the name of Medical Facilities Equipment Company, a subsidiary of Vendor. In 1976, the Department of Revenue audited Petitioner and on or about April 26, 1976 assessed a tax on purchases and rental of the Equipment. On or about April 26, 1976, petitioner agreed to pay the amount of the assessment on the purchases and rentals which included the Equipment, in monthly installments of approximately Ten Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($10,000.00) each and subsequently paid such amount of assessment with the last monthly installment paid on or about November 26, 1976. On or about December, 1976, the Department of Revenue, State of Florida, checked its records and could not find the Vendor registered to file and pay sales tax with the State of Florida. Petitioner then looked to the State of Indiana for a tax refund. On or about January 4, 1977, Petitioner filed for a refund of sales tax from the State of Florida in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand One Hundred Four and 02/100 Dollars ($35,104.02). This amount was the sales tax paid to and remitted by various vendors for certain other equipment purchased in 1973 and 1974 and simultaneously leased. The amount of this refund request was granted and paid. Relying upon the facts expressed in paragraph 4 heretofore, Petitioner on or about June 2, 1977 filed with the Department of Revenue of the State of Indiana for the refund of the Tax. On or about June 7, 1979, the Department of Revenue of Indiana determined that the Vendor was registered in the State of Florida as Medical Facilities Equipment Company and therefore Petitioner should obtain the refund of the Tax form the State of Florida. So advised, Petitioner then filed the request for amended refund, which is the subject of this lawsuit, on July 16, 1979 in the amount of Seventeen Thousand Two Hundred Sixteen and 28/100 Dollars ($17,216.28). This request for refund was denied by Respondent, Office of the Comptroller, on the basis of the three year statute of non-claim set forth in section 215.26, Florida Statutes. Purchasers have assigned all rights, title and interest in sales and use tax refunds to Petitioner. During the audit of Petitioner in 1976 the lease arrangement on the equipment apparently came to light and Petitioner was advised sales tax was due on the rentals paid for the equipment. This resulted in an assessment against Petitioner of some $80,000 which was paid at the rate of $10,000 per month, with the last installment in November, 1976. The auditor advised Petitioner that a refund of sales tax on the purchase of this equipment was payable and he checked the Department's records for those companies registered as dealers in Florida. These records disclosed that sales taxes on the sale of some of this rental equipment had been remitted by the sellers of the equipment but Hospital Contract Consultants was not registered. Petitioner was advised to claim a refund of this sales tax from Indiana, the State of domicile of Hospital Contract Consultants. By letter on March 18, 1974, Amedco Inc., the parent company of wholly owned Hospital Contract Consultants, Inc. had advised the Florida Department of Revenue that Medical Facilities Equipment Company, another subsidiary, would report under ID No. 78-23-20785-79 which had previously been assigned to Hospital Contract Consultants Inc. which had erroneously applied for this registration. (Exhibit 2) Not stated in that letter but contained in Indiana Department of Revenue letter of April 18, 1979 was the information that the name of Hospital Contract Consultants had been changed to Medical Facilities Equipment Company. The request for the refund of some $17,000 submitted to Indiana in 1976 was finally denied in 1979 after research by the Indiana Department of Revenue showed the sales tax had been paid to Florida and not to Indiana.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue (DOR) has properly issued an assessment against Petitioner for sales and use tax, interest, and penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida resident. In 1996, Petitioner began doing business as a sole proprietor under the name of "Duraline Industries" and registered with DOR as a sales tax dealer. Later, this entity was called "Dura Steel." Petitioner also operated as a corporation, Steel Engineered Design Systems, Inc. Petitioner's Florida sales tax numbers are 42-11-009271-63 and 40-00-003416- For purposes of these consolidated cases, Petitioner has been audited and charged individually as "Charles R. Bielinski," because the audit revealed that no checks were made out to the corporation(s) and that the monies received were received by Mr. Bielinski as a sole proprietor in one or more "doing business as" categories. Petitioner engaged in the business of fabricating items of tangible personal property, i.e., prefabricated steel buildings, many of which later became improvements to real property in Florida. Petitioner used some of the steel buildings in the performance of real property contracts by installing the buildings as improvements to real property. Petitioner also engaged in the business of selling buildings and steel component parts such as sheets and trim in Florida. Petitioner sold buildings and component parts in over- the-counter retail sales, also. On October 7, 2002, DOR issued Petitioner a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records for the period of September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2002. This audit was assigned number AO226920428. In 2002, Petitioner provided DOR's auditor with his sales activity records, such as contracts and job information. A telephone conversation/interview of Petitioner was conducted by the auditor. Over a period of several months, the auditor attempted to get Petitioner to provide additional records, but none were forthcoming. DOR deemed the contracts and job information provided by Petitioner to be an incomplete record of his sales activity for the audit period. Petitioner claimed that most of his sales activity records had been lost or destroyed. Due to the absence of complete records, DOR sampled Petitioner's available records and other information related to his sales in order to conduct and complete its audit. Petitioner purchased materials used to fabricate his steel buildings. Petitioner sometimes would erect the buildings on real property. Petitioner fabricated main frames for smaller buildings at a shop that he maintained at the Bonifay Airport. Otherwise, Petitioner subcontracted with like companies to fabricate main frames for larger buildings. Petitioner made some sales to exempt buyers, such as religious institutions and government entities. When he purchased the materials he used to fabricate the buildings, Petitioner occasionally provided his vendors with his resale certificate, in lieu of paying sales tax. Petitioner did not pay sales tax on the materials he purchased to fabricate buildings when such buildings were being fabricated for exempt buyers such as churches and governmental entities. On June 23, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Form DR-840), for audit number AO226920428, covering the period of November 1, 1997 through August 31, 2002. DOR has assessed Petitioner sales tax on the buildings, sheets, and trim he sold over-the-counter in Florida. DOR has assessed Petitioner use tax on sales of the materials used in performing real property contracts in Florida. The auditor calculated a method of estimating taxes based on the limited documentation that had been provided by Petitioner. She used a sampling method based on Petitioner's contract numbering system; isolated the Florida contracts; and divided the Florida contracts between the actual sale of tangible property (sale of just the buildings themselves) and real property contracts (where Petitioner not only provided the building but also provided installation or erection services). The auditor scheduled the real property contracts and assessed only the material amounts as taxable in Florida. Since she had only 19 out of 47 probable contracts, or 40 percent, she projected up to what the taxable amount should be and applied the sales tax and surtax at the rate of seven percent, as provided by law. She then divided that tax for the entire audit period by the 58 months in the audit period, to arrive at a monthly tax amount. This monthly tax amount was broken out into sales and discretionary sales tax. Florida levies a six percent State sales tax. Each county has the discretion to levy a discretionary sales tax. Counties have similar discretion as to a surtax. The auditor determined that Petitioner collected roughly $22,000.00 dollars in tax from one of his sales tax registrations which had not been remitted to DOR. During the five-year audit period, Petitioner only remitted tax in May 1998. DOR gave Petitioner credit for the taxes he did remit to DOR during the audit period. The foregoing audit processes resulted in the initial assessment(s) of August 28, 2003, which are set out in Findings of Fact 25-31, infra. On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR-832/833), for additional discretionary surtax, in the sum of $2,582.19; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $782.55; and penalty, in the sum of $1,289.91; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.50 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0008) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional sales and use tax in the sum of $154,653.32; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $50,500.06; and penalty, in the sum of $77,324.54, plus additional interest that accrues at $31.54 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0009) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional local governmental infrastructure surtax, in the sum of $7,001.82; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $2,352.09; and penalty in the sum of $3,497.35; plus additional interest that accrues at $1.45 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0010) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional indigent care surtax, in the sum of $513.08; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $156.33; and penalty, in the sum of $256.24; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.10 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0011) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional school capital outlay surtax in the sum of $3,084.49; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $922.23; and penalty, in the sum of $1,540.98; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.60 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0012) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional charter transit system surtax, in the sum of $2,049.22; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $766.07; and penalty, in the sum of $1,023.27; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.46 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0013) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), additional small county surtax, in the sum of $10,544.51; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $3,437.85; and penalty in the sum of $5,282.30; plus additional interest that accrues at $2.15 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0014) However, the auditor testified at the May 13, 2004, hearing that she attended Petitioner's deposition on March 18, 2004. At that time, Petitioner provided additional documentation which permitted the auditor to recalculate the amount of tax due. The auditor further testified that she separated out the contracts newly provided at that time and any information which clarified the prior contracts she had received. She then isolated the contracts that would affect the Florida taxes due. Despite some of the new information increasing the tax on some of Petitioner's individual Florida contracts, the result of the auditor's new review was that overall, the contracts, now totaling 33, resulted in a reduction in total tax due from Petitioner. These changes were recorded in Revision No. 1 which was attached to the old June 23, 2003, Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, which was sent by certified mail to Petitioner. The certified mail receipt was returned to DOR as unclaimed. The auditor's calculations reducing Petitioner's overall tax are set out in Respondent's Exhibit 16 (Revision No. 1). That exhibit appears to now show that taxes are owed by Petitioner as follows in Findings of Fact 34-40 infra. For DOAH Case No. 04-0008, discretionary surtax (tax code 013), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $1,937.37, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0009, sales and use tax (tax code 010), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $111,811.04, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0010, local governmental infrastructure surtax (tax code 016), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $5,211.00, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0011, indigent care surtax (tax code 230), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $317.39, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0012, school capital outlay tax (tax code 530), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $2,398.68, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0013, charter transit system surtax (tax code 015), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $1,558.66, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0014, small county surtax (tax code 270), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $7,211.83, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order upholding the amount of tax calculated against Petitioner in its June 21, 2003, Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, Revision No. 1, in the principal amounts as set forth in Findings of Fact Nos. 34-40, plus interest and penalty accruing per day as provided by law, until such time as the tax is paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2004.
