Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues here, the Petitioner, Carol C. Bledsoe, was a part-time employee of the University of Central Florida (U.C.F.) U.C.F. is an agency of the State of Florida, whose employees are eligible for participation in the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self-Insurance Plan (Plan), administered by Respondent, D.O.A. On December 1, 1980, Petitioner applied for full family coverage under the Plan, with coverage to be effective January 1, 1981. The application form executed by Petitioner was submitted to the Benefits Coordinator at the personnel office at U.C.F. At the time of submission, that portion of the form reserved for "payroll clerk use only" was left blank. The Benefits Coordinator, after checking the form to insure all required information was supplied by the applicant, Petitioner, forwarded it to the payroll department at U.C.F. It was at that office that the payroll clerk inserted an erroneous deduction code on December 2, 1980. The incorrect deduction code inserted was "0.2." the proper deduction code which should have been inserted to reflect Petitioner's status was "42." Though the current Benefits Coordinator indicates an applicant who is a part-time employee, such as Petitioner here, is given, at the time application for coverage is made, a form to show what the correct deduction for the requested coverage will be, this calculation is made by the Benefits Coordinator for the employee based on a formula which calls for a different rate for part- time employees. A part-time employee's contribution to the premium (the amount deducted) is higher than that of a full-time employee. The current coordinator, Ms. Evans, cannot state that Petitioner got the described form when she applied, and Petitioner denies having received it. There is no evidence to show Petitioner received any indication of what the deduction should or would be until the deductions from her pay began on January 9, 1981, with the deduction for the pay period December 19, 1980 - January 1, 1981. At that time, the deduction made was $14.37. The corrected deduction should have been $19.52 per pay period. Here, the deduction from Petitioner's pay was calculated on the erroneous basis that she was a full-time employee, thereby resulting in a smaller deduction that was correct. This insufficient deduction continued until the discrepancy was discovered due to an audit in March, 1983. The parties stipulate that the total shortage in issue is $345.78. During the approximately 2 1/4 years that the improper deduction was being withheld from Petitioner's pay each pay period, Petitioner was fully covered under the full family coverage plan. During this period, she filed only one claim -- a small one for an injury to her son -- and was paid the amount claimed. During this same period, she underwent several inquiries into her pay, instigated by her, to correct other inaccuracies in her pay. At no time prior to the March, 1983 audit was the incorrect health insurance deduction discovered, and Petitioner had no indication that amount being deducted for that purpose was incorrect. From an examination of her biweekly employee's earning statement, there was no way she could have known her pay was in error in this particular. Several factors contributed to the error. One of these was that personnel in the payroll department of U.C.F. were doing things wrong. Another was that Petitioner was not a typical employee, and her situation required specialized handling by personnel and payroll which was not given. None of these factors, however, was within the control of the Petitioner. Changes made in the procedures followed within the agency as a result of a reorganization in January, 1982 -- made as the result of the recognition of numerous payroll problems over several months involving numerous other employees on the insurance plan -- should prevent recurrence of Petitioner's situation. However, Petitioner was in no way responsible for the creating of her situation and acted in good faith throughout the entire period. When she was notified of the error, she immediately took the appropriate steps to correct it and now pays the appropriate premium for the desired coverage. When an error is discovered, as happened here, the employee is notified that he or she has overpaid and the employee is reimbursed. On the other hand, if the employee has underpaid, as here, the employee is notified of the liability and advised of various settlement systems. If the employee desires to pay other than in one lump sum, periodic payments can be arranged in an amount not less than 3% of the employee's salary for not more than 24 months. The insurance office, under Respondent D.O.A., contends it has no authority to waive the reimbursement of the shortage and states that if Petitioner does not make up the shortage, here coverage will be terminated. If that happens, she will not be eligible to reenroll until the shortage is reimbursed. Under the insurance plan in question here, the State is a self-insurer. Petitioner's contribution and that of her agency goes into a trust fund administered by Respondent and is used to pay benefits through Blue Cross, which processes the claims. Since in this case, Petitioner paid less than she should have as a part-time employee, the U.C.F. paid more than its appropriate contribution for her coverage.
Recommendation That Petitioner, Carol C. Bledsoe, pay the underpayment of $345.78.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Mario Medero, discriminated against the Petitioner, Sharon L. Zbikowski, on the basis of her sex, female?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Sharon L. Zbikowski, is a female. The Respondent, Mario Medero, is a male. Dr. Medero is a physician. He practices medicine as a professional association. Dr. Medero is the chief executive officer and the supervisor or principal of the professional association. The professional association operates a medical office in Ocala, Florida. The medical practice performed by Dr. Medero consists primarily of treating individuals who have been injured on the job and who are covered by workers compensation insurance. Ms. Zbikowski's Employment. On August 20, 1992, Ms. Zbikowski was hired for employment by Dr. Medero's professional association as the front desk receptionist at Dr. Medero's office. At the time she was hired, Ms. Zbikowski was told that she would be considered for an accounts payable clerk position at the office. The position was held by Barbara Redding if Ms. Redding left the position. Ms. Zbikowski was told at the time of her employment that her consideration for the position of accounts payable clerk was dependent upon Ms. Redding actually leaving. Ms. Redding ultimately decided not to resign her position. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. Zbikowski was hired as a bookkeeper or accounts payable clerk, or that she was not placed in the position she was hired to fill. Ms. Zbikowski's Performance. Ms. Zbikowski worked initially at the front desk. Her performance was considered inadequate by Marilyn Hartsel, the office manager and Ms. Zbikowski's immediate supervisor. Ms. Zbikowski was moved to other positions within the office. She worked for a while in medical records and for approximately one day in accounts payable with Ms. Redding. Ms. Zbikowski's performance in medical records and in accounts payable was also considered inadequate by Ms. Hartsel. Within three or four weeks after Ms. Zbikowski began her employment, Ms. Hartsel had decided to recommend that Ms. Zbikowski be terminated because of the inadequacy of her work. Ms. Zbikowski's Employment by Dr. Medero. At the time that Ms. Zbikowski was initially employed at Dr. Medero's office, Dr. Medero had caused the office to advertise for a housekeeper for his home. Ms. Zbikowski discussed the position with Dr. Medero. Dr. Medero agreed to employ Ms. Zbikowski as his housekeeper and Ms. Zbikowski agreed to work as Dr. Medero's housekeeper. Ms. Zbikowski agreed to clean Dr. Medero's house, run errands for him and the office, pick up his son from school and take his son to and from tennis lessons, meet Dr. Medero's former wife half way between Ocala and Tampa to pick up or to drop off Dr. Medero's daughter, who was in the custody of his former wife, and generally oversee his household. Although the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Zbikowski performed services in her capacity as housekeeper for anyone other than Dr. Medero, Ms. Zbikowski was paid for her services out of accounts of the professional association and Ms. Hartsel continued to be her immediate supervisor. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. Zbikowski was forced in any way to accept employment as Dr. Medero's housekeeper. The evidence proved that she accepted the position voluntarily and without coercion. Ms. Zbikowski continued to work as Dr. Medero's housekeeper until September 28, 1992. During her employment as Dr. Medero's housekeeper, Dr. Medero was satisfied with Ms. Zbikowski's performance. Alleged Sexual Harassment. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Medero sexually harassed Ms. Zbikowski. Ms. Zbikowski testified about very few specific alleged incidents involving Dr. Medero and the evidence failed to substantiate those incidents. Ms. Zbikowski admitted that she had had no physical contact with Dr. Medero except for one occasion when she hugged him from advancing funds to her to pay for her son's day care and on another occasion when he gave her a physical examination after being in an automobile accident. The evidence failed to prove that either incident involved improper conduct by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski's testimony that Dr. Medero evidenced a "flirtatious manner" was not substantiated by competent substantial evidence of specific incidents. The most specific incident, and the incident which led to Ms. Zbikowski's termination from employment, took place on Thursday, September 24, 1992. At lunch on that day, Ms. Zbikowski and her four year old son were in Dr. Medero's back yard. Ms. Zbikowski was cleaning lawn furniture. Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding came to Dr. Medero's house, waved at Ms. Zbikowski and went into Dr. Medero's bedroom. The curtains/blinds to the bedroom windows were closed soon after Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding went into the room. Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding, both of whom were not married at the time, were lovers. Ms. Zbikowski was aware of their relationship. At no time did Ms. Zbikowski see Dr. Medero or Ms. Redding in Dr. Medero's bedroom. Ms. Zbikowski believes that Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding engaged in sexual intercourse while in the bedroom. This belief was not, however, substantiated by competent substantial evidence. Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding, who is not longer involved personally or in a working relationship with Dr. Medero, both testified that they did not engage in sexual intercourse. Ms. Zbikowski did not see them engage in intercourse. At best, Ms. Zbikowski's belief was based upon hearing "giggling" and "these little, um, sounds and things" from the bedroom. Ms. Zbikowski's Termination from Employment. On the afternoon of September 24, 1992, Ms. Zbikowski spoke with Ms. Hartsel and told her that Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding had sexual intercourse in her presence and her son's presence. Ms. Zbikowski was very upset and Ms. Hartsel told her to take the afternoon off and report to the office the next morning. Ms. Zbikowski also made other allegations, which the evidence failed to substantiate, of incidents of sexual harassment by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski left a beeper and a garage door opener she had been provided by Dr. Medero at Dr. Medero's home and left. The next morning, Friday, September 25, 1992, Ms. Zbikowski reported to the office. She was told that she would be expected to the work at the office in the mornings and then work at Dr. Medero's home in the afternoons. Ms. Zbikowski left at lunch and did not return. Ms. Zbikowski informed Ms. Hartsel that she did not intend to return that day because she did not want to return to Dr. Medero's home. Ms. Hartsel told Ms. Zbikowski that she would discuss the matter with Dr. Medero. Ms. Hartsel did not, however, order Ms. Zbikowski to return to work that day or inform her that she was not authorized to stay home. After speaking to Ms. Hartsel by telephone that weekend and being told that Ms. Hartsel had not yet discussed the matter with Dr. Medero, Ms. Zbikowski reported to work Monday, September 29, 1992. By the time that Ms. Zbikowski returned to the office on Monday, Dr. Medero had been informed of the allegations of sexual harassment she had made against him to Ms. Hartsel. Shortly after arriving at the office, Ms. Zbikowski was escorted to her automobile by Dr. Medero, Ms. Hartsel and a nurse and was told by Dr. Medero not to return. Ms. Zbikowski was, therefore, fired by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski was terminated because of the allegations she made concerning Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding and the other allegations of sexual harassment. Ms. Zbikowski was not terminated because she was not performing her duties as Dr. Medero's housekeeper in a satisfactory manner. Ms. Zbikowski's Subsequent Employment. Ms. Zbikowski was employed, and eventually terminated, by other physicians after her termination from employment by Dr. Medero. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Medero was involved in any manner in Ms. Zbikowski's subsequent terminations from employment. Ms. Zbikowski's Charge of Discrimination. Ms. Zbikowski filed a Charge of Discrimination against Dr. Medero with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ms. Zbikowski alleged that she had been discriminated against based upon the following: I am a female. I worked for the above named respondent since August 20, 1992, until September 28, 1992 when I was discharged from my position of maid. During my employment I was subjected to sexual harassment by Dr. Mario Medero, and also I was subjected to different terms and conditions in my employment. I believe I have been discriminated against because of my sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. On September 2, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Ms. Zbikowski filed a Petition for Relief, requesting a formal administrative hearing on October 19, 1993. In the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission Ms. Zbikowski alleged, in part, the following: Respondent has violated the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, in the manner specifically described below: Petitioner did not abandoned [sic] her job. Petitioner was hired for one position and was told to accept another position 1 1/2 weeks into her employment which was not mentioned, nor described as part of original position. The disputed issues of material fact, if any, are as listed below: Petitioner did not abandoned [sic] her job. Petitioner was hired for one position and was told to accept another position 1 1/2 weeks into her employment which was not mentioned, nor described as part of original position. The ultimate facts alleged and entitlement to relief are as listed below: . . . . The alleged fact memos are that Petitioner was hired for a "Bookkeeping" position but was never given the opportunity to work in this position as original Bookkeeper (Dr. Medero's girlfriend) decided not to leave her position, so Petitioner was given a less meaningful job as "Housekeeper" but was subjected to harassing sexual misconduct by Respondent. The relief is as follows: Petitioner has for 1 year been trying to maintain and seek employment in the Medical field, one which she has worked in for 13 years, but because of Dr. Medero's influence in the Medical field has made it very hard for Petitioner to continue in this field. Petitioner is seeking recovery for the discriminating position he placed her in while under his employment plus relief from the undue hardship which has been placed upon her because of his lies in this matter. . . . . . . . Ms. Zbikowski proved the following allegations contained in her Charge of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief: "I am a female." "I worked for the above named respondent since August 20, 1992, until September 28, 1992, when I was discharged from my position of maid." "Petitioner did not abandoned [sic] her job." The remaining allegations contained in the Charge of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief were not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Ms. Zbikowski. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that any action of Dr. Medero was based upon Ms. Zbikowski's sex: she was not held to any standard or requirement based upon her sex, she was not sexually harassed and she was not terminated because of her sex. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that any policy or standard of Dr. Medero or his office had a disparate impact on female employees. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that she was replaced by a male or that other female employees with comparable or lessor qualifications were retained. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that she was sexually harassed by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that Dr. Medero or his office discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, female.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of a perceived handicap or disability of obesity and in retaliation for filing an earlier charge of discrimination alleging racial discrimination in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (1995). (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1995) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a member of a protected class. Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent employed Petitioner as a registered nurse from sometime in November 1990 until Petitioner resigned from her employment on July 15, 1996. Petitioner claims that Respondent perceived Petitioner as being handicapped or disabled due to her obesity and discriminated against her by creating a hostile work environment that led to a constructive discharge on July 15, 1996. Petitioner also claims that Respondent created the hostile work environment in retaliation for a previous charge of racial discrimination that is not at issue in this proceeding. On February 25, 1995, a therapist employed by Respondent observed that Petitioner did not bend down to assist a patient suffering from a "pseudo-seizure" at Respondent's facility where the therapist and Petitioner both worked. The therapist concluded that Petitioner was physically unable to tend to the patient. Petitioner actually refused to tend to the patient. As Petitioner explained in her testimony, everyone at the facility knew the patient faked the seizures, and Petitioner was overworked and preoccupied with a more pressing matter. Petitioner did not refute the need for a competent health care provider to examine each seizure and ensure that it does not require medical attention. The therapist who observed the incident submitted an incident report to Respondent's director of human resources. The report stated that Petitioner was physically unable to attend to the patient. Respondent conducted an investigation of the incident. Respondent had recently appointed new management. The new personnel investigated the incident and discovered that Petitioner had absences from work of approximately 10 weeks since April 1994. On March 15, 1995, Respondent conducted a corrective action meeting with Petitioner to address the excessive absenteeism and the reported incident on February 25, 1995. The purpose of the meeting was to determine the cause of the absenteeism, including any health problems Petitioner may have been experiencing. Appropriate personnel counseled Petitioner at the corrective action meeting. Petitioner agreed to participate in a "Wellness Program" that provided weekly sessions for health and fitness and was available to all employees. The "Wellness Program" was voluntary, and Petitioner signed documents acknowledging her agreement with the corrective action. Petitioner signed the documentation without objection and did not separately voice any objection. Petitioner attended only one session of the "Wellness Program." Respondent took no adverse employment action against Petitioner for her failure to participate in the program. On April 20, 1995, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination alleging racial discrimination. Petitioner claimed that Respondent forced her to attend weekly diet classes and keep logs on exercise and health but did not impose similar requirements on two overweight white females. The two white females did not have excessive absenteeism and no employees had filed incident reports against them. For similar reasons, Respondent did not recommend that another African-American female participate in the "Wellness Program." The Commission issued a finding of no cause in regard to the first charge of discrimination. The merits of that charge are not at issue in this proceeding even though the nature of the charge is part of the retaliation claim in this proceeding. Respondent did not change Petitioner's conditions of employment throughout her employment. Petitioner's job duties, responsibilities, schedule, and conditions of employment remained the same. Petitioner perceived that Respondent increased her workload to retaliate for her first charge of discrimination and to create a hostile work environment. An increase in work load did occur, but the increase was motivated by economic factors rather than discrimination. Economic factors forced Respondent to decrease staffing for the entire facility and to appoint new management. Neither Petitioner nor any other staff received a salary increase in 1995. Petitioner never expressed any complaints to management about the alleged hostile work environment. On July 15, 1996, a patient eloped from the unit where Petitioner was working as charge nurse. Petitioner was the person responsible for the patient. On the same day, Respondent scheduled another corrective action meeting. Immediately prior to the meeting, Petitioner resigned from her employment. The letter of resignation does not mention any hostile work environment or similar cause for her resignation. Respondent did not have an opportunity to counsel Petitioner concerning the patient who eloped. Respondent did not intend to terminate Petitioner from her employment. Except for the problems already discussed, Petitioner was a competent nurse that Respondent wished to retain. Competent medical providers are rare, and it was difficult to replace Petitioner. Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of a perceived handicap or disability of obesity. The evidence was insufficient to show that Respondent constructively discharged Petitioner or retaliated against Petitioner for a prior charge of discrimination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner, and denying Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Matthew Klein, Esquire Bunnell, Woulfe, Kirschbaum, Keller, McIntyre & Gregoire, P.A. 888 East Las Olas Boulevard 4th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Barbara J. Morgan 2804 Rio Lane Orlando, Florida 32805 Barbara Tashlein, Human Resource Manager La Amistad R.T.C. 1650 Park Avenue, North Maitland, Florida 32751 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Andrea Bateman, is a female. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Bateman was 41 or 42 years of age. Ms. Bateman is an attorney. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was a member of The Florida Bar during the period of time at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. Ms. Bateman's Employment by the Department. In October of 1990, the Department employed Ms. Bateman as an attorney in the Department's Office of Child Support Enforcement. Ms. Bateman was required to be a member of The Florida Bar. Ms. Bateman's position with the Department was classified as a "Select Exempt Service" position. Pursuant to Chapter 22SE-1.002(5), Florida Administrative Code, and Part V, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, persons employed in select exempt service positions may be terminated from employment without cause. Ms. Bateman's immediate supervisor was Chriss Walker. Mr. Walker is a Senior Attorney with the Department and, at the time Ms. Bateman was hired, also served as the Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement. As of December 4, 1991, the Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement, and Mr. Walker's immediate supervisor was Anne F. Donovan. At all times relevant to this proceeding, William H. Bentley was an Assistant Deputy Secretary of the Department with supervisory authority over the Department's Assistant Secretary's, including Mr. Walker and Ms. Donovan. "Productivity Enhancement" at the Department. During 1991, the Department was required to evaluate all employment positions at the Department and to reduce those positions in an effort to improve the productivity of the Department. Generally, all positions at the Department and the work performed by the persons filling those positions were considered and decisions were made as to which positions could be eliminated. The Department referred to the elimination of positions as "red-lining". The Department also made efforts to insure that any person affected by the elimination of their position would be placed in another position. Ms. Bateman's attorney position with Child Support Enforcement was identified for elimination. Another attorney position in Child Support Enforcement and Mr. Walker's Senior Attorney position were not identified for elimination. The decision to eliminate one of the attorney positions was based upon conclusion that the administrative duties of the two attorney positions could be handled by a paralegal position and the legal duties could then be handled by one attorney. Efforts to assist Ms. Bateman to find another position were not successful. Ultimately, the Department decided to find a position in which to continue to employ Ms. Bateman rather than to terminate her position and release her. The Department reclassified another vacant position so that Ms. Bateman could continue to be employed as an attorney for Child Support Enforcement. Mr. Walker was directed to create an attorney position for Ms. Bateman by the Assistant Secretary for Human Services. This decision was made during the early Fall of 1991. The Department's decision to continue to employ Ms. Bateman was based in part on the Department's concern about terminating an employee of the Department. The evidence failed to prove that the Department acted unreasonably with regard to the red-lining of Ms. Bateman's position. Ms. Bateman's Performance. During the year after Ms. Bateman began her employment with the Department, Mr. Walker, Ms. Bateman's supervisor, began to develop concerns about the adequacy of her work product. Ms. Bateman also began to evidence behavior which was not acceptable for an attorney of the Department. As a result of Ms. Bateman's odd behavior, Mr. Walker became concerned about Ms. Bateman's mental well-being. Mr. Walker memorialized his concerns about Ms. Bateman in a memorandum to Mr. Bentley dated December 2, 1991. The memorandum was revised December 19, 1991 to eliminate references to a counselor that Ms. Bateman had informed Mr. Walker she was seeing. Ms. Bateman's work deteriorated to an extent which necessitated other employees carrying out some of her duties. Among the difficulties experienced with Ms. Bateman which formed a reasonable basis for terminating her employment were the following: Ms. Bateman had difficulty communicating with other employees and her supervisor. As an attorney, Ms. Bateman was required to communicate orally and in writing. She was unable to do so in an adequate manner. Ms. Bateman failed to demonstrate good judgment and trustworthiness and, therefore, her supervisors were unable to rely upon her judgment as an attorney of the Department. Ms. Bateman's appearance was unacceptable for an employee of the Department who was required to meet and communicate with the public. Ms. Bateman's hair was unkempt and dirty, her clothes were often soiled and wrinkled, she failed to brush her teeth and she appeared not to be bathing based upon her appearance and her strong body odor. Although required to do so by Department policy, Ms. Bateman refused to give her supervisor a permanent home address or phone number. On one occasion Ms. Bateman was found asleep in the offices of the Department at night and on one occasion she was found asleep during working hours. Based upon the inadequacy of Ms. Bateman's performance, the Department had a reasonable basis for terminating Ms. Bateman's employment. Mr. Walker's Evaluation of Ms. Bateman. On December 18, 1991, Mr. Walker presented Ms. Bateman with a Professional Employee Performance Appraisal form he had completed on her performance. The Appraisal was reviewed by Ms. Bateman and signed by her on December 18, 1991. Mr. Walker gave Ms. Bateman's performance a rating of "effective" on the Appraisal. Of the factors evaluated on the Appraisal, Mr. Walker judged Ms. Bateman's performance as "excellent" on one factor, "effective" on eleven factors and "needs improvement" on nine factors. Mr. Walker gave Ms. Bateman's performance an "effective" rating despite his conclusion that her work product was not acceptable and despite his concerns about her inappropriate behavior. He did so because he had recently been directed to create a position to keep Ms. Bateman as an employee of the Department and in an effort to avoid litigation over Ms. Bateman's termination. Mr. Walker did not believe that his supervisors wanted to avoid any difficulties concerning Ms. Bateman employment. Mr. Walker failed to follow Department procedure in presenting the Appraisal to Ms. Bateman. The Appraisal was required to be reviewed and approved by Mr. Walker's immediate supervisor, Ms. Donovan, before it was given to Ms. Bateman. Mr. Walker, contrary to Department policy, presented the Appraisal to Ms. Bateman before Ms. Donovan had seen and approved it. Ms. Donovan was aware of the problems with Ms. Bateman's performance and would not have approved an "effective" rating. Upon receiving the Appraisal, Ms. Donovan discussed the Appraisal with Mr. Walker and rejected it, as it was her right to do. Ms. Donovan, consistent with Department policy, specified that Ms. Bateman would be evaluated again in sixty days. The Department's Request that Ms. Bateman Undergo a Psychological Evaluation. Although the Department had a reasonable basis for terminating Ms. Bateman's employment by the end of 1991 and in early 1992, the Department decided to attempt to discover the cause of Ms. Bateman's decline in performance and the onset of her odd behavior rather than terminate her employment. The Department made this decision in an effort to determine what assistance Ms. Bateman might need. Ultimately, the Department was attempting to determine what work, if any, Ms. Bateman was capable of performing. The Department's decision was based upon a number of incidents involving Ms. Bateman. Those incidents are included in Mr. Walker's Chronology of December 2, 1991 and his Revised Chronology of December 19, 1991 and are hereby incorporated herein. Although not all the incidents described in the chronologies were proved during the final hearing to have occurred, the Department's consideration of the incidents reported by Mr. Walker was reasonable. Due to the Department's concerns about Ms. Bateman, the Department requested that Ms. Bateman voluntarily participate in the Department's employee assistance program. Ms. Bateman refused. In order to determine what could be done to help Ms. Bateman, and to determine what duties and responsibilities she was capable of performing, the Department requested that Ms. Bateman undergo a psychological, or other, evaluation. Ms. Bateman refused. After discussing the matter with Ms. Bateman and legal counsel she had retained, the Department notified Ms. Bateman that her continued employment was conditioned upon her undergoing a psychological evaluation or some other evaluation which would allow the Department to determine what work she was capable of performing. In a letter of February 12, 1992, Ms. Bateman, through her representative, was informed of the following: As you also know, we are attempting to help Andrea address a problem which we believe exists and has been well documented over the past 16 months. In return, we need Andrea's help and cooperation. If Andrea chooses to agree to our request that she undergo a psychiatric evaluation and authorize the release to us of the psychiatrist's prognosis, diagnosis and recommendation for treatment, we will be glad to schedule an appointment for her with a psychiatrist, and will pay for such an evaluation. We will use the evaluation to determine an appropriate course of action. Ms. Bateman's Termination from Employment. Ms. Bateman continued to refuse to undergo any evaluation or to suggest any alternative course of action. Consequently, based upon Ms. Bateman's inadequate and unacceptable work performance, the Department terminated Ms. Bateman's employment with the Department on or about February 13, 1992. Ms. Bateman's termination from employment was effective February 28, 1992. Ms. Bateman was terminated from employment due to the fact that she was not adequately performing her job and she refused to cooperate with the Department to find out what could be done to help her become an effective employee. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department's reason for terminating her employment was a pretext. Ms. Bateman's Charge of Discrimination. On or about September 15, 1992, Ms. Bateman filed a Charge of Discrimination against the Department with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ms. Bateman alleged that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex and a perceived handicap. On February 10, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Ms. Bateman filed a Request for Redetermination on March 4, 1992. On April 12, 1993, the Commission issued a "Redetermination: No Cause" affirming its decision. On May 12, 1993, Ms. Bateman filed a Petition for Relief seeking a formal administrative hearing. In the petition Ms. Bateman alleged that the Department had discriminated against her on the basis of sex, a perceived handicap and, for the first time, age. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Ms. Bateman. Alleged Sex Discrimination. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that any action of the Department was based upon Ms. Bateman's sex: she was not held to any standard or requirement based upon her sex, she was not terminated because of her sex and the Department's efforts to determine the cause of Ms. Bateman's problems was not based upon her sex. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that any Department policy or standard had a disparate impact on female employees. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was replaced by a male attorney. Ms. Bateman's grooming habits were discussed with her. Some of those discussions concerned the wearing of panty hose and her makeup. It must be inferred that such discussions were not carried on with male employees. The evidence, however, failed to prove that Ms. Bateman's termination was based upon these matters. Although grooming played a part in the decision to terminate Ms. Bateman's employment, it was grooming related to basic cleanliness and neat appearance required of all employees and not just female employees. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, female. Alleged Age Discrimination. At the time that Ms. Bateman was hired she was 41 years of age, and at the time she was terminated she was 42 years of age. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that age played any part in her treatment by the Department. This finding is supported, in part, by the fact that the difference between Ms. Bateman's age when she was hired and when she was terminated was only one year. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was replaced by a younger person. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the persons who made the decision to terminate her employment were aware of her age. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her age. Alleged Perceived Handicap. The Department did believe that Ms. Bateman was suffering from some mental problem. This belief was based upon Ms. Bateman's odd behavior and a concern that Ms. Bateman was "homeless". It was for this reason that the Department requested that Ms. Bateman undergo a psychological evaluation. Ms. Bateman failed to prove, however, that the Department treated her differently from the manner other employees of the Department were treated under similar circumstances. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that the Department's request that she undergo a psychological or other evaluation to determine how to assist her to meet the requirements of her employment was made for a discriminatory reason. Under the circumstances, the Department's request of Ms. Bateman was reasonable. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that she was terminated from employment because of any perceived handicap. The evidence proved that she was in fact terminated from employment due to her inability to satisfactorily carry out her job responsibilities. Ms. Bateman also failed to allege or prove that she has a handicap based upon her mental condition. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of a handicap or a perceived handicap.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues heard at this hearing, Respondent was licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida under License No. ME- 0022000 and was in practice in Orlando. Respondent is Dr. Mario Vega. Dr. James J. Schoeck, a physician practicing in Orlando, was, during 1980, Chairman of the Board of Censors of the Orange County Medical Society (OCMS). In that capacity, he had occasion to contact Respondent based on a letter from Dr. Alberto Herran, Chairman of the Patient Review Committee, founded on a grievance letter from a former patient of Respondent, Debra Mitchell. Ms. Mitchell had complained that she had gone to see Respondent on a medical matter and he had given her a 20-minute pelvic examination without wearing a surgical glove and without a nurse present. Since this was the Respondent's first reported offense allegation, Dr. Schoeck merely discussed the situation with him and got his side of the story, to the effect that a female employee was just down the hall during the examination and nothing out of the ordinary was done. No further action was taken by the OCMS as a result of this. It is not a unique type of complaint for the OCMS which, upon investigation, finds most to be unfounded. Debra Hall Mitchell saw Respondent in his office on September 19, 1980, because she was having a pain in her lower abdominal area, thought she might have an infection of some kind, and wanted it checked. When she got to the office, the only people there were Respondent and his wife, who after weighing her and doing the preliminary activities, took her into an examining room and asked her to disrobe and don a paper examining gown. When Respondent came in, he asked her to lie down on the examining table and asked what her problem was. Ms. Mitchell told him about the pain she was having. At that point, she thought it odd that there was no nurse present in the room with them, but because she had a strong trust in doctors, she did not worry about it. The pelvic examination took approximately 20 minutes with Respondent having the fingers on one hand in her vagina while he pushed on her abdomen with the other hand. When he was finished, he had her stand in front of him with her back to him and examined her vagina with her standing up, again using his other hand to push on her stomach, from time to time asking her if what he was doing hurt her. During the course of the examination, because it took as long as it did, Ms. Mitchell became alarmed and asked Respondent if anything was wrong. He replied that one of her ovaries was enlarged, but not to worry about it. When she got off the table, it was then she noticed that Respondent was not wearing any surgical gloves. She is not sure if he began the pelvic examination by using any type of instrument. After completing the examination, Respondent told Ms. Mitchell to get dressed and left the room. After she was dressed, he came back in, told her he did not find anything except for a slightly enlarged ovary, gave her a prescription for an antibiotic, and requested she come back in a week. When she stopped at the front desk, she did not say anything to the lady there, the Respondent's wife, because she was embarrassed. She merely did the necessary administrative things, including making another appointment and arranging for payment by Medicaid and left. However, as she began telling her friend about what happened on the way home, she got more and more upset; and when she arrived home, she called a female doctor friend of hers who advised her to write to the Medical Society, which she did, but not until two months later. Also, she discussed the situation with a couple of her very closest friends during this period to get advice on what to do about this situation. She neither had the prescription given her by Respondent filled, nor went back to see him again. Several weeks later, when her condition had worsened, she went to see another physician. On April 16, 1982, Georgia S. Fields, 17, went to the Respondent's office to get her birth control pills. She had been to see him four or five times previously, having been taken there initially by her mother, who was also Respondent's patient. When she entered his examining room, Respondent asked her to sit down and asked how her mother was. Then, according to the witness, he had her stand up, and, sitting to the side of her, unzipped her dress and checked her breasts. He then ostensibly pulled her underpants down below her knees and massaged her clitoris for about 10 minutes, during which time he said nothing to her. He then reportedly examined her vagina and told her she was dry. After these activities went on for a while, according to the witness, he then moved her chair behind her and brushed his lips, like a light kiss, across her shoulder. With that, the witness called an immediate halt, at which point the Respondent pulled her panties back up, wrote out her prescription and returned to his office while she went up to the desk. According to the witness, this was unusual, as he usually would accompany her to the desk. Ms. Fields, feeling quite upset about this situation, told the lady at the desk what had happened and refused to pay the bill. When she got home that day, Ms. Fields told her mother what ostensibly had happened and, on the next morning, reported it at the police department. Ms. Fields, as was stated above, has seen Respondent on several different occasions going back to early 1981. Though she denies having had any type of vaginal discharge, she admits to several infections, and her medical records indicate she was treated on various occasions for vaginal discharge. Ms. Fields also states she came in on the day in question only to get a refill on her birth control pills, yet both Respondent's testimony and his patient notes clearly reflect that she complained about low back pain resulting from an injury at work and requested information about a possible disability. Catherine Lynn Griffin, Ms. Fields' cousin, recalled a conversation she had with her shortly after Ms. Fields' last visit to Respondent. At that time, Ms. Fields stated she was angry with Dr. Vega because he would not give her a statement regarding her work. Ms. Fields indicated at the time that she had filed a complaint against the doctor, although she would not say why. She was heard to state at that time words to the effect that "I'll either get some money from him, or he'll lose his license." Coincidentally, Ms. Fields' medical records on file at her work place, Disneyworld, reflect that on June 1, 1982, somewhat over a month after her last visit to Dr. Vega's office, she was seen in the Disney doctor's office complaining of pain in the low back area resulting from pushing a wheelbarrow up a hill while at work in the landscaping department on May 28, 1982. At that time, the doctor put her on light duty for one week. She was seen again in follow up on June 8 and June 22. There is no evidence of any permanent injury. About three weeks after the alleged incident, on April 16, 1982, Ms. Fields' mother came into Respondent's office and apologized to Mrs. Vega, who was working there at the time, saying that she knew her daughter's allegations were not true. Mrs. Fields is still currently a patient of Respondent. Respondent denies any impropriety with Ms. Fields on this or any other occasion. While admitting he did not have a witness in the room while examining Ms. Fields, he states there was no need to do so because there was no pelvic examination conducted. He contends that the visit concerned itself with the birth control pills he prescribed, discussion of resolved prior vaginal discharge problems and continuation of discussion regarding a certification of Ms. Fields' mother as an alcoholic, which he refused to do. The main purpose of the visit related to an examination of her back concerning her request for a disability certificate for work. He also refused to give her the certificate. Dr. Vega also referred to his admitted failure to use gloves, which other evidence showed is sometimes the case with other doctors as well. Both the presence of a witness and the use of gloves are protection for the physician, not the patient. The first protects against unwarranted allegations of improper conduct, and the second, while admittedly protecting the patient from possible infection by the hands of the doctor, equally as important and more likely, protects the doctor from contamination by his patient. Ms. Fields was, at the time of the alleged incident, under 18 years old. She dropped out of school in the ninth grade. She has been described in her medical records as having acne, unpleasant odors from the vaginal area, cervical and vaginal discharges secondary to poor hygiene habits, oily seborrhea and halitosis. Considering the inherent probabilities and improbabilities of the evidence presented, and the permissible influences to be drawn therefrom, the evidence fails to establish sufficiently that this Respondent conducted a vaginal examination on this occasion or made any sexual advances toward Ms. Field by kissing her shoulders.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner dismiss the Administrative Complaint herein. RECOMMENDED this 17th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Charlie L. Adams, Esquire Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Department of Professional Executive Director Regulation Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Department of Professional Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Michael Sigman, Esquire Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Post Office Box 1786 Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent due to Petitioner's race, age, or sex in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner, an African-American male, as a nursing assistant at the community healthcare facility known as Jackson Hospital in Marianna, Florida, at all times relevant to these proceedings. Petitioner obtained his designation as a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) subsequent to his employment by Respondent. Petitioner entered into a conversation with a female co-worker and CNA at Jackson Hospital on or about June 12, 2003. In the course of the conversation, he made an unwelcome sexual request of the co-worker. Petitioner was not on duty at the time and had returned to the hospital for other reasons. Subsequently, on June 12, 2003, the female co-worker filed a complaint with Respondent's human resource office at the hospital alleging unwelcome requests for sexual favors by Petitioner, inclusive of a request that the co-worker engage in sexual relations with Petitioner. In the course of his employment with Respondent, Petitioner was made aware of the strict guidelines and "zero tolerance" policy of Respondent toward sexual harassment. Respondent's policy expressly prohibits sexual advances and requests for sexual favors by employees. Discipline for a violation of this policy ranges from reprimand to discharge from employment of the offending employee. Petitioner has received a copy of the policy previously and he knew that violation of that policy could result in dismissal of an erring employee. Violations of this policy resulted in dismissal of a non- minority employee in the past. Corroboration of Petitioner’s policy violation resulted from interviews with other employees in the course of investigation by the hospital director of human resources. Further, in the course of being interviewed by the director, Petitioner admitted he had propositioned his co-worker for sexual favors. As a result of this policy violation, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment on June 16, 2003. At final hearing, Petitioner admitted the violation of Respondent's policy, but contended that termination of employment had not been effected for white employees for similar offenses in the past. This allegation was specifically rebutted through testimony of Respondent's hospital human resources director that a white male employee had been previously discharged for the same offense. Accordingly, allegations of Petitioner of dissimilar treatment of employees on a racial basis for violation of Respondent's policy are not credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Bowles 4193 Evelyn Street Marianna, Florida 32446 H. Matthew Fuqua, Esquire Bondurant and Fuqua, P.A. Post Office Box 1508 Marianna, Florida 32447 Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was terminated from his employment with Respondent because of his race in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Chester R. Cooper, is an African-American male. He was employed by Respondent, Gulf Coast Treatment Center, on May 19, 1998, as a youth care worker at its facility in Fort Walton Beach, Florida (assignment center). Petitioner was terminated on November 5, 1998. During his employment, Petitioner worked the "midnight shift" from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. His supervisor was Ollie Rainwater. Respondent operated its facility under a contract with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). The Fort Walton Beach facility performs behavioral, medical, educational, and psychological assessments and completes a 21-day report to DJJ prior to the assignment of a each youth to a residential commitment facility. The program director of the Center was Mikel Currie. In November 1998, four of the five shift supervisors were African-Americans, and approximately 50 percent of the youth care workers at the Center are African-Americans. Pursuant to the requirements of the DJJ, the Center promulgated and briefed all employees on a Use of Force Policy, which provided in relevant part, that mechanical restraints, such as handcuffs or leg cuffs, may be used upon the youths only to prevent injury or property damage. The policy prohibits the shackling of youths together and the practice of hog-tying. Hog-tying is securing a youth's legs and hands together behind the youth's back. The policy also required that any use of mechanical restraints be reported in writing by the staff member involved within two hours of the incident. All youth care workers are provided with some training in this area. The Employee Conduct Policy expressly prohibits the "shielding" of any employee from the consequences of misconduct and imposes a duty upon all employees to report any misconduct. The language of this policy does not limit these reporting obligations to one's immediate supervisor. Such reports may be made to the program director or any member of the administration. Petitioner was aware of the policy to report misconduct, but believed that he was supposed to report the misconduct to his immediate supervisor, who was the person who was actually perpetrating the misconduct involved in this case. On November 4, 1998, Petitioner was assigned to the Boys' Unit of the Assignment Center. His shift began at 10:00 p.m., on November 4, 1998, and ended at 6:30 a.m., on November 5, 1998. Ollie Rainwater (African-American), shift supervisor, and Jimmy Coleman (African-American), youth care worker, were the only other employees assigned to the Boys' Unit on Petitioner's shift. Jesse Mathews (Caucasian) worked on November 3 and 4, 1998, on the second shift, from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. On November 3, 1998, Annette Whittlesay, a youth care worker on the female side of the facility observed Ollie Rainwater and Jesse Mathews, handcuff two youths together. However, she never reported this information to anyone in the administration. The Boys' Unit is comprised of two residential sides, each of which is approximately 75 to 80 feet long. The residential sides form a hallway divided by double doors. When Petitioner arrived at work on November 4, 1998, he observed Quentin Williams and Ricky Sheets handcuffed together. The handcuffing occurred when Petitioner was at the other end of the hall. The doors were closed and Petitioner did not see the actual handcuffing. The youths told Petitioner that Mr. Rainwater, along with Jimmy Coleman, handcuffed them. It took a while for Petitioner to obtain this information because the two youths were fighting each other while cuffed. During this time Petitioner sat down. Petitioner then went to find the key to the cuffs to uncuff the boys. Upon the program director's arrival at the Center, around 5:00 a.m., on November 5, 1998, one of the youths, Quentin Williams, reported to him that he had been handcuffed together with another youth, Ricky Sheets, by Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman. Quentin Williams reported that one of his wrists and one of his ankles had been shackled to the wrist and the ankle of Ricky Sheets, and that they had fought with each other while shackled together. During this struggle, Quentin Williams had been bitten on his finger by Sheets. Quentin Williams also told Mikel Currie that Petitioner had sat in a chair and laughed at them while they struggled. Mikel Currie sent Quentin Williams to the nurse for treatment of his finger and immediately commenced an investigation of the matter. Mikel Currie determined that no report of any use of mechanical restraints had been made by anyone from the night shift. Mikel Currie directed each of the youths who had been shackled or had witnessed the shackling or hog-tying to prepare a written statement in their own words. In order to avoid any collusion, the youths were separated from each other as they prepared their written statements. After the youths completed their written statements, each one was interviewed separately by Mikel Currie and Keith Williams (African-American), the first shift supervisor. Quentin Williams told Mikel Currie and Keith Williams that he had been shackled to Ricky Sheets by Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman on two consecutive nights. He also told them that "Mr. Cooper was sitting in a chair laughing" while he and Sheets were fighting. The youth did not state that any other employee was involved in the incident. Ricky Sheets' report was consistent with that of Quentin Williams. He identified Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman as the two staff members who had shackled him to Quentin Williams and did not state that any other employee was involved in the shackling. Youth, Frederick Alls, confirmed that Jimmy Coleman and Ollie Rainwater had shackled Quentin Williams and Ricky Sheets together on two nights and that Ollie Rainwater had hog- tied Alls with a set of leg cuffs earlier that morning. Alls did not state that any other employee was involved in the shackling or hog-tying. Youth, Brandon Mason, told Mikel Currie and Quentin Williams that two youths had been shackled together by Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman. He also told Mikel Currie and Keith Williams that Petitioner sat in a chair watching while Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman shackled Quentin Williams and Ricky Sheets together. Mason identified Ollie Rainwater, Jimmy Coleman, and Petitioner as the only employees involved in the shackling incidents. Two other youths, Edward Roberson and John Croshat, were interviewed and identified Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman as the staff members who shackled the two youths together. During the investigation, none of the six youths who were interviewed ever told Mikel Currie or Keith Williams that Jessie Mathews, a white youth care worker assigned to the evening shift (2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.) had participated in any mechanical restraints or misconduct of any nature. From the youths, Mikel Currie determined that the shackling incidents occurred around 1:00 a.m., several hours after Jessie Mathews had left the Center. Neither Mikel Currie nor Keith Williams had any reason to suspect Jesse Mathews was involved. Mikel Currie and Keith Williams interviewed Ollie Rainwater on the afternoon of November 5, 1998. Ollie Rainwater admitted his involvement in the shackling and hog-tying incidents of November 4 and 5, 1998. He was terminated for violations of the Center's Use of Force and Employee Conduct policies. Ollie Rainwater never claimed that Jessie Mathews, or any other white employee, had been involved in misconduct. Mikel Currie and Keith Williams also interviewed Jimmy Coleman that same afternoon. Jimmy Coleman admitted that he was involved in the incidents on November 4 and 5, 1998. His role had been to bring the restraints to Ollie Rainwater when he ordered him to do so. Jimmy Coleman was terminated from employment. At hearing Jimmy Coleman testified he told Mikel Currie and Keith Williams that Jesse Mathews had participated in a similar incident the day before. However, the assertion is not credible because Mikel Currie and Keith Williams both testified unequivocally that Jimmy Coleman never mentioned that Jesse Mathews, or any other white employee, had been involved. This testimony is bolstered by the interviews given by the various youths. Mikel Currie attempted to reach Petitioner several times by telephone on November 5, 1998, but was unsuccessful. Keith Williams reached Petitioner by telephone around 1:00 p.m. on that date, as detailed in his contemporaneous memorandum of this conversation. Keith Williams asked Petitioner if he was aware of the shackling incidents and Petitioner denied any knowledge. Petitioner repeated several times that he knew nothing about the incidents. He made that statement because he did not directly see the handcuffing of the youths. He did not reveal his knowledge regarding events after the act of handcuffing. Mikel Currie and Keith Williams did not believe Petitioner's claims that he knew nothing about the incident because the Boys' Unit is a relatively small area (150 feet in length), Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman admitted their involvement and several of the youths had stated that Petitioner had observed the shackling incident. Accordingly, Mikel Currie and Keith Williams decided to terminate Petitioner for knowingly attempting to mislead Keith Williams during the course of the investigation, failure to report the improper restraint of the youths, and humiliating the youths by laughing at them while they were shackled. Petitioner was terminated on November 7, 1998. Contrary to his testimony, Petitioner never advised Mikel Currie, Keith Williams, or any other member of management that Jessie Mathews had any alleged involvement in the improper use of restraints. In his "Letter of Rebuttal" submitted to the Center four and one-half months after his termination, Petitioner never mentioned any involvement on the part of Jessie Mathews. He did, however, admit in this letter that he did observe the two youths shackled together while they fought. Since Respondent did not know of Jessie Mathews' similar behavior, Jessie Mathews was not terminated or otherwise disqualified. Later, however, Jessie Mathews, the white employee involved in the November 3, 1998, handcuffing was involved in an argument with another shift supervisor. Mr. Mathews used profanity and acted unprofessionally. He was suspended and demoted as a result of his misconduct. During the two months following the termination of Ollie Rainwater, Jeremy Coleman, and Petitioner, a majority of the individuals hired as youth care workers at the Center were minority group members (7 African-Americans and 1 Hispanic out of 15 hirees). Robert Cannon, a white youth care worker, was terminated by Mikel Currie on October 16, 1998, for suspicion of being under the influence of alcohol and refusing to take a drug/alcohol test. Neither Mikel Currie nor Keith Williams had any knowledge of any prior misconduct of this nature on the part of Robert Cannon. Tammy Curry, a white female youth care worker, was subject to an assault by a female youth on December 13, 1998. Mikel Currie placed Tammy Curry on leave while he investigated the incident. Based upon his investigation, Mikel Currie reinstated Tammy Curry because he determined that she had been punched in the face and pulled down the hallway by her hair by a youth in an unprovoked attack. Mikel Currie concluded that she had acted properly in self-defense. The youth was charged with battery and Tammy Curry was reinstated. Additionally, the Inspector General at the Department of Children and Family Services conducted its own investigation and cleared Tammy Curry of any wrongdoing. The Robert Canon and Tammy Curry incidents are not similar to Petitioner's circumstances. Respondent, including the unit presently known as the Okaloosa Youth Academy, actively pursues a policy of affirmative action designed to recruit minorities. As of the spring of 2000, the Center employed 138 individuals, the majority of whom (72 employees ) were African-American. After Petitioner's termination from the Center, Petitioner sought employment to replace the income he lost from this employment. On February 21, 2000, Petitioner began working for Correctional Services Corporation as an on-call youth worker. His earnings through the date of the hearing are $8,013.56. He earns $8.30 per hour. He averages approximately 24 hours per week.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: R. John Westberry, Esquire Holt & Westberry, P.L. 1108-A North 12th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32501-3308 Kevin L. O'Dea, Esquire McGlinchey Stafford 643 Magazine Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Azizi Coleman, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Hispanic male. Respondent is an 860-unit apartment complex in Ocala. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a full-time maintenance technician from 2001 through September 28, 2007. His job responsibilities included performing repairs and general maintenance work on the insides of the apartments. Petitioner’s starting wage in 2001 was $9.00 per hour. He received annual raises from 2001 to 2004, at which point his wage was $11.75 per hour. Petitioner did not receive any raises from 2004 through 2007. He was still earning $11.75 per hour when he was fired on September 28, 2007. Starting in 2004, Respondent did not give raises to any maintenance technicians who were not HVAC-certified. This policy applied equally to all maintenance technicians, including non-Hispanics, and was intended to encourage them to get HVAC- certified. HVAC certification was important to Respondent because the air conditioning systems at the apartment complex were getting older and were requiring more frequent repairs. Respondent provided the necessary study materials for the HVAC certification exam and paid for the exam. Petitioner is not HVAC-certified. He took the certification exam once, but he did not pass. He did not take the exam again, even though Respondent would have paid for him to do so as it did for other maintenance technicians. HVAC certification is not required to perform all types of work on air conditioners, and Petitioner continued to do some work on the air conditioners at the apartment complex after 2004 even though he was not HVAC-certified. Petitioner was characterized as a “fair” employee who did “okay” work. His supervisor, a Hispanic male, testified that there were some jobs that he did not assign to Petitioner, that Petitioner frequently got help from other employees, and that he received a couple of complaints from other maintenance technicians about Petitioner’s work. Respondent does not have an employee handbook, and the only written policy that Respondent has is a policy prohibiting sexual and other harassment. Respondent’s executive director, Laura Smith, testified that she expected employees to use “common sense” regarding what they can and cannot do at work. Respondent utilizes a system of progressive discipline, which starts with warnings (oral, then written) and culminates in dismissal. However, the nature of the misconduct determines the severity of the discipline imposed, and a serious first offense may result in dismissal. On October 5, 2006, Petitioner was given an oral warning for “improper conduct” for visiting with a housekeeper multiple times a day for as long as 20 minutes at a time. The housekeeper also received an oral warning for this conduct. On May 15, 2007, Petitioner was given a written warning for the same “improper conduct,” i.e., wasting time by going into an apartment to visit with a housekeeper. Petitioner acknowledged receiving these warnings, but he denied engaging in the conduct upon which they were based. His denials were contradicted by the more credible testimony of his supervisor and Ms. Smith. Petitioner was fired on September 28, 2007, after a third incident of “improper conduct.” On that day, Petitioner left the apartment complex around 10 a.m. to get gas in his truck. He did not “clock out” or get permission from his supervisor before leaving the apartment complex. Petitioner was away from the apartment complex for at least 15 minutes, but likely no more than 30 minutes. Even though Respondent does not have written policies and procedures, Petitioner understood, and common sense dictates that he was supposed to get his supervisor’s approval and “clock out” before he left the complex on a personal errand. Petitioner also understood the procedure to be followed to get the 14 gallons of gas per week that Respondent provided for maintenance technicians. The procedure required the employee to get the company credit card from the bookkeeper, get the gas from a specific gas station, and then return the credit card and a signed receipt for the gas to the bookkeeper. Petitioner did not follow any aspect of this procedure on the day that he was fired. He had already gotten the 14 gallons of gas paid for by Respondent earlier in the week. Petitioner’s supervisor, a Hispanic male, compared Petitioner’s actions to “stealing from the company” because he was getting paid for time that he was not at the apartment complex working. He also expressed concern that Respondent could have been held liable if Petitioner had gotten in an accident on his way to or from getting gas because he was still “on the clock” at the time. Petitioner testified that he and other maintenance technicians routinely left the apartment complex to fill up their cars with gas without “clocking out” or getting permission from their supervisor. This testimony was corroborated only as to the 14 gallons of gas paid for each week by Respondent. There is no credible evidence that other employees routinely left the apartment complex to do personal errands without “clocking out,” and if they did, there is no credible evidence that Respondent’s managers were aware of it. There is no credible evidence whatsoever that Petitioner’s firing was motivated by his national origin. His supervisor is Hispanic, and he and Ms. Smith credibly testified that the fact that Petitioner was Hispanic played no role in her decision to fire Petitioner. Petitioner claimed that he was “harassed” by Ms. Smith and that she accused him of having sex with a housekeeper in the vacant apartments. No persuasive evidence was presented to support Petitioner’s “harassment” claim, which was credibly denied by Ms. Smith. Petitioner also claimed that he was disciplined differently than similar non-Hispanic employees, namely James Stroupe, Jason Head, and Willie Hutchinson. Mr. Stroupe is a white male. He worked on the grounds crew, not as a maintenance technician. In May 2007, Mr. Stroupe was given a written warning based upon allegations that he was making explosive devices at work, and in September 2007, he was given an oral warning for “wasting time” by hanging out in the woods with Mr. Head. Mr. Head is a white male. He worked on the grounds crew, not as a maintenance technician. In September 2007, he received a written warning for “wasting time” by hanging out in the woods with Mr. Stroupe. Mr. Hutchinson is a white male, and like Petitioner, he worked as a maintenance technician. In September 2007, he was arrested for DUI. Mr. Hutchinson was not disciplined by Respondent for this incident because it did not happen during working hours and it did not affect his ability to perform his job duties as maintenance technician. The grounds department (in which Mr. Stroupe and Mr. Head worked) was responsible for maintaining the landscaping around the apartment complex, whereas the maintenance department (in which Petitioner and Mr. Hutchinson worked) was responsible for maintaining the insides of the apartments. The departments had different supervisors. Petitioner was initially denied unemployment compensation by Respondent after he was fired, but he successfully appealed the denial to an Appeals Referee. Petitioner received unemployment compensation through April 2008. On April 11, 2008, Petitioner started working for Holiday Inn as a maintenance technician. He is employed full time and his wage is $11.50 per hour. Respondent placed an advertisement in the local newspaper after Petitioner was fired in order to fill his position in the maintenance department. The advertisement stated that Respondent was looking for an applicant who was HVAC-certified. Respondent hired Javier Herrera to fill the position. Mr. Herrera, like Petitioner, is a Hispanic male.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 2008.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based upon her race.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, an African-American female, submitted an application for employment directly with the store manager, Jerry Wienhoff. Mr. Wienhoff personally interviewed Petitioner and hired her within 48 hours of her application for the afternoon clerk position. She began working for Respondent on July 21, 2009. Petitioner received a notice of a disciplinary issue on March 9, 2010. Respondent cited Petitioner for failure to complete her work in a timely manner. Petitioner was warned that if her work did not improve, her employment would be terminated. Not long after issuance of this disciplinary notice, Mr. Wienhoff, the store manager and Pensacola Regional Manager for 17 years, began receiving complaints about Petitioner's behavior. One complaint came from a long-time customer, while another came from a co-employee. The complaints were that Petitioner treated them rudely. During her employment, Petitioner complained that her work duties were heavier than those of the morning clerk. Mr. Wienhoff relieved Petitioner of certain duties related to tagging each garment dropped off during the afternoon shift. None of the other stores out of the four area stores had similar requests to remove this duty. Petitioner testified that the morning clerk, a white female, Amanda Sidner, was given a lighter workload. Petitioner further testified that Ms. Sidner was given additional hours during Petitioner's vacation, yet Petitioner was not given additional hours during Ms. Sidner's vacation. Mr. Wienhoff testified and Petitioner admitted that she took vacation days during the same week that Ms. Sidner took vacation days. Further, Petitioner was given additional hours during the days Ms. Sidner was on vacation, and the balance of those hours that Petitioner was not interested in working went to Petitioner's daughter, Anastarsia Martinez, also an African- American female. On December 14, 2010, Petitioner was issued her second and final corrective action report by Mr. Wienhoff. At that time, Mr. Wienhoff terminated Petitioner due to the ongoing complaints about her behavior in the workplace. Respondent also established the racial composition of every employee under Mr. Wienhoff's supervision. The company profile in Pensacola shows a racially diverse mix of employees. Petitioner candidly testified that she never heard Mr. Wienhoff make racially insensitive comments to her or any other employee. Her claim of discrimination is based upon favoritism. She believes that other employees were treated better than she, but did not tie this perceived favorable treatment to their race.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that no act of discrimination was committed by Respondent and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Groendyke, Esquire Douberley & Cicero 1000 Sawgrass Corporate Parkway, Suite 590 Sunrise, Florida 33323 Mary Cottrell 776 Backwoods Road Century, Florida 32535 Christopher J. Rush, Esquire Christopher J. Rush & Associates, P.A. 1880 North Congress Avenue, Suite 206 Boynton Beach, Florida 33426 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
