Findings Of Fact Progressive American Insurance Company is a property and casualty insurance company. It markets auto insurance to drivers who are ordinarily non- insurable by standard insurance companies. The Company's claims organization includes 18 claims offices throughout the state, including the relevant Gainesville claims office. The Petitioner was hired as a claims office assistant on December 17, 1986. She worked in that capacity in the Gainesville office throughout the course of her employment. Claims office assistants are clerical employees who perform secretarial tasks, such as typing, filing and answering the telephone, and also perform insurance work related to the claims processing, such as personal injury protection (PIP) and small loss claims. Claims office assistants, such as the Petitioner, also provide support to the adjusters in the office by typing their dictation and taking down information on accident reports or loss reports, as well as creating files. The Gainesville claims office is a small branch office and as of December 1, 1986, was staffed by a Branch Manager, Douglas Helton, two claims adjusters and two claims office assistants, one of whom was the Petitioner. Douglas Helton was promoted to the position of Branch Manager in the Gainesville office in mid-1986. He hired Debbie Fuller and supervised her throughout her tenure with the Company. Progressive has adopted a business philosophy known as "management by objectives." Under this philosophy, each employee is assigned objectives which explain what is expected and the standards involved with the job. The employee's performance is then measured against those standards. Employees receive an overall numerical assessment of their performance on a 1-4 scale. The average score on performance evaluations in the Florida division of the Company has ranged from about 2.86 to 2.92. When the Petitioner was hired, she was placed in a three-month training plan by the Branch Manager and was assigned a set of objectives. Her performance was evaluated against these objectives at the end of 90 days, and she was given a 2.44 overall rating. Mr. Helton regarded her work as satisfactory at that time. The Petitioner was then assigned another set of three-month objectives. These objectives included the assignment to her of personal injury protection work, as well as small losses work for the first time. She was given individualized training by Helton and the other claims office assistant, Christine Bivens. She applied for and obtained a temporary license to do PIP claims work, which was valid from March of 1987 to March of 1988. She received another performance evaluation at the end of the second three-month period, with a score of 2.597. Mr. Helton, again, described her performance as satisfactory, although her score was below average. In June of 1987, Helton assigned the Petitioner another set of performance objectives, this time for six months. These objectives also included the assignment to her of PIP claims work. Her performance was evaluated again at the end of six months in December of 1987. This time, she scored 2.0, which is the lowest score an employee can receive before he or she is put on a 30-day performance probation, also known as "short term objectives." The Petitioner's performance was deficient because of non-timely processing of claims. Although her PIP case load was only about one-quarter of that of claims assistant, Christine Bivens, she allowed PIP files to "fall off her diary." This means that the medical bills involved were not being paid or timely paid. One such failure to pay medical bills actually resulted in a lawsuit being filed against her employer. When Mr. Helton reviewed some of her files in the process of preparing her performance evaluation, he discovered that most of the files had not been timely processed. She also received a poor rating for her work in typing dictation. Mr. Helton received complaints from all of the workers in the office concerning the Petitioner's typing skills and had orally counseled her in the past regarding this aspect of her work. Another major area of performance deficiency involved the Petitioner's failure to secure a permanent PIP and small loss license. She took the examination for the license and did not pass it. She was scheduled to take it again in November of 1987, but failed to do so. Mike Painter, the claims adjuster, had a bad experience with the Petitioner's work performance. He had a problem with her typing, which was characterized by a high level of inaccuracy and delay. He became sufficiently dissatisfied with her typing that he began doing his own typing. He discussed these problems with Mr. Helton on a number of occasions. He also had experience with the Petitioner taking down inaccurate information on loss reports. Mr. Painter found the Petitioner erratic in her attention to detail and that her work pace was significantly slower than the rest of the people in the office. Christine Bivens, another co-worker, also testified regarding the Petitioner's performance. Her initial performance during the first six months was acceptable, but then she began slowing down her work production. Because of this, Ms. Bivens had to put more time, herself, into the dictation typing and the loss reports She complained to Mr. Helton, as well; and Mr. Helton counseled the Petitioner concerning these deficiencies. After these counseling sessions, she would improve her performance for a short while; but the improvement was only temporary. Mr. Helton prepared Ms. Fuller's final performance evaluation around December 17, 1987. The two of them discussed the evaluation; and although she was not content with it, she ultimately accepted it. In the meantime, the Petitioner had become pregnant and began discussing the matter of maternity leave with Mr. Helton. In October or November of 1987, she had several conferences with him about the subject matter of her leave. Two of these conferences were attended by Christine Bivens. During the course of these meetings, Ms. Fuller requested a maternity leave of eight to 12 weeks. Mr. Helton told Ms. Fuller that she would not be provided a 12-week leave. Ms. Bivens testified that Mr. Helton told Ms. Fuller that he could not approve a 12-week leave. Sometime in December of 1987, Ms. Fuller began having premature contractions and told Mr. Helton she would not be able to work a full eight-hour day. Mr. Helton accepted that situation and told her she could work whatever hours per day she wanted to work. She thus began working five or six hour days. On December 17, 1987, Mr. Helton wrote a memorandum to the Human Resources Office of his Company, regarding Ms. Fuller's performance and her upcoming maternity leave. In that memorandum, he criticized her performance, writing that she demonstrated "minimal commitment to excellence and handles her responsibilities in a passive manner." He also noted that Ms. Fuller had requested a three-month leave of absence which he had refused. In this memorandum, Mr. Helton also indicated that he intended to hold her employment position open for her for a period of only four weeks. When he drafted this memorandum and prepared the Petitioner's performance evaluation, he gave some consideration to putting her on "thirty-day objectives." Under the circumstances of her imminent maternity leave, he decided that such an action would be inappropriate and assigned her objectives for May 17, 1988 instead. The Respondent has a policy concerning leaves of absence by which employees with less than one year of service are eligible for a four week leave of absence. Employees with between one and five years of service are eligible for a six-week leave. The Petitioner had one year of service, effective December 17, 1987. Therefore, she was qualified; and, indeed, the Respondent determined that she should have a six-week leave of absence related to her pregnancy. The Petitioner's supervisor, Mr. Helton, advised the Petitioner that she was not entitled to and would not receive a 12-week leave of absence, as she requested. Ms. Fuller also acknowledged in her testimony that Tammy Taylor, who worked in the Human Resources or personnel office of the Respondent, had informed her that she was entitled to a six-week leave of absence. Her colleague, Ms. Bivens, recalled that both Mr. Helton and Ms. Fuller had checked with the Human Resources office of Progressive and that both had learned that she was entitled to a six-week leave. Robin Hart, who worked in the Human Resources office at the time, told Ms. Fuller that she was entitled to and could take a six-week leave of absence and that any leave past that six-week period would be unapproved, as not being in accordance with Company policy. The Petitioner received a note from her treating physician on December 22, 1987 instructing her to discontinue her activities, including regular employment as of that date. Ms. Fuller initially testified at the hearing that she then met with Mr. Helton on that date, gave him the note and had a conversation with him concerning her leave of absence. She later changed her testimony, however, upon introduction by Progressive of evidence showing that Mr. Helton was on vacation on that date. She also changed her testimony regarding her last day at work. She had initially testified that the date was January 4, 1988, but following testimony by Christine Bivens, her co-worker, to the effect that her last day was December 29, 1987, she agreed that was her last day of work. Thus, she continued to work after her doctor had instructed her to cease her employment pending her delivery. Ms. Fuller, instead of personally discussing her leave with Mr. Helton on the final occasion before she actually left her employment, left a note for him on his desk while he was on vacation, along with her request for a 12-week leave of absence from January 4, 1988 through March 29, 1988. Upon his return from his Christmas vacation, Mr. Helton saw the leave request and reviewed it. He checked the box on the form marked "cannot approve" and wrote on the form "maximum allowed for 1 yr. employee is 4 weeks. Debbie requests excess of 12 weeks." Mr. Helton then submitted the leave of absence form to the Human Resources office in Tampa and conversed with Marilyn Kaschner of that office concerning the length of the requested leave and how long he should leave the Petitioner's job open for her. Ms. Kaschner informed him that the Petitioner was entitled to a six-week leave of absence based upon her tenure with the Company, and Mr. Helton agreed with that. That conversation occurred sometime between January 15th and the end of January of 1988. At approximately this time, Mr. Helton hired Wendy Rosenberg, as a full-time claims office assistant, and Renee Jackson, as a part-time claims office assistant. Ms. Fuller's replacement was required because the Gainesville office was very busy during the fall of 1987 and the early part of 1988. Ms. Rosenberg began employment on January 15, 1988, and Ms. Jackson was employed on January 25, 1988. Ms. Jackson was hired into a newly-approved part-time position, and Ms. Rosenberg replaced Ms. Fuller. Both employees were advised when they were hired that if Ms. Fuller returned upon the expiration of her maternity leave, she would have her choice of either the full-time or part-time positions which Ms. Rosenberg and Ms. Jackson were filling. In fact, Ms. Fuller did not return within the six-week time period. Mr. Helton subsequently contacted his supervisor, Jim Krahn; and they decided voluntarily to hold her position open for another week. She was eventually terminated, effective February 29, 1988, some nine weeks after her last day of work. Mr. Krahn at this time authorized Mr. Helton to permanently hire Ms. Rosenberg and Ms. Jackson. Ms. Fuller testified about a number of conversations she allegedly had with Mr. Helton during 1988. According to Ms. Fuller, the first one took place about the second week of January at the Gainesville office, attended by Ms. Fuller, Mr. Helton, Ms. Bivens and two claims adjusters in the office. Ms. Fuller maintains that Mr. Helton told her that he had turned in her "leave papers" and that things were fine and that there was no problem. Mr. Helton did not recall the conversation, but was positive that he would not have told her that everything was fine with her leave request because it was an excessive request. In any event, Ms. Bivens, who was present during the conversation, had no recollection of the tenor of it. However, under the circumstances under which the conversation apparently was made with a number of other employees present, it is unlikely that any in-depth discussion of the propriety of the leave request was entered into. In any event, Ms. Fuller had been informed otherwise, by the Human Resources office in Tampa, that she was only entitled to six weeks of leave. Both Mr. Helton and Ms. Fuller had conversations in March regarding her employment. Mr. Helton noted that the dates of the conversations were March 16 and 21, 1988, as he noted them on Ms. Fuller's termination form. During the first conversation, he advised Ms. Fuller that he did not have a position for her in his office. This is when Ms. Fuller learned of her ultimate termination. He did not have a conversation with her between February 29th and March 16th because he thought that Human Resources was going to send her a termination letter. The first conversation with her thus occurred on March 16th concerning the subject of her termination. Following this conversation, Ms. Fuller called Ms. Hart at the Human Resources office and informed her that Mr. Helton had guaranteed her a job when she wanted to return from maternity leave. Ms. Hart advised Mr. Helton of this representation and he denied it. Subsequently, on March 21st, there was an angry conversation between Mr. Helton and Ms. Fuller concerning what Mr. Helton believed to be Ms. Fuller's misrepresentation of his earlier statement concerning her job tenure and the availability of a position whenever she wanted to return. In any event, Mr. Helton, on March 21, 1988 executed Ms. Fuller's termination form and on the second page of the form, indicated she was ineligible for rehire. He considered her ineligible because her past performance bad been substandard and also because he felt that she had made misrepresentations to the Human Resources office concerning the conditions under which he had informed her that she could return to work. Accordingly, when there was later an opening in the Gainesville office for a claims office assistant, he did not consider offering Ms. Fuller that employment. Ms. Marilyn Kaschner testified about the company leave policy and statistical records of leaves of absence for the claims organization of Progressive. She reviewed and compiled a list of all leaves of absence for the last two and one-half years for the claims office portion of the company's operations in Florida. This list showed that eight employees, in addition to Ms. Fuller, had taken leaves of absence during that time period. Four of those leaves of absence were for childbirth. In each instance, the employee was allowed to return to her job. In those instances, the employees had taken leaves of absence which were in accordance with the company's leave of absence duration policy. It is also noteworthy that the Petitioner was accorded short- term disability insurance benefits during her leave of absence in accordance with company policy.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petition of Debbie Fuller be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-480 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on the subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on the subject matter. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, except for the last sentence. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, as contrary to the Preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. Rejected, as contrary to the Preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as not itself material and dispositive. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as not itself material and dispositive. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as not itself material and dispositive. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter and as not itself material and dispositive. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: John P. McAdams, Esq. CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD, EMMANUEL, SMITH & CUTLER, P.A. P.O. Box 3239 Tampa, FL 33601 Carla D. Franklin, Esq. P.O. Box 694 Gainesville, FL 32601 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Mr. Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a healthcare facility that provides in- patient nursing care to patients after their surgery. As a healthcare facility, Respondent employs an ethnically diverse staff of nurses, including several black nurses. Petitioner is a black female. As such, Petitioner is a protected person under chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Additionally, Petitioner is a Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN). She received her nursing license in 2002 and has worked in the nursing field since that time. Currently, she is completing her education to become a Registered Nurse. In March 2011, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as an LPN on its skilled medical surgical unit in Tallahassee, Florida. Petitioner was supervised by the Director of Nursing (DON), Michelle, who was, in turn, supervised by Heritage's administrator, Brenda. Both the DON and administrator are white. An important part of Respondent's service is the administration of prescribed medications to its patients in accordance with the medication's prescribed dosage and schedule. As an LPN at Heritage, Petitioner was responsible for the proper administration of medications to patients under her care. At some point, two patients accused Petitioner of giving them their medications earlier than they were supposed to receive them. Although the evidence is unclear, these accusations may have been reported to the administration of Heritage by another nurse who worked the same unit as Petitioner and who Petitioner believed was jealous of her because the patients preferred Petitioner's care to that of the other nurse. Additionally, Petitioner testified that one of the patients told her that she was bribed with a package of cigarettes by the other nurse to make the allegations. However, neither of these patients testified at the hearing. As a consequence, such patient statements constitute uncorroborated hearsay and cannot be considered in this proceeding. Petitioner denies that she ever gave these two patients medication earlier than the prescribed time. Sometime around April 1, 2011, Petitioner was called into a meeting with the administrator and the DON for a "number 2 write-up." There was no evidence that demonstrated the nature of such a disciplinary action or the action that would be taken for such a write-up. The write-up was based on the allegations of the two patients referenced above. However, there was no evidence that Respondent did not investigate or follow its policy on employee discipline. Indeed there was no evidence regarding any of Respondent's policies. Likewise, there was no evidence that other similarly-situated, non-protected employees had received less discipline for similarly alleged infractions. Petitioner tried to explain what the patient had told her about being bribed and making her allegation up. Petitioner also asked the administrator to explain what a "number 2 write- up" was since she did not know, and did not know at the hearing, what such a write-up was. The administrator said she did not have to explain anything, slammed her hand down on her desk, and loudly said "you people make me sick." The administrator also referenced something about lying and trying to cover things up instead of admitting mistakes. There was no substantive evidence that the administrator’s very subjective statement was a reference to Petitioner's race or was intended as a racial epithet. Indeed, viewed objectively, the statement appears to be, at worst, abusive or rude. Ultimately, there was insufficient evidence upon which to base a finding (or to infer) that these remarks were anything but an administrator venting her exasperation at staff. Without more, such language is not the sort of language that anti-discrimination laws are designed to reach. Petitioner was told to sign the write-up or be terminated. She was understandably offended by the administrator's behavior, refused to sign "something that was untrue,” wished the administrator "Jehovah's blessing" and left. Petitioner never returned to the facility and her paycheck was mailed to her. However, as indicated, the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that Petitioner was the victim of racial discrimination. The Petition for Relief should, therefore, be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Kareen Anita Gantt 1340 Mount Hosea Church Road Quincy, Florida 32352 Michael McKelvaine Heritage Health Care 1815 Ginger Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues here, the Petitioner, Carol C. Bledsoe, was a part-time employee of the University of Central Florida (U.C.F.) U.C.F. is an agency of the State of Florida, whose employees are eligible for participation in the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self-Insurance Plan (Plan), administered by Respondent, D.O.A. On December 1, 1980, Petitioner applied for full family coverage under the Plan, with coverage to be effective January 1, 1981. The application form executed by Petitioner was submitted to the Benefits Coordinator at the personnel office at U.C.F. At the time of submission, that portion of the form reserved for "payroll clerk use only" was left blank. The Benefits Coordinator, after checking the form to insure all required information was supplied by the applicant, Petitioner, forwarded it to the payroll department at U.C.F. It was at that office that the payroll clerk inserted an erroneous deduction code on December 2, 1980. The incorrect deduction code inserted was "0.2." the proper deduction code which should have been inserted to reflect Petitioner's status was "42." Though the current Benefits Coordinator indicates an applicant who is a part-time employee, such as Petitioner here, is given, at the time application for coverage is made, a form to show what the correct deduction for the requested coverage will be, this calculation is made by the Benefits Coordinator for the employee based on a formula which calls for a different rate for part- time employees. A part-time employee's contribution to the premium (the amount deducted) is higher than that of a full-time employee. The current coordinator, Ms. Evans, cannot state that Petitioner got the described form when she applied, and Petitioner denies having received it. There is no evidence to show Petitioner received any indication of what the deduction should or would be until the deductions from her pay began on January 9, 1981, with the deduction for the pay period December 19, 1980 - January 1, 1981. At that time, the deduction made was $14.37. The corrected deduction should have been $19.52 per pay period. Here, the deduction from Petitioner's pay was calculated on the erroneous basis that she was a full-time employee, thereby resulting in a smaller deduction that was correct. This insufficient deduction continued until the discrepancy was discovered due to an audit in March, 1983. The parties stipulate that the total shortage in issue is $345.78. During the approximately 2 1/4 years that the improper deduction was being withheld from Petitioner's pay each pay period, Petitioner was fully covered under the full family coverage plan. During this period, she filed only one claim -- a small one for an injury to her son -- and was paid the amount claimed. During this same period, she underwent several inquiries into her pay, instigated by her, to correct other inaccuracies in her pay. At no time prior to the March, 1983 audit was the incorrect health insurance deduction discovered, and Petitioner had no indication that amount being deducted for that purpose was incorrect. From an examination of her biweekly employee's earning statement, there was no way she could have known her pay was in error in this particular. Several factors contributed to the error. One of these was that personnel in the payroll department of U.C.F. were doing things wrong. Another was that Petitioner was not a typical employee, and her situation required specialized handling by personnel and payroll which was not given. None of these factors, however, was within the control of the Petitioner. Changes made in the procedures followed within the agency as a result of a reorganization in January, 1982 -- made as the result of the recognition of numerous payroll problems over several months involving numerous other employees on the insurance plan -- should prevent recurrence of Petitioner's situation. However, Petitioner was in no way responsible for the creating of her situation and acted in good faith throughout the entire period. When she was notified of the error, she immediately took the appropriate steps to correct it and now pays the appropriate premium for the desired coverage. When an error is discovered, as happened here, the employee is notified that he or she has overpaid and the employee is reimbursed. On the other hand, if the employee has underpaid, as here, the employee is notified of the liability and advised of various settlement systems. If the employee desires to pay other than in one lump sum, periodic payments can be arranged in an amount not less than 3% of the employee's salary for not more than 24 months. The insurance office, under Respondent D.O.A., contends it has no authority to waive the reimbursement of the shortage and states that if Petitioner does not make up the shortage, here coverage will be terminated. If that happens, she will not be eligible to reenroll until the shortage is reimbursed. Under the insurance plan in question here, the State is a self-insurer. Petitioner's contribution and that of her agency goes into a trust fund administered by Respondent and is used to pay benefits through Blue Cross, which processes the claims. Since in this case, Petitioner paid less than she should have as a part-time employee, the U.C.F. paid more than its appropriate contribution for her coverage.
Recommendation That Petitioner, Carol C. Bledsoe, pay the underpayment of $345.78.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Mario Medero, discriminated against the Petitioner, Sharon L. Zbikowski, on the basis of her sex, female?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Sharon L. Zbikowski, is a female. The Respondent, Mario Medero, is a male. Dr. Medero is a physician. He practices medicine as a professional association. Dr. Medero is the chief executive officer and the supervisor or principal of the professional association. The professional association operates a medical office in Ocala, Florida. The medical practice performed by Dr. Medero consists primarily of treating individuals who have been injured on the job and who are covered by workers compensation insurance. Ms. Zbikowski's Employment. On August 20, 1992, Ms. Zbikowski was hired for employment by Dr. Medero's professional association as the front desk receptionist at Dr. Medero's office. At the time she was hired, Ms. Zbikowski was told that she would be considered for an accounts payable clerk position at the office. The position was held by Barbara Redding if Ms. Redding left the position. Ms. Zbikowski was told at the time of her employment that her consideration for the position of accounts payable clerk was dependent upon Ms. Redding actually leaving. Ms. Redding ultimately decided not to resign her position. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. Zbikowski was hired as a bookkeeper or accounts payable clerk, or that she was not placed in the position she was hired to fill. Ms. Zbikowski's Performance. Ms. Zbikowski worked initially at the front desk. Her performance was considered inadequate by Marilyn Hartsel, the office manager and Ms. Zbikowski's immediate supervisor. Ms. Zbikowski was moved to other positions within the office. She worked for a while in medical records and for approximately one day in accounts payable with Ms. Redding. Ms. Zbikowski's performance in medical records and in accounts payable was also considered inadequate by Ms. Hartsel. Within three or four weeks after Ms. Zbikowski began her employment, Ms. Hartsel had decided to recommend that Ms. Zbikowski be terminated because of the inadequacy of her work. Ms. Zbikowski's Employment by Dr. Medero. At the time that Ms. Zbikowski was initially employed at Dr. Medero's office, Dr. Medero had caused the office to advertise for a housekeeper for his home. Ms. Zbikowski discussed the position with Dr. Medero. Dr. Medero agreed to employ Ms. Zbikowski as his housekeeper and Ms. Zbikowski agreed to work as Dr. Medero's housekeeper. Ms. Zbikowski agreed to clean Dr. Medero's house, run errands for him and the office, pick up his son from school and take his son to and from tennis lessons, meet Dr. Medero's former wife half way between Ocala and Tampa to pick up or to drop off Dr. Medero's daughter, who was in the custody of his former wife, and generally oversee his household. Although the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Zbikowski performed services in her capacity as housekeeper for anyone other than Dr. Medero, Ms. Zbikowski was paid for her services out of accounts of the professional association and Ms. Hartsel continued to be her immediate supervisor. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. Zbikowski was forced in any way to accept employment as Dr. Medero's housekeeper. The evidence proved that she accepted the position voluntarily and without coercion. Ms. Zbikowski continued to work as Dr. Medero's housekeeper until September 28, 1992. During her employment as Dr. Medero's housekeeper, Dr. Medero was satisfied with Ms. Zbikowski's performance. Alleged Sexual Harassment. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Medero sexually harassed Ms. Zbikowski. Ms. Zbikowski testified about very few specific alleged incidents involving Dr. Medero and the evidence failed to substantiate those incidents. Ms. Zbikowski admitted that she had had no physical contact with Dr. Medero except for one occasion when she hugged him from advancing funds to her to pay for her son's day care and on another occasion when he gave her a physical examination after being in an automobile accident. The evidence failed to prove that either incident involved improper conduct by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski's testimony that Dr. Medero evidenced a "flirtatious manner" was not substantiated by competent substantial evidence of specific incidents. The most specific incident, and the incident which led to Ms. Zbikowski's termination from employment, took place on Thursday, September 24, 1992. At lunch on that day, Ms. Zbikowski and her four year old son were in Dr. Medero's back yard. Ms. Zbikowski was cleaning lawn furniture. Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding came to Dr. Medero's house, waved at Ms. Zbikowski and went into Dr. Medero's bedroom. The curtains/blinds to the bedroom windows were closed soon after Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding went into the room. Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding, both of whom were not married at the time, were lovers. Ms. Zbikowski was aware of their relationship. At no time did Ms. Zbikowski see Dr. Medero or Ms. Redding in Dr. Medero's bedroom. Ms. Zbikowski believes that Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding engaged in sexual intercourse while in the bedroom. This belief was not, however, substantiated by competent substantial evidence. Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding, who is not longer involved personally or in a working relationship with Dr. Medero, both testified that they did not engage in sexual intercourse. Ms. Zbikowski did not see them engage in intercourse. At best, Ms. Zbikowski's belief was based upon hearing "giggling" and "these little, um, sounds and things" from the bedroom. Ms. Zbikowski's Termination from Employment. On the afternoon of September 24, 1992, Ms. Zbikowski spoke with Ms. Hartsel and told her that Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding had sexual intercourse in her presence and her son's presence. Ms. Zbikowski was very upset and Ms. Hartsel told her to take the afternoon off and report to the office the next morning. Ms. Zbikowski also made other allegations, which the evidence failed to substantiate, of incidents of sexual harassment by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski left a beeper and a garage door opener she had been provided by Dr. Medero at Dr. Medero's home and left. The next morning, Friday, September 25, 1992, Ms. Zbikowski reported to the office. She was told that she would be expected to the work at the office in the mornings and then work at Dr. Medero's home in the afternoons. Ms. Zbikowski left at lunch and did not return. Ms. Zbikowski informed Ms. Hartsel that she did not intend to return that day because she did not want to return to Dr. Medero's home. Ms. Hartsel told Ms. Zbikowski that she would discuss the matter with Dr. Medero. Ms. Hartsel did not, however, order Ms. Zbikowski to return to work that day or inform her that she was not authorized to stay home. After speaking to Ms. Hartsel by telephone that weekend and being told that Ms. Hartsel had not yet discussed the matter with Dr. Medero, Ms. Zbikowski reported to work Monday, September 29, 1992. By the time that Ms. Zbikowski returned to the office on Monday, Dr. Medero had been informed of the allegations of sexual harassment she had made against him to Ms. Hartsel. Shortly after arriving at the office, Ms. Zbikowski was escorted to her automobile by Dr. Medero, Ms. Hartsel and a nurse and was told by Dr. Medero not to return. Ms. Zbikowski was, therefore, fired by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski was terminated because of the allegations she made concerning Dr. Medero and Ms. Redding and the other allegations of sexual harassment. Ms. Zbikowski was not terminated because she was not performing her duties as Dr. Medero's housekeeper in a satisfactory manner. Ms. Zbikowski's Subsequent Employment. Ms. Zbikowski was employed, and eventually terminated, by other physicians after her termination from employment by Dr. Medero. The evidence failed to prove that Dr. Medero was involved in any manner in Ms. Zbikowski's subsequent terminations from employment. Ms. Zbikowski's Charge of Discrimination. Ms. Zbikowski filed a Charge of Discrimination against Dr. Medero with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ms. Zbikowski alleged that she had been discriminated against based upon the following: I am a female. I worked for the above named respondent since August 20, 1992, until September 28, 1992 when I was discharged from my position of maid. During my employment I was subjected to sexual harassment by Dr. Mario Medero, and also I was subjected to different terms and conditions in my employment. I believe I have been discriminated against because of my sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. On September 2, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Ms. Zbikowski filed a Petition for Relief, requesting a formal administrative hearing on October 19, 1993. In the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission Ms. Zbikowski alleged, in part, the following: Respondent has violated the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, in the manner specifically described below: Petitioner did not abandoned [sic] her job. Petitioner was hired for one position and was told to accept another position 1 1/2 weeks into her employment which was not mentioned, nor described as part of original position. The disputed issues of material fact, if any, are as listed below: Petitioner did not abandoned [sic] her job. Petitioner was hired for one position and was told to accept another position 1 1/2 weeks into her employment which was not mentioned, nor described as part of original position. The ultimate facts alleged and entitlement to relief are as listed below: . . . . The alleged fact memos are that Petitioner was hired for a "Bookkeeping" position but was never given the opportunity to work in this position as original Bookkeeper (Dr. Medero's girlfriend) decided not to leave her position, so Petitioner was given a less meaningful job as "Housekeeper" but was subjected to harassing sexual misconduct by Respondent. The relief is as follows: Petitioner has for 1 year been trying to maintain and seek employment in the Medical field, one which she has worked in for 13 years, but because of Dr. Medero's influence in the Medical field has made it very hard for Petitioner to continue in this field. Petitioner is seeking recovery for the discriminating position he placed her in while under his employment plus relief from the undue hardship which has been placed upon her because of his lies in this matter. . . . . . . . Ms. Zbikowski proved the following allegations contained in her Charge of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief: "I am a female." "I worked for the above named respondent since August 20, 1992, until September 28, 1992, when I was discharged from my position of maid." "Petitioner did not abandoned [sic] her job." The remaining allegations contained in the Charge of Discrimination and the Petition for Relief were not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Ms. Zbikowski. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that any action of Dr. Medero was based upon Ms. Zbikowski's sex: she was not held to any standard or requirement based upon her sex, she was not sexually harassed and she was not terminated because of her sex. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that any policy or standard of Dr. Medero or his office had a disparate impact on female employees. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that she was replaced by a male or that other female employees with comparable or lessor qualifications were retained. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that she was sexually harassed by Dr. Medero. Ms. Zbikowski failed to prove that Dr. Medero or his office discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, female.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of a perceived handicap or disability of obesity and in retaliation for filing an earlier charge of discrimination alleging racial discrimination in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (1995). (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1995) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a member of a protected class. Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent employed Petitioner as a registered nurse from sometime in November 1990 until Petitioner resigned from her employment on July 15, 1996. Petitioner claims that Respondent perceived Petitioner as being handicapped or disabled due to her obesity and discriminated against her by creating a hostile work environment that led to a constructive discharge on July 15, 1996. Petitioner also claims that Respondent created the hostile work environment in retaliation for a previous charge of racial discrimination that is not at issue in this proceeding. On February 25, 1995, a therapist employed by Respondent observed that Petitioner did not bend down to assist a patient suffering from a "pseudo-seizure" at Respondent's facility where the therapist and Petitioner both worked. The therapist concluded that Petitioner was physically unable to tend to the patient. Petitioner actually refused to tend to the patient. As Petitioner explained in her testimony, everyone at the facility knew the patient faked the seizures, and Petitioner was overworked and preoccupied with a more pressing matter. Petitioner did not refute the need for a competent health care provider to examine each seizure and ensure that it does not require medical attention. The therapist who observed the incident submitted an incident report to Respondent's director of human resources. The report stated that Petitioner was physically unable to attend to the patient. Respondent conducted an investigation of the incident. Respondent had recently appointed new management. The new personnel investigated the incident and discovered that Petitioner had absences from work of approximately 10 weeks since April 1994. On March 15, 1995, Respondent conducted a corrective action meeting with Petitioner to address the excessive absenteeism and the reported incident on February 25, 1995. The purpose of the meeting was to determine the cause of the absenteeism, including any health problems Petitioner may have been experiencing. Appropriate personnel counseled Petitioner at the corrective action meeting. Petitioner agreed to participate in a "Wellness Program" that provided weekly sessions for health and fitness and was available to all employees. The "Wellness Program" was voluntary, and Petitioner signed documents acknowledging her agreement with the corrective action. Petitioner signed the documentation without objection and did not separately voice any objection. Petitioner attended only one session of the "Wellness Program." Respondent took no adverse employment action against Petitioner for her failure to participate in the program. On April 20, 1995, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination alleging racial discrimination. Petitioner claimed that Respondent forced her to attend weekly diet classes and keep logs on exercise and health but did not impose similar requirements on two overweight white females. The two white females did not have excessive absenteeism and no employees had filed incident reports against them. For similar reasons, Respondent did not recommend that another African-American female participate in the "Wellness Program." The Commission issued a finding of no cause in regard to the first charge of discrimination. The merits of that charge are not at issue in this proceeding even though the nature of the charge is part of the retaliation claim in this proceeding. Respondent did not change Petitioner's conditions of employment throughout her employment. Petitioner's job duties, responsibilities, schedule, and conditions of employment remained the same. Petitioner perceived that Respondent increased her workload to retaliate for her first charge of discrimination and to create a hostile work environment. An increase in work load did occur, but the increase was motivated by economic factors rather than discrimination. Economic factors forced Respondent to decrease staffing for the entire facility and to appoint new management. Neither Petitioner nor any other staff received a salary increase in 1995. Petitioner never expressed any complaints to management about the alleged hostile work environment. On July 15, 1996, a patient eloped from the unit where Petitioner was working as charge nurse. Petitioner was the person responsible for the patient. On the same day, Respondent scheduled another corrective action meeting. Immediately prior to the meeting, Petitioner resigned from her employment. The letter of resignation does not mention any hostile work environment or similar cause for her resignation. Respondent did not have an opportunity to counsel Petitioner concerning the patient who eloped. Respondent did not intend to terminate Petitioner from her employment. Except for the problems already discussed, Petitioner was a competent nurse that Respondent wished to retain. Competent medical providers are rare, and it was difficult to replace Petitioner. Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of a perceived handicap or disability of obesity. The evidence was insufficient to show that Respondent constructively discharged Petitioner or retaliated against Petitioner for a prior charge of discrimination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner, and denying Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Matthew Klein, Esquire Bunnell, Woulfe, Kirschbaum, Keller, McIntyre & Gregoire, P.A. 888 East Las Olas Boulevard 4th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Barbara J. Morgan 2804 Rio Lane Orlando, Florida 32805 Barbara Tashlein, Human Resource Manager La Amistad R.T.C. 1650 Park Avenue, North Maitland, Florida 32751 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Andrea Bateman, is a female. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Bateman was 41 or 42 years of age. Ms. Bateman is an attorney. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was a member of The Florida Bar during the period of time at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. Ms. Bateman's Employment by the Department. In October of 1990, the Department employed Ms. Bateman as an attorney in the Department's Office of Child Support Enforcement. Ms. Bateman was required to be a member of The Florida Bar. Ms. Bateman's position with the Department was classified as a "Select Exempt Service" position. Pursuant to Chapter 22SE-1.002(5), Florida Administrative Code, and Part V, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, persons employed in select exempt service positions may be terminated from employment without cause. Ms. Bateman's immediate supervisor was Chriss Walker. Mr. Walker is a Senior Attorney with the Department and, at the time Ms. Bateman was hired, also served as the Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement. As of December 4, 1991, the Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement, and Mr. Walker's immediate supervisor was Anne F. Donovan. At all times relevant to this proceeding, William H. Bentley was an Assistant Deputy Secretary of the Department with supervisory authority over the Department's Assistant Secretary's, including Mr. Walker and Ms. Donovan. "Productivity Enhancement" at the Department. During 1991, the Department was required to evaluate all employment positions at the Department and to reduce those positions in an effort to improve the productivity of the Department. Generally, all positions at the Department and the work performed by the persons filling those positions were considered and decisions were made as to which positions could be eliminated. The Department referred to the elimination of positions as "red-lining". The Department also made efforts to insure that any person affected by the elimination of their position would be placed in another position. Ms. Bateman's attorney position with Child Support Enforcement was identified for elimination. Another attorney position in Child Support Enforcement and Mr. Walker's Senior Attorney position were not identified for elimination. The decision to eliminate one of the attorney positions was based upon conclusion that the administrative duties of the two attorney positions could be handled by a paralegal position and the legal duties could then be handled by one attorney. Efforts to assist Ms. Bateman to find another position were not successful. Ultimately, the Department decided to find a position in which to continue to employ Ms. Bateman rather than to terminate her position and release her. The Department reclassified another vacant position so that Ms. Bateman could continue to be employed as an attorney for Child Support Enforcement. Mr. Walker was directed to create an attorney position for Ms. Bateman by the Assistant Secretary for Human Services. This decision was made during the early Fall of 1991. The Department's decision to continue to employ Ms. Bateman was based in part on the Department's concern about terminating an employee of the Department. The evidence failed to prove that the Department acted unreasonably with regard to the red-lining of Ms. Bateman's position. Ms. Bateman's Performance. During the year after Ms. Bateman began her employment with the Department, Mr. Walker, Ms. Bateman's supervisor, began to develop concerns about the adequacy of her work product. Ms. Bateman also began to evidence behavior which was not acceptable for an attorney of the Department. As a result of Ms. Bateman's odd behavior, Mr. Walker became concerned about Ms. Bateman's mental well-being. Mr. Walker memorialized his concerns about Ms. Bateman in a memorandum to Mr. Bentley dated December 2, 1991. The memorandum was revised December 19, 1991 to eliminate references to a counselor that Ms. Bateman had informed Mr. Walker she was seeing. Ms. Bateman's work deteriorated to an extent which necessitated other employees carrying out some of her duties. Among the difficulties experienced with Ms. Bateman which formed a reasonable basis for terminating her employment were the following: Ms. Bateman had difficulty communicating with other employees and her supervisor. As an attorney, Ms. Bateman was required to communicate orally and in writing. She was unable to do so in an adequate manner. Ms. Bateman failed to demonstrate good judgment and trustworthiness and, therefore, her supervisors were unable to rely upon her judgment as an attorney of the Department. Ms. Bateman's appearance was unacceptable for an employee of the Department who was required to meet and communicate with the public. Ms. Bateman's hair was unkempt and dirty, her clothes were often soiled and wrinkled, she failed to brush her teeth and she appeared not to be bathing based upon her appearance and her strong body odor. Although required to do so by Department policy, Ms. Bateman refused to give her supervisor a permanent home address or phone number. On one occasion Ms. Bateman was found asleep in the offices of the Department at night and on one occasion she was found asleep during working hours. Based upon the inadequacy of Ms. Bateman's performance, the Department had a reasonable basis for terminating Ms. Bateman's employment. Mr. Walker's Evaluation of Ms. Bateman. On December 18, 1991, Mr. Walker presented Ms. Bateman with a Professional Employee Performance Appraisal form he had completed on her performance. The Appraisal was reviewed by Ms. Bateman and signed by her on December 18, 1991. Mr. Walker gave Ms. Bateman's performance a rating of "effective" on the Appraisal. Of the factors evaluated on the Appraisal, Mr. Walker judged Ms. Bateman's performance as "excellent" on one factor, "effective" on eleven factors and "needs improvement" on nine factors. Mr. Walker gave Ms. Bateman's performance an "effective" rating despite his conclusion that her work product was not acceptable and despite his concerns about her inappropriate behavior. He did so because he had recently been directed to create a position to keep Ms. Bateman as an employee of the Department and in an effort to avoid litigation over Ms. Bateman's termination. Mr. Walker did not believe that his supervisors wanted to avoid any difficulties concerning Ms. Bateman employment. Mr. Walker failed to follow Department procedure in presenting the Appraisal to Ms. Bateman. The Appraisal was required to be reviewed and approved by Mr. Walker's immediate supervisor, Ms. Donovan, before it was given to Ms. Bateman. Mr. Walker, contrary to Department policy, presented the Appraisal to Ms. Bateman before Ms. Donovan had seen and approved it. Ms. Donovan was aware of the problems with Ms. Bateman's performance and would not have approved an "effective" rating. Upon receiving the Appraisal, Ms. Donovan discussed the Appraisal with Mr. Walker and rejected it, as it was her right to do. Ms. Donovan, consistent with Department policy, specified that Ms. Bateman would be evaluated again in sixty days. The Department's Request that Ms. Bateman Undergo a Psychological Evaluation. Although the Department had a reasonable basis for terminating Ms. Bateman's employment by the end of 1991 and in early 1992, the Department decided to attempt to discover the cause of Ms. Bateman's decline in performance and the onset of her odd behavior rather than terminate her employment. The Department made this decision in an effort to determine what assistance Ms. Bateman might need. Ultimately, the Department was attempting to determine what work, if any, Ms. Bateman was capable of performing. The Department's decision was based upon a number of incidents involving Ms. Bateman. Those incidents are included in Mr. Walker's Chronology of December 2, 1991 and his Revised Chronology of December 19, 1991 and are hereby incorporated herein. Although not all the incidents described in the chronologies were proved during the final hearing to have occurred, the Department's consideration of the incidents reported by Mr. Walker was reasonable. Due to the Department's concerns about Ms. Bateman, the Department requested that Ms. Bateman voluntarily participate in the Department's employee assistance program. Ms. Bateman refused. In order to determine what could be done to help Ms. Bateman, and to determine what duties and responsibilities she was capable of performing, the Department requested that Ms. Bateman undergo a psychological, or other, evaluation. Ms. Bateman refused. After discussing the matter with Ms. Bateman and legal counsel she had retained, the Department notified Ms. Bateman that her continued employment was conditioned upon her undergoing a psychological evaluation or some other evaluation which would allow the Department to determine what work she was capable of performing. In a letter of February 12, 1992, Ms. Bateman, through her representative, was informed of the following: As you also know, we are attempting to help Andrea address a problem which we believe exists and has been well documented over the past 16 months. In return, we need Andrea's help and cooperation. If Andrea chooses to agree to our request that she undergo a psychiatric evaluation and authorize the release to us of the psychiatrist's prognosis, diagnosis and recommendation for treatment, we will be glad to schedule an appointment for her with a psychiatrist, and will pay for such an evaluation. We will use the evaluation to determine an appropriate course of action. Ms. Bateman's Termination from Employment. Ms. Bateman continued to refuse to undergo any evaluation or to suggest any alternative course of action. Consequently, based upon Ms. Bateman's inadequate and unacceptable work performance, the Department terminated Ms. Bateman's employment with the Department on or about February 13, 1992. Ms. Bateman's termination from employment was effective February 28, 1992. Ms. Bateman was terminated from employment due to the fact that she was not adequately performing her job and she refused to cooperate with the Department to find out what could be done to help her become an effective employee. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department's reason for terminating her employment was a pretext. Ms. Bateman's Charge of Discrimination. On or about September 15, 1992, Ms. Bateman filed a Charge of Discrimination against the Department with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ms. Bateman alleged that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex and a perceived handicap. On February 10, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Ms. Bateman filed a Request for Redetermination on March 4, 1992. On April 12, 1993, the Commission issued a "Redetermination: No Cause" affirming its decision. On May 12, 1993, Ms. Bateman filed a Petition for Relief seeking a formal administrative hearing. In the petition Ms. Bateman alleged that the Department had discriminated against her on the basis of sex, a perceived handicap and, for the first time, age. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Ms. Bateman. Alleged Sex Discrimination. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that any action of the Department was based upon Ms. Bateman's sex: she was not held to any standard or requirement based upon her sex, she was not terminated because of her sex and the Department's efforts to determine the cause of Ms. Bateman's problems was not based upon her sex. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that any Department policy or standard had a disparate impact on female employees. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was replaced by a male attorney. Ms. Bateman's grooming habits were discussed with her. Some of those discussions concerned the wearing of panty hose and her makeup. It must be inferred that such discussions were not carried on with male employees. The evidence, however, failed to prove that Ms. Bateman's termination was based upon these matters. Although grooming played a part in the decision to terminate Ms. Bateman's employment, it was grooming related to basic cleanliness and neat appearance required of all employees and not just female employees. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, female. Alleged Age Discrimination. At the time that Ms. Bateman was hired she was 41 years of age, and at the time she was terminated she was 42 years of age. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that age played any part in her treatment by the Department. This finding is supported, in part, by the fact that the difference between Ms. Bateman's age when she was hired and when she was terminated was only one year. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was replaced by a younger person. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the persons who made the decision to terminate her employment were aware of her age. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her age. Alleged Perceived Handicap. The Department did believe that Ms. Bateman was suffering from some mental problem. This belief was based upon Ms. Bateman's odd behavior and a concern that Ms. Bateman was "homeless". It was for this reason that the Department requested that Ms. Bateman undergo a psychological evaluation. Ms. Bateman failed to prove, however, that the Department treated her differently from the manner other employees of the Department were treated under similar circumstances. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that the Department's request that she undergo a psychological or other evaluation to determine how to assist her to meet the requirements of her employment was made for a discriminatory reason. Under the circumstances, the Department's request of Ms. Bateman was reasonable. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that she was terminated from employment because of any perceived handicap. The evidence proved that she was in fact terminated from employment due to her inability to satisfactorily carry out her job responsibilities. Ms. Bateman also failed to allege or prove that she has a handicap based upon her mental condition. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of a handicap or a perceived handicap.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.10 et seq., Florida Statutes, as set forth in Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination dated September 4, 2001, and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a nursing home located in Miami Springs, Florida. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Cathy Abello was Respondent's Director of Nursing (DON), and Barbara Fernandez was Respondent's Assistant Director of Nursing (ADON). The DON is responsible for the performance of the nursing staff and has primary responsibility for personnel decisions pertaining to the nursing staff. The ADON also has supervisory authority over the nursing staff and can hire or fire nursing personnel. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent employed between 50 and 55 registered nurses, six of whom have supervisory responsibilities. Respondent used three shifts of approximately eight hours each to provide 24 hour per day nursing coverage for its residents. The first shift began at 7:00 a.m. and ended at 3:00 p.m. The second shift began at 3:00 p.m. and ended at 11:00 p.m. The third shift began at 11:00 p.m. and ended at 7:00 a.m. The starting and ending times are approximate because there was usually an overlap between shifts to permit nurses coming on duty to coordinate patient care with the nurses going off duty. It was not uncommon for nurses to work more than one shift each day. In addition to the DON and the ADON, Respondent had a nursing supervisor for each shift. A nursing supervisor's duties include supervising the nurses and support staff during a shift, finding personnel to fill in for absences, and responding to emergencies. A nursing supervisor works under the supervision of the DON and the ADON. Petitioner is a registered nurse and had worked for Respondent for several years prior to May 2001. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent employed Petitioner as a nursing supervisor for the first shift. Respondent stipulated that Petitioner was qualified to do her job and performed her duties adequately with no disciplinary record. Petitioner failed to present evidence as to her date of birth. While her exact age was not established, the testimony of the witnesses who had known her and had worked with her for several years established that Petitioner was in her late fifties or early sixties at the times pertinent to this proceeding. In April 2001, Petitioner required a total knee replacement. Prior to her surgery, Petitioner was capable of performing her job. When she learned she required knee surgery, Petitioner requested and was granted medical leave. She began her medical leave in April 2001. It is inferred that Petitioner was incapable of performing her work for a period of time following her surgery. However, the duration of her incapacity and the extent of her recovery were not established by the evidence presented at the final hearing. When Petitioner went on medical leave in April 2001, Ms. Fernandez worked as ADON during the first shift and also worked the second shift. To accommodate Petitioner’s absence, Ms. Abello asked Ms. Fernandez to continue to perform her duties as ADON during the first shift and to assume Petitioner’s duties as nursing supervisor for the first shift. From the time Petitioner went on medical leave to the time of the final hearing, Ms. Fernandez discharged her duties as the ADON on the first shift and served as nursing supervisor for the first shift. Ms. Fernandez also continued to perform duties on the second shift. At the time of the final hearing, Ms. Fernandez was the nursing supervisor for the second shift. Ms. Abello was pleased with the manner in which Ms. Fernandez performed her dual responsibilities as ADON and as nursing supervisor for the first shift. Ms. Abello made a business decision to consolidate the positions of ADON and first shift nursing supervisor. Ms. Abello also decided to have Ms. Fernandez perform those consolidated responsibilities. Ms. Abello made the employment decision to make the nursing staffing more efficient and to reduce Respondent's overhead. Ms. Abello's articulated reason for the challenged employment decision is found to be legitimate and non-discriminatory. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the articulated reason for the challenged employment decision was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. At the time of the final hearing, Ms. Abello had worked with Ms. Fernandez for almost 14 years and had worked with Petitioner for approximately five years. Ms. Abello considered Ms. Fernandez’s professional qualifications to be superior to Petitioner’s. Ms. Fernandez and Petitioner are approximately the same age. 1/ Petitioner failed to establish that age was a factor in Ms. Abello’s decision to have Ms. Fernandez perform in the consolidated positions instead of having Petitioner perform those duties. The greater weight of the credible evidence established that age was not a factor in Ms. Abello’s decision. Petitioner was still on medical leave when Ms. Abello decided to have Petitioner’s responsibilities consolidated with Ms. Fernandez’s ADON responsibilities. Maria Cruz, acting on instructions from Ms. Abello, informed Petitioner by telephone that as of the end of May 2001, her position as nursing supervisor for the first shift would be eliminated and that her employment would be terminated. During that telephone conversation, Ms. Cruz told Petitioner that there was an open position as a nursing supervisor on the weekends and asked Petitioner to call her if she was interested. Petitioner never called Ms. Cruz about that or any other position Respondent might have open. The fact that Petitioner was still on medical leave when she was informed of Ms. Abello's employment decision arguably creates an inference that Petitioner had not recovered from her surgery. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner was disabled when Respondent terminated her employment, Respondent clearly established that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory business reason for the challenged employment decision. The greater weight of the credible evidence established that any disability Petitioner might have suffered from her total knee replacement, whether temporary or permanent, was not a factor in the challenged employment decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 2002.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was terminated from her position with Respondent as a picker/stock keeper on or about September 26, 2001, on the basis of her race (African-American) and/or gender (female), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as that term is defined under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a temporary employee to perform the job of picker/stock keeper at its Parts Distribution Center in Orlando, Florida, during the time period from September 12, 2001, to September 26, 2001, the date she was terminated. Petitioner worked a total of 14 days for Respondent. Petitioner is an African-American female, a member of a protected class. The Parts Distribution Center for Respondent in Orlando, Florida, is a facility that holds automotive parts that are then shipped to dealerships. All temporary employees at Respondent are at-will employees. Temporary employees are told during their orientation that they are at-will employees who can be terminated at any time, for any reason. Temporary employees at Respondent are only eligible to work 119 days. Most temporary employees are not offered full time permanent employment. There is no guarantee that a temporary employee will receive an offer to work as a permanent employee. Petitioner was hired to perform the job of picker/stock keeper. A picker/stock keeper takes parts off of shelves to be shipped to dealerships. Petitioner participated in an orientation, and Petitioner received the same training as every other temporary employee. Petitioner worked the night shift. Respondent maintains written Standards of Conduct to which all employees must adhere. The Standards of Conduct apply to both temporary and permanent employees. The Standards of Conduct were in effect in September 2001, when Petitioner worked as a temporary employee. All employees are given a copy of the Standards of Conduct when they are hired. Petitioner received a copy of the Standards of Conduct when she was hired, and the Standards of Conduct are posted throughout the plant. The Standards of Conduct provide that an employee's "[f]ailure or refusal to follow the instructions of supervision" is grounds for "disciplinary action up to and including discharge." The supervisors who worked at Respondent's Distribution Center during Petitioner's employment were Richard Alvarez ("Alvarez") (Hispanic male), Lenier Sweeting ("Sweeting") (Black male), and Joe Bromley (White male). Alvarez was temporary supervisor for the night shift from June 2001 until December 2001. Alvarez was Petitioner's direct supervisor. Sweeting was a supervisor in September 2001. Sweeting was chosen to become a supervisor by Hal McDougle, a Black male. Sweeting was the supervisor on the day shift when Petitioner worked at the Distribution Center. His shift ended at 3:30 p.m. but he stayed in the building to help with the transition to the night shift. Alvarez would normally walk Sweeting to the front door to discuss what had occurred during the day shift. On September 25, 2001, Sweeting was walking past the bathroom with Alvarez and heard two women talking and laughing in the bathroom. Alvarez recognized one of the voices to be that of Petitioner. Alvarez had heard rumors that Petitioner had been taking a lot of extended breaks and told Sweeting about the complaints he had been receiving. Alvarez received at least two complaints, and possibly four or five, from Petitioner's co- workers that she was taking extended breaks and not on the floor working. Alvarez wanted to wait and see how long Petitioner remained in the bathroom. Sweeting and Alvarez waited outside the bathroom until they saw Petitioner exit the bathroom with Maria Dejesus. Alvarez believes that he and Sweeting waited outside the bathroom for approximately ten to 15 minutes. Alvarez told Petitioner that she had been taking an extensive break and needed to go back to work. Sweeting witnessed Alvarez tell Petitioner to go back to work in a professional tone. Alvarez also told Petitioner that he had heard rumors that she was taking extended breaks. He told her that since he saw it first hand, he wanted to mention it to her and let her know it would not be tolerated. Petitioner asked Alvarez which bathroom she could use in a very sarcastic tone. Sweeting observed Petitioner ask this question. Alvarez told Petitioner that he did not care which bathroom she used, as long as she did not abuse the break period. Petitioner proceeded to ask Alvarez in a sarcastic tone which bathroom she could use several times throughout the night. Despite Petitioner's sarcastic tone, Alvarez answered her questions professionally. Alvarez never asked Petitioner how old she was, whether she was married or how many children she had. Sweeting asked Maria Dejesus to go back to work as well. Sweeting and Alvarez have told other employees to go back to work when they have observed employees taking extended breaks. They have spoken to employees of both genders and all racial groups. On September 26, 2001, Alvarez assigned Petitioner to the "fast rack" area. Petitioner had never previously worked in the fast rack area. Alvarez personally instructed Petitioner in how to perform the assignment. Alvarez told Petitioner to pick the parts and put them on a rack float. After Alvarez gave Petitioner her instructions, Petitioner began her assignment. Petitioner never asked Alvarez any questions about her assignment or expressed that she was having difficulty with the job. Wanda Carithers ("Carithers") saw Petitioner using the wrong equipment to complete her assignment. Petitioner was using a bin cart instead of a float to pick the items. Alvarez noticed that Petitioner's assignment was running late. Alvarez walked over to the fast rack area and asked Petitioner two questions. Alvarez asked Petitioner whether she was going to be able to pick the whole assignment using the bin cart that she was using. Petitioner did not respond to or acknowledge Alvarez. Alvarez then asked Petitioner if she was almost done with her assignment. Petitioner rolled her eyes and said, "Your first question, yes, second question, no." Alvarez was very uncomfortable with Petitioner's response and demeanor. Alvarez told Petitioner that perhaps they had gotten off on the wrong foot. Petitioner asked Alvarez something about her union rights. Alvarez saw Petitioner's co-worker, Carithers, who was a union representative, driving by. Alvarez asked Carithers to explain to Petitioner her union rights as a temporary employee. During this conversation, Alvarez tried repeatedly to talk to Petitioner and on each occasion, Petitioner cut Alvarez off and would not let him speak. When Alvarez realized that he was not making any progress with Petitioner, he asked her to go to the warehouse office so that they could talk to a senior supervisor, Al White ("White") (Black male). Alvarez hoped that they could work out their differences with White's help. Alvarez started to walk approximately ten steps. He turned back and realized that Petitioner was not moving towards the office. Alvarez walked back to Petitioner and asked her a second time to go to the office. Once again, Petitioner did not move. Alvarez told Petitioner, "This is your last chance; go to the warehouse office." Once again, Petitioner did not move. Alvarez, after asking Petitioner to go to the office three times with no response, told Petitioner that her services were no longer needed, that she should gather up her things, and that she was terminated. Alvarez terminated Petitioner for her failure to follow a direct order of her supervisor in violation of Respondent's Standards of Conduct No. 6. Petitioner refused to move even after she was terminated. Petitioner asked Alvarez to reconsider, and he said that he had made up his mind. Alvarez started to walk away. When he saw that Petitioner was still not moving, he told her that he could call law enforcement to escort Petitioner off the property. Alvarez, and ultimately Petitioner, walked to the office. White asked Petitioner if she knew why she was terminated. Petitioner never asked to have someone from the union with her in the office until after she was terminated. At that time, Alvarez and White complied with her request and paged Rodney Witt, a union official, to come to the office. Carithers observed Petitioner fail to follow Alvarez's instruction to go to the office. Carithers recalls that Petitioner told Alvarez that Petitioner did not have to listen to Alvarez. Amber McPherson heard Alvarez call Petitioner to the office several times. Petitioner did not respond to Alvarez's requests. Sweeting has never experienced discrimination from management while working for Respondent for over seven years. Sweeting has never heard Alvarez make any gender or race-related comments or slurs. Sweeting has never heard any management employee at Respondent make a gender or race related comment or slur. Alvarez did not consider Petitioner's gender or race when he made the decision to terminate Petitioner. In addition, Petitioner lied on her application to Respondent and failed to indicate that she had been terminated from a prior employment. Petitioner had been terminated from Walt Disney World Company for theft. If Respondent had known that Petitioner had lied on her application or had been terminated for theft from a prior employer, it would not have hired her. Had Respondent learned that she had lied on her application after she was hired, she would have been terminated. Petitioner had no idea why she thinks she was treated differently based upon her gender or race. She just had a "feeling" or a "hunch." Petitioner had no evidence or information that her termination was based on her gender or race. Petitioner had no idea why she was terminated. She did not believe that it was because she failed to follow a command. Petitioner had no idea whether her supervisor, Alvarez, considered her gender or race when he terminated her employment with Respondent. Petitioner bases her claims that Respondent discriminated against her on the fact that there is general racism and sexism in society. Petitioner checked the "sex" and "race" box on her FCHR Charge of Discrimination simply because she is female and African-American. Petitioner felt as though she was harassed but cannot articulate a reason for it.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie L. Adler, Esquire Susan K. McKenna, Esquire Jackson Lewis LLP 390 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1285 Orlando, Florida 32801 Dorothy J. McCrimmon 5361 Commander Drive Number 304 Orlando, Florida 32822 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner by discriminating against her based on sex and race and by retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Jones is an African-American female. From May 29, 2007, to December 5, 2007, Ms. Jones was employed by Spherion. Spherion provides temporary employees to businesses. Spherion had a contract with American Automobile Association (AAA) to provide temporary employees for an AAA call center in Lake Mary, Florida. AAA does not pay the Spherion employees, Spherion does. AAA can request that Spherion terminate a Spherion employee from an assignment at AAA. Ms. Jones was employed as a customer service representative (CSR) at the AAA site in Lake Mary, Florida. Her duties included taking calls from AAA customers who were in need of roadside assistance. At the time Ms. Jones was working at the AAA site, approximately 150 to 200 Spherion employees were assigned to the AAA call center. Approximately 60 to 70% of the Spherion employees were female, and approximately 60 to 70 of the female employees were members of racially protected classes. Ms. Jones received the CSR Performance Participant Guide, which is provided to all CSRs working on-site at AAA. On May 21, 2007, Ms. Jones executed an acknowledgement of having received the Spherion Workplace Harassment policy, the Spherion Attendance and Punctuality policy, and Spherion’s Policies and Procedures – Application Supplement. She also executed an acknowledgement of having received Spherion’s Equal Opportunity Statement. On June 7, 2007, Ms. Jones executed an acknowledgement of having received Spherion’s Customer Service Quality Commitment policy. During her employment with Spherion, Ms. Jones was paid $10.00 per hour. Ms. Jones received approximately two weeks of training. She began taking live calls on her own on June 10, 2007. Spherion allowed Ms. Jones two months to learn her job before Spherion began to evaluate her calls for quality assurance purposes. Spherion has a progressive discipline policy. A verbal warning is first given followed by a written warning, and then a final warning. On July 30, 2007, Ms. Jones received a verbal warning for attendance. On August 23, 2007, she received a final warning for call avoidance because she had failed to follow Spherion’s policies and procedures related to receipt of incoming calls. On September 18, 2007, Ms. Jones received a verbal warning regarding safety because she did not use a safety statement in one or more of her calls. According to the policies of Spherion and AAA, the goal for each skill set for a CSR is 90%. On September 11, 2007, Ms. Jones’ performance for quality assurance (QA) for the month of August was rated as 79%. She was given a verbal warning for performance on September 7, 2007, for her poor performance in August. Ms. Jones was advised that immediate action was required to correct her performance, and that failure to meet the quality standards could lead to further discipline, including termination. Ms. Jones’ QA average for September was 69%. As a result of her QA average for September, Ms. Jones was given a Written Warning for Performance on October 11, 2007.1 Again, she was warned that she needed to take immediate action to improve her performance and that failure to do so could result in further disciplinary action, including termination. Ms. Jones received a QA average of 77% for the month of October. As a result of her October average, she received a Final Warning for Performance on November 2, 2007. Once again, Ms. Jones was reminded that she needed to take immediate action to improve her performance and that failure to do so could lead to further discipline, including termination. For the month of November 2007, Ms. Jones received a QA average of 78.2%. On December 2, 2007, Spherion received an e-mail from Matthew Cooper, an AAA supervisor, directing Spherion to terminate Ms. Jones assignment at AAA for failure to achieve QA from August through November, 2007.2 As a result of her poor performance, Ms. Jones’ assignment with AAA was terminated on December 7, 2007. At the time her assignment was terminated, Ms. Jones was being paid $11 per hour and was working 40 hours per week. AAA has requested that other Spherion employees assigned to the AAA call center have their assignments terminated for low performance for four months, and Spherion complied with those requests. Such employees included a white male, an African-American/Hispanic female, and an Asian/American male. The termination of an assignment to the AAA site did not mean that Ms. Jones was terminated from employment with Spherion. If Ms. Jones desired to seek an assignment with another Spherion client, she could have contacted the Spherion branch office. Ms. Jones did not contact Spherion for another assignment. Ms. Jones filed for unemployment compensation and received one check for $182.00.3 During the second week of January 2008, Ms. Jones began to work for Kelly Services. She worked approximately 25 hours per week until she left Kelly Services during the first week of June 2008. Her hourly rate of pay was $10.75 per hour. From June 23, 2008, to September 22, 2008, Ms. Jones was employed by Careers USA. She worked approximately 40 hours per week, and her hourly rate of pay was $10.75. After leaving Careers USA, Ms. Jones went to work for Comcast, where she is currently employed. She works 40 hours per week, and her hourly rate of pay is $10.75. Spherion has a workplace harassment policy which was provided to Ms. Jones at the time of her hiring. The policy provides in pertinent part: Spherion Corporation, including all of its divisions, business groups and subsidiaries [“Spherion”], is committed to providing a work environment free of unlawful harassment. Harassment based on an individual’s race, religion, color, national origin, citizenship, marital status, sex, age, sexual orientation, veteran status, disability or any other legally protected status is strictly prohibited and will not be tolerated at Spherion. Employees have a right to be free from harassment from managers, co-workers, and non-employees with whom Spherion employees have a business, service, or professional relationship, including, but not limited to, vendors, clients and client employees. Every Spherion manager and supervisor is responsible for ensuring that the spirit, intent, and goals of this anti-harassment policy are achieved. * * * All employees must report incidents of harassment. Any employee who believes that he or she is being harassed by a co-worker, supervisor, manager, or other individual at the workplace — whether employed by Spherion or not — or believes that his or her employment is being adversely affected by such conduct, should immediately report such concerns to his or her supervisor, next-level manager, or other manager or the HR department. A human resources representative may be contacted at – Human Resources, c/o Spherion Corporation, 2050 Spectrum Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309, 800- 839-1965, or employeerelations@spherion.com. If a Spherion employee has a complaint about an AAA employee, the Spherion employee is to contact Spherion, not AAA. Spherion has the responsibility to look into the matter. When Ms. Jones first became employed with Spherion, she made a complaint that one of the AAA security guards was rude to her concerning the use of a restroom. April Jaques, who was a Spherion client service supervisor and responsible for staffing and human resources at the AAA call centers, followed up on Ms. Jones’ complaint and learned that Ms. Jones had been using a restroom that was off limits to employees after the building was closed for the night. The security guard had correctly advised Ms. Jones about the use of the restrooms. Ms. Jaques explained to Ms. Jones which restrooms could be used by overnight employees. Ms. Jones claimed that John Sherwood, who was not her supervisor, had discriminated against her based on her gender because he was disrespectful and rude and had accused her of destroying a computer. Her basis for claiming discrimination was that she “didn’t see him talking to men that way.” She also claimed that Mr. Sherwood had retaliated against her because she had complained to management about his being rude and disrespectful. Her testimony was not clear how he retaliated against her. Mr. Sherwood had no control over Ms. Jones’ pay, benefits, or terms and conditions of employment. While Ms. Jones was assigned to AAA, Anthony Hinton was an AAA supervisor. Because Mr. Hinton was employed by AAA, Spherion could not discipline Mr. Hinton. Mr. Hinton has been described as a “by-the-book kind of guy,” who sometimes “rubs people the wrong way.” He expected all employees to follow policy regardless of the employee’s race or gender. There were some complaints about his abrasive management style. Some complaints were made by employees who are not members of a protected class. The evidence does not support Ms. Jones’ assertions that Mr. Hinton was hostile only to African-American women or women of color. In November 2007, AAA required him to attend some anger management sessions with a therapist. He completed the therapy sessions. On September 6, 2007, Ms. Jones sent an e-mail to Mike Fratus, an employee of AAA, complaining about Mr. Hinton. She stated that Mr. Hinton had been rude and hostile to her on her first day of work on the call center floor. She complained that Mr. Hinton had put her on notice because of her footwear,4 but had not said anything to an employee who was sitting nearby and wearing similar footwear. She further added, “[t]he word going around is he is hostile and demeaning to Black women only.” Ms. Jones did not specifically name any other Black women to whom Mr. Hinton was rumored to be hostile and demeaning. Mr. Fratus forwarded the e-mail to April Jaques on September 11, 2007. Ms. Jaques scheduled a time to speak with Ms. Jones regarding her concerns. It was Ms. Jaques’ understanding that AAA would follow-up regarding the complaint against Mr. Hinton because Mr. Hinton was an AAA employee. Mr. Hinton credibly testified that he spoke to Ms. Jones about her inappropriate footwear, but that he did not see any other employee at the time with similar footwear. Mr. Hinton has spoken to non-African-American men and women about their attire. On September 19, 2007, Ms. Jones sent an e-mail to April Jaques. Ms. Jones complained that Mr. Hinton had talked to her about logging in early.5 She denied that she had logged in early and asked that “[n]o action be taken.” She further stated: Again after speaking with you and being counseled on compliance regarding my time I immediately wanted to correct the issue. This is just very disturbing to me especially after sharing with you and Mike how he [Hinton] discriminates with his treatment toward women of color. Ms. Jaques discussed the e-mail with Ms. Jones. Ms. Jones did not give Ms. Jaques any names of women that were being discriminated against by Mr. Hinton. Because Mr. Hinton was an employee of AAA, Ms. Jaques sent a copy of the e-mail to AAA. In October 2007, Jamie Jordan, a dispatcher who was employed by Spherion, complained to Mike Fratus about an incident concerning Ms. Jones that happened on the call center floor. Mr. Jordan had approached Ms. Jones about some information that was missing from a call that had been received requesting a tow truck. Mr. Jordan felt that Ms. Jones was rude and disrespectful to him when he approached her. Mr. Fratus sent an e-mail to Ms. Jaques, outlining Mr. Jordan’s complaint. On October 5, 2007, Ms. Jaques spoke to Ms. Jones about the incident between Ms. Jones and Mr. Jordan. Ms. Jones claimed that Mr. Jordan was rude and harsh to her. During the conversation, Ms. Jones became angry and accused Ms. Jaques of discrimination and harassment. Ms. Jaques attempted to calm Ms. Jones and told Ms. Jones that she would investigate the incident. Ms. Jones gave Ms. Jaques the names of some employees who had witnessed the incident with Mr. Jordan. Ms. Jaques investigated the issue, including talking with other employees who had heard the altercation. Ms. Jaques concluded that both Mr. Jordan and Ms. Jones were to blame for the incident. Based on Ms. Jones’ testimony, as of November 1, 2007, she had filed an employment discrimination complaint against Spherion with the Florida Human Rights Association. The complaint was forwarded to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Ms. Jones filed an amended complaint on December 17, 2007. On November 11, 2007, Ms. Jones sent an e-mail to Simon DeYoung, an employee of AAA, complaining of sexual harassment, verbal abuse, and retaliation. Specifically, she was claiming that there were supervisors and a team leader who were listening to her calls and referring them to the quality assurance section; thus, her calls were not being monitored on a random basis. She also claimed that she had made a recommendation that the Dispatch section make return calls to members for updated information rather than having a CSR get the correct information and that Dispatch was upset with her for making the recommendation. Simon DeYoung forwarded the e-mail to Spherion management. Stacy Futch was Spherion’s on-site client service representative at the AAA site in St. Mary. She met with Ms. Jones on November 11, 2007, concerning Ms. Jones’ e-mail to Mr. DeYoung. Ms. Futch asked Ms. Jones about her claim of sexual harassment, and Ms. Jones said that it had happened months ago and that she had not brought the matter up before because she did not think that the issue would be addressed. Ms. Jones did not go into detail with Ms. Futch about the alleged sexual harassment actions. Ms. Jones felt that Mr. Jordan was sexually harassing her based on some comments that he had made to her. Mr. Jordan was not Ms. Jones’ supervisor. During the first week of Ms. Jones’ employment with Spherion, Mr. Jordan asked her if she would like to go fishing. Mr. Jordan admitted that he had told Ms. Jones that he thought she was beautiful, but that he had never seriously asked her to marry him. Ms. Jones went to Mr. Jordan and asked him to stop making comments to her. Three days later he told her that she looked nice. Ms. Jones testified that in October 2007, Mr. Jordan told her that he was drinking milk and that he was growing. Ms. Jones said she took the comment to mean that his penis was getting larger. Mr. Jordan denied he made any comments about drinking milk. Given Ms. Jones’s conversation to Ms. Futch in which she told Ms. Futch on November 11, 2007, that she had not experienced any sexual harassment for several months, and Ms. Jones’s testimony that after the October 5, 2007, altercation with Mr. Jordan that there had been no further incidents involving him, I find that Ms. Jones’ testimony about the milk to lack credibility. Ms. Jones did not make a complaint to Ms. Jaques about Mr. Jordan’s comments. Ms. Jones claims that her low performance scores were a result of her scores being manipulated by either AAA or Spherion as retaliation for making a complaint of discrimination and harassment. The evidence does not support Ms. Jones’ claim that her scores were manipulated. Ms. Jones had heard that some supervisors were dismissed for manipulating scores, and she concluded that if other scores could be manipulated then her scores must have been manipulated. The rumors that Ms. Jones had heard about supervisors had nothing to do with the manipulation of QA scores and Ms. Jones’ claim of manipulation is based on pure speculation. Ms. Jones claims that two other employees Jessica Robart and Marci Palumbo, who were white females, had low QA scores and were not dismissed for poor performance. Ms. Jones’s claim is unfounded. Ms. Robart had low performance scores for the last two weeks in June 2007 and for the last two weeks in July 2007. Marci Palumbo, referred to as Ricky or Marsha by Ms. Jones, had a low performance score for August 2007. Neither Ms. Robart nor Ms. Palumbo had four consecutive months with low performance scores. At least one non-minority male employee’s employment has been terminated for poor performance relating to QA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Ms. Jones’ Petition for Relief and denying Spherion’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 2009 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April 2009.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a female of child bearing age. The Respondent, Croft Metals, Inc., is an employer as defined by Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner obtained an application for employment with Croft Metals, Inc. at that company's Oviedo, Florida facility in response to a sign located on the premises which indicated the Respondent sought clerical/secretarial help. The Petitioner submitted her application to Tim Hobbs, vice-president for marketing and sales for Design Technologies International (DTI), a division of Croft Metals, Inc., in March, 1989. The Petitioner was interviewed by Tim Hobbs and Stan Cannon, the president of DTI, for the position of technical secretary with DTI; and for a possible opening as secretary to the parent company's CEO, Mr. Bancroft. At the time of Petitioner's interview the position of technical secretary was filled by Carol Dorsey. Ms. Dorsey had submitted her resignation to be effective March 29, 1989. Ms. Dorsey subsequently withdrew her resignation prior to March 27, 1989. The Petitioner was advised by letter dated March 27, 1989, that the position for which she was considered, the technical secretary position for DTI, was not open due to Carol Dorsey's withdrawal of her resignation, and that her qualifications exceeded the requirements for that position. She was also advised that the salary range for the position was $12,000 to $13,000. The position of technical secretary subsequently became available when Carol Dorsey resigned on May 15, 1989, effective May 31, 1989. That position was subsequently filled by Ragan Debra Cole, a single woman of child-bearing age. The Respondent placed an advertisement in the Orlando Sentinel which ran on May 19 and 20, 1989. The advertisement read: Private Secretary for office of a national multi-plant corporation. Must be capable of taking accurate shorthand and performing other duties of an experienced secretary. Substantial salary plus excellent fringe benefit package and company paid retirement. Five day week, excellent working conditions. Application by letter only. Croft Metals, Inc., R & D Center, Post Office Box 219, Oviedo, FL (greater Orlando) 32765. The position represented by the advertisement for private secretary was subsequently filled by Joyce Marie Morehart, an unmarried female of child bearing age. The private secretary position, which was for Mr. Bancroft, was filled several weeks after Petitioner's interview. In March, 1989, Petitioner was not aware of the advertisement for the private secretary position which would run in May, 1989, but was made aware of the possible future opening during the interview with Mr. Hobbs. Neither Tim Hobbs nor Stan Cannon would have hired an applicant for employment as private secretary for Mr. Bancroft in March, 1989. They were not authorized to do so. The position which could have been given to Petitioner in March, 1989, was not available after Ms. Dorsey elected to stay on with DTI. On July 14, 1989, there were fourteen female employees employed at the Oviedo, Florida facility of Croft Metals, Inc. Seven were single, five were married and two were divorced. At the time of her interview with Mr. Hobbs and Mr. Cannon, Mr. Bancroft entered the room and asked Petitioner questions regarding her marital status and her intentions regarding possible future child-bearing. Such questions, and the answers given by Petitioner, were not the basis for Petitioner not receiving the job with DTI.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 21st day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1908 The Petitioner submitted a seven paragraph "final order;" its numbered paragraphs have been treated, for purposes of this appendix, as proposed findings of fact. Accordingly, the rulings are as follows: Paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 3, it is accepted that Hobbs and Cannon interviewed Petitioner for a job with DTI and that they told her of a possible opening with Mr. Bancroft; otherwise rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are accepted. Paragraph 6 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 7 is accepted but is a conclusion of law, not fact. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraphs 1 through 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 15 are accepted. Paragraph 4 is rejected as irrelevant. With the clarification that the letter to Petitioner advised her that the salary range for the position was $12,000 to $13,000, paragraph 8 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 13, the Petitioner would not have foreseen the advertisement running in May (her interview was in March), however, she was made aware of the possible opening for Mr. Bancroft when she interviewed. Accordingly, paragraph 13 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. With regard to paragraph 14, it is accepted that neither Hobbs nor Cannon had the authority to hire the secretary for Mr. Bancroft; otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 16 and 17 are accepted but are irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Timothy R. Eves 1656 Eagle Nest Circle Winter Springs, Florida 32708 Ned N. Julian, Jr. Stenstrom, McIntosh, Julian Colbert, Whigham & Simmons, P.A. 200 West First Street--Suite 22 Post Office Box 4848 Sanford, Florida 32772-4848 Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113
