Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: At all times material hereto, Respondent was an osteopathic physician licensed by the State of Florida having been issued License Number OS 0016000. In August, 1984, one Jacob Kantor was a regular patient of both Respondent and Dr. Barry Goldberg, a chiropractor employed by Respondent. Kantor periodically came to the office for chiropractic therapy with Dr. Goldberg and for medical examination and treatment by Respondent. Kantor often showed up at Respondent's office without an appointment. On August 13, 1984, Jacob Kantor came to Respondent's medical office and discussed with Dr. Goldberg whether he could obtain reimbursement for a bill Kantor had paid to another chiropractor. Goldberg advised Kantor that, as an HMO patient, procedurally he should have first sought a referral to another chiropractor before obtaining services from a chiropractor, not affiliated with Respondent's practice, when he wished to be reimbursed by Respondent. Goldberg suggested that he talk with Respondent who perhaps would make an exception to the usual procedure in this instance. Kantor did not ask for medical treatment from Respondent on that visit although he did speak with Respondent about getting reimbursed for the fees he paid to an unaffiliated chiropractor. Respondent explained to Kantor that he was not entitled to reimbursement for chiropractic treatment received from chiropractors not associated with his office without his prior approval. Respondent then terminated the conversation with Kantor and proceeded to an examination room to treat a female patient. Kantor followed Respondent into the examination room and insisted upon continuing the conversation concerning the reimbursement. Respondent escorted Kantor out of the room and closed the door. Kantor persisted and re-entered the room, again interrupting Respondent's intended examination of the female patient and was, for a second time, escorted by Respondent out of the examining room. Debbie Lombardo, a medical assistant whose employment was terminated by Respondent five days after the alleged incident, recalled Kantor's repeated interruption of Respondent's attempt to examine the female patient. Respondent touched or pushed Kantor which resulted in his (Kantor) losing his balance and falling backwards inside the doorway of an adjoining room. Lombardo assisted Goldberg in picking up Kantor from the doorway that he fell into in losing his balance. Dr. Goldberg did not see what caused Kantor to lose his balance but he did observe Kantor back-pedalling out of an examination room, through the hallway, into an adjoining room and ultimately landing against the back wall of that room. Goldberg assisted Kantor in getting up from the floor. Lombardo was in another room assisting with a patient at that time. Kantor, who did not testify at the Final Hearing, alleged in his initial written complaints to the Petitioner that he did not fall but instead fell into the arms of Dr. Goldberg. To the contrary, both Goldberg and Lombardo denied that Goldberg prevented Kantor from falling after he lost his balance. In his statement to Investigator O'Connell during 1984, Kantor again stated that when he lost his balance, he was caught by Goldberg who prevented him from falling. Respondent denied pushing or otherwise attempting to strike or threaten Kantor. Archie Page, a former patient of Respondent, witnessed the incident in August, 1984. Page observed that Kantor appeared mad and taunted Respondent while Respondent was trying to restrain and calm him down. Page observed Goldberg coming out of his office, putting his arms around Kantor and taking him toward the waiting room following the incident, all in an effort to put him at ease. Page denied that Respondent pushed Kantor or that Kantor was ever on the floor. 1/ Resolution of the issue, concerning an alleged battery, although not charged in the complaint, requires a credibility choice between Respondent, his former patient Archie Page and Respondent's two previous employees, Debbie Lombardo and Barry Goldberg. The testimony of former patient Archie Page appears more credible as he has no personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings, his testimony was direct and he appeared most credible during the hearing. Three months after the subject incident, investigator O'Connell went to the offices of Respondent to investigate the incident and interviewed Respondent and Goldberg. During that interview, Goldberg, who was not under oath, stated that Jacob Kantor needed a lot of help as he had a bad psychological problem. Referring to the alleged incident of August 13, 1984, Goldberg stated that, "its possible that I may have seen (Kantor) that day but I don't recall it, and I'd certainly remember seeing him if I was supposed to have seen Dr. Shore strike him. Nothing of this sort ever took place to my knowledge." (T-page 121, lines 14 through page 122, line 17.) Goldberg testified under oath at a deposition in a related civil case that he did not have to lie to the DPR agent because the subject did not come up. Goldberg further testified at final hearing herein that he told the truth when questioned during the course of that deposition. Goldberg again testified under oath at the trial of the related civil case that he did not lie to the DPR agent and that he did not even discuss the incident with the agent. Goldberg, under oath at final hearing herein, again initially testified that he did not discuss the incident with the DPR agent. Finally, Goldberg claimed that he lied by means of withholding information from the DPR agent and that he did so because Respondent threatened to hurt him if he did not lie to DPR's agent. 2/ Respondent did not strike, threaten to, or attempt to strike Kantor at anytime on August 13, 1984. Kantor, as testified by all witnesses, was a demanding and overbearing patient who would show up at Respondent's office, without an appointment and would demand treatment whenever he showed up. Within one week after the subject incident, Kantor came back to Respondent's office seeking treatment for an abrasion and a cyst and wanted a referral to a proctologist. Respondent made the referral and had no further contact with Kantor. Such actions by Kantor is not indicative of a patient who was the subject of an assault and battery at the hands of Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed herein in its entirety. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1988.
The Issue An amended administrative complaint, dated July 31, 1989, alleges various violations of Chapter 459, F.S., by Respondent. Counts V, VI and VII, relating to Respondent's treatment of patient, R.C., were voluntarily dismissed by Petitioner at the commencement of the hearing. The following allegations are left at issue: That Respondent violated Section 459.015(1)(u), and (y), F.S., by prescribing Percodan and Ritalin, controlled substances, to his wife, G.I., inappropriately or in excessive quantities. That in the treatment of his wife, Respondent failed to practice osteopathic medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar osteopathic physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, in violation of Section 459.015(1)(y), F.S. That Respondent violated Section 459.015(1)(p), F.S., by failing to keep medical records justifying the course of treatment of G.I.; and that of his mother, M.I., for whom he prescribed Demerol.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Donald Iafornaro, D.O., is and has been at all times material to the allegations of the amended administrative complaint, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, with license number OS 0001794. Dr. Iafornaro has a limited osteopathic practice which he conducts from his home at 1802 North Lakemont, Winter Park, Florida. He has about fifty patients, and also treats his large family, including his wife, mother, eleven children and grandchildren. G.I. has been a patient of Dr. Iafornaro for approximately 25 years -- since 1973, as his wife, and prior to that, from 1964, along with the rest of her family in Cleveland, Ohio. Mrs. Iafornaro has had a demanding job caring for the Iafornaro children, her mother-in-law, the house and pets, and has recently been her husband's only staff in his practice. Between May 1985, and April 1987, her husband treated her for a variety of medical problems, including severe allergies, sleep apnea (a mechanical difficulty in breathing during deep sleep), depression, fatigue, a chronic fracture of the foot bone (a fracture which failed to heal), spinal stenosis, an unstable hip, ulcers, angina and various gynecological complaints Between May 1, 1985, and April 11, 1987, Dr. Iafornaro prescribed the following drugs, among others, to his wife: 2,720 tablets of Percodan 900 tablets of Ritalin Percodan is the product name for oxycodone hydrochloride, and Ritalin is the product name for methylphenidate hydrochloride. Both are Schedule II controlled substances and are legend drugs as defined in Section 465.003(7), F.S. With the concurrence of the parties, official recognition was taken of the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR) for the years 1984-1987. Petitioner also presented the testimony of two osteopathic physicians practicing in Dr. Iafornaro's community. The evidence from these authorities established that the prescriptions of Percodan and Ritalin for G.I. were inappropriate or in excessive quantities. Dr. Iafornaro felt that Ritalin was necessary to counteract the sedative effect of the antihistamines his wife had to take for her many allergies. He also prescribed the Ritalin for her depression. Ritalin is a mild central nervous system stimulant. It is indicated for attention deficit disorders (primarily in children) and narcolepsy. It should not be used for severe depression or for the prevention or treatment of normal fatigue. The PDR warns of drug dependence. Ritalin is also contraindicated in patients, such as G.I., who have exhibited anxiety, tension, depression and agitation. Ritalin may cause reactions such as skin rashes, a common complaint of this patient, but a problem which Dr. Iafornaro attributed to her multiple allergies. The Percodan was prescribed by Dr. Iafornaro for his wife's pain in her foot and for other pain in her low back and in her wrist. The PDR warns that Percodan may be habit forming. It contains aspirin, which can aggravate ulcers. It is indicated for relief of moderate to moderately severe pain; it is a depressant; it can cause apnea and respiratory depression in an overdose. Mrs. Iafornaro's statement that she used only about a half a tablet a day is inconsistent with the volume of the drugs prescribed for her over the relevant period. Dr. Iafornaro produced all of his medical records for G.I. for the relevant period. He claims they are incomplete because he also makes notes on odds and ends, writes on the back of a medical journal and keeps a lot of records in his head. (Iafornaro Deposition, p.15) The medical records produced by Dr. Iafornaro do not justify his course of treatment,for this patient, and particularly fail to explain the long-term volume of drugs that he was prescribing. Dr. Iafornaro claims that the probable cause panel previously reviewed his records and found them acceptable. The records were produced in response to charges that he had violated certain terms of an earlier disciplinary action. The issue was resolved with a "no probable cause" finding. That finding, in 1983, was for a different time period than the period at issue in this proceeding. Dr. Iafornaro provided records to the panel covering a limited period in 1983 when he was treating his wife for her foot fracture, a slip and fall accident and other acute conditions. The 1983 records, in contrast to those at issue here, describe the condition and his treatment. The later records provide copious listings of a variety of prescriptions, including the Percodan and Ritalin, with scant examination results, explanation of the condition being treated, or diagnoses of the complaints. Complete written medical records are an essential element of prudent osteopathic practice, particularly when, as here, the physician is treating his family and his objectivity may be questioned. Between January 5, 1987, and March 1, 1987, Dr. Iafornaro prescribed 200 50 mg Demerol tablets to his 84 year old mother, M.I. Demerol is a product name for meperidine hydrocloride, a Schedule II controlled substance, and a legend drug as defined in Section 465.003(7), F.S. The basis for the prescriptions was an episode of right upper quadrant pain felt to be of gallbladder origin. It is cheaper to purchase Demerol tablets by the 100. After M.I. took a few of the first prescription of 100, she lost the bottle and Dr. Iafornaro replaced it with another prescription. The medical records make no mention of the lost prescription, but they marginally justify the use of this drug for the limited period in issue and for the purpose intended. A previous disciplinary case involving allegations of Dr. Iafornaro's improper prescriptions and record-keeping practices was resolved with a stipulation for his one-year probation with conditions. The stipulation was approved by the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners in a Final Order entered on December 28, 1982. (DPR Cases #0010979, 0014467, and 0015303)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners enter a Final Order which finds Donald Iafornaro, D.O., guilty of having violated the provision of Subsection 459.015(i)(p), (u) and (y), F.S. and imposing the following penalties: Suspension of license for 90 days and until such time as he appears before the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners and establishes that he has taken and passed the examination conducted by the National Board of Examiners for Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons or the Special Purpose Examination (SPEX) of the Federation of State Medical Boards, as designated by the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners in its final order; Upon reinstatement that his license be placed on probation for two years subject to such terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the Board, including, but not limited to, restriction of practice, direct or indirect supervision of practice or prescribing of controlled substances and required additional continuing education; That he be permanently restricted from prescribing controlled substances to family members, unless under direct supervision of another osteopathic physician; That a reprimand be imposed; That a fine of $2,000. be imposed. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-5277 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 1. 3.-5. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraphs 6, 8 and 10. Some blood pressure monitoring is found in the records however. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted as a conclusion of law and in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 12. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in substance in paragraph 19. Respondent's Proposed Findings Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph l. Adopted in part in paragraphs 7-10, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 4.-6. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 7.&8. Adopted in paragraphs 15, 17 and 18. 9. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Dept. of Professional Regulation 730 S. Sterling Street Tampa, FL 33609 Sam Murrell, Jr., Esquire P.O. Box 1749 Orlando, FL 32802 Kenneth D. Easley, General Counsel Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St., Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Rod Presnell Executive Director Osteopathic Medical Examiners Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St., Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint dated November 19, 1998, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Board of Osteopathic Medicine is the entity responsible for imposing discipline on those licensed in Florida as osteopathic physicians. Section 459.015(2), Florida Statutes. The Department of Health is the state agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting disciplinary cases in which a probable cause panel of the Board of Osteopathic Medicine has found probable cause to support the filing of a formal complaint against a licensee. Section 455.621(4), Florida Statutes. Christopher Wayne, D.O., was at the times material to this proceeding, and is currently, a licensed osteopathic physician in the State of Florida, specializing in family practice and certified by the American Osteopathic Board of Family Physicians. Dr. Wayne operated at the times material to this proceeding, and currently operates, a primary care medical practice under the name of Dr. Christopher Wayne, D.O., Incorporated ("Company"). At the times material to this proceeding, the Company's office was located on the fifth floor in a building adjacent to the Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami Beach, Florida. At the times material to this proceeding, Dr. Wayne and the physicians employed in his practice had staff privileges at several hospitals and medical centers in the Dade County area. However, at the times material to this proceeding, Dr. Wayne did not have staff privileges at Parkway Regional Medical Center ("Parkway"). At least one physician employed by the Company, Agustin Andrade, had staff privileges at Parkway. Dr. Wayne began discussions with Agustin Andrade with respect to his possible employment by the Company as a family practice physician in or around June 1995. Dr. Andrade is a medical doctor who completed a three-year residency in internal medicine and a two-year fellowship in endocrinology at the University of Miami, in Miami, Florida; he is board-certified in internal medicine and endocrinology. Dr. Andrade was also a citizen of Ecuador at the times material to this proceeding. On July 7, 1995, Dr. Andrade signed an Employment Agreement with the Company, and he began working for the Company in October 1996. The delay was attributable to Dr. Andrade's need to obtain legal residency and authority to work in this country. He obtained legal residency and authorization to work in this country in June 1996, and he obtained his green card, representing the permanent right to stay in this country, in February 1997. As part of the process for obtaining a green card, Dr. Andarde completed a HUD J-1 Visa Waiver Policy Affidavit and Agreement in which he agreed to the following conditions: I understand and agree that in consideration for a waiver, . . . I shall render primary medical services to patients, including the indigent, for a minimum of forty (40) hours per week within a USPHS designated HPSA. Such service . . . shall continue for a period of at least two (2) years. I agree to incorporate all the terms of this HUD J-1 Visa Waiver Affidavit and Agreement into any and all employment agreements I enter pursuant to paragraph 3 and to include in each such agreement a liquidated damages clause, of not less than $250,000 payable to the employer. This damages clause shall be activated by my termination of employment, initiated by me for any reason, only if my termination occurs before fulfilling the minimum two year service agreement. Soon after he began working for the Company, Dr. Andrade's professional relationship with Dr. Wayne deteriorated rapidly for a variety of reasons. After two weeks, Dr. Andrade told Dr. Wayne that he wanted a raise because he had learned that the other physician employed by the Company at the time was paid a higher salary than he was paid. Dr. Andrade also accused Dr. Wayne of forcing him to engage in what Dr. Andrade termed "illegalities," of forcing him to see too many patients at too many different hospitals, and of requiring him to see pediatric patients, which he did not feel he was qualified to treat. On January 7, 1997, Dr. Wayne and Dr. Andrade were the only physicians employed by the Company. On the evening of January 7, 1997, medical orders were given by telephone for three of Dr. Andrade's patients hospitalized at Parkway. The physician order forms indicate that the person giving the orders was Dr. Andrade. Dr. Andrade denies giving these orders, and he subsequently refused to accept responsibility for the orders by declining to sign them. At around 8:00 p.m. on January 9, 1997, Dr. Andrade went to Parkway and spoke with the nurses in Parkway's surgical intensive care unit, specifically Ann Bravi, a registered nurse who has been employed at Parkway for twenty-eight years. Dr. Andrade told Nurse Bravi that someone was impersonating him and giving telephone orders for his patients. While Dr. Andrade was standing beside her, Nurse Bravi called Dr. Andrade's answering service regarding one of his patients. The call was returned by someone who identified himself to Nurse Bravi as Dr. Andrade and who told her that there would be "[n]o orders for now." Nurse Bravi cannot recall whether she telephoned the answering service at Dr. Andrade's request or on her own initiative, nor could she recall whether she called the answering service number noted on the patient's chart or called a number that Dr. Andrade gave her. On Friday, January 10, 1997, Dr. Andrade terminated his employment with the Company, accusing Dr. Wayne of having breached the Employment Agreement by impersonating him with the staff at Parkway and by giving telephone orders on Dr. Andrade's patients at Parkway. On Monday, January 13, 1997, Dr. Andrade was distributing business cards indicating that he was practicing medicine with another physician, whose offices were located on the first floor of the building in which the Company's office was located. The Company has sued Dr. Andrade for damages resulting from breach of contract, and Dr. Andrade has sued Dr. Wayne for defamation. At the time of the final hearing, both lawsuits were pending in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. If an osteopathic physician gives medical orders by telephone for a patient who is not his patient and who is hospitalized in a facility at which he does not have medical staff privileges, then that physician has acted in a manner inconsistent with ethics and the standard of care practiced by an osteopathic family physician. The osteopathic physician has further acted in a manner inconsistent with ethics and the standard of care practiced by an osteopathic family physician if that physician gives telephone orders using the name of another physician. The evidence presented by the Department is insufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Dr. Wayne gave telephone orders for any of Dr. Andrade's patients at the Parkway Regional Medical Center or that he identified himself as Dr. Andrade in telephone conversations with staff at the Parkway Regional Medical Center.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Osteopathic Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against Christopher Wayne, D.O. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1999.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent's license or authority to practice osteopathic medicine was acted against by the licensing authority of another jurisdiction, in violation of section 459.015(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016)1; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine and prosecuting disciplinary actions on the Board's behalf, pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 459, Florida Statutes. 2 Respondent's Exhibits A through D were also initially offered into evidence and admitted. However, during the hearing, the parties noted that Respondent's Exhibits A through D duplicated Petitioner's Exhibits A, B, J, and M, except that Petitioner's versions of these exhibits contained redactions. After the hearing, the parties filed a joint motion to allow Respondent to adopt Petitioner's Exhibits A, B, J, and M and withdraw Respondent's Exhibits A through D. The joint motion was granted. Accordingly, the record does not include Respondent's withdrawn Exhibits A through D. 3 By agreeing to an extended deadline of more than ten days after the filing of the transcript for filing PROs, the parties waived the 30-day time period for issuing the Recommended Order. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.216. Respondent is licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in Florida, having been issued license number OS 10315 on or about March 4, 2008. Although Respondent has been licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in Florida since 2008, including at all times relevant to the Complaint, he testified that he did not practice osteopathic medicine in Florida until sometime after December 14, 2016. Currently, Respondent does not hold any other active licenses to practice osteopathic medicine in other states. Previously, he held licenses in Ohio, Missouri, and Kansas. The factual allegation in the Complaint that is the predicate for the charge against Respondent is as follows: On or about December 14, 2016, the State Medical Board of Ohio issued an Entry of Order permanently revoking the license of Respondent to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in the State of Ohio. (Complaint at 2, ¶ 5). The parties stipulated that the Ohio Board is the licensing authority of the practice of osteopathic medicine in the state of Ohio. The parties also stipulated to the following: On December 14, 2016, in case number 16-CRF- 0055 and in accordance with chapter 119, Ohio Revised Code, the State Medical Board of Ohio entered an order which permanently revoked Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in Ohio. (Amended Jt. Pre- hrg. Stip. Part E (Stipulated Facts), ¶ 10). Respondent disputed the Complaint's allegation quoted above, notwithstanding the stipulations, based on the argument that the word "license" in the Complaint is different from the word "certificate" in the stipulation. Respondent attempted to argue that the "certificate" that was permanently revoked was not a form of authority to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery. Respondent offered various possibilities, such as that the permanently revoked "certificate" must have been the "training certificate" that he believed he was given in 2004 to participate in a training program before licensure, or that it was some other kind of "certificate." Respondent's argument is not credible, is inconsistent with the words following "certificate"—"to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery"—and is wholly unsupported by the evidence. Ohio Licensure History In late December 2003, Respondent applied for osteopathic medical licensure in Ohio via an application for a Certificate to Practice Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery (Ohio Application) submitted to the Ohio Board.4 The application was not deemed officially received for processing until January 29, 2004, because Respondent's initial submission was not accompanied by the required $335.00 fee and he did not pay the fee until January 29, 2004. See Pet. Ex. 1, Bates p. 28, 3, and 18. The Ohio Application form asked whether the applicant was, or intended to be, in an accredited training program in Ohio. Respondent answered that he intended to be in an accredited training program. He identified the training program as Doctor's Hospital/Anesthesiology in Columbus, Ohio, with a planned start date of June 30, 2004. On January 30, 2004, the Ohio Board sent Respondent its "Acknowledgement of Application for Certificate to Practice Medicine and Surgery or Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery" (Acknowledgement), notifying Respondent that his application for a certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery was received by the Board on January 29, 2004. The Acknowledgement also notified Respondent that he was authorized to 4 Respondent's entire licensure file, certified as complete by the Ohio Board, is in evidence, with Bates page numbers added in red. It is apparent that the pages representing Respondent's application for licensure to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery are not in order, perhaps because his initial submission in late December 2003 was incomplete and supplemented with various revised answers and additional documentation between 2004 and early 2005. participate in the training program identified in his application: "Please be advised that you are hereby authorized to begin participation in the training program to which you have been appointed … while your application is being processed." (Pet. Ex. 1, Bates p. 18). Respondent claimed that the Acknowledgement notified him that he was granted a "training certificate" so he could participate in the residency program while his application for a license to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery was being processed. The Acknowledgement says no such thing. Respondent's argument to the contrary is rejected. No evidence was offered to prove that a training certificate was ever issued to Respondent. Respondent's "training certificate" argument was part of his broader attempt to argue that in Ohio, the terms "certificate" and "license" refer to distinct items, and that a "license" is the form of authority to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery. Here too, Respondent's argument is contradicted by the record evidence and by Ohio law. Beginning with Respondent's initial submission, date-stamped by the Ohio Board on December 23, 2003, it is clear that the specific phrase used to describe the form of authority to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in Ohio was a "certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery," although the umbrella term "license" was frequently used interchangeably with "certificate."5 The interchangeable use of "license" and "certificate," prefacing the phrase "to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery," is replete throughout Respondent's Ohio licensure file. The interchangeable use of these terms is evident perhaps nowhere more clearly than in the Ohio Board's form "Affidavit and Release of Applicant [-] Medicine or Osteopathic 5 Pursuant to the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, just as under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, "license" is an umbrella term defined to mean "any license, permit, certificate, commission, or charter issued by any agency." § 119.01(b), Ohio Rev. Code; compare § 120.52(10), Fla. Stat. (defining "license" as "a franchise, permit, certification, registration, charger, or similar form of authorization required by law[.]"). Medicine"6 executed by Respondent and submitted as part of the Ohio Application bearing the Ohio Board's "received" stamp dated December 26, 2003. By the executed affidavit, Respondent certified under oath: that I am the person named in this application for a license to practice medicine or osteopathic medicine in the State of Ohio … and that all documents, forms or copies thereof furnished or to be furnished with respect to my application are strictly true in every respect. … I further understand that the issuance of a certificate to practice medicine or osteopathic medicine in Ohio will be considered based on the truth of the statements and documents contained herein or to be furnished[.] (Pet. Ex. 1, Bates p. 26, emphasis added). Respondent's Ohio Application contained multiple deficiencies and required several rounds of requests for omitted information/documentation followed by submissions that attempted to respond to the requests. This process, documented in Respondent's complete Ohio licensure file in evidence, spanned from early 2004 through early 2005. On April 13, 2005, the Ohio Board gave Respondent notice that it intended to determine whether to refuse to grant his certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery, for reasons set forth in a detailed three- page letter. The gist of the reasons was that Respondent allegedly made false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading statements to the Acting Director of Medical Education for Respondent's residency program in Missouri pertaining to Respondent's failure to appear or respond to pages when he was on call. Respondent was informed of his right to a hearing. Respondent requested a hearing, which was held before a hearing examiner for the Ohio Board on August 24, 2005. The hearing examiner's report and recommendation in evidence sets forth a summary of the evidence 6 The title of this form is on two lines: the first line is "Affidavit and Release of Applicant"; the second line, immediately below the first, is "Medicine or Osteopathic Medicine." The dash has been inserted to denote separation between the two lines of the title, for clarity. (including Respondent's testimony at the hearing), findings of fact, and conclusions of law. (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 71-80). The findings were that Respondent had failed to report to work when he was scheduled to be the resident on call, and failed to respond to several pages from the emergency department. He met with the Acting Director, and after the meeting, a determination was made to terminate Respondent from the residency program for "grievous dereliction of duty and subsequent imminent risk to quality patient care." (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 77). Respondent appealed the termination. Shortly thereafter, upon questioning by the Acting Director, Respondent falsely reported that he had been at the hospital, on duty that night, and received no pages. Respondent said that he had been in the hospital library and had used the computer. The Acting Director asked Respondent three times if he had used the computer at the library, and Respondent said yes. But the Acting Director verified with library staff that the computers had remained inactive during the time in question. Caught in the lie, Respondent ultimately admitted to the Acting Director that he had failed to report to duty. Instead, he had taken cold medicine and slept the entire night at home. Respondent "admitted that he had used very poor judgment and had been dishonest." (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 77). Respondent's termination from the residency program was upheld on appeal. The hearing examiner concluded that Respondent's conduct violated section 4731.22(B)(5), Ohio Revised Code (making false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading statements in relation to the practice of osteopathic medicine and surgery), but did not demonstrate a current failure to prove good moral character. The hearing examiner elaborated on these conclusions: Dr. Hall issued a series of deceitful and self-serving misstatements during the course of his practice. Such conduct would justify permanent denial of his certificate to practice in this state. Nevertheless, Dr. Hall admitted his misconduct and deceit within a short time of their occurrence. Moreover, Dr. Hall was forthcoming in his application for licensure in Ohio. Therefore the evidence suggests that Dr. Hall has learned from his mistakes and will be more cautious and forthcoming in the future. (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 78, emphasis added). Based on the hearing examiner's findings and conclusions, her proposed order was that Respondent's application "for a certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery" in Ohio be granted, "provided that he otherwise meets all statutory and regulatory requirements." If so, the "certificate" should be issued on the effective date of the order. However, the "certificate" should be immediately suspended for 30 days, then reinstated subject to a number of probationary terms for a period of at least two years. The hearing examiner's proposed order concluded with a provision addressing when the order would become effective: "This Order shall become effective thirty days after mailing of notification of approval by the Board." (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 78-80, emphasis added). At a meeting of the Ohio Board on December 14, 2005, the hearing examiner's proposed findings of fact, conclusions, and order were approved. A letter dated December 14, 2005, notifying Respondent that the Ohio Board had approved the hearing examiner's recommendations, bears a notation that it was mailed December 16, 2005. Respondent was required to update certain components of his licensure application. By letter dated December 29, 2005, Respondent was given notice as "a follow-up to your application for Ohio licensure" that he had to update his resume of activities from July 2004 forward; update the listing of licensure activity in other states; and execute another notarized Affidavit and Release of Applicant. (Pet. Ex. A, Bates p. 89, emphasis added). Respondent executed another Affidavit and Release on January 13, 2006; the form appears unchanged from the one he signed in 2003, continuing to use the terms "certificate" and "license" to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery interchangeably (Pet. Ex. A, Bates p. 25). Other updates to his application also were submitted on or shortly after January 13, 2006, including a letter from Doctors Hospital verifying that Respondent was in the anesthesia residency program, having begun February 2, 2004, and was anticipated to complete the program February 1, 2007. The submission of the required update items on or shortly after January 13, 2006, resulted in Respondent's certificate (a/k/a license) to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery being issued on January 17, 2006, two days after it otherwise could have been consistent with the provisions of the hearing examiner's proposed order. Also in accordance with the hearing examiner's proposed order, approved by the Ohio Board, Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery was immediately suspended for 30 days, which included the day that the certificate was issued. The 30-day suspension ran from January 17, 2006, through February 15, 2006. Respondent was permitted to practice osteopathic medicine pursuant to his certificate beginning February 16, 2006, subject to the terms of probation for at least two years. Less than six months after Respondent's first suspension was over, Respondent self-reported to the Ohio Board that he was terminated from the anesthesia residency program for diverting a drug he had prescribed to a patient for his own use. One month after the self-report, on August 30, 2006, Respondent signed a Step I Consent Agreement (Step I Agreement) with the Ohio Board. The Step I Agreement included the following stipulations and admissions: Dr. Hall admits that the Board ordered him to submit to a three-day examination at The Woods at Parkside [Parkside], a Board-approved treatment provider in Columbus Ohio, on or about July 31, 2006, based upon his self-report that he was terminated from his anesthesia residency program with Doctors Hospital in Columbus, Ohio, because he diverted for self-use Celestone, a corticosteroid, that he prescribed for a patient; and that he had diverted Kenalog, another corticosteroid, in the past. Dr. Hall further admits that during this examination, he was diagnosed with substance abuse and Bipolar Disorder with mixed anxiety and that he entered Parkside for further treatment, including 28-day residential treatment. Dr. Hall further admits that due to his substance abuse he currently is impaired in his ability to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery according to acceptable and prevailing standards of care because of habitual or excessive use or abuse of drugs, alcohol, or other substances that impair ability to practice and an inability to practice according to acceptable and prevailing standards of care by reason of mental illness or physical illness, including, but not limited to, physical deterioration that adversely affects cognitive, motor, or perceptive skills, due to his Bipolar Disorder with mixed anxiety. (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 57). The Step I Agreement provided that, based on the stipulations and admissions, Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery was suspended indefinitely. A series of requirements and conditions were imposed, which had to be met before the Ohio Board would "consider reinstatement of Dr. Hall's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery." (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 60). The Step I Agreement took effect September 13, 2006, when signed on behalf of the Ohio Board. (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 63). Six months later, on March 14, 2007, Respondent and the Ohio Board entered into the Step II Consent Agreement (Step II Agreement). Pursuant to the Step II Agreement, the indefinite suspension was lifted and Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery was conditionally reinstated under new probationary terms set forth in the Step II Agreement. The Step II Agreement contained additional stipulations and admissions agreed to by Respondent, including: C. Dr. Hall is applying for reinstatement of his license to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in the state of Ohio, which was indefinitely suspended pursuant to the terms of the [Step I Agreement]. * * * E. Dr. Hall admits that he initially entered inpatient treatment for cortical steroid abuse, at the Woods at Parkside [Parkside], a Board- approved treatment provider in Columbus, Ohio, on or about July 31, 2006, that he transitioned to out- patient treatment on or about August 28, 2006, and that he was subsequently discharged, treatment complete, on or about September 5, 2006. Dr. Hall further admits that in addition to his abuse of corticosteroids, in the past he also self-medicated with Elavil and Ultram, and excessively consumed alcohol to the point of having blackout events. Dr. Hall further admits that during his treatment at Parkside, he received an additional diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder for which he was prescribed medication. * * * G. … Dr. Hall states … that Victoria Sanelli, M.D., a psychiatrist who was approved by the Board to provide an assessment of Dr. Hall, evaluated Dr. Hall and submitted a report to the Board … in which she stated that Dr. Hall's diagnoses include steroid dependence in early sustained remission, and that although Dr. Hall has been recently diagnosed with possible Bipolar Disorder, it was Dr. Sanelli's opinion as an addiction psychiatrist that it is extremely difficult to assign an Axis I diagnosis to someone who has recently been involved in substance abuse. … Dr. Sanelli further opined that Dr. Hall has a Mood Disorder, which may be depressed mood or Bipolar Disorder, and that Dr. Hall's ability to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery has been assessed, and he is capable of practicing according to acceptable and prevailing standards of care so long as certain treatment and monitoring requirements are in place. The Step II Agreement provided that reinstatement of Respondent's license would be subject to a probationary term of at least five years from March 14, 2007, with numerous conditions and limitations imposed, including the treatment and monitoring requirements deemed necessary to ensure Respondent remained capable of practicing according to acceptable standards of care. The terms of Respondent's probation included random drug and alcohol tests, evaluations, restrictions on travel outside the state, use of a monitoring physician to monitor Respondent's practice of osteopathic medicine and surgery, and submission of quarterly reports to the Ohio Board in which Respondent attested under oath to full compliance with all conditions of the Step II Agreement. Respondent testified that, at the beginning, he complied with the probationary terms he agreed to. For example, with regard to the travel restrictions, in 2007, when Respondent decided on the spur of the moment to travel to Alabama to visit a friend, he requested and obtained last-minute permission from the Ohio Board for the trip with the proviso that he continue to be subject to random screenings and go to meetings there. However, in or about September 2008, after the Step II Agreement had been in place for only a year and a half, Respondent decided he could no longer comply with the agreement he entered into. When his brothers, who lived in Florida, asked him to travel with them to Italy and Lebanon for a vacation, for which the brothers would pay, Respondent agreed. The brothers coordinated the travel dates to work with Respondent's schedule. Respondent testified that he could not recall how long the trip was, but it was more than one week and possibly less than two weeks. Even though this longer trip was planned, rather than spontaneous like the Alabama trip for which Respondent had obtained Ohio Board approval, this time Respondent did not request approval. This was no accident. Instead, Respondent schemed to leave "clean" urine samples and slips filled out to submit with the samples to the lab, and left them behind with an employee who kept the samples in a freezer and submitted one or more samples while Respondent was out of the country. Respondent devised this scheme to cover up his unauthorized travel, and to give the impression that the samples were being given contemporaneously with their submission to the lab. Instead, Respondent went unmonitored during his unauthorized trip abroad. This was a blatant and devious affront to the terms of the Step II Agreement Respondent promised to abide by. At the hearing, Respondent attempted to explain several different times why he carried out a scheme to circumvent the Step II Agreement's monitoring requirements and cover up his unauthorized travel: Because I had no control in my life. I was doing everything that the board had asked; I had gone to meetings, two, three, sometimes four times a week as required; I was doing random urine drug screens for almost two years; and I had done everything that was asked, and I felt I had no control of my life. I wasn't getting anywhere with this board program. I felt that they were completely inflexible and had a total lack of understanding. And I thought that the suspension—I'm sorry; the impairment diagnosis for basically prednisone, which is an anti-inflammatory drug, was cruel. … [W]hen the program in Ohio said that I had an [impairment], based on the use of drug that in literature is used for inflammatory conditions, it blew my mind. I was still being required to test like a drug addict for over two years and I was labeled a drug addict for two-plus years at that point, and the board didn't want to listen to my protest or my concerns. And there was just a total lack of understanding on the part of the board. And I—and I got—I got overwhelmed emotionally. And just said I had enough of being controlled by somebody who didn't—who didn't have any of my interests at heart. They only wanted to punish. (Tr. 135-136). * * * I was put in a vice like a grape and crushed. (Tr. 142). * * * I don't know that I thought it was okay [to circumvent the Step Two Agreement]. … At the time, like I said, I was under the impairment agreement; I was hoping there would be some benefits to asking for help for mental health issues, and like I said, rolling in the drug portion. But as time went on, there was no positive affect on my life. I couldn't travel to see family. Family is important. Family is who we turn to in times of stress. I couldn't see them without the board's approval. I couldn't find work because of the scarlet letter that was on me. I couldn't find work because I didn't finish the residency. You know, I think when we tell patients by the way, we have a treatment for your problem, but it's going to kill you, most people would say, well, screw that, I'm not going to do it. And you know, I don't think any of the downside was anticipated by me. (Tr. 144). I didn't foresee all of the negative repercussions that would come through in my life. And I was—I was adhering to everything they that they asked of me, meetings, urine drug screens. This—you know, when you have to do a urine drug screen, you have to basically strip for them and someone has to look at you. And it's intrusive. And I was doing that. I was more than willing to work within their system, and do back flips and front flips. If they said, you know, stand on one leg, I would have said yes, sir, for how long, sir? But at the same time, you could only get beaten and put into a corner for so long and say what in the hell is this program designed to do except excommunicate people from a profession? … And so I broke. After a certain amount of time, I broke. It was too much. I—I know I did something stupid. I know I did. And I regret it every day of my life. And I look at it and kick myself and wish I would have never done it. But all I can say is I'm sorry. … So, you know, that's all I can say. I know I screwed up and I took the punishment for it, and I'm here today to say, I am not that person from 12 years ago. (Tr. 145-146). * * * In 2008, like I said, I had been compliant with the board's ruling since '06, since August of '06. I think it was August of '06. And now we're looking at two years later and despite having done everything the board asked, I'm getting—I'm getting nowhere. I'm just feeling like I'm spinning my wheels and there's no end in sight to this—to this situation. And so I threw my hands up. (Tr. 149). No evidence was offered to substantiate Respondent's dramatic claims that the Ohio Board showed inflexibility, a lack of understanding, or an unwillingness to consider any protests or concerns submitted by Respondent. No evidence was offered to show that the Ohio Board ever denied a request by Respondent to travel; the only evidence was that Respondent's single last- minute request was granted and Respondent was allowed to meet his monitoring and treatment requirements while traveling. As Respondent acknowledged, the Step II Agreement that he signed was for a minimum of five years, beginning March 2007. Before March 2007, Respondent was subject to the Step I Agreement, which he also signed. These agreements included stipulations and admissions agreed to by Respondent, and imposed terms and conditions that he accepted. Respondent's characterization at the hearing of the terms he had agreed to as cruel, and his explanation at the hearing that he could not abide by the Step II Agreement because he decided he needed to take back control, after less than one-third of the five-year minimum term had passed, are very troubling current-day admissions. Respondent attempted to refute his admissions in the Step I and Step II Agreements, disputing the substance abuse characterizations and claiming that he admitted to them as a means to have his license reinstated. Without any evidentiary basis to contradict his own admissions in the Step I and Step II Agreements, it is sufficient for purposes of this proceeding to simply point out that Respondent's admissions speak for themselves, and Respondent is not painted in a favorable light, whether he admitted to facts he did not believe as a means to the end of having his suspended license reinstated or whether he admitted to facts that were true. Respondent's claims of oppression and torture (i.e., being put in a vice like a grape and crushed) to explain the backdrop to the Ohio Board's action permanently revoking his certificate to practice osteopathic medicine cause concern. Respondent overly dramatizes the simple fact that he chose to enter into the Step I and Step II Agreements, regardless of his rationalizations for having done so. Also of concern is that for all of his dramatic expressions at the hearing, Respondent ignored a troubling series of admissions. In the Step II Agreement, Respondent admitted to diverting the hospital's prescription medication that he had prescribed for a patient for his own use, and he also admitted to having diverted other medication for his own use in the past. His diversion of hospital medication that he prescribed for a patient for his own use instead was essentially theft, resulting in his termination from the hospital's residency program. Respondent admitted to drug diversion on more than one occasion, in addition to self-medicating, and those admissions were predicates for the conditions imposed by the Step II Agreement. At the hearing, Respondent never addressed this dishonest conduct. That makes Respondent's attempted explanation for why he could no longer abide by the Step II Agreement, with three and a half years left to the agreement he entered into, wholly unsatisfactory. Respondent seemingly has not recognized that these underlying dishonest dealings in medication played a part in his being "painted with a scarlet letter." Whether he recognized it or not, he certainly expressed no remorse. Respondent's scheme to violate the Step II Agreement and cover up his violation succeeded, initially, and for several years thereafter. Respondent made it to the end of his five-year probation, falsely representing under oath to the Ohio Board in quarterly reports that he complied with the terms the entire time. Respondent's probation was lifted under false presences, based on the false impression given by Respondent to the Ohio Board that as of March 14, 2012, he had complied with the Step II Agreement for the five-year probationary term. From then until April 1, 2013, Respondent's certificate to practice was active and unrestricted for the first time since it was issued. Respondent's scheme came to light after Respondent fired an employee and reported to police that the employee was discovered forging prescriptions to obtain prescription drugs. The employee reciprocated by reporting to the Ohio Board that Respondent had falsified his urine samples to cover up an unauthorized jaunt abroad, during which he evaded the required monitoring. Once again, Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine in Ohio was immediately and indefinitely suspended by the Ohio Board on April 1, 2013. Criminal charges were brought against Respondent in the fall of 2014, based on his scheme to have an employee submit "clean" urine samples that were kept in a freezer, with slips Respondent filled out ahead of time, to give the appearance that he was providing those samples while he was on his overseas trip. Respondent's Ohio certificate to practice osteopathic medicine was still under indefinite suspension when it came up for biennial renewal in 2014. Respondent chose not to renew the license, so the license became inactive on October 1, 2014, but remained under suspension. Respondent did not surrender his license/certificate to practice osteopathic medicine in 2014 or at any time thereafter. On March 2, 2016, Respondent pled guilty to, and was found guilty of, two felonies: attempted tampering with evidence, a fourth degree felony; and possession of criminal tools, a fifth degree felony. After the felony convictions, on April 13, 2016, the Ohio Board both vacated the summary suspension of his certificate and initiated the disciplinary action against Respondent's certificate, designated case number 16-CRF-0055, notwithstanding that Respondent's certificate was inactive. The notice mailed to Respondent on April 14, 2016, informed Respondent that the Ohio Board "intends to determine whether or not to limit, revoke, permanently revoke, suspend, refuse to register or reinstate your certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery, or to reprimand you or place you on probation" for reasons enumerated in the notice. The reasons included the two felony convictions, Respondent's falsification of his quarterly reports to the Ohio Board attesting to full compliance with the Step II Agreement, and Respondent's violations of the limits placed on his certificate to practice pursuant to the terms of the Step II Agreement. Respondent was informed of his right to a hearing. Respondent asked for a hearing regarding the proposed disciplinary action against his certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in Ohio. Respondent testified at the hearing in this case that he pursued a hearing before the Ohio Board in the hope that he and his attorneys could persuade the Ohio Board to reinstate his inactive license. In his view, he had been punished enough and deserved something less than the most draconian punishment of permanent revocation. He believed that reinstating his license, likely subject to more conditions, was a possible outcome of the proceeding. Instead, the decision following an evidentiary hearing was to permanently revoke Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in Ohio. The written decision reflects that the basis for the permanent revocation was, in part, Respondent's lack of remorse, downplaying his past crimes for which he pled guilty, and dishonesty displayed at the hearing. After setting forth proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the hearing examiner provided a summary to explain why the proposed order recommended permanent revocation: Dr. Hall was dismissed from a residency program at the University of Health Sciences in Independence, Missouri, for sleeping through a shift, then lied about his whereabouts in an effort to regain his position. Before this Board, he testified that he learned his lesson and had come to understand the importance of telling the truth. Yet while working at Doctors Hospital in Columbus, Ohio, he created a false patient record in order to obtain corticosteroids to treat his own pain. Then, in 2008, Dr. Hall devised and employed a scheme to deceive the Board that he remained in Ohio when in fact he was abroad, because he feared his request to travel might be refused. He caused specimens, provided in different times than he had indicated, to be submitted for drug testing, as part of that scheme. He has been under Board supervision his entire tenure in Ohio, up to 2012. It is indeed true that several years have passed since the 2008 conduct at issue in this hearing, and that there have been no proven instances of misconduct or non-compliance with monitoring for the five years between 2008 and 2013, when Dr. Hall's license was summarily suspended, or since early 2016 when Dr. Hall resumed practice in Florida. But his career up to that point in 2008 had consisted of a nearly unbroken chain of deceitful conduct, and for four of the five following years, Dr. Hall had remained under Board supervision on pain of revocation of his license. So the question now is whether Dr. Hall's pattern of lying "under pressure" was situational, caused by pain, depression, and perhaps frustration, the causes of which are largely in his past, or whether this conduct reflects an ingrained character trait. Given his history, if Dr. Hall wished to regain the Board's "trust" and demonstrate a character trait for truthfulness, it was incumbent upon Dr. Hall to testify with complete candor in the proceedings before this Hearing Examiner. This Hearing Examiner did not, however, find Dr. Hall's testimony to be particularly credible as a general matter, based on his demeanor and testimony. Three factors stand out in particular: Dr. Hall attempted to minimize his deceit to [the Acting Director of his Missouri residency program] … . But the Board's prior finding was that Dr. Hall's lie was premeditated; … Dr. Hall repeatedly attempted to minimize the character of his scheme to conceal from the Board his travel outside Ohio, and to submit urine specimens not given at the times indicated … . … Dr. Hall repeatedly resorted to pat phrases to describe, and in all likelihood exaggerate, the level of discomfort he experienced … . The evidence that Dr. Hall's persistent lack of candor is merely a result of past causes, no longer at play in his life, is less than convincing. Accordingly, this Hearing Examiner does not believe that the record reflects mitigating circumstances sufficient to support providing a pathway for Dr. Hall to regain licensure by this Board.[7] (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 27-28). 7 The hearing examiner's observation regarding whether mitigating circumstances supported providing a pathway for Respondent to regain licensure confirms Respondent's testimony that the reason he invested time and resources in this hearing was in the hope that the Ohio Board would consider mitigating circumstances, with the possibility of having his license reinstated subject to conditions. This would have been similar to the approach of the Step I and Step II Agreements, whereby in Step I, Respondent's certificate to practice was suspended, and would be considered for reinstatement only after Respondent complied with a series of requirements, followed by Step II, which was treated as an application for reinstatement, and was granted subject to limitations and conditions. This time, Respondent failed to convince the hearing examiner or the Ohio Board to allow another similar pathway. The Ohio Board entered an Order on December 14, 2016, attaching and incorporating the hearing examiner's report and recommendation and ordering as follows: "The certificate of Adam Patrick Hall, D.O., to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in the State of Ohio shall be permanently revoked." (Pet. Ex. B, Bates p. 3). Just as Respondent's candor was found lacking in the Ohio proceeding, so, too, at the hearing in this case, Respondent was not credible, based on his demeanor and testimony. Instead, he was evasive, dramatizing his personal tribulations to which he attributed his past mistakes, while downplaying the extent and significance of his past wrongdoing. Several months after the Ohio Board permanently revoked Respondent's certificate to practice osteopathic medicine, Respondent's counsel, who had represented him since the Ohio proceedings in 2016, and worked with local Ohio counsel in the 2016 disciplinary proceeding, wrote the following on his behalf as a "self-report" to the Department on April 3, 2017: Please be advised that Adam Hall is represented by Chapman Law Group before the Florida Department of Health ("Department") and Board of Osteopathic Medicine ("Board"). … In November 2016, Dr. Hall submitted his response to the Department's Administrative Complaint. Subsequently, the Ohio Board of Osteopathic Medicine took action against his license. To wit, on December 15, 2016, by an order of the Board, Dr. Halls' [sic] Osteopathic medical license was permanently revoked. Such an order was based on convictions in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, Ohio in which Dr. Hall pled guilty to Attempted Tampering of Evidence, a fourth degree felony and Possession of Criminal Tools, a fifth degree felony. … Dr. Hall knows that pursuant to Florida Statute, his Ohio Board action constitutes grounds for disciplinary action, as specified in s. 456.072(2). To wit s. 456.015 [sic; 459.015(1)(b)] reads that: Having a license or the authority to practice osteopathic medicine revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against, including the denial of licensure, by the licensing authority of any jurisdiction, including its agencies or subdivisions. The licensing authority's acceptance of a physician's relinquishment of license, stipulation, consent order, or other settlement offered in response to or in anticipation of the filing of administrative charges against the physician shall be construed as action against the physician's license. Chapman Law Group respectfully submits that no action is needed on the part of either the Department or Board, because Dr. Hall reported this incident to the Department as required by law. (Pet. Ex. E, emphasis added). The letter was submitted on Respondent's behalf by attorneys Steven D. Brownlee and Ronald W. Chapman for the firm. Other Relevant Facts Respondent had a license to practice osteopathic medicine in Missouri at one time. He testified that "Missouri followed the action of Ohio, and I lost my license to practice in Missouri." (Tr. 148). Respondent did not provide specific details regarding the basis for the Missouri action to take away Respondent's license to practice in Missouri. Respondent had a license to practice osteopathic medicine in Kansas at one time. Respondent did not provide details regarding what happened to the Kansas license he held at one time. Respondent's Ohio licensure file contains a Kansas license verification form submitted as part of Respondent's application for a license (certificate) to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery in Ohio. The Kansas license verification form dated April 15, 2004, reports that Respondent's "original license date" was April 26, 2003; and the "expiration date" was September 30, 2003. The license status was reported as "cancelled." (Pet. Ex. A, Bates p. 31). No other evidence was offered regarding Respondent's Kansas licensure history, the reason for the short duration of his license, or why his license was "cancelled." As previously noted, Respondent has also been licensed to practice osteopathic medicine in Florida since 2008. However, he testified that he did not begin practicing in Florida until after the Ohio proceedings concluded with the Ohio Board's order of permanent revocation. There is no evidence of any blemishes on his track record practicing in Florida, but the tenure has been relatively short—three and a half years at the time of the hearing.8 Respondent is married, with three children. At the time of his hearing in Ohio that resulted in permanent revocation of his certificate to practice osteopathic medicine, his now-wife was his fiancée and they had a one- month-old child. Respondent testified that his wife is a lawyer. He credited her with coming up with the argument that the permanent revocation of his "certificate" to practice osteopathic medicine in Ohio was arguably something different than a permanent revocation of a "license" to practice osteopathic medicine in Ohio. Respondent noted that she raised this question before the Ohio disciplinary hearing, but the argument was not pursued there.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathic Medicine, enter a final order revoking Respondent, Adam Patrick Hall, D.O.'s, license to practice osteopathic medicine and assessing costs against him for the investigation and prosecution of this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Jovane Williams, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Ronald W. Chapman, Esquire Chapman Law Group 6841 Energy Court Sarasota, Florida 34240 (eServed) Lauren Ashley Leikam, Esquire Chapman Law Group 6841 Energy Court Sarasota, Florida 34240 (eServed) Jamal Burk, Esquire Department of Health Prosecution Services Unit 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Kama Monroe, Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medicine Department of Health Bin C-06 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3257 (eServed) Louise St. Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health Bin C-65 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent Warren B. Mulhollan has been licensed as an osteopathic physician in Florida. His license number is OS 0000896. At some time in the recent past, respondent was placed on probation. One of the terms of his probation was that he acquire continuing education credits. The Order of probation was not offered into evidence. In April of 1985, respondent was working in a Chinese acupuncture clinic approximately two days a week performing physical examinations and preparing patient histories. He was not writing prescriptions. At the time of the hearing, he was not practicing osteopathic medicine and does not now desire to do so, though he does wish to maintain his license. The respondent is 77 years of age. The respondent did suffer a stroke and has had several transient ischemic attacks over the past few years. For a period of time, he was unable to concentrate and his attention span was limited. He communicated this fact to the Department and requested that he be excused from compliance with the continuing education requirements of the Board. Apparently, the Board never excused the respondent from such requirements. Respondent was examined by two psychiatric physicians in the latter months of 1985 and in April of 1986. It was their understanding from discussions with respondent that he did not desire to have the ability to maintain a practice in the traditional setting. Both physicians were of the opinion that if respondent is unable to pursue continuing education and stay current in his field, he should not practice osteopathic medicine. According to the respondent, his former lack of concentration was due to eye strain. He states that after getting a new pair of glasses, he has no trouble concentrating. He does not wish to maintain a practice of osteopathic medicine in a traditional setting. However, he does desire to retain his license because he takes pride in his past accomplishments in the community, and he enjoys lunching and associating with other doctors and attending lectures and seminars at the Suncoast Hospital. He is willing to maintain a probationary- type practice, file monthly affidavits with the Board and comply with continuing education requirements.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be placed on probation for a period of five (5) years, and that the conditions of probation include the requirements that he attend continuing education courses, that any type of practice in which he engages be performed in a supervised, clinical-type setting with other physicians in the immediate area and that he submit to the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners verified, monthly reports setting forth any hours of osteopathic practice engaged in by him, as well as the names of patients and treatment rendered. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Bryant, Esquire Alpert, Josey, Grilli & Paris, P.A. Ashley Tower, Suite 2000 100 South Ashley Drive Tampa, Florida 33602 Warren B. Mulhollan, D.O. 2458 Enterprise Road, Apt. 6 Clearwater, Florida 33515 Rod Presnell, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that s. 381.494(6)(c) 5, 6, 10, and 11, Fla. Stat. (1983) and s. 381.494(6)(d)3 and 5, Fla. Stat. (1983) either were not applicable to, or were satisfied by, Petitioner's application. The statutory criteria remaining in dispute at the final hearing are as follows: s. 381.494(6)(c) 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, and 13; s. 381.494(6)(d) 1, 2, and 4. SUBURBAN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., the Petitioner in this case, operates an osteopathic primary care facility at the intersection of U.S. Highway 1 and Southwest 97th Avenue in South Dade County, and a satellite primary care facility in Naranja, Florida. Petitioner also has a certificate of need to operate an outpatient surgical clinic at its main facility, and is associated with International Medical Center, a health maintenance organization. Petitioner has approximately 6 physicians on its staff, and these physicians generate 1 to 3 patients per day needing acute care hospitalization with an average length of stay of about 6 to 7 days. Intervenor BAPTIST HOSPITAL OF MIAMI, INC., (BAPTIST), is a licensed and accredited 513 bed general acute care hospital located at 8900 North Kendall Drive, Miami, Florida, in subdistrict 4. Intervenor AMERICAN HOSPITAL OF MIAMI, INC., d/b/a AMERICAN HOSPITAL (AMERICAN), is a licensed and accredited 412 bed general acute care hospital located at 11750 Bird Road, Miami, Florida, also in subdistrict 4. Although both intervenors allow osteopathic physicians on their respective staffs, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that either intervenor in whole or in part constitutes an "osteopathic facility" as that term is used in Section 381.494(2), Fla. Stat. There is no evidence that any portion of either intervenor is under the management and control of osteopathic physicians so as to actively further, rather than to merely tolerate, the practice of osteopathic medicine. Both intervenors have allopathic physicians controlling admissions to staff and all important medical departments. Further, there is no evidence in this record that any other facility in District XI, with the exception of Southeastern Medical Center and Westchester Hospital, meet the definition of "osteopathic facility" contained in the statute as construed above by the Court in Gulf Coast Hospital, Inc. v. DHRS, 424 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Southeastern Medical Center is a 224 licensed acute care osteopathic teaching hospital located in North Miami Beach, Florida, close to the Broward County line. Westchester is a 100 licensed acute care osteopathic hospital located approximately at the intersection of Southwest 22nd Street (Coral Way) and the Palmetto Expressway in subdistrict 4, District XI, in Dade County. Pursuant to a settlement agreement with HRS, Westchester has permission to build a new, replacement 125 bed hospital for its current 100 bed facility. This permission is not pursuant to the current certificate of need law, and thus is not regulated by a certificate of need. There is no evidence in the record upon which to conclude that Westchester will exercise its permission, and therefore the existence of the permission is irrelevant to the determination of bed need for osteopathic facilities. Put another way, absent evidence that Westchester will in fact build a replacement facility, the Hearing Officer cannot conclude that it will, and will not find that Westchester will in the future provide osteopathic patients with a new 125 bed hospital. All calculations of osteopathic bed need on this record will be based upon the facts in the record, which show that Westchester now provides 100 osteopathic beds. Osteopathic medicine differs from allopathic medicine in several fundamental ways. Osteopathy is holistic, emphasizing treatment of the entire body; allopathic medicine tends to focus upon particular diseased areas of the body. Osteopathic medicine places great emphasis upon the health of the musculoskeletal system as a condition of healing, and employs techniques of manipulation of muscles and joints in the process of therapy for illness. Allopathic medicine does not. Osteopathic physicians tend to be general practitioners, since the emphasis of osteopathy is holistic. Allopathic physicians tend to specialize. Osteopathic medicine is growing in the United States. About 5 percent of all physicians in the United States are osteopaths. Of these, some 87 percent are general practitioners. Since 1970, the number of osteopathic medical schools has increased from 5 to 15 and these colleges now produce about 2000 graduates per year as compared to only 700 in 1970. Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine is affiliated with the Southeastern Medical Center in North Miami Beach, and in a few years will graduate 100 osteopathic physicians annually. Petitioner, SUBURBAN MEDICAL CENTER, originally sought 150 acute care beds, but amended its petition to 100 beds at the hearing. Petitioner intends to locate its proposed facility in conjunction with its primary care facility located at the intersection of U.S. 1 and Southwest 97th Avenue, commonly called Franjo Road. The facility's proposed location lies within subdistrict 4 of HRS Health Planning District XI. The primary service area for the proposed hospital extends from Southwest 152nd Street into South Dade County and the upper area of North Monroe County. The secondary service area for the proposed facility extends northward from the primary service area to Southwest 88th Street, also known as Kendall Drive, and southward to encompass the upper Keys in North Monroe County. These service areas generally encompass the northern portion of subdistrict 5 and the southern portion of subdistrict 4. Petitioner sought to demonstrate a need or a new 100 bed osteopathic hospital on the southern boundary between subdistrict 4 and 5 by projecting the need for such beds by means of a formula based upon current data. This primary evidence of need was supplemented with additional need evidence: the need for an osteopathic teaching facility, and the need to provide an osteopathic hospital that is closer to potential patients than Westchester Hospital or Southeastern Medical Center. As will be discussed more completely ahead in the conclusions of law, there is no specific rule available to calculate osteopathic hospital bed need. Moreover, pursuant to the Gulf Coast case, the need for osteopathic hospital beds must be considered separately from considerations of need for allopathic bed needs. Consequently, the rule applicable for acute care hospital beds is inappropriate for calculating need. The parties offered a variety of methods to project the future need for osteopathic hospital beds, but none of the methods presented were very satisfactory. Each of these methods will be discussed with respect to the witness who offered the method for consideration. Petitioner presented calculations of need through the testimony of Ms. Gail Buck, who was accepted as an expert in certificate of need review and health planning. Based upon data contained in the District XI health plan, 3 percent of the physicians in Dade County in 1983 were osteopathic physicians. (169 osteopaths in Dade County in 1983.) From other studies, she testified that the percentage of osteopathic physicians nationally is about 5 percent, and that these physicians have approximately 10 percent of all patients as osteopathic patients. Applying this ratio, she concluded that one could reasonably assume that 6 percent of all patients in Dade are osteopathic patients. From other studies she had read, the number of osteopathic patients hovers around 5-7 percent. One of these studies was a study done by HRS, developed by the Office of Health Planning. Ms. Buck further testified that for acute care hospital bed planning, it was normal to project need five years in the future. She then testified that by 1989, 8,792 acute care beds would be needed in District XI based upon HRS projections. Assuming that 5 percent of these beds were needed for osteopathic patients, by 1989 District XI would need to allocate 440 of these hospital beds to osteopathic patients. Ms. Buck then calculated the net osteopathic bed need by subtracting 224 beds at Southeastern Medical Center, and 100 beds at Westchester, resulting in 116 net beds need. Using a 6 percent rate, the net bed need was 204 beds using the same method. Ms. Buck further testified that the data as to the number of osteopathic patients using allopathic hospital beds does not exist, but that such patients were not accounted for in the 5 percent estimate above. Ms. Buck stated that since the majority of osteopaths are general or family practitioners and refer their hospital-bound patients to specialists, who in turn admit the patients to hospitals, it is very difficult to obtain data as to actual osteopathic patient need, and that for this reason, the 5 percent method, as well as other methodologies, lacked a firm data base. She said ". . . there's no one methodology that can be considered totally accurate." Ms. Buck chose the 5 percent method because she felt it was based upon more accurate data than other methods. Ms. Buck did not set forth any underlying data to justify the assumption that osteopathic patients constitute from 5 to 10 percent of all patients. She simply stated that these figures came from various studies. Other data in the record reveals that at least for District XI, the S to 10 percent standard of need is much too high. In 1982, District XI had 11,052 licensed acute care beds as shown by American Exhibit 1. 324 of these beds, or 2.9 percent, were osteopathic acute care beds. If these beds had been running at 100 percent occupancy, then the data would be at least consistent with Ms. Buck's opinion that the "need" is from 5 to 6 percent of all acute care beds, though this would not necessarily be total proof of the point. But in 1982, these osteopathic beds were on the average only 60 percent occupied, thus indicating that "need" for osteopathic beds in 1982 in the District was only 60 percent of 2.9 percent of all acute care beds, or only 1.7 percent of all acute care beds. The difference between a real figure of 1.7 percent and the 5 to 10 percent range is so great that the conclusion has to be drawn that the 5 to 10 percent figure is inappropriate in this case for District XI. While Petitioner's need calculation is unreasonably high, the calculations presented by Respondent and Intervenor, AMERICAN HOSPITAL, suffered from unreliability that would tend to underestimate need. Daniel J. Sullivan was presented as an expert in health planning by AMERICAN HOSPITAL, and was accepted as such. He testified with respect to projections of need, and his testimony formed the basis for introduction into evidence of American Exhibit 1. Need was first calculated using the rule for acute care hospitals, rule 10-5.11(23), F.A.C. As will be discussed ahead in the conclusions of law, this evidence may be relevant to the issue of the financial feasibility of the proposed project, since an osteopathic hospital must compete for many of the same ill patients as are served by allopathic hospitals; but in accordance with the decision in the Gulf Coast case, the rule cannot be used to project osteopathic need because it impermissibly assumes that allopathic beds will be adequate for osteopathic patients. Mr. Sullivan criticized the 5 percent methodology presented by Ms. Buck as being overstated. In 1982, the number of patient days in osteopathic hospitals in Florida was 3.6 percent of all the patient days in all hospitals in Florida, and was 2.67 percent in Dade and Monroe Counties. From this he reasoned that 5 percent was too high as a representation of osteopathic patient needs. His reasoning, however, fails to account for the number of patient days of patients in allopathic hospitals admitted to those hospitals by osteopaths who would have been admitted to an osteopathic facility had one been available. Calculation of future osteopathic need based upon osteopathic hospital availability is inherently faulty because it equates supply of facilities with demand of patients. Three additional methods of projecting acute care osteopathic hospital bed needs were presented by Mr. Sullivan. The first was to project need based upon a projection of the number of patient days that would be generated by the supply of osteopathic physicians in the District. There are 184 currently licensed osteopathic physicians in District XI as shown by the records of the, Florida Board of osteopathic Medical Examiners. Mr. Sullivan then selected the number of osteopathic patient days per osteopathic physician in Florida in 1983 as a basis for determining need. The data came from HRS, and simply reflects patient use of osteopathic hospitals. The method used by HRS to count osteopathic physicians in this data was not explained. The data results in 510 patient days per osteopathic physician which, when multiplied by the number of currently licensed osteopaths in District XI, results in a projection of 93,840 patient days. This number divided by 365 results in 257 beds needed at 100 percent capacity, and 321 beds needed at 80 percent capacity. Since 324 beds already exist, there is no need using this method. The above method of calculating need is inadequate for two reasons: it fails to account for osteopathic patients in allopathic hospitals and other patients who might want to be treated in an osteopathic hospital but cannot due to lack of facilities, and it fails to consider the number of additional osteopathic physicians who might be attracted to South Dade County if an adequate osteopathic hospital existed there. Parenthetically, Mr. Sullivan noted that most of the osteopaths in District XI have offices close to Southeastern Medical Center, and concluded from this zip code analysis that there was no need for an osteopathic hospital in South Dade County. The conclusion is untenable. From other testimony it is clear that all physicians tend to locate their offices near hospitals (just as lawyers tend to locate their offices near the courthouse.) More important, however, there was credible testimony of prior and lingering discriminatory practices against osteopathic physicians who try to practice at allopathic hospitals. A minority profession, under such circumstances, would be expected to locate offices close to a friendly, home osteopathic hospital, and not in areas lacking such a facility. Health planning methods that look for osteopaths in areas lacking osteopathic hospitals put the cart before the horse. The next need methodology proposed by Mr. Sullivan multiplied the rate of osteopathic patient days per 1,000 of population (based upon osteopathic hospital patient days in 1983 in seven districts) times the District XI projected population in 1989. This method resulted in a net projected osteopathic bed need of 20 beds. Again, the methodology is faulty in that it is based upon the status quo, the current availability of osteopathic hospitals, and fails to account for osteopathic patient needs which the existing stock of osteopathic hospitals may or may not be able to serve. The final methodology offered by Mr. Sullivan was first to compute the 1982 osteopathic hospital patient days for Dade County as a ratio of population in 1982, and then to extrapolate the expected number of osteopathic hospital patient days in 1989 for the 1989 projected population. This method projects a surplus of 52 osteopathic hospitals beds in Dade County by 1989. Again, the problem with the methodology is that it is based upon the status quo, and would be substantially inaccurate as a projection of need if current need is unmet by existing osteopathic hospitals. Respondent, HRS, proposed several methods to calculate need through the testimony of Walter Eugene Nelson, administrator of the Office of Community Medical Facilities at HRS, who was accepted as an expert in health care planning and certificate of need review in Florida. Mr. Nelson first mentioned the 5 percent method which was relied upon by the Petitioner, as described above. Mr. Nelson did not attempt to support this methodology, even though it had been proposed by HRS as a rule, and the record contains no other evidence from HRS to prove that the 5 percent method is reasonable or that it should determine need in this case. The second method proposed was to estimate the number of osteopaths in Dade County in five years and then to project the number of patient days chat would be generated by this number based upon current use rates for the two osteopathic hospitals in Dade County. This method projects a surplus of 86 osteopathic beds by 1989. This projection is mathematically incorrect. The surplus projected is actually 22. (The error is in the calculation of patient days per osteopath in 1984, Respondent Exhibit 1, which is 439.5 not 353.6, since 59,766 is divided by 136, resulting in 439.5.) Other than this error, the method has more fundamental flaws. First, though it reasonably projects that the 1984 census of osteopaths (136) will grow to a larger number in 1989, it accounts only for growth expected from graduates of Southeastern Medical College. Surely the climate of south Dade County will attract osteopaths from other colleges and other areas of the country, particularly if south Dade County were to have ample osteopathic hospitals. Second, as discussed above, the method fails to count the number of patients in allopathic hospitals who might prefer an osteopathic hospital if additional facilities were available. In summary, all of the methods of projecting need discussed above have major problems. But the primary evidence of lack of need in this case is a result not of the relatively unsatisfactory methods of predicting the future that have been offered, but the lack of need shown by the recent past use rates at the two osteopathic hospitals in the District. There are two osteopathic hospitals in District XI discussed above. The occupancy rates at these two osteopathic facilities have been significantly lower than capacity in recent years, and have been very similar to the use rates of allopathic hospitals: OCCUPANCY RATE 1981 1982 All district XI Hospitals 67.4 percent 66.6 percent Westchester Hospital 67.8 percent 65.8 percent Southeastern Medical Center 61.3 percent 58.4 percent This is strong evidence that District XI has had an excess of osteopathic beds in recent years. Moreover, the need for the existing osteopathic beds in 1984 has decreased. In the first six months of 1984, the use rate at Westchester dropped to 46.7 percent and the rate at Southeastern Medical Center dropped to 52.5 percent. The cause of these lower use rates have been causes that apply equally to osteopathic and allopathic hospitals, thus leading to the conclusion that the lack of need shown by the above data will probably persist for several years into the future. All acute care hospitals have lost patients due to growth of alternatives to in-patient care, such as nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, outpatient surgical centers, and the like. Additionally, medicare policy changes have reduced the length of stay at all acute care hospitals. There is no compelling evidence on this record that osteopathic hospitals will not suffer from diminished need from these market forces in the same way that allopathic hospitals have suffered. The Petitioner presented some evidence that the lower use rate at Westchester was due not to lack of osteopathic patient demand and need, but rather to poor quality of care at that facility. But the evidence was insufficient to dispel the conclusion that an additional major cause was simple lack of need. Dr. Jules Gary Minkes testified with respect to the adequacy of Westchester Hospital for osteopathic patients. He said that there have been emergencies where Westchester was too far away to take the patient in the ambulance, and the patient had to be taken to a closer allopathic hospital. He did not testify as to how frequently this had occurred. Further, he testified that the bulk of the area to be his proposed osteopathic hospital was outside the service area of Westchester. Both of these problems, however, are ones that naturally flow from the fact that osteopathic physicians and patients constitute such a small percentage of all patients and physicians. Even if 10 percent of the acute care beds in District XI were osteopathic beds, these beds would be located at only a few hospitals at great distances from many of the osteopathic patients. Dr. Minkes further testified in a general way that at some time in the middle 1970's, Westchester ". . . did not develop and did not meet the needs of the osteopathic physicians and did not keep up. And there was not a sufficiently integrated cohesive development." In the next sentence he implied that Westchester did not keep its staff, but did not testify to that fact. Finally, Dr. Minkes testified that physicians that practice at Westchester had made requests to upgrade equipment and take a "more aggressive competitive attitude," but that this had not occurred at Westchester. On cross examination Dr. Minkes again acknowledged that he had "problems gaining access of my patients in our service area to go to Westchester," but he did not state further what those problems were. Perhaps the strongest evidence of the inadequacy of health care at Westchester came from Dr. Ira Hershman, an osteopathic physician who has practiced in Dade County since 1960. Dr. Hershman's testimony, however, is ultimately as general and nonspecific as the testimony of Dr. Minkes. Dr. Hershman was chief of staff at Westchester a number of years ago, and in the early years osteopathic physicians tried to modernize the facility. Dr. Hershman then testified without explanation or elaboration that in recent years those efforts had "gone by the boards," and he was of the opinion that the current management at Westchester would not support expansion of osteopathic medicine in south Dade County and Monroe County. Dr. Hershman was convinced that no effort now would improve Westchester. Dr. Hershman primarily admits his patients to Westchester, however, although he used allopathic hospitals occasionally for specialities not found at Westchester. Westchester has six or seven specialists on its staff, but does not have neurology, obstetrics, or psychiatry. Dr. Hershman said that his patients often do not approve of the quality of the facility at Westchester. Westchester, in his opinion, is designed in a "very poor way" and there are many, many inconveniences in there." He stated that Westchester is "very unpleasant for the patient and their families in many ways." He felt that the management of Westchester could have made improvements, but that architecturally "in its very design, it was just not made as a real facility." Dr. Hershman testified that Westchester had problems with equipment, both in terms of modernization and quality, with equipment breaking down. He concluded that "although I can get by with my cases in there on a general primary care level, it is really not an ideal facility. And that is being kind, I suppose." Dr. Kathleen M. Tillman, an osteopathic physician specializing in internal medicine and practicing in Dade County, testified that she admits patients to both Westchester and Larkin hospitals. She stated that there was a "definite problem" for her patients due to the distance to Westchester Hospital. She said that due to the distance and travel time to Westchester, she had to "almost talk them into going" to Westchester. She said that a lot of her patients were over 65 years of age, and driving was a problem for them, that family visitation at Westchester was a problem due to the distance, and that she planned an office further south, thus increasing the distance in her work to Westchester. Other than driving distance, the only reason Dr. Tillman could think of that her patients did not want to go to Westchester was the physical facility, "the actual looks of the place more than anything, more than the actual health care." Dr. William Levin is also an osteopathic physician who practices in Dade County. He testified that he had "difficulty" admitting patients to Westchester Hospital. Dr. Levin said that his difficulty is partially caused by the physical plant at Westchester, and partially caused by the location. He felt that the physical plant was a major factor, but that rebuilding the facility would not solve the problem of patient acceptance. Dr. Levin further testified that for the past 10 years, the chief of staff at Westchester has always been an osteopathic physician. He also testified that he had been the past chairman of general medicine at Westchester, that Westchester had a department of family medicine, and that department heads at Westchester, to the best of his knowledge have always been osteopathic physicians. Dr. Nsitibe Nelson Ikpe, an osteopathic physician who practices in Dade County, is trying to expand his practice to the southern portion of Dade County. Dr. Ikpe is currently using Westchester Hospital. Dr. Ikpe has not in the last few years had any problem admitting patients to Westchester. Dr. Ikpe conceded that it could "take up to 30 minutes" for a patient to drive from north Monroe County to Westchester, but he did not say it would take more than 30 minutes, and did not testify that this driving time was a problem for him. Dr. Ikpe did not provide any other evidence as to the adequacy of Westchester. Finally, Dr. Arnold Melnick, Dean of the Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine, was offered the opportunity to express an opinion as to the adequacy of Westchester Hospital, and his testimony leads the Hearing Officer to conclude that he found no fault with Westchester, at least as a training facility. Dr. Melnick testified that if the American Osteopathic Association (AOA) approved a hospital, he would have no hesitation to recommend it to his students. He then testified that Westchester was AOA approved for internships. Finally, when asked to express an opinion as to the need for a new osteopathic hospital, assuming Westchester was no longer adequate, Dr. Melnick testified: "Since Westchester is accredited as a training institution by the American Osteopathic Association, I couldn't comment because it contradicts what you're stating." None of the osteopathic physicians who expressed general dissatisfactions with Westchester supported their conclusions with concrete examples of inadequacies. While the foregoing is evidence that there are problems at Westchester for the physicians who testified, these problems were not proven with sufficient specificity and have not been shown to be such for this Hearing Officer to conclude that Westchester is so inadequate that it should be replaced by the hospital proposed by Petitioner. Nor is the evidence sufficient for the Hearing Officer to conclude that the low use rate at Westchester is due solely to inadequate health care at Westchester. As stated above, the record evidence indicates that the use rate at Westchester is quite similar to the use rates at allopathic hospitals in the District, which is consistent with the conclusion that the lower use rate at Westchester is caused by the same diminished need. Further, the use rate at Westchester is quite similar to the use rate at Southeastern Medical Center. On this record, there is no indication that Southeastern Medical Center is other than an adequate health care facility. The similarity in use rates, therefore, leads one to the conclusion that the use rate at Westchester is driven primarily by the same force that drives the use rate at Southeastern: lack of need or demand by osteopathic patients. Petitioner also argued need for its proposed hospital because of plans to make the new osteopathic hospital a teaching hospital serving the needs of osteopathic students, interns, and residencies. Dr. Melnick, Dean of the Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine, testified with respect to the need for teaching hospitals for these purposes. The Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine has been in existence only a few years, and has yet to graduate its first class. The first class will be 40 students, but the fourth graduating class, and in every year thereafter, will be 100 students. In order to be certified as an osteopathic physician, a graduate of a college of osteopathy must serve an internship in an osteopathic hospital approved by the American Osteopathic Association. In District XI, Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine currently places about 16 of its interns in internships at the Southeastern Medical Center. Westchester is approved by the AOA for from 2 to 5 interns, and currently has one. Dr. Minkes testified that the proposed new hospital would strive to be approved by the AOA and provide at least 5 osteopathic internship slots, and possibly more based upon outpatient and emergency room use. Thus, if there were other compelling evidence of need to fill the beds of the proposed 100 bed osteopathic hospital, the above evidence would be some additional evidence of need. By itself, however, the need to provide 5 internships is not sufficient justification for the project, particularly since the internship crisis facing Southeastern College would be ameliorated only in a small way by the availability of 5 intern positions at the proposed hospital. Dr. Melnick testified that in a few years in Florida there would be a shortage of as many as 500 osteopathic internships. Petitioner further sought to establish a need for its proposed hospital by presenting evidence that Westchester does not have obstetric beds, and the proposed hospital would devote 10 percent of its beds (10 beds) to obstetrics. First, it should be noted that whether or not existing allopathic hospitals provide obstetric services, or whether any such allopathic services are currently running at capacity, is not relevant to this case since allopathic obstetric beds are not an adequate equivalent to osteopathic obstetric beds. Nonetheless, other than the fact that Westchester has no obstetric beds, there is no evidence in the record of the magnitude of need for such beds. Moreover, the proposed hospital will devote only 10 percent of its beds to obstetrics. Even assuming a need have been proved, this is not a sufficient reason to grant a certificate of need for all 100 beds. As further justification for need, Petitioner presented evidence that osteopaths had been discriminated against in the years before this decade, and that the growth of the profession has thus been retarded by these practices. Petitioner argued that the numbers of osteopathic physicians in District XI was not reflective of actual patient need, and that a new osteopathic hospital would attract more osteopathic physicians. Though not extensive, the evidence of discrimination by allopathic hospitals and physicians through the 1970's was shown by the record. Moreover, there is good reasons in the record to believe that osteopathic physicians will cluster around an osteopathic hospital. Osteopaths currently locate their offices near Southeastern and Westchester. Despite the general truth of the above two principles, however, on the record of this case the operation of these principles does not compel the conclusion that a new osteopathic hospital is needed. If indeed there were continued serious discrimination against osteopaths and their patients, one would expect that the use rates at Westchester and Southeastern would be higher. The relatively low use rates at Westchester and Southeastern lead one to the conclusion that the magnet effect of those hospitals has already pulled all available and interested osteopathic physicians to District XI, and has attracted all those osteopathic physicians who have been discriminated against. And still, presuming the full operation of both principles, both existing osteopathic hospitals run at about 50 percent capacity. In sum, prior discrimination and the potential of attracting new osteopaths to a new hospital, even if probably true, do not ultimately show a need for a third osteopathic hospital in District XI. Dr. Melnick testified that about 80 percent of his students at Southeastern College of Osteopathic medicine came from Florida, and estimated that "a good number" would practice in Florida. Dr. Melnick did not provide any data as to the number that might practice in Dade County. Eugene Nelson based his estimates of the number of osteopathic physicians who might stay in Dade County after graduating from Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine upon actual experience at the University of Miami College of Medicine, and as such his testimony is based upon better evidence and is accepted over the estimate of Dr. Melnick. Eugene Nelson mentioned one other methodology for calculating bed need, a methodology which assumes that each osteopathic physician will generate 660 patient days per year. This methodology was used in OMHI-UHSI vs. DHRS, 5 FALR 2294A, the "Wellington" case, and is based upon the use rate at one osteopathic facility in Palm Beach County. It therefore was based upon a sample of data relevant only to that case, a sample size too small to provide a basis for extrapolation to this case. As will be discussed ahead in the conclusions of law, since osteopathic bed need constitutes at most only 10 percent of all acute care hospital beds, the 30 minute driving standard for urban areas is of little use in this case to determine osteopathic hospital bed need. Many osteopathic patients will always be at some distance from the few osteopathic hospitals if, at best, only 1 out of 10 hospitals is an osteopathic hospital. Nonetheless, for the record, additional findings will be made with respect to the evidence of driving distances to the two osteopathic hospitals, Westchester and Southeastern. Southeastern Medical Center is located in the northeastern portion of Dade County and, of the hospitals considered at the hearing, is the furtherest hospital from residents living in subdistricts 4 and 5. Southeastern Medical Center is currently over 30 minutes driving time from all the persons residing in subdistricts 4 and 5, and will continue to be beyond 30 minutes driving time in 1988. Westchester Hospital is closer to residents in subdistricts 4 and 5. It is located approximately at the intersection of Coral Way and the Palmetto Expressway about 9 miles north northeast of the proposed new osteopathic hospital. Westchester is located in a dense urban area, and consequently the 30 minute driving distance surrounding the hospital consists of a smaller area. In 1984, about 30 to 35 percent of the population in subdistrict 4 resided more than 30 minutes driving time from Westchester, and 100 percent of the population of subdistrict 5. In 1988, about 40 to 45 percent of the population is subdistrict 4 is expected to reside beyond 30 minutes driving time of Westchester, and 100 percent of subdistrict 5. Baptist Hospital presented travel time evidence that showed 30 minute distances from locations on major roadways to four allopathic hospitals and Westchester Hospital, all located in the south Dade County area. The data provided did not show the percentage of population within 30 minutes driving time of Westchester Hospital. Moreover, the driving distances tend to overstate the accessibility of the hospitals considered. The data does not account for driving time from residential areas to major roadways, but rather, begins (or ends) at points still on major roadways. The driving data presented by Petitioner, however, tends to understate the area of accessibility to Westchester Hospital and Southeastern Medical Center. Petitioner's travel times include time to park at the hospital and walk to the entrance. This is an entirely reasonable approach, at least with respect to parking time as discussed above. Rule 10-5.11(23)(i)1, F.A.C., is concerned with "beds" being "accessible within an automobile travel time." A bed is not accessible until one is there, and parking can take a few minutes. However, it is also reasonable for HRS to construe its own rule, for the sake of simplicity, as not counting these periods of travel, and therefore it is the obligation of the Hearing Officer to follow the interpretation of the agency of its own rule, if reasonable. The record does not reflect how much time, on the average, Petitioner's expert added to the driving time for parking and walking, but the amount should not have been more than a few minutes. Petitioner's travel may have also been understated because Petitioner's expert assumed that travel by night would be 10 percent slower. The testimony of intervenor's expert, that night driving should be the same or faster, is accepted as more correct. Petitioner's expert further assumed that driving times in the future would be 10 percent slower. Intervenor's expert presented a contrary view, arguing that it was impossible to predict future traffic demand and traffic improvements but on this point Petitioner's expert's view of the future traffic in south Dade County is accepted as being more accurate. Since none of the allopathic hospitals represented in any of the travel studies was shown to be an "osteopathic facility" as discussed above, the travel times to these hospitals for this case was irrelevant. If one were to rely upon the acute care bed rule to project need for osteopathic patients, District XI by 1989 shows a significant maldistribution of beds. Subdistrict 4 will have a net surplus of 1012 beds, while subdistrict 5, the extreme southern portion of Dade County and Monroe County, will have a net need for 533 beds. This is some evidence that were this proposed project to be located in subdistrict 5 it would serve the unmet needs of that district. However, this is not an appropriate conclusion to draw for several reasons. First, the overbedded situation in subdistrict 4 is so extreme that the better policy would be to require patients in subdistrict 5 to travel to hospitals in subdistrict 4, at least until the extreme circumstance in subdistrict 4 is improved. The distances from south Dade County are not that much greater, and the distances from the keys would remain troublesome for any new hospital located in the northern part of subdistrict 5. Moreover, the bulk of the population of subdistrict 5 lives in the northern section immediately adjacent to subdistrict 4. More importantly, however, if the acute care bed rule is inappropriate for projecting osteopathic bed need, it remains inappropriate whether it shows or does not show a need. The financial feasibility of the proposed project depends primarily upon whether the new hospital will attract and keep an adequate number of patients Petitioner projected that its hospital would be 44 percent occupied in the first month of operation, 65 percent at the end of the first year, and 75 percent at the end of the second year. These projections were not substantiated by Petitioner, and the evidence would indicate that they are overly optimistic. First, the other two osteopathic hospitals are having trouble attracting enough patients to fill 50 percent of their beds, thus suggesting that the new facility will rely upon a pool of patients that is inadequate to fill two facilities. Second, the record does not contain adequate evidence as to the numbers of osteopathic patients currently treated in allopathic hospitals who would want to switch to the new osteopathic facility. What little evidence there is on that point tends to show that the new osteopathic hospital cannot expect to gain large numbers of osteopathic patients from allopathic hospitals. In 1983, BAPTIST had 18,167 patient admissions. Ernest Nott, Chief Executive Officer at BAPTIST, testified that in the same year, osteopaths admitted only 240 of these patients, or 1.3 percent of all 1983 admissions. (Petitioner submits as a proposed finding that osteopathic physicians admitted 42 patients to AMERICAN HOSPITAL in 1984, and that osteopaths admitted 121 patients during 1984 to BAPTIST HOSPITAL, citing Petitioner's exhibits 12 and 13 as containing that evidence. This proposed finding is rejected because those figures are not contained in those exhibits.) Thus, if the data from BAPTIST is typical, there are very few osteopathic patients in allopathic hospitals available to the new hospital as a future source of income. Finally, the projection that the new osteopathic hospital will be 75 percent occupied by the second year of operation is suspect given the fact that established subdistrict 4 hospitals in two consecutive years (1981 and 1982) operated at only a 63.2 percent occupancy level. Since the most basic element of financial feasibility, projected patient days, has not been shown on this record, there is no need in this Recommended Order to consider the subsidiary points as to financial feasibility raised by the parties. Thus, no findings have been made with regard to the reasonableness of financing proposals, projected costs and expenses, projected revenues, or the reasonableness of the space study. Westchester is also in subdistrict 4, the same subdistrict as the proposed hospital, and therefore the fiscal impact upon Westchester would very likely be quite negative. As discussed above, the osteopathic physicians who testified in this case would probably discontinue using Westchester, thus lowering its use rate even below the current 47 percent. The magnitude and precise effect of the impact cannot be ascertained on this record, but a significant negative impact is certain. The impact of the proposed new osteopathic hospital upon the two intervenors would not be substantial, and would not be a cogent reason to deny this application. Both of these hospitals have continued to be profitable despite lower occupancy levels. In 1982, American had only a 51.4 percent occupancy level, but it ended up with $153.48 excess of patient charges per day over operating expenses per day, which was an excess of 22 percent over the average charge per patient day. Similarly, Baptist was occupied at the level of 66.7 percent in 1982, and it had $93.25 excess of patient charges per day over operating expenses for 1982, a margin of 20 percent. Either hospital could lose a number of patients to the proposed new hospital and not suffer major financial damage. Moreover, if it is true that fewer than 2 percent of the patients at these hospitals are osteopathic patients, even the loss of all of these patients would not cause major economic damage to either intervenor. The acute care bed need rule, section 10-5.11(23), F.A.C., contains a health care planning standard for general medical and surgical beds: new beds should be authorized when existing beds reach 80 percent of their capacity. (This standard is contained in the formula district bed allocation in subpart (f)3a of the rule.) While the formula used in this rule (which treats osteopathic beds to be adequate alternatives to allopathic beds, and vice versa) is inappropriate as a means to project osteopathic bed need, the 80 percent planning standard is useful to measure osteopathic bed need based upon utilization of existing osteopathic facilities. The 80 percent standard has applicability to any acute care hospital since it addresses basic efficiencies in operation, and unlike the 30 minute driving standard, is not inapplicable to an osteopathic facility due to some factor unique to the osteopathic circumstance. Further, the 80 percent threshold was supported by other evidence in the record as a suitable standard for measurement of bed need in this case. First, the 80 percent standard is also used by The Health Council of South Florida, Inc., which is the local health planning agency responsible for the health plan for District XI. The 80 percent standard was used in the District XI health plan adopted in July 1983. Second, the 80 percent standard is a standard that is a generally accepted standard for acute care hospitals contained in national medical planning guidelines. All of the parties proposed a number of findings concerning the availability of allopathic hospital services in District XI, and in subdistricts 4 and 5 in particular. Since, as discussed above, no party proved that any allopathic hospital had any portion thereof which was in fact so dedicated to osteopathy that it could be called an "osteopathic facility" as defined by the Gulf Coast decision, supra, evidence as to the nature of existing or future allopathic hospital services was deemed to be irrelevant to this case. Likewise, evidence that osteopathic physicians are admitted to the staff of allopathic hospitals, or admit patients to allopathic hospitals, was also deemed to be irrelevant to this case because the evidence did not show that such osteopathic patients to have been treated in "osteopathic facilities" within such allopathic hospitals. The fact that some osteopaths may prefer to practice in an allopathic hospital was found to be true, and it was recognized that not all of the osteopathic patients currently served by allopathic hospitals would necessarily be served by the proposed osteopathic hospital. However, the A magnitude of this diminution of osteopathic patient need was not presented in the record, and was not necessary to the ultimate conclusion that no need was shown. There were a number of other findings of fact proposed by the parties in this case which are not mentioned in the above findings. No separate finding will be made as to these since they were subordinate to the findings made above, were unnecessary in view of findings made above, were cumulative, or were irrelevant. In summary, there may be a need for additional osteopathic hospital facilities in District XI, but that need was not shown in this case. First, the low utilization of the existing osteopathic hospitals was not adequately explained. And second, there was no reliable data as to the numbers of osteopathic patients who would prefer treatment in an osteopathic hospital but have been diverted to an allopathic hospital due to lack of existing osteopathic facilities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of the Petitioner in this case for a certificate of need to establish and operate a 100 bed osteopathic teaching hospital in subdistrict 4, District XI, in Dade County, Florida, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: F. Philip Blank, Esquire Susan A. Maher, Law Clerk F. Philip Blank, P.A. 241 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John F. Gilroy, Esquire Culpepper, Turner & Mannheimer 318 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kyle R. Saxon, Esquire Paige & Catlin 169 East Flagler Street Suite 816 Miami, Florida 33131 Ivan Wood, Esquire Steven T. Mindlin, Esquire Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein 1501 Venera Avenue, Suite 200 Miami, Florida 31146 Mr. David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Background Manasota applied for a Certificate of Need to construct a 100-bed osteopathic acute care hospital in Sarasota County, (District VIII). Manasota did not specifically designate a site in its application and indeed has not obtained a site for its proposed hospital as yet. It intends to locate its facility in the southern part of Sarasota County, near the interchange of I- 75 and Jacaranda Boulevard. There are three existing acute care hospitals serving south Sarasota County. Memorial, which is a 788-bed acute care hospital located in the southerly portion of the City of Sarasota; Venice, which is a 312-bed acute care hospital located in Venice; and Englewood Community Hospital (ECH) which is a brand new 100-bed acute care hospital located in Englewood, also in southern Sarasota County, immediately south of the City of Venice. ECH opened its facility in early November, 1985. The proposed location of the Applicant Manasota is in the vicinity of the southerly environs of Venice, and is within the primary service areas of these existing hospitals. The Parties Venice Hospital is a not-for-profit, general, acute care hospital. It has 312 licensed beds, of which 6 are OB beds and 32 are intensive care beds. In fiscal year 1983, it enjoyed an 89.5% average annual occupancy. That occupancy declined to 83.5% in 1984 and the next fiscal year (1985) it dropped to 71%. The hospital's occupancy rate in fiscal year 1986 will decline to approximately 55.8%. That figure includes consideration of the impact of the November, 1985 opening of the Englewood Hospital but not the projected impact of Manasota. Venice's primary service area is the southerly portion of Sarasota County and northern Charlotte County, generally co-extensive with that proposed by Manasota. Memorial is a 788-bed, publicly owned, acute care hospital. Its primary service area is Sarasota County. Its publicly elected board requires it to maintain at least a 2% operating margin (profit) in order to maintain sufficient working capital and a sufficiently favorable bond rating so that its debt financing can be obtained at optimum cost. In 1984, Memorial obtained a 6.5% operating margin, but in 1985, that margin declined to approximately 2%, due to reduced utilization. Due to declines in utilization, only 590 of its licensed beds were in service in October, 1985. Memorial's total patient days for 1985 were the lowest it has experienced since 1973. Memorial is a full-service acute care hospital, offering services including obstetrics, psychiatric services, pediatrics, emergency care, cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery, neo-natal intensive care and ambulatory surgery. ECH is a 100-bed, full-service, acute care hospital located in Englewood, immediately south of Venice, in Sarasota County. It will open in November, 1985, and thus has not yet had an opportunity to obtain patients, adequate utilization, and a favorable operating experience. Its primary service area is southern Sarasota County and northern Charlotte County, substantially the same as that of Venice and that proposed by the Applicant. ECH has osteopathic physicians on its staff and provides manipulative therapy to patients of osteopathic physicians, as do the other two existing hospitals. The chief of ECH's medical staff is an osteopath. Manasota seeks approval for construction of a 100-bed osteopathic teaching hospital in southern Sarasota County in the immediate environs of Venice. The hospital would provide medical surgical services, ICU/CCU, a 24-hour physician staffed emergency room, outpatient surgery, a pharmacy, clinical laboratory, x-ray and other surgical and diagnostic services such as radiography, cardio-pulmonary and ultra-sonography. Manasota projects opening the facility in 1988 with 92 medical surgical beds and 8 intensive care beds. The hospital would be owned by Manasota, but will be operated and managed as a subsidiary of AmeriHealth, Inc., a Florida corporation. Ninety-two per cent of Manasota's stock has been purchased by AmeriHealth Systems, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of AmeriHealth Holdings, Inc., which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AmeriHealth, Inc. AmeriHealth Inc. is a publicly-held, Florida corporation. Manasota proposes to treat patients in accordance with the principles of osteopathy, supported by osteopathic specialists. Manasota will have an open medical staff, meaning it will have allopathic and osteopathic physicians on its staff. It maintains that management and control of the facility will be by osteopaths or those "sympathetic" to the osteopathic school of medicine. Although two of the four present members of Manasota's Board of Directors are osteopathic physicians, the chief executive officer of AmeriHealth, Inc., Mr. White established that in the near future that parent entity will nominate a new board of directors. Manasota proposes to affiliate with the Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine in Miami as an osteopathic teaching hospital and seek accreditation by the American Osteopathic Association. The facility would be located adjacent to or east of I-75 in southern Sarasota County, a minimum distance of five miles from existing hospitals. The primary service area would be southern Sarasota County (Census Tracts 20- 27). The secondary service area would include northern Sarasota County and northern Charlotte County, as well as the remainder of HRS District VIII, purportedly within a 30-60 minute driving time. In this connection, however, it is noted that osteopathic acute care hospitals have been held to be regional in nature and Manasota's health planning witness, Mr. Konrad, established that a two-hour driving time access standard is appropriate for osteopathic hospitals. District VIII is not, by rule, divided into subdistricts for health planning and CON review purposes. See, South Dade Osteopathic Medical Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 84-0750, Final Order at 7 FALR 5681 (November 14, 1985); Community Hospital of Collier, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al. and Naples Community Hospital v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., DOAH Case Nos. 84- 0744, 84-0907 and 84-0909 (consolidated), (Recommended Order August 16, 1985), p. 39. Although there are no operating osteopathic acute care hospitals in District VIII at the time of hearing, Gulf Coast Hospital has been approved by Final Order for a CON for 60 osteopathic beds and will be located approximately 68 miles and less than two hours driving time from the proposed location of the Manasota facility. Demoqraphics of the Proposed Service Area Sarasota County ranks second in the state in the percentage of its population which is 65 years of age or older. Projections show that by 1990 approximately 31% of its population will be 65 years of age or older, and 14% of the population will be 75 years of age or older. It will, at that time, rank first in the state as to the percentage of its population in excess of 74 years of age. Between 1980 and 1985, Sarasota County, which comprises most of the applicant's primary service area, increased in population approximately 40,000 persons. The county is expected to grow by an additional 43,000 persons between 1985 and 1990. Southern Sarasota County (above census tracts), between 1980 and 1985, grew by approximately 28,000 persons. Between 1985 and 1990, the southern portion of the county, will increase by an additional 33,000 persons, for growth rates of 33% and 32% respectively. Between 1980 and 1985, the population of southern Sarasota County in the 65 to 74 age group grew by about 5,000 persons, as did the population of the 75 and older age group. Between 1985 and 1990 it is projected that Sarasota County residents between the ages of 65 and 74 will increase by 5,700 persons and those in the county age 75 and older will increase by approximately 6,000 persons. Northern Charlotte County, adjacent to the southern Sarasota County primary service area of the applicant, increased by approximately 16,000 persons between 1980 and 1985. This same area is projected to increase by an additional 17,000 persons between 1985 and 1990. Approximately 7,000 of those additional persons will be 65 years of age or older. Much of the population growth in Sarasota County is due to in-migration from other areas. Approximately 43% of the immigrants to Sarasota County come from the midwestern area of the United States. This is somewhat significant because the greatest percentage of osteopathic medical schools and osteopathic physicians and acute care facilities are located in what is generally described as the midwestern United States. It may be expected that elderly immigrants from those areas might have somewhat more of a predisposition to use osteopathic acute care facilities and physicians in Sarasota County. It has not been proven, however, what percentage of the population growth of Sarasota County is attributable to in-migration from all areas of the state and nation. It has thus been demonstrated that the primary service area of the applicant has experienced significant population growth since 1980, but that that population growth will continue at the same or a lesser rate between 1985 and the horizon year of 1990. Indeed, it was established that the population growth rate of elderly persons age 65 and older, who tend to use acute care hospital services more intensively than other age cohorts of the population, will actually decline between the years 1985 and 1990. It has also been proven that between 1980 and 1985 (especially since 1983), the utilization rate for Sarasota County hospitals and District VIII hospitals as a whole, has declined markedly and will continue to do so through 1990, in spite of and counter to the population growth. This is a result of such factors as the advent of "DRG" methods of medic re reimbursement, professional review organizations and consequent shifts in the provision of many health care services to an "outpatient" basis. These changes in the Medicare reimbursement system, of course, are directly related to the segment of the population aged 65 and older, which provide the majority of all acute care hospital admissions from the general population. Because the population growth rate will decline for the age 65 and older age group, the trend of declining occupancy and utilization in the face of population growth will continue through l990 The Need for the Facilities Section 381.494(6)(c)(1), Florida Statutes. HRS has not adopted, by rule, a bed need methodology for determining need for osteopathic acute care hospitals. The normal bed need determination methodology embodied in Rule 10- 5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, is not used for determination of bed need and need for osteopathic facilities because Section 381.494(2), Florida Statutes, requires that need for osteopathic facilities be determined separately from general acute care facilities. South Dade Osteopathic, supra at 5684. Thus, osteopathic bed need must be determined by development of agency policy in light of the general statutory criteria contained in Section 381.494(2), Florida Statutes, and Subsection (6) of that provision. HRS policy has been to consider whether the proposed facility will be osteopathic; whether a demonstrated need exists for additional osteopathic acute care beds; and whether similar services or facilities exist and are available in the area where the proposed facility is to be located. The court in Gulf Coast Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 424 So.2d 86, 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) defined "osteopathic facilities" as those maintained for the purpose of: . the cure and treatment of patients in accordance with the principles of osteopathy, the teaching and the study of osteopathic medicine, and the association in practice of doctors of osteopathy, including osteopathic specialists, with support from staff personnel suitably trained in the principles and philosophy of osteopathy. The management and control of the facility so as to actively further all of the above activities rather than to merely tolerate them, must be in the hands of osteopaths or those sympathetic to that school of medicine. Manasota has proposed in its application to construct and operate a 100-bed osteopathic acute care facility with patients being treated in accordance with the principles of osteopathy in a facility meeting the above definition. The preponderant evidence reveals however, that Manasota is not truly an "osteopathic" applicant. AmeriHealth's president, Mr. White, established that AmeriHealth would soon be appointing its own board of directors for Manasota, with no assurance given that osteopathic membership would be retained. None of the officers, directors or shareholders of AmeriHealth have any experience in ownership or operation of osteopathic facilities. Mr. White established that the proposed hospital would have an open staff, but it was not shown what percentage of the staff would be osteopaths and what percentage would be M.D.'s. Mr. White intends to staff the hospital from the existing medical community in Sarasota County. There would be no recruitment of physicians from outside that area unless it became impossible to staff the hospital with Sarasota County doctors. Mr. White would seek advice from "the medical community here" in establishing needed specialties and credentials. AmeriHealth intends to assure the viability of the proposed hospital by following the practice it employed at its Richmond Hospital of obtaining physicians in the community as investors in the hospital. It was not shown, however, what percentage of the investor-physicians the Applicant seeks would be D.O.'s and what percentage would be M.D.'s. In this connection, Dr. Fred Miller, M.D., testifying for Manasota, established that the promoters of the project intend that the staff physicians would be existing physicians in the Venice area. There are six or seven D.O.'s in the Venice area, and approximately 120 M.D.'s. In this regard, Dr. Norman Ross attended a meeting at Dr. Miller's office concerning organization of Manasota. All the doctors at the meeting were M.D.'s, except for the two D.O.'s who had an ownership interest in Manasota. Mr. White assured the physicians attending the meeting that the source of physicians for the new hospital would be physicians who had already developed practices in the Venice area who could "swing their admissions" to the new hospital. Dr. Ross was also assured that the vast majority of the staff physicians would be M.D.'s. Dr. Navarro attended this or a similar meeting and, was assured by a promoter and owner of Manasota that there would not be a heavy influx of osteopaths to town because they intended to get investor-physicians in the community to staff and support the hospital. When Dr. Navarro questioned Dr. Oliva, D.O., one of the directors of Manasota, concerning how he would build an osteopathic hospital without osteopaths, Dr. Oliva explained that "the rules did not require them to have a majority of osteopaths." The intent to staff the hospital largely with M.D.'s is borne out by the fact that the promoters of the hospital offered limited partnerships in the facility to Venice area M.D.'s first. Since Manasota's own witness, Dr. Snyder, D.O., showed that it would take 50 to 75 physicians to staff such a hospital, and since Manasota's principals see no need to recruit physicians from other areas, and have primarily sought support from M.D.'s who make up 95% of the physician population in the county, it is quite unlikely that the project would actually operate as an osteopathic hospital. In this regard, the four Sarasota osteopaths testifying for existing hospitals would definitely not use the proposed facility and feel it is not needed. The preponderant evidence thus establishes that the vast majority of staff physicians will be M.D.'s. The proposed facility has been promoted primarily to M.D.'s and the majority of Sarasota County D.O.'s testifying will not use the facility. Thus, Manasota has not demonstrated it is controlled or in the hands of osteopaths or those sympathetic to that school of medicine. It has not shown it can meet the definition of an osteopathic facility even as described by some of its own medical experts. Dr. Oliva, Dr. Lewis, Dr. Kudelko and Dr. David Lowery, (D.O.'s) opined that the majority of the medical staff and department heads would have to be osteopaths for it to truly be an osteopathic facility. This will clearly not be the case at Manasota. Manasota proposes to be accredited by the American Osteopathic Association (AOA), but also proposes to be accredited by the association which accredits allopathic facilities. The AOA accreditation manual requires osteopathic hospitals to identify themselves as such on buildings and letterheads, unless they are of mixed staff. Manasota proposes a mixed M.D. and D.O. staff. Likewise, nothing in the AOA accreditation requirements mandates any particular composition of the governing board or the medical staff. The Applicant has thus not proven that it will meet any record definition of an "osteopathic" hospital, nor that it will operate as such. Assuming arguendo that it would be osteopathic, the question of whether a demonstrated need exists for additional osteopathic acute care beds and an osteopathic acute care facility and the question of whether similar services or facilities exist and are available in the area of the proposed facility must be addressed. In this connection, although there are no osteopathic facilities currently operating in District VIII, Gulf Coast Osteopathic Hospital has had its Certificate of Need approved by final order of HRS for 60 beds with its request for 120 beds being currently on appeal. It will be located in Lee County, some 68 miles from the approximate location of the applicant. Mr. Konrad, having established that osteopathic hospitals are regional in nature, and that a two-hour travel time more or less is appropriate as a standard for access to an osteopathic facility, the service areas of Gulf Coast and Manasota will overlap. It is therefore found that an osteopathic acute care facility is legally in existence and will be operationally available for osteopathic physicians and patients in District VIII and Sarasota County in the near future. Over-bedded, under-utilized acute care facilities are available represented by existing hospitals whose need for more patients is discussed elsewhere in this Recommended Order. It is undisputed amongst the parties that there is no difference between the way allopathic and osteopathic physicians and hospitals practice in terms of the health care services rendered their patients, except for the emphasis, in the osteopathic realm, of manipulation therapy for patients and the increased emphasis on a holistic view of patients by osteopathic physicians in terms of determining a proper treatment regimen. In any event, acute care patients can be fungibly treated in osteopathic or allopathic hospitals by either osteopathic or allopathic physicians. It is thus found that the services rendered by the existing allopathic facilities are like and similar services to those proposed by the applicant. There was no testimony establishing that patients wishing osteopathic care from osteopathic physicians are not receiving it. Indeed, Drs. Furci and Nestor, osteopathic physicians in Sarasota, and Dr. Chirillo, who practice in southern Sarasota County, established that doctors are currently able to treat their patients with adequate quality of care, in an osteopathic manner, in existing hospitals. Sarasota County has a significant population of 20 osteopathic physicians. Their patients desiring osteopathic acute care services are currently receiving them despite the lack of an operating osteopathic hospital. Indeed, many of those physicians could accept more patients in their practices. Some close their offices at noon due to lack of patients. The number of osteopathic physicians per 1,000 persons in the District VIII population, when compared to the state and national averages for osteopaths per 1,000 population, reveals that there is no shortage of osteopathic physicians in District VIII. A number of the osteopaths practicing in Sarasota County testified on behalf of Manasota. Doctors James and Donald Blem and Dr. Chirillo are osteopaths practicing in southern Sarasota County and northern Charlotte County. Dr. James Them supports the application in that he would prefer to practice in an osteopathic hospital with osteopathic specialists on staff with whom he could consult. He prefers the continuity of care available if he had a situation where he could refer his patients upon admission to an osteopathic specialist, rather than having to refer patients to allopathic specialists. He also supports the teaching aspect of the Manasota application. Dr. Chirillo supported the application of Manasota essentially because it would be a teaching hospital and he feels that there is a need to train osteopathic physicians, but acknowledged that no additional acute care beds are needed in Sarasota County and District VIII. Dr. Donald Them supported the hospital's application for similar reasons. None of the three doctors would transfer all their patient admissions to the Manasota Hospital, should it be built, however. Indeed, Dr. James Them did not feel some of his patients would want to go to the Manasota facility because of the travel distances involved. Drs. Them and Chirillo are on the staff of Venice Hospital, and have no difficulty in getting their patients admitted to that hospital. They have full privileges and can practice osteopathic medicine there, including manipulation therapy. They know of no patients in Sarasota County going without acute care services because there is not an osteopathic hospital in the county. The osteopathic physicians in the county have no trouble getting staff privileges at existing facilities and each is generally practicing as he chooses without restriction, other than specialization. Osteopaths will practice with allopathic physicians at Englewood Community Hospital. Three osteopaths are on its charter Medical staff. One of these was chosen as the president elect of the ECH medical staff. The osteopaths at that facility are being provided with any needed equipment. Drs. Furci, Bipman, Yonkers, and Nestor, osteopaths testifying for the existing hospitals, all feel that they can treat their patients in a proper osteopathic manner. All are on the staffs of Doctors or Memorial Hospitals in Sarasota. They believe osteopaths in the area have enough acute care beds for their patients and there are always empty beds. All found no need for any additional beds, osteopathic or allopathic. In the words of Dr. Mervin Lipman, D.O., of Sarasota, "we don't need any more hospital beds period. We are up to our ears in hospital beds today." In short, the low utilization of acute care hospitals in the district and the county, among other factors, reveals that there are available, accessible mixed staff hospitals to serve the needs of patients of allopathic or osteopathic doctors. Manasota's proposal is, in part, consistent with the 1985-87 state health plan. That plan states at Volume 2, Pages 22 and 23: in short, the dynamic nature of health care calls for a planning approach which attends to overall development patterns rather than viewing specific health problems in isolation. Three interrelated policy guides were adopted as part of the 1985-87 State Health Plan: A holistic concept of health is espoused which views man's well-being as a function of the complementary interaction of mind, body, and environment. The holistic concept of health places emphasis on promotion of well- being and prevention of illness. The resources available for organized health care activities are limited and must, therefore, be utilized to their greatest effect. Given a holistic concept of health and finite health resources, priority should be placed on increasing resources for effective health promotion and primary care while containing total health care costs. In that Manasota proposes to be an osteopathic teaching hospital and the osteopathic philosophy comports with the holistic concept of health espoused above, the Manasota proposal is consistent in part with the 1985-87 State Health Plan. Neither the state nor the District VIII Health Plans specifically address need for osteopathic beds and for osteopathic hospitals and services, but rather treat all acute care services, osteopathic or allopathic, together. The State Health Plan emphasizes the growing problem and societal expense caused by excess acute care beds in the state, and states that "the combined effect of ambulatory surgery, HMO's, DRG's and other innovations could reduce acute fewer acute care beds will be needed state-wide than existed in 1984. Mr. Konrad, Manasota's own expert health planning witness, conceded that that projection may be accurate and would apply equally to allopathic and osteopathic facilities. Goal no. 3 at page 83 of the state health plan states the policy that efficient utilization of acute care services should be promoted. Objective 3.1 of that goal expresses the intent that all non federal hospitals, considered together, should attain an average occupancy rate of at least 80 per cent by 1989. District VIII currently has a district-wide occupancy rate for the last six months of 1985 of only 63.9%. Thus, approval of an additional acute care hospital would not conform with objective 3.1 of the state health plan, and, given the declining occupancy and use rates, even if the Manasota application were not approved, District VIII will not be in compliance with this objective by 1989. Due to the continuing decrease in patient days, decrease in average length of stay and decrease in admissions projected to 1989, the occupancy rate for 1989 for District VIII is likely to be less than 69%. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) has not adopted a rule setting forth an osteopathic acute care bed need methodology. The policy of HRS, in this case at least, is to use the so-called "Wellington Methodology" in determining osteopathic bed need. Ms. Dudek, the sole HRS witness, collected data for this methodology from a number of·a 33 sources. She used data concerning numbers of admissions by osteopathic physicians from July, 1984 through June, 1985, and the total number of patient days by osteopathic physicians from the local health councils in Broward, Dade, Duval, Volusia, Hillsborough, Orange and Pinellas Counties. Those counties were chosen because they contain osteopathic hospitals. Ms. Dudek considers such data important when reviewing applications for acute care osteopathic beds in areas like District VIII where no such facilities exist. The department ascertained the number of licensed osteopathic physicians residing in District VIII from the Department of Professional Regulation, and used the latest population projection issued by the Governor's Office. This data was used in three formulas, the results of which were then averaged to determine the department's position as to osteopathic acute care bed need for District VIII in the horizon year of 1990. HRS used these three formulas because, by Ms. Dudek's admission, it felt no single formula was best. The first of the formulas is population based. It multiplies the number of osteopathic admissions to hospitals per 1,000 population, multiplied times the projected 1990 population for District VIII. It then multiplies that number by the average length of stay per osteopathic admission and divides the result by 365 days, further dividing that result by 80 per cent utilization to project the total number of osteopathic beds supposedly needed in 1990. Shown mathematically, that formula is as follows: [8.6 x (907, 804/1,000) 6.9]/[365 x .80] = 184 beds. The second formula is termed "physician based" and multiplies the admission rate per osteopathic physician by the number of osteopathic physicians licensed in District VIII. It then multiplies that number by the average length of stay per admission and divides the result by 365 days, once again divided by 80% utilization, to project the number of osteopathic beds putatively needed in 1990. That formula is depicted mathematically as follows: [53.1 x 67 x 6.9]/[365 x .80] = 84 beds. The third formula, also physician based, multiplies the number of osteopathic physicians in District VIII times the number of patient days per osteopathic physician (taken from the counties from which data was collected, not District VIII), divides the resulting number by 365 days; and then multiplies that by 80% utilization to project the number of beds needed in 1990. That formula is depicted mathematically as follows: [67 x369.2]/[365 x .80] = 85 beds. The Department averaged the results of these three formulas to arrive at its position that there is a gross osteopathic acute care bed need for 1990 of 118 beds. It then subtracts the 60 beds already approved for Gulf Coast Hospital, by Final Order, for a net need of 58 osteopathic beds. Formulas 2 and 3 above are essentially identical in that they are composed of the same variables and produce the same effective result, absent rounding of numbers. It is thus apparent that it is not truly valid to include both formulas 2 and 3 in the averaging calculation since they contain the same information. They would improperly weight the result (and HRS' position) in favor of the physician-based data. This is especially true in light of the fact that HRS concedes itself that no single formula used is more accurate than the other. If the results of the population based formula number 1 is averaged with only one of the other methods, the result is a gross osteopathic bed need for District VIII of 134 beds for 1990. When the 60 beds already approved for Gulf Coast Hospital are subtracted from this total, a net osteopathic bed need for 1990 of 74 beds results. Ms. Dudek acknowledged that, in reaching the agency's position she espoused at hearing, she had not considered the other applicable statutory criteria, but merely employed her "need methodology" to determine bed need results. She acknowledged however, that her data itself showed that admissions- at osteopathic facilities in the counties she surveyed were declining. Further, in employing her formula she did not determine how many physicians were available and would actually use the facility in the Sarasota County service area, nor how many of their osteopathic patients would be admitted to existing hospitals as opposed to the Applicant' s. Her formula assumed that the osteopaths would send all their patients to an osteopathic facility in District VIII. Indeed, a number of the physicians who would seek to become staff numbers at Manasota also testified that they would not necessarily refer all their patient admissions to that facility. The D.O. specialists who expressed a desire to become staff members would admit few patients because they would not have primary care practices. The evidence establishes that osteopaths as close as the City of Sarasota would not seek to use this facility. It is thus illogical to assume that physicians further away in District VIII would attempt to use it. Ms. Dudek also apparently assumed that the data regarding admissions per osteopathic physician and per one-thousand population obtained from other areas of the state would automatically apply in the service area involved in this application. There was no proof that that would be the case. Further, her formulas take into account the optimal 80% occupancy rate which the record clearly reflects does not prevail in District VIII. The average occupancy for District VIII acute care facilities is substantially less than that and will decline through 1990. In short, there is no basis in fact to support some of the HRS assumptions with regard to its bed need methodology since some of those assumptions were not shown to apply to District VIII and since it did not include in its assumptions certain data regarding osteopathic admissions which was available for District VIII. Since its formula assumptions are thus flawed and since HRS did not evaluate the remaining statutory criteria, its conclusion that there should be approval of a 60-bed osteopathic hospital (or any other number of beds) is rejected. Testifying on behalf of Manasota, Mr. Thomas Konrad, an expert in health planning, opined that a need exists for the Manasota project. Mr. Konrad believes there is no acceptable mathematical need calculation for osteopathic beds, but feels it reasonable that the district, with two large population centers in Lee County and Sarasota Counties, could support two osteopathic hospitals. He based this on his general proposition that osteopathic acute care facilities should be placed in populous areas with high acute care utilization rates based upon the age characteristics of the population. Sarasota has a relatively large population base and will be the 14th most populous county in the state in 1990, with a large percentage of elderly persons who utilize acute care services at a higher rate than the general population. Mr. Konrad performed a "reality check" to test the efficacy of his position by calculating the osteopathic acute care bed to population ratios for the populous counties in which osteopathic hospitals are located, which have similar demographic characteristics to Sarasota County. His analysis showed that the state-wide osteopathic hospital bed to population ratio is .313 beds per 1,000 population. If the 100-bed Manasota facility were approved, the ratio for Sarasota County would be .351 beds per 1,000 population. Mr. Konrad acknowledged that he has never before employed the osteopathic bed to population test used in this case. The test contains a fallacy in that Mr. Konrad did not adjust the bed to population ratio by any occupancy standard, but rather his approach necessarily embodies the assumption that either the beds are needed in those counties he surveyed, merely because they are in existence or approved, or alternatively, he failed to consider the occupancy rates in those counties vis-a- vis the present or projected occupancy rates in Sarasota County and District VIII. It is apparent from his testimony that he did not take into account the recent occupancy rates and trends for osteopathic hospitals in the counties included in his analysis. In fact, the osteopathic hospitals in the surveyed counties experienced a collective occupancy rate of approximately 43 per cent, rather than the optimal 80%, in 1984, which represented a 10% decrease since 1982. Between 1983 and 1985 the patient days per osteopathic physician in those counties decreased by almost 28%. The test used by Mr. Konrad does not present a true picture of need for District VIII since it does not take into account whether the figures upon which it is based represent excess osteopathic bed capacity and does not take into account the utilization rates in those counties, much less the presently existing and projected utilization rate for Sarasota County and District VIII as that might relate to an appropriate bed to population rates. The utilization rate at Gulf Coast is unknown because it has not had an opportunity to get into operation and the utilization rate at the allopathic hospitals which are like, existing facilities and services, is substantially lower than 80% and declining. Manasota will admittedly compete for the same declining patient day pool with those existing allopathic facilities. Thus, Mr. Konrad's general opinion that the two populous centers of District VIII involved could support two minimum-sized osteopathic hospitals, as tested by his osteopathic bed to population ratio method of analysis, was not established to be a valid test for osteopathic acute care bed need for District VIII and Sarasota County. In light of this and in consideration of the other above findings, there has been shown to be no need for additional osteopathic (or other) acute care beds or facilities in Sarasota County or District VIII. Availability, Quality of Care, Efficiency, Appropriateness, Accessibility, Extent of Utilization and Adequacy of Like and Existing Health Care Facilities in the District There presently are no acute care osteopathic hospitals operating in District VIII nor do any have dedicated portions of their facilities devoted solely to the practice of osteopathic medicine, although each of the acute care hospitals involved have varying numbers of osteopaths on their staffs. Gulf Coast Hospital, however, will construct and operate its approved facility in the immediate future and thus, at least 60 osteopathic beds are approved and not yet utilized as available osteopathic services in the district. Gulf Coast Hospital has not had the opportunity to get into operation, attain its market share and a favorable utilization experience so as to become available as yet. Given that Gulf Coast will be constructed 68 miles from Manasota in Lee County, much closer than the two-hour regional travel time standard established above, it is obvious that an osteopathic acute care hospital will soon be available and accessible to District VIII patients. Osteopathic acute care services are presently available in District VIII, notwithstanding the fact that the Gulf Coast facility is not yet open. Sarasota County osteopathic physicians have staff privileges at area hospitals and by their own testimony, are able to treat their patients in a fully osteopathic manner at existing Sarasota County acute care facilities. Venice Hospital is supportive of the practice of osteopathic medicine. Dr. James Them, D.O., is on the staff at Venice with full privileges and has no difficulty in getting his patients admitted. He can practice osteopathic medicine there in an unimpeded way, including the use of manipulation tables provided by the hospital. He acknowledged that the patients in Sarasota County are not denied acute care services because of the lack of an osteopathic hospital. Drs. Donald Them, D.O., and Joseph Chirillo, D.O., of the Venice staff are of a similar opinion. The other area D.O.'s testifying are able to treat their patients in a proper osteopathic manner at existing facilities and they would not seek staff privileges at Manasota. Although several osteopaths testified that they desired the availability of osteopathic specialists in an osteopathic facility to render consultation and referral of their patients with attendant continuity of care more facile, and to avoid, in some instances, duplication of tests in the referral process with allopaths, they did not demonstrate that their patients suffer from any lack of adequate care in existing facilities. The advent of the Manasota facility would not necessarily alleviate this "physician inconvenience" purportedly caused by referring patients to allopathic specialists, inasmuch as Manasota will be a mixed staff hospital, such that many of the specialists on its staff are likely to be allopathic physicians anyway. All of the Sarasota County osteopathic physicians can handle additional patients and have had osteopathic patients adequately cared for in existing facilities, at which they have full privileges. Osteopathic physicians have no difficulty gaining staff privileges and admitting patients at existing facilities. Indeed, at the new Englewood facility, three osteopaths are on the staff and one was chosen by his peers as president-elect of the medical staff. Osteopaths at Englewood will be provided with any needed equipment. In short, with the advent of the 100-bed Englewood facility, the 60-120 bed Gulf Coast facility, together with the existing hospitals which have substantial unused capacity, osteopaths practicing in Sarasota, Charlotte County, and District VIII have enough beds between now and 1990 for their patients at facilities at which they may freely practice osteopathic medicine. These like and similar services are available because both allopathic and osteopathic physicians and hospitals draw from the same limited patient pool. There is no essential difference between the way allopathic and osteopathic primary care physicians, surgeons, and specialists practice in terms of the services rendered acute care hospital patients. The primary difference only lies in the use of manipulative therapy, with attendant manipulation tables which are used in the osteopathic setting. This service is already available at the existing hospitals. The difference in philosophy between osteopathic and allopathic practice is manifested more at the out-patient primary care level. At the primary treating physician level the patient is looked at holistically in the sense that, in addition to treating the illness or condition the patient is presented with, the osteopath seeks to ascertain and correct causes of the illness rooted in other systems of the body or the patient's environment or family circumstance. The allopathic physician tends to be oriented toward treating the specific problem by dealing with the involved bodily system only. There is, at any rate, very little difference in the way allopathic and osteopathic physicians practice at the acute care hospital level, in caring for their patients. Thus, all persons desiring osteopathic acute care services are able to receive them in District VIII, despite the lack of an additional osteopathic hospital. In view of the number of osteopaths per thousand population in District VIII, as compared to state and national averages in evidence, there is no shortage of osteopathic physicians in District VIII. Given the low utilization of existing acute care hospitals in the district and in Sarasota County, including Gulf Coast, which has not had the opportunity to fill any of its beds, there are like, existing, available, accessible, mixed staff hospitals in Sarasota County and in District VIII providing adequate acute care services, including osteopathic of the type proposed. The quality of existing hospitals in the district has not been placed at issue. No testimony or evidence concerning quality of care about Memorial or Doctors Hospitals has been adduced. The Englewood Hospital, as of the time of the hearing, had not yet opened. Dr. Raymond McDearmott, M.D., was presented to criticize quality of care at the Venice Hospital. Dr. McDearmott, however, did not have admitting privileges and was limited in his experience to working in the emergency room at Venice. He has been engaged in a dispute with Venice's administration concerning his operation of the emergency room, which may culminate in litigation. This adversarial attitude toward Venice, together with his failure to describe specific instances of inadequate care, entitles his testimony to scant consideration. There is no competent evidence to indicate that existing hospitals are not providing adequate quality care. Likewise, the efficiency of existing facilities was largely not addressed, with the exception of Venice Hospital. Manasota contended that Venice Hospital was not operating efficiently because of an alleged excessive amount of administrative expenses. That contention was predicated upon data submitted to the Hospital Cost Containment Board by Venice Hospital which was reported by the board and indicated that administrative expenses at Venice exceeded those of other hospitals in the cost containment board "reporting group" of which Venice is a member. It was established, however, that that information had either been filed with or reported by the Hospital Cost Containment Board in error, and that indeed, the error was corrected on the Board's own volition. The administrative expenses at Venice Hospital for the reporting period in question, were at approximately the mid-point for hospitals-in its reporting group. Thus, it has not been established that Venice or any of the other hospitals in Sarasota County or District VIII, are operating inefficiently, aside from their problems with under-utilization and unused capacity. It has also been proven that the existing hospitals are "like" facilities which are accessible. Indeed, 95% of the population of District VIII is within 20-miles or less of an existing acute care hospital. The Gulf Coast osteopathic facility will be well within the proven two hour accessibility standard for osteopathic hospitals, since it will be 68 miles from the proposed location of the Manasota facility. The existing hospitals are underutilized. There has been no showing that existing hospitals are inaccessible to residents of the county and the district. Concerning the issue of extent of utilization of like and existing facilities, witnesses Konrad, Beechey, Shanika, Zaretsky, Schwartz and Porter acknowledged the declining utilization of acute care hospitals in Sarasota County and District VIII, and the continuing nature of that decline. In District VIII, occupancy of acute care hospitals has decreased significantly from 1983 through 1985, such that the composite occupancy rate for the district was 67.2% in 1983, 60.9% in 1984 and 52.4% for 1985. The dramatic changes occurring in the health care industry since 1983 have caused the severe declines in inpatient utilization. The primary reason has been the change, beginning in 1983, to the Medicare prospective payment system as opposed to the former cost-based reimbursement system. The new system is otherwise known as the "DRG" system. Thus, Medicare reimbursement is now based on a Fla. rate reimbursement based upon the type of illness, diagnosis or treatment. The effect of this change has been to sharply decrease the average length of stay of Medicare patients in hospitals, as well as to decrease Medicare admissions. Medicare admissions are decreasing through increased emphasis on utilization review by professional review organizations mandated by the Medicare system. This results in more procedures, such as some surgery, being performed on an outpatient basis. Inpatient utilization concomitantly declines. These factors, coupled with the growth of home health services, and the imminent impact of preferred provider organizations (PPO's) and health maintenance organizations (HMO's) in Sarasota County and District VIII, have and will impact hospital occupancy rates significantly to an increasing degree. Mr. Conrad and Mr. Schwartz both showed that these factors which depress hospital utilization impact utilization of osteopathic and allopathic facilities in the same way. In fact, since osteopathic facilities have historically experienced higher average lengths of stay than allopathic facilities, the DRG method of prospective reimbursement has and will have a greater impact on osteopathic hospitals. Hospital utilization in District VIII is still declining. Even though the population is increasing significantly, hospital occupancy is decreasing. During 1980 the population of Sarasota County was 205,846 from which 292,500/ patient days were generated. In 1985 the projected population for Sarasota County was 242,875 and the projected number of patient days was down to 273,486. Thus, the population of the county increased by 37,000 during that five year period, yet the number of patient days decreased by approximately 19,000. Thus, the hospital use rate is decreasing more rapidly than the population is increasing, and it has not been shown that patient days will increase in relation to the population through the year 1990. The increasing influence of the above-mentioned alternatives to inpatient care will continue to cause a drop in the hospital use rate for Sarasota County in the future. Indeed, the 1985-87 state health plan, in evidence, predicts that the combined effect of outpatient surgery and other delivery systems will result in an additional 15 per cent decline in hospital admissions by 1989. The current decline in utilization rate in Sarasota County hospitals has not yet been affected by the advent of HMO's and PPO's, but those prepaid health insurance organizations are in the offing and will cause further declines in utilization. If present trends continue, as has been proven to be likely, and the Manasota Hospital application is approved with its proposed 100 beds, hospital occupancy in Sarasota County will decline to approximately 40% in 1990. Approval of the applicant's facility would result in occupancy rates as low as 35 to 38% for Venice, Englewood and Manasota Hospitals, since Manasota, with a large number of M.D.'s on its staff will draw its patients and patient days from the same pool as the existing hospitals and thus share an insufficient number of patients with them. In order for all hospitals in District VIII to operate at the optimum of 80% utilization, as many as 1,344 acute care beds would have to be eliminated from the existing licensed and approved beds. Even if no additional beds are approved, the most realistic projection of hospital utilization in District VIII for 1990 is 44.6%. The average occupancy for acute care beds in District VIII during 1983 averaged 67.2%. By 1985 the occupancy rate was down to 52.4%. Accordingly, in view of the significantly low district-wide and county occupancy and the continuing downward trend, the legislatively mandated goal of hospital cost containment underlying Section 381.494, Florida Statutes, will not be furthered by the approval of additional hospital facilities in District VIII and Sarasota County, including that proposed by Manasota. Manasota's Abilitv to Provide Qualitv CareSection 381.494(6)(C)(3), Florida Statutes Inasmuch as the Manasota facility has not been found needed for a variety of reasons enunciated herein, the issue of its ability to provide quality health care will not be addressed in depth. It is quite likely that Manasota, if it got into operation, overcoming the operational and legal impediments discussed herein, could provide quality health care. Its management team is made up of Mr. Gerald White and other former managers of Health Corporation of America, all of whom have substantial health care managerial expertise. The Availability of Alternative Sources of Care -Section 381.494(6) (c)4, Florida Statutes There are less costly, more efficient and appropriate alternatives to the proposed Manasota project for District VIII and Sarasota County. The existing acute care hospitals are like and existing facilities offering similar health care services which are severely under-utilized. The osteopaths testifying both for and against the Manasota application acknowledge that there are plenty of hospital beds to admit their patients in Sarasota County, and that they can be satisfactorily, osteopathically treated at existing hospitals. Those D.O.'s supporting the application of Manasota acknowledged that they will continue to send their patients to existing facilities as well. Thus the existing acute care hospitals (as well as the future Gulf Coast facility), are appropriate alternatives to the Manasota facility, and since they are greatly under-utilized, or in the case of ECH and Gulf Coast, not yet utilized, they need more patients and more revenue to become more efficient, enabling them to deliver health care services in a less costly manner the public. If Manasota's hospital were approved, utilization would decline still further, generating even more excess acute care capacity. Unused capacity has a significant fixed cost increment which will have to be borne by the health care consuming public. This is wholly aside from the capital expenditure in excess of fifteen million dollars needed to place the Manasota facility in operation. This would be an unnecessary cost for the consumers of District VIII to bear in view of the lack of need for it. Probable Economies in Service Derived from Joint or Shared Resources-Section 381.494(6)(c)5, Florida Statutes Manasota does not propose to operate joint, cooperative or shared health resources in conjunction with its proposed hospital. This criteria is not really at issue in this case and no party offered proof with regard thereto. Need in the District for Special Equipment and Services not Accessible in Adjoining Areas-Section 381.494(6)(c)6, Florida Statutes This criterion is not applicable in this proceeding. Manasota will not offer specialized equipment or services of a type not already available in Sarasota County or the district. The Need for Research and Educational Facilities Including Institutional and Community Training Programs for Practitioners and for Doctors of Osteopathy and Medicine at the Internship and Residency Training Level-Section 381.494(6)(c)7, Florida Statutes Manasota proposes an osteopathic teaching hospital. It called Dr. Arnold Melnick to testify regarding the need for additional osteopathic teaching hospitals in Florida. Dr. Melnick is the Dean of the Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine (SECOM) in North Miami Beach. He was accepted as an expert in the fields of medical education and osteopathic medicine. Dr. Melnick established that the emphasis in osteopathic medical education is to train general or family practitioners. This aspect of medical education and practice comports with the holistic philosophy of osteopathic medicine which emphasizes treatment of a patient by looking at the patient's entire physical and environmental circumstance, rather than being specific disease, condition or system oriented. Because of the emphasis on training for ability to diagnose and treat all aspects of a patient's medical circumstance, osteopaths tend to be in general practice and family practice rather than specializing such that approximately 87% of osteopaths are in general. Only 4% of the osteopathic profession are primary care specialists in the areas of pediatrics, obstetrics and internal medicine. Dr. Melnick established that because of the holistic philosophy, there is not a significant need for more osteopathic specialists. This is also the reason that internships for osteopaths are required to be one year "rotating" internships. Osteopathic interns in teaching hospitals must rotate for a month or more through each of a teaching hospital's medical departments, such as pediatrics, obstetrics, and the like so that their training will be designed to give them a broad knowledge of many areas of medical practice. Contrastingly, with allopathic internships, interns concentrate in the area of their chosen specialty with a view toward moving on toward a residency in that specialty. It is for this reason that osteopathic teaching hospitals must offer a sufficient number of different medical practice departments so that interns may be given broad training in all the medical practice fields they will be required to know to be competent general or family practitioners, in keeping with the osteopathic philosophy of medical practice. Thus, although osteopathic practice is characterized by a vast majority of family practitioners, specialists are required· to train osteopathic physicians. The AOA accreditation requirement dictates that certified osteopathic trainers must be present in the various departments. Dr. Melnick established that an osteopathic teaching hospital should not be smaller than l00 beds, must have at least three outstanding osteopathic internists, at least two osteopathic surgeons, an osteopathic pediatric specialist, as well as an obstetrics-gynecology specialist. Manasota presented testimony of osteopathic specialists consisting of a surgeon, a pathologist and an opthamologist from Suncoast Hospital in Largo, Florida who are willing to move to Sarasota County and become staff members if the hospital is built. Manasota, however, has not established that it will have the specialists required for an appropriate quality osteopathic teaching hospital. It did not show how it would obtain the required number of internal medicine specialists, surgeons, a pediatrician nor a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology. In fact, Manasota will not have an obstetrics department. Both Dr. Melnick and Mr. White established that a teaching hospital needs more FTE staff members than a non- teaching hospital. The proposed 3.4 FTE's will be less than necessary for a teaching hospital to adequately operate. There is currently a shortage of nurses and other technical staff employees in Sarasota County, as evidenced by the difficulty Venice has had hiring and retaining people in these positions due to the advent of the Englewood facility and its competing recruitment. There is a substantial likelihood that Manasota will have difficulty obtaining sufficient staff members to be a bona fide quality teaching hospital, especially since it proposes to hire osteopathically trained nurses and technicians. It did not establish where it intends to recruit them. In view of the fact that Manasota proposes to recruit its medical staff locally, it has failed to establish where it will obtain the required number of D.O. specialists as certified trainers for each of its departments. There are eight osteopathic teaching hospitals in Florida. The most recent graduating class from SECOM consisted of 40 osteopathic physicians. All of them were placed in suitable intern programs in and out of Florida. It was not shown that all of these 40 interns would have remained in Florida even had there been an additional osteopathic teaching hospital. The college will be graduating 100 osteopathic physicians per year by 1987. It was not established that all of the internships they will require must be at Florida hospitals. In this connection it was shown that a 100-bed osteopathic teaching hospital could accommodate eight interns, but only if that hospital was operating at 80% capacity. If the same hospital had only a 57% occupancy it could accommodate 5.7 interns. Thus by Manasota's own utilization projections it could accommodate only about five interns, even if it could obtain the required number of osteopathic specialists as trainers. Further, such interns typically receive stipends of from $18,000 to $20,000 per year. Although Manasota could obtain approximately $3,000 per year per intern from a grant program established by the legislature, it did not demonstrate in its financial evidence that it has provided for the necessity of $75,000 per year for intern salaries. In short, it has not been proven that Manasota genuinely can establish its facility as an osteopathic teaching hospital in accordance with Dean Melnick's own, requirements. Availabilitv of Resources, Manpower, Management Personnel and Funds for Operating and Capital Expenditures; Effects on Clinical Needs of Training in the District for Health Care Professionals; Accessibility to Schools in the District for Health Care Training; Alternative Uses of Resources for Other Health Services; Accessibility of the Facility to all Residents of the District; Section 381.494(6)(c)8, Florida Statutes In terms of manpower availability, the Applicant intends to have an open staff of M.D.'s and D.O.'s, purportedly recruited from the existing medical community in Sarasota County. Manasota will only seek to recruit physicians from outside that area if unable to staff the hospital from existing physicians with practices in Sarasota County who could "swing" their patients from existing hospitals to Manasota's facility, discussed above. The potential physician-investors, referenced above, were assured by Manasota's principals, that the vast majority of the 20 or 30 physicians needed to staff the facility would be M.D.'s from the Venice and Sarasota area. The doctors attending these promotional meetings were told there would not be a heavy influx of osteopathic physicians to Venice to staff the hospital. There are between 100 and ll0 M.D. physicians in the Venice area. There are 20 osteopathic physicians in Sarasota County. Three support the application and would seek privileges at Manasota, four of them would not and do not feel the hospital is needed. The remainder did not testify nor indicate any interest in staff privileges. The testimony of the osteopathic physicians from other areas (Dade City and Pinellas County), as well as Dr. Melnick, as found above, established that for a hospital to be osteopathic in philosophy and operation, at least 52% of its governing body should be osteopathic physicians, as well as the majority of its department heads and staff. Only four of these doctors expressed a desire to join Manasota's staff. There is therefore simply no competent, substantial evidence of record to establish that a majority of the staff physicians will be osteopathic physicians, nor that the majority of the department heads will be osteopaths. In fact, the evidence does not reflect clearly how many staff positions Manasota proposes to obtain to operate the hospital, nor that a sufficient number of M.D.'s and D.O.'s can be obtained locally in the face of the staff privileges offered at existing hospitals. If an influx of physicians will be required from outside areas to staff the hospital, while this might provide adequate physicians to staff the hospital, it would not serve to increase hospital utilization, they would bring no patients with them. In fact, with the utilization rate decreasing, the pool of patient days available to render the hospital and medical practices feasible is continuing to shrink and if more physicians are added to the Sarasota County market, health care costs can only rise as doctors and the hospitals must raise charges in order to render their practices financially feasible when there are not enough patients in relation to the number of doctors or beds available. Better alternative uses of the resources represented by the increased charges would involve not building such a facility in such a shrinking patient market, but rather allowing existing hospitals a chance to improve their utilization experience first with their already constructed and financed excess capacity. The 3.4 full time staff equivalents (FTE's) per occupied bed based upon witness Sucher's projections are insufficient to staff an acute care hospital such as this. Indeed, as shown by Mr. White, a teaching hospital may require up to 5.6 FTE's. A minimum of 3.8 FTE's per occupied beds would be needed to staff an acute care facility such as that proposed by Manasota as shown by Mr. Schwartz, and as a teaching hospital an even higher staff ratio would be necessary. If Manasota adjusted its FTE staff to meet only the minimum 3.8 FTE standard, its costs for staffing would be $450,000 more than that proposed in its pro forma expense statement. Indeed, if it actually proposes to be a teaching hospital, its staffing requirements and concomitant expense would increase on the order of one million dollars more than that proposed in its pro forma. In connection with this, the staff proposed to be needed in certain departments was understated. For instance, 16 to 18 employees would be needed to staff a laboratory in a 100-bed hospital and Manasota only allocated 8. Similarly, it only proposes to have 3 FTE's to staff its pharmacy. This is an insufficient number of employees to staff a pharmacy seven days a week, 24 hours a day as Manasota proposes to do. Finally, although Manasota proposes to have an osteopathically trained staff of nurses and other technicians, it did not demonstrate where it would be able to recruit such staff members trained in osteopathic principles of nursing and other disciplines. Thus the Applicant has not proven the availability of sufficient manpower and related resources to feasibly operate the project. The issue of availability of funds for capital and operating expenditures for accomplishment and operation of this project is treated with more specificity infra., however, it should be pointed out that Manasota has significantly understated land purchase, site development, working capital and other capital costs by more than two million dollars, and otherwise understated the magnitude of resources the project will require. Although the facility will be readily accessible to the population of south Sarasota County, in view of the above findings there is no accessibility difficulty for acute care patients, both allopathic and osteopathic, at the present time, in the county and District VIII, especially with the advent of the Gulf Coast Osteopathic Hospital and the recently opened Englewood facility. The considerations in the above statutory criteria regarding health care training and education needs are dealt with to the extent they are relevant in this proceeding in the findings concerning Manasota's proposed posture as an osteopathic teaching hospital. Financial Feasibility Mr. Randy Sucher and Dr. Elton Scott, testified as financial experts on behalf of Manasota. Mr. Sucher testified that the projected utilization of a proposed facility is the "cornerstone" of a financial feasibility study, and financial forecast. Mr. Sucher conceded that the financial feasibility study done in this case was much less detailed and thorough than had been done in his experience when he was employed by an accounting firm to perform feasibility studies for hospital clients, especially in the area of evaluating patient demand. Mr. Sucher largely relied on the demand and utilization study performed by Dr. Scott. The frailty in the study lies in the method employed by Dr. Scott to study demand and project utilization, which lacks specificity. He determined his position regarding patient demand for Manasota's project largely by attending meetings and interviewing physicians, most of whom are M.D.'s in Sarasota County. He then projected utilization by determining the admission rate per 1,000 population in south Sarasota County which is Manasota's primary service area. He arrived at a figure of 102 admissions per 1,000 population, determined by merely considering the admissions to Venice Hospital as reported in the 1983 hospital cost containment board data. He applied that admission figure to the population figures for south Sarasota County for 1985. He performed no patient origin studies for Venice Hospital, so it was not established whether all of those admissions originated from the same south Sarasota County origin area represented by his population figure. The results of his interviews with physicians do not indicate hat all the patients admitted by those physicians to Venice Hospital, came from the south Sarasota County service area proposed for Manasota. There is thus no way to determine from this record if the patient admission figures relied upon by Dr. Scott correlate with the actual admissions to Venice and from the relevant primary service area population. Thus, even though Dr. Scott's data showed 102 admissions for Venice per 1,OO0 population, when only looking at the census tract population areas for south Sarasota County, it was not established that those admissions were not drawn from a much larger population base representing more of Sarasota County and possibly north Charlotte County. If so, that would result in a much lower admissions per 1,000 population figure for Venice Hospital, as that relates to the number of patient admissions Manasota could expect to capture from Venice. Dr. Scott's utilization assumptions were not verified by any patient origin studies for Venice Hospital, which might show, for instance, that significant numbers of its admissions come from areas from which Memorial and Englewood will draw patients. Thus, the 22 per cent share of Venice's admissions that Scott opines Manasota will attract, have not been verified by a showing that those patients are from origin areas or physicians more likely to be attracted to Manasota as opposed to Venice, Englewood or Memorial, if Manasota is built. In this connection, no in-depth physician analysis study or market analysis study was done by Dr. Scott or Mr. Sucher. Instead, they relied upon general discussions at interviews with three local osteopathic physicians and 12 to 15 M.D.'s as well as three or four out-of-district D.O.'s and, according to Mr. Sucher,: "from that, we just kind-of got a composite feeling that we could generate 'x'." Dr. Scott and Mr. Sucher also relied in part upon a 1983 informal survey conducted by a Manasota shareholder of an indefinite number of Sarasota County physicians. Some of these, including the four Sarasota D.O.'s discussed above, now have privileges at other Sarasota area hospitals and will not admit patients to Manasota. The three D.O.'s who support the application will not refer all their patients to Manasota and the osteopathic physicians from the St. Petersburg area, who indicated a desire to join Manasota's staff, are not all "admitting physicians," some of them being specialists who only engage in hospital practice and would provide no patient admissions. As found above, Manasota did not prove that it could adequately staff the hospital with M.D.'s and D.O. s. If it obtains doctors from other areas, they will not have a local patient base from which the hospital can gain the admissions necessary to achieve a feasible revenue posture. Neither Dr. Scott or Mr. Sucher took into account the market share that Englewood would obtain, including its share of admissions from Venice Hospital. Englewood is a new, 100-bed acute care facility located in Sarasota County, closely proximate to the Manasota proposed location and to Venice's location. A significant portion of its staff physicians are located in Venice. The primary service areas of all three hospitals substantially overlap. It is not reasonable to conclude that Manasota will not compete with Englewood for patients, as well as with Venice. Thus, Dr. Scott and Mr. Sucher's estimate that 22% of its admissions could be obtained from the patient pool enjoyed by Venice at the present time, is over-stated as that relates to Manasota's projected patient utilization and revenue. All three hospitals will compete for the same pool of patients, as will Memorial. Englewood is likely to claim a substantial number of the patient admissions originating in this area, and thus it is unrealistic to ignore the market share that Englewood is likely to obtain. Manasota is not likely to realize the admissions it projects obtaining from the Venice area and thus its utilization will be significantly lower than projected, as will its revenues. Patient days will continue to drop through 1990 because the use rate is dropping more rapidly than the population is increasing. Manasota will thus have to obtain most of its patient days from the admissions enjoyed by existing hospitals, which already have low and declining utilization. It has simply not been established that Manasota will be able to capture sufficient patient days from them to ensure its financial feasibility. Assuming arguendo, that its utilization projections are accurate, the revenue and expense projections based thereon are inaccurate and not supportive of finanical feasibility. "Contractual adjustments" represent the differences between what the hospital charges and what is actually reimbursed by Medicare and other reimbursement schemes. The contractual adjustment represents a deduction from gross revenue. A significant issue was raised by all parties through their financial experts, concerning the portion of the contractual adjustment related to capital cost pass-through. Mr. Beachey, and other witnesses for existing hospitals, opined that capital cost pass-through, whereby a hospital is reimbursed for its cost of capital through the DRG reimbursement system, will be eliminated entirely phased out in steps such that the increment of DRG reimbursement represented by capital cost pass-through should be eliminated from Nanasota's revenue figures. Mr. Beachy feels the ultimate federal regulations enacted will call for a phased reduction in capital cost pass-through. All experts, both for the Applicant and the protestants, agreed that the capital cost pass-through is very likely to be reduced or eliminated in future years. The dispute amongst the experts concerned whether new facilities, either CON approved, under construction, or opening in the year the regulation becomes effective, will have their capital cost pass-through reimbursement entirely eliminated. Because all the opinions are based upon conjecture and speculation regarding what the Congress will do in this regard, they are rejected. The Applicant's pro forma statement of revenues (in evidence) is predicated, in part, upon the assumption that DRG Medicare reimbursement will increase five per cent a year through fiscal year 1989-1990. This assumption is rejected in favor of Mr. Beachey's expert testimony. Mr. Beachey established that the Medicare reimbursement increase for 1986 will only be one-half of one per cent, and that for 1987 one house of congress has agreed to a one half per cent increase in the reimbursement rate, and the other to a one per cent increase. While the ultimate 1987 rate is speculative, Mr. Beachey established that for that and future years it is not likely to be on the order or magnitude of 5%. Mr. Beachey, in an abundance of caution (favorable to the Applicant), opined that at best there might be a 3% annual increase in Medicare reimbursement after 1986, rather than the 5% postulated by the Applicant (even though the 1986 increase is only one-half per cent. His opinion is clothed with substantial probability of reliability and is accepted. The Applicant projects a 5% deduction to revenue for bad debts. Mr. Beachey established that this is more likely to be 8%. That was indeed the figure used by the Applicant in its own application, also in evidence. Mr. Sucher's pro forma statement also projected Manasota providing 3% Medicaid, while the application itself, in evidence, indicates Manasota will obtain 5% of its revenue based upon reimbursement for Medicaid care. These resulting contractual adjustments, which are deductions from revenue, coupled with the necessary adjustment for the increased increment for bad debt, which was established, reveal that, because of these adjustments alone, the Applicant will experience a loss of $414,000 for its first year of operation, and a $1,012,000 loss for the second year. These loss figures do not reflect Mr. Beachey's opinion that an increased number of FTE's are necessary over the 3.4 FTE's projected by Mr. Sucher, which would reduce revenue by $512,000, nor his opinion that declines in "capital cost pass-through" would reduce revenue by $700,000 the first year and $430,000 the second year. This latter opinion was rejected for the reasons mentioned above, and his opinion regarding the additional FTE staff required is rejected because of Mr. Beachey's lack of expertise regarding adequate staffing patterns and levels. The Applicant failed to account for indigency tax assessments of $155,000 and $188,000 for 1988-1990. That assessment is designed to enhance reimbursement for indigent care for hospitals in the state. Although Mr. Sucher and Dr. Scott opined that the amount of the assessment would be reimbursed, an accounting "wash," the preponderant, expert testimony reveals that there is no direct reimbursement payment related to the amount paid into that fund. In any event, the amounts of such possible reimbursements are not proven. Additionally, the Applicant did not account in its expenses for real estate taxes which will amount to $155,000 per year. These expense increases and concomitant revenue deductions are reflected in the above found loss figures. The Applicant will have to increase its charges by a substantial amount to offset these net losses. The revenues would have to be increased on the order of 36% the first-year of operation and 35.9% the second year. It is important to remember that only 26% of the Applicant's patient mix would be private paying or insurance reimbursed patients, who could absorb these increased charges. Concerning staff salaries and benefit expense, the Applicant proposes 3.4 FTE's per occupied bed. A number of the expert witnesses, both for the protestant hospitals and the Applicant, established that that is an insufficient level of staffing for a 100-bed hospital. Mr. Sucher acknowledged that he had no personal experience in determining staffing patterns and staffing a hospital, although in his capacity as an expert in hospital finance, he had dealt with the financial implications of staffing. Mr. Sucher admitted that his 3.4 FTE figure was a rough estimate, which primarily included only nursing and administrative staff, and did not take into account laboratory staff and other technical positions. Mr. White himself finds that teaching hospitals, require a range of from 3.7 to 5.6 FTE's per occupied bed. Mr. Schwartz established that the non-teaching hospitals in the area have a minimum of 3.8 FTE's per occupied bed which is the minimum accepted for a facility such as Manasota's. Indeed, the testimony of Dr. Melnick and Mr. White shows that a higher staffing rate would be needed since Manasota proposes to be an osteopathic teaching hospital. Thus, the appropriate staff ratio (and concomitant salary and benefit expense) for Manasota would have to be substantially higher than 3.8 FTE's per occupied bed. If the FTE ratio were, however, raised to the minimum level of 3.8 FTE's, the expense figure for salaries and benefits would increase by $450,000. Given Mr. White's, Mr. Schwartz's and Dr. Melnick's testimony that a higher level of staffing is needed at a teaching facility, this expense figure might be much higher. If, for example, a modest increase in staffing to account for Manasota's obligations as a teaching hospital operation necessitated a raise in the FTE ratio to only 4.2 FTE's per occupied bed, the total additional expense over that attributable to the projected 3.4 FTE's would be on the order of $900,000. Even that figure would be on the lower end of the range normal for teaching hospitals. These additional staffing expense adjustments would increase the above loss figures by a minimum of $450,000 and likely much more. In addition to the above understated expense items, the Applicant failed to account for payment of federal income tax. The Applicant also failed to provide for payment of insurance which Mr. Sucher acknowledged would cost between $400,000 and $600,000 per year. Payments for utility expense were also not accounted for and Mr. Sucher acknowledged those would cost approximately S300,000 per year. Payments for sales taxes and contract services such as laundry service, which will be a substantial expense, were not accounted for, nor were principal payments on the approximate 14 million dollar debt. The Applicant did not allow for marketing expenses, even though Mr. Sucher and Mr. White acknowledged that an aggressive marketing strategy would be used to obtain a feasible level of admissions. Mr. Sucher testified that a great deal of these expenses generally fell under the heading "supply and other" in the pro- forma statement but, in consideration of these and many other non-itemized expenses such as kitchen or food service, supply purchases, and drug purchases which were not depicted in the pro- forma statement as to amount, it was not established that the general category for supply and other expenses was sufficient to cover all of these expenditures. Capital Costs The Applicant has additionally understated some of the capital costs involved in the project. Foremost among these, as Mr. Sucher admitted, the proposed $15,587,000 capital cost attributable to the project did not include a required 1.5 million dollars in working capital. Manasota also included only $500,000 for land acquisition. One of the sites under consideration however, would cost approximately $1,250,000. Manasota's own witness regarding real estate values established that the required 7 to 10 acre site in south Sarasota County, would cost on the order of a million dollars, exclusive of real estate commissions, legal fees, and other preliminary site costs. Although Manasota has proposed to be an osteopathic hospital, no provision was made in its proposed equipment costs for manipulative therapy tables. Ms. Usher, Manasota's equipment expert, opined that such a table would cost from $150 to $8,000. Indeed, Dr. Snyder, D.O., established that equipping a department of manipulative therapy could cost as much as $100,000. The equipment list does not provide for other items of equipment normally present in operating an acute care hospital, such as an incinerator or two-way radio communication equipment. Some items, such as televisions and a computer system, are optional to some extent, and the record does not reflect whether some items such as a telephone system might be included in the overall capital costs for the facility, even though not listed on the equipment list. It is noteworthy, however, that Manasota has not provided for any expenditure for kitchen or dining room equipment, which could cost as much as $250,000 to $350,000. This unprovided for equipment is essential for functioning as an acute care hospital. The inclusion of these items would boost the capital costs of the project to approximately $17,837,000, without considering the cost of the osteopathic manipulation tables and unknown construction contingencies, dependent on site selection, such as acceleration and deceleration traffic lanes, extension of utility lines and service, and, potentially, a package sewage treatment plant. The contingency fund of $400,000 described by Mr. Henry, was not shown to be adequate to cover these costs. Short-Term Financial Feasibility Manasota retained Morgan, Schiff and Company, Inc. as its financial adviser and broker for this project approximately three months prior to hearing. Mr. Thaddeus Jaroszewicz represented that corporation in testifying regarding financiability of the project. Neither Mr. Jaroszewicz nor Morgan Schiff have participated in the financing of a health care facility prior. Mr. Jaroszewicz stated that it was necessary to have an understanding of the health care industry in which a client operates in order to evaluate the reasonableness of cash flow projections provided to him by the client. Although Mr. Jaroszewicz has some understanding of the economics of the health care industry, due to his lack of experience with health care clients, his expertise is somewhat limited. Given his experience in the financial markets, Mr. Jaroszewicz is confident he can raise the 90% debt financing, probably through banking institutions. However, he based his opinion on the financial projections provided him by Manasota, which for reasons expressed in the other findings herein, have been shown to be inaccurate in projecting financial feasibility. The capital costs, for reasons found herein, are understated as well, such that the true capital costs of the project will approach 18 million dollars, instead of $15,587,000 which Mr. Jaroszewicz assumed. All of these factors, coupled with the fact that AmeriHealth, Inc., through its purchase of Richmond Metropolitan Hospital, the pending purchase of Antauga Medical Center and Smith Hospitals in Alabama from HCA, the Savannahs Hospital Project in Indian River County, Florida, together with its pending half-million dollar lease of a facility in Lockhart, Texas, has committed all its resources and indeed is heavily "leveraged" in seeking to accomplish these purchases. AmeriHealth owes in excess of 11.3 million dollars on the 14 million dollar Richmond Hospital purchase. Regarding the HCA Alabama facilities purchase, AmeriHealth will assume 5 to 6 million dollars in HCA debt and incur new debt totaling 8 million dollars. Additionally, it will give 2.3 million dollars in subordinated notes back to HCA for the remainder of the financing. Upon completion of an expansion project at the Antauga Hospital there will be an additional 8 million dollars in debt assumed by AmeriHealth. The Savannahs Hospital Project in Indian River County will involve an additional 9.5 million dollars in debt. That financing has not closed. AmeriHealth is additionally involved in purchasing Ambulatory Surgical Centers which will cost $450,000 to $750,000 each. AmeriHealth's net worth is approximately 4.7 million dollars. As of September 11, 1985, the HCA acquisitions had not closed because AmeriHealth was unable to secure acceptable financing. Citibank, the proposed lender, was requiring strict liquidity requirements and capital expenditure requirements on AmeriHealth before it would finance the project. AmeriHealth found these requirements unworkable so that it was unable to close the HCA transaction and had to ask for extensions of time on the closing date. AmeriHealth has not yet been able to obtain acceptable financing for that purchase. AmeriHealth is thus a fledgling company which has leveraged all its assets. It will likely have substantial difficulty obtaining financing for the Manasota project. In view of the fact that Mr. Jaroszewicz had not had the benefit of doing his own analysis of the Applicant's proposed financial projections, and in view of the other evidence that has shown that revenues have been overstated and expenses and capital costs understated, it must be concluded that if a lender was aware of this negative cash posture, obtaining of satisfactory financing would be quite doubtful. In this regard it is understood that if a CON were actually granted financing might be arranged. It must be proven that the financial projections are indeed accurate and that indeed, the project will be financially feasible on a short and long term basis for that to happen, however. Such has simply not been proven to be the case. Special Needs of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's)-Section 381.494(6)(c)10, Florida Statutes This provision is not at issue in this proceeding. There is no evidence regarding special needs of HMO's. Needs and Circumstances of Entities Which Provide a Substantial Portion of Services to Individuals Not in the District or Adjacent Districts-Section 381.494(6)(c)11, Florida Statutes If Manasota were approved and could feasibly operate as a teaching hospital, it would be available to provide internship and residency programs to students from SECOM and other medical schools. Additionally, Manasota would be available to provide osteopathic health care services to individuals in adjacent districts. However, the preponderant evidence of record does not reveal that osteopathic health care services in adjacent districts are not already being met, especially given the under utilization of osteopathic hospitals in Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties, approximately an hour's drive to the north. Probable Impact of Project on Cost of Providing Health Services, Effects of Competition on Innovations in Financing and Delivery of Health Services which Foster Competition Section 381.494(6)(c)12, Florida Statutes. That portion of this criterion concerning innovations in financing and delivery of health services which foster competition, etc., is not truly at issue. There was no evidence to indicate that any innovations in financing and delivery of health services are proposed other than that Manasota proposes to be an osteopathic teaching hospital, and proposes to charge 10% lower rates. As found above, the Gulf Coast Osteopathic Hospital will be substantially less than two hour's travel time from Manasota's site, and thus Manasota will not truly be an innovative health service in the district. Even if Manasota were approved, it is highly unlikely, in view of the above findings, that it can deliver its health services more cost-effectively. The probable impact of the project on cost of health services and the effects of resultant competition on the supply of health services, must be addressed. In this regard, Memorial is a full-service, acute care hospital, competing for the pool of patients in the primary service areas of Venice, Englewood and the proposed Manasota facility. Memorial is licensed for 788 beds, but as of October, 1985, only 590 beds were in service and staffed, due to a steady decline in utilization. Memorial's total patient days for 1985 were the lowest it has experienced since 1973, 15% less than its peak year of 1982. Memorial would experience substantial adverse financial impact if the Manasota project were approved. Memorial, in 1984, obtained 1,458 patients from the south Sarasota County area, including the cities of Osprey, Venice, Nokomis and Northport, in the primary service area proposed by Manasota and also served by Venice and Englewood. If the Manasota Hospital is approved, Memorial will lose approximately half of those patients. This would result in a reduction of gross revenues of approximately $3,579,000 and a concomitant reduction in its net operating revenue margin of $1,382,000. A reduction of this magnitude would reduce Memorialt's overall operating margin to 1.2%. A 2% operating margin, which Memorial will experience for 1985, is the absolute minimum safe level at which a hospital can operate in a financially viable manner. With a 1.2% operating margin, Memorial will be unable to maintain necessary working capital, nor maintain favorable bond financing ratings with bond rating agencies. If its bond rating worsens, its cost of bonded indebtedness will correspondingly rise. In order for Memorial to maintain its 2% operating margin, it would have to increase prices by at least 2.6%. The only other alternative would be to raise its tax levy as a public hospital board by approximately 28%. Either eventuality would result in a significant increase in health care costs to the Sarasota County community. Venice Hospital has 312 licensed beds. Its average annual occupancy was 71% in 1985, but will decline to 55.8% for the 1986 fiscal year. The declining utilization will be caused by the continuing effects of the DRG reimbursement system, and the other factors enumerated above. The average length of stay and projected utilization at Venice will continue to decline at least until 1990. The 55.8% occupancy rate projected for 1986 includes only the impact on Venice's utilization of the opening of the ECH, not Manasota. Even so, its projected operating revenue for 1986 will be only $589,150. The patients that Manasota will obtain will come from the same pool of patients served by Venice and the declining utilization rate, even in the face of increasing population, reveals that there are not enough patients for Venice to operate cost-effectively, especially if Manasota is opened. The loss of patients to Manasota will cause a loss of gross revenues for Venice of $10,287,200, strictly from inpatient revenues, not taking into account outpatient losses. Venice has already laid off personnel and will have to continue to do so to compensate for revenue losses from the downturn in its utilization. Venice will have to close additional nursing units and beds and further reduce staff on account of the competitive effects of the ECH opening. Even after reducing a reasonable percentage of such variable costs, Venice will suffer a net operating revenue loss of approximately $4,020,119 if Manasota is opened. If this eventuality occurs, Venice will be forced to face either bankruptcy or likely closing of entire wings and drastic reductions of present services. This would diminish access to health care services in the area, and quite likely result in declination of quality care. Dr. Scott acknowledged that Manasota would take a significant number of patients from Venice, but minimized its effect by opining that Venice could make up for the loss by operating more efficiently, believing that its recent bond refinancing resulted in unnecessary additional financing costs to Venice, that Venice had an excessive amount of administrative expenses. The above findings reflect, however, that the bond refinancing did not result in any significant increase in debt cost to Venice, and yielded several million dollars more capital funds for Venice. Dr. Scott's figures for Venice's purportedly high administrative costs was shown by Mr. Shanika to be in error. Thus, if Manasota Hospital meets its own projections, which are over-stated, it will draw approximately 2,415 patients from Venice, causing it to operate at a loss, and destroying the feasibility of its programs and endangering its quality of care. Since Venice is already operating as a relatively efficient hospital, it cannot make up those losses by becoming more efficient. Venice's operating revenue would fall to the break even point if it only lost 309 patients. If Manasota drew anywhere near 2,415 patients from Venice, charges would have to be increased on the order of 40% to compensate for the loss. Englewood is a fledgling 100-bed acute care facility scheduled to open in November, 1985, and has thus not yet had an opportunity to obtain adequate utilization of its beds and services and to secure a positive operating ratio. Dr. Scott recognized the potential impact on Englewood of the Manasota opening, particularly with respect to physicians located in the Englewood area who might swing all or part of their admissions to Manasota. If any of Englewood's staff physicians, such as Dr. Chirillo, who testified in support of Manasota, swung all or part of their patient bases to Manasota, it would have a substantial deleterious effect on the patient days and revenue for Englewood. This would result in a diminution of service at Englewood or in some cases a discontinuance of certain services. Under present projections, Englewood will not realize profit for approximately 5 years, but if the Manasota facility is built, that time will be significantly extended. Manasota will have a significant adverse impact on Englewood's utilization and financial viability by taking patients away from it before it has an opportunity to reach a profitable operating situation. Englewood has already experienced problems in hiring sufficient qualified staff members. It has experienced counter offers to prospective staff members made by other hospitals, such that in order to obtain qualified staff, Englewood has had to raise the salaries it offers. If Manasota opened, the additional competition for staff members would likely cause salaries for staff to be bid upwards still further, as well as causing technically trained staff members to become even scarcer. This situation could cause significant cost increases to all facilities involved and to the health care consuming public. Manasota seeks to staff its facility largely with physicians in Sarasota County who could swing their admissions to the new hospital. There is only one pool of patients and patient days for the four contending facilities to divide amongst them, however. Osteopathic patients come from the same patient pool as those treated by M.D.'s, in that all are acute care patients. Since there is no unserved need for more acute care beds in Sarasota County, or District VIII, inpatient utilization of the three existing facilites will necessarily decrease by the advent of Manasota. Manasota also projects 1,200 outpatient surgeries its first year. These patients must come from Venice, Englewood or Memorial. These facilities depend on outpatient surgeries as an important source of revenue and profit which is used to offset areas of service which do not operate as favorably. The loss of these patients to Manasota by the existing facilities, which are already competing for a shrinking patient market in terms of declining patient days and utilization, will inevitably lead to higher patient charges and to shrinking availability of services. The cost to the community will be significant. Under- utilized facilities are more costly to the community. As utilization declines due to the above-found causes, future patients will be forced to absorb the cost of excess beds. The more patients who utilize a service which represents a capital expenditure, the lower the unit cost will be to the health care consumer. The construction of unneeded facilities, representing excess capacity, results in capital expenses borne by the public increasing at a greater rate than the numbers of patients or patient days from which off-setting revenues must come. The patients and the community will then have to bear a higher unit cost for health care services represented by this excess capacity. While Manasota contended, as partial justification for its facility, that there are a number of hospitals-in the state with occupancy rates in the low forty percentile range, which still generate significant profits, this point ignores the high cost the health consuming public must pay for 50 to 60% unused capacity at such hospitals. Hospitals can only reduce their variable costs attributable to unused bed capacity and typically, 40% of the costs of unused capacity are fixed costs which are not covered by any revenue and which cannot be reduced by staff and service reductions. Such fixed costs must be passed on to the public through higher rates and through the government reimbursement systems. Indeed, as established by Dr. Zaretsky, the cost of 100 excess beds to the Sarasota County community would amount to $3,674,349 in aggregate added annual costs, expressed in 1983 dollars. Even without the advent of the Manasota facility, there are already considerably more than 100 excess beds in Sarasota County. If the capital cost "pass through" scheme is eliminated in whole or in part, the hospitals would have to absorb or pass on to consumers more costs through inFla.ed rates and possible increases in Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. To the extent that existing facilities are unable to raise charges sufficiently, they will have to absorb the differences, incur losses or cut back on services and quality of care. If a hospital is approved for an area that is not currently a monopoly, with existing hospitals already competing for patients, especially if the hospitals are operating below capacity, than the added competition is destructive. It dilutes the patient volume each hospital depends upon for adequate revenue coverage of costs. This results in inefficiency in the health care system since hospitals have fewer patients to spread the fixed costs among. Thus it has been established that approval of Manasota as an additional competitor in this market will result in significant added health care costs to the community. Cost and Methods of Construction, Etc.-Section 381.494(6)(c)13, Florida Statutes Aside from the capital cost understatements reflected in the above findings, the construction costs, methods of construction and provisions for energy conservation dictated by the south Florida environment where the hospital will be built, have been shown by the Applicant to be reasonable and appropriate. Because of the indefinite site location in the south Sarasota County area, however, the funds set aside in the pro forma of $35,000 for site preparation costs, and the $400,000 contingency fund related to construction, have not been established to be adequate to cover all site preparation work and such potential offsite construction costs as additional traffic lanes, signals and utility service extensions. Available, Less Costly, More Efficient Alternatives Section 381.494(6)(d)(1), Florida Statutes. There are available less costly, more efficient alternatives to the acute care inpatient services proposed by the Applicant. The existing inpatient facilities, including Gulf Coast Osteopathic Hospital, can or will provide, inpatient services similar to those proposed. The existing facilities are providing them in an appropriate, efficient manner to the extent they are able, given their under-utilization. Existing Facilities Are Being Used in an Appropriate, Efficient Manner-Section 381.494(6)(d)2, Florida Statutes It has not been established that existing inpatient facilities are being used in an efficient manner, in terms of adequate use of their present capacity. Rather, the record reflects that existing hospitals are under-utilized with the added health care costs and inefficiencies that entails, which Manasota would aggravate. Alternatives to New Construction such as Modernization and Sharing-Section 381.494(6)(d)3, Florida Statutes The Applicant has not established that alternatives to the proposed construction have been considered and implemented to the maximum extent possible. The existing facilities are viable alternatives to the proposed new construction, in that they have substantial amounts of unused capacity and can provide additional acute care services as needed without expansion. Many of the osteopathic physicians testifying acknowledged that their patients can be treated in an appropriate, efficient manner in existing facilities. Patients Will Experience Serious Problems Obtaining Inpatient osteopathic Care in the Absence of the Proposed Facility-Section 381.494 (6)(d)4, Florida Statutes. The Applicant has not established that patients will experience serious problems in obtaining inpatient care of the type proposed in the absence of Manasota. Osteopathic acute care services are available in District VIII, notwithstanding the absence of another identifiable osteopathic facility, for the reasons delineated above.
Recommendation Accordingly, having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the competent, substantial evidence of record, the candor and demeanor ot the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the application of Manasota Osteopathic General Hospital, Inc. for a Certificate of Need authorizing establishment and operation of a 100-bed osteopathic teaching hospital in HRS District VIII and Sarasota County, Florida be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: John D. C. Newton, II, Esquire CARSON & LINN, P.A. 253 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William E. Williams, Esquire FULLER & JOHNSON, P.A. Post Office Box 1739 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire 118 North Gadsden Street Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ken Davis, Esquire DAVIS, JUDKINS & SIMPSON Post Office Box 10368 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 E. G. Boone, Esquire Robert Klingbeil, Esquire Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 W. David Watkins, Esquire OERTEL & HOFFMAN, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Theodore C. Eastmore, Esquire WILLIAMS, PARKER, HARRISON, DIETZ & GETZEN Post Office Box 3258 Sarasota, Florida 33578 Harden King, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES VENICE HOSPITAL, INC., Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 85-0045 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, and MANASOTA OSTEOPATHIC GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., Respondents. / HCA OF FLORIDA, INC., d/b/a DOCTORS-HOSPITAL OF SARASOTA, Petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, CASE NO. 85-0047 Respondent, and MANASOTA OSTEOPATHIC GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC. AND ENGLEWOOD COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Intervenors. / DOCTORS' OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a GULF COAST HOSPITAL, INC., Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 85-0050 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Respondent. / SARASOTA COUNTY PUBLIC HOSPITAL BOARD d/b/a, MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, SARASOTA, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 85-0051 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES and MANASOTA OSTEOPATHIC GENERAL HOSPITAL, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact At all times here relevant Theodore S. Brandwein, D.O., held License No. 3259 issued by the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners. During the calendar year 1977 and for some period subsequent thereto Respondent maintained his office and practice at 18055 Franjo Road, Perrine, Florida under the name of Brandwein Medical Practice, P.A. The sign marking Respondent's office in 1977, when these charges were preferred, is the same sign depicted in Exhibit 6 which is a photograph taken in 1979. It is the sign for which Respondent registered with the Florida Secretary of State as a service mark. In his application (Exhibit 11) for this registration Respondent described this mark as "a stethoscope, binaural in design, lying horizontally on the paper, sign, building, item, or object on which it is emblazoned, the earpieces and connecting piece forming in script the letter 'D' and the tubing and chest piece convoluted to form the 'O'. Taken together, the stethoscope forms the letters 'D. O.'" The application further provided "applicant is the owner of the mark and no other person except a related company has the right to use such mark in Florida, whether in identical form thereof, or in such resemblance thereto as might be, calculated to deceive or confuse". The sign on Respondent's office in 1977 consisted of this mark depicting a convoluted stethoscope which forms the letters "D.O." only after the exercise of a vivid imagination and an appreciation of surrealistic art. In the yellow pages of the 1977 Miami telephone directory Respondent is listed under Physicians and Surgeons MD. (Exhibit 9). He is not listed under Physicians and "Surgeons - DO. (Exhibit 10). Brandwein Medical Practice, P.A., is the Theodore S. Brandwein who is Respondent in these proceedings. Respondent's Florida license is presently inactive.
Findings Of Fact South Dade Osteopathic Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a Suburban Medical Center is an outpatient office facility in South Dade County, Florida. Suburban Medical Ambulatory Surgical Center (the "Am/Surg Center") is a licensed ambulatory surgical center which is operating out of the same building. (Together these entities will hereinafter be referred to as the "Outpatient Center.") The Outpatient Center currently provides outpatient services including ambulatory surgical, diagnostic, radiologic, and laboratory services. The existing building which houses the Outpatient Center was completed in approximately 1980. The building has two floors. The AM/Surg surgical center occupies the second floor of the building. The Outpatient Center currently has approximately 6,000 open patient files and has serviced approximately 12,000 patients since it opened in or about 1980. The license to operate the AM/Surg Center was obtained in approximately 1988. The Outpatient Center operates as an osteopathic facility. However, it does have allopathic physicians on staff. Dr. Jules G. Minkes is an osteopathic physician who owns and controls the Outpatient Center. Dr. Minkes is also the sole owner of Suburban Medical Hospital, Inc. ("Suburban" or the "Applicant"), the applicant in this case. On March 29, 1989, Suburban filed an application for a Certificate of Need to convert the existing Outpatient Center into a 36-bed osteopathic acute care hospital. The Application was assigned CON #5868. The Executive Summary contained in the Application summarizes the project as follows: The proposal is to convert the 26 ambulatory surgical recovery beds into hospital beds. The surgi-center and 26 beds are on the second floor of the facility which was constructed in accordance with hospital code specifications. Thus, conversation of the center into a hospital will primarily involve certain struc- tural changes on the first floor of the center to meet code specifications. The project will also require additional construction for ten ICU/CCU beds, a cafeteria, and certain engi- neering equipment. The Center will continue to offer its current out-patient services. The evidence at the hearing created some confusion and questions as to the Applicant's intended operation of the proposed project. At the hearing, Dr. Minkes testified that the AM/Surg Center will continue to exist and operate in the same physical structure as the proposed hospital. The plan for continuing the AM/Surg Center is not detailed in the Application. It is not clear where the ambulatory surgical center would be located in the converted facility and what equipment and/or space would be shared. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the revenues and expenses for the ambulatory surgical center are included within the projections set forth in the Application. It should be noted that, under existing law, an ambulatory surgical center cannot be part of a hospital. See, Section 395.002(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). (This issue is discussed in more detail in the Conclusions of Law below.) As noted in Gulf Coast Hospital v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 424 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1982), osteopathy and allopathy are two primary and separate schools of medicine which differ substantially in philosophy and practice. Doctors of medicine are licensed under Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Osteopathic physicians are licensed under Chapter 459, Florida Statutes. The practice of medicine is defined in Section 458.305, Florida Statutes as the "diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or other physical or mental condition." Allopathy is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as "a system of medical practice that aims to combat disease by use of remedies producing effects different from those produced by the special disease treated." 424 So.2d at 89 n.8. Section 459.003(3), Florida Statutes, (1989) defines osteopathic medicine as the "diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or any other physical or mental condition which practice is based in part upon educational standards and requirements which emphasis the importance of the musculoskeletal structure and manipulative therapy in the maintenance and restoration of health." Osteopathic medicine places great emphasis upon the health of the musculoskeletal system as a condition of healing, and employs techniques of manipulation of muscles and joints in the process of therapy for illness. As explained by Dr. Minkes, osteopathic medicine is a distinct school of practice that embodies a philosophy based on a holistic approach that integrates the biomechanical and structural aspects of the body's function in all aspects of the functioning of the body. Dr. Minkes testified that it is his intention to seek accreditation for the proposed facility from the American Osteopathic Association and to operate the proposed hospital as an osteopathic hospital. Suburban intends to locate its proposed facility in conjunction with the existing Outpatient Center at the intersection of U.S. 1 and S.W. 97th Avenue. This location lies within Subdistrict 4 of HRS Health Planning District XI near the dividing line between Subdistricts 4 and 5. Baptist and South Miami are general acute care hospitals located in southern Dade County, Florida. The primary service area proposed by Suburban overlaps the primary service areas of Baptist and South Miami. Suburban's proposed service area is "bounded by S.W. 88th Street (Kendall Drive) and Homestead, Florida City and the upper Keys on the north and south; Biscayne Bay and the Everglades on the east and west: Subdistrict 4 from Kendall Drive south, subdistrict 5a, northern subdistrict 5(b)." There is an existing osteopathic hospital in District XI. That hospital, Westchester General Hospital ("Westchester"), is also located in Subdistrict 4. Currently, Westchester is licensed for 100 beds. It is an approved osteopathic teaching hospital and intern training hospital. Until 1989, there was another osteopathic hospital located in District XI. Southeastern Medical Center ("Southeastern") was a 224 bed facility that was approved for delicensure by HRS as of May 9, 1989. Southeastern was located in North Miami Beach Florida, close to the Broward County line. In 1983, South Dade Osteopathic Medical Center, Inc., one of the corporations owned and controlled by Dr. Jules Minkes, filed a Certificate of Need Application for a 150 bed osteopathic teaching hospital at the same site as the current Suburban proposal. The prior application was subsequently amended to 100 beds. After HRS denied that prior application, a hearing was held leading to the entry of a Final Order dated October 11, 1985 denying the application. See, South Dade Osteopathic Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a Suburban Medical Center vs. DHRS, 7 FALR 5686. (This case will hereinafter be referred to as the "South Dade" case.) In denying the prior application for a 100-bed osteopathic hospital, the Hearing Officer in the South Dade case noted the existence of the two osteopathic facilities in the district (Westchester and Southeastern) and found their occupancy rates had been significantly lower than capacity in the immediate years preceeding that application. He also noted that those occupancy rates were very similar to the occupancy rates for allopathic hospitals in the area. In 1981, the occupancy for all acute care hospitals in District XI was 67.4 percent. The occupancy rate for Westchester was 67.8 percent and Southeastern's occupancy rate was 61.3. In 1982, the overall occupancy for all District XI hospitals was 66.6 percent, Westchester's occupancy dropped to 65.8 percent and Southeastern's occupancy rate dropped to 58.4 percent. The Hearing Officer in the South Dade case noted that, in 1984, the occupancy rate for osteopathic beds had decreased even further. Based upon this evidence, the Hearing Officer found that there was an excess number of osteopathic beds in District XI in the years preceding that hearing. In the Recommended Order denying South Dade's application, the Hearing Officer noted: ...The cause of these lower use rates have been causes that apply equally to osteopathic and allopathic hospitals, thus leading to the conclusion that the lack of need shown by the above data will probably persist for several years into the future. All acute care hospitals have lost patients due to growth of alternatives to inpatient care, such as nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, outpatient surgical centers, and the like. Additionally, medicare policy changes have reduced the length of stay at all acute care hospitals. There is no compelling evidence on this record that osteopathic hospitals will not suffer from diminished need from these market forces in the same way that allopathic hospitals have suffered...7 FALR at 5698. The South Dade Recommended Order predicted that the lack of need for new acute care facilities of any affiliation was destined to continue for several years into the future. That prediction has proven to be correct. The evidence in this proceeding demonstrated that many of the same forces that caused reduced occupancy at both allopathic and osteopathic hospitals in 1984 continue to influence occupancy at both allopathic and osteopathic facilities. Without question, the overall occupancy rates and number of patient days in District XI acute care facilities has been declining significantly since 1984. The average annual occupancy rate for all acute care facilities in District XI was approximately 51 percent in 1988. The occupancy in Dade County alone was approximately 47 percent. These figures are well below the 80 percent efficiency standard established by HRS for an acute care facility. This decline can be attributed to a number a factors including the development of diagnostic related groups ("DRG's") for Medicare reimbursement. Osteopathic facilities have not been immune to this decline. Indeed, since 1984, the occupancy for the two existing osteopathic facilities in District XI decreased at a significantly greater rate than occupancy in allopathic facilities. In 1984, Westchester's occupancy was 46.7 percent. Westchester's average occupancy in 1987 was approximately 30.5 percent. By the end of the calendar year 1988, that occupancy had declined to 27 percent. Similarly, Southeastern Medical Center experienced declining occupancies from 1984 until its closure. Occupancy at Southeastern in 1984 was approximately 60 percent. Southeastern's average utilization rate for 1988 was only 20.3 percent. These trends are consistent with the statewide occupancy of osteopathic facilities which has been dropping at a rate equal to, if not greater, than, that of allopathic facilities. Suburban attempted to explain the closure of Southeastern through the testimony of several witnesses who were affiliated with that facility. Petitioner contends that the decline and eventual closing of Southeastern was the result of a conscious decision on the part of the owner of that facility, AMI, to focus its resources and efforts on the development of a nearby allopathic hospital which it also owned. While management decisions and/or problems may have contributed to the declining occupancy and ultimate closure of Southeastern, it is clear that the facility was also impacted by many of the factors that have contributed to the overall decline in occupancy at acute care facilities throughout the District. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, it is concluded that there was an excess number of licensed osteopathic beds in the District at least prior to the time of the delicensure of Southeastern. With the delicensure of Southeastern, there are now 100 licensed osteopathic beds in the District, all of which are located at Westchester in the same Subdistrict as the proposed project. Petitioner presented extensive testimony regarding the perceived inadequacy of Westchester to meet the need for osteopathic services in the District. That testimony indicates that some osteopathic physicians are unhappy with the management philosophy of Westchester and they feel they are unable to provide quality osteopathic care in that facility. Most of the complaints about the care and treatment at Westchester were voiced by Dr. Minkes and Dr. Hershmann. Both of these physicians are expected to have a significant financial investment in the proposed facility. Several osteopathic physicians who do not have an interest in the proposed project testified that they did not have a problem with the quality of care at Westchester. Thus, while there may be some minor and/or individual problems with Westchester, the evidence was not sufficiently compelling to establish that the occupancy problems at Westchester are due to problems and/or inadequacies that facility. In other words, while some osteopathic physicians may prefer to treat their patients in a new, more modern facility, Westchester has not been shown to be so inadequate that it should be replaced or supplemented by the proposed project. The HRS Office of Licensure and Certification has not received any complaints against Westchester regarding the facility's physical plant or quality of care. Furthermore, Westchester's license is in good standing and it is accredited by the JCAH and the AOA. Petitioner presented hearsay evidence suggesting that a number of the beds at Westchester are not being utilized because of space limitations and that a number of the beds are contained in undesirable four bed rooms. As a result, Petitioner suggests that Westchester's functional bed count should be considered in the neighborhood of 50 rather than 100 beds. If this argument is accepted, Westchester's occupancy rates would not appear nearly as dismal. However, the evidence was insufficient to justify this conclusion. Westchester is presently licensed for 100 beds and no evidence was presented to establish that the hospital is not trying to fill all those beds. Petitioner also contends that Westchester has ceased functioning as a distinct osteopathic facility. The evidence was insufficient to support this conclusion. The testimony from several osteopathic physicians indicated that they still admit patients to Westchester. Similar contentions regarding Westchester were made in the South Dade case. In that earlier proceeding, the Hearing Officer found: ...While the foregoing is evidence that there are problems at Westchester for the physicians who testified, these problems were not proven with sufficient specificity and have not been shown to be such for this Hearing Officer to conclude that Westchester is so inadequate that it should be replaced by the hospital proposed by Petitioner. Nor is the evidence sufficient for the Hearing Officer to conclude that the low use rate at Westchester is due solely to inadequate health care at Westchester. As stated above, the record evidence indicates that the use rate at Westchester is quite similar to the use rates at allopathic hospitals in the District, which is consistent with the conclusion that the lower use rate at Westchester is caused by the same diminished need. Further, the use rate at Westchester is quite similar to the use rate at Southeastern Medical Center. On this record, there is no indication that Southeastern Medical Center is other than an adequate health care facility. The similarity in use rates, therefore, leads one to the conclusion that the use rate at Westchester is driven primarily by the same force that drives the use rate at Southeastern; lack of need or demand by osteopathic patients. 7 FALR 5702 The evidence in this case was similarly insufficient to attribute the low occupancy at Westchester to other than market forces. While the low occupancy rates at Westchester may be due in part to problems with that facility and reluctance on the part of some osteopathic physicians to utilize that hospital, the evidence indicates that both Southeastern and Westchester have experienced declining enrollments for many of the same reasons that all acute care facilities in District XI have. The evidence did establish that osteopathic physicians experience some difficulties in practicing osteopathy in allopathic facilities and that the facilities of many allopathic institutions are not conducive to osteopathic treatment. Most physical therapists at allopathic facilities are not trained to provide osteopathic treatment. In addition, few osteopathic specialists have obtained staff privileges at allopathic facilities. On the other hand, it appears that many of the difficulties and barriers that osteopathic physicians have historically experienced are being eroded. Virtually all of the osteopathic physicians who testified had staff privileges at several allopathic facilities and regularly admit patients to those facilities. Several of the osteopathic physicians who testified are practicing in partnership with or in association with allopathic physicians. Suburban presented the testimony of several osteopathic physicians who testified that additional osteopathic hospitals are needed in the District in order to enhance the survivability of osteopathy as a distinct approach to health care. Such facilities enable osteopathic physicians to learn and practice together and consult with osteopathic specialists in a forum that is supportive of osteopathy. The evidence established that approval of the proposed facility would, to some degree, enhance the survivability of osteopathy as a distinct and separate alternative treatment mode in the District. However, no evidence was presented to demonstrate that individuals seeking osteopathic care are currently being denied such services. While a significant number of osteopathic physicians have indicated an intention to use the proposed facility if it is approved (even though many of them do not use the existing osteopathic facility in the District, Westchester,) the evidence was insufficient to establish the need for an additional 36 osteopathic beds in the District. Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, the evidence did not establish that Suburban's Application satisfies the remaining criteria necessary for the issuance of a CON. Section 381.704(1), Florida Statutes (1989), recognizes that the review of CON applications includes consideration of the state and local Health Plans. Neither the Local Health Plan nor the State Health Plan specifically address osteopathic facilities. Therefore, Petitioner contends that the State and Local Health Plans are largely irrelevant to this case. This legal argument is addressed in the Conclusions of Law below. The Local Health Plan for District XI is prepared by the Health Council of South Florida. Linda Quick, Executive Director of the Health Council of South Florida testified that the Health Council does not support the construction of any new hospitals in the District. The Health Council opposes the construction of any new hospitals regardless of whether they are osteopathic or allopathic. The Health Council has prepared a booklet entitled District XI CON Allocation Factors Report for 1989. That booklet does not contain any CON allocation factors for osteopathic facilities. There are approximately thirty-two acute care facilities in the District. Utilizing the state's bed need methodology, the Health Council has concluded that there are nearly two thousand too many acute care hospital beds in the District through 1993. This determination does not differentiate between osteopathic and allopathic acute care beds. Because of the existing excess number of beds in the District, Linda Quick emphasized the need to fully explore alternatives to the construction of a new acute care facility. Such alternatives could include the acquisition of an existing facility, establishing a working relationship with an existing provider, increasing utilization at Westchester or arranging a joint venture with a licensed hospital. The Petitioner's failure to fully explore these alternatives weighs against approval of Suburban's Application. The purpose of the Local Health Plan is to describe the existing health care system, the existing population and its health status. The Plan also establishes goals and objectives for the growth, development and change of the local health system. The Local Health Plan sets forth general criteria and policies regarding health planning for services to individuals within the area. One of those goals is for the District to have a licensed bed capacity of no more than five beds per one thousand population by 1993. The State Health Plan calls for an even lower ratio. Currently, the ratio of acute care beds to the population is well in excess of five per one thousand. Approval of Suburban's Application would increase the number of acute care beds and, therefore, would be contrary to this goal of the Local Health Plan. However, it should be noted that this goal does not differentiate between osteopathic and allopathic acute care beds. Another pertinent goal of the Local Health Plan for District XI is to make services in the community geographically and financially accessible to all segments of the resident population. Because the proposed facility is located in the same Subdistrict as Westchester, it does not appear that the proposed project would significantly improve geographic accessibility to osteopathic services. Similarly, because of the large number of hospitals in the District, it does not appear that this proposed project would measurably improve the accessibility to acute care services. Section 381.705, Florida Statutes, sets forth the specific criteria to be considered in the review of a CON application. The first criteria to be considered under Section 381.705(1)(a) is the need for the proposed project in relation to the State and Local Health Plans. In assessing need, it is necessary to also consider the provisions of Section 381.713(2), Florida Statutes which provides that the need for an osteopathic hospital "shall be determined on the basis of the need for and availability of osteopathic services and osteopathic acute care hospitals in the District..." The Application cites the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Gulf Coast Hospital v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 424 So.2d 86, for the assumption that approximately ten percent of the population of the United States prefers to be treated by osteopathic physicians. Based upon this assumption and the most recent population estimate for Dade County (1.829 million as of 1987), Petitioner suggests in its Application that there should actually be 750 osteopathic beds in Dade County. No evidence was presented to support the assumption that ten percent of the population in the District prefers to be treated by osteopathic physicians. Indeed, the evidence of occupancy at osteopathic facilities in Dade County indicates that the ten percent assumption is vastly overstated. In 1985, only 2.4 percent of the total patient days for all hospitals in District XI were in osteopathic facilities. In 1986, that number decreased to 2.1 percent and in 1987 it decreased to 1.8 percent. These rates coincide with the declining occupancy rates at the existing osteopathic facilities in the District during this period. These facts indicate that the assumption that ten percent of the patients prefer osteopathic facilities is not accurate, at least in District XI. HRS has not adopted a rule or an official methodology to calculate osteopathic bed need. The need methodology set forth in Rule 10-5.011(1)(m) for calculating acute care bed need is not applicable to osteopathic facilities. The Application does not present any methodology to demonstrate osteopathic need in the District. At the hearing in this case, Suburban attempted to demonstrate the need for additional osteopathic beds in Dade and Monroe counties through the testimony of Dr. Howard Fagin, who was accepted as an expert in health planning, bed need methodology development and health economics. Dr. Fagin presented several calculations of "need" which Petitioner contends support the conclusion of need set forth in the Application. None of Dr. Fagin's calculations were included in the Application. Dr. Fagin's calculations used current hospital and physician utilization data and, by applying certain assumptions, attempt to project osteopathic need and/or demand in the District for five years into the future. In other words, Dr. Fagin attempted to develope a methodology specifically geared to calculate osteopathic need over a five-year planning horizon. Dr. Fagin set forth five different approaches for calculating osteopathic need. Most of these approaches had been considered and rejected by HRS in connection with other applications for osteopathic facilities. Intervenors and Respondent have painstakingly pointed out the deficiencies in Dr. Fagin's testimony. While their criticisms have merit, the shortcomings in the methodologies submitted by Dr. Fagin must be considered in the context of Section 381.713(2), Florida Statutes, and the lack of an approved and/or workable methodology for determining osteopathic need. It does not appear that there is a reasonably identifiable osteopathic unit of service for planning purposes. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure osteopathic need in accordance with the usual "normative" methodologies used to determine need for discreet services. However, the burden is on the Applicant to overcome these obstacles and present persuasive evidence of the need for the proposed project. Insufficient evidence was presented to accomplish this task. Intervenors and Respondents suggest that only those patients who receive osteopathic manipulative therapy during their stay in the hospital should be considered in determining "osteopathic patient days." They contend that such manipulative therapy is the only specific procedure measurable and monitored as distinctly osteopathic. The Hospital Cost Containment Board's data indicates that only two percent of the patients discharged from "osteopathic" hospitals received osteopathic manipulative therapy during their hospital stay. However, the evidence established that osteopathic care includes more than manipulative therapy. Thus, utilizing this unit of measure would significantly understate osteopathic need. All of the projections prepared by Dr. Fagin rely upon an assumption that "osteopathic patient days" are an identifiable unit of service which can be distinguished from allopathic patient days. There are several problems with this assumption. Dr. Fagin obtained the number of "osteopathic patient days" by simply taking the number of days in osteopathic designated facilities. However, not all patient days in an osteopathic hospital are "osteopathic patient days." There are clearly a number of allopathic physicians who admit and treat patients in osteopathic facilities. Indeed, at some osteopathic facilities, allopathic physicians constitute a majority of the staff. While Dr. Fagin contends that the number of allopathic admissions to osteopathic hospitals is a "wash" with the number of osteopathic admissions to allopathic hospitals, no evidence was presented to support this assumption. Patient days is a generally recognized unit of service for inpatient care and acute care beds. Typically, patient days are broken down into discreet units of service, i.e., obstetrical, psychiatric, pediatric, etc., relating to the underlying epidemiology of the population. Osteopathy is an approach to the practice of medicine rather than a specific clinical service. Osteopathy can not be measured in the same manner as a clinical service. Mixed staff hospitals and the inability to isolate a discreet unit of measurement such as an osteopathic patient day make it virtually impossible to quantify need for an osteopathic facility utilizing a traditional "normative" approach to planning. A "normative" approach provides a projection based on an estimate of the number of units of service or resources that should be in place. It is based on a number of unit of services related to an underlying need of the population. Dr. Fagin's forecast of "osteopathic patient days" includes the "need" for osteopathic beds to provide patient services in several specialized areas of care which will not be offered in the proposed project. For example, the proposed project will not offer obstetrics, psychiatry, pediatrics, tertiary care services, or cardiac catheterization. "Osteopathic patient days" as utilized by Dr. Fagin includes all of these services because he did not isolate those services that will be offered by the proposed facility. At best, Dr. Fagin's calculations show how many beds would be utilized at an osteopathic hospital if it achieved the average utilization of other osteopathic facilities. There was no showing that the average utilization at other osteopathic hospitals is appropriate or reflective of need. Thus, these methodologies do not measure need or demand for osteopathic services in the true sense of the word. In making his calculations, Dr. Fagin relied upon population figures published by the Executive Office of the Governor on May 15, 1989. The Intervenors and Respondent objected to the testimony and contended that only the population projections which had been released at the time the Application was filed could be used in connection with this Application. The earlier projection figures were released on January 1, 1989. These objections are discussed in more detail in the Conclusions of Law below. The evidence indicates that there would be no material changes in Dr. Fagin's conclusions regardless of whether the January 1st or May 15th projections are used. From 1980-1989, District XI experienced a population growth of approximately 14.6 percent and from 1990 through 1994 the projected increase is 22.1 percent. Thus, the population in the District is growing significantly. There is less than a one percent difference in the January and May population projections. In addition to the general limitations set forth above, there are several specific flaws contained in certain of the calculations performed by Dr. Fagin. The first methodology employed by Dr. Fagin was referred to as Florida Osteopathic Utilization Based Bed Need. This methodology divided the 1988 Florida population by the number of "osteopathic patient days" in the state that year to obtain a rate of 31.62 patient days per one thousand population. "Osteopathic patient days" was determined from the Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board, 1988 Hospital Budget Data. The rate of 31.62 osteopathic patient days was then multiplied by the projected 1994 District XI population, resulting in a projection of 65,192 osteopathic patient days in District XI in 1994. The projected number of osteopathic beds needed in District XI to accommodate these patient days was accomplished by dividing the projected patient days by 365 to arrive at an average daily census of 179. The average daily census was then divided by the HRS standard of eighty percent occupancy for efficient operations, resulting in a projected need of 223 osteopathic beds in District XI in 1994. Subtracting the 100 licensed beds at Westchester, this methodology results in a projected need of 123 additional osteopathic beds by the year 1994. This first methodology suffers from the deficiencies noted in Findings of Fact 53-58 above. In addition, the state wide total of osteopathic patient days for purposes of this first methodology was obtained from fourteen "osteopathic" hospitals. However, the evidence raises serious doubt as to the reliability of this data. At least one of those hospitals is no longer osteopathic and another one of the hospitals includes a utilization rate of ninety-five percent for a service (psychiatric) which will not be offered by the proposed facility. The next methodology submitted by Dr. Fagin was entitled Florida Osteopathic Physician Based Bed Need. This method calculated patient days per osteopathic physician in the State of Florida by dividing the 1988 "osteopathic patient days" by the number of osteopathic physicians in 1989. Patient days per osteopathic physician was then multiplied by the projected number of osteopathic physicians in District XI in 1994 to arrive at a projection of 66,544 osteopathic patient days in District XI in 1994. The projected patient days were then divided by 365 to arrive at an average daily census of 182. Applying the occupancy standard of eighty percent, this method projects 228 osteopathic beds will be needed in District XI in 1994. Again, subtracting the beds at Westchester, Dr. Fagin concludes that there is a net bed need of 128 beds. In addition to the overall problems noted above with respect to identification of "osteopathic patient days," this calculation includes an overly optimistic assumption of the number of osteopathic physicians that can be expected in District XI. In making this calculation, Dr. Fagin assumed a thirty percent increase in the number of osteopathic physicians in District XI from 1989 to 1994. This assumption is predicated on an expectation that a large number of graduates from Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine ("SECOM") would remain in the area and there would also be an influx of practicing osteopaths moving into the area. Dr. Fagin based his assumption, in part, on data provided by the Florida Health Care Atlas which showed that there were 198 osteopathic physicians in District XI in 1986, 180 in 1987, and 256 in 1989. Dr. Fagin attributes the apparent increase in osteopathic physicians in the District from 1987 to 1989 on the influx of the first graduating class from the SECOM in 1988. However, the 1986 and 1987 data reflected only active osteopathic physicians whereas the 1989 data reflected all licensed osteopaths. In other words, the 1986 and 1987 data did not include retired and inactive physicians whereas the 1989 data did. No reliable evidence was presented to compare the number of active osteopathic physicians to any year subsequent to 1987. Furthermore, SECOM's first graduating class actually occurred in 1985, not 1988. Additional classes also graduated in 1986 and 1987. Therefore, Dr. Fagin's assumption that SECOM graduates will increase the ranks of osteopathic physicians in the district is not necessarily correct. In addition, these projections assume new physicians in the area will be as productive as established physicians, which is unlikely to be the case. In sum, Dr. Fagin's assumptions as to the expected growth and the number of osteopathic physicians in District XI during the next five years is predicated on several erroneous assumptions. The next methodology presented by Dr. Fagin was entitled District XI Osteopathic Utilization Based Bed Need. Dr. Fagin projected a minimum and maximum number of expected osteopathic patient days in 1994 in the District based upon the actual utilization of existing osteopathic facilities in the District (Westchester and Southeastern) in 1986 and 1987. He calculated the number of "osteopathic patient days" in the District in those years and divided it into the District population to obtain rates of 24.67 and 19.72 patient days per one thousand population. These rates were multiplied by the projected District population in 1994, then divided by 365 and achieved an average daily census of between 139 and 111. Applying the eighty percent occupancy standard, Dr. Fagin calculated that there would be a need in District XI for between 174 and 139 osteopathic beds. After subtracting the existing beds at Westchester, he calculated the net bed need in 1994 to be between 74 and 39 beds. In addition to suffering from the general defects noted above, this approach is unnecessarily narrow. This methodology does not include any years prior to 1986 because Dr. Fagin did not feel that DRG's fully impacted on occupancy rates prior to that time. Dr. Fagin eliminated any years after 1987 on the grounds that the impending closure of Southeastern introduced too many variables into the equation. By eliminating all other years, this methodology provides a limited view of actual utilization and ignores the continuing decline in the utilization rate of osteopathic facilities in the District dating back to the 1970's. Dr. Fagin's next methodology was entitled Osteopathic Physician Based Bed Need. The "osteopathic patient days" from the existing facilities in District XI in 1986 and 1987 were divided by the number of osteopathic physicians in the District. The patient days per physician were then multiplied by the projected number of osteopathic physicians in the District in 1994 to arrive at an estimate of maximum and minimum patient days in 1994. Dividing by 365, an average daily census of between 210 and 188 was projected. Applying the eighty percent occupancy standard, Dr. Fagin concluded there would be a need for between 263 and 235 osteopathic beds in District XI in 1994. After the 100 beds at Westchester were subtracted, a net need of 163 and 135 beds was calculated. This methodology suffers from the same deficiencies as those noted in Findings of Fact 53 through 59 and 63 through 65 above. Dr. Fagin's final projections were based on the relationship of the overall bed need in District XI to Osteopathic Bed Need. In 1986, osteopathic facilities in the District accounted for 2.1 percent of the total patient days. This figure was 1.8 percent in 1987. Applying these percentages to HRS' projected total bed need for the District in 1994, Dr. Fagin concluded that a minimum of 159 to 137 osteopathic beds were needed. After subtracting the beds at Westchester, he calculated a net need of between 59 and 37 beds. This approach suffers from the deficiencies noted in Findings of Fact 55 through 59 above. In addition, it does not account for the continuing decline in occupancy at osteopathic facilities in the District. Suburban's Application includes over 2,000 signatures from members of the community indicating their support for the proposed project. Those petitions do not specifically indicate support for an osteopathic facility. Instead, the petitions include the following statement: "I support the establishment of Suburban Medical Hospital in the Perrine/Cutler Ridge area." It is clear from the evidence that the desire of osteopathic physicians to have a new facility in the area and the reputation of Dr. Minkes will attract a number of admissions to the proposed project. Suburban presented extensive testimony from osteopathic physicians regarding their interest in the project and their intent to refer patients to the proposed facility if it is built. Physician referral plays a large role in determining where a patient is admitted. Thus, it does appear that the proposed project can be expected to achieve a higher occupancy rate than Westchester or other acute care facilities in the area. However, this expected occupancy does not in and of itself establish need. The second review criteria set forth in Section 381.705(1), deals with the availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization, and adequacy of like and existing health care services in the district. For purposes of reviewing applications for osteopathic acute care facilities, HRS has interpreted "like and existing health care services" to include all acute care facilities irrespective of their orientation towards osteopathic or allopathic care. In evaluating this criteria, the goals of the local Health Plan are pertinent. One of the goals set forth in the local Health Plan is an access standard that an acute care hospital should be available to all residents of the District within 30 minutes average driving time. The Plan does not set forth a goal for access to osteopathic facilities. The existing hospitals in the District are sufficient to satisfy this criteria without the need to add another hospital. In accordance with the State Health Plan, HRS has concluded that the efficient level of utilization for acute care services is eighty percent occupancy. The utilization rate for osteopathic beds in Dade County is twenty- seven percent. Thus, the effective utilization standard is not met regardless of whether it is applied to all acute care hospitals or only osteopathic hospitals. Section 381.705(1)(c), Florida Statutes, requires a consideration of the Applicant's ability to provide quality care. HRS did not dispute Suburban's ability to provide quality osteopathic medical care. The Intervenors and Respondents have questioned whether quality care could be provided in the project as it is currently planned since the physical layout of the proposed facility does not meet hospital code requirements. Those deficiencies are discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 97 through 101 below. Certainly, if those deficiencies are not corrected, the quality of care could be affected. Although the parties stipulated that Section 381.705(1)(e), Florida Statutes, remained at issue in this proceeding, no evidence was presented with respect to this criteria. Suburban's Application does not involve joint, cooperative, or shared health care resources and, therefore, there are no probable economies or improvements in service that may be derrived from its proposal. Section 381.705(1)(g), Florida Statutes, requires a consideration of the need for research and educational facilities. The existing Outpatient Center currently provides externship training for SECOM students. While the proposed facility may provide some additional training opportunities for osteopathic students, the evidence did not demonstrate that any such additional benefits would be significant. Section 381.705(h) requires a consideration of the availability of resources, including health manpower, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation. It also requires a consideration of the effects the project will have on clinical needs of health professional training programs in the District and the extent to which the services will be accessible to schools for health professions in the service district for training purposes if such services are available in a limited number of facilities. Finally, this Section requires a consideration of the availability of alternative uses of the resources for the provision of other health services and the extent to which the proposed services will be accessible to all residents of the District. The evidence indicates that there is a current shortage in the District of nurses and skilled hospital personnel, such as physical therapists, laboratory technicians, radiation therapy technicians, respiratory therapists and pharmacists. This shortage of available health care personnel is ongoing and long standing. While a number of existing employees of the Outpatient Center have indicated a willingness to become employees of the proposed project at the salary stated in the Application, they constitute only 35% of the projected staff for the proposed project. It does not appear that any of the existing staff are required to work weekends and nights on a regular basis. Such positions are likely to be the most difficult to fill. Petitioner has not demonstrated an ability to recruit and hire the additional skilled staff necessary to run a hospital on a full-time basis. Approval of this project is likely to exacerbate the existing shortage. It is also not clear from the Application whether Suburban intends to hire a hospital administrator. No such position is reflected on the tables in the Application setting forth "manpower requirements." The evidence presented at the hearing was very sketchy as to the availability of funds for capital and operating expenditures. Suburban's audited financial statements only show $10,000.00 cash on hand, all of which was donated by Dr. Minkes. Thus, Suburban has virtually no capital resources except to the extent that it might be able to borrow funds for capital expenditures and operating expenses. The Applicant does not own the property on which the proposed project will be located. No evidence was presented to establish the basis upon which the proposed project will be occupying the land and existing facility. The existing Outpatient Center and the land on which it is located is owned by Dr. Minkes and subject to a first mortgage of 1.5 million dollars. Monthly interest payments on this mortgage currently run between $25,000 and $35,000. The proposed project budget does not provide for the payoff of this mortgage. Dr. Minkes contended that the interest/amortization figures on the long-term feasibility table contained in the Application included the funds necessary to service the underlying mortgage on the property. However, no specific breakdown of this figure was provided. Furthermore, no clear explanation was given as to the basis upon which the proposed hospital would occupy the land and existing facility. Thus, it is not clear whether the existing mortgage would be paid off, some lease arrangement would be entered into between Suburban and Dr. Minkes as owner of the property, or whether some other arrangement would be made. It is not clear from the initial Application whether Suburban intends to finance 100% of this project. Lending institutions typically are not willing to assume all of the risk for a proposed project and, therefore, will usually only lend between 60 to 70% of the project cost. While the Applicant suggests that private investors may participate in the financing of the project, the only evidence introduced to support this contention was the testimony of Dr. Minkes that he had talked with various osteopathic physicians who had indicated an interest in participating as private investors and the testimony of Dr. Hershman who indicated that he was willing to commit $100,000.00 to the project. These statements do not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that Suburban has the resources available to meet the initial capital expenditures for this project. Dr. Minkes suggested that one possible way to raise funds for the project would be through a limited partnership offering or a private placement. However, the estimated project costs in the Application does not provide for the cost of registering a limited partnership or otherwise raising money through private investment. As part of its Application, Suburban submitted a letter from a real estate investment banking firm, Sonnenblick-Goldman Southeast Corp., indicating an "interest in exploring arranging financing" for 4.1 million dollars for the proposed project. At the hearing, Petitioner also proffered another "letter of interest" from James F. Perry of Professional Bancorp Mortgage indicating an interest in processing a loan application for the project. This letter was not part of the Application and does not provide any additional proof that the resources are available to complete this project. Both letters merely reflect an interest in seeking a loan on behalf of Suburban. Neither of these letters establishes that Suburban has secured sufficient funds to finance the proposed capital expenditure. The Application indicates that the proposed facility would treat all patients requiring medical care regardless of ability to pay and would implement payment schedules based on the patient's ability. The Application contains a projected distribution of fifty percent Medicare patients, ten percent Medicaid patients, and three percent indigent. However, no competent evidence was presented to support the reasonableness of this projected patient mix. The issues related to training are discussed in Findings of Fact 75 above. Section 381.705(1)(j), Florida Statutes, requires a consideration of the immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal. As set forth in Findings of Fact 76 through 82 above, Petitioner has not demonstrated that it has the resources available to complete the project. Therefore, there are significant questions regarding the short-term feasibility of the project. In addition, as set forth in Findings of Fact 91 through 101, below, there are significant questions as to whether the project can be completed within the budgeted cost of $4,085,780 and still meet hospital code requirements. The long term financial feasibility and the pro forma projections contained in the Application were not verified by any direct testimony at the final hearing. Suburban's financial feasibility expert, Mr. Darrell Lumpkin, did not prepare the pro formas contained in the Application. Mr. Lumpkin was not hired by Suburban until several months after the Application was filed and shortly before the hearing in this cause. Suburban conceded that Mr. Lumpkin did not base his financial feasibility analysis on the Application filed by Suburban and that he would not testify regarding the figures contained in the Application. Mr. Lumpkin prepared a feasibility study generally applicable to any 36-bed proprietary hospital in the State. His study utilizes occupancy rates of 50% for year one and 60% for year two. In presenting his testimony concerning operating expenses, Mr. Lumpkin looked only to the average charges, average deductions from revenue, average contractual allowances, etc., from all proprietary hospitals in Florida. He did not adjust these average figures to reflect the payor mix anticipated at Suburban or to compensate for the small size of Suburban. He was provided with occupancy figures and salary costs to use in making his projections. However, the reasonableness of these figures was never established. While Petitioner contended that Mr. Lumpkin's study confirmed the reasonableness of the pro formas contained in the Application, there were several significant differences between Mr. Lumpkin's study and the information contained in the Application. For example, the Application assumes a first year occupancy of 38%; Mr. Lumpkin's study assumes a first year occupancy of 50%. Furthermore, Mr. Lumpkin's first year revenue projections and average daily charges were significantly higher than the figures contained in the Application. The reasonableness of the figures used by Mr. Lumpkin are also questionable. He used HCCB data which contained consolidated information from all proprietary hospitals rather than utilizing information that was more closely tailored to the proposed project. In determining revenue deductions, he utilized statewide averages which contain many variables. In sum, Mr. Lumpkin's study is of minimal help in evaluating the financial feasibility of this project. The evidence did not establish the reasonableness of the income and expense projections contained in the Application. Moreover, there are several areas where the Application omits or understates expected operating costs. For example, the benefits to be provided to employees, as stated in the pro forma projections, are only 8% of salaries. This percentage would be insufficient to cover the cost of the statutorily mandated benefits of Social Security and unemployment insurance. Furthermore, this benefit level would not cover Workers' Compensation, health insurance, disability insurance, retirement benefits or life insurance. While Suburban suggested that some or all these costs were built into the salary figures rather then the benefit numbers, no specific evidence was presented to support or explain this position. The Application assumes that financing can be obtained at a 10% interest rate. However, the evidence suggests that, at the time the Application was filed and as of the date of the hearing, this rate was probably overly optimistic. It is possible, indeed likely, that Suburban will have to borrow money at a rate in excess of 10%. Therefore, the monthly principal and interest payments may be higher than allotted. The evidence was unclear as to exactly what equipment would be purchased and/or leased for the Project. The Application contains no provision for the purchase of anything other than medical equipment. While a $600,000 contingency is provided, it does not appear that serious consideration has been given to the expected costs for day-to-day items such as furniture, televisions for patient rooms, and similar such items. In addition, it was unclear as to exactly what medical equipment would be required, whether it would be purchased or leased, what equipment in the existing Outpatient Center could be utilized, and whether there would be costs associated with such utilization. Much of the existing equipment serves as security for indebtedness of the Outpatient Center. The Application does not provide for the cost of security or a dietician, both of which are required at an acute care hospital. In sum, Suburban has not proven that the costs set forth in the Application are a reliable estimate of the costs that will necessarily be incurred to open the proposed hospital. The Application provides for ten ICU beds and 26 acute care beds. This bed configuration makes it unlikely that the facility will be able to achieve the utilization rate set forth in the Application. Thus, it is not clear that the projected revenues are reasonable. Section 381.705(1)(l), Florida Statutes, requires a consideration of the "probable impact of the proposed project on the cost of providing health services proposed by the Applicant, ... including... the effects of competition on the supply of health services being proposed and the improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of health services which foster competition and service to promote quality assurance and cost-effectiveness." It is not clear whether osteopathic health services should be distinguished from allopathic health services in applying this criteria. No evidence was presented as to the probable impact of the proposed project on the cost of providing osteopathic services. Suburban contends that it will be offering health care services at lower cost than allopathic facilities in the area and, therefore, will have a positive effect on the cost of health care in the area and enhance competition to the benefit of health care consumers. To support this contention, Suburban argues that its per diem charges will be less than the Intervenors' and other allopathic facilities per diem charges. However, as indicated above, the evidence was insufficient to establish the reasonableness of the projected costs set forth in the Application. Furthermore, Suburban will not be providing some of the more costly services provided by larger hospitals. Suburban did not present any evidence comparing its charges with facilities providing similar services and/or with small hospitals. A comparison of Suburban's proposed patient charges with the average charges of larger hospitals does not reflect whether Suburban will be a cost-effective provider of acute care services. Finally, the proposed project may somewhat increase the demand for nurses and other skilled health care personnel which could exacerbate existing shortages in the District and lead to higher costs. Section 381.705(1)(m), Florida Statutes, requires a consideration of the costs and methods of the proposed construction. Suburban is proposing to convert an existing outpatient center to an acute care hospital. The Application projects a total project cost of $4,085,780. The total construction costs are estimated at $2,173,600. This sum includes a construction contingency of $190,000. In addition, the total project costs include a working capital reserve of $600,000. Schematic plans of the proposed project to 1/16th inch scale are required to be submitted with the CON Application. The Application is also required to contain certain tables that indicate the functional spaces, square footage per space, and construction cost per square foot for various areas. HRS conducts an architectural review of the submitted plans to determine whether the state requirements for the planned facility can be met. The physical plant requirements for general hospitals in this state are set forth in Rule 10D-28.081, Florida Administrative Code. As noted below, the plans submitted by Suburban fell short of these requirements in many areas. The evidence demonstrates that the proposed project could not be licensed without significant modifications to the submitted architectural plans. Such modifications will necessarily impact upon the cost of the project and, unless rectified, may also impact upon the quality of care rendered in the new facility. The uncertainty surrounding the changes needed to the architectural plans weighs heavily against approving the Application. When the existing building was constructed, Suburban attempted to build it to the then-existing hospital codes. Many aspects of those code requirements have changed and several aspects of the building do not meet the new standards. While Suburban has suggested that, because there is an existing building in place, it may not have to meet all of the current standards, no persuasive evidence or legal precedent was presented to indicate that HRS can or will waive those standards. Bernard Horovitz, the architect who prepared the plans for Petitioner, testified that the plans submitted were conceptual in nature and were not intended as final plans to be held to code standards. According to Mr. Horovitz, the development and refinement of the plans is an ongoing process with HRS that continues even after a Certificate of Need is issued. While Mr. Horovitz felt that the project could be completed in accordance with the applicable code requirements at a price that was not significantly different than the cost estimate set forth in the initial Application, the extent of the deficiencies detailed below raises considerable doubt as to this conclusion. During the review of Suburban's plans, James Gregory, the HRS Architectural Supervisor for the Office of Plans and Construction, discovered that certain essential functions were missing or not indicated in the plans. Some of the omissions and/or deficiencies in the plans submitted with the Application were as follows: Emergency room- The plans indicate that the emergency room is to be constructed in the area of the existing outpatient clinic. The evidence was unclear as to how or whether the outpatient clinic would continue to operate. Moreover, while the Application indicates that the facility would be operating an emergency room on a 24 hour basis, Dr. Minkes' testimony at the hearing raised some question as to whether the proposed hospital would have a fully- staffed emergency room. In any event, the plans provide no clear layout as to how the emergency room and out-patient clinic would be mixed. The plans contain no emergency grade level entrance for ambulance entry, parking or emergency room entry as required by Rule 10D-28.081(12), Florida Administrative Code. There was no reception and control area for the emergency room shown on the plans. Such a reception and control area is required by Rule 10D-28.081.(12)(b). Mr. Gregory testified that during his review he scaled the plans and discovered that the examination and treatment rooms were not large enough to meet the 100 square foot requirement set forth in Rule 10D-28.081(12)(e). Furthermore, Suburban's plans show a corridor running through the emergency room contrary to Rule 10D- 28.081(12)(m). While the cost estimates in the Application indicate extensive remodeling will be done in the area of the outpatient clinic, it is not clear that the remodeling could be completed and the emergency room brought up to code standards within the costs allocated. Furthermore, the evidence was unclear as to the Applicant's intentions with respect to jointly operating an emergency room and an outpatient clinic. Dietary and Dining Facilities - While the Application indicates the conversion of the existing building will include a cafeteria, the evidence at the hearing indicates that a final decision has not been made as to whether Suburban will operate a cafeteria for employees and visitors. In any event, the plans provide for only 720 square feet for the hospital's dietary and dining facilities. This area is too small to meet the functional requirements of Rule 10D-28.081(21). Storage Areas - Suburban's plans only allocate 1,260 square feet for general stores and central service areas. Rule 10D-28.081(25) requires the general storage area of a hospital to contain 20 square feet of storage per patient. In order to meet the general stores requirement, Suburban will only have 540 square feet of storage for central services. This remaining storage area would have to include a decontamination receiving room, a clean workroom to clean medical supplies used in the hospital, storage for clean medical supplies, storage for equipment used in delivery of patient care and a storage room for distribution carts. Furthermore, the plans did not provide for a body holding room as required by Rule 10D-28.081(19)(f). It is unlikely that all of these functions could be fit in the allocated area. Operating rooms - Rule 10D-28.081(10) sets forth a minimum size requirement of 360 square feet for operating rooms. The surgery rooms reflected on the plans do not meet this requirement. Moreover, the surgical area set forth in the plans contains only 75% of the required functions specified in the rule. The area lacked a storage room for splint and traction equipment and a sink for plaster work as required by Rule 10D-28.081(10)(b) if orthopedic surgery is to be performed. The proposed recovery room did not provide for an isolation room with an anteroom for infected patients, a medication administrative station, a supervisor's office, a nurses station, two scrub stations for each operating room, an equipment storage room of at least 100 square feet, a soiled workroom for the exclusive use of the operating staff, a storage room, an out-patient change area, (which is required if out-patient surgery is to be provided,) a stretcher alcove and a storage area for portable x-ray equipment as required under Rule 10D-28.081(10)(d) and (e). ICU/CCU - The ICU area was only generally laid out on the plans and there was no indication where the isolation room, emergency cardio-pulmonary resuscitation cart storage, soiled utility room, clean linen storage, equipment storage, staff toilets, staff lounge, waiting room, conference room, and nurses station would be located within this unit. All of these functions are required by Rule 10D-28.081(6). The ICU area functions cannot be shared with the general medical/surgical and nurses stations. The proposed ICU area does not appear to be large enough to accommodate the proposed ten ICU beds. This lack of space exists whether the rooms are arranged in a corridor or suite arrangement. The area where the ICU is proposed to be located has only one means of exit/access. Therefore, the ICU units will have to be set up in corridor system rather than a suite arrangement. Such an arrangement will reduce the usable square footage by approximately 800 feet. The loss of this 800 square feet further exacerbates the problem of lack of area. Nursing Care Unit - The nursing care unit shown on the plans does not have enough area to include all of the required functions set forth in Rule 10D- 28.081(5). Among the functions required to be located in the nursing care unit are a medication room of at least 50 square feet, a workroom and a storage room of at least 60 square feet, an equipment storage room and an alcove for stretchers. The plans submitted by Suburban failed to appropriately represent that the proposed project would meet the minimum standards set forth in Chapter 10D-28, Florida Administrative Code. While Suburban contends that the plans were not intended to be final and many of the issues could be addressed with HRS during the licensure process, the extent of the deficiencies raises serious questions as to whether this project could be completed within the budget set forth in the Application. A major redesign of the project will be necessary in order for it to meet code requirements. Suburban's contentions that these modifications could be made within the existing budget (including contingencies) and/or that waivers of certain elements could be obtained during the licensure process were not supported by persuasive evidence. Section 381.705(1)(n) requires a consideration of the applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. As indicated above, no competent evidence was presented to establish the reasonableness of the patient mix set forth in the Application. Since Suburban has not begun operations, it has no historical record regarding provision of services to Medicaid and indigent patients. Dr. Minkes testified that the existing Outpatient Center treats all patients regardless of ability to pay and that the proposed project will operate on a similar basis. The existing Outpatient Center has entered into a contract with the State of Florida to provide primary care to Medicaid patients on a prepaid basis. Dr. Minkes anticipates that the proposed project would be used to provide hospital care to a large portion of the patients who enroll in the program. If that contract is implemented, the proposed project should provide some increased access for Medicaid patients. Section 381.705(2)(a) requires a consideration of the availability of less costly, more efficient or more appropriate alternatives to the proposal. Alternatives to new construction include purchasing an existing acute care hospital, working in conjunction with an existing acute care hospital in a joint venture or shared facility arrangement or increasing the utilization of Westchester. All of these alternatives could further the osteopathic presence in the District and Subdistrict without the need for additional construction and the addition of new acute care beds. While Dr. Minkes indicated that he did not feel any of these alternatives were viable, it does not appear that any serious efforts were undertaken to explore these alternatives. Section 381.705(2)(b) requires a consideration of the utilization of existing facilities providing inpatient service similar to those proposed. As set forth in Findings of Fact 14 through 19 above, Westchester, which is located in the same subdistrict as the proposed facility, has been operating at approximately 27% occupancy. This occupancy level has been steadily decreasing for several years. It must be anticipated that the approval of this Application would further deteriorate the efficient use of Westchester. For purposes of this Section, HRS interprets "similar services" to osteopathic acute care bed applications to include allopathic facilities which provide osteopathic services within the service area. If this interpretation is accepted, it is clear that there is a great excess of acute care beds in the District and the addition of the proposed beds would only diminish the potential for their efficient use of the existing beds. Section 381.705(2)(d) requires a consideration of whether patients will experience problems in obtaining inpatient care of the type proposed in the absence of the proposed new service. While there are only one hundred licensed osteopathic beds in the District, the evidence did not indicate that any individuals seeking osteopathic care were being denied such services. Section 381.705(2)(c) Florida Statutes, requires that, in the case of new construction, alternatives to new construction such as modernization or sharing arrangements, be considered and implemented to the maximum extent possible. As set forth in Findings of Fact 41 and 104 above, the evidence did not indicate that the modernization of Westchester or shared arrangements with other facilities have been fully explored. Baptist and South Miami are general acute care hospitals located in South Dade County. The primary service area for the proposed project overlaps the primary service areas of Baptist and South Miami. The evidence indicated that both intervenors are likely to loose some admissions and will probably experience some difficulties in obtaining skilled staff if this Application is approved. Both of the intervenor hospitals have a substantial number of vacant positions for which Suburban would be competing. If the Application is approved, Suburban will be seeking to fill its skilled staff positions from an already limited pool. One expected result would be an increase in salary structure for both Baptist and South Miami. Petitioner challenged the accuracy of the zip code analysis prepared by Mr. Cushman which attempted to estimate the number of lost admissions that each of the Intervenors could expect. While the zip code analysis does have many flaws, the evidence was sufficient to establish that both South Miami and Baptist will loose some admissions if the proposed facility is opened. Established programs at Baptist and South Miami could be substantially affected by the increase in salaries and lost admissions that are likely to occur if the proposal project is approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, recommended that HRS enter a final order denying Suburban Medical Hospital, Inc.'s application for Certificate of Need #5868 to convert an existing outpatient surgery center to an osteopathic acute care hospital by conversion and new construction. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of March, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4445 All four parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1.-2. Adopted in substance in the Preliminary Statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1 and 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4 and 10. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 8 and 10. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 8 and 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14 and 15. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 50-58. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 59. 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 63 and 64. 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 52 and 53. 14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 61 and 62. 15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 63 and 64. 16. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 65. 17. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 66. 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 67. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 58. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 53 and 56. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 55 and 65. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 69, 33 and 34. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 68. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44 and in the Preliminary Statement. 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 37-42. 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 37 and 42. 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 37. 29. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27. 31. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24-30. 32. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. 33. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24 and 28. Rejected as vague, overbroad and irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26 and 30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact because it is irrelevant to the conclusions reached in the Recommended Order. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 21-23. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 21-23. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony and legal argument rather than a finding of fact. This subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 41, 70, 94 and 106. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 74. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 75. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 75. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 75. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 79-81 and 90. Rejected as irrelevant. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 76. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 81 and 82. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 83. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony and legal argument rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 41, 104 and 108. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 85. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 82. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 86-93. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 69 and 93. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 69 and 93. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 69 and 93. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 69 and 93. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 69 and 93. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony and argument rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 69 and 73. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 80 and 89. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 80. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 86 and 87. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 86-93. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 86-92. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 93 and 98-100. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony and legal argument rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Finding of Fact 86 and 87. 70-72. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 94 and 105. 70.(sic) Rejected as unnecessary. A related issue is addressed in Findings of Fact 94. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 95. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 100. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 100. Rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 90. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 96-101. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 96-101. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 100. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 102. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 103. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 104. See the rulings on proposed findings 29-40 above. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 108. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26 and 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 31. Suburban has submitted eleven proposed findings with respect to the standing issue. Those proposals are subordinate to Findings of Fact 109-112. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 2.-3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 5.-6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. 7.-8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36 and 42. Addressed in Findings of Fact 36, 42, 43 and 71. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 42. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15 and 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 43. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 71. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 33. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 24 and 25. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 41-43 and 71. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 42. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 72. 24.-25. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20 and 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. 28. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 40. 29. Subordinate 106. to Findings of Fact 105 and 30. Subordinate 49. to Findings of Fact 46 and 31. Subordinate 49. to Findings of Fact 46 and Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 50. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 51. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 59. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 53. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 53. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 53 and 55. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 8, 10 and 56. 39. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 58. 40. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 62. Subordinate Subordinate to Findings of to Findings of Fact Fact 57. 53 and 57. 43. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 55. 44. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 53-55. 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 54. 46. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 65. Subordinate Subordinate to Findings of to Findings of Fact Fact 65. 63 and 66. Subordinate Subordinate to Findings of to Findings of Fact Fact 64 and 64. 66. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 55 and 64. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 67. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 53. 54. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 85-93. 55. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 85-93. 56. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 86 and 87. 57. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87. 58. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 86 and 87. 59. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87. 60. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87. 61. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 87. Addressed in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 86. This subject matter is also addressed in the Preliminary Statement and the Conclusions of Law. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 86 and 87. This subject is also addressed in paragraphs 17 of the Conclusions of Law. Addressed in paragraphs 17 of the Conclusions of Law. Addressed in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 65. 66. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 82. 67. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 81. 68. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 81. 69. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 81. 70. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78 and 81. 71. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 86-93. 72. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 86-93. 73.-74. Addressed in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 86 and 88. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 96. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 96. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 96. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 101. 80.-101. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 101. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 100 and 102. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 98, 100 and 102. Rejected as a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 71. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 20. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 42, 43 and 107. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 107. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 31, 33, 42, 43 and 70-73. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20 and 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 70 and 106. 111. Subordinate 101. to Findings of Fact 73 and 97- 112. Subordinate and 108. to Findings of Fact 45, 104 113. Subordinate and 108. to Findings of Fact 45, 104 Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 45, 104 and 108. Rejected as unnecessary. Furthermore, there is considerable confusion as to how this per diem calculation was made. 116.-117. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 105-106. The Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact (Baptist Hospital) Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1.-7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 109-112. This subject matter is addressed in paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law. 8.-14. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 50-67. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 15 and 17- 23. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 17, 21, 30, 65 and 69. This proposal consists largely of legal argument and is addressed in the Conclusions of Law. Pertinent portions of the proposal are addressed in Findings of Fact 14 and 18. Subordinate 37. to Findings of Fact 42. 19. Subordinate and 108. to Findings of Fact 41, 104 20. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 71 and 83. 21. Subordinate 71-73. to Findings of Fact 24-33 and 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 71. 23. Subordinate 71-73. to Findings of Fact 37-43 and 24. Subordinate 72. to Findings of Fact 20, 42 and 25. Much of this proposal consists of legal argument. The pertinent factual provisions are addressed in Findings of Fact 70 and 106. 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 106. 42 and 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 105. 42 and 28.-29. The pertinent portions of these proposals are addressed in Findings of Fact 73. The remainder of these proposals are rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 71. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 14 and 75. 32. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 76. 33. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 77. 34. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 78-81. 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 75. 36. Subordinate and 108. to Findings of Fact 41, 104 37. Subordinate 103. to Findings of Fact 83 and 38. Subordinate 85. to Findings of Fact 76-82 and 39. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 85-102. 40. Subordinate 93. to Findings of Fact 86-88 and 41. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 86-102. 42. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 94. This proposal consists largely of legal argument. Pertinent factual issues are addressed in Findings of Fact 20 and 21, 76 and 94. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 95-102. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 83 and 103. Much of this proposal consists of legal argument and/or speculation. Pertinent factual issues are addressed in Findings of Fact 41, 104 and 108. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 105 and 106. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 41, 104 and 108. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 69. The Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact (South Miami Hospital) Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. 4.-6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16-19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15, 20 and 21. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. The remainder is rejected as constituting legal argument. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 49 and 50. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 101. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 79. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 101. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 100. Included in the Preliminary Statement. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 73. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 96. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 101. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 101. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 98-100. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 100 and 102. Rejected as constituting a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 98-102. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44 and in the Preliminary Statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 44 and 45. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 45. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 48 and 49. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 70 and 106. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 20 and 21. Rejected as vague. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 20 and 21. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 33 and 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20, 21 and 42. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 23 and 30. Adopted in substance in Findings of 25. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 23. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 23. Addressed in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 20 and 21. 42.-43. Rejected as overly broad. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 31. 44. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 40 and 42. 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 73. 46. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. 47.-51. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 49-67. 52. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 35. 53.-55. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 109-112. 56. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 85-93. 57. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 69. 58. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 69 and 93. Rejected as overly broad. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 35 and 73-109. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel C. Minkes, Esquire 17615 S.W. 97th Avenue Miami, Florida 33157 Silvio Amico, Esquire 6401 S.W. 87th Avenue Suite 114 Miami, Florida 33173 Thomas R. Cooper, Esquire Edward Labrador, Esquire Suite 103 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Kyle Saxon, Esquire Catlin, Saxon, Tuttle & Evans 1700 Alfred I. Dupont Building 169 East Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131 Jay Adams, Esquire 1519 Big Sky Way Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jean Laramore, Esquire 7007 McBride Pointe Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Linda K. Harris Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
