Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1991, the Petitioner, Douglas Adams, filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule. In the Petition, the Petitioner challenged Rules 33-22.005(5) and 33- 22.007(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the Challenged Rules. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-22.005(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Section III. Report of Investigation. Upon receipt of the Disciplinary Report, the Senior Correctional Officer shall review the report and, when the facts suggest that the alleged violations is significant, he shall cause the report to be forwarded to the Correctional Officer Chief. Upon approval of the Correctional Officer Chief, or in his absence the Senior Correctional Officer, an impartial investigation of the charge against the inmate shall be conducted. This investigation shall be completed without unreasonable delay. Any delay at any state must be justified in the report. The Correctional Probation Supervisor shall review the report and cause an impartial investigation to be conducted for inmates participating in the Supervised Community Release Program. The investigating officer is responsible for obtaining the inmate's version of the offense as well as contacting the charging officer and any other staff members or inmates who have information pertaining to the allegation and the charge. The inmate charged shall be offered staff assistance and asked if he has any material witnesses to offer in his behalf. If the inmate has no witnesses, it must be noted in the report. If names of witnesses are given, the investigating officer shall then interview both inmate and staff witnesses and, if appropriate, have the Witness Statement Form DC4-856 completed. If inmate witnesses or staff witnesses are not contacted, a statement as to why they were not contacted must be included. Opinions as to innocence or guilt shall not be made by the investigating officer. The investigator shall sign and date the report. Rule 33-22.007(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (2) The Hearing Officer or Disciplinary Team can request further investigation or evidence, the appearance of additional witnesses or the statements of unavailable witnesses. . . . . Witnesses shall not be called or certain information disclosed if doing so would create a risk of reprisal, undermine authority or otherwise present a threat to the security or order of the institution. The inmate witnesses must be willing to testify but may offer an oral or written statement to the investigating officer in lieu of personal appearance. Notations shall be made in the report with reasons for declining to call requested witnesses or for restricting any information. The Petitioner has alleged that the Challenged Rules are invalid because the rules are "contrary to due process contained in enabling legislation. Section 20.315, Florida Statutes (1989)" and are vague, arbitrary and capricious. The Petition does not include any alleged facts supporting the Petitioner's assertion that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious."
Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on November 18, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. 3. In the Petition Rules "33-3.002, 33-19.006, 33-19 et. seq., 33-19.012, 33-23 et. seq." were challenged. Most of the Challenged Rules are lengthy and deal with a number of subjects. The common thread of the Challenged Rules concern medical care of inmates. The Petition is, to say the least, confusing. This confusion is caused by the Petitioner's frequent use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 17, State of the Case and Facts, provides the following: 17. That the (Petitioner) has learned that the (Respondent) act [sic] pursuant to an invalid delegation as 33-3.002 33-19 et. seq., 233-23 et. seq. that fail to establish adequate standards for agency decision making, and vests unbridled discretion in the agency or employees that's inconsistant [sic] to the statutory requirements of 120.54 and 944.09. This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition. Although it contains some "legalese", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of employees of the Respondent in allegedly releasing confidential medical information to "security staff and psychologist or and other staff or employees with criminal intent" and other medical practices of the employees of the Respondent. The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rules. The statements concerning constitutional issues consist of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rules are unconstitutional. Again, most of the Petitioner's arguments apparently concern violation of constitutional rights by the acts of employees of the Respondent as opposed to the violations of constitutional rights in the Challenged Rules. Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the Challenged Rules are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. On December 10, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend was entered. The Petitioner was informed that his Petition was being dismissed and the Petitioner was given an opportunity to file an amended petition. No amended petition has been filed by the Petitioner. On January 14, 1992, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered dismissing the Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Darryl James McGlamry, is an inmate under the supervision of the Respondent. The Petitioner is incarcerated at Dade Correctional Institution. The Respondent is the Department of Corrections, an agency of the State of Florida. The Petitioner has challenged Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code. The Challenged Rule governs the visitation privileges of unmarried inmates. The Petitioner has alleged that the Challenged Rule "impairs the Petitioner's substantial interest in that it restricts the Petitioner's First Amendment Right of Freedom of Association, as it substantially limits the number of female visitors that the Petitioner may have." The Petitioner has also alleged that the Challenged Rule is invalid because the restriction on visitation of the Challenged Rule is: . . . contrary to the Civil Rights Act of Florida, Chapter 760.01, Florida Statutes. 11. As such, it is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority". The Respondent does not have the authority to pass rules that are contrary to other statutes. This amounts to vesting unbridled discretion to the agency in violation of Section 120.52(8)(d), Florida Statutes. The Amended Petition is devoid of any alleged facts which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rule is invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Donald Eugene Halpin, Richard Edward Jackson and Jeffery Lynn Fowler, are inmates under the supervision of the Respondent. Petitioners Halpin and Fowler are incarcerated at Glades Correctional Institution. Petitioner Jackson is incarcerated at Martin Correctional Institution. The Respondent is the Department of Corrections, an agency of the State of Florida. The Petitioners have challenged Rules 33-6.003, 33-6.0045 and 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. The Challenged Rules govern transfers of inmates and custody classification of inmates. The Challenged Rules were amended by the Respondent after the Respondent enacted and applied several emergency rules governing inmate transfers and custody classification of inmates. These emergency rules were adopted during 1990 and 1991. The Petitioners have alleged that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious as applied to the Petitioners . . . ." The Petitioners have also alleged that the Challenged Rules are invalid because they were amended "through prohibited acts as defined in Chapter 120.54(9)(c), Fla. Stat., when the Respondent ran two emergency rules (33ER91-1 & 33ER91-2) back-to- back so that Amended Chapter 33-6, etc. (1991) could be implemented."
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Lester Bishop, was employed as a Correctional Officer at Union Correctional Institution from March 20, 1981, to April 1, 1986. Union Correctional Institution (UCI) is a facility which houses inmates ranging in custody levels from minimum to close. In December of 1981, the Respondent was given a copy of the rules of the Department of Corrections. At this time he acknowledged that he was responsible for compliance with these rules. In late March and early April, 1986, the Respondent was scheduled to work the first shift at UCI beginning at 12:00 midnight and ending at 8:00 a.m.. The supervisor for this shift was either Lieutenant R. L. Weiland or Lieutenant S. E. Stafford, depending upon the day of the week. On March 23, 1986, the Respondent called Lieutenant Weiland at Union Correctional Institution at 12:30 a.m., requesting and receiving sick leave for the remainder of this shift. On March 24, 1986, the Respondent did not report to work, and he did not contact the shift supervisor to request leave. As a result, he was placed on unauthorized leave without pay status for this day. On March 25, 1986, the Respondent called his supervisor, requesting and receiving eight hours sick leave for this day. On March 26 and 27, 1986, the Respondent neither called his supervisor nor reported for work. He was given unauthorized leave without pay status for these days. March 28 and 29, 1986, were the Respondent's regularly scheduled days off. From March 30 until April 2, 1986, the Respondent neither called his supervisor nor reported for work. He was given unauthorized leave without pay status for these days. On April 2, 1986, the Superintendent of Union Correctional Institution, T. L. Barton, sent the Respondent a letter informing him that he had abandoned his position at Union Correctional Institution, and that he was dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order terminating the employment of the Respondent, Lester Bishop, from his position as Correctional Officer at Union Correctional Institution, for abandonment, pursuant to Rule 22A 7.010(2), Florida Administrative Code, effective March 25, 1986. THIS Recommended Order entered on this 9th day of December, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Gilda H. Lambert Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis A. Vargas General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1986. Ernest A. Reddick, Esquire 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Lester Bishop, in pro per Box 1341 Starke, Florida 32091
The Issue Whether Respondent, a corrections officer, has failed to maintain the qualification to have good moral character, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 19, 1993, as a Corrections Officer, Certification Number 136191. Respondent’s certification is active. At all times relevant, the Respondent was employed as a corrections officer with the Central Florida Reception Center. On November 5, 1994, Karen Mills was employed as a law enforcement officer with the Seminole County Sheriff’s office. At the time of the event, Officer Mills had been working under cover for five years with the City/County Investigative Bureau. Officer Mills was working undercover at one o’clock on a Saturday morning posing as a prostitute on the sidewalk and parking lot located at State Road 427 and Pomosa in Sanford, Florida. On November 5, 1994, Mills approached a black male driving a Toyota car, later identified as the Respondent, Travis Long, when he stopped for a traffic light at the corner of State Road 427 and Pomosa. After idle conversation, the Respondent asked what she was doing. She advised that she was trying to make some money. He asked her if she would “take it up the ass?” She took that to mean that he wanted anal intercourse. Mills said yes and asked him how much money he was willing to pay. Respondent said $25.00. Mills said she wanted $40.00. Respondent agreed but stated that he would have to go get the money from an ATM and also that he wanted to get something to eat. He asked Mills if she wanted to go with him to get something to eat. Mills declined. Mills did not immediately arrest Respondent because she wanted to see the money to confirm that he was there to buy sex. Respondent left the area and returned 20 minutes later. Upon his return, Respondent asked Mills if she was a cop and asked her to pull up her shirt to prove that she was not carrying a recording device (a wire). Mills asked Respondent if he was a cop. He said no, and ultimately exposed his penis as a way to prove it to her. Mills asked Respondent to show her the money and kept encouraging him to do so, by saying, “You ain’t gonna pay me . . . You ain’t got no money. I just want to be sure I’m gonna get paid.” Respondent finally showed Mills the money and mouthed, without speaking, “I will pay you.” As soon as she saw the money, Mills, who was wearing a wire, gave the predetermined code. Respondent began to pull away in his vehicle but other officers pulled him over and arrested him. Respondent plead Nolo Contendere to the charge of Lewd and Lascivious Behavior, a second degree misdemeanor, in the County Court for Seminole County, Florida, on January 5, 1995. Respondent was adjudicated guilty, and a $100 fine was imposed. Respondent’s testimony that, although he conducted himself as above stated, he did not have the intent to solicit for prostitution on the night of November 5, 1994, is not credible. Respondent was an energetic, hard-working individual. Respondent had no prior criminal or employment discipline problems prior to this incident. Respondent has continued in his current position as a corrections officer in the three years since the incident and has received above-average ratings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (1993). Respondent's certification be SUSPENDED for a period of six months and that the Commission impose such conditions on his reinstatement as it deems reasonable and necessary. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy Bardill, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 H. R. Bishop, Jr., Esquire 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Department of Law Enforcement Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, Darryl James McGlamry, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, an agency of the State of Florida, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing inmate visitation and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rule"), provides: Inmates not married may be allowed to have one single non-immediate family member of the opposite sex on the visiting list, after approval. A married inmate may be allowed to have one single, non-family member of the opposite sex on the visiting list, after approval, if a pending divorce or separation of long duration can be verified and the spouse is removed from the list. [Emphasis added]. The Petitioner, a married male inmate, has made requests to have females, by whom he has had children and who have custody of those children, placed on his visiting list. The females by whom the Petitioner has children are his current wife, his former wife and a girlfriend. Those requests have been denied by the Respondent. The Petitioner has attempted to add his former girlfriend and his former mother-in-law to his visiting list. His former wife and all of his children are currently on his visiting list. His current wife was not on his visitor list because she was also incarcerated at the time of the final hearing. The Petitioner has suggested that he has been denied visitation with his children by his former wife and his current wife that he is unable to see because of his inability to have more than one female visitor. The Petitioner's former girl friend was offered a special visitor's pass which was limited to week days but, due to her employment, did not visit the Petitioner. Although the evidence proved that the application of the Challenged Rule to the Petitioner and the Petitioner's circumstances make it difficult for the Petitioner to have visitation with some of his children, the evidence failed to prove that the Challenged Rule itself bars married inmates from having visitation with minor children from other marriages or relationships. The Respondent promulgated the Challenged Rule to limit the number of female visitors a married inmate may have for the following reasons: Male inmates tend to request visitation from more females than males. Due to limited space for visitation, the increasing number of inmates at every institution and the burden placed on the staff of the correctional institutions to handle visitation, the number of visitors had to be limited. Each visitor has to have a local law enforcement background check and each visitor must be checked by staff before visitation. Visitation is generally allowed between 9 and 3 on visiting days but visitors may all show up at essentially the same time. There is limited staff to handle the checking of visitors and the supervision of the visitation area.
Findings Of Fact Prior to his termination, Petitioner had been employed as a Correctional Officer by the Respondent, Department of Corrections, at Glades Correctional Institute for approximately two years. On April 3, 1987, Petitioner signed a written statement acknowledging that he was immediately responsible for reading the rules of the Respondent. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Mr. Edward Minor, Correctional Officer Supervisor at Glades Correctional Institute. Mr. Chester Lambdin is the Superintendent of Glades Correctional Institute. Although he felt ill, Petitioner reported to work on January 25, 1989 before his scheduled eight hour work shift was to begin at midnight and continue through January 26, 1989. Petitioner left work due to his illness before the end of his January 26, 1989 shift. Petitioner did not report to work after he left on January 26, 1989. On January 26, 1989, Petitioner contacted his supervisor, Mr. Minor, and informed him that he was ill; that he would not report to work for about two days and that he had a doctor's excuse for his absence. Mr. Minor excused Petitioner for two days, January 27, 1989 and January 28, 1989. Petitioner's doctor's excuse covered the period of January 27, 1989 through January 30, 1989. Petitioner gave the excuse to a fellow worker and requested the associate to deliver the excuse to Mr. Minor. Before February 2, 1989, Mr. Minor did not see the excuse. Petitioner did not contact Mr. Minor until the afternoon or evening of February 2, 1989. Petitioner was not scheduled to work on January 30 or January 31, 1989. Petitioner stated that he knew he should contact his supervisor before each work shift if he were ill and would not report to work, but he stated that most of his fellow workers did not follow the procedure and were not penalized for failure to make the required report. Notice before an absence is the standard policy of the Respondent. Petitioner was on unauthorized leave on January 29, 1989, February 1, 1989 and February 2, 1989. On February 3, 1989, Mr. Lambdin drafted a letter to Petitioner, which was posted by certified mail, informing Petitioner that he had been deemed to have abandoned his position as a Correctional Officer I at Glades Correctional Institution and to have resigned from the career service system.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration issue a final order that the Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of May 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-1189 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. The Respondent was the sole party who submitted Proposed Findings of Fact. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2; rejected in part as not supported by competent and substantial evidence. Rejected as conclusion of law. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 11. As to first sentence, rejected as irrelevant. As to the remainder, adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Lynne Winston, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Mr. Lewis C. Stewart 692 Waddel Way Pahokee, Florida 33476 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Varga, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
Findings Of Fact By Administrative Complaint filed May 28, 1986, Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) charged that Respondent, Theodore Riley (Riley), while employed as an adjuster by United States Fidelity and Guaranty Group, (USF&G), did wrongfully obtain the sum of $400 from a workmens compensation claimant to assure that USF&G would not contest the claim (Count I). The complaint further alleged that on September 16, 1985, Riley entered a plea of nolo contendere to an information charging a violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes, a felony of the second degree and a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the court withheld adjudication and placed Riley on 18 months probation (Count II). The Department concluded that such conduct demonstrated, inter alia, a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance; fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or permit; and, a plea of nolo contendere to a felony involving moral turpitude. Section 626.611(7),(9) and (14), Florida Statutes. At hearing, Riley entered a plea of no contest to Count II of the Administrative Complaint in exchange for the Department's dismissal of Count I of the Administrative Complaint and the Department's agreement that the penalty imposed would be limited to a suspension of his eligibility for licensure for a period of two (2) years. While not conditioning his agreement to a two year suspension, Riley did request that the Department consider crediting the time he has been on probation against the two year suspension. The evidence shows that Riley was arrested and charged with the subject offense in March 1985, that he entered a plea of nolo contendere, that adjudication of guilt was withheld, and that he was placed on probation for 18 months commencing September 16, 1985. As a special condition of probation, Riley was ordered not to apply for an adjuster's license during the term of his probationary period. Consistent with the terms of his probation, Riley has not renewed his adjusters' license. The Department's records reflect that Riley's license was last due for renewal, but not renewed, on April 1, 1985.
The Issue Whether Rules 33ER91-1 and 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, Donald Eugene Halpin and Richard Edward Jackson, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the emergency rules at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing the rights of inmates, the operation and management of correctional institutions, classification of inmates and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code. Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code, governs, among other things, the classification of inmates. Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, governs the classification of inmates for purposes of determining the type of custody an inmate should be subjected to. Pursuant to Rule 33-6.009(3), Florida Administrative Code, inmates may be classified in one of five custody classifications: minimum, medium-out, medium-in, close or maximum. History of Changes in Custody Grade Classification of Inmates Since 1990. In June of 1990, Donald D. Dillbeck, an inmate of the Respondent, was classified and placed in a minimum custody classification, which is the least restrictive custody classification. While outside of the institution in which he was housed and while working at a vocational center, Dillbeck escaped from custody of the Respondent and murdered a woman in the parking lot of a shopping center in Tallahassee, Florida. In response to this murder, then Governor Bob Martinez issued an executive order ordering that all medium or minimum custody classifications of capital-life felons be revoked and that all capital-life felons be classified as close custody, the second most restrictive custody classification. Governor Martinez's executive order was followed by the promulgation by the Respondent of Rule 33ER90-4, Florida Administrative Code, amending Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. Effective January 23, 1991, the Respondent promulgated Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, amending Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. Effective April 23, 1991, at approximately the same time that Rule 33ER91-1 expired, the Respondent promulgated Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, amending Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, Prior to the First 1991 Emergency Rule. Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, prior to its amendment by Rule 33ER91-1, and other subsequent amendments, contained the following general provisions, pertinent to this proceeding: Section (3) contained provisions concerning the manner in which custody grades of inmates were determined; Section (4) contained provisions placing restrictions on the placement of certain inmates into the community; and Section (5) contained provisions placing restrictions on the assignments that certain inmates could be given. In general, Rule 33-6.009(3), Florida Administrative Code, provided the following: Five classes of custody were established. Rule 33-6.009(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code; An initial questionnaire and reclassification questionnaires were required to be completed for all inmates. Rule 33-6.009(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code; Inmates were awarded a numerical score as a result of the completion of the initial and reclassification questionnaires. Each inmate's custody classification was initially determined based upon this numerical score. For example, an inmate with an initial score of six or more and an inmate with a reclassification score of eight or more was classified as close custody. Rule 33-6.009(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code; If an inmate's numerical score was below the score for close custody and the inmate was not within thirty-six months of release, the inmate's custody classification had to be raised to close custody if any of a number of factors referred to as a "custody checklist" applied to the inmate. For example, an inmate serving a sentence for first or second degree murder had to be classified as close custody even if that inmate's questionnaire score was below six points (on an initial questionnaire) or below eight points (on a reclassification questionnaire). Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code; Additionally, an inmate had to be classified as close custody even if the inmate's score was below six or eight points until the minimum mandatory portion, if any, of the inmate's sentence was satisfied or the inmate was within thirty-six months of release, if the inmate was serving time for certain specified offenses. Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)4, Florida Administrative Code; An inmate's custody grade questionnaire score could also be modified upward based upon consideration of other factors specified in Rule 33- 6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code, such as whether the inmate's primary offense had been reduced as a result of a plea bargain. Custody grade scores could be modified downward based upon the same factors but only if the custody checklist was met. Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code; Finally, all custody assignments had to be reviewed and approved by the superintendent or his designee. Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)6, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.009(4), Florida Administrative Code, prohibited the placement of an inmate on work release or other community contract bed if the inmate met any of a number of specified factors, including conviction of 1st or 2nd degree murder (unless the inmate had completed the mandatory portion of the inmate's sentence and was within twelve months of release). Rule 33-6.009(5), Florida Administrative Code, prohibited inmates from being assigned to a road prison, vocational center, forestry camp or to a work camp not adjacent to a major institution if the inmate met any of a number of specified factors, including conviction of 1st or 2nd degree murder. Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, amended the substance of Rule 33-6.009(3), (4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1 did not amend the five classes of custody established in Rule 33-6.009(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1 did not amend the requirement that initial and reclassification questionnaires be completed for all inmates contained in Rule 33-6.009(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1 did not amend the manner in which inmates are awarded a numerical score as a result of the completion of the initial and reclassification questionnaires. Each inmate's custody classification is still initially determined based upon this numerical score. Rule 33-6.009(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1 did amend Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, by eliminating the requirement that the custody classification of an inmate with a grade below the score for close custody had to be raised if any of the factors on the "custody checklist" applied to the inmate. Therefore, for example, an inmate serving a sentence for first or second degree murder is not automatically classified as close custody even if that inmate's questionnaire score is below the six points (on an initial questionnaire) or below eight points (on a reclassification questionnaire). Rule 33ER91-1 also amended Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, by eliminating the requirement that an inmate be classified as close custody even if the inmate's score was below six or eight points until the minimum mandatory portion, if any, of the inmate's sentence was satisfied or the inmate was within thirty-six months of release based upon the specified offenses formerly contained in Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)4, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-1, also amended Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code. In essence, the amendment to Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code, requires that the Respondent consider a number of factors to either increase or decrease an inmate's custody grade questionnaire score. Generally, all of the factors which the Respondent was required to consider under Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, and all of the factors which required close custody under Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, must only be considered by the Respondent under the emergency rule. Rule 33ER91-1, eliminated the requirement contained in Rule 33- 6.009(3)(d)6, Florida Administrative Code, that all custody assignments be reviewed and approved by the superintendent or his designee. The superintendent of a prison is now required under the emergency rule to review and approve all modifications to the custody classification resulting from an inmate's questionnaire. Rule 33ER91-1 repealed Rule 33-6.009(4), Florida Administrative Code, and its prohibition on the placement of an inmate on work release or other community contract bed if the inmate met any of the factors specified in this portion of the rule. Finally, Rule 33ER91-1 repealed Rule 33-6.009(5), Florida Administrative Code, and its prohibition on inmates being assigned to a road prison, vocational center, forestry camp or to a work camp not adjacent to a major institution if the inmate met any of the factors specified in this portion of the rule. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirements of Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, are arbitrary or capricious. Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, is for all practical purposes identical to Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, was declared invalid in a Final Order entered on October 1, 1991, in Darryl James McGlamry v. Department of Corrections, Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 91-2804R.
