Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1991, the Petitioner, Douglas Adams, filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule. In the Petition, the Petitioner challenged Rules 33-22.005(5) and 33- 22.007(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the Challenged Rules. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-22.005(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Section III. Report of Investigation. Upon receipt of the Disciplinary Report, the Senior Correctional Officer shall review the report and, when the facts suggest that the alleged violations is significant, he shall cause the report to be forwarded to the Correctional Officer Chief. Upon approval of the Correctional Officer Chief, or in his absence the Senior Correctional Officer, an impartial investigation of the charge against the inmate shall be conducted. This investigation shall be completed without unreasonable delay. Any delay at any state must be justified in the report. The Correctional Probation Supervisor shall review the report and cause an impartial investigation to be conducted for inmates participating in the Supervised Community Release Program. The investigating officer is responsible for obtaining the inmate's version of the offense as well as contacting the charging officer and any other staff members or inmates who have information pertaining to the allegation and the charge. The inmate charged shall be offered staff assistance and asked if he has any material witnesses to offer in his behalf. If the inmate has no witnesses, it must be noted in the report. If names of witnesses are given, the investigating officer shall then interview both inmate and staff witnesses and, if appropriate, have the Witness Statement Form DC4-856 completed. If inmate witnesses or staff witnesses are not contacted, a statement as to why they were not contacted must be included. Opinions as to innocence or guilt shall not be made by the investigating officer. The investigator shall sign and date the report. Rule 33-22.007(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (2) The Hearing Officer or Disciplinary Team can request further investigation or evidence, the appearance of additional witnesses or the statements of unavailable witnesses. . . . . Witnesses shall not be called or certain information disclosed if doing so would create a risk of reprisal, undermine authority or otherwise present a threat to the security or order of the institution. The inmate witnesses must be willing to testify but may offer an oral or written statement to the investigating officer in lieu of personal appearance. Notations shall be made in the report with reasons for declining to call requested witnesses or for restricting any information. The Petitioner has alleged that the Challenged Rules are invalid because the rules are "contrary to due process contained in enabling legislation. Section 20.315, Florida Statutes (1989)" and are vague, arbitrary and capricious. The Petition does not include any alleged facts supporting the Petitioner's assertion that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious."
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent engaged in conduct unbecoming a public servant in violation of Chapter 89-404, Section 8, Laws of Florida, as amended by Chapter 90-395, Section 8, Laws of Florida (the "Civil Service Act") and Rules 3-1.1 and 3-1.3 of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office ("Rules 3-1.1 and 3-1.3").
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a constitutional officer of the State of Florida who is responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within Pinellas County, Florida. At all times pertinent to this case, Respondent was employed by Petitioner. On September 6, 1999, Respondent responded as backup deputy sheriff to the apartment of Mr. Cornell Cunningham and Ms. Karen Stewart. The purpose of the response was to arrest Mr. Cunningham on a civil warrant for failure to pay child support. Deputy Ward Snyder was the primary deputy on the call. Deputy Snyder is also employed by Respondent. It was raining outside when the two deputies arrived at Mr. Cunningham's residence. Mr. Cunningham invited both deputies inside. Once inside, Deputy Snyder talked to Mr. Cunningham and advised him of the civil arrest warrant. Deputy Snyder also contacted the Sheriff's Office to confirm that the warrant was still valid. While Deputy Snyder was talking to Mr. Cunningham and the Sheriff's Office, Respondent conducted a security search of the residence to confirm that no one else was present in Mr. Cunningham's apartment. By the time Respondent completed the security search, Deputy Snyder had finished his telephone call. Respondent concluded his search of the residence in the kitchen. While standing in the kitchen, Respondent stood adjacent to and viewed a countertop that separated the kitchen from the dining area. The kitchen and counter top were well lit with florescent lighting. Respondent observed a marijuana seed on the countertop. Respondent picked the seed up from the countertop and held it up for Deputy Snyder to see. Respondent said, "We got a problem here." Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham were standing in the dining room adjacent to the countertop that separated the kitchen from the dining room. Deputy Snyder had a clear and unobstructed view of the countertop. A Nike shoebox was on the countertop inside the kitchen. The shoebox contained a hinged top that opened from one side and also contained circular holes in the sides. Respondent, Deputy Snyder, and Mr. Cunningham were within two or three feet of the shoebox. The top on the shoebox was closed. There was no other access into the shoebox other than through the top of the shoebox. Respondent removed his flashlight from his belt, turned it on, shined the light into the holes in the side of the shoebox, and observed the contents of the shoebox. Respondent then opened the shoebox and looked inside the shoebox. Respondent observed a small bag of marijuana and a small scale inside the box. Respondent then told Deputy Snyder that there was "a problem." Respondent then showed Deputy Snyder the contents of the box. Mr. Cunningham denied ownership of the shoebox as well as any knowledge of its contents. The deputies arrested Mr. Cunningham based on the civil warrant for failure to pay child support. Mr. Cunningham protested his arrest and asserted that the matter had been taken care of. However, he did not physically resist, did not threaten either deputy, and did not display any intent to flee. Neither deputy charged or arrested Mr. Cunningham at the time with any offense related to the marijuana or the scale. Deputy Snyder transported Mr. Cunningham to the Pinellas County Jail on the original civil warrant. While Deputy Snyder was transporting Mr. Cunningham to jail, Respondent contacted Deputy Snyder by radio. Respondent told Deputy Snyder that Respondent was going to charge Ms. Stewart with criminal offenses related to the possession of marijuana and the scale. Mr. Cunningham overheard the radio conversation between the two deputies and stated that he would claim ownership of the marijuana and scale. Upon hearing this, Deputy Snyder advised Mr. Cunningham of his rights. Mr. Cunningham then denied ownership of the contraband. While Deputy Snyder transported Mr. Cunningham to jail, Respondent remained at Mr. Cunningham's residence and awaited the arrival of Ms. Stewart. With the consent of Ms. Stewart, Respondent conducted a further search of the residence. The further search revealed additional marijuana in a drawer located in the kitchen where the shoebox was located. Respondent combined the marijuana found in the drawer with the seed on the countertop and the marijuana previously found in the shoebox. Respondent then seized the contraband and proceeded to the jail where he charged Mr. Cunningham with felony possession of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Respondent prepared an arrest report stating that Respondent had observed marijuana "scattered" on top of the kitchen counter. Respondent also stated in the report that, "Laying next to the scattered marijuana in a partially opened Nike shoebox, was a clear plastic baggie filled with marijuana and also laying next to that baggie was a silver hand-held weight scale." Respondent’s supervisor, Sergeant Robert Helmick, approved the report on the same day that Respondent prepared the report. On the following day, September 7, 1999, Deputy Snyder prepared his supplemental report of the events occurring at the Cunningham residence. In his report, Deputy Snyder stated that Respondent "pointed out a seed on the kitchen countertop. There was a Nike shoebox also on the countertop. Deputy Broome used his flashlight to illuminate the inside of the box by shining the light through a hole in the box. Deputy Broome then opened the box and displayed a bag of what appeared to be marijuana and a small balance scale." Deputy Snyder’s report also recited the events occurring in his vehicle as he transported Mr. Cunningham to jail. Sergeant Helmick, who was off duty that day, did not review or approve Deputy Snyder's report. Rather, Corporal Larry Weiland approved Deputy Snyder's report. Sergeant Helmick did not see Deputy Snyder’s report until much later. Three days later, on September 10, 1999, Respondent participated in a pre-filing investigation conducted at the office of the State Attorney for Pinellas County. Assistant State Attorney Patricia Cope conducted the investigation. As part of the investigation, Ms. Cope took the sworn testimony of Respondent. In his testimony to Ms. Cope, Respondent repeated the same version of events found in his report. Respondent testified to Ms. Cope that he had observed marijuana scattered on the countertop and that the top of the shoebox on the countertop was ajar. Respondent further testified that he was able to see the marijuana and the scale inside the shoebox through the space created by the partially open top of the shoebox. Ms. Cope specifically asked Respondent whether the shoebox was open or closed in order to confirm that Respondent's search was within the scope of the plain view doctrine. Respondent testified that the shoebox was open. Ms. Cope did not speak with Deputy Snyder or review his report. As a result of the investigation and the information provided by Respondent, Mr. Cunningham was charged with felony possession of marijuana and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Sometime after Ms. Cope's conversation with Respondent, Deputy Snyder spoke with Sergeant Helmick concerning the discrepancies between the two reports filed by Deputy Snyder and Respondent. Sergeant Helmick advised Deputy Snyder to allow the discrepancies to be worked out by the state attorney’s office and to allow the criminal process to run its course. Sergeant Helmick did not report the discrepancies to the state attorney’s office, to his supervisors, or to anyone else. At the time, Sergeant Helmick did not initiate any complaint or investigation against either Respondent or Deputy Snyder. In June 2000, depositions were set in the criminal prosecution of Mr. Cunningham. Ms. Cope contacted Deputy Snyder to inquire about the possibility of having the shoebox tested for fingerprints. At that time, Deputy Snyder directed Ms. Cope's attention to the discrepancies in the respective reports prepared by Deputy Snyder and Respondent. Ms. Cope reviewed the reports and the discrepancies between the two reports. Ms. Cope concluded that the discrepancies would create a problem in the criminal prosecution of Mr. Cunningham. The discrepancies between the accounts by Respondent and Deputy Snyder created the possibility that Respondent had conducted an illegal search of the shoebox that would render the evidence seized as a part of that search inadmissible. The plain view doctrine applicable to the law of search and seizure would allow the search of the shoebox if the top had been ajar and the contents of the shoebox could be observed. However, the search would not be lawful if the shoebox top was closed and observation of the contents could have only been accomplished by shining a light through the holes in the box. The differing statements in the reports of the two deputies placed the credibility of Respondent in question. No independent evidence was available, including the testimony of Mr. Cunningham, from which it could be ascertained which deputy was being truthful. The State Attorney’s Office deemed it unfair to the defendant, the court, and the witnesses to proceed on a case where the prosecution could not be certain if the evidence was properly seized. Ms. Cope referred the matter to Mr. Robert Lewis, her supervisor. Mr. Lewis reviewed the reports of the two deputies and agreed with Ms. Cope's assessment that the discrepancies precluded any further criminal prosecution of Mr. Cunningham. Ms. Cope cancelled the depositions set in the Cunningham case on the grounds that Respondent had been accused of lying and that the two investigating police officers recalled two inconsistent views of the events that occurred at Mr. Cunningham's residence. Mr. Lewis then instructed Ms. Cope to enter a nolle prosequi of the charges against Mr. Cunningham. After the State Attorney's Office filed the nolle prosequi, the State Attorney’s Office referred the matter to the Sheriff's Office. The matter was brought to the attention of Major Samuel F. Lynn, the commander of the road patrol division. Major Lynn prepared an administrative inquiry form that disclosed the allegations communicated to him by the State Attorney’s Office. Thereafter, the Administrative Investigation Division of the Sheriff’s Office ("AID") initiated an investigation. During the investigation, Respondent and Deputy Snyder each provided a sworn statement to the investigators. The investigators also obtained a sworn statement from Ms. Cope and a letter from Mr. Lewis. The investigators were unable to locate Mr. Cunningham and therefore did not interview him or ascertain his account of the matters at issue in this proceeding. During the investigation, Respondent had the opportunity to offer additional information or comments. Respondent’s attorney placed a statement on the record at the conclusion of Respondent’s sworn statement. Respondent did not offer any witnesses on his behalf or provide the investigators with any information pertaining to the location of Mr. Cunningham. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Board conducted a hearing concerning the charges against Respondent. The charges were: Violation of Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, subsection 4: violations of the provisions of law or the rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the office of the Sheriff; Violation of Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.1 (Level Five violation), 006, relating to untruthfulness by being untruthful in relation to the seizure of narcotics at the Cunningham residence. Violation of Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.3 (Level Three violation), 060, relating to standards of conduct by bringing discredit upon the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office by being untruthful and by inaccurately documenting facts and circumstances submitted to the State Attorney’s Office. Respondent was present at the hearing, had an opportunity to offer a statement, responded to questions, and presented additional evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board determined that Respondent violated the Civil Service Act and Rules 3-1.1 and 3-1.3. The violations resulted in a cumulative point total of 65 points under the progressive discipline policy of the Sheriff's office. The 65 points were added to 23 discipline points that the Sheriff's Office had previously assessed against Respondent for a total of 88 progressive discipline points. When a deputy has 88 progressive discipline points, Petitioner's progressive discipline policy authorizes discipline that ranges from a ten-day suspension to termination. Petitioner terminated Respondent's employment. Respondent violated relevant portions of the Civil Service Act and Rule 3-1.1 by being untruthful in relation to the seizure of narcotics at the Cunningham residence. Respondent conducted an improper search at the residence of Mr. Cunningham. Respondent then charged Mr. Cunningham with a felony and misdemeanor offense related to the fruits of that search. Respondent then prepared a false report relating the events occurring at Mr. Cunningham's residence and then provided false testimony under oath to the State Attorney’s Office. Respondent violated relevant portions of the Civil Service Act Rule 3-1.3 and by bringing discredit upon the Sheriff's Office. Respondent was untruthful by inaccurately documenting facts and circumstances submitted to the State Attorney’s Office. Respondent's conduct discredited the Sheriff's Office by encouraging mistrust of law enforcement officers and by creating the appearance that persons in law enforcement engage in improper tactics to effectuate an arrest. Respondent's untruthfulness resulted in the improper arrest and prosecution of an individual. Truthfulness on the part of a deputy sheriff is an important part of the job. It is necessary in order to maintain discipline and to preserve the integrity of the agency and the functions performed. Respondent's untruthfulness violated those essential elements and exposed the Sheriff's Office to the potential for civil liability for an improper arrest. Although much of Respondent's testimony was credible and persuasive, there were significant parts of Respondent's testimony that were neither credible nor persuasive. The flawed part of Respondent's testimony was inconsistent with prior statements by Respondent and with the testimony of Deputy Snyder. For the most part, no one inconsistency in Respondent's testimony, standing alone, would be sufficient to adversely affect Respondent's credibility. However, the cumulative effect of all of the inconsistencies deprives Respondent's testimony of credibility and persuasiveness concerning material issues in this case. In an earlier sworn statement to AID, Respondent testified that he found marijuana on the countertop in Mr. Cunningham's apartment, showed the seed to Deputy Snyder, and then looked inside the shoebox. At the final hearing, however, Respondent testified that he found the marijuana seed on the countertop, saw the marijuana in the shoebox, and then walked over to Deputy Snyder to show him the marijuana seed. Respondent further testified at the final hearing that he could not recall whether he picked up the seed first or saw the marijuana in the shoebox first. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the location of Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham at the time that Respondent found the seed and searched the shoebox. At the final hearing, Respondent insisted that Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham never got within ten to fourteen feet of the shoebox. In an earlier sworn statement to AID, however, Respondent indicated that Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham were two to three feet from the shoebox. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the position of the top of the shoebox at the time that Respondent found the seed and searched the shoebox. Respondent testified at final hearing that the shoebox was open between 1.5 and 2.0 inches. In a sworn statement to AID, however, Respondent testified that the top of the shoebox was open less than one inch. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the manner in which he shined light from his flashlight into the shoebox. At final hearing, Respondent testified that he shined light into the holes on the side of the shoebox. In an earlier deposition, however, Respondent testified that he shined the light in the top of the shoebox where the top was open and could not remember if the shoebox had holes. Respondent made inconsistent statements regarding the location of the marijuana on the countertop. At the final hearing, Respondent indicated that the marijuana was spread out into the center of the dark countertop where there was a white paint spot, as shown in one of the photographs in evidence. However, the drawing provided during the course of Respondent's earlier deposition did not indicate that marijuana was spread into the center of the dark countertop where the white paint spot was located. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the location of the shoebox. Respondent placed the shoebox close to the wall where it may have been more difficult for Deputy Snyder to view the box. Deputy Snyder placed the shoebox in the middle of the countertop where it was more easily seen. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the vantage points of Respondent and Deputy Snyder. Respondent placed Deputy Snyder ten to fourteen feet from the shoebox and stated that Deputy Snyder could not see the shoebox or the marijuana from that vantage point. Deputy Snyder placed himself within two to three feet of the shoebox and stated that he had an unobstructed and clear view of the countertop and the shoebox. Deputy Snyder's testimony was consistent with an earlier sworn statement to AID by Respondent indicating that Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham were two to three feet from the shoebox. See Finding of Fact 43. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the amount of marijuana on the countertop. Respondent stated there was a considerable amount or marijuana on the countertop. Deputy Snyder stated there was no marijuana on the countertop except the seed displayed to him by Respondent. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the actions taken by Respondent in looking into the shoebox. Respondent testified that he identified the debris, saw the marijuana in the shoebox, showed the seed to Snyder, and then looked into the shoebox. Deputy Snyder testified that Respondent showed him a seed, shined his light into a hole in the shoebox, and then opened the shoebox. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the actions of Respondent after discovering the marijuana and the shoebox. Respondent claimed he walked from the kitchen into the living and dining area to display the seed to Deputy Snyder. Deputy Snyder testified that Respondent remained in the kitchen and displayed the seed across the countertop. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the issue of whether Respondent had his flashlight out before he looked into the shoebox or removed it in order to look inside the shoebox. Respondent testified he had the flashlight out the entire time he was in the residence. Deputy Snyder stated that Respondent removed the flashlight from his belt in order to look into the shoebox. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the issue of whether Deputy Snyder was on the telephone when Respondent observed the marijuana and shoebox and pointed these items out to Deputy Snyder. Respondent stated that Deputy Snyder was on the telephone when these events occurred. Deputy Snyder testified that he had completed his call by the time Respondent arrived in the kitchen. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding the ability of Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham to be in the dining room and close to the countertop. Respondent claimed that the dining room table and chairs did not allow sufficient room for Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham to be within two or three feet of the countertop in the dining room. Deputy Snyder and other testimony by Respondent concerning the dimensions of the dining room and table and chairs indicated there was sufficient room for Deputy Snyder and Mr. Cunningham to stand in the dining room within two or three feet of the shoebox. The testimony of Respondent differed from that of Deputy Snyder regarding Respondent's testimony that he searched the shoebox, in part, because he was concerned over the existence of booby traps in the shoebox. Deputy Snyder saw no such concern indicated in Respondent’s actions. Respondent's testimony that he was concerned the shoebox contained booby traps is neither credible nor persuasive. Respondent testified that the room was sufficiently well lit to allow him to clearly see the marijuana inside the partially open shoebox without shining his flashlight into the shoebox before opening it. Respondent attempted to explain why he used his flashlight in a well-lit kitchen by expressing concern that the shoebox may have contained booby traps. Regarding the discrepancies between the testimony of Respondent and Deputy Snyder, there is no apparent motive for Deputy Snyder to fabricate his version of the events or to attempt to create any form of disciplinary problem for Respondent. Respondent had no prior experience with Deputy Snyder that would create a reason for Deputy Snyder to be untruthful. Respondent suggested that Deputy Snyder fabricated his report and testimony in exchange for a transfer to a position as a detective. That testimony is neither credible nor persuasive. Deputy Snyder’s transfer occurred months before any concerns arose pertaining to Respondent. There is no evidence that Deputy Snyder played any role in the initiation of the investigation. Deputy Snyder's initial disclosure to his supervisor did not result in any investigation or action against Respondent. The transfer to the detective unit was a lateral transfer without any increase in rank, pay, or benefits. The evaluation system in effect at the Sheriff's Office provided a specific component for self-initiated arrests. The arrest of Mr. Cunningham in this case falls into the category of self-initiated arrests and could have resulted in a positive evaluation component for Respondent, who already had 23 disciplinary points against him. Respondent has a prior disciplinary history. In June 1999, Respondent received a one-day suspension and five disciplinary points for violating rules that are not relevant to this proceeding. In January 2000, Respondent received a three- day suspension and 15 disciplinary points for violating rules that are not relevant to this proceeding. The two violations resulted in 20 progressive points with a range of discipline from reprimand to a three-day suspension. In August 2000, Respondent received a seven-day suspension for violating rules that are not relevant to this proceeding. The violations consisted of three level three violations resulting in the assignment of 40 disciplinary points. The 40 points were combined with ten "modified points" from the prior violations and resulted in a total of 50 progressive points with a range of discipline from a five-day suspension to termination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of conduct unbecoming a public servant and terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard C. Millian, Esquire Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire Tew, Zinober, & Barnes, L.L.P. 2655 McCormick Drive, Prestige Professional Park Clearwater, Florida 33759 B. Norris Rickey, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34756 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, et al. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at the Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. In accordance with plea arrangements, Petitioner was convicted of numerous charges of robbery, burglary, sexual battery, and false imprisonment in Circuit Courts in Dade and Broward Counties, Florida. He received numerous and various prison sentences, all of which were to run concurrently with a 99- year sentence. Assuming that Petitioner is eligible for statutory gain time for good behavior, his sentence would expire sometime prior to the year 2080. During July, 1981, Petitioner was interviewed by an examiner of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of establishing a presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Under Parole and Probation Commission rules then in effect, the examiner was to consider the severity of the offense committed by the Petitioner, calculate a "salient factor score" and apply various aggravating or mitigating circumstances in determining a recommended PPRD. The examiner classified the offense as "greatest (most serious III);" determined a salient factor score of nine based upon prior convictions, total time served, the existence of burglary as a present offense of conviction, the number of prior incarcerations, and the Petitioner's age of first commitment; and applied numerous aggravating circumstances based upon the nature of various of the charges that had been lodged against Petitioner. The examiner recommended a PPRD of March 4, 2092. On August 26, 1981, the Parole and Probation Commission considered the examiner's recommendation and affirmed it. Petitioner is now pursuing a review of the PPRD before the Commission. In promulgating the rules which were in effect when Petitioner'S PPRD was determined, the Parole and Probation Commission sought to isolate factors that would predict the probability of a successful parole outcome. There is no perfect predictive device on a case-by-case basis. An inmate's past behavior and statistical relationships that can be isolated provide the best predictive devices. The Commission's C utilization of a system which first classifies the offense characteristics, then applies a salient factor score and aggravating or mitigating circumstances is designed to set a presumptive parole release date based on an inmate's past behavior and based upon the statistical relationships that have been found to exist. The evidence does not establish that the guidelines adopted by the Commission in its rules which were applied to the Petitioner are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The Parole and Probation Commission has amended the rules which were followed in the setting of the Petitioner's PPRD. The Petitioner continues to be affected, however, by the rules as they existed prior to the amendments because those rules provide the basis for his PPRD.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Paul R. Layton, is an inmate presently confined at the Tomoka Correctional Institution, Daytona Beach, Florida. Given a choice the Petitioner would not wear his hair any longer than his collar. His personal feeling, however, is that the rule is used as a harassment technique and is used to dehumanize and institutionalize the prisoners. The Respondent's rationale for the rule is that requiring prisoners to keep their hair short aids in identification of the individual prisoners within the institution and in the event of an escape. Prisoners have attempted escapes by altering their appearance. The Department of Corrections, pursuant to the challenged rule, has required prisoners to cut their hair such that it is above their collar and off of their ears. The Department houses approximately 27,000 inmates, all of whom are required to wear similar uniforms. When a prisoner escapes, the Department of Corrections must provide a current photograph of the escaped prisoner to law enforcement agencies. Requiring short standardized haircuts substantially reduces the cost and difficulty such current photographs. Petitioner contended that the rule is discriminatory in that female inmates are not subjected to the same haircut standards. The majority of female inmates wear their hair long and when they change the length of their hairs they are rephotographed. Shorter hair is more sanitary for those prisoners who are involved in food preparation. Long hair can also constitute a safety hazard for those inmates who operate machinery.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its business located in Tampa, Florida. Respondent is a stated agency charged with responsibility for investigating and resolving unlawful employment practices. Its duties and powers are enumerated in Chapter 23, Florida Statutes, the Human Rights Act of 1977. 2. Respondent has adopted Rules 9D-8.06, 8.22(2), 9.03(4), and 9.03(7), Florida Administrative Code. These rules authorize Respondent to issue subpoenas, serve them by registered mail, and enforce them through judicial proceedings. The rules specifically authorize issuance, service, and enforcement of subpoenas in connection with investigations of unfair employment practices. They provide that inferences may be drawn from the failure of a person to provide requested information. . . Linda Parties filed a complaint against Petitioner with the Respondent, alleging sex discrimination by Petitioner. Based upon the complaint, Respondent initiated an investigation. It formally requested information from Petitioner on July 13, 1979. On April 7, 1981, Respondent issued a subpoena in connection with the investigation and served it by registered mail in accordance with its rules. Petitioner objected to the subpoena and has not provided the requested information. Respondent has sought to enforce the subpoena through a "Petition for Enforcement" filed in Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida. Circuit Judge Donald O. Hartwell has entered an Order which provides: This cause came to be heard on the Motion To Dismiss Petition For Enforcement of Investigatory Subpoena filed by the Human Development Center, Respondent. Both parties were represented by Counsel who presented argument to the court. The court being otherwise fully advised enters this its order; therefor it is, Ordered that the service of an investigatory subpoena served by certified mail pursuant to Rule 9D-8.22, Florida Administrative Code is valid service. Such service is not required to be served in accordance with Florida Statutes 48.031 or Rule 1.410(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. It is further, Ordered that the Motion To Dismiss Petition For Enforcement of Investigatory Subpoena is denied. It is further, Ordered that further proceedings to enforce the investigatory subpoena in this cause are stayed pending the ruling of Hearing Officer G. Steven Pfeiffer in Case No. 81-2101RX now set for hearing on October 21, 1981. Respondent has made no determination of reasonable cause to believe that Petitioner has engaged in any unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Donald Eugene Halpin, Richard Edward Jackson and Jeffery Lynn Fowler, are inmates under the supervision of the Respondent. Petitioners Halpin and Fowler are incarcerated at Glades Correctional Institution. Petitioner Jackson is incarcerated at Martin Correctional Institution. The Respondent is the Department of Corrections, an agency of the State of Florida. The Petitioners have challenged Rules 33-6.003, 33-6.0045 and 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. The Challenged Rules govern transfers of inmates and custody classification of inmates. The Challenged Rules were amended by the Respondent after the Respondent enacted and applied several emergency rules governing inmate transfers and custody classification of inmates. These emergency rules were adopted during 1990 and 1991. The Petitioners have alleged that the Challenged Rules are "arbitrary and capricious as applied to the Petitioners . . . ." The Petitioners have also alleged that the Challenged Rules are invalid because they were amended "through prohibited acts as defined in Chapter 120.54(9)(c), Fla. Stat., when the Respondent ran two emergency rules (33ER91-1 & 33ER91-2) back-to- back so that Amended Chapter 33-6, etc. (1991) could be implemented."
Findings Of Fact Herein, Ibanez seeks recovery of attorney's fees and costs she claims to have incurred in DOAH Case No. 91-3336R styled Silvia S. Ibanez et al. v. State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy et al. In that case, Ibanez challenged the validity of Board of Accountancy Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. (the "holding out rule"). Ibanez unsuccessfully tried to initiate that case by filing a petition on May 10, 1991 with the Department of Professional Regulation. Ibanez successfully initiated the rule challenge on May 30, 1991, by filing with DOAH a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing under Section 120.56 F.S. This type of action is commonly referred to as a "challenge to an existing agency rule." In such a case, the Petitioner is fully the initiator, challenger, or sword-wielder in the proceeding and bears both the duty to go forward and the burden of proof. Ibanez initiated the rule challenge in her capacity as a licensed certified public accountant (CPA). She is a sole practitioner and an employee of a law firm called "Silvia S. Ibanez, P.A.," but the law firm "Silvia S. Ibanez, P.A.," was not a party and did not participate in the rule challenge, except as one of several legal representatives for Silvia S. Ibanez, the individual. The Board participated in the rule challenge case to defend the holding out rule. The Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants (FICPA) intervened in the rule challenge in support of the position of the Board that the holding out rule was valid. While Ibanez' petition in the rule challenge contained a prayer for "other appropriate relief, including award of costs as appropriate," her petition therein did not request an award of attorney's fees. Ibanez' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and her accompanying Memorandum of Law submitted after formal hearing for that case, both of which pleadings were dated October 11, 1991, did not contain proposed findings of fact or proposed conclusions of law addressing the issue of attorney's fees and costs. Neither of Ibanez' post- hearing filings contained a request for attorney's fees or costs or a request to reserve jurisdiction in that case for such an award. The undersigned hearing officer rendered a final order declaring invalid the holding out rule on January 15, 1992. That final order did not award attorney's fees and costs, nor did it reserve jurisdiction to decide attorney's fees and costs at another time. Neither Ibanez nor any of her corporate entities nor any of her supporting intervenors filed any motion requesting a reservation of jurisdiction or requesting reconsideration. The Board and FICPA each appealed the final order in the rule challenge to the First District Court of Appeal in February 1992, but dismissed those appeals on May 6, 1992, by filing a Joint Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. The First District Court of Appeal issued an order acknowledging the Joint Dismissal on May 14, 1992. The Joint Dismissal and First District Court of Appeal Order were both attached to the material filed by the parties in this instant case. For purposes of deciding the pending motions to dismiss herein, the undersigned has considered the Joint Dismissal, the First District Court of Appeal Order, and the record in the rule challenge case, DOAH Case No. 91-3336R. Due to the unique arguments advanced in Ibanez' fees and costs motion (sic) herein, it also has been necessary and appropriate to consider the record in DOAH Case No. 91-4100. On May 22, 1991, a probable cause panel of the Board held a probable cause hearing involving Ibanez. As a result of that hearing, the Board initiated a disciplinary proceeding styled State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy v. Silvia S. Ibanez, DOAH Case No. 91-4100, by filing an administrative complaint on June 13, 1992. That case was a disciplinary action arising under Section 120.57(1) F.S. which was prosecuted by the Department of Professional Regulation on behalf of the Board against Ibanez. At one time, the disciplinary case was consolidated with the rule challenge case. The two cases were bifurcated prior to formal hearing of the merits of either case. FICPA never intervened in the disciplinary case, nor had they any standing to do so. The undersigned hearing officer conducted a 120.57(1) F.S. hearing in the disciplinary case on August 27, 1991, and issued a recommended order to the Board on January 15, 1992. The Board issued its final order in the disciplinary case on April 23, 1992. Therein, contrary to the recommended order, the Board held that Ibanez had violated Sections 473.323(1)(a), (f), (g), and (h) F.S. and Rule 21A-24.001 F.A.C. The Board accordingly issued a reprimand to Ibanez, which reprimand was stayed by the Board pending appeal. Ibanez has appealed the Board's final order in the disciplinary case to the First District Court of Appeal, which appeal is still pending. Ibanez served on July 9, 1992 her Motion for Attorney's Fees which is here under consideration. In doing so, Ibanez elected to use the style of the underlying rule challenge case, DOAH 91-3336R, the style of which still included intervenors James R. Brewster and American Association of Attorney Certified Public Accountants. Those intervenors have never attempted to appear in the instant fees and costs case and apparently seek no relief via Ibanez' pending fees and costs motion. The rule challenge case was final for all purposes before DOAH as of January 15, 1992 and before the District Court of Appeal on May 14, 1992. The DOAH case file for DOAH Case No. 91-3336R has been closed for several months. Ibanez' Motion for Attorney's Fees was received and deemed filed by DOAH on July 13, 1992. It was filed with DOAH sixty-eight (68) days after the rule challenge appeals were voluntarily dismissed by FICPA and the Board and sixty (60) days after the First District Court of Appeals entered its order ratifying the voluntary dismissal. Because petitions brought solely under Section 57.111 F.S. result in final orders, it is DOAH's standard operating procedure to open new files for all fees and costs cases arising under Section 57.111 F.S. Upon receipt of Ibanez' motion, DOAH's Clerk assigned Ibanez' motion the instant new case number (DOAH 92-4271F), primarily on the basis that the motion prayed for relief upon grounds of Section 57.111 F.S., among other statutes. The other statutory grounds cited in the motion were Sections 120.57(1)(b)5 and 120.59(6) F.S.