Findings Of Fact CPC is an international health care company specializing in psychiatric care. It operates 25 hospitals in the United States and three in Great Britain. Its proposed Orlando hospital would be its fourth Florida facility. CPC has not yet selected a site for the proposed facility, but anticipates a South Orange County or Osceola County location. Site factors such as cost, services and zoning are obviously not determined and the estimated project cost of $6,776,125 is subject to substantial change. It has prepared basic architectural plans, however, which were shown to provide adequate space and necessary health care features for its proposal. The CPC facility would be "freestanding" and not a part of any larger medical complex. It would provide a range of psychiatric and substance abuse services for adolescent and adult patients, emergency evaluation, family therapy and follow-up care. CPC policy provides that up to 5 percent of gross annual revenue may be allocated for indigent care. Thus, some indigent patients could be treated. However, no specific commitment in this regard was made. CPC has adequate funds to finance this project "in-house" and anticipates no difficulty in obtaining necessary medical staffing. In view of this company's resources and experience, its ability to fund this project and adequately staff it are reasonably certain. OGH is a nonprofit 171-bed osteopathic acute care facility located in Orange County, seven miles east of downtown Orlando. It has been operated as a nonprofit facility since 1945, and has existed at its present location since 1960. In 1981, HRS issued a Certificate of Need authorizing OGH to add 70 medical-surgical beds to its facility by constructing four new floors to an existing building, including a top (sixth) floor which is now proposed for the OGH substance abuse program. The additional cost of construction is estimated to be $500,000. OGH proposes to apply osteopathic principles to its substance abuse program. Of the approximately 60 doctors of osteopathy in Orange County, most are admitted to the staff of OGH and not to the allopathic facilities in Orange County, which require that doctors of osteopathy have postgraduate training in an allopathic residency program. The proposed OGH facility would thus be the only one available to these physicians and would provide an opportunity for osteopathic practice and training in substance abuse. This would also be the only program of this type available to substance abuse patients who seek osteopathic treatment in Orange County. There are patient care advantages to locating a substance abuse program within an acute care hospital such as OGH, since patients who require substance abuse treatment frequently require other services provided by a general hospital. The program proposed by OGH would have such auxiliary hospital services readily available where the CPC program would not. OGH has made tentative arrangements for the additional health care and management personnel required by its proposal. OGH will provide some indigent care and anticipates that it will continue to experience a "bad debt" rate of about 9 per cent, which includes indigent care costs. Intervenor, Florida Hospital (FH), consists of three major campuses in the Orlando metropolitan area, (Orlando, Orange County; Altamonte Springs, Seminole County; and Apopka, Orange County). FH is a not-for-profit tertiary care hospital owned by the Seventh Day Adventist Church. It has been in operation for approximately 75 years and currently has 943 beds. As of the date of the hearing, FH had 99 beds in its facility dedicated to psychiatric and substance abuse services with 2 in Altamonte Springs, 51 in the main Orlando campus building and 24 in a building adjacent to the Orlando campus main hospital building. FH has been providing psychiatric and substance abuse services for approximately 25 years, but does not currently have any beds designated specifically for substance abuse patients. At the time of the hearing, FH had under construction and scheduled to be completed in October, 1984, a 56-bed, freestanding psychiatric facility which is to be located approximately 600 feet from the main Orlando campus building, consisting of 24 adult general psychiatric beds, 16 substance abuse beds and 16 adolescent psychiatric beds. During FH's current fiscal year, which began January 1, 1981, there has been a decrease in patient days in the hospital in general and a decline in occupancy in the psychiatric treatment program. At the time of the hearing, the occupancy level for the pregram was approximately 60 percent and had been less than 75 per cent during the calendar years 1982, 1983 and 1981 (through August), with a projection of 62 percent for all of 1984. The opening of the facility by Intervenor, West Lake Hospital (WLH) in May, 1984, has had the effect of reducing the number of patient days and percentage of occupancy at FH. Intervenor, WLH, is located in Longwood, Seminole County, Florida, (HRS District VII) and provides psychiatric and substance abuse treatment. Forty-eight percent of its patients come from Orange County and it estimates that as many as 60 percent of those patients would go to another facility in Orange County, were one available. Since its opening in May, 1984, the WLH facility has had an occupancy level of less than 75 per cent for its 80-bed facility. Both intervenors oppose grant of the CPC application, but neither opposes grant of the OGH application. HRS Rules 10-5.11(25)(d) and 27(f), Florida Administrative Code (FAC), set forth the methodology to be used in computing bed need for short term psychiatric and substance abuse treatment. Beds are allocated within each health planning district on the basis of a five year projection. The proposed facilities would be located in HRS Health Planning District VII. Thus, projections, allocations and computations are based on health planning data applicable to this district. Although CPC seeks to create a sub-district consisting of Orange and Osceola Counties for evaluation of its application, there is no basis in these rules or in existing health plans for this proposed subdivision. The projected bed need for District VII (1989) is as follows: A. Short term psychiatric Existing and approved beds 368 Tentatively approved beds 60 1/ Total existing and approved 428 Total need 454 2/ Net need 26 B. Short term substance abuse Existing and approved beds 40 Tentatively approved beds 26 3/ Total existing and approved 66 Total need 78 4/ Net need 12 The above referenced rules, while providing for a minimum number of psychiatric beds in general hospitals, require no corresponding minimum number of beds in freestanding specialty hospitals, nor do they establish any preference for freestanding hospital beds. Should a freestanding facility be viewed as desirable, the new psychiatric treatment center at Florida Hospital is essentially freestanding, and would meet any such need. Further, the inventory of short term psychiatric beds indicates that the limited existing need is within the category of general hospital beds, rather than the specialty hospital category. HRS Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)5, F.A.C. provides that no additional short term psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing psychiatric beds in the district exceeds 75 percent (for adult services) or 70 percent (for adolescent and children's services) for the preceding twelve months. Virtually all of the psychiatric beds in District VII have been for adult services. For calendar year 1983, the occupancy rate for short term psychiatric beds in District VII was approximately 73.5 percent. For the 12-month period from July, 1983 through June, 1984 the occupancy rate had declined to 71.7 percent. Thus, the occupancy standard for short term psychiatric beds was not met. Similarly, Rule 10-5.11(27)(h)1, F.A.C. provides that no additional inpatient substance beds will normally be approved unless the average occupancy rates for all existing hospital based substance abuse inpatient beds is at or exceeds 80 percent for the preceding twelve months. Since the occupancy rate for substance abuse beds during the 12-month period of July, 1983 through June, 1984 was in the low sixties, this standard was not met.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order granting the application of Orlando General Hospital to establish a 26-bed substance abuse treatment program and denying the application of Community Psychiatric Centers to construct a 105-bed short term psychiatric and substance abuse facility in District VII. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of December, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1984.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent became interested in massage therapy after receiving such therapy in a military hospital while he was in the United States Marine Corps. He was discharged from the Marine Corps in August of 1968. Approximately three years later he enrolled in a massage therapy course. He completed 1,000 hours of coursework. In or around December of 1972, Respondent received a license to practice massage therapy in the State of Florida. He has remained licensed, without interruption, since that time. His license number is MA 0002715. During the period that he has been licensed, Respondent has performed an average of a 1,000 massages (approximately 500 on females and 500 on males) per year. At no time has Respondent ever been disciplined by the Board of Massage. No formal accusations of sexual misconduct have ever been made against Respondent other than those made in the instant case. Respondent has no criminal record. For the first several years after receiving his license Respondent worked for others. Since about 1976, he has been self-employed. He currently works with his wife, who is also a Florida-licensed massage therapist. Respondent has an "out-call" practice, where he goes to the client (usually at the client's residence) to perform therapy as opposed to the client coming to him. He brings with him a special table on which the client is positioned during the therapy session. Respondent gives his clients the option of receiving their massages clothed or unclothed. He tells them that they may wear whatever they need to be comfortable. Respondent makes every effort to keep his clients properly draped while they are being massaged. On a daily basis, Respondent is alone with female clients who, but for the drapes covering them, are unclothed. Among the female clients on whom Respondent has performed massage therapy are Alexsandra Lopardo and her best friend, Donna Arenas. Lopardo was the first of the two to use Respondent's services. Lopardo is a hair stylist. She has been receiving massages for over 20 years. Respondent had been recommended to her by one of her clients. Lopardo received massage therapy from Respondent on several occasions from November of 1993, 2/ to January of the following year. 3/ On each occasion Lopardo was naked during the massage except for the drapes Respondent used to cover her. Respondent came to Lopardo's home, which she shared with her husband and her stepson, to perform the therapy. The living room of the home was the site of all but the last therapy session. Lopardo paid from $50.00 to $60.00 for each massage. During the first therapy session, when Lopardo was on her back, Respondent, while massaging her neck and shoulders, kissed her on the forehead. The kiss took Lopardo by surprise and embarrassed her. She responded by telling Respondent not to "get fresh" with her. There were no similar incidents during the remainder of the therapy session. Lopardo believed that she had "established her boundaries" and that Respondent would not make any further advances toward her. She therefore used Respondent's services on subsequent occasions to help alleviate discomfort she was experiencing in her arms and shoulders. All but the last of these subsequent therapy sessions were without incident. Lopardo thought that her friend Arenas would also benefit from massage therapy. She therefore, as a Christmas present, gave Arenas a gift certificate that she had purchased for a massage from Respondent. Lopardo told Arenas of the kiss on the forehead that she had received from Respondent during her first massage therapy session the month before. Lopardo pointed out, however, that after she had expressed her displeasure to Respondent about the incident, Respondent had not engaged in any similar conduct. 4/ Arenas used the gift certificate to receive a massage from Respondent on January 10, 1994. 5/ The massage was given in one of the bedrooms of Lopardo's home. 6/ Arenas was naked during the massage except for the drapes Respondent used to cover her. While massaging Arenas' inner thighs, Respondent mentioned that massages energized and stimulated, and enhanced the performance of, certain parts of the body 7/ and then stated that he was not going to get into it any further because the door to the room in which the massage was being given was not closed all the way. In addition to making these sexually suggestive remarks, Respondent also kissed Arenas on the back. Arenas' reaction was to instruct Respondent to "stick to the massage." Respondent complied with the request. He engaged in no other inappropriate conduct during the massage. Lopardo's last therapy session with Respondent took place later that same day, January 10, 1994, in the same room where Arenas had received her massage. During this therapy session, Respondent kissed Lopardo on the ankle. Lopardo was dumbfounded by Respondent's action. She was also concerned for her safety inasmuch as there was no one else in the home other than her and Respondent. She thought it best to simply ignore what Respondent had done and let him finish the massage, which, fortunately, he did without any further incident. After the massage, Lopardo paid Respondent, by check, $60.00 for the therapy session. As Respondent was leaving the Lopardo home, Lopardo advised him that Arenas had left a check for him. The check was in the amount of $20.00 and was intended as a tip. 8/ On the check, Arenas wrote, "Thanks Norm," followed by an exclamation point, under which she drew a "smiley face." Arenas made out the check after her massage. 9/ Arenas left a tip for Respondent because she thought it was "proper etiquette" and if she failed to do so it might place her friend, Lopardo, in an "uncomfortable situation." On the evening of January 10, 1994, after they had both received their massages, Lopardo and Arenas spoke with one another over the telephone. 10/ During their telephone conversation, they each revealed to the other that they had been kissed by Respondent while being massaged earlier that day. On or about March 14, 1994, Lopardo filed with the Department a written complaint against Respondent. In her complaint, Lopardo stated the following: I would like to preface this statement by saying that it is not my wish that Norman lose his license to massage. I feel that intervention by the proper authorities is in order though. I first used Norman's services on or about December 13th 1993. 11/ His knowledge and technique are notable and somewhat impressive, however in the middle of the massage he somehow felt inclined to kiss me on the forehead. I reprimanded him and though Norman suffers from horrible body odor there were no further problems that day, and I felt there wouldn't be any in the future. On Jan. 10th 1994 while Norman was massaging me he must have had the same inappropriate urge. This time he kissed me on the ankle. I was so shocked that I wasn't able to do anything. On further reflection I decided that it was totally inappropriate and unprofessional behavior. 12/ I trusted Norman to be professional. I don't feel that it is my responsibility to reprimand and correct behavior, but I do feel that it is my duty to report less than professional behavior. I know that the state tries to enforce proper standard of etiquette. If not for Norman's overzealous behavior and horrible body odor problem I might still use his service. The Department investigated the allegations made by Lopardo in her complaint. The investigation was conducted by Department investigator Steve Yarbrough. As part of his investigation, Yarbrough interviewed Lopardo. Lopardo told Yarbrough that she knew of "other women" who had complaints about Respondent. She declined, however, to reveal the identities of any of these "other women" other than Arenas because she wanted to protect their privacy. These unidentified women were clients of Lopardo's and had spoken to her in confidence. Lopardo felt an obligation to maintain the confidentiality of her client's disclosures. She did not even tell Arenas about them. By letter dated April 29, 1994, Yarbrough notified Respondent of the complaint that Lopardo had filed against him. During a conversation that he had with Yarbrough shortly after receiving the letter, Respondent denied the allegations of misconduct made by Lopardo against him. Respondent asked Yarbrough to contact any of his other clients and inquire about Respondent's conduct. 13/ In response to Respondent's request, Yarbrough suggested that Respondent himself contact these other clients and have them submit a written statement to the Department. Respondent followed Yarbrough's suggestion. At Respondent's request, several of his clients, on his behalf, wrote letters of support and sent them to the Department. By letter dated May 17, 1994, Respondent responded in writing to Lopardo's complaint. In his letter, he "categorically den[ied] all charges" Lopardo had made against him. As noted above, an Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent on or about October 24, 1994. At no time prior to his receipt of the Administrative Complaint was Respondent made aware of Arenas' allegations of misconduct against him. Lopardo and Arenas have not conspired to falsely accuse Respondent of wrongdoing. On or about May 2, 1995, the Department provided Respondent with a subject matter index containing a listing, by the alleged violation(s) involved, of all final orders issued from January 1, 1992, to April 21, 1995, by the Board of Massage in disciplinary cases. The Department has also identified for Respondent, and provided him with copies of, those orders listed in the subject matter index which involve allegations of sexual misconduct.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Massage enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations of subsection (1)(k) of Section 480.046, Florida Statutes, alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and disciplining him for having committed these violations by fining him $750.00 and suspending his license to practice massage therapy for a period of three months. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of August, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings 21st day of August, 1995.
The Issue Two issues are raised in this case. The first issue concerns the question of whether the Petitioner must seek review and permission by and from the Respondent before engaging in this project to provide inpatient radiation therapy. See Section 381.706(1)(h), Florida Statutes. If that question is answered in the affirmative, then the next question to be answered is whether Petitioner is entitled to a certificate of need to provide inpatient radiation therapy services at its hospital in Pensacola, Florida. In answering the initial question reference is made to the case of Scared Heart Hospital of Pensacola v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and Baptist Hospital, DOAH Case No. 90-3576. That reference is made because Intervenor in the present case has made a motion in limine which asserts that the Petitioner here is estopped from raising the issue of whether jurisdiction resides with the Respondent to require a certificate of need based upon the belief that DOAH Case No. 90-3576 has answered that question in the affirmative. Thus, as argued in the motion in limine, Petitioner in the present action should be barred by doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata from further examining that issue. Both issues are addressed in the fact finding and conclusions of law which follow, to include a ruling on the motion in limine. At the commencement of the hearing in discussing the motion in limine an examination was made of the significance, if any, of the Petitioner having failed to clearly state its opposition to the Respondent's assertion of jurisdiction over the subject matter and that party in the Petition contesting the decision on the merits to deny the application for certificate of need. Consequently, the issue of whether Petitioner has waived its right to contest the jurisdiction is also addressed in the Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact MOTION IN LIMINE (DOAH Case No. 92-3576) On the prior occasion described in DOAH Case No. 90-3576, Petitioner had applied to Respondent for a certificate of need to institute radiation therapy services and to construct a radiation therapy facility at the campus of its hospital in Pensacola, Florida. That center was to serve inpatients and outpatients. The projected capital expenditure for that project approximated 3.7 million dollars. Petitioner contended that the radiation therapy center that would be constructed would be an extension to an existing oncology program as contrasted with the establishment of a "new service." Consistent with that position Respondent asserted that the basis for requiring a certificate of need was found in the language at Section 381.706(1)(c), Florida Statutes, which states: A capital expenditure of $1 million or more by or on behalf of a health care facility or hospice for a purpose directly related to the furnishing of health services at such facility; provided that a certificate of need shall not be required for an expenditure to provide an outpatient health service, or to acquire equipment or refinance debt, for which a certificate of need is not otherwise required pursuant to this subsection. The department shall, by rule, adjust the capital expenditure threshold annually using an appropriate inflation index. By resort to Section 381.706(1)(c), Florida Statutes, as the basis for declaring jurisdiction, the Respondent in its preliminary position did not perceive that the proposed project constituted establishment of new institutional health services or a substantial change to the existing health services, rather, it was believed to be constituted of construction costs as a capital expenditure related to the existing oncology program which expenditure met the $1 million threshold. If the basis for jurisdiction was found within Section 381.706(1)(c), Florida Statutes, then the would-be intervenor in that case, the same intervenor here, would be denied intervention. The basis for denial is found within the limitations placed upon those persons who may participate in a decision involving certificate of need for a capital expenditure as identified in Section 381.706(1)(c), Florida Statutes. That contest is between the Respondent and an applicant for the certificate. Third parties have no right to participate. On the other hand, if the basis for jurisdiction is as argued by the petition for intervention in the prior case, that basis being the jurisdiction established by Section 381.706(1)(h), Florida Statutes, then a third party health care provider in competition with the applicant seeking a certificate of need could participate in that decision. The language in Section 381.706(1)(h), states: The establishment of inpatient institutional health services by a health care facility, or a substantial change in such services, or the obligation of capital expenditures for the offering of, or a substantial change in, any such services which entails a capital expenditure in any amount, or an annual operating cost of $500,000 or more. The department shall, by rule, adjust the annual operating cost threshold annually using an appropriate inflation index. The Hearing Officer in DOAH Case No. 90-3576, heard the matter and entered his Recommended Order to resolve the right of the present intervenor to intervene in that cause. In doing so the Hearing Officer generally addressed the jurisdictional basis upon which the agency could review the application. Nothing in that process attempted to distinguish between inpatient and outpatient costs by way of a discrete analysis and allocation of those costs. Observations were made in passing concerning the aggregate amount of inpatient and outpatient costs. In particular reference was made to the capital expenditure of approximating 3.7 million dollars. No attention was given the issue of the threshold amount associated with annual operating costs identified in Section 381.706(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Factual reference to that jurisdictional amount associated with annual operating costs was left for some other occasion. The thrust in DOAH Case No. 90-3576 was to determine whether the appropriate basis for the jurisdictional claim would be found in Section 381.706(1)(c), Florida Statutes, as initially contended by the Respondent or upon resort to Section 381.706(1)(h), Florida Statutes, as contended by the petition for intervention, without a more complete analysis concerning the jurisdictional amount set out in Section 381.706(1)(h), Florida Statutes, should the hearing officer be persuaded that the latter provision constituted the grounds for review generally stated. In the factual and legal conclusions by the hearing officer in DOAH Case No. 90-3576, he determined that the project in question for inpatient and outpatient radiation therapy services constituted the establishment of new inpatient institutional health services or at least constituted a substantial change in the services that were being provided by the applicant. Thus the petition for intervention was deemed appropriate and the motion to dismiss that petition was recommended for denial. Through the Final Order which followed, with some minor modifications which have no influence on the present case, the Respondent adopted the findings of fact of the hearing officer in DOAH Case No. 90-3576, and granted the petition to intervene. The Recommended Order was entered on April 3, 1991, and the Final Order on May 21, 1991. The parties in DOAH Case No. 90-3576 did not proceed to hearing before the present case was heard. The decision by the hearing officer in DOAH Case No. 90-3576 was to defer consideration of the matter pending hearing in the present case. That choice was upon a request by all parties in DOAH Case No. 90-3576. PARTIES STIPULATIONS CONCERNING REVIEW CRITERIA The parties agree that Petitioner's Certificate of Need Application No. 6772, the present application, meets the following statutory criteria: Section 381.705(1)(c), (h), except for the third clause which is not applicable and the fourth clause which is at issue, (i), (m), except that Intervenor contends that the project costs were not properly allocated to Petitioner's Certificate of Need Application No. 6772, and (n) to Section 381.705(1). The parties also agree that the following statutory criteria are not applicable to Petitioner's application: Section 381.705(1)(e), (f), (g) and (j), Florida Statutes. Within the context of the stipulation as to criteria, the parties agree that the following issues are to be litigated: The need for the proposed project in relation to the applicable district plan and state health plan. The availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization, and adequacy of like and existing health care services in the service district. The availability of and adequacy of other health care facilities and services in the service district, which may serve as alternatives for the services proposed to be provided by Scared Heart Hospital. The impact of the proposed project on the cost of providing health services proposed by Scared Heart Hospital. Whether less costly, more efficient, or more appropriate alternatives to the proposed services are available. Whether existing inpatient facilities, providing inpatient services similar to those proposed are being used in an appropriate and efficient manner. Whether patients will experience serious problems in obtaining inpatient care of the type proposed, in the absence of the proposed new service. The need that the population served or to be served has for the health services proposed to be offered, and the extent to which residents in the district are likely to have access to those services. The contribution of the proposed service in meeting the health needs of members of such medically underserved groups. BACKGROUND FACTS On August 22, 1991, Petitioner gave notice that it intended to apply for the September 19, 1991, batch review cycle to initiate inpatient radiation therapy services at its Pensacola, Florida facility. That notification referred to the fact that the Petitioner was presently constructing an outpatient cancer center to provide radiation therapy services and that the anticipated opening date for that outpatient facility was December, 1991. Petitioner did apply for the September 19, 1991 batch review for initiation of inpatient radiation therapy services. At that time the construction of the outpatient radiation therapy services was proceeding. Petitioner had received a letter of non-reviewability for the construction of the outpatient cancer treatment facility on a prior date. The completion of the outpatient radiation therapy services center at the Petitioner's facility was completed and Petitioner began to provide outpatient radiation treatment in April, 1992. The cancer treatment program at Petitioner's facility is a comprehensive cancer center providing radiation therapy, chemotherapy, IV. hydration, blood transfusion, nutrition counseling, social work counseling and a library. The outpatient facility for radiation therapy is fully staffed and supplied. It was placed on the books of the Petitioner as an active asset in the year 1991. Before submitting the application for review in September, 1991 review cycle, Petitioner conferred with Respondent and was instructed to submit an application for the initiation of inpatient services and to allocate costs to the project based upon a percentage of the total facility which would be devoted to inpatient services. Through the application Petitioner noted that the total cost of the establishment of the radiation therapy services projected to open in December, 1991, was $4,124,475. Pursuant to the instruction by the Respondent $618,671 was allocated as an estimate of capital expenditures for inpatient radiation therapy services. This approximates 15 percent of patients being treated as inpatients of the total number of patients treated by radiation therapy. Generally stated, the experience of most providers is that 10 to 15 percent of radiation therapy is delivered on an inpatient basis with the balance of the radiation therapy being delivered on an outpatient basis. The allocation of capital expenditures to inpatient therapy was an artificial device mandated by the Respondent. It does not reflect the actual experience. In actuality the incremental project costs related to capital expenditures for the inpatients receiving radiation therapy are zero. The reason for this finding is based upon the fact that the equipment for providing the inpatient radiation therapy is already in place, the facility for providing that care had been constructed, there is no associated incremental depreciation for inpatient care, the project has been fully paid for from funded depreciation cash and has been placed upon the books of the facility at 100 percent of that total. In essence, the capital costs have been incurred before the advent of the inpatient radiation therapy services. Additional costs promoted by the provision of care for inpatients who receive radiation therapy at the facility would be supply expenses attributable to those inpatients and the possibility of additional salaries attributable to overtime work done by staff to serve the inpatients. These are minimal costs. Operating costs were also artificially allocated to inpatients in the application. For the first year of operation, salaries allocated to inpatient care were estimated at $64,950.00, with associated benefits at $9,898.00, other patient care expenses at $17,925.00 and depreciation in the amount of $51,135.00. Even when resort is made to this certificate the proposal to institute inpatient radiation therapy does not reach the $500,000.00 threshold in annual operating costs, in addition to having no fiscal impact by way of capital expenditures. Petitioner is a 391 bed acute general hospital located in Pensacola, Florida. The services that it provides are available to inpatients and outpatients. Among those services are an open heart facility, neonatal intensive care Level II and Level III units, and freestanding 50 bed children's hospital. The patients receiving care for cancer are provided screening programs, risk assessments, preventative education programs, diagnostic services, surgery, chemotherapy and radiation therapy on an outpatient basis. The application for inpatient radiation therapy was not favorably reviewed in the State Agency Action Report issued on or about January 8, 1992. This led to the present hearing when Petitioner contested the decision to deny the application. Intervenor and West Florida Hospital, both of Pensacola, Florida, and the same planning district where Petitioner is located, have certificates of need to provide inpatient radiation therapy. They also provide outpatient radiation therapy. The other two hospitals treat patients referred by Petitioner for radiation therapy needs. The inpatients of the Petitioner requiring radiation therapy must be transported to the other two hospitals to receive that care. The majority of those patients who are being transported are referred to the Intervenor. Pediatric cancer patients from Petitioner's facility are transported to West Florida. The patients who are transported from Petitioner's facility to the Intervenor's facility are received by the Intervenor as outpatients. When they return to the Petitioner's facility they are perceived as inpatients. Each of the other two facilities who offer radiation therapy pursuant to certificates of need have two linear accelerators to provide inpatient and outpatient radiation therapy. Petitioner seeks to have its single linear accelerator which now provides outpatient radiation therapy made available to provide inpatient radiation therapy. There are also two non-hospital based radiation therapy centers which have single linear accelerators to provide outpatient radiation therapy services. Those non-hospital based providers are located in Ft. Walton Beach and Crestview, Florida, within the same planning district that is associated with this application. REVIEW CRITERIA 1/ Section 381.705(1)(a), Florida Statutes, requires that an application be reviewed for its consistency with the state and district health plans. Neither of those plans addresses the provision of radiation therapy services. As a consequence, neither plan sets forth need allocation factors that would address this type application. In view of the silence of the state and local health plans concerning inpatient radiation therapy, the application cannot be seen as inconsistent with those plans. Section 381.705(1)(b), Florida Statutes, speaks in terms of the availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, and extent of utilization and adequacy of like and existing health care services in the service district to be served by the applicant. As stated before inpatient radiation therapy is being delivered by two other providers. Those providers make available and could continue to make availability the quality of care, which is efficient, appropriate, accessible and adequate in delivering inpatient radiation therapy to those patients which Petitioner would serve if granted the certificate of need to do so. The inpatient radiation therapy services offered by those two providers are not over-utilized at present nor would they be in the foreseeable future. The exception to these findings would be related to a quality of care issue not pertaining to the actual delivery of radiation therapy to patients referred from the Petitioner to the other two providers but related to the inconvenience in preparing those patients for transport for delivery of therapy and the transport itself. For some patients who are required to undergo the preparation for transport and transport, that process can be quite painful. Patients have refused to be transported to receive radiation therapy and this has complicated their treatment. It would be a less uncomfortable process if the patients were undergoing the radiation therapy at the Petitioner's facility. Physician's practice patterns in this community where some physicians choose to practice in a single hospital notwithstanding their admission privileges in multiple hospitals complicates the issue in that a patient may be admitted to Petitioner's facility because the admitting physician chooses to practice there alone. Once a diagnosis is made and a decision reached that the patient in that hospital needs to undergo radiation therapy, the need to transport for those treatment ensues. Moreover, as suggested, the decision to utilize radiation therapy in the treatment is not ordinarily made at the initial moment of admission when health care professionals are trying to make the initial diagnosis concerning the patients complaints in deciding whether they are associated with cancer or not and if radiation therapy would benefit the patient or even in the instance where the patient is known to have a history of that illness whether radiation therapy is indicated. Therefore, there might not be a reason to try and place the patient in a facility that has inpatient radiation therapy available if that treatment regime upon evaluation does not seem indicated. The issue concerning the ability to transfer a patient from one facility to another for the overall hospitalization to include provision of inpatient radiation therapy such that a patient who has been determined to need radiation therapy could be transferred from Petitioner's facility to Intervenor's facility for overall care, while theoretically possible does not seem practicable. Additionally, the patients who receive outpatient radiation therapy through Petitioner's facility who would need at some future point in treating the condition to be transferred to another facility to receive radiation therapy once admitted as an inpatient in Petitioner's facility breaks the continuity of the management of the care by requiring the patient to undergo an evaluation by two different radiation therapists, disrupting the patient- physician relationship in a setting which is complicated by the patient's condition. Nonetheless, the quality of care is not so compromised by the need to transport for the inpatients at the Petitioner's facility to receive radiation therapy to conclude that it constitutes a reason standing alone to grant the certificate of need. In a similar vein, as contemplated by Section 381.705(1)(d), Florida Statutes, the availability and adequacy of other health care facilities and services and hospices in the service district of the applicant, such as outpatient care and home care services, which might serve as alternatives for the applicant's proposal have been considered. Out of that list, only the possibility of the use of outpatient care provided by the existing facilities who offer outpatient radiation therapy would arguably have pertinence to this inquiry. They would not constitute an available and adequate substitute for inpatient radiation therapy for reason that patients who are admitted to a hospital are distinguished from those who come to the facility from other places for purposes of receiving outpatient radiation therapy. That distinction has to do with the gravity of the condition of the patient which caused the patient to be admitted to the hospital in the first instance, and to receive, together with medical attention and other therapies, the provision of radiation therapy. Concerning that portion of Section 381.705(1)(h), Florida Statutes, which describes the applicant's need to address the availability of alternative uses of resources for the provision of other health services, that clause was referred to as an issue in the prehearing stipulation but was not advanced at the hearing. Through the prehearing stipulation the parties did not include reference to Section 381.705(1)(k), Florida Statutes, as a provision about which there was an agreement concerning compliance or the need to comply with its terms. The record reveals that the applicant and the existing providers address the need for radiation therapy of individuals who are not residing in the service district. This project does not appear to have a pronounced influence in improving or diminishing health care for persons not residing in the service district. Section 381.705(1)(l), Florida Statutes, addresses the probable impact of the project on the cost of providing health services proposed by the applicant and it takes into consideration the effects of competition on the supply of health services being proposed and any improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of health services which foster competition and serve as a promotion of quality assurance and cost effectiveness. Whether the applicant delivers services to the inpatients that it would gain with recognition of its application or some other entity serves the needs of those patients, the basic costs of providing health services would be relatively the same. The exception is the improvement in the circumstance of health care costs related to the transport of the patients from the Petitioner's facility to the two other facilities for provision of the radiation therapy of inpatients in the Petitioner's facility and the attendant costs of duplication of patient charges and professional fees charged by the physician therapist potentially associated with having a patient move from the status of an outpatient at the Petitioner's facility to an admitted patient at that facility who receives radiation therapy at one of the other two facilities while undergoing inpatient care in the Petitioner's facility. These additional costs in transport and potential for patient charges associated with procedures in the other two hospitals and physicians fees in those other two hospitals which are duplicative of efforts made by the Petitioner's outpatient radiation program in its procedures and the physician's fees associated with those outpatient radiation therapy procedures could be done away with if the project were approved. There is no indication of any significant improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of health services associated with this application which might foster competition and serve to promote quality assurance and cost effectiveness. The cost improvements that are discussed here standing alone do not justify the applicant being granted a certificate of need. The advent of an inpatient radiation therapy service will not be so adverse in its impact that it will cause the Intervenor or any other existing facility to lose financial viability concerning the ability to maintain an appropriate level of utilization of existing facilities. There are no costs of construction and the method of proposed construction need not be considered in that the construction has been concluded as previously discussed. Consequently, the necessity to address the costs and methods of the proposed constructions as described in Section 381.705(1)(m), Florida Statutes, is not relevant to the inquiry. Nor are the references within Section 381.705(2), Florida Statutes, having to do with capital expenditures pertinent to the outcome in examining the review criteria. LACK OF A VIABLE NEEDS FORMULA Respondent does not have a rule which calculates the need for inpatient radiation therapy by resort to a formula which derives need. Neither does the Respondent have an emergent policy which it is developing to formulate the amount of inpatient radiation therapy services needed in a given review cycle. Respondent and the private litigants have attempted to examine the need for inpatient radiation therapy contemplated by this application by devising various mathematical formulas to determine need. Each explanation is fundamentally flawed in that they fail to address the discrete issue contemplated for examination by the review process, that is the need for inpatient radiation therapy. Instead, these methods look at all radiation therapy both inpatient and outpatient. The statute does not contemplate that form of evaluation. It is the 10 to 15 percent of all radiation therapy patients that constitute the inpatients. It is the provision of care to those persons that is subject to examination. If need is to be derived by use of a formula, a knowledge of the circumstances existing for outpatients, a category of patient for whom no certificate of need must be obtained to serve them, should not enter in to the analysis. The formulas exercised by the parties in measuring the overall need for inpatient and outpatient radiation therapy services derive the answers by identifying the number of linear accelerators needed in the district or in one instance for the applicant's facility alone. In that exercise a count is made of the four linear accelerators in the district belonging to the two hospitals which have been granted certificates of need which would allow inpatient radiation therapy to be delivered as well as outpatient therapy and the three programs that serve outpatients on three additional linear accelerators. The total number of linear accelerators is seven counting the linear accelerator the Petitioner has to serve outpatients. No attempt by formula has been made to ascertain whether more than four linear accelerators found within the two hospitals who have certificates of need to provide inpatient radiation therapy service are warranted. Thought provoking questions have been raised by the several parties in critiquing the needs calculation made by an opponent or opponents. However, it is not necessary to choose among these competing theories because in selecting any theory one cannot derive the amount of inpatient radiation therapy services needed in the district. Furthermore, case law does not allow the trier of fact to utilize the basic information provided by the parties to construct a formula for determining need for inpatient radiation services independent of the efforts of the parties in the person of their experts whom they have consulted with on this subject. This means that the decision here must be made by a review of applicable criteria without resort to a preliminary determination of numeric needs. This has been done. On balance, when taking into account the combination of improvements to quality of care for a patient being transported from the Petitioner's facility to receive radiation therapy and the improvement concerning the removal of the cost of that transport and duplication of charges and fees for certain patients who move from an outpatient posture under treatment by the Petitioner and into an inpatient status with Petitioner receiving radiation therapy at one of the two other hospitals which has been discussed in preceding paragraphs, the project is justified and the application should be granted.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts, and in view of the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which declines jurisdiction to require a certificate of need for inpatient radiation therapy services or in the alternative grants a certificate of need for inpatient radiation therapy services. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1992.
Findings Of Fact On or about September 22, 1994, Byron Charles Todaro (Petitioner) filed an application for licensure as a massage therapist by examination with the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Massage (Respondent). On the application, Petitioner responded "yes" to the question that asked, in pertinent part, if he had "ever been convicted or found guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a crime in any jurisdiction", excluding parking and speeding tickets, with a plea of nolo contendere being considered a conviction. On or about September 7, 1982, Petitioner pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance (methaqualone) in the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida. The court withheld adjudication and imposed a fine. Also, in 1982, Petitioner pled guilty to driving under the influence/unlawful blood alcohol level and careless driving. On or about May 22, 1987, in the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida, Petitioner pled guilty to driving while his license was suspended. The court adjudged him guilty and, among other things, placed Petitioner on one (1) year probation and ordered him to participate in and successfully complete a drug evaluation and rehabilitation program. On or about March 3, 1988, the court vacated the adjudication and adjudication was withheld. On or about May 26, 1989, Petitioner pled guilty to a four-count criminal offense in the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida: Count I - possession of cocaine; Count II - possession of a controlled substance; Count III - possession of drug paraphernalia; and Count IV - possession of cannabis. As to Counts I and II, the court withheld adjudication and, among other things, imposed a 3-year probation and drug evaluation and treatment. As to Counts III and IV, the court, among other things, adjudicated Petitioner guilty. On or about November 25, 1992, in the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a five-count criminal offense: Count I - possession of a controlled substance (diazepam); Count II - possession of cannabis; Count III - possession of drug paraphernalia; Count IV - fleeing a police officer; and Count V - reckless driving. Regarding Counts I, II, and IV, the court, among other things, withheld adjudication and imposed a five (5) year and one (1) year drug offender probation (running concurrently). Regarding Counts III and V, the court, among other things, adjudicated Petitioner guilty. Furthermore, the court ordered an evaluation and random urinalysis. Less than one (1) year later, on or about July 20, 1993, in the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a two-count criminal offense: Count I - possession of cocaine with intent to deliver; and Count II - possession of a controlled substance. The court, among other things, withheld adjudication, placed Petitioner on 4 1/2 years of probation, and ordered Petitioner to attend and complete Concept House, followed by Broward Alcohol Recovery Center (BARC) and random urinalysis. The Concept House provides an inpatient drug rehabilitation program. Petitioner had voluntarily begun treatment at the Concept House in June 1993 and the court made it a mandatory part of his probation. Petitioner attended Concept House for six months. For the first three months, Petitioner had to remain at the Concept House, and for the last three months, he was allowed to leave only to seek employment or receive training but returned to the Concept House in the evenings. In December, 1993, Petitioner successfully completed the program at the Concept House. During his treatment at the Concept House, Petitioner was consistently tested by the Concept House, and no test was positive. BARC is an outpatient alcohol abuse program. Petitioner is currently attending BARC. Petitioner's probation officer supervises his treatment at BARC. Petitioner receives weekly drug testing at BARC. No test has been positive. In addition to the weekly testing at BARC, Petitioner receives a monthly urinalysis as part of his probation. No test has been positive. Petitioner received vocational rehabilitation training through the Concept House, and through this training, it was determined that massage therapy was a field which he could pursue. The Concept House funded Petitioner's schooling for massage therapy. On or about January 11, 1994, Petitioner entered the therapeutic massage training program at the Florida Institute. He successfully completed the program on or about June 14, 1994, with a scholastic average of 91.55 percent, using a grading scale of 100 percent. Petitioner's probation officer assisted him in getting admitted to the Florida Institute. Petitioner's drug cases involve personal use and consumption, not the sale or trafficking of drugs or conspiracy to sell or traffic in drugs. Petitioner has been drug free for almost 2 years. Petitioner's current probation is scheduled to end in 1998. He has applied to the court for early termination. Petitioner presented letters of recommendation from his probation officer who has contact with Petitioner on at least a monthly basis regarding his drug abuse and from his vocational rehabilitation counselor employed with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. The practice of massage involves a great degree of trust between the client and the practitioner. For a massage, a client disrobes to a point of comfort for the client, and in certain instances completely disrobes, and, therefore, a client must feel that he/she can trust the practitioner. The trust is both physical and psychological. Accompanying the trust is a high level of responsibility for the massage therapist who must guard and protect that trust. An applicant for licensure must demonstrate that he/she possesses that level of responsibility necessary to practice massage. Massage is a part of health care, being placed under the responsibility of the Division of Medical Quality Assurance of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. A substantial number of massage therapists (25 percent to 30 percent) are employed in medical areas such as physical therapy centers, hospitals and doctor's offices. Petitioner has no desire to work in a medical area and has been offered a position in a health spa upon licensure by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Massage enter a final order DENYING Byron Charles Todaro licensure as a massage therapist by examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of September 1995. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September 1995. APPENDIX The following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner 1. Rejected as being unnecessary as a finding of fact since no issue of standing exists. 2-4. Rejected as being unnecessary as a finding of fact. Rejected as being unnecessary, or argument. a. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. b. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. c-f. Rejected as being argument, or conclusions of law. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence. Petitioner admitted that he was currently on probation. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. i-j. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. k-l. Rejected as being argument, or conclusion of law. m-n. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6 and 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6, 8, 9, 15 and 16. Rejected as being argument, or conclusion of law. See Preliminary Statement Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 11. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Partially accepted in findings of fact 7, 8, 9 and 14. Respondent 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2 and 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Rejected as being unnecessary, or irrelevant. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Rejected as being argument, or conclusion of law. a. Rejected as being argument, or conclusion of law. Partially accepted in finding of fact 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Rejected as being argument, or conclusion of law. NOTE: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, cumulative, not supported by the evidence, argument, or conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Center 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0062 Roger S. Elkind, Esquire 2903 Salzedo Street, Suite 100 Coral Gables, Florida 33134-6618 Lee Ann Gustafson M. Catherine Lannon Assisant Attorneys General Administrative Law The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Sections 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(q), 458.331(1)(s), and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.42, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is licensed to practice medicine in the state of Florida. She holds license number ME 0028693. 3 Respondent, a native of Manila, Philippines, attended medical school and received her M.D. degree in 1965 from Manila Central University. She completed an internship and residency in OB-GYN in Manila before immigrating to the United States in 1968. Respondent became a citizen of the United States in 1972. She obtained her license to practice medicine in the state of Florida in 1973. Thereafter, Respondent completed a residency in general practice in Portsmouth, Virginia, and a residency in pathology in Norfolk, Virginia. She is not board certified. Prior to October 23, 1996, Respondent was engaged in a solo practice of general and family medicine. Except for this proceeding, Respondent has never been the subject of disciplinary action in connection with her medical license. She has never had a medical malpractice claim asserted against her. Fiorinal No. 3 or Fiorinal with codeine is a legend drug as defined by Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes. Fiorinal No. 3 is also a Schedule III controlled substance which is listed in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes. In March of 1991, Respondent began treating Patient G.C. for symptoms related to menopause and anxiety. Respondent's record of G.C.'s initial visit indicates that G.C. is allergic to penicillin and codeine. G.C. made 46 visits to Respondent's office from March 12, 1991 through February 21, 1995. On 37 of these visits, Respondent's records note G.C.'s allergy to codeine. On September 19, 1991, G.C. complained that her knee and calf on her right leg were hurting. Respondent ordered a venogram and prescribed Lorcet Plus for G.C. On December 13, 1991, G.C. complained that she had a cough, sore throat, and congestion. Respondent prescribed Lorcet Plus for G.C. in addition to other medication. G.C. made 15 visits to Respondent's office from June of 1995 through September of 1996. Respondent's records of these visits do not note G.C.'s allergy to codeine. Respondent did not charge G.C. for six of these visits. G.C. complained of pain and swelling in her left elbow on October 31, 1995. Respondent treated G.C. for bursitis and gave her a prescription for Fiorinal No. 3. Respondent did not charge G.C. for this visit. G.C. complained of pain in her elbow again on December 19, 1995. Respondent treated G.C. for bursitis and prescribed Fiorinal No. 3. Respondent did not charge G.C. for this visit. Respondent's records indicate that she saw G.C. for the last time on September 20, 1996. The records do not indicate the purpose of the visit. There is a notation which states, "Last time I'll give this Rx to her," followed by three prescriptions including Fiorinal No. 3. Respondent testified that she prescribed Fiorinal for G.C. because she had previously taken Lorcet with no problems or reactions. Lorcet, like Fiorinal, contains codeine. Allergic reactions to codeine can range from mere rashes to life-threatening problems. Accordingly, prescribing Fiorinal No. 3 for G.C. was contraindicated. Respondent concedes that G.C.'s medical chart was deficient in several ways. It failed to contain an adequate medical history, failed to reflect proper physical examinations, failed to reflect adequate tests and lab studies, and failed to fully document conditions/symptoms to warrant treatment rendered, including medications prescribed. Respondent and G.C. developed a social relationship in 1995. Respondent and G.C. were taking trips together, going out to eat together, and seeing each other quite often in a social setting. G.C. told Respondent that some investors in Sicily wanted to buy Respondent's medical practice. Respondent and the foreign investors could not agree on the terms of sale. Respondent lent G.C. a large sum of money in cash. G.C. would not re-pay the loan or acknowledge the debt. The friendship between G.C. and Respondent began to deteriorate. In March of 1996, G.C. contacted Lynn Flanders, a narcotics investigator from the Escambia County Sheriff's Department. G.C. informed Ms. Flanders that Respondent had written a prescription for Fiorinal No. 3 in G.C's name with the intention of diverting the medicine for her own consumption. The prescription was dated January 15, 1996. Respondent's records do not indicate that G.C. made a visit to Respondent's office in January of 1996. G.C. planned to meet Respondent at a restaurant on March 19, 1996. Before the meeting, Investigator Flanders had the prescription filled at a local drug store. She equipped G.C. with an audio listening device. Ms. Flanders also searched G.C.'s car and person. Finding no drugs or money in G.C.'s possession, the investigator gave the bottle of Fiorinal capsules to G.C. and sent her to meet Respondent at the restaurant. Investigator Flanders seated herself in the restaurant so that she could observe Respondent and G.C. during the meal. Respondent never left the table. Ms. Flanders was unable to observe G.C. when the confidential informant went to the ladies' room. The investigator did not see G.C. hand the prescription bottle to Respondent. After Respondent and G.C. ate lunch, they left the restaurant. Investigator Flanders subsequently discovered that the audio tape was inaudible. Ms. Flanders told G.C. to call the sheriff's office if the doctor gave her another prescription and asked her to get it filled. As referenced above, Respondent gave G.C. a prescription for Fiorinal No. 3 on September 20, 1996. Although the prescription was in G.C's name, Respondent intended to consume the medicine herself. G.C. contacted Investigator Flanders again. She told Ms. Flanders about the prescription. The investigator took the prescription and had it filled at a local drug store. G.C. planned to meet Respondent at another restaurant on September 15, 1996. Before the meeting, Investigator Flanders equipped G.C. with an audio listening device, searched her car and person, gave her the bottle of Fiorinal No. 3 capsules, and sent her to meet Respondent. Investigator Shelby and his partner arrived at the restaurant before G.C. or the Respondent. Investigator Shelby positioned himself in the restaurant so that he could observe G.C. and Respondent. Investigators located outside of the restaurant monitored the listening device. They recorded the conversation between Respondent and G.C. Investigator Shelby saw G.C. take the bottle containing 30 Fiorinal No. 3 capsules from her shirt pocket and pass it under the table to Respondent. Respondent leaned forward, accepted the bottle under the table, and placed it in her purse. Respondent left the restaurant and entered her vehicle. She was then placed under arrest. The bottle of medicine, containing 30 capsules, was recovered from her purse. Respondent's testimony that she did not intend to divert the narcotic for her own consumption is not persuasive. Criminal charges against Respondent are being processed through the Pretrial Intervention Program for nonviolent first offenders. Charges against Respondent will be dismissed if she does not commit any offense for ten months after March 27, 1997, and provided that she satisfactorily completes the program. As part of the ten-month probation, Respondent agreed to voluntary urinalysis and compliance with the mandates of her recovery program through the Physician's Recovery Network (PRN). Respondent has a history of chronic daily headaches and hypertension. She has been taking Fiorinal No. 3 which contains codeine and aspirin since 1972. Respondent was diagnosed with a bleeding ulcer just before her arrest in September of 1996. Her treating physician prescribed Fioricet which contains codeine but no aspirin. Respondent accepted this prescription without telling her treating physician about her codeine dependency. Respondent divorced her husband for the second time in August of 1996. Around the time of her arrest, Respondent experienced a lot of stress as a result of her relationship with her ex-husband. PRN is Florida's impaired practitioner program. Pursuant to contract with Petitioner, PRN offers educational intervention, treatment referral, and rehabilitation monitoring services for health care workers in Florida. The PRN's director, Dr. Roger Arthur Goetz, became aware of Respondent's arrest on October 3, 1996. On his recommendation, Respondent voluntarily agreed to undergo an evaluation by the following three doctors in Pensacola, Florida: (a) Dr. Rick Beach, an addiction specialist; (b) Dr. Doug H. Fraser, a board certified psychiatrist; and (c) Dr. Thomas Meyers, a psychologist. Dr. Beach and Dr. Meyers agreed that Respondent was impaired due to a substance abuse problem. All three doctors agreed that Respondent suffered from a depressive disorder and other psychological problems. Dr. Beach, the addictionologist, determined that Respondent had a dysfunctional relationship with her ex-husband, an unhealthy relationship with G.C., and a probable dependence on opiates. Dr. Fraser, Respondent's psychiatrist, diagnosed Respondent with generalized anxiety disorder and dysthymia. Generalized anxiety disorder is a life-long disorder from which the patient experiences a chronic sense of nervousness, tension, and worry. A patient suffering from this condition will have some physical symptoms such as gastrointestinal problems, headaches, muscle tension, or difficulty sleeping. Dysthymia is also a chronic life-long disorder which causes patients to suffer from chronic minor depression more days than not. On October 23, 1996, Respondent entered into a Voluntary Agreement to Withdraw from Practice with Petitioner. This agreement states that Respondent shall cease practicing medicine until Petitioner issues a Final Order in this case. On November 4, 1996, Respondent entered Jackson Recovery Center in Jackson, Mississippi. This facility was an in-patient substance abuse treatment center. Respondent's treating physician, Dr. Lloyd Gordon, admitted her for treatment with the following diagnosis: (a) Axis I, opioid dependence and dysthymia with anxiety; and (b) Axis II, avoidant and dependent traits. Respondent subsequently entered a residential treatment program, the Caduceus Outpatient Addictions Center (COPAC), in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. COPAC specializes in the treatment of physicians and other health care workers who abuse controlled substances. Respondent remained in this residential program for almost three months. She was discharged from COPAC on February 21, 1997. Respondent signed an Advocacy Contract with PRN the day that she was discharged from COPAC. The contract established a five-year monitoring period during which Respondent agreed to abide by certain terms and conditions, including but not limited to, the following: (a) to participate in a random urine drug and/or blood screen program; (b) to abstain from the use of controlled substances; (c) to attend group self-help meetings such as AA or NA; (d) to attend continuing care group therapy; and (e) to attend a twelve-step program for recovering professionals. In March of 1997, Respondent went to her office to see patients. She wrote prescriptions for some of these patients. She was under the impression that she could return to her practice because she had been therapeutically cleared to practice by COPAC. PRN learned that Respondent was practicing medicine in violation of her agreement to voluntarily withdraw from practice. PRN advised Respondent that she could not go into her office to see patients or write prescriptions until Petitioner gave her that right. Respondent immediately ceased her practice. Upon her discharge from COPAC, Respondent continued to see her psychiatrist, Dr. Fraser. In May of 1997, Respondent told Dr. Fraser that she was experiencing forgetfulness and panic attacks. She complained of having difficulty making decisions and sleeping. Respondent was feeling depressed and having suicidal thoughts. Dr. Fraser increased her antidepressant medication and referred her to a local counseling center. Respondent went to visit her family in California from May 25, 1997 through June 6, 1997. She did not tell Dr. Fraser that she was going out of town. However, she did tell one of the therapists from Dr. Fraser's office about the trip. Respondent saw Dr. Fraser again on June 18, 1997, when she returned to Pensacola. He made a tentative diagnosis of bipolar disorder and began appropriate treatment. Respondent was feeling better when she saw Dr. Fraser on June 25, 1997. Respondent moved to California to live with her sister on July 6, 1997. This move was necessary because Respondent had lost her home as well as her practice. While she was in California, Respondent saw a psychiatrist, Dr. Flanagan. She also attended AA meetings in California. Respondent returned to Pensacola a week before the hearing. She saw Dr. Fraser on August 21, 1997. Dr. Fraser was not aware that Respondent had been living in California and receiving treatment from Dr. Flanagan. During her visit with Dr. Fraser, Respondent admitted that she had a craving for codeine when she was tense. However, she denied use of any prescription drugs except those being currently ordered by her doctors. Respondent reported on-going mood swings even though Dr. Flanagan had increased her Depakote. She verbalized fantasies involving violent behavior toward G.C. Respondent revealed that she was experiencing grandiose delusions. She admitted that she was not ready to return to medical practice. Dr. Fraser concurs. Respondent needs intensive individual psychotherapy for at least six months on a weekly basis. At the time of the hearing, Respondent had not begun such therapy. The record indicates that Respondent was a caring and compassionate physician. Respondent's elderly patients testified that Respondent treated them with extraordinary concern when other doctors refused. Respondent's colleagues in nursing home settings attested to her skill and proficiency in the care of the elderly. None of these patients or associates were aware of Respondent's drug dependence or psychological problems before her arrest. Respondent is "in recovery" for her drug dependence. However, she is not mentally, emotionally, or psychologically ready to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety for her patients.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order indefinitely suspending Respondent's license to practice medicine until she is able to demonstrate the ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety followed by five years of probation with appropriate terms, conditions, and restrictions, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $4,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: John E. Terrel, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 James M. Wilson, Esquire Wilson, Harrell and Smith, P.A. 307 South Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Marm Harris, Executive Director Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Building 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
