The Issue The issue is whether the site plan for the Evergreens project should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this land use dispute, Petitioners, Meadowbrook Neighborhood Association, Inc.; Lynn Hill; A.A. Sulkes; Philip Bennett; Vera Harper; and Carlos McDonald (Petitioners), have contested a decision by the Developmental Review Committee (DRC) of Respondent, City of Tallahassee (City), to approve a Type B site review application for a project known as Evergreens at Mahan (Evergreens). In its decision, the DRC exempted the project from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan based upon a 1991 agreement by the City and the property owner which conferred vested rights on the property. Thus, the project was never reviewed for compliance with the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan. If the application is approved, the applicant will be authorized to commence the process for constructing 416 apartment units in ten three-story buildings on approximately 24.56 acres of land located just south of the intersection at East Mahan Drive and Riggins Road in Tallahassee, Florida. The apartment complex will be one of the largest in the City. The application was filed by Respondent, Genesis Group (Genesis), acting as an agent for the owner of the property, Respondent, George K. Walker, Trustee (Walker). After the application is approved, Walker is contractually obligated to sell the property to Respondent, TTK, L.L.C. (TTK), a New Hampshire developer, who will actually construct the complex. In response to the DRC's decision, on August 9, 2000, Petitioners filed a Notice of Intent to File Petition for Formal Proceedings. On August 28, 2000, Petitioners filed their Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings. As grounds for denying the application, Petitioners contended that a Stipulation and Final Settlement Agreement (Settlement Agreement) entered into by Walker and the City on August 6, 1991, in DOAH Case No. 91-4109VR determining that the property was presumptively vested violated in a number of respects the City's Vested Rights Review Ordinance (Ordinance); that any vested rights acquired on the property have expired under Section 18-104(1)(c), Code of Ordinances; and the site plan is inconsistent with the City's Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Code. As to the latter ground, the parties have agreed that this issue need not be addressed now, but rather it can be considered by the DRC in the event Petitioners prevail on the merits of this action. Other than the vesting status, no issues have been raised regarding the site plan itself. On September 11, 2000, the Commission entered its Determination of Standing. Pursuant to the Bylaws of the Commission, the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on September 20, 2000, for an evidentiary hearing. The parties Meadowbrook Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Association) is a not-for-profit corporation organized on February 18, 2000, and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. The Association represents approximately 200 of the 279 homeowners who reside in the Meadowbrook neighborhood. The Meadowbrook neighborhood is zoned for Residential Preservation-1 and has a residential density of less than three units per acre. A portion of the Meadowbrook neigborhood is adjacent to the proposed project. Lynn Hill, A.A. Sulkes, Philip Bennett, Vera Harper, and Carlos McDonald reside and own property in the Meadowbrook neighborhood. Their property either abuts, or is close to, the location of the proposed Evergreens project. All are members of the Association and bring this action in their individual capacity and as a member of the Association. During the course of the hearing, Respondents stipulated to the standing of all Petitioners. The City is a municipal corporation of the State of Florida. It has authority to review proposed site plans for real property located within the City's geographic boundaries. Genesis is a Tallahassee consulting firm which prepared the application for Walker and acted as his agent in seeking approval of the site plan for the Evergreens project. TTK, a New Hampshire limited liability corporation, is a developer and builder of real property, and has a contract to purchase the site of the Evergreens project pending final approval of the site plan by the City. Walker is the owner of the approximately 30-acre parcel (the subject property) which is at issue in this proceeding, and is the applicant for the Evergreens site plan. The Evergreens project will be located on 24.56 acres of this 30-acre parcel. The property and its history The subject property has been owned by the Walker family, either as a part of a consortium of investors or in trust, for more than 70 years. Since the mid-1960's, Walker has controlled the property as trustee for himself and his brother. The site of the apartment complex lies a few hundred feet south of the intersection of East Mahan Drive (U.S. 90) and Riggins Road. Approximately 11.738 acres of the land sit on the eastern side of Riggins Road while the remaining 12.821 acres sit on the western side. The remainder of the property, which consists of around 7 or 8 acres, is situated just north of the apartment site, fronts on East Mahan Drive, and is currently zoned commercial. The Meadowbrook neighborhood begins approximately 1,250 feet or so south of Mahan Drive and sits on around 100 acres. The boundaries of the neighborhood abut the southern and southeastern ends of the project site. The relevant history of the property goes back to January 9, 1926, when the original plat of Glenwood Estates was recorded in Leon County (County). The property was located in the County, but not within the City, and was owned by a group that included Walker's father. The subject property was identified in the plat as Blocks L and M. The Glenwood Estates plat did not contain any statements establishing use or density for the subject property. On April 7, 1943, Glenwood Estates was replatted for taxation purposes. Walker's mother, a widow and the heir of Walker's father, was among the owners of the property. The 1943 replat reconfigured the subject property as a single, large acre parcel. The replat does not contain any statements establishing uses or densities for the platted parcels. Prior to 1967, Glenwood Estates became the sole property of Walker's mother. Upon her death, the property was placed in trust for the benefit of Walker and his brother. George K. Walker is the named trustee of the property. On March 22, 1989, the remaining property owned by Walker was subdivided into three parcels; two of the small parcels on the southwestern corner of Riggins Road and Mahan Drive were sold, thereby reducing the size of the subject property by approximately 1.56 acres. By 1991, the 1943 replat of Glenwood Estates had been resubdivided a minimum of seven times which changed the replat substantially from its original configuration. Five of the resubdivisions involved the Meadowbrook tract. Since 1989, the subject property has been configured as a large parcel of approximately 30 acres. Since 1991, the subject property is the only property in the replat that Walker has owned. In addition to his ownership of the subject property, until 1971 Walker owned approximately 69 acres of land that presently constitute a large part of the Meadowbrook neighborhood. On October 6, 1971, Walker entered into a contract for the sale of that land. Among the conditions of the sale was a requirement that the property consisting of the Meadowbrook neighborhood be rezoned R-3; that the property that is the proposed apartment site be rezoned RM-2; and that the property fronting Mahan Drive be rezoned C-1. Costs of the rezoning were to be shared equally by the buyer and seller. At the time of this sale, the subject property and the Meadowbrook tract were undeveloped. In 1972, the County rezoned the property consisting of the Meadowbrook neighborhood as R-2 for single-family residential development; rezoned the approximately 25-acre portion of the subject property north of the Meadowbrook tract as RM-2, for multi-family residential development; and rezoned the property fronting Mahan Drive as C-1 for commercial development. The multi-family zoning on the property that is the proposed location for the Evergreen project authorized a range of dwelling units from single-family to two-family to multi-family up to a maximum of 17.4 units per acre. One of the conditions of the 1971 sale was the granting of an easement by Walker to the buyer (Collins Brothers) to extend Riggins Road south from Mahan Drive to the northern boundary of the Meadowbrook tract. At the time of the sale, there was no direct access from the Meadowbrook tract north to Mahan Drive. On an undisclosed date, Collins Brothers was forced into receivership. Therefore, between 1971 and 1980, there was no development on the Meadowbrook tract or the subject property, other than the roughing-out of the location of what was to become Riggins Road. In 1980, Guardian Mortgage Investors (Guardian) took over the previous buyer's interest. At that time, Walker entered into a road construction agreement with Guardian in which he agreed to pay one-half of the road construction costs to extend Riggins Road south from Mahan Drive to the Meadowbrook subdivision. Guardian agreed to pay one-half of the road construction costs as well as all of the cost for the installation of the main water and sewer trunk lines, except for laterals which were to be installed at Walker's expense. In 1981, the construction of Riggins Road and the main water and sewer trunk lines were completed. The minimum allowable width of Riggins Road from Mahan Drive to the northern boundary of the Meadowbrook tract was 30 feet. However, it was constructed 36 feet wide so that it could serve not only the Meadowbrooks neighborhood, but also Walker's future development. For the same reason, even though the minimum right-of-way for this section of Riggins Road was 60 feet, an extra 20 feet (or 80 feet in all) were dedicated for the right-of-way. No development has occurred on the subject property since this dedication. The sewer main serving the Meadowbrook neighborhood is a gravity feed system flowing into a pump station within the Meadowbrook neighborhood. From there, it is pumped into a force main to a point under or adjacent to Riggins Road approximately 50 feet into the property that is zoned RM-2. From there, the system is again a gravity feed system flowing north under Mahan Drive to another pump station. If the sewer system had been installed to serve only the Meadowbrook neighborhood, it could have consisted only of a forced main system between the two pump stations. However, because further development was anticipated, the developer installed a gravity feed system that flowed through the RM-2 property, through the C-1 property, and under Mahan Drive at considerably more expense than a forced main system. Both the water and sewer systems have the capacity to serve 670 domestic equivalent units in the RM-2 and C-1 portions of the subject property. Following their completion, the water and sewer facilities, and Riggins Road, were dedicated to the City. Since 1983 or 1984, the City has owned, operated, and maintained Riggins Road and the water and sewer lines from Mahan to the Meadowbrook neighborhood. On April 14, 1983, Walker petitioned the City to annex his property. By Ordinance No. 83-0-2185 adopted on December 30, 1983, the Walker property, the Meadowbrook neighborhood, and considerable other properties were annexed into the City. Prior to annexation, Walker received assurance from the City that the annexation would not affect his ability to develop the RM-2 and C-1 portions of his property. The City's vesting process On July 16, 1990, the City adopted its 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Concurrent with its adoption, the City adopted a Vested Development Rights Review Ordinance (Ordinance), which established "the sole administrative procedures and standards by which a property owner" could assert that he had acquired certain property rights and obtain a vested rights determination from the City. The Ordinance is codified as Article VII of Chapter 18 of the City's Code of Ordinances. The Ordinance established the administrative procedures and standards for common law or statutory vesting. A property that was determined to be vested under the Ordinance was exempt from the application of the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Once a property is found to be exempt, or vested, it retains that status in perpetuity. In order to claim vested development rights under the Ordinance, a property owner was required to apply for a vested rights determination with the City's Planning Department within 120 days of July 16, 1990. A failure to timely file an application constituted a waiver of any vested rights claim. However, a property owner whose property was located within a recorded subdivision, or unrecorded subdivision which the City determined had satisfied the City's infrastructure requirements, did not have to submit an application for a vested rights determination. In those cases, vested rights were "presumed," based upon the infrastructure requirements being satisfied, and the property was "presumptively" vested from the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan pursuant to Section III.1.a. of the Ordinance. The right of a property owner to assert that his property is presumptively vested can be made at any time, even today. After reviewing its land development records, on July 25, 1990, the City published in the Tallahassee Democrat a lengthy list of recorded and unrecorded subdivisions it had determined were presumptively vested from the concurrency and consistency requirements of the City's Comprehensive Plan. The subject property, identified on the City's tax rolls by Tax I.D. #11-28-20-071-000-0, was included within the City's list of presumptively vested recorded subdivisions. The notice stated that it was the City's intent to only exempt subdivisions for which streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for development had been completed by July 16, 1990. Recorded subdivisions included on the list of exempt subdivisions were presumed to have satisfied the infrastructure requirements. The City did not inspect recorded subdivisions to ensure compliance with the infrastructure requirements, but presumed the existence of the requisite infrastructure. Any recorded subdivision subsequently determined not to be in compliance with the infrastructure requirements could be removed from the exempt list. Unrecorded subdivisions were not included on the exempt list unless they had first been physically inspected to ensure compliance with the infrastructure requirements. Walker's application for vested rights On October 17, 1990, the City's Director of Growth Management instructed that Walker's property be removed from the list of exempt subdivisions due to the resubdivision of the original plat and because all of the infrastructure was not in place. At that time, however, there was no provision in the Ordinance that made resubdivision a factor in the determination of an exemption or vesting. On the other hand, the issue of infrastructure was a valid consideration. On November 13, 1990, Walker timely submitted an application for a vested rights determination on the basis that his property was entitled to vesting under the common law. The City assigned Number V.R.0195T to the application. On January 8, 1991, in accordance with Section III.3.b. of the Ordinance, the City Planning Department determined that the subject property was not vested and notified Walker that Application Number V.R. 0195T was denied. No reason was given. The letter of denial advised him of his rights to contest the planning staff's denial of his vested rights. On January 22, 1991, Walker notified the City of his decision to challenge planning staff's denial of his vested rights application. He elected to waive his right to a hearing before the City Staff Committee, and he requested a hearing before DOAH pursuant to Section III.3.c. of the Ordinance. On July 3, 1991, the City referred Walker's request for an administrative hearing to DOAH on the planning staff's denial of Application Number V.R.0195T. The request was assigned DOAH Case Number 91-004109VR. On July 9, 1991, the case was scheduled for a hearing on August 29, 1991. During the pendency of the DOAH case, and at the request of the City, Walker and his counsel met with representatives of the City, including a Planning Department staffer and an assistant city attorney. Before the meeting, Walker reconfirmed with City officials that his property had been rezoned to C-1, RM-2, and R-2 in 1972, and that the necessary water and sewer lines were in place to serve his property. After learning at the meeting that infrastructure for the property had already been built, the City agreed to find Walker's property vested to the extent that the infrastructure was in place. In other words, Walker would be allowed to develop as many units as the existing infrastructure would accommodate. After the meeting, Walker secured an affidavit from Wayne Colony, the engineer who designed the water and sewer system for the property and the southern extension of Riggins Road. In his affidavit dated August 6, 1991, Coloney attested that the sewer line between Mahan Drive and the Meadowbrook neighborhood was designed to serve the single-family residences, the RM-2 property and the C-1 property; that the sewer line had the capacity to serve 670 residential equivalent units in the RM-2 and C-1 portions of that property; and that the sewer had sufficient capacity for the maximum density of development on the RM-2 and C-1 portions of the property. A letter from the City's Water and Sewer Department dated August 1, 1991, also confirmed that the City had "the necessary water and sewer lines to serve the property." Finally, Riggins Road and the stormwater drain to serve the property had been completed in the early 1980's. With this information in hand, counsel for the City agreed that the property was presumptively vested. On August 6, 1991, or just prior to the scheduled administrative hearing, counsel for Walker and the City executed the Settlement Agreement which declared the subject property an exempt subdivision based upon Section III.1.a.1. of the Ordinance, and presumptively vested the property from the consistency and concurrency requirements of the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The Settlement Agreement authorized the development of the subject property for up to 670 residential equivalent units. The Settlement Agreement also stated that there was no time frame in which the Walker property was required to commence or complete development, and that the property was vested in perpetuity. On August 7, 1991, the Settlement Agreement was filed with DOAH. On August 8, 1991, an Order Approving Stipulation and Final Settlement Agreement was entered. Therefore, an administrative hearing was never held on Application V.R.0195T. Walker's application was one of hundreds of vested rights applications being processed by the City at that time. Although many of the specific details underlying the City's decision to approve the settlement are not known now because of the passage of time, the subsequent loss by the City of Walker's application file, and the sheer number of applications then being processed, the City Attorney is certain that he would have known about the petition and the underlying facts before he authorized the Assistant City Attorney to execute the agreement. Based on the information then available, the City Attorney now says that Walker clearly qualified for either common law or presumptive vesting. Petitioners contend that the Assistant City Attorney (and/or City Attorney) lacked authority to settle the case without obtaining specific prior authority from the City Commission; however, the more credible and persuasive evidence shows otherwise. This is true even though the Ordinance does not specifically address the settlement of vested rights cases. The City Attorney's policy is and has been to involve the affected City staff in settlement negotiations rather than negotiating without the consent of his client. Moreover, the present City Attorney, and his two predecessors, have always considered it a part of their inherent authority to settle litigation on the City's behalf when it is in the best interest of the City to do so. The only exception to this inherent authority is when there is a budgetary impact; in those cases, prior approval must be obtained before committing the City to spending money. Here, however, there was no fiscal impact resulting from the Walker settlement. Further, at no time after the Settlement Agreement was signed has the City Commission ever expressed its disagreement with the City Attorney's interpretation of the Ordinance, taken steps to curtail his inherent authority, or acted to vacate the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, in the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, it is found that the Assistant City Attorney, after consultation with the City Attorney and appropriate City staff, had the authority to execute the Settlement Agreement on behalf of the City without prior City Commission approval. Petitioners also contend that based upon the language in Section III.3.e.7. of the Ordinance, there was no authority for the hearing officer to approve the Settlement Agreement until a substantive review of the information which formed the basis for the agreement had been made. The cited provision sets forth the criteria upon which the decision of the hearing officer in a vested rights case must be based. They include an evidentiary presentation by the parties at a formal hearing, adherence to certain land use guidelines and relevant case law, and a recommended order at the conclusion of the proceeding. The City points out, however, that under its interpretation of the Ordinance, once the parties learned that the property was exempt and the dispute had been settled, the criteria in Section III.3.e.7. did not apply. In those situations, no useful purpose would be served in requiring the parties to go through the formality of a de novo hearing. Otherwise, the parties (including the taxpayers) would be required to expend time, resources, and energy to litigate a matter in which no material facts were in issue. Accordingly, the City's interpretation of the Ordinance is found to be the most logical and reasonable, and it is found that the DOAH hearing officer had the authority to accept the parties' settlement without conducting a hearing. Petitioners next contend that when the Settlement Agreement was executed, the City lacked sufficient evidence to show that Walker had installed the infrastructure necessary for presumptive vesting. More specifically, they assert that except for Wayne Colony's affidavit, and the letter from the City, there was no evidence to support that determination. Petitioners go on to contend that not only must the primary roadways and water and sewer lines be built before the vesting cut-off date, but the "on-site" water and sewer lines, stormwater facilities, and other facilities necessary to begin vertical construction on each apartment building must also be in place. This contention is based on Section III.1.a.1. of the Ordinance which requires that in order for a subdivision to attain exempt status, the "streets, stormwater management facilities, utilities, and other infrastructure required for the development must have been completed as of July 16, 1990." The City Attorney's testimony on this issue is found to be the most persuasive. According to his interpretation of the Ordinance, only that infrastructure necessary to serve the subdivision must be completed in order to qualify for vesting. Conversely, on-site or private infrastructure does not have to be completed in order to satisfy the terms of the Ordinance. Therefore, on-site infrastructure is not a factor in determining whether a property qualifies for an exempt status. Indeed, as the City Attorney points out, if Petitioners' interpretation of the Ordinance were accepted, there would be "no vested lots in the City" since infrastructure is never extended from the public street to the lot prior to its development. Finally, Petitioners contend that the Settlement Agreement is invalid because Walker's application in DOAH Case No. 91-4109VR was for common law vesting while the Settlement Agreement made a determination that the property was presumptively vested. As a practical matter, there is no difference between property being exempt or being vested. Under either category, the property would not have to meet the requirements of the Comprehensive Plan. Here, the evidence shows that Walker's property qualified for both common law and presumptive vesting. Since the two types of vesting have the same practical effect, the validity of the Settlement Agreement has not been impaired. Expiration of vested rights Sections II.5.a., d., and i. of the Ordinance provide, respectively, that for purposes of a vested rights determination, an "[e]xempt subdivision," "[f]inal subdivision plat approval," or "[a]ny other development order which approved the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use and which allowed development activity on the land for which the development order was issued" shall be deemed a final development order. Section IV.1.c. of the Ordinance provides that "[a]ll final development orders shall expire in one year or such shorter time as may be adopted unless it is determined that substantial development has occurred and is continuing in good faith." Petitioners argue that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a "development order" within the meaning of the foregoing provisions of the Ordinance, and because no activity has occurred on the land since the Settlement Agreement was approved in 1991, the development order has expired by operation of the law. For the following reasons, this contention has been rejected. The Settlement Agreement did not approve "the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use" and did not allow "development activity on the land." Further, it did not allow the owner to pull building permits and commence development on his land. Rather, it simply determined which set of rules and regulations (pre-1990 or post-1990) Walker had to comply with in order to develop his property. Therefore, it cannot be "[a]ny other development order which approved the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use and which allowed development activity on the land for which the development order was issued." At the same time, a recorded subdivision such as Glenwood Estates is "complete" since all necessary infrastructure is in place. It has no expiration date, and no further development remains to be done to show "continuing good faith," as that term is used in the Ordinance. Therefore, even if the Walker property technically meets the definitions of an "exempt subdivision" or a "final subdivision plat approval," the expiration provisions of the Ordinance still do not apply. Finally, the City has never applied the expiration provisions of the cited provision to terminate the exempt status of a recorded subdivision, nor has it construed a vested rights determination as being a "final development order" within the meaning of the Ordinance. This interpretation of the Ordinance is found to be reasonable, and it is hereby accepted. Equitable estoppel As noted earlier, when Walker sold the Meadowbrook tract (69 acres) to Collins Brothers in 1972, he made the sale contingent on his obtaining not only residential zoning for the Meadowbrook tract, but also upon obtaining commercial and multi-family zoning on the remainder of the tract. Thus, he sold the site in reliance on his ability to develop the remainder of the tract in conformance with his master plan. As a part of that sale, Walker gave the purchasers credit towards the purchase price to defray one-half of the cost of installing the infrastructure for the entire 100-acre parcel, again in reliance on his ability to develop the property. When Collins Brothers defaulted, he paid the successor developer (Guardian) the money necessary to defray one-half of the cost of the communal infrastructure, and he paid additional funds for water and sewer taps and a storm drain, again in reliance on his ability to develop the property. Walker also petitioned the City to annex his property in the early 1980's based on a representation by the City that the annexation would not affect his ability to develop his property. After the annexation, Walker has continued to pay property taxes to the City based upon the value of the property to be developed under the property's C-1 and RM-2 zoning. In addition, Walker encumbered his property to secure loans in reliance on his ability to develop it in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. After the Settlement Agreement was approved, the City adopted a site-specific zoning plan which impacted Walker's property. Walker agreed to reduce the maximum density he might otherwise have obtained through litigation in reliance upon the City's representation that the Settlement Agreement remained in effect and that his rights under that Agreement would survive in perpetuity. Finally, Walker has entered into an option contract for the sale of his property to TTK based upon the validity of the Settlement Agreement. He has also expended substantial monies to further that sale and to develop his site plan. Other contentions Petitioners have also contended in their Proposed Recommended Order that "[t]he creation of new lots through the re-subdivision of the parent parcel [in 1989] subjects the property under review to the consistency and concurrency provisions in the City's 2010 Comprehensive Plan." Because this contention was not raised in the initial pleading or in the parties' Joint Pretrial Statement, it has been disregarded. Finally, the Association points out that multiple three-story apartment buildings will be constructed immediately adjacent to single-family homes in the Association with only an 8-foot fence and a 30-foot setback dividing the two areas. In addition, its members logically fear that the project will generate additional traffic, crime, and pollution and result in the lowering of property values in the neighborhood. It also asserts that the developer has never been willing to sit down with neighborhood members and attempt to compromise on any design aspect of the apartment complex. While these concerns are obviously legitimate and well- intended, they are not relevant to the narrow issues raised in this appeal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission enter a final order granting the Type B site plan review application filed by George K. Walker which determined that his property is presumptively vested. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth D. Goldberg, Esquire 1725 Mahan Drive, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5201 Linda R. Hurst, Esquire City Hall, Second Floor 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731 Jay Adams, Esquire Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1804 Jean Gregory, Clerk Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission City Hall 300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1731
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for nonconforming status on his property at 1607 and 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road, Gainesville, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of facts filed by the parties, the following findings of fact are determined: Mr. Mayhew resides in Hawthorne, which is located in the southeastern portion of Alachua County (County). (Some papers filed in this case identify his residence as being in Cross Creek, rather than Hawthorne, but with the same street address.) Since November 1998, he has owned property at 1607 and 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road, Gainesville, Florida. More specifically, the property is in an older, single-family residential neighborhood known as Florida Park which is located several blocks west of U.S. Highway 441, which runs in a north-south direction through the City, and approximately one-quarter mile north of Northwest 8th Avenue. In broader geographical terms, the property is located around one mile north of the University of Florida campus. There are two structures (or units) on Petitioner's property. One is a three-bedroom, two-bath dwelling constructed by the original owner (Mr. Gainous) in 1949, who occupied that dwelling with his wife. That unit's address is listed on the County Property Appraiser's records as 1607 Northwest 12th Road. The second structure, a two-bedroom, one-bath dwelling (also referred to as a "cottage"), was built by Mr. Gainous in 1957, and was apparently used primarily as rental property by the owner. The address of the second unit on the Property Appraiser's records is 1607 1/2 Northwest 12th Road. Separate gas meters and a single water line and electric meter serve the two units. (Although the two units are given separate street addresses by the Property Appraiser, only one tax bill is issued by the County Tax Collector.) When these structures were built, the County did not issue building permits. The property was in the unincorporated area of the County until 1961, when the City annexed the property. In 1964, the City adopted its first zoning plan and placed the property in what was then known as the Single-Family Residential (R-1a) zoning district. This category was used since the property was "closely consistent" with that zoning classification. A few years later, the property was rezoned to the Residential Single-Family zoning district (RSF-1), which apparently replaced the R-1a zoning district, and it still remains in that zoning classification. Under current zoning regulations, unless a property has "legal" nonconforming status, two family dwellings are not permitted in the RSF-1 zoning district. However, if a structure and use of land was in existence before the City annexed the property and adopted its zoning code, and was not otherwise shown to have lost that status, the nonconforming use is grandfathered and allowed "to continue until [it is] removed" or otherwise conflicts with conditions pertaining to nonconforming lots, uses, or structures. See § 30-346, Code of Ordinances. (Nonconforming status allows the owner to rent each unit on the parcel to no more than three unrelated persons. Thus, six unrelated persons could legally occupy Mr. Mayhew's two units. However, Mr. Mayhew has always rented to smaller numbers of tenants, and then only to graduate students or "professionals.") One way a property can lose its status is for the owner to not use the property in a nonconforming status for nine consecutive months. In the case of a rental property, this means that the owner has not rented the property for at least nine consecutive months. If this occurs, the owner is presumed to have abandoned the nonconforming status. See § 30-346(5)(d), Code of Ordinances. The precise date on which the City began using the nine-month time period is unknown. According to Mr. Calderon, this time period has been in the Code of Ordinances for "awhile," it was in the Code of Ordinances when "Citywide zoning" was first used in 1982, and he implied that it was in the first zoning code adopted in the 1960s. The City has no formal process by which it monitors properties to ensure that they continue to meet the requirements for legal nonconforming status. Generally, the issue arises after a complaint is filed by a third party or an inspection is made by City officials, who then require that the owner confirm (or prove) that the property still qualifies for that status. In this case, in October 2006, the tenant who occupied the cottage filed a complaint with the City concerning the installation of a new gas stove and other possible code violations. Prior to that time, no other complaints had been lodged against Mr. Mayhew's property. In response to that complaint, a code enforcement officer, Michael Wohl, inspected the property. During the course of that inspection, Mr. Wohl noticed that there were two rental units on one parcel of land. As a routine part of the inspection process, Mr. Wohl made an inquiry to determine if Mr. Mayhew had a landlord permit for each unit. Under the Code of Ordinances, a landlord permit is required for each rental unit. (The specific provision in the Code of Ordinances which imposes this requirement was not given.) According to Mr. Calderon, this requirement has been in the Code of Ordinances since 1989. Mr. Wohl learned that Mr. Mayhew had purchased one landlord permit for the parcel in the year 2000 (and had renewed that permit each year) but did not have a second permit. (When he purchased the property in late 1998, Mr. Mayhew did not know that such permits were even required. He obtained one as soon as this was brought to his attention.) After Mr. Mayhew advised Mr. Wohl that he was unaware that a permit was needed for each unit on his property, Mr. Wohl spoke with Mr. Calderon, who instructed Mr. Wohl to verify if the property was a legal nonconforming use (and therefore could qualify for two landlord permits) since it was located in a single-family zoning classification. Shortly thereafter, a citation was issued to Petitioner. The specific nature of the citation was not disclosed. In any event, by letter dated September 25, 2006, Mr. Calderon requested that Mr. Mayhew provide documentation to support the nonconforming use of the cottage at 1607 1/2 NW 12th Road as an accessory dwelling unit. In response to Mr. Calderon's request, on October 2, 2006, Mr. Mayhew submitted a lengthy letter with supporting documentation, including photographs of the units; copies of rental agreements of tenants who had rented the cottage since he had purchased the property in November 1998; information regarding the date of construction of the two units; and Property Appraiser records showing two units on the parcel. On December 7, 2006, the Department advised Mr. Mayhew by letter that "[b]ased on the physical evidence, property appraiser records and documents provided by you, the property is therefore classified as an existing non-conforming two-family development and is subject to regulations governing non-conforming uses." However, because the City apparently has a policy of notifying residents who live within 300 feet of the subject property of this type of decision, the City also issued on the same date a Notice of Decision to Issue Non-Conforming Status to Petitioner's Property (Notice)." (The record is unclear whether this notice was given pursuant to a policy or a specific Code provision. Other provisions within the Code of Ordinances provide for such notice when the Board conducts hearings on variances, appeals alleging error by an administrative official, and requests for special zoning exceptions. See § 30-354(h)(6)(i)-(k), Code of Ordinances.) In response to the Notice, affidavits were filed by a number of residents who lived adjacent to, or near, the subject property. After reviewing those affidavits, on December 20, 2006, the Department advised Petitioner by letter that based on "new information . . . submitted by affected persons within 300 feet of your property . . . [the] staff [is going to] reconsider the nonconforming status of your property." On January 25, 2007, Mr. Calderon issued a letter denying Mr. Mayhew's request for the following reasons: I have reviewed the information you submitted and those submitted by surrounding property owners. Based on the information and affidavits, there appears to be no consensus or conclusive data establishing emphatically that the subject property has been used consistently as a two-family development since annexation into the city. Evidence from the property owner would suggest that since 1998, the subject property has been used as a two- family dwelling and that no nine-month period has elapsed where the property was not used as a two-family dwelling. However, due to uncertainty for the period around and prior to 1998, staff cannot make a determination about the status of the development around and prior to 1998. Staff cannot determine whether the subject property was illegal, legal non-conforming or lost its non-conforming status at the time of ownership change in 1998. Since the current zoning of the subject property is RSF-1 (Single-family residential, 3.5 dwelling units per acre), the current use as a two-family dwelling is not permitted. Staff is therefore denying the request on the basis that available information cannot demonstrate continued use of the property as a two-family development, since annexation into the [C]ity of Gainesville. On February 8, 2007, Mr. Mayhew filed his appeal of that decision. Because Mr. Mayhew alleged that there were disputed issues of material fact, the appeal was forwarded to DOAH, rather than the Board. In his appeal, Mr. Mayhew alleged that the City had improperly relied on affidavits from neighbors to reconsider its decision, that there was no new evidence submitted to support a change in the City's initial decision, and that he could not get a fair hearing from the Board because several members of the Board live in the affected neighborhood or are members of a neighborhood association that includes the Florida Park area. Section 30-346(5)(d), Code of Ordinances, as amended in November 2006, provides the following restrictions on nonconforming uses: Whenever a nonconforming use of land or a building or other structure or any portion thereof is abandoned or the use is discontinued for a continuous period of nine months or more, such abandonment or discontinuance shall be presumed to constitute an intention to abandon or discontinue such use, and such use shall no longer be permitted. Any subsequent use of such building or structure or land shall be in conformity with the provisions of this chapter. Although this section was amended in November 2006, the amendment did not affect (or otherwise change) the nine- month time period for losing a nonconforming use. Prior to the amendment, the section provided that if a nonconforming use was lost due to abandonment or discontinuation, the reestablishment of the use could be authorized by the Board, after hearing, if the Board found the design, construction, and character of the building not suitable for the uses in the district in which the nonconforming use is situated. Under the new amendment, that option no longer exists. The history note to this provision indicates that the original ordinance (No. 3777) was adopted on June 10, 1992, and was later amended on July 25, 1994.1 (However, Mr. Calderon indicated that the nine-month period dates back many years before the adoption of this particular Ordinance. See Finding of Fact 5, supra.) When an owner is required to demonstrate that his rental property has continuously retained its nonconforming status, he must show that the property has been continuously rented (with no nine-month breaks) not only for the period of time that he has owned the property, but also for the entire time the property has enjoyed nonconforming status, or in this case since the property was annexed by the City. Thus, Mr. Mayhew was obligated to show that the original owners (Mr. and Mrs. Gainous) rented the property continuously from the time the property was annexed in 1961 until it was sold to Mr. Mayhew in late 1998. The City's practice is to determine nonconforming status on a case by case basis but the burden is on the owner to prove that status through records such as building permits, landlord permits, zoning compliance permits, and occupational licenses, and "records from reputable sources." The parties agree that both units were continuously rented by Mr. Mayhew since the time he purchased the property in November 1998. The dispute here is whether the nonconforming use was abandoned for any nine-month period prior to Mr. Mayhew's purchase of the property. The City contends that Mr. Mayhew has presented no evidence to show that the cottage was rented by the prior owner from 1996 until the property was sold in late 1998. Although Mr. Mayhew clearly established (and the City agrees) that the property has been continuously rented since he purchased the parcel in late 1998, he conceded that the cottage was vacant when he purchased the property, that he had made no inquiry to the seller as to how long the cottage had been vacant, and that he had no personal knowledge regarding the rental history of the property during the three years preceding the purchase. He contended, however, that there are always periods of time when a unit remains vacant while the owner is actively seeking a new tenant or when necessary renovations must be made. While this is true, there is no evidence that this occurred during the years 1996, 1997, or 1998. (It is unknown where Mrs. Gainous presently resides, or even if she is still alive. When the property was sold in late 1998, Mrs. Gainous was described as being elderly and in poor health.) Significantly, City records show that Mrs. Gainous had secured landlord permits to rent the cottage from 1989 (when permits were first required) through 1995, but she had failed to obtain any permits for the years 1996, 1997, or 1998, at which time she sold the property to Mr. Mayhew. This raises a logical inference, not overcome by Mr. Mayhew, that she did not rent the cottage during those years. In addition, Dr. Kosch, who has lived across the street from the subject property for the last twenty years, testified that he personally observed several periods of time before the property was sold to Mr. Mayhew when there were no tenants in the cottage. Although Dr. Kosch could not specifically identify the exact time periods when this occurred (due to the passage of time), his testimony adds further support to a finding that there is insufficient evidence that the cottage was rented continuously (without any nine-month breaks) during the years 1996-1998. Mr. Mayhew purchased the property with the understanding that he could legally rent both units. While it may seem unfair for him to now have to prove that the property has been continuously rented (with no breaks exceeding nine consecutive months) since the 1960s, this interpretation of the Code of Ordinances has always been followed by the City without exception. According to Mr. Wohl, this situation has occurred at least 8 or 9 times in the last few years alone, and in each case, the property owner was required to prove a continued nonconforming use since the property was annexed by the City or placed in a more restrictive zoning classification.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Environmental Coalition of Broward County, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Coalition"), is a Florida corporation. The Coalition has offices located in Broward County. The Coalition has approximately 500 members, most of whom reside in Broward County. A substantial number of the Coalition's members own property in Broward County and/or operate businesses within Broward County. The Coalition is a not-for-profit corporation, chartered for educational and scientific purposes. The primary purpose of the Coalition is to present objections and recommendations to local governments concerning planning issues on behalf of its membership. The Coalition is authorized to participate in actions of this type and to represent its membership in administrative proceedings. The Coalition presented oral and written objections to Broward County during the review and adoption process concerning the plan amendment at issue in this proceeding. Respondent, the Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of implementing the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Among other things, the Department is required to review local government comprehensive plans and amendments thereto for compliance with the Act. Respondent, Broward County (hereinafter referred to as the "County"), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County is the local government with the authority pursuant to the Act and the Broward County Charter to adopt and amend a comprehensive plan. The County has adopted the 1989 Broward County Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"). The Broward County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the "County Commission"), is the local planning agency for the County. The County Commission is advised on land use planning issues by the Broward County Planning Council (hereinafter referred to as the "Planning Council"). The Planning Council was created by the County Charter. Intervenors, Miramar Lakes, Inc., d/b/a Miramar Rock, Robert A. Whitcombe, Trustee, and the South Broward Trust own or have under contract virtually all of the property affected by the Plan amendment which is the subject of this proceeding. These Intervenors have entered into a joint venture agreement with Intervenor Atlantic Gulf Communities Corporation to develop the subject property. Intervenors applied for the amendment that is the subject of this proceeding and presented oral or written comments, recommendations and objections during the period of time between the transmittal hearing and adoption of the subject Plan amendment. The County's Plan. The County adopted a comprehensive plan as required by the Act in 1989. The planning horizon of the plan is 2010. The Plan includes two volumes of text, two volumes of support documents and associated maps. See Petitioner's exhibit 8. Volume One is text and is effective countywide. Volume Three contains support documents for the Plan. The Plan also includes the 1989 Broward County Future Land Use Plan Map (Series) (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUM"). The FLUM depicts the proposed distribution, extent and location of categories of land uses allowed under the Plan. Among others, those land uses include "residential" at various densities and "agricultural". Pursuant to the Plan, the eastern approximately one-third of the County may be developed. The developable area consists of approximately 400 square miles of land area. The western approximately two-thirds of the County are designated as water conservation areas and are separated by a levee from the developable one- third. Future land use elements of municipal comprehensive plans in the County must be in substantial conformity to the Plan. The Subject Property. The property which is the subject of the Plan amendment at issue in this case consists of 1,280 acres of a total of 1,965 acres (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"). The Property is located in the City of Miramar, in southwest Broward County, Florida, Sections 25, 26, 27 and 36, Township 51 South, Range 39 East. The Property is located in the southwestern portion of the developable one-third of the County. See Map 1 of Broward County exhibit 1. The Property is bounded on the east by S.W. 184th Avenue and on the north by Honey Hill Road. It is east of U.S. Highway 27. Part of the Property is vacant. Part of the Property is being used as cattle pasture and for a rock mining, batching, mixing and crushing operation. Existing land uses in the vicinity of the Property include vacant land, rock mining and some development to the north, single-family residential development to the east, rock mining and vacant land to the south, in Dade County, Florida. Residential development immediately to the east in a development known as "Silverlakes" is being developed at a density of three dwelling units per acre. Further to the west of the Property is the eastern boundary of the water conservation areas of the Everglades. These areas are separated from the rest of Broward County by a levee. The land use designation of the Property and other property in the surrounding area is "agricultural". Under the Plan, the land use designation allows agricultural uses and residential development of one dwelling per 2.5 acres. Under its current land use designation, a total of 786 dwelling units may be developed on the Property. The First Amendment Requested by the Intervenors. In early 1994 Intervenors filed an application with the County seeking an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Low (2) Residential". "Low (2) Residential" allows the development of two dwelling units per acre. The Planning Council conducted a review of the proposed amendment. The Broward County Department of Natural Resource Protection raised objections to the proposed amendment because the Property is located in an area of water recharge and wetlands. The area is identified as within a general wetlands area on the "Southwestern Generalized Wetlands Map" of the Plan. 30 Based upon the objections of the County Department of Natural Resource Protection, the staff of the Planning Council recommended denial of the proposed amendment. The South Florida Water Management District (hereinafter referred to as the "SFWMD"), an agency with broad regional responsibility for water management in southeast Florida, raised objections with the Planning Council concerning the location of the property in an area which was being considered for use as part of a project to restore the Everglades. The SFWMD was concerned that the Property is located within an area which has come to be known as the "East Coast Buffer". In early 1994, at the time of the initial review of the proposed amendment, the East Coast Buffer was a study area abutting the eastern water conservation areas of southeast Florida. The SFWMD was studying the East Coast Buffer for use in water conservation efforts in southeast Florida. At the time of the first review of the proposed amendment, the portion of the East Coast Buffer in which the Property is located was being considered for preservation as a reservoir site. The Planning Council transmitted the proposed amendment to the County Commission without recommendation. The County Commission decided not to transmit the proposed amendment to the Department for its review, ending review of the initial application. The Initial Review of the Subject Amendment. A second application on the Property was resubmitted by the Intervenors in March of 1994. The application was designated Application PC 94- 15. Application PC 94-15 sought an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". "Irregular 1.5 Residential" allows 1.5 dwelling units per acre. The amendment sought by Intervenors would have allowed an increase from 786 dwelling units to 2,947 dwelling units on the Property. An increase of 2,161 units. Application PC 94-15 was again reviewed. The same comments about, and objections to, the proposed amendment were raised concerning groundwater and aquifer recharge. The staff of the Planning Council again recommended denial of the proposed amendment. 41 The Planning Council recommended transmittal of the application, subject to the Intervenors satisfying the concerns raised by the SFWMD. On August 17, 1994, the County Commission transmitted Application PC 94-15 to the Department, conditioned upon the Intervenors satisfying the concerns of the SFWMD. The SFWMD objected to Application PC 94-15 because of its conclusion that the proposed future land use designation was not compatible with the East Coast Buffer then under evaluation by the SFWMD. SFWMD had developed data and conducted computer modeling concerning the utilization of a buffer for a variety of purposes, including reducing seepage of water from the Everglades, increasing groundwater recharge into aquifers and creating a natural buffer to protect the Everglades from the impacts of development. The SFWMD had commissioned a worldwide engineering firm, CH2M Hill to prepare a report on the East Coast Buffer. The SFWMD recommended that Application PC 94-15 not be approved until it had completed its study of the East Coast Buffer because the land use designation being sought might be incompatible with the conclusions reached from the SFWMD's and CH2M Hill's evaluation. The Department reviewed Application PC 94-15 and, based upon comments from the SFWMD similar to those raised before the County Commission, issued an Objections, Recommendations and Comments report concerning Application PC 94-15. The Department raised objections consistent with the adverse comments from the SFWMD. Modification of the Proposed Amendment. Parts of southwestern Broward County and northwestern Dade County were designated "Management Unit 5" by the SFWMD. Management Unit 5 was being considered, as recommended by CH2M Hill, as a reservoir area. Development of the Property was, therefore, not considered to be a use comparable with the concept of the East Coast Buffer being considered by the SFWMD at the time of the County's and Department's decision to reject Application PC 94-15. Intervenors worked with the SFWMD in an effort to find a way of modifying Application PC 94-15 to satisfy the SFWMD's concerns. SFWMD utilized computer modeling to simulate groundwater and surface water flows in Management Unit 5 to determine the impact of allowing development of the Property. The SFWMD concluded that Management Unit 5 was more suitable as a recharge area rather than as a reservoir. This conclusion was based, in part, of the transmissibility of the soil and other site conditions which were not conducive to storing water above ground for long periods of time. Use of Management Unit 5 as a recharge area and not a reservoir requires less surface area. Therefore, it was concluded that development in the area might be compatible with the SFWMD's East Coast Buffer concept. The SFWMD modeled four development alternatives for Management Unit 5 and analyzed the impact of each alternative on the efforts to retard seepage, provide groundwater recharge and enhance wetland benefits: (a) retaining the Property as a recharge area and allowing no development; (b) retaining the entire western two-thirds as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern one-third; (c) retaining the western one-third as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern two-thirds; and (d) allowing development of the entire management unit. Alternatives (b) and (c) assumed that a berm would be constructed between the recharge area and the developed area. After meeting with Intervenors and discussing the results of the modeling, Intervenors indicated willingness to remove the western portion of the Property from the proposed development. The SFWMD then conducted a more detailed, computer analysis of the following alternatives: (a) continuing existing conditions; (b) constructing a berm around Management Unit 5 and utilizing the entire area as a recharge area; (c) constructing a berm between the eastern and western sections of the Management Unit 5 and utilizing the western section for recharge with no development in the eastern section; and (d) alternative "(c)" with development of the eastern section. As a result of computer modeling of the alternatives, it was concluded that alternatives (b), (c) and (d) could significantly reduce seepage from the Everglades and increase groundwater recharge in to the aquifers when compared to development under the agricultural land use designation of alternative (a). As a result of the more detailed analysis, the SFWMD concluded that essentially all of its goals could be achieved for Management Unit 5 if the western section of Management Unit 5 is preserved even if development is allowed in the eastern section. The SFWMD concluded that the eastern two-thirds of the Property, consisting of approximately 1,280 acres, could be developed as "Irregular 1.5 Residential" if the western one-third, consisting of approximately 685 acres, was utilized as a recharge area. Intervenors agreed to preserve the western third of the Property (685 acres) and grant the SFWMD a flowage easement, consistent with the East Coast Buffer and at a savings of $43 million. On December 14, 1994, the staff of the SFWMD presented the results of the computer modeling to the SFWMD. On December 15, 1994, the SFWMD withdrew its objection to Application PC 94-15, conditioned upon the deletion of the 685 acres from the application and the granting of a flowage easement. The County and the Department were informed of the decision of the SFWMD. Approval of Application 94-15. On December 20, 1994, the County Commission adopted by Ordinance 94-55 an amendment to the Plan, Amendment PC 94-15 (hereinafter referred to as the "Amendment"), subject to the conditions suggested by the SFWMD, which resolved the SFWMD's objections. The Amendment included modifications to the FLUM and text amendments. The Amendment, in relevant part, modifies the future land use designation of approximately 1,280 acres of the Property from "Agricultural" to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". This will allow the construction of a total of 1,920 dwelling units on the Property, or an increase of 1,408 dwelling units over the number of dwelling that may be constructed under the current future land use designation for the Property. In light of Intervenor's modifications of the application, the removal of the SFWMD's objections and the approval of the application by the County, the Department found the Amendment to be in compliance with the Act. On February 14, 1995, the Department issued a notice of intent to find the Amendment in compliance. The County and the Department accepted and relied upon the data and methodology employed by the SFWMD and the conditions for removal of the SFWMD's objections. Petitioner's Challenge. On or about March 8, 1995, Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Department challenging the Amendment. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on April 25, 1995. At the commencement of the final hearing, Petitioner withdrew all issues it had raised in the Amended Petition except the issues of: (a) whether the data and analysis available supports a conclusion that there is a need for additional residential development; and (b) whether the Amendment is supported by data and analysis in light of an ongoing study of the East Coast Buffer. Residential Housing Need. The Plan includes the following Goal and Objective concerning the provision of adequate areas for residential use: Goal 01.00.00 Provide residential areas with a variety of housing types and densities offering convenient and affordable housing opportunities to all segments of Broward County's population while maintaining a desired quality of life and adequate public services and facilities. Objective 01.01.00 Accommodate the projected population of Broward County by providing adequate areas on the Future Broward County Land Use Plan Map (Series) intended primarily for residential development, but which also permit those non-residential uses that are compatible with and necessary to support residential neighborhoods. The Plan, including the methodology utilized to determine residential need, was found to be in compliance by the Department. The residential need methodology of the Plan utilized the Broward County Population Forecasting Model to project the population of southwest Broward County in 1994 to be 225,489 people. This projected population formed the basis for the allocation of residential housing units for Subregion 5 under the Plan. The Property is located in an area of southwest Broward County designated as Subregion 5 in the Plan. In reviewing the Amendment, the County conducted an analysis of the need for additional residential development in southwest Broward County. This analysis utilized, and was consistent with, the residential need methodology of the Plan. A summary of the data and analysis utilized by the County was provided to the Department. The County's analysis indicated that the population of Subregion 5 has exceeded the population projections for the Subregion of the Plan. By 1994, there were 284,361 people living in Subregion 5 or 17,872 more than projected in the Plan. The increased population rate of growth in Subregion 5 was projected to represent an increase in projected demand for approximately 6,847 residential units in excess of the projected demand expected under the Plan. The analysis also took into account amendments to the Plan which have resulted in a reduction of 1,087 residential units for Subregion 5. When combined with the increased population, the data and analysis supports a conclusion that there is a need for 7,934 additional residential units in Subregion 5. The Amendment increases residential housing in Subregion 5 by 1,134 dwelling units (1,920 units allowed under the Amendment, less 786 dwelling units allowed under the current agriculture classification), well below the projected need for additional residential units for Subregion 5. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and submitted to the Department supports the conclusion of the County that there is need for the proposed additional residential development approved by the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was professionally acceptable and adequate to support the Amendment. The evidence presented by Petitioner failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was not professionally acceptable and adequate. Rather than attempting to prove that the County's methodology was not professionally acceptable or was flawed, Petitioner utilized a methodology based upon an annualized population growth rate for Subregion 5. Petitioner offered evidence that there is sufficient residential housing approved under the Plan to meet the projected population for 15.6 years, beyond the remaining life of the Plan. The methodology utilized by Petitioner was, by the admission of the Petitioner's own witness, not a professionally acceptable methodology. The evidence failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County does not support its conclusion that there is sufficient need for the additional residential housing authorized for the County by the Amendment. The East Coast Buffer Zone. Efforts to restore the Everglades have been initiated and are ongoing. As a part of these efforts a group of technical and scientific staff members of various federal agencies involved in the restoration efforts were formed as the "Science Sub Group." The Science Sub Group was formed as an advisory group to provide guidance towards ecosystem restoration efforts. The Science Sub Group had no implementing authority. It issued at least one report in late 1993 which included an East Coast Buffer concept. The East Coast Buffer identified by the Science Sub Group included the area in which the Property is located. The Science Sub Group relied upon data obtained from the SFWMD and various computer models developed by the SFWMD, and SFWMD personnel contributed to the preparation of the report. The East Coast Buffer concept generally includes a series of interconnected water flow-ways along the eastern edge of the water conservation areas necessary to restore the Everglades. The federal government has also instituted a study known as the "Central & South Florida Project: Comprehensive Review Study" (hereinafter referred to as the "Restudy"). The United States Corps of Engineers is the lead agency of the Restudy. The first phase of the Restudy's efforts has resulted in a "Reconnaissance Report", also known as the "Recon Study". The second phase of the Restudy's efforts will be the feasibility phase. The feasibility phase will begin in the summer of 1995 and will be completed several years later. The purpose of the Restudy is to bring together the interested federal agencies to review the current management of the Everglades and identify strategies for altering management practices and systems to improve the Everglades. The Recon Study was completed in late 1994. It describes various conceptual strategies for restoring the Everglades. The determination of the feasibility of the strategies has not, however, been started, much less completed. Therefore, although the East Coast Buffer concept is considered in the Recon Study, the actual identification of the area which will constitute the Buffer has not been identified. Nor has the area which should constitute the East Coast Buffer been recommended in the Recon Study. The Recon Study identifies problems and opportunities, formulates alternative plans, evaluates conceptual alternative plans and recommends further study. The Recon Study is advisory. It does not identify, recommend or implement a plan of action. The Coalition presented evidence concerning the ongoing analysis of Everglades restoration efforts. That evidence proved that the Property is located within a very large area, which completely surrounds the Everglades, which is being considered as part of the Everglades restoration effort because of the impact of this large area on restoration efforts. The evidence presented by the Coalition, however, failed to prove that the Property has been, or will be, determined to be essential or even necessary for future Everglades restoration efforts. At the time of the approval of the Amendment and, even at the time of the final hearing of this case, no such determination had been made. Nor had any determination been made as to what will be necessary for the restoration of the Everglades or whether decisions will be made to carry out the necessary restoration efforts. As recognized by the Coalition in its proposed order: 52. The study necessary to make [a determination of the water levels needed] for the areas which are implicated by this amendment will be done in the next two years or three years. * * * 55. There is no way of telling, based on the data and analysis available at this point, how much water will be necessary in order to fully restore the Everglades. . . . Coalition proposed findings of fact 52 and 55. The Coalition also recognized the following: The Reconnaissance study has not reached the point where conclusions can be drawn about parcel specific uses. The next step is the feasibility planning phase, which is a much more detailed phase which will run for several years. . . . Coalition proposed finding of fact 107. Instead of attempting to prove that the data and analysis at the time of adoption of the Amendment indicated that development of the Property authorized by the Amendment would be detrimental to restoration efforts, the Coalition attempted to prove that development of the Property should be delayed until data and analysis is available indicating conclusively what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts. The Act does not require such delay. In addition to failing to prove what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts, the evidence presented by the Coalition also failed to prove that the conclusions reached by the Science Sub Group and the Restudy will even be implemented. The evidence presented by the Coalition failed to prove that the conclusions of the SFWMD with regard to the impact of the Amendment are not supported by data and analysis or were not arrived at by professionally acceptable methods. While the evidence proved that there will be some reduction in the amount of groundwater recharge function and seepage control function as a result of the Amendment, the evidence failed to prove what ultimate impact the reductions in recharge and seepage control will be or that the SFWMD's conclusions are not reasonable. While the Coalition proved that the SFWMD's conclusions were not based upon a consideration of what should be done to restore the Everglades, the evidence failed to prove that the information available was sufficiently conclusive that the SFWMD should have objected to the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County in approving the Amendment was collected and applied in a professionally acceptable manner. None of those agencies charged with responsibility to review the Amendment raised objections to its approval. The evidence failed to prove that the state of the data and analysis available to the County from the Science Sub Group and the Restudy or any other source concerning the area referred to as the East Coast Buffer and the Property is such that it proved that the data that was relied by the County upon was inadequate.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department dismissing finding the Amendment "in compliance" and dismissing the petition in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Coalition's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1-2. Accepted in 2. 3-4 Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5 Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5. Accepted in 4-6. Accepted in 5-6. Accepted in 6. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12 14-15 Not relevant. 16-18 Not relevant. See 81-84. 19-25 Not relevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 81-84. Accepted in 29. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 26 and hereby accepted. 30-31 See 24. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 36 and 62. Accepted in 62. 35-41 Hereby accepted. 42-48 These proposed findings are generally correct. They are not, however, relevant to the ultimate determination in this case. 49-50 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is hereby accepted. The last sentence is not relevant. See 96. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted in 96. The last sentence is not relevant. Hereby accepted. 57-63 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 64-65 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 89 and 91 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90 and 92. See 86 and 92. Hereby accepted. Although generally true, the evidence failed to prove that this finding specifically applies to the Property. Except for the first sentence, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31-33. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 76-87 Although generally correct, these findings were too broad and the evidence failed to prove that they specifically apply to the Property. 88-90 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 94-97 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 98 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 99-100 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 104-105 Not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 97. Accepted in 90. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 111-114 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The County's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 Accepted in 1. 2 Accepted in 7. 3 Accepted in 8. 4 Accepted in 11. 5 Hereby accepted. 6 Accepted in 12. 7 Accepted in 13. 8 Accepted in 14. 9 Accepted in 15. 10 Accepted in 9-10. 11 Accepted in 18. 12 Accepted in 16. 13 Accepted in 17. 14 Accepted in 61. 15 Accepted in 60. 16 Accepted in 19-20, 26 and 62. 17 Accepted in 23. 18 Accepted in 21-22 19-20 Accepted in 24. 21 Hereby accepted. 22 Accepted in 37. 23-24 Hereby accepted. 25 Accepted in 68. 26 Accepted in 65-67. 27-28 Accepted in 67. 29-30 Hereby accepted. 31-32 Accepted in 28. 33 Accepted in 29. 34 Accepted in 30. 35 Accepted in 34. 36 Accepted in 31 and hereby accepted. 37 Accepted in 32-33. 38 Accepted in 31. 39 Accepted in 33. 40 Accepted in 35. 41 Accepted in 316. 42 Accepted in 37. 43 Accepted in 39. 44 Accepted in 40. 45 Accepted in 41. 46 Accepted in 42. 47 Accepted in 72. 48-49 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 73-77 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 76-77. Accepted in 38. Accepted in 79-80 Accepted 58 and 62. 55-57 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 82. Hereby accepted. 60-61 Accepted in 81-84. 62 Hereby accepted. 63-65 Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 43 and 45. Accepted in 88. Accepted in 89-90. 69-70 Accepted in 85-86. 71 Accepted in 90 and 92-93. 72-77 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 32 and 44. Hereby accepted. None proposed. Accepted in 33. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 49 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. 87-88 Accepted in 52. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 53 and 58 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 54. Accepted in 56. Accepted in 58. 95-96 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 60. Accepted in 61. The Department's and Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 7. Accepted in 8. Accepted in 11. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12. Accepted in 13. Accepted in 14. Accepted in 15. Accepted in 9-10. Accepted in 18. Accepted in 16. Accepted in 17. Accepted in 61. Accepted in 11 and 19-20. Accepted in 20. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 24-25. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 27. Accepted in 36-38. 22-37 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 43. Accepted in 88. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31. 42-43 Accepted in 44. Accepted in 43 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 42. Accepted in 42 and 46. Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 46. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 46. 52-53 Accepted in 48. Accepted 49. Accepted in 49, 52 and 54. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 54 and 57. 59-60 Accepted 54. 61-63 Accepted in 54 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 55. Accepted in 56-57. 66-67 Accepted in 58. 68-70 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 64. Accepted in 58 and 62. Accepted in 60 and 62. Accepted in 63. Accepted in 67. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 67 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 37 and hereby accepted. Not relevant. Accepted in 86. Hereby accepted. 82-83 Accepted in 86. Accepted in 87. Accepted in 89 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90. Accepted in 90 and 92-93. Accepted in 93. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 72-78. Accepted in 69-71. Accepted in 70. Accepted in 73-74 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 75. Accepted in 76. Accepted in 77. Accepted in 78. Accepted in 79-80. 101-102 Accepted in 82. Accepted in 83. Accepted in 83-84. Accepted in 81 and 84. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Stengle, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brion Blackwelder, Esquire Jack Milbery, Esquire 8751 West Broward Boulevard, #206 Plantation, Florida 33324 Sherry A. Spiers Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Tracy Lautenschlager, Esquire Broward County Attorney's Office 115 South Andrews Avenue Suite 423 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Glenn Smith, Esquire Michael A. Cohn, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. 200 East Broward Boulevard Post Office Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Honorable Gerald F. Thompson Chairman, Broward County Board of County Commissioners Governmental Center 115 South Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Findings Of Fact In 1984, the Petitioners, a married couple, purchased a parcel of real property zoned agricultural located in Clay County. The Petitioners' parcel, which is the subject of the application for vested rights, is a fraction over twenty-two acres and is bounded on the east side by the St. John's River, on the west side by County Road 209, and by other private property on the north and south which is not subject to the application under consideration. An abandoned rail road right of way runs northwest to southeast across the parcel approximately half way between the paved road on the western boundary of the property and the river which forms the eastern boundary. A sand road has been constructed between the paved road and the abandoned railroad right of way. The land uses for agricultural property included single family residential development with one single family residence per acre until the enactment of the comprehensive plan discussed in detail below. The Petitioners purchased the parcel for the purpose of constructing a single family, and subdividing and selling the remaining portions of the parcel as home sites. The Petitioners obtained two mobile home permits (move-on permits) in 1986 and a building permit for the construction of a barn in 1989 from Respondent. In addition, the Petitioners obtained a permit for the construction of a dock from the Corps of Engineers. The Petitioners had a road constructed to access the interior of the property prior to 1990. The Petitioners later purchased equipment including a back hoe, grader, and dump trucks in 1990 for improving the road and improving drainage. The Petitioner, Robert I. Moore, completed improvements to the sand road with his own labor incurring costs for fill, fuel, and equipment repairs. The Petitioners ordered a survey which was completed in 1991. They then conveyed property between themselves via quit claim deeds to subdivide the property into nine lots, A through I. Three lots were created along the river, Lot I (3.59 acres), Lost H (3.16 acres), and Lot G (2.97 acres). Three lots were created along the paved road: Lot C running from the paved road to the rail road right of way containing 2.87 acres; Lot B running east from the paved road approximately 140 feet containing 1.11 acres; and Lot A running east from the paved road approximately 150 feet containing 1.09 acres. Lot F is located east of Lot A, and runs east approximately 800 feet containing 4.60 acres. Lot D is located east of Lot B and runs east approximately 300 feet containing 1.42 acres. Lot E is located east of Lot D, runs east approximately 200 feet to the rail road right of way, and contains approximately 1.42 acres. The surveyed subdivision of the parcel was recorded on December 31, 1991, together with private road maintenance agreement and quit claim deeds. The mobile homes were located on lots B and D, and barn had been built on Lot F. The amended application combined Lots A and F, and Lots D and E. The Petitioners spent money and expended energy to make improvements to the property in pursuit of their objective of developing the parcel. Their efforts included developing a graded, sand road through the property, improving the drainage, having a survey of the property conducted, and engaging an attorney to advise them. In June 1991, the Respondent adopted a comprehensive land use plan which was submitted to the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) of the State of Florida. The DCA is charged by statute to determine if county comprehensive planning ordinances conform to state requirements. Those counties whose plans did not conform could amend them to conform; however, if the county failed to bring its plan into compliance, sanctions could be invoked by the state against the county. The Respondent's initial plan as adopted retained agricultural zoning for the parcel owned by Petitioners, and the Petitioners were aware of this having obtained several planning maps reflecting the proposed land uses for various areas of the county including their parcel. The Petitioners' subdivision complied with all existing requirements of the county to include those contained in the county's original comprehensive land use plan. The county's comprehensive land use plan provided that a lot of record included "a non-platted piece, parcel, lot, or tract of land described by metes and bounds or other similar means in a legally recorded deed as of July 1, 1991." The Petitioners' subdivision was not recorded until December 31, 1991. The county's comprehensive land use plan was not accepted by the DCA which received written objections, recommendations and comments (ORC Report) of the DCA. These objections included the density allowed in rural residential land use classification. On December 5, 1991, the Respondent and its Planning Commission held a joint workshop, advertised and open to the public, at which a modification to the density provisions of the comprehensive land use plan was considered for the purpose of addressing the objections by the DCA. The DCA's recommendation to reduce density in rural areas from one single family residence per acre to one to every five acres based upon a point system was specifically considered. On January 23, 1992, following a public hearing as required by statute, the Respondent adopted the amended plan containing the reduced density for rural areas based upon the point system. This changed the density of the Petitioners' parcel to one single family residence per five acres. This amended plan retained the definition of "lot of record" first discussed in March 1991; later considered at the public hearing on the plan in May 1991; and adopted in the original comprehensive plan. The assessed value of the parcel in 1994 was $274,200; in 1993 it was $158,462; and in 1992 it was $96,921. The expenditures for fill, labor, and repairs to construct and improve the road cost $23,425. The purchase price of the heavy equipment used by Mr. Moore to improve the road was $26,200 including $4,595 for repair of the loader/backhoe which is considered part of "purchase price." Although some of the heavy equipment was purchased used, and would have a lower rate of depreciation, the equipment lost value being used. This depreciation was part of the costs of doing the work. A declining depreciation rate of 15 percent in 1989, 12 percent in 1990, and 10 percent in 1991 was used to arrive at the depreciation costs, which were approximately $8,500. The capital costs of building the dock were excluded; however, the taxes paid to Clay County for the past two years, $5,023, were included. The total developmental costs would be approximately $37,000 as of the end of 1991. Expenditures after adoption of the plan are not considered.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the findings of facts and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the amended application for equitable vested rights be approved in part, and denied in part as follows: That Petitioner be granted equitable relief to subdivide their 22-acre parcel into 4 lots each containing approximately 5 acres using the existing road which they constructed as a boundary between the lots, but that they not be permitted to exceed the plan's density requirements. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Findings Recommended Order Paragraphs 1-4 Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,7 Paragraph 5,6 Paragraphs 6,5 Paragraph 7 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 8 It is the hearing officer's under-standing that the ordinances were adopted prior to submission to DCA, which could state objections to the county's ordinance. Mr. Moore was aware of the plan and its impact upon his property. Paragraph 9 Paragraphs 11,12,14 Paragraph 10 Paragraphs 15,16 Paragraph 11 Paragraphs 17,18 Paragraph 12 Paragraph 13 Paragraph 13 Paragraphs 11,12 Respondent's Findings Recommended Order Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 1-4 Paragraphs 4-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 5-10 Paragraphs 9-12 Subsumed in Paragraphs 11-14 Paragraph 13 Irrelevant. Paragraph 14 Paragraphs 14,18 Paragraph 15 Discussed in Conclusions Paragraphs 16-19 Paragraphs 15-18 Paragraph 20 Paragraph 8 Paragraph 21 Subsumed in Paragraph 7 Paragraph 22 Paragraph 9
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, matters officially recognized, and the record in this case as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The property that was the subject of Monroe County Building Permit No. 9110002601 (hereinafter referred to as the "Property") is an 18.85-acre parcel located on No Name Key in unincorporated Monroe County within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. Since 1985, the Property has been owned by Florida Keys Investment Properties, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "FKIP"). The Property is the site of a borrow pit occupying 9.65 acres of the Property's surface area. Since the early 1970's, Petitioner, Rudolph Krause & Sons of Florida, Inc., (hereinafter also referred to as "Krause & Sons") has been operating the borrow pit and excavating fill from the Property for sale to the public pursuant to permits issued by the County. Both Krause & Sons and FKIP are owned by Rudolph Krause, his wife, Roseann Krause, and other members of the Krause family. Since 1975, Roseann Krause has assumed primary responsibility for obtaining from the County the permits necessary to perform the excavation work on the Property (hereinafter referred to as the "excavation permits"). Such excavation permits have been issued by the County each year from 1975 to 1991, with the exception of 1988. 1/ Each of these excavation permits contained language indicating that the permit was a renewal of at least one previously issued permit. No excavation permit other than the 1991 permit, Monroe County Building Permit No. 9110002601, has been appealed by the Department. Although the excavation work on the Property has been conducted with the approval, and to the apparent satisfaction, of the County, in 1985 the United States Army Corps of Engineers filed a complaint in federal district court against Mr. and Mrs. Krause, FKIP and Krause & Sons alleging that certain work had been done in the wetlands portion of the Property without the requisite dredge and fill permit and therefore in violation of federal law. Neither the County nor the Department were parties to this federal district court proceeding, although the County, at least, was aware of the proceeding. In September of 1985, the federal district court entered a final consent judgement, the first eight numbered paragraphs of which provided as follows: This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action and of the parties thereto. The provisions of this Final Judgment shall be binding upon the Defendants; their successors and assigns; and all persons, firms and corporations in active concert or privity with the Defendants who have actual or constructive notice of this Judgment by personal service or otherwise. All references to geographical locations with respect to this dredge and fill/ restoration on No Name Key shall be directed to the attached sketch entitled "Florida Keys Investment Properties, Inc. Restoration Plan." (Exhibit A). Exhibit A is merely an enlarged view of a portion of Exhibit B, which is a jurisdictional determination by Curtis Kruer, dated June 3, 1983. Within 18 months of entry of this Final (Consent) Judgment, the Defendants shall remove all fill material located in the area indicated on Exhibit A (the south side and southern portion of east side of the existing borrow pit) down to the adjacent wetland elevation. All spoil material so removed will be placed on upland areas on site or at the Defendants' option, may be trucked off site. Spoil material may be stockpiled in areas designated as wetlands immediately adjacent to the areas of the borrow pit to be excavated. Defendants shall notify the Big Pine Key regulatory Field Office of the United States Army Corps of Engineers upon commencement and completion of this phase of the earthmoving work. Within three years of the entry of this Final (Consent) Judgment, the Defendants shall be allowed to enlarge the existing borrow pit as shown on Exhibit A to a maximum depth of -60 feet MSL. Within 120 days from completion of the excavation work described in paragraph 5 above or within 40 months after entry of this decree, whichever date comes first, the Defendants, shall complete the creation of the wetland shelf area on the eastern and western sides of the borrow pit (excluding that portion of the pit to be excavated in the uplands, i.e. Section "C" on Exhibit B) by grading the area down to the adjacent natural wetland elevations as shown on Exhibit A. All spoil material will be placed on an upland site or, at Defendants' option, may be temporarily stored on site, and then trucked off site within the period set forth in the first sentence of this paragraph. Defendants agree to conduct the above- described restoration measures in an environmentally-sensitive manner and shall use their best efforts to avoid damage to adjacent wetlands or water areas (other than the borrow pit) during this process. In addition, a low fill berm 6-feet wide and 2- feet high shall be constructed and remain around the immediate edge of the pit as shown in Exhibit A at all times during excavation of the pit. This berm shall be extended around the immediate edge of the pit's final configuration. This allows Defendants to continue excavation of the pit in a northerly direction into the existing uplands shown as "C" on Exhibit B. Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from conducting any further dredging, filling or construction activities at No Name Key, adjacent to Big Spanish Channel in any wetland or water area, above or below the mean high water line, without the prior issuance of a Department of Army permit. The only exception to this provision is the work described herein. Only that portion of Defendants' property depicted as Section "C" on attached "Sketch of Jurisdictional Determination" (Exhibit "B" hereto) is agreed to be uplands, not subject to Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction. Mrs. Krause had submitted an application for a renewal excavation permit in February of 1985, prior to the entry of the federal district court's final consent judgment. The application, as originally submitted, did not specify the total amount of fill Krause & Sons expected to excavate during the year. In a letter dated March 12, 1985, that she sent to the County's Building Director, Mrs. Krause acknowledged that she did not include this information in the application. The body of the letter read as follows: I applied for renewal of our excavation (borrow pit on No Name) permit in February. I wish to keep current this permit but at the present time I cannot supply you with any additional information since it is in litigation with the Corps of Engineers. As soon as this litigation is resolved, I will supply you with the needed information as to width, length and depth to be dug as well as total amount of cubic yards. I do not wish this permit to lapse in any way and therefore request that you issue a renewal based upon this information at this time. If you have any questions regarding this information, please do not hesitate to call me. Thank you for your attention to this matter. I certainly appreciate your understanding. The following month, Mrs. Krause supplemented the application she had submitted in February by providing the County with two sketches of the Property which were similar, but not identical, to the one appended to the final consent judgment and identified as Exhibit B. On one of these sketches, she had made the following handwritten notations: "proposed 25,000 yds. 25'x750'x35,'" which notation appeared next to the southwestern edge of the borrow pit; and "uplands to be dug," which notation appeared in the same area on the northerly portion of the Property that is depicted in the final consent judgment's Exhibit B as Section "C" (hereinafter referred to as the "Uplands"). It is apparent from a review of the two sketches that the "proposed 25,000 yds" were to come from an area on the western side of the pit and not from the Uplands. On April 29, 1985, the County issued the excavation permit (Building Permit No. 13289A) for which Mrs. Krause had applied on behalf of Krause & Sons. In issuing this permit, the County used a printed building permit form which contained the following language: THIS PERMIT SHALL ALLOW WORK (AS DEFINED UNDER WORK DESCRIPTION BELOW AND AS SHOWN AND SPECIFIED ON PLANS SUBMITTED AND ON FILE IN THE BUILDING DEPARTMENT OFFICES) TO BE PERFORMED ON THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY BY THE OWNER LISTED: Typed in under "WORK DESCRIPTION" on the form was the following: "Renewal of Excavation Permit, Supplement to 11332A, 10203A, 9543A, 7791A, 6498A, 4884A, 3492A." Recipients of permits issued on these printed building permit forms are also furnished "permit cards" that they are instructed to post in an appropriate location at the work site. Each "permit card" contains the following advisement: The person accepting this permit shall conform to the terms of the application on file in the office of the Zoning Department of Monroe County and construction shall conform to the requirements of the Monroe County Codes. In or around early 1986, Krause & Sons hired E.I. DuPont De Nemours (hereinafter referred to as "DuPont") to blast, as a preliminary step in the resource extraction process, portions of the Property that had not yet been excavated (hereinafter referred to as the "Unexcavated Areas"), including the entire uplands area referred to as Section "C" in the federal district court's final consent judgment. Thereafter, DuPont, on behalf of Krause & Sons, applied to the County for a permit authorizing such blasting. The requested permit (Building Permit No. 14835A) was issued on February 20, 1986. In issuing Building Permit No. 14835A, the County used the same printed building permit form that it had used in issuing the 1985 excavation permit referenced in paragraph 15 above. It also provided an appropriate "permit card" for posting. Typed in under "WORK DESCRIPTION" on Building Permit No. 14835A was simply the following: "Blasters and Users Permit." No further indication was given as to the nature or scope of the work authorized to be performed. Following the issuance of Building Permit No. 14835A on February 26, 1986, Dupont began its blasting of the Unexcavated Areas. The work was completed later that year. Mr. Krause was on site during the blasting and provided assistance to DuPont. In April of 1986, before the completion of the blasting, Mrs. Krause, on behalf of Krause & Sons, sought to renew Building Permit No. 13289A, the excavation permit she had obtained for the Property the previous year. The application she submitted indicated that Krause & Sons proposed to "[e]xcavate approx. 25,000 cu yds." Along with the application, she submitted a copy of the sketch of the Property containing her handwritten notations that she had sent to the County to supplement the previous year's application. The requested permit (Building Permit No. 15276A) was issued on April 30, 1986. In issuing Building Permit No. 15276A, the County used the same printed building permit form that it had used in issuing the blasting permit and the previous year's excavation permit. In addition, it provided an appropriate "permit card" for posting. Typed in under "WORK DESCRIPTION" on Building Permit No. 15276A was the following: "Renewal of Excavation Permit- Approximately 25,000 CY FILL Supplement to 13289A, 11332A, 10203A, 9543A, 7791A, 6498A, 4884A, 3492A." On September 15, 1986, after DuPont had completed its blasting, the County's current land development regulations (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations") became effective. Section 9.5-231(a) of the Regulations provides that "[n]o structure or land in Monroe County shall hereafter be developed, used or occupied unless expressly authorized in a land use district in this division." Under the Regulations, the Property is in a "Native" or "NA" land use district. 2/ Section 9.5-239 of the Regulations lists the uses that are allowed in "NA" land use districts. "Resource extraction," which is defined in Section 9.5-4 of the Regulations as "the dredging, digging, extraction, mining and quarrying of limerock, sand, gravel or minerals for commercial purposes," is not among the uses listed. "Resource extraction" is permitted as a major conditional use in Industrial land use districts under Section 9.5-249(c)(2) of the Regulations, however. Sections 9.5-431, 9.5-432 and 9.5-433 of the Regulations specifically address the subject of resource extraction. They provide as follows: Section 9.5-431. General. All resource extraction activities in the county shall comply with the provision of this division in order to ensure that such activities do not adversely affect long-term ecological values in the county and that abandoned extraction sites will be restored. Section 9.5-432. Resource extraction standards. All resource extraction activities shall: Be designed so that no area of excavation, storage area for equipment or machinery or other structure or facility is closer than: Two hundred (200) feet to any property line; and Five hundred (500) feet to any residential nonresource extraction related commercial use in existence on the date the permit is issued; Be located on a parcel of at least twenty (20) acres; Be fenced or blocked so as to prevent unauthorized entry into the resource extraction operation through access roads; Will not involve excavation below sixty feet; Will not cause the introduction of saline aquifer waters into fresh water aquifers; Will involve restoration of disturbed areas at the completion of the resource extraction operation in accordance with section 9.5-433, and the implementation of the restoration plan is secured by a surety bond or other guarantee of performance approved by the county; and Operate solely between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Section 9.5-433. Restoration standards. All parcels of land which are used for resource extraction operations shall be restored as follows: Restoration shall be a continuous process, and each portion of the parcel shall be restored within two (2) years after resource extraction is completed for that portion; Topsoil shall be restored in approximately the same quality and quantity as existed at the time the resource extraction operation was initiated; Any body of water created by the resource extraction operation shall have a graded shoreline with a slope not to exceed one (1) foot vertical to five feet horizontal; All equipment, machinery and structures, except for structures that are usable for recreational purposes or any other use authorized in the area, shall be removed within six (6) months after the resource extraction operation is terminated and restoration is completed; and Reclamation shall to the maximum extent practical result in the reestablishment of the vegetation association which existed prior to the extraction activity. A "nonconforming use," as that term is used in the Regulations, is defined in Section 9.5-4 thereof as "any use lawfully being made of any land, buildings or structure, other than a sign, on the effective date of this chapter or any amendment thereto, rendering such use nonconforming, which does not comply with all of the regulations of this chapter, or any amendment thereto." Section 9.5-143(a) of the Regulations provides that "[n]onconforming uses of land or structures may continue in accordance with the provisions of this section." Among "the provisions of this section" are the following found in subsection (c) thereof: Extensions: Nonconforming uses shall not be extended. This prohibition shall be construed so as to prevent: Enlargement of nonconforming uses by additions to the structure in which the nonconforming uses are located; or Occupancy of additional lands. According to Section 9.5-141 of the Regulations, the purpose of the provisions relating to "nonconforming uses" is to regulate and limit the continued existence of uses and structures established prior to the enactment of this chapter. Many nonconformities may continue, but the provisions of this article are designed to curtail substantial investment in nonconformities and to bring about their eventual elimination in order to preserve the integrity of this chapter. Section 9.5-113 of the Regulations prescribes the procedure to be followed in the "[r]eview of building permit applications." Subsection (b) of this section provides as follows: If the application and the construction plans and environmental analysis demonstrates compliance with all environmental standards of this chapter and technical, health and safety requirements of the County Code, a site preparation permit shall be issued within thirty (30) days of receipt of a complete application and upon receipt of an improvement guarantee, if a subdivision is involved, under the provisions of section 9.5-85 or a performance bond, in an amount acceptable to the director of planning to ensure completion of the development, if a subdivision is not involved. Section 9.5-115 of the Regulations is entitled "Expiration of building permit." Subsections (a) through (d) of this section provide as follows: A building permit shall automatically expire and become null and void if work authorized by such permit is not commenced within sixty (60) days from the effective date of the permit, or if such work, when commenced, is suspended or abandoned at any time for a period of one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days. The effective date of a building permit authorizing land clearing or which authorizes development as defined in chapter 380, Florida Statutes, shall be as provided in rule 9J-1.03, Florida Administrative Code, as long as the parcel is located within an area of critical state concern. If the work covered by the permit has not commenced or has commenced and been suspended or abandoned, the building official may extend such permit for a single period of sixty (60) days from the date of extension is [sic] made prior to the expiration date of the initial permit. If the work covered by the permit has commenced, is in progress, but has not been completed and in the opinion of the building official and the director of planning, is being carried on progressively in a substantial manner, the permit shall remain in effect until completion of the job. If work has commenced and the permit becomes null and void or expires because of lack of progress or abandonment, a new permit covering the proposed construction shall be obtained before proceeding with the work under regulations in effect at the time the new permit is issued. Section 9.5-115 of the Regulations makes no reference to "renewal" permits. The first excavation permit Krause & Sons received after the effective date of the Regulations (Building Permit No. 17487A) was issued on May 1, 1987. In issuing Building Permit No. 17487A, the County used the same printed building permit form that it had used in issuing the 1986 blasting permit and the 1985 and 1986 excavation permits. In addition, it provided an appropriate "permit card" for posting. Typed in under "WORK DESCRIPTION" on Building Permit No. 17487A was the following: "Excavation Pit- RENEWAL- Supplement to Permit #13289A, 11332A, 10203A, 9543A, 7791A, 6498A, 4884A, 3492A." Typed in under "REMARKS" on Building Permit No. 17487A was the following: APPLICANT MUST APPLY FOR A BLASTING PERMIT IF THIS ACTIVITY IS REQUIRED Issued under the condition that restoration required from Army Corps be completed. Biologist recommends approval as per Monroe County Code. On April 26, 1988, Mrs. Krause, on behalf of Krause & Sons, filed an application to renew Building Permit No. 17487A. Accompanying the application was a sketch of the Property. On the sketch, Mrs. Krause had drawn an arrow pointing to the southern portion of the Uplands. Above the arrow she had written, "proposed to dig approx 19,444 cu yds," and in the area to which the arrow was pointing, she had written, "Approx. 19444 cu yds to be dug." There was a delay in the issuance of the requested permit. On April 4, 1989, the permit (Building Permit No. 8910000731) was finally issued. An application to renew Building Permit No. 8910000731 was filed on April 3, 1990. The requested permit (Building Permit No. 9010000645) was issued on June 21, 1990. The effective date of the permit was August 28, 1990. An application to renew Building Permit No. 9010000645 was filed on April 16, 1991. The requested permit (Building Permit No. 9110002601 and hereinafter also referred to as the "Permit") was issued on July 11, 1991. In the "Remarks" section of the Permit the following was typed: RENEWAL OF PERMIT 90-10000645, 89-10000731 AND 17487A. PLANNING APPROVAL 6-25-91 AG BIOLOGIST RECOMMENDS APPROVAL AS PER MONROE COUNTY CODE. THIS PERMIT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE BLASTING. A SEPARATE PERMIT IS REQUIRED. Neither the application nor the Permit specified the amount of fill to be excavated or where on the Property the excavation was to occur. There was only one area of the Property however, where there was further excavation to be done. This area was the Uplands. Krause & Sons and FKIP had hoped, pursuant to the authorization provided by the permit, to merely remove the already blasted fill material that remained there. 3/ No further blasting was needed. A copy of the Permit was hand delivered to the Department's Key West field office (hereinafter referred to as the "field office") on July 12, 1991. In charge of the field office was Kenneth Metcalf, a Community Program Administrator with the Department. Under his supervision were two planners, a biologist and a secretary. The duties of the field office staff included, but was not limited to, reviewing and commenting upon proposed development activity within the office's territorial jurisdiction, which covered not only unincorporated Monroe County, but the municipalities of Key West, Key Colony Beach and Layton as well. Approximately 25 percent of the staff's time was devoted to the review of building permits issued by Monroe County and the cities of Key West, Key Colony Beach and Layton. The staff reviewed over 10,000 permits a year, of which about 30 to 40 were ultimately appealed by the Department. Given the 45-day time limit for filing an appeal, the staff had approximately four weeks from the date of issuance within which to review each permit and submit its written recommendation and report to Department headquarters in Tallahassee. In conducting its permit review, the staff examined the materials it received from the local government, which typically included the permit itself, the permit application and accompanying site plan, to ascertain if the development authorized by the permit complied with the local government's land development regulations. 4/ Because of time constraints, the staff did not make a practice of contacting applicants and asking them to supply missing information that the staff thought was necessary to demonstrate compliance, although there were occasions that it did request such information from the local government that had issued the permit. In the staff's opinion, the information that it had been provided in connection with Building Permit No. 9110002601 was insufficient to demonstrate that the Permit complied with Monroe County's land development regulations. Along with a copy of the Permit, the staff had an aerial photograph of the Property, taken in 1985, upon which to base its opinion regarding the Permit's compliance with the Regulations. That resource extraction activity had taken place on the Property was apparent from an examination of the photograph. The staff had not been furnished with the permit application, with a site plan of the Property, nor with copies of any other County issued-permits concerning the Property. It had requested these materials from the County, but the County had not provided them. Consistent with its standard operating procedure, the staff had made no effort to obtain any additional information from the Krauses or FKIP. Neither the Krauses nor FKIP provided, or offered to provide, the staff with additional information. As a result, at the time it completed its review of the Permit and rendered its opinion on the Permit's compliance with the Regulations, the staff was unaware of the existence of Building Permit No. 14835A, the "Blasters and Users Permit" that DuPont, on behalf of Krause & Sons, had obtained in February of 1986, and which authorized the blasting of the entire Uplands. Given the information that the staff had in its possession, which reflected that the Property was located in a land use district in which resource extraction activity was not allowed under the Regulations, the staff's conclusion that the Permit was not in compliance with the Regulations was a reasonable one. The Permit did not indicate on its face that the resource extraction activity it authorized qualified as a "nonconforming use" under the provisions of Section 9-5.143 of the Regulations, nor was it apparent from a reading of the Permit, in conjunction with an examination of the 1985 aerial photograph that the staff also had in its possession, that the permitted activity so qualified. Adopting the field staff's recommendation, the Department, on August 26, 1991, filed with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission written notice of its appeal of Building Permit No. 9110002601. The Department's notice of appeal was accompanied by a petition in which the Department alleged that the Permit had been issued contrary to the provisions of the County's land development regulations in that it authorized resource extraction activity in a land use district in which such activity, under the Regulations, was not allowed. According to the petition, "[t]here [were] no conditions under which [such activity could] be authorized consistent with the Monroe County land development regulations absent amending the land use district maps [to change the Property's land use designation from NA] to Industrial use and proceeding through the conditional use process," during which the applicability of the resource extraction and restoration standards of Sections 9.5-432 and 9.5-433 of the Regulations would need to be addressed. On November 27, 1991, approximately three months after the Department filed its appeal, the field office staff, in response to a second, post-appeal request it had made, received from the County's assistant building official six index cards reflecting historical permitting activity relating to the Property. None of these cards made reference to Building Permit No. 14835A, the February, 1986, "Blasters and Users Permit." The Department first learned about the existence of this "Blasters and Users Permit" during discussions with the Krauses sometime after it had filed its notice of appeal of Building Permit No. 9110002601 and the accompanying petition. 5/ On December 18, 1991, the Department's notice of appeal and petition were referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a Hearing Officer. A final evidentiary hearing on the Department's appeal was held on October 13, 1992. Three witnesses, Mr. Krause, Mrs. Krause, and Metcalf, testified at the hearing. The Krauses testified regarding the extent of the blasting activity authorized by Building Permit No. 14835A, a copy of which was offered and received into evidence. A total of 28 other exhibits were admitted into evidence. Following the conclusion of the hearing, the parties filed post- hearing submittals. In their post-hearing submittal, the Krauses did not dispute that resource extraction, the activity authorized by Building Permit No. 9110002601, is a use that, under the Regulations, that is not expressly allowed in the NA land use district in which the Property is located. They argued, however, that the resource extraction activity they were seeking to undertake pursuant to Building Permit No. 9110002601, to wit: the completion of the excavation of the Uplands, should be permitted as a "nonconforming use" under the provisions of Section 9-5.143 of the Regulations, regardless of whether such activity would be allowable under the Regulations' other provisions. The Hearing Officer, in his Recommended Order, agreed with the Krauses, reasoning as follows: A "nonconforming use" that may continue in accordance with the provisions of Section 9-5.143 is "any use lawfully being made of any land, buildings or structure, other than a sign, on the effective date of [Chapter 9.5 of the Monroe County Code], rendering such use nonconforming, which does not comply with all of the regulations of [Chapter 9.5]." September 15, 1986, was the effective date of the Regulations. By that date, the excavation of the Uplands had already begun. The entire area had been blasted as the first step in the excavation process that Respondents now desire to complete. The Department acknowledges in its proposed recommended order that such blasting occurred, but contends that it was not authorized by the blasting permit (Building Permit No. 14835A) that had been obtained prior to the blasting. According to the Department, the "blasting permit cannot be construed as authorizing that extent of blasting but is most reasonably viewed as authorizing blasting [only] of the wetlands on the eastern and western sides of the pit." Having carefully considered the evidence on the matter, including, most significantly, the copy of Building Permit No. 14835A and the accompanying "permit card" which were offered and received into evidence as Respondents' Exhibit 6, as well as the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Krause, the Hearing Officer has reached a contrary conclusion. The documents that comprise Respondents' Exhibit 6 do not indicate, on their face, that the blasting authorized by the County was to be restricted to any particular area of the Property, much less "the wetlands on the eastern and western sides of the pit;" however, they each contain language suggesting that the extent of the authorization given by the blasting permit may not be determined without reference to the permit application and any plans submitted in connection therewith. No such application materials or copies thereof were in the County's files at the time of hearing, nor were they otherwise readily available to Respondents, who had never been given copies of these application materials to keep for their records. Under such circumstances, it was permissible for Respondents to supplement Respondents' Exhibit 6 with parol evidence to establish the extent of the land area which was subject to the provisions of the blasting permit. See Nahmod v. Nelson, 3 So.2d 162, 164-65 (Fla. 1941)("[u]nquestionably secondary evidence is admissible to prove the contents of a lost writing where proper predicate is laid and where such evidence is otherwise competent and admissible"). The parol evidence offered by Respondents was the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Krause. The Krauses testified that permission was sought and obtained to blast the entire Uplands. Their testimony on this matter was unrebutted. While neither Mr. or Mrs. Krause actually prepared or submitted the application to gain such permission, given their respective positions with the entity for which the blasting work was done, it appears likely, and therefore the Hearing Officer has found in the absence of any persuasive evidence to the contrary, that their testimony was based upon firsthand knowledge and not speculation or what someone else had told them. In view of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer has credited the Krauses' testimony and taken it into consideration in determining that the blasting of the entire Uplands was authorized by Building Permit No. 14835A. The resource extraction activity that Building Permit No. 9110002601 authorizes, therefore, will not involve the use of any land that was not lawfully being used for that purpose at the time of the effective date of the Regulations. Such activity thus qualifies as a "nonconforming use," within the meaning of Section 9.5-143 of the Regulations, which the Commission should allow to continue, notwithstanding that the Property is in a land use district in which such activity, but for its qualification as a "nonconforming use," would be prohibited. The Hearing Officer noted that, "[i]n engaging in such continued activity, Respondents must comply with the applicable provisions of Sections 9.5-432 (resource extraction standards) and 9.5-433 (restoration standards) of the Regulations [both of which were referenced in the Department's appeal petition], but only to the extent that these provisions do not operate to effectively prevent them from excavating any land that, on the effective date of the Regulations, was being lawfully used for resource extraction activity." The Hearing Officer recommended that, "[i]n the interest of clarity and to avoid any uncertainty regarding the matter, the final order issued by the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission . . . make specific reference to these requirements [the Krauses] must meet, notwithstanding that [they] would still be required to comply with these requirements even if, like Building Permit No. 9110002601, the order did not contain any such specific reference." On March 11, 1993, the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission issued a final order adopting the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order. Petitioner was represented by counsel in the appeal proceeding that culminated in the issuance of this final order and it incurred attorney's fees and costs as a result of such representation that it is obligated to pay.
The Issue The issue is whether a development order adopted by Respondent City of Marathon by Resolution PC00-09-04 is consistent with the comprehensive plan, land development regulations, and statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent City of Marathon (Marathon) was incorporated on November 30, 1999. It adopted as its land development regulations (LDR) the LDRs of Monroe County in effect at the time of Marathon's incorporation. Marathon is within The Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. This case involves a development order that Marathon issued to Respondent Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc. (BB). As Planning Commission Resolution 00-09-04, the development order authorizes BB to add 12 motel rooms to an existing motel in return for imposing certain restrictions on the use of wet slips at its adjacent marina that is part of the same motel/marina development. The restrictions require the removal of cable television connections from 12 slips and limitation upon vessels using these 12 slips to those without plumbing facilities. For the remaining wet slips at the marina, the development order requires BB to limit their use to no more than 18 vessels at one time and to provide mandatory sewage pumpout for these vessels. At various points in the record and this recommended order, references to a "transfer" of 12 marina slips for 12 motel rooms refer to the conditions set forth in this paragraph. BB owns 7.39 acres of upland and 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom in Marathon at mile marker 49.5 (Subject Property or, as developed, Banana Bay). The Subject Property runs from U.S. Route 1 to the water. The Subject Property contains 60 motel rooms in two buildings, a conference room, a motel office, support buildings, three apartments suitable for employee use, and a marina. The marina includes 40-50 slips, depending upon the size of the moored vessels. The Subject Property is zoned Suburban Commercial (SC) and Mixed Use (MU). About 2.4 acres (104,544 square feet) running about 350 feet from U.S. Route 1 is SC. About 4.99 acres (217,364 square feet) is zoned MU. The additional 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom are also zoned MU, although the submerged acreage is unimportant for reasons discussed below. Twenty-five of the motel rooms are in SC, and 35 of the motel rooms are in MU, although the distinction between zoning districts is also unimportant for reasons discussed below. LDR Code Section 9.5-267 authorizes ten "rooms" per ”acre" as "allocated density" for motel uses in SC and MU and 15 "rooms" per "buildable acre" as "maximum net density" for motel uses in SC and MU. (There is no difference between "hotels" and "motels" in this case; all references to "motels" include "hotels.") Three fundamental questions emerge concerning the application of these two density limitations to this case. The first is whether BB must satisfy both the "allocated density" and "maximum net density" limitation. This is not a difficult issue; BB's proposal must satisfy each of these density limitations. The second question is what is included in the areas under each of these density limitations. Notwithstanding the use of "gross acres" in the "allocated density" formula, it is necessary to net out certain areas--just less than is netted out in the "maximum net density" formula. The third question is what constitutes a "room." When applied to marine-based units, the definition of a "room" presents a difficult and important issue. As a whole, the LDRs imply that no marine-based dwelling units should count as "rooms," but one provision specifically requires the inclusion of "live-aboard" units in density calculations. The first question requires little analysis. As noted below in the discussion of the two types of areas, "allocated density" and "maximum net density" provide two separate measures of the intensity of use of land. The allowable density for "maximum net density" is never less than the allowable density for "allocated density" because "maximum net density" is a safeguard to ensure that, after netting out from the parcel those areas reserved for open space, setbacks, and buffers, the intensity of use will not be excessive. Nothing whatsoever in the LDRs suggests that Marathon may issue a development order for a proposal that satisfies the "maximum net density," but not the "allocated density." These two densities limitations operate in tandem, not in the alternative. The calculation of the "allocated density" requires consideration of the second and third questions identified above. The issue of area seems straightforward. LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-3) defines "density or allocated density" as "the number of dwelling units or rooms allocated per gross acre of land by the plan." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-4) defines "maximum net density" as "the maximum density permitted to be developed per unit of land on the net buildable area of a site, as measured in dwelling units or rooms per acre." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(G-4) defines "gross area" as "the total acreage of a site less submerged lands and any dedicated public rights-of-way." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(N-4) defines "net buildable area" as "that portion of a parcel of land which is developable and is not open space required by section 9.5-262 or 9.5-343 or required minimum bufferyard under article VII division 11 or required setbacks under section 9.5-281." The area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is greater than the area of land involved in determining "maximum net density." But the area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is itself a net amount. The LDRs expressly require reducing the gross areas by any submerged land and dedicated public rights-of-way. However, any reasonable application of the LDRs also requires reducing the gross areas used for the motel "allocated density" calculation by the minimum areas required to support other uses on the Subject Property. If the only use of the Subject Property were motel rooms, the "allocated density" limit of ten units per acre (10:1) would allow 73.9 rooms. But the Marathon Planning Commission Staff Report dated September 18, 2000, correctly netted from the Subject Property the land areas required to support the commercial aspects of the hotel and the commercial apartments. These reductions leave a total of 5.86 acres available to support the motel rooms. At a density of 10:1, the Subject Property could therefore support a total of 58 motel rooms. The Planning Commission incorrectly used the 15:1 ratio for "maximum net density" in concluding that the Subject Property could support a total of 67.65 motel rooms. Evidently, the Planning Commission used the "maximum net density" because it was not using "gross area" or "gross acres" (the terms are synonymous under the Code) in calculating the area. The netting reduction necessary to calculate whether BB's proposal satisfies the "maximum net density" limitation would require the calculation of the area of the Subject Property that must be devoted to open space, setbacks, and buffers. The Planning Commission probably undertook this step in calculating the "maximum net density" for the Subject Property, as its figures seem to include unstated deductions for the 20 percent open space plus another factor, probably for setbacks and buffers--all of which are discussed in its report. However, the Planning Commission erroneously neglected to apply the "allocated density" limitation to the "gross acres," exclusive of submerged land, public rights-of-way, and the minimum land required to support the other upland uses. As noted above, doing so would have yielded no more than 58 motel rooms. At present, the Subject Property contains 60 hotel or motel rooms. The Subject Property therefore cannot support the addition of another 12 hotel or motel rooms, given its "allocated density" of only 58 rooms. In general, BB justifies the addition of 12 rooms to the front motel by arguing that it is only transferring these units from the 12 existing wet slips. It is unnecessary to determine whether a transfer under these facts is lawful when, if these 12 slips count as units, the Subject Property is already 14 units over its "allocated density." The resolution of the third question--what constitutes a "room"--dispenses with this argument. Thirty of the existing 40-50 boat slips in the marina have water, electric, and cable hook-ups and are presently used for some form of habitation. Most vessels berth at the marina for two or three days, although the average stay is slightly over one month. The average stay at the 30 slips offering utilities, though, is two to three months. Typically, two persons use a vessel berthed at the marina for more than a couple of days. BB seals the discharge ports of all vessels mooring at the marina for any appreciable period of time. BB provides a sewage pumpout service for these and other vessels. The wastewater from the marina operations goes to a septic tank, in contrast to the wastewater from the motel operations, which goes to an onsite package plant. Persons mooring at the marina for at least two months normally obtain telephone service and may obtain cable television service, in addition to the potable water and electrical services provided by BB. The marina also provides rest rooms, laundry facilities, showers, a bar, limited food service, and a mail box. However, BB rules require that all persons berthing at the marina register a permanent address because the slips are "not considered permanent housing." At the request of the Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority and the Monroe County Planning Department, BB has limited rental agreements at the marina to a maximum of one month, although some persons enter into back-to-back rental agreements. Persons staying more than one week often have cars. Contrary to BB's contentions, none of these slips provides additional density for the Subject Property, and therefore the 12 slips are not available for transfer to the motel. For the same reason, as discussed below, the proposed transfer of the 12 units would also violate the Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO). In two respects, the record reveals that the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland residential uses might facilitate the achievement of important land use planning objectives. First, the wastewater collected from the marina is directed to a septic tank, and the wastewater collected from the motel is directed to a package plant. Absent a significantly reduced flow from the marine-based residential use, the upland residential use would therefore impact the adjacent waters to a lesser extent. Second, marine-based residential users may be more reluctant to evacuate for an approaching hurricane than upland residential users. Absent a significantly greater number of visitors during hurricane season if the 12 units were taken from the marina slips and added to the motel, the upland residential use might therefore facilitate timely hurricane evacuation of the vulnerable Keys. However, the record was relatively undeveloped on these two points, and these possible advantages to the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland-based residential uses do not override the LDRs. The LDRs may treat the more intense residential use associated with "live-aboards" differently than the less intense residential use associated with other moored vessels. Although the LDRs' treatment of "live-aboards" may not be entirely consistent, any inconsistency is irrelevant in this case because the moored vessels at the Banana Bay marina do not qualify as "live-aboards." As stipulated for the purpose of this case, LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-4) defines a "transient residential unit" as "a dwelling unit used for transient housing such as a hotel or motel room, or space for parking a recreational vehicle or travel trailer." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-31) defines a "dwelling unit" as "one (1) or more rooms physically arranged to create a housekeeping establishment for occupancy by one (1) family with separate toilet facilities." LDR Code Sections 9.5-4(D-23) through 9.5-4(D-30) identify the various types of dwellings that may contain "dwelling units.” These dwellings are, respectively, detached zero-lot-line dwellings, multifamily apartment dwellings, attached dwellings, detached individual dwellings, duplex dwellings, commercial apartment dwellings, rooftop dwellings, and townhouse dwellings. The frequent references to "open yards" in these definitions precludes the application of these definitions to moored vessels, even "live- aboards." The exclusion of all moored vessels, including "live-aboards," from density calculations is also suggested by two other portions of the LDRs. As is typical, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 provides that the mechanism for enforcing density limitations is in the issuance of building permits, but this enforcement mechanism is of doubtful use in regulating vessel moorings, which do not typically involve the issuance of a building permit. Also, the density definitions discussed above both refer to the development of various types of residential uses on "land." Moreover, none of the zoning districts established in Marathon's LDRs measures the intensity of marina uses, including vessels moored for extended periods as live-aboards, by imposing some sort of marine density limitation, either by including the moored dwelling units or the submerged acreage. Because the LDRs did not intend to include such marine-based uses in density calculations, LDR Code Section 9.5-267, which is a table setting forth "allocated densities" and "maximum net densities," covers only upland-based uses, including recreational vehicle or campground spaces per acre, and does not extent to marine-based uses, such as live-aboard marina slips. However, two provisions in the LDRs require density calculations to include "live-aboards." LDR Code Section 9.5-308, which seems to be an older provision in the LDRs, provides that "each live-aboard shall count as a dwelling unit for the purpose of calculating density limitations in the district in which it is permitted." Better incorporated into the present regulatory scheme of the LDRs, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 defines a "residential dwelling unit" as a "dwelling unit," including a "transient rental unit," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-3), and "live-aboard vessels," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(L-6). However, LDR Code Section 9.5-4((L-6) states that a "live-aboard vessel" is "any vessel used solely as a residence or any vessel represented as a place of business, a professional or other commercial enterprise, or a legal residence." The record does not suggest that any of the moored vessels were used "solely" as a residence, as distinguished, for instance, from a vessel used for residential and recreational purposes, or that any of the mixed-use vessels served as the occupants' legal residence. Absent a finding that the moored vessels constitute "transient residential units," ROGO does not support this proposed transfer of residential uses from marine-based to upland-based. LDR Code Section 9.5-123(f)(3) authorizes the transfer of an existing "residential dwelling unit" from one site to another within the same subarea. However, LDR Code Section 9.5-122 defines a "residential dwelling unit" to extend only to "live-aboards." For the reasons already discussed, the less intense residential uses associated with the vessels moored at Banana Bay's marina preclude their treatment as "residential dwelling units" eligible for transfer to the motel. Petitioner has proved that the development order is materially inconsistent with the LDRs. LDR provisions governing the density and intensity of residential development go to the heart of effective land use planning, especially in an area as sensitive as the Keys. For these reason, it is unnecessary to consider the consistency of the development order with the more general provisions of Marathon's comprehensive plan, on which Marathon's LDRs are based.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order denying the request of Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc., to approve the transfer of 12 slips to 12 rooms in a motel on the Subject Property. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara L. Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Charles Canaday, General Counsel Office of the Governor Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1001 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Mitchell A. Bierman Weiss Serota 2665 South Bayshore Drive Suite 420 Miami, Florida 33133 James S. Mattson James S. Mattson, P.A. Post Office Box 586 Key Largo, Florida 33037
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether a land development regulation adopted as City of Key West Ordinance 98-31, and approved by a Final Order of the Department of Community Affairs, DCA Docket No. DCA98-OR-237, is consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development for the City of Key West Area of Critical State Concern set forth in Rule 28-36.003(1), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. All of the Petitioners in Case No. 99-0666GM, except Neal Hirsh and Property Management of Key West, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Abbe Petitioners"), are all involved in the rental of real property in Key West, Monroe County, Florida. No evidence was presented concerning the identity of Mr. Hirsh or Property Management of Key West, Inc. The Abbe Petitioners are involved in the rental of Key West real property as owners or as rental managers of residential properties which are rented to tourists for periods of less than 30 days or one calendar month (hereinafter referred to as "Transient Rentals). None of the properties used as Transient Rentals by the Abbe Petitioners constitute the Abbe Petitioners' primary residences. Petitioner in Case No. 99-0667GM, Jerry Coleman, owns residential property located in Key West. Mr. Coleman rents the residential property owned by him to tourists for periods of less than 30 days or one calendar month. Mr. Coleman also resides in Key West. Petitioner in Case No. 99-1081DRI, John F. Rooney, failed to present any evidence in support of his case or his standing. Respondent, the Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with responsibility for, among other things, the approval or rejection of the comprehensive growth management plan, plan amendments, and land development regulations adopted by the City of Key West. Intervenor, the City of Key West (hereinafter referred to as the "City"), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. Consistent with the requirements of Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, the City has adopted a comprehensive growth management plan, the City of Key West Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "City's Plan"). The City's Plan became effective in 1993. The City's Plan consists of twelve elements: (a) Land Use; (b) Historic Preservation; (c) Traffic Circulation; (d) Housing; (e) Public Facilities; (f) Coastal Management; (g) Port Facilities; (h) Conservation; (i) Open Space and Recreation; (j) Intergovernmental Coordination; (k) Capital Improvements; and (l) General Monitoring and Review. Data Inventory and Analysis in support of the City's Plan was compiled by the City. The City has been designated as an area of critical state concern (hereinafter referred to as the "City ACSC"), pursuant to Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes, since 1974. Rule 28-36.001, et seq., Florida Administrative Code. As an area of critical state concern, all comprehensive plan amendments and land development regulations adopted by the City must be reviewed by the Department for consistency with the Principles for Guiding Development (hereinafter referred to as the "Principles"), set out in Rule 28-36.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. The Principles were adopted by the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Administration Commission, in February 1984. Intervenors, Henry and Martha duPont, reside at 326 Whitehead Street, Key West, Florida. The duPonts reside in an area known as the "Truman Annex." The properties on both sides of the duPonts' residence are used as Transient Rentals. Key West History and Tourism. The City is located primarily on the southern-most bridged island of the Florida Keys, a chain of islands, or keys, which run in a generally southwesterly direction from the southeastern tip of the Florida peninsula. The City, like the Florida Keys, is bounded on the west by the Gulf of Mexico and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. The City is connected to the Florida peninsula by a series of bridges which connect the keys. The road which runs the length of the Florida Keys is designated U. S. Highway 1. It is approximately 112 miles from the Florida mainland to the City. Prior to the early 1970s, the two most significant components of the City's economy were commercial fishing and the military. Tourism also played a role, but not to the extent that it does today. Toward the middle and end of the 1970s the military presence in the City was significantly reduced and the fishing industry was on the decline. To replace the fading fishing and the lost military components of the City's economy, the City turned to tourism. The City's efforts began in earnest during the 1980s and have continued through the present. The City is now a major tourist destination. The City's most attractive features include its historic character, especially the area of the City designated as "Old Town," its warm climate, its extensive shoreline, and its water resources, including coral reef systems. Approximately two-thirds of the City's economic base is now associated with tourism. While the City shares many of the characteristics of most tourist-resort destinations, it also features certain unique characteristics not found in other destinations. Those features include its geographic remoteness and its limited size. The island where the City is principally located is only approximately eight square miles. Currently, approximately 6.82 million tourists visit the City annually. Approximately 62 percent, or 4.25 million visitors, stay overnight in the City. Approximately 480,000 tourists, or about 11 percent of the overnight guests, stay in Transient Rentals. Tourism in the City represents, directly and indirectly, approximately 66 percent of the economic base of the City. The City's economy in turn represents approximately half of the economy of Monroe County. Approximately 15,000 of the 23,000 jobs in Monroe County and Key West are associated with the tourist industry. Of those jobs, 54 percent of all retail sales jobs are involved in the tourist industry. Approximately 50 percent of the estimated $187 million of Monroe County-wide personal income comes from the tourist industry. The tourist industry should continue to prosper in the City as long as the natural environmental characteristics of the City (the climate, surrounding waters, and tropical features of the Keys) and the unique historical and "community" character of the City remain vibrant. It is the natural environment, the climate, and local community character in combination with the historical and cultural attractions of the City that create a diverse mix of attractions which make the City a unique vacation destination. The City's mixture of attractions must be served by a mixture of tourist accommodation services, including hotels, motels, guest houses, and Transient Rentals. Those accommodations are currently available. There are approximately 3,768 hotel/motel rooms available in the City. There are also approximately 507 residential properties with 906 units which are licensed as Transient Rentals in the City and approximately 647 unlicensed residential properties used for Transient Rentals. The loss of the availability of unlicensed Transient Rentals will not have a lasting adverse impact on tourism in the City. The City's Plan recognizes the importance of tourism. Objective 1-1.3, "Planning for Industrial Development and Economic Base," of the land use element of the City's Plan provides, in pertinent part, the following: . . . . Tourism is the most significant component of the City of Key West economic base. The City of Key West is a major tourist destination. It's principal attributes are its historic character, warm climate, extensive shoreline, water resources, the coral reef system, abundant water related and water-dependent activities, and the ambiance of Old Town. The historic district contains many old structures which do not comply with the City's size and dimension regulations since many structures pre-date these local regulations. Realizing the significant contribution of Old Town, especially the unique character of its structures and their historic and architectural significance, and realizing the substantial impact of tourism to the economic base, the City shall direct considerable attention to its growth management decisions to maintaining the historic character of Old Town and preserving tourism as a major contributor to the City's economic base. Similarly, the City shall carefully consider supply and demand factors impacting tourism and the local economy to ensure the long term economic stability. The two policies adopted to implement Objective 1-1.3, Policies 1-1.3.1, "Mandatory Planning and Management Framework for Industrial Development," and Policy 1- 1.3.2, "Pursue Nuisance Abatement Standards and Criteria," provide for measures to deal with industrial development and not tourism. Reliance upon Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan by Petitioners' witnesses is misplaced. While the Objective does reflect the importance of tourism in the City, it does not provide any guidance concerning appropriate land uses which may be allowed throughout the City. There is no direction in the Objective concerning land uses which the City must maintain. Land uses are considered and dealt with in other provisions of the City's land use element. Additionally, the reliance upon Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan fails to give adequate weight to other provisions of the Plan. The Historic Significance of the City and "Old Town." The importance of the City's history is recognized throughout the Plan. Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan quoted, supra, points to the City's history and the role it plays in tourism. An area of the City has been designated as the Key West Historic District. The area is described in the Data Inventory and Analysis as the "physical manifestation of the 170 year existence of [the City]." Page 1A-11 of the Data Inventory and Analysis. Objective 1-2.3 of the Future Land Use Map Goal of the City's Plan deals with the importance of the Key West Historic District and an area which is largely located within the historic district known as "Old Town": OBJECTIVE 1-2.3: MANAGING OLD TOWN REDEVELOPMENT AND PRESERVATION OF HISTORIC RESOURCES. Areas delineated on the Future Land Use Map for historic preservation shall be planned and managed using a regulatory framework designed to preserve the form, function, image, and ambiance of the historic Old Town. The City's Historic Architectural Review Commission (HARC), in addition to the Planning Board, shall review all development proposals within the historic area designated by the National Register of Historic Places. The land development regulations shall be amended upon plan adoption to incorporate design guideline standards recently adopted by HARC. Development in any area of Old Town within and outside the HARC review area may impact the historic significance of Old Town. Any development plans for these areas shall be subjected to site plan review and shall be designed in a manner compatible with historic structures within the vicinity. While Objective 1-2.3 makes reference to the preservation of the "function" of Old Town, the Objective does not require that any particular "land use" which may exist in Old Town be preserved in perpetuity. The Objective and other provisions of the City's Plan addressing the historic significance of the City evidence a concern for the overall character of the area, not particular land uses. That character is described in, and adopted as part of, the Future Land Use Map of the City's Plan. See Policy 1-3.4.1 and Objective 1-3.4 of the City's Plan. Objective 1-1.5 of the Land Use element emphasizes the importance of maintaining and enhancing the appearance of gateway corridors into the City and the "major activiy centers such as Old Town." The Historic Preservation Element of the City's Plan, Chapter 1A, deals with historic resources, structures, and sites. No particular land use of these resources, structures, and sites, other than "housing," is mentioned. Throughout the history of the City, residents have to varying degrees rented their residences or parts of their residences on a short-term basis to tourists and other guests to the City. Most of the rentals involved the rental of portions of a residence while the owner of the property continued to reside in the rest of the property. Monroe County Commissioner Wilhelmina Harvey, Joe Crusoe, Robert Lastres, Vincent Catala, and Olivia Rowe, all long-term residents of the City, all testified about such rentals. The evidence failed to prove, however, that the types of rentals historically undertaken in the City constitute a part of the significant "history" of the City, at least not in the context of the historical significance of the City addressed in the City's Plan. Nor were the historical rentals testified to during hearing of the scale and scope of the rentals that now exist in the City. Additionally, to the extent that Transient Rentals are considered to be part of the significant "history" of the City, nothing in the land development regulation which is the subject of this proceeding absolutely prohibits such rentals. In fact, Transient Rentals of property for which a transient rental license has been obtained are not impacted by the land development regulation. Transient Rentals will, therefore, continue in the City. Nothing in the City's Plan dealing with the historical significance of the City requires that the City allow Transient Rentals of residential property to continue unregulated in the City. Regulation of the extent and location of Transient Rentals in the City does nothing to harm the historical significance of the City. In suggesting that Transient Rentals constitute part of the "history" of the City, and in particular, a part of the history of Old Town, the Abbe Petitioners have relied upon Policy 1-2.3.9, which provides, in part, the following: Policy 1-2.3.9: Retention of Historic Character and All Permanent Single Family Housing Units. The City desires to retain in perpetuity the existing character, density, and intensity of all historic sites and contributing sites within the historic district; and shall protect all the City's permanent single family housing stock citywide which was legally established prior to the adoption of the plan or a legal single family lot of record. Therefore, the City shall protect and preserve these resources against natural disaster, including fire, hurricane, or other natural or man-made disaster, by allowing any permanent single family units within the City, or other structures located on historic sites or contributing sites, which are so damaged to be rebuilt as they previously existed. . . . The reliance upon Policy 1-2.3.9 is misplaced. First, this Policy deals with all permanent single-family housing stock of the City and not just housing used for Transient Rentals. Secondly, the Policy does not provide for the protection of any particular use of single-family housing stock; it provides for the protection of the structures used as single-family housing. It recognizes the unique, historical construction of homes in the City and provides for their continued protection. The Impact of the City's Limited Land Mass and the City's Effort to Control Transient Rentals. As a relatively small island, the City has a limited land area and little opportunity for expansion without significantly altering the traditional character of the City. Because of the limited land area, maintaining adequate housing, including affordable housing, is a significant concern in the City. Residential property in the City has been used by tourists for accommodations for many years, long before the tourist boom now being experienced in the City. Transient uses of residential property were less organized and were less available than they are today, however. Often times, transient uses of residential property consisted of people renting out rooms in their residences to tourists. While the extent to which residential property has been used historically for tourist accommodations was not accurately quantified by the evidence, the evidence did establish that the use of residential property for Transient Rentals has significantly increased since the 1980s. As tourism has increased since the 1980s, there has been an increasing demand for tourist accommodations of all types. This demand for tourist accommodations, especially the demand for Transient Rentals, has adversely impacted the need and demand for residential housing in the City. In an effort to address the problem the Key West City Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "City Commission"), adopted a Growth Management Ordinance in 1985 mandating a ratio of Transient Rentals to residential units for the City. The intent of the 1985 Growth Management Ordinance was to maintain a suitable balance between tourist accommodations and housing for permanent residents of the City. In 1993 the City Commission adopted a dwelling unit allocation ordinance, or the "rate of growth ordinance," which was designed, at least in part, to achieve a balance between the demand for tourist accommodations and the need for permanent housing, including affordable housing. The 1993 rate of growth ordinance was subsequently incorporated into the City's Plan as Objective 1-3.12. Pursuant to the City's Plan, Transient Rentals are not to exceed 25 percent of single family units permitted annually. Note 2 to Policy 1-3.12.3 of the Plan provides that "[t]he number of transient units reflect a preference for preserving housing opportunities for permanent residents as opposed to transient residents since historical trends indicate an erosion of the permanent housing stock which is largely attributed to conversion of permanent housing units to transient housing." The City's Failure to Control Transient Rentals; The "50% Rule." In 1989, the City required that an occupational license be obtained by property owners using their property for both long-term rentals and Transient Rentals. These occupational licenses were not subject to review by the Department for consistency with the City's Plan and land development regulations. Occupational licenses are essentially a revenue raising requirement. The issuance of an occupational license does not constitute a zoning decision or otherwise constitute the approval of a land use. By the time the City adopted the 1993 rate of growth ordinance and the City's Plan, the number of occupational licenses issued for Transient Rentals had already exceeded the allocation of Transient Rentals which are allowable in the City. As a consequence, owners of residential property who desired to use their property for Transient Rental purposes have been unable to obtain an occupational license for such use. The lack of allowable Transient Rentals under the City's Plan did not, however, actually stop individuals from using their property for Transient Rentals. In addition to licensed Transient Rentals, there are approximately 647 unlicensed Transient Rental properties in the City. Properties owned by the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman are among these unlicensed Transient Rentals. The Abbe Petitioners who own Transient Rentals rather than manage them have occupational licenses issued by the State of Florida and Monroe County, but not a Transient Rental occupational license issued by the City. Mr. Coleman has a "nontransient" license issued by the City and occupational licenses issued by the State and Monroe County, but not a Transient Rental occupational license from the City. The number of unlicensed Transient Rental properties in the City has been contributed to, in part, by an interpretation of a former definition of "tourist and transient living accommodations" found in the City's land development regulations. The definition was adopted in 1986. Accommodations meeting this definition were prohibited in a number of zoning districts in the City. Accommodations which did not come within the definition were not prohibited in those districts. The 1986 definition of "tourist and transient living accommodations" (hereinafter referred to as the "Former Transient Definition"), was as follows: Tourist and transient living accommodations. Commercially operated housing principally available to short-term visitors for less than twenty-eight (28) days. Pursuant to this definition, any property used "principally" for visitors for less than 28 days constituted a tourist or transient living accommodation. There were some who advocated that the term "principally" meant that a residence had to be used as a 28-day short-term visitor accommodation for at least 50 percent of the year. Pursuant to this definition, any residence used at least 50 percent of the year for 28-day or less rentals is considered to constitute a "tourist and transient living accommodation." Conversely, if a residence was used less than 50 percent of the year for 28-day or less rental the property is not considered to constitute a tourist or transient living accommodation. This interpretation of the Former Transient Definition has been referred to as the "50% Rule." Pursuant to the 50% Rule, the owner of residential property in the City could rent the property for periods of less than 28 days without obtaining an occupational license for the property as long as the property was not rented more than half of the year. This rationale was assumed to apply regardless of where the property was located; even in land use districts where Transient Rentals were prohibited. The developer of Truman Annex, an area formerly owned by the Navy located to the immediate south of Old Town, advocated the 50% Rule in his dealings with the City in the early 1990s. The City's licensing department also issued "non- transient" licenses for residences which met the 50% Rule. Code enforcement citations against owners of residences used as Transient Rentals for less than 50 percent of the year without an occupational license were withdrawn. Despite the foregoing, the evidence at hearing in these cases failed to prove that the 50% Rule became an official "policy" of the City Commission. What the evidence proved was that the City took no action to adopt or reject the 50% Rule as an official position. The City simply failed to take any action to reject the 50% Rule and interpret the definition of tourist and transient living accommodations in a more reasonable manner. Given the City's efforts to limit Transient Rentals through the adoption of the 1985 Growth Management Ordinance, the 1993 rate of growth ordinance, and the City's Plan, it is clear, however, that reliance upon the 50% Rule is not reasonable. See findings of fact 39 through 45 of the Department of Community Affairs and City of Key West's Joint Proposed Recommended Order, which are hereby incorporated herein by reference. Finally, even if the 50% Rule did constitute the legislative intent of the City Commission in adopting the Former Transient Definition, it was eliminated by the City Commission in 1997 by the adoption of City Ordinance 97-20. City Ordinance 97-20 was adopted September 16, 1997, and was approved by Final Order of the Department dated November 19, 1997. The new definition of transient living accommodations adopted by City Ordinance 97-20, and still in effect today, is as follows: SECTION 5-21.2: DEFINITION OF TERMS TRANSIENT LIVING ACCOMMODATIONS. Any unit, group of units, dwelling, building, or group of buildings within a single complex of buildings, which is 1) rented for periods of less than 30 days or 1 calendar month, whichever is less; or which is 2) advertised or held out to the public as a place regularly rented to transients. (Emphasis added). The current definition of transient living accommodations has eliminated the reference to properties "principally" used as a Transient Rental. The new definition includes any residence rented for any period of time, even once a year, as long as the rental is for a period of less than 30 days or one calendar month, whichever is less. The Former Transient Definition and, consequently, the 50% Rule, was also superceded by the adoption of the City's Plan. The City recognized the foregoing history in the ordinance which is the subject of this proceeding. In rejecting the notion that the City had adopted the 50% Rule as City policy, the City stated the following in the ordinance: . . . . In 1986, the City enacted former zoning code Section 35.24(44) which provided the following definition of a transient living accommodation "Commercially operated housing principally available to short-term visitors for less than twenty-eight (28) days." (This definition shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Former Transient Definition.") Some property owners and developers interpreted the Former Transient Definition to mean that an owner could rent his or her residential dwelling for less than half the year without the dwelling losing its residential status, and therefore without the need for City-issued transient license . . . . This interpretation went unchallenged by the City. . . . . . . . Therefore, the City of Key West intends by these regulations to establish a uniform definition of transient living accommodations, and to halt the use of residences for transient purposes in order to preserve the residential character of neighborhoods. . . . Based upon the foregoing, any reliance by Petitioners in these cases upon the 50% Rule as City policy is rejected. The City's Adoption of Ordinance No. 98-31. During 1997 and 1998 the City conducted workshops and held public meetings to consider and develop an ordinance regulating Transient Rentals. The workshops were conducted by City staff and were attended by representatives of essentially all those interested in the Transient Rental issue. An effort was made to achieve consensus on the issue. During these workshops, the 50% Rule and the history of Transient Rentals in the City were fully considered. In addition to the workshops conducted by the City, the City hired Frank Pallini with PRG, Real Estate Research and Advisory Services, Clearwater, Florida, to conduct an analysis of the economic impact of an ordinance limiting Transient Rentals. The report prepared by Mr. Pallini (hereinafter referred to as the "Pallini Report"), was submitted to the City on August 28, 1998. The Pallini Report and, consequently, the negative economic impact of the ordinance at issue in this proceeding was fully considered by the City when it adopted the ordinance. On June 2, 1998, the City Commission adopted Ordinance 98-16, which amended the definition of "transient living accommodations" in the City's land development regulations. Unlicensed short-term Transient Rentals were expressly prohibited by Ordinance 98-16 with the exception of four specified City land use districts. Those districts, referred to during the hearing as "gated communities," are all single, contiguous zoning district areas of the City with controlled access and which are governed by homeowners' or condominium associations. Truman Annex was one of the four excluded gated communities. Ordinance 98-16 was found by the Department to be inconsistent with the Principles on July 29, 1998, by Final Order DCA98-OR-135. The Department concluded that Ordinance 98- 16 was inconsistent with the Principles because it allowed the use of residential property as Transient Rentals in areas where, according to the Department, such rentals were prohibited under the City's Plan. The City initially challenged the Department's decision, but subsequently withdrew its challenge. The City subsequently repealed Ordinance 98-16. On November 10, 1998, the City adopted Ordinance 98-31 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance"), which is the subject of this proceeding. The Ordinance contains the same provisions, except the exception for gated communities, that had been contained in Ordinance 98-16. The Ordinance is a "land development regulation" as defined in Section 380.031(8), Florida Statutes. It is, therefore, subject to review for consistency with the Principles by the Department. During the process of adopting the Ordinance the City recognized the confusion that the 50% Rule had caused concerning the intent of the City's Plan with regard to Transient Rentals. The City expressly dealt with the 50% Rule and rejected it as policy of the City. In particular, the Ordinance provides that the City's purpose in enacting the Ordinance was to phase out unlicensed transient uses of residential properties in land use zoning districts in which they are not permitted. This goal is accomplished by further modifying the definition of "transient living accommodations" adopted in 1997 in Section 5-21.2 of the City's land development regulations: Sec. 5-21.2 Definition of terms. Transient Living Accommodations. Or Transient Lodging. Any unit, group of units, dwelling, building, or group of buildings within a single complex of buildings, which is 1) rented for a period or periods of less than 30 days or 1 calendar month, whichever is less; or which is 2) advertised or held out to the public as a place rented to regularly regularly rented to transients. , regardless of the occurrence of an actual rental. Such a short-term rental use of or within a single family dwelling, a two family dwelling or a multi-family dwelling (each also known as a "residential dwelling") shall be deemed a transient living accommodation. (Words struckstruck through were eliminated from the definition and underlined words were added). The Ordinance also adds Section 2-7.21 to the City's land development regulations explaining its action in modifying the definition of transient living accommodations and expressly prohibiting unlicensed Transient Rentals of less than 30 days or one calendar month, whichever is less. The Ordinance does not provide for a complete ban on Transient Rentals. On the contrary, Transient Rentals of properties for which transient occupational licenses have been issued by the City are expressly allowed by the Ordinance. The City estimated that 507 residential properties containing a total of 906 transient units hold such licenses. Under the Ordinance, these units may continue to be used as Transient Rentals. The Department's Review of the Ordinance. On November 24, 1998, the City transmitted a copy of the Ordinance to the Department for approval or rejection pursuant to Section 380.05(6), Florida Statutes. The Department conducted its review of the Ordinance following its customary procedures for review of land development regulations that impact an area of critical state concern. The review included a consideration of Chapter 28-36, Florida Administrative Code, including the Principles, the City's Plan, and the legislative intent of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. The Ordinance was directed to Kenneth Metcalf, the person in the Department responsible for supervision of the City ACSC. Mr. Metcalf reviewed the ordinance and assigned it to the Department's Field Office with directions as to which issues the Field Office should address during its review. Following staff review, an evaluation was prepared addressing the Ordinance's consistency with the Principles. The evaluation was reviewed by Mr. Metcalf. After receipt and review of the evaluation, it was discussed at a meeting of Department staff. As a result of the meeting, it was recommended that the Secretary of the Department find the Ordinance consistent with the Principles. On January 5, 1999, the Department entered a Final Order, DCA98-OR-237, finding that the Ordinance was consistent with the Principles. The Department caused notice of the Final Order to published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Petitioners' Challenge to the Ordinance. The Abbe Petitioners, Mr. Coleman and over 200 other owners of property in Truman Annex, and Mr. Rooney all timely filed petitions challenging the Department's Final Order pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, to the Department's Final Order approving the Ordinance. The petitions were filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Department. The petitions were designated Case Nos. 99-0666GM, 99-0667GM and 99-1081DRI, respectively. Following dismissal of the petitions in all three cases, amended petitions were filed. Mr. Coleman's amended petition, filed on or about June 14, 1999, named Mr. Coleman as the only Petitioner remaining in that case. Standing. The parties stipulated to certain facts relating to the standing of the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman. In addition to stipulating to the facts found, supra, concerning the ownership and use of real property by the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman in the City, it was agreed that the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman have transient occupational licenses issued by the State of Florida and Monroe County for their City real property. The Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman suggested in their proposed orders that it had been stipulated during the hearing that they have standing to initiate, and participate in, this proceeding. A close reading of the stipulation of the parties, however, fails to support this contention. What the Department, City, and the duPonts stipulated to were certain underlying facts; they did not stipulate to the ultimate finding. The Department, City, and duPonts did not stipulate to whether the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman will suffer an immediate injury as a result of the Ordinance. The evidence proved that, the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman do not have the legal right to use their properties as Transient Rentals. Neither a reasonable interpretation of existing land development regulations nor the 50% Rule legalizes such use. As a consequence, the Ordinance cannot have the effect of preventing the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman from using their properties for Transient Rental purposes because that is not a purpose for which they are legally authorized to use the properties anyway. The evidence also proved, however, that the City has allowed the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman to continue to use their properties as Transient Rentals, legally or not, and that, without the City's taking some action, the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman would continue to do so. As a consequence, the Ordinance will have the practical and real effect of preventing the Abbe Petitioners and Mr. Coleman from continuing to use their properties as Transient Rentals, to their economic detriment. The Abbe Petitioners, other than Neal Hirsh and Property Management of Key West, Inc., and Mr. Coleman have proved that they have standing to institute and participate in this proceeding. The duPonts proved that they have standing to participate in this proceeding. The City proved that its substantial interests were determined by the Department's decision in this matter. The City has standing to participate in this proceeding. Mr. Hirsh, Property Management of Key West, Inc., and Mr. Rooney failed to prove that they have standing to institute or participate in this proceeding. The Principles. Rule 28-36.003, Florida Administrative Code, contains the Principles: Strengthen local government capabilities for managing land use and development; Protection of tidal mangroves and associated shoreline and marine resources and wildlife; Minimize the adverse impacts of development of the quality of water in and around the City of Key West and throughout the Florida Keys; Protection of scenic resources of the City of Key West and promotion of the management of unique, tropical vegetation; Protection of the historical heritage of Key West and the Key West Historical Preservation District; Protection of the value, efficiency, cost-effectiveness and amortized life of existing and proposed major public investments, including: The Florida Keys Aqueduct and water supply facilities, Sewage collection and disposal facilities, Solid waste collection and disposal facilities, Key West Naval Air Station, The maintenance and expansion of transportation facilities, and Other utilities, as appropriate; Minimize the adverse impacts of proposed public investments on the natural and environmental resources of the City of Key West; and Protection of the public health, safety, welfare and economy of the City of Key West, and the maintenance of Key West as a unique Florida resource. In determining whether the Ordinance is consistent with the Principles, the Principles should be considered as a whole. No specific provision should be construed or applied in isolation from the other provisions. The Ordinance has little or no impact on those Principles that relate to the natural resources of, and public facilities in, the City. Those Principles include Rule 28- 36.003(1)(b), (c), (d), (f), and (g), Florida Administrative Code. Those Principles are considered neutral in the determination to be made in these cases. The determination of whether the Ordinance is consistent with the Principles is limited to a balancing of the Principles listed in Rule 28-36.003(1)(a), (e), and (h), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as "Principles A, E, and H," respectively). Principle A: The Ordinance Strengthens the City's Capabilities for Managing Land Use and Development. In order for the Ordinance to be considered as strengthening the City's capabilities for managing land use and development, the Ordinance must be consistent with the City's Plan. The evidence proved that it is. The City's Plan contains various land use districts, all of which have certain allowable and prohibited uses. The districts established in the City's Plan and the relevant prohibition of transient lodgings are as follows: Coastal Low Density Residential Development district: prohibits "transient lodging and guest homes." Single Family Residential Development district: prohibits "transient accommodations" and "transient rental housing." Medium Density Residential Development district: prohibits "transient lodging and guest homes." Mixed Use Residential/Office: prohibits "transient lodging." Limited Commercial Development: Prohibits "transient residential land use activities." Historic High Density Residential Development and Historic Medium Density Residential Development districts: prohibit "transient residential uses, including guest homes, motels, or hotels." Historic Residential Commercial Core 2: prohibits "transient residential uses." Historic Residential/Office district: prohibits "transient lodging or guest houses" unless previously licensed. Conservation, Military, and Public Services districts: prohibit transient uses. The following districts established by the City Plan allow Transient Rentals: Salt Pond Commercial Tourist: allows "motels, [and] limited scale tourist facilities." General Commercial Development: allows "transient lodging including hotels and motels, timesharing or fractional fee residential complexes, and other transient quarters." Mixed Use Planned Redevelopment and Development districts: uses are determined, not by the City's Plan, but the land development regulations and development approvals for these large scale development districts. Historic Residential Commercial Core 1 and 3 districts: allow "transient residential accommodations" and "tourist accommodations." Historic Neighborhood Commercial: allows "transient rental accommodations" in HNC-1 and HNC-3 districts as long as they do not displace permanent resident housing and "transient accommodations" in HNC-2 districts. Historic Commercial Tourist: allows "hotels, motels, and/or transient lodging facilities." The most reasonable interpretation of the restricted and allowable land uses for the land use districts established under the City's Plan is that references to "transient rental accommodations," "transient residential uses," "transient rental housing," and "transient lodging facilities" are intended to include Transient Rentals. One other district is established by the City's Plan which is relevant to this matter: Historic Planned Redevelopment and Development districts (hereinafter referred to as "HPRD" districts). Land uses allowable in an HPRD district are to be established by land development regulations. The only HPRD district in the City is currently the Truman Annex. Truman Annex was being developed at the time the City's Plan was adopted. While the City's Plan provides that the specific requirements for any HPRD district is to be provided by land development regulations, Policy 1-2.3.4 of the City's Plan does provide, among other things, that the regulations are to "[a]void replacement of permanent housing stock with transient lodging." The Ordinance, and its application to Truman Annex, is consistent with this direction of the City's Plan. Truman Annex was developed as a development of regional impact, or "DRI." As a DRI and HPRD district, land uses in Truman Annex are subject to development agreements between the City and the developer of Truman Annex. Those agreements have been amended 12 times. The Truman Annex development agreements allow the development of "housing units," which included both transient and non-transient uses. "Housing units" were further broken down into the following types: "affordable," "hotel transient housing units," "time share transient housing units," and "other residential housing units." "Affordable" and "other residential housing units" are intended to be "residential" development in the context of the Truman Annex development agreements; "hotel transient housing units" and "time share transient housing units" are intended to be Transient Rentals in the context of the Truman Annex development agreements. Given the distinction between "transient" housing units and other uses in the Truman Annex development agreements, no approval of Transient Rentals of "affordable" or "other residential housing units" was contemplated or allowed by the City. The Truman Annex development agreements and the HPRD district land development regulations do not authorize the use of "affordable" or "other residential housing units" in Truman Annex as Transient Rentals. The Ordinance is, therefore, consistent with the Truman Annex development agreements and the HPRD district land development regulations. The Ordinance, if nothing else, clarifies the state of the law with regard to which Transient Rentals are allowed and which are prohibited in the City. The Ordinance eliminates any lingering confusion caused by the failure of the City to reject the 50% Rule in all circumstances and to properly interpret the Former Transient Definition. The suggestion of the Abbe Petitioners that the 50% Rule was adopted as a part of the City's Plan because it existed when the City's Plan was adopted is not supported by the evidence. Again, the 50% Rule was never adopted as the official policy of the City; it simply went unchallenged by the City. In fact, the 50% Rule was allowed to be advanced by some despite the adoption of the City's Plan and its prohibition against Transient Rentals in the land use districts described, supra. Nor does Objective 1-1.3 of the City's Plan support the Petitioners' position in these cases. That Objective does not require that any particular land use be continued in the City. Nor do those provisions of the City's Plan dealing with the historic significance of the City detract from the conclusion that the Ordinance is consistent with the City's Plan. The provisions dealing with the historic significance of the City are concerned with the significance of structures which have been a part of the history of the City's existence. The City's Plan also evidences a desire to preserve historically significant housing, not any particular use of those structures. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the Ordinance is consistent with Principal A. Principle E: Protection of the Historic Heritage of the City and the Key West Historical Preservation District. Principle E requires a consideration of significant events in the history of the City, famous visitors and residences of the City throughout its history, the architectural history of the City, and other aspects of the City's character. This conclusion is supported, in part, by Rule 28-36.003(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code: (e) Historic Resource Protection. A management and enforcement plan and ordinance shall be adopted by the City of Key West providing that designs and uses of development reconstruction within the Key West Historical Preservation District shall be compatible with the existing unique architectural styles and shall protect the historical values of the District. The City of Key shall maintain an architectural review board established pursuant to Section 266.207(2), Florida Statutes. . . . . The evidence in these cases proved that the Ordinance will preserve and ensure the preservation of the City's historical significance. It will do so by limiting the destruction of the character and community of the City, as discussed, infra. Principle E does not support a conclusion, as argued by Petitioners, that Transient Rentals have played such a large part in the history of the City that they should not be regulated in the manner the Ordinance provides for. Petitioners' argument also fails because the Ordinance only regulates Transient Rentals, it does not eliminate historical Transient Rental uses. The City's Plan also fails to support Petitioners' argument. The City's Plan does not address, or require, the continuation of "historical" land uses such as Transient Rentals. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, it is concluded that the Ordinance is consistent with Principal E. Principle H: Public Health, Safety, and Welfare and the Economy of the City. Principal H requires a consideration of the public health, safety, and welfare, and the economic viability of the City. These factors are inextricably tied to the tourist industry of the City. Without the tourist industry, the City's economy would likely falter to the detriment of the public health, safety, and welfare. A large part of what makes the City attractive, to tourist and residents alike, is the unique community atmosphere and the historical character of the City. The health of the tourist industry in the City is, in part, caused by the City's vibrant and viable communities. An essential characteristic of that vibrancy is the fabric of the people that inhabit the City and the interactions of those inhabitants among themselves and with tourists. As long as tourists continue to enjoy the unique character of the City, they will continue to enjoy their experience and will continue to come back to the City. If that unique character is significantly diminished or lost, so too will be the tourist industry. A number of factors threaten the quality of the tourist experience in the City and, therefore, the continued viability of the tourist industry. Those factors include the shortage of available and affordable housing, a shortage of labor to serve the tourist industry, crowding, and conflicts between tourist and residents of the City. All of these factors are related and must be adequately addressed in order to protect the economic viability of the City. Left unchecked, tourism in the City will likely be seriously impacted. Tourism requires a large labor force to provide the services which tourist expect. The labor force must provide lodging, food, retail sales, amusements, and other services. Indirect services, such as fire protection, police, and others must be provided for also by the labor force. The labor force necessary to serve a tourist industry must be provided with adequate housing. The ability to meet this need must be balanced with the need to provide adequate accommodations to the tourists who visit a destination. The need to balance these competing interests is an even greater challenge in the City because of the existing shortage of available residential property in the City and the lack of viable measures which can be taken to address the shortage. The City's shortage of residential property is caused by the fact that the supply of available land in the City is so restricted it simply cannot meet the demand. The problem caused by the lack of available land is exacerbated by restrictions on development, including those imposed by the rate of growth ordinance and the City's Historic Architectural Review Commission. Actions of the City's Historic Architectural Review Commission cause increases in the cost of redeveloping property and limits the types of redevelopment that may be pursed. Alternatives, like housing the labor force some distance from a tourist destination and providing transportation to bring the labor force into the destination, cannot be utilized in the City to meet the demand for housing for its labor force. The unavailability of adequate land is a problem throughout the length of the Florida Keys. Tourist are now demanding a variety of accommodations. The national trend has seen a increase in the demand for accommodations other than the traditional hotel or motel. Many tourists desire accommodations that include multiple rooms, including kitchen facilities. Transient Rentals have become increasingly available in order to meet part of this demand. Hotels and motels have also begun to offer efficiency- like units. Transient Rentals have also increased because of 1986 changes in federal income tax laws. Those changes have resulted in more owners of vacation housing turning their properties into Transient Rentals in order to offset the cost of the properties. The availability of Transient Rentals has significantly increased in scope and magnitude over what was historically experienced in the City. In addition to the impact on the types of accommodations desired by tourist and the tax benefits of converting property to Transient Rental use, tourism itself has increased dramatically during the past 30 years, further increasing the demand for tourist accommodations. According to a report on housing in the City known as the "Shimberg Report," from 1990 to 1995 the number of housing units decreased from 12,221 to 11,733, a decrease of 488 units. Despite this decrease, the number of households in the City during the same period increased from 10,424 to 11,298, an increase of 874. Economically, a commercial-type use, such as Transient Rentals, will usually be more profitable than a residential use of the same property. The City has experienced this economic impact. As a result of the higher economic value of using a residence as a Transient Rental, tourist use of residential property have in many cases displaced the residential use of property. The demand for Transient Rentals and the need to provide for housing for the labor force necessary to serve the City's tourist industry involve competing and inconsistent goals. In order to meet the need for Transient Rentals in the City, it has been necessary to convert housing formerly used to house the City's residents, including those who make up the labor force. The resulting decrease in residential housing and the increase in Transient Rentals also result in crowding, with members of the labor force in the City being required to share available space with tourists. Crowding results in unacceptable densities of use and increased user conflict. The resulting decrease in residential housing caused by the increase in Transient Rental use in the City has not only resulted in permanent residents leaving the City's communities, but in their departure from the City and the Florida Keys altogether. In addition to the negative impacts on housing, a tourist destination can become so popular that the very quality of the location is negatively impacted or even destroyed. John Pennekamp State Park, located in the northern part of the Florida Keys, has been so successful at attracting visitors that it has been negatively impacted. Although tourism has not reached a point where it is destroying the unique character of the City, the very thing that attracts many visitors to the City, it has the potential of reaching that stage without adequate planning by the City. Shopping by residents in the "downtown" area of the City has already been displaced by shopping areas located away from Old Town. Dr. Virginia Cronk testified during the hearing of these cases concerning what can happen to a community's identity if tourism becomes too dominate. The City is already showing some signs of the negative impact tourism can have on a community. As more stress from overcrowding is placed on the City's communities, the very base of the City's tourist industry is impacted. Not only will the labor force be moved out, the community atmosphere of communities that is so attractive in the City may be diminished or even destroyed. As in many other tourist destinations, the activities of tourists and permanent residents the City are often incompatible. This is especially true in the City because much of what attracts tourists to the City is associated with the City's residential neighborhoods. Part of the tourist destination of the City is its neighborhoods. The type of visitors attracted to the City over the last decade has changed significantly. Many tourists now come to "party" on Duval Street, often late into the night and the early morning hours. The partying often continues back to, and at, the accommodations that the tourists utilize. Many tourists make every effort to maximize their "fun time" by staying up late and playing hard. Because tourists are on vacation, they are not as concerned about when they go to sleep and when they enjoy the City. They are not required to keep any particular schedule, so they are more at liberty to stay up into the early morning hours. Because tourists are only in the City for a short time, they are also less concerned with getting along with their neighbors. They want to have a good time and assume that everyone around them is there for the same reason. Permanent residents of the City are much like permanent residents everywhere. The adults are employed during the day and their children attend school. They go to bed and rise earlier than tourists generally do. Because of the differences in the goals of tourists and permanent residents, inevitable conflicts arise when tourists and residents mix. Unless those conflicts are controlled in the City, permanent residents will be forced out, threatening to end one of the very features that has made the City so attractive to tourists: the unique community atmosphere and historical character of the City. Dr. Cronk explained the different social forces which impact the behavior of tourists and residents. Tourists are simply not subject to the same informal social controls that residents are. As a result, the behavior of tourists often comes into conflict with the behavior normally associated with a true community neighborhood. Because the behavior of tourists is not subject to the same informal social controls as residents, residents must turn increasingly to more formal social controls such as the police and private security forces. These controls often do not work and are more expensive than the informal social controls normally associated with neighborhoods. Witnesses during the hearing of these cases gave examples of clashes between permanent residents and tourists. Those incidents are fully reported in the transcript of the hearing of this matter and are summarized in the proposed orders filed by the Department and City, and the duPonts. The need to resort to more formal social controls, such as the police and private security was also explained by these witnesses. The credible testimony of Ms. Rowe, Margaret Domanski, and Martha duPont accurately describe the types of conflicts the Ordinance is intended to reduce. The impact which the conversion of residential properties to Transient Rentals has on affordable housing in the City is difficult to measure. The Department has suggested that it is significant. Petitioners argue that there is no impact and that, even if there were some impact, affordable housing is not one of the Principles and, therefore, should play no part in the review of the Ordinance. The principles which apply to Monroe County require that Monroe County "make available adequate affordable housing for all sectors of the population of the Florida Keys." Section 380.0552(7)(j), Florida Statutes. This principle is consistent with the legislative intent set out in Section 380.0552(2)(d), Florida Statutes, that a local government provide affordable housing in close proximity to places of employment in the Florida Keys. The Principles applicable to the City ACSC do not contain a principle specifically requiring that affordable housing be maintained. The lack of a specific requirement concerning affordable housing does not, however, support a conclusion that affordable housing should be ignored when applying the Principles to land development regulations adopted by the City. On the contrary, Principle H is broad enough to require a consideration of affordable housing. After all, any consideration of the "public health . . . welfare, and economy" of the City, necessarily must include a consideration of affordable housing. Without adequate housing for all sectors of the City's population, the public health and welfare of the City cannot be maintained. Nor can the economy of the City survive without adequate housing for all segments of the work force. "Affordable housing" does not mean housing for the poor. "Affordable housing" is defined in terms of the percentage of a household's income spent on housing which is considered "affordable" by very-low income, low-income, and moderate-income persons. What is considered affordable is based upon the median household income of a community's very-low income, low-income, and moderate-income population. The approximate median household income of City residents is $49,000.00. In order for the City to be considered to have adequate "affordable housing," persons making between 80 and 120 percent of the median household income, or $39,000 to $59,000, should be able to afford a house. The average value of a single-family house in the City, however, is $300,000, well above the price affordable to persons with a household income of between $39,000 and $59,000. Because of the disparity between the average price of homes and the low median household income of City residents, an enormous burden is placed on residents to fund any type of housing. As much as 30 percent of residents' income must be spent on housing. The number of residents spending at least 30 percent of their income on housing increased significantly between 1990 and 1995. That number is likely to continue to increase. As the cost of residential property increases, the economic burden on residents for housing continues to increase. The cost of residential property is increasing, and will continue to increase, because of the conversion of residential property to Transient Rentals. If the City takes no action with regard to balancing tourist accommodations, particularly Transient Rentals, and housing for its residents, the ability of residents to afford any housing will continue to be negatively impacted. Even though it is doubtful that the Ordinance will increase the ability of residents to actually own their own home, there is no doubt that their ability to afford any housing will continue to be negatively impacted if Transient Rentals continue to displace the use of property for residential purposes. In adopting the Ordinance, the City recognized the negative impact that tourism is having on the City: . . . the transient use of residential dwellings has had deleterious consequences in the residential neighborhoods of Key West; and . . . the increase in the conversion of residential dwellings to transient use is, in part, responsible for the affordable housing shortage in Key West, a shortage confirmed in a study of the City by the Shimberg Center of the University of Florida . . . The finding concerning affordable housing is consistent with the City's Plan. Objective 3-1.1 and Note 2, Policy 1-3.12.3 of the City's Plan. In adopting the Ordinance, the City took a reasonable step to address the problems associated with tourism. The Ordinance, while causing an initial negative impact to the economy, will promote the protection of residential neighborhoods from unnecessary intrusion, promote affordable housing, and ultimately ensure the continued viability of the tourist economy of the City. By limiting the intrusion of Transient Rentals into most residential neighborhoods in the City, the Ordinance will limit the intrusion of negative tourist activities into those neighborhoods. Those negative impacts testified about by Ms. Rowe, Ms. Domanski, and Ms. duPont will be, in most cases, prevented or at least reduced. The reduction of tourist intrusions into neighborhoods will also ensure that the unique community character of the City remains viable. The Ordinance will go a long way in keeping the charm of the City's neighborhoods intact for tourists and residents both. The Ordinance goes a long way in planning for tourism in the City. Reducing economically competitive uses of property in the City, such as the use of property for Transient Rentals, will ensure that the scarce supply of residential property is not further reduced. Stabilizing the supply of residential property, while not eliminating cost increases, will at least eliminate the increase in housing costs associated with the conversion of residential property to Transient Rental use. Eliminating the unlicensed use of Transient Rentals, which the Ordinance will do, will have the effect of actually returning some residential property to the supply of property available to residents. By prohibiting the use of residential properties as Transient Rentals, the total properties in the City available for housing, including for long-term rentals, for permanent residents, will increase. As supply increases, the demand for all housing, including to a very limited extent affordable housing, will be better met. By reducing the drain on residential properties in the City, the strain on the work force necessary to serve the tourist economy of the City will also be reduced. The City recognized and accepted the fact that the Ordinance will have an initial negative impact on the economy of the City. The Pallini Report was commissioned by, and considered by the City Commission. There will be an immediate reduction in revenues from unlicensed Transient Rentals that comply with the Ordinance and the income associated with providing services to those Transient Rentals. Some tourists who would otherwise select the City as their vacation destination will go elsewhere. Unlicensed Transient Rentals (taxed and untaxed), however, make up no more than ten percent of the total accommodations available in the City. It is estimated that the Ordinance will result in a loss in gross sales of $31 million, a loss in personal income of $9 million, and a loss in City revenues annually of $260,000. It is also estimated that there will be a loss of approximately 500 jobs associated with unlicensed Transient Rentals. These estimates are the "worst case" scenario figures. Actual losses will likely be somewhat less. The losses associated with the Ordinance will, however, not be long-term. Gradually, the tourist industry will adjust to the decrease in tourist accommodations and the negative impact on the economy. Some tourists will adjust the time of year they come to the City, resulting in greater tourist business during traditionally slower times. Persons who experience unemployment as a result of the Ordinance will also very likely find other employment relatively quickly because of the tight labor market in the City. The negative economic impacts to the City caused by the Ordinance should not last longer than three to five years. After that time, the economy will adjust. The overall impact of the Ordinance will be to help balance the need to provide tourist accommodations and the need to protect the charm of the City and the ability of the City to provide a work force. Protection of residential neighborhoods in the City comes within the City's responsibility to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, and is a necessary consideration in providing for the economic well- being of the City. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the Ordinance is consistent with Principal H. Truman Annex. It has been argued by Mr. Coleman that the application of the Ordinance to the Truman Annex supports a conclusion that the Ordinance is not consistent with the Principles. The evidence failed to support this contention. Truman Annex is located within walking distance of most tourist destinations in the City. The character and atmosphere of Truman Annex makes it an attractive tourist destination in itself. The "Little Whitehouse," a house utilized by President Harry Truman, is located within Truman Annex as is a tourist destination itself. While the Truman Annex is located in an area conducive to use as tourist accommodations, nothing in the City's Plan or land development regulations, the development orders associated with Truman Annex, the historic use of Truman Annex, the public health, safety and welfare, or the continued economic viability of the City depends upon such use. Truman Annex consists of residential housing and tourist accommodations, as well as some commercial facilities. Those activities are, however, largely buffered from each other. Most of the commercial activities are located in the western portion of Truman Annex. The residential housing is located primarily in the eastern portion of Truman Annex. Truman Annex without Transient Rentals constitutes appropriate planning by the developer of Truman Annex and the City. The Ordinance, even when applied to Truman Annex, constitutes an appropriate effort of the City to manage land uses and development. The Ordinance, even when applied to Truman Annex, will protect the historic heritage of Truman Annex and, more importantly, the City. Finally, the evidence proved that the application of the Ordinance to Truman Annex will not adversely impact the public health, safety, welfare, or the long-term economy of the City. Consideration of the Principles as a Whole. The evidence in these cases supports a conclusion that the Ordinance has no or little impact on most of the Principles, except Principles A, E, and H. The evidence proved that the Ordinance is neutral with regard to the other Principles. When Principles A, E, and H are considered individually and together, the evidence proved that the Ordinance is consistent with Principles A, E, and H. The Ordinance constitutes an effort of the City to manage land uses and development in the City, consistent with Principal A. The Ordinance will also help to protect the historic heritage of the City by preserving the character of the City's neighborhoods and, as a result, will preserve the tourist industry, consistent with Principal E. Just as clearly, the Ordinance will enhance the safety, health, and welfare of the residents of the City. Finally, the Ordinance is consistent with Principal H because it will benefit the public health, safety, and welfare of the City by protecting neighborhoods from the intrusion of tourists, reducing the impact of the conversion of residential housing for Transient Rentals, and ensuring the continued character of the City. While there will be an initial negative impact on the economy of the City as a result of the Ordinance, ultimately the Ordinance will have a positive impact on the economy of the City due to the positive impact on the City's tourist industry which will result from the regulation of Transient Rentals. Abbey Petitioners' Rule Challenge, Constitutional Issues, and Other Issues. In the Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing (hereinafter referred to as the "Amended Petition") filed by the Abbe Petitioners, the Abbe Petitioners attempted to challenge pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, portions of the Final Order of the Department as an unpromulgated rule. The Amended Petition was not, however, filed consistent with the requirements of Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes. This challenge was required to be filed in a separate petition filed solely with the Division of Administrative Hearings (hereinafter referred to as the "Division") and not through an amendment to a petition originally filed with the Department which was subsequently filed by the Department with the Division with a request that the Division hear the matter. Additionally, even if the issue were properly before the Division, the evidence in this case failed to prove that the statements in the Final Order have any application other than to the Ordinance. Therefore, those statements are not "agency statements of general applicability." The statements are not, therefore, "rules" as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes. The Abbe Petitioners also raised issues in the Amended Petition other than the consistency of the Ordinance with the Principles. Other than the question of the consistency of the Ordinance with the Principles, the evidence failed to support the Abbe Petitioners' argument that the issues raised in the Amended Petition are relevant to this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order approving City of Key West Ordinance 98-31 as consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development of Rule 28-36.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey M. Bell, Esquire Ritter, Chusid, Bivona & Cohen, LLP 7000 West Palmetto Park Road, Suite 400 Boca Raton, Florida 33433 Jerry Coleman, Esquire Post Office Box 1393 Key West, Florida 33041 John F. Rooney 208-10 Southard Street Key West, Florida 33040 Andrew S. Grayson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Robert Tischenkel, City Attorney City of Key West Post Office Box 1409 Key West, Florida 33041 David J. Audlin, Jr., Esquire Eaton Street Professional Center 524 Eaton Street, Suite 110 Key West, Florida 33040 Lee R. Rohe, Esquire Post Office Box 500252 Marathon, Florida 33050 Barbara Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carol A. Licko, General Counsel Office of the Governor The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Steven M. Seibert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Bradford County Board of County Commissioners should approve or deny an application to rezone a 12.76-acre parcel located at the southwest corner of Highway 301 and County Road 18 in unincorporated Bradford County (“the Property”) from Residential, (Mixed) Single Family/Mobile Home (RSF/MH-1) to Commercial Intensive (CI).
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioners Craig W. Patterson and Timothy Buffkin own the Property and are the applicants for the proposed re-zoning. Bradford County is the local government responsible for determining the land use designation and zoning classification for the Property and has adopted a comprehensive plan and LDRs which it amends from time to time. The Property The Property is a 12.76-acre parcel located at the intersection of U.S. Highway 301 (US 301) and County Road 18 (CR 18) in unincorporated Bradford County. US 301 is a four-lane divided principal arterial roadway, and CR 18 is a two-lane major collector roadway. The intersection has a traffic light and left turn lanes on US 301. This is the only intersection of a principal arterial road and a major collector road in unincorporated Bradford County. The Property is roughly rectangular, with approximately 1,240 linear feet fronting on US 301 (eastern boundary of the Property) and approximately 450 feet fronting on County Road 18 (northern boundary). The Property is not located within a flood-prone area and has little or no wetlands. Approximately a half mile to the east of the Property is Hampton Lake. The Property is relatively flat. The soils on the property are poorly drained soils, but not indicative of wetlands. The soils and topography of the property do not preclude its development with a system to control stormwater and drainage. Currently, the Property contains one single-family dwelling unit. The Property is bounded on the north by a commercial land use and single-family residences, on the east by vacant and commercial land use, on the south by vacant land, and on the west by vacant land and single-family residences. Current Zoning and Land Use Designations Before October 2004, the Property was designated on the County’s Future Land Use Map (FLUM) as “Residential Low Density,” which authorizes residential development at a density of less than or equal to two dwelling units per acre. On October 21, 2004, the County amended the FLUM to re-designate the Property as “Commercial.” However, the zoning for the Property remained “Residential, (Mixed) Single Family / Mobile Home (RSF/MH-1). The current zoning does not allow the types of uses appropriate under its Commercial land use designation. The Property is also located within an Urban Development Area which is defined in the Future Land Use Element of the comprehensive plan as an “area to which higher density agricultural, residential (single family, multi-family and mobile homes) and commercial and industrial uses are to be directed.” Within Urban Development Areas, lands classified as “Commercial” are to be used for the “sale, rental and distribution of products or performance of services, as well as public, charter and private elementary, middle and high schools.” Certain other uses may also be approved as special exceptions or special permits. Surrounding Land Uses A portion of the land to the north of the Property and all of the land immediately east are within the municipal boundaries of the City of Hampton. The City of Hampton has zoned property at the US 301/CR 18 intersection as “CG”, a commercial designation which includes all of the uses authorized under Bradford County’s CI zoning district. Within the past several years, a truck repair and auto parts facility was located and is still operating east of the Property, across US 301. Farther east, but bordering those commercial lands, a residential subdivision (Fox Hollow) is under development. The Requested Re-zoning The Applicants seek to re-zone the Property to Commercial Intensive (CI). Permitted principal uses and structures allowed within the CI zoning district are consistent with the types of commercial uses listed in the comprehensive plan for the Commercial land use designation, namely retail outlets for the sale of food, home furnishings, vehicles, etc.; service establishments such as barber shops, shoe repair shops, repair and service garages; medical or dental offices; and wholesaling. The CI zoning district is described as “intended for intensive, highly automotive-oriented uses that require a conspicuous and accessible location convenient to streets carrying large volumes of traffic and shall be located within commercial land use classifications on the [FLUM].” The Property meets the description of a conspicuous and accessible location that is convenient to streets carrying large volumes of traffic. Concurrency Management Assessment The requested re-zoning is a “straight” re-zoning request, meaning that the re-zoning is not associated with any particular proposed use. Future development of the site will be subject to development plan review and approval, pursuant to Article Fourteen of the County LDRs. A concurrency reservation is not available until final site plan approval. However, at the County’s request, the North Central Florida Regional Planning Council (NCFRPC) performed concurrency management assessments of the re-zoning in 2006 and again in 2008. In 2006, the NCFRPC provided the County with nonbinding concurrency determination that the applicable service levels would be met or exceeded for potable water (to be supplied by potable water wells); sanitary sewer (to be served by on-site septic tanks); solid waste; drainage; recreation; affordable housing; and historic resources. As to transportation facilities, the 2006 concurrency management assessment determined that the maximum potential development of the Property would generate 389 trips on US 301 at “PM peak hour.” When added to the then-existing PM peak hour trips, based on Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) traffic count data, US 301 would continue to operate within the adopted level of service (LOS). Between 2006 and 2008, the adopted LOS standard for US 301 was raised from “C” to “B,” meaning that the governmental objective was changed to maintain a freer flow of traffic during evening peak traffic. Therefore, despite the reduction of “background” trips on US 301, the 2008 concurrency management assessment determined that maximum development of the Property would cause the new LOS “B” standard to be exceeded. Petitioners presented a traffic analysis based upon more recent FDOT traffic count data than was used by the NCFRPC for its 2008 concurrency management assessment. The newer data showed a further decline in background trips on US 301, so that adding the maximum potential trips from the Property would no longer result in total PM peak hour trips that would exceed the adopted LOS standard. Petitioners’ more recent data and analysis is professionally acceptable and should be used. At the time of site plan review for any future development of the Property, an updated concurrency assessment will be required and will be based on the number of trips generated by the actual proposed use, rather than the trips that would be generated by the maximum development potential of the Property. The assessment will also use the most current FDOT traffic count data. Compatibility with Surrounding Land Uses The County’s Planning and Zoning Board reviewed the application for re-zoning at its July 10, 2006, meeting. It recommended denial of the re-zoning based upon the impact of the proposed change upon living conditions in the neighborhood. As factual support for the recommended denial, the Planning and Zoning Board’s report cites “all comments received during the said public hearing and the Concurrency Management Assessment concerning said application.” At the August 19, 2008, public hearing held before the Administrative Law Judge, members of the public expressed concern that the CI zoning would be incompatible with the existing residential development to the west, in the Hampton Lake area. Some members of the public also expressed concern about possible future uses of the Property, such as a truck stop or bar. Package stores for the sale of alcoholic beverages, bars, taverns, cocktail lounges, truck stops and automotive service stations can only be approved as special exception uses in the CI zoning district. Special exception uses require approval of the County’s Board of Adjustment after a public hearing, upon a finding that granting the special exception use would promote the “public health, safety, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, propriety or the general welfare.” The Board of Adjustment must also determine that the special exception use would be compatible with adjacent properties. A favorable decision here on the requested re-zoning to CI is not a determination that a bar or truck stop on the Property would be compatible with the adjacent residential area. The LDRs impose site use and design criteria for commercial uses that adjoin residential districts. Site plan approval for commercial developments in CI zoning districts requires the consideration of landscape buffers, height restrictions, off-street parking requirements, lot coverage and yard standards. These development conditions are designed to minimize impacts to adjacent residential areas. Stormwater Some of the speakers at the public hearing expressed concern about stormwater runoff from the Property. One speaker, Michael Davis, testified that stormwater from the Property currently flows across his property. Another expressed concern that runoff from the Property would flow directly to Hampton Lake. On-site stormwater retention facilities would be required for the Property in conjunction with its development. The LDRs require that post-development runoff rates not exceed pre-development conditions. The objective of the required stormwater runoff controls is to approximate the rate, volume, quality, and timing of stormwater runoff that occurred under the site’s unimproved or existing state. There is no basis, at this stage of analysis, to determine that the County’s stormwater regulations are not adequate to prevent adverse stormwater impacts to adjacent residences or to Hampton Lake. Traffic on CR 18 Several speakers expressed concerns regarding increased traffic on CR 18. Petitioners conducted a site-specific traffic count for CR 18 east of US 301 and determined that the peak hour trips are now 131. The capacity for CR 18 is approximately 600. Based upon the total of 389 additional trips generated by the maximum potential development of the Property (on either US 301 or CR 18), the adopted LOS standard for CR 18 would not be exceeded. Petitioners demonstrated that the proposed re-zoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan and the LDRs.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Bradford County Board of County Commissioners approve the requested re-zoning. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Ray Norman, Clerk of the Board Bradford County Board of County Commissioners 945 North Temple Avenue Starke, Florida 32091 Marcia Parker Tjoflat, Esquire Charles L. Gibbs, Esquire Pappas Metcalf Jenks & Miller, P.A. 245 Riverside Avenue, Suite 400 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 William E. Sexton, Esquire Brown & Broling 486 N. Temple Avenue Starke, Florida 32091
The Issue The issue is whether two map changes on the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) of the Comprehensive Plan (Plan) adopted by Taylor County (County) by Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17 on December 15, 2009, are in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties The Department is the state planning agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing and approving amendments to comprehensive plans adopted by local governments. The County is a local government that administers a Plan. It adopted the two plan amendments that are the subject of this proceeding. It is considered a "rural" county with a current population of around 20,000 residents. Dr. Hutchins owns property in the County. Although his initial pleading alleges, and his Proposed Recommended Order states, that he "submitted oral comments regarding the subject amendments at transmittal and prior to adoption of the amendment," no evidence was presented at hearing that Dr. Hutchins did so during the adoption process. Ms. Redding and Mr. Wood are siblings and along with three other members of the Wood family jointly own property in the County. Like Dr. Hutchins, no evidence was presented at the hearing that either Intervenor submitted written or oral comments to the County during the adoption process. History Preceding the Amendments The process for adopting the County's first Plan, including the FLUM, began around 1988. For the purpose of drafting a FLUM, a Planning Board (Board) was created consisting of seven individuals, all of whom were volunteers with no formal planning experience. However, they received advice and assistance from two outside consultants, who also advised the County concerning the appropriate text to be used in the new Plan. Four members of the Board, including its former Chairman, testified at the final hearing. Over the next two years, the Board conducted meetings, spoke with numerous property owners, and collected information in order to assign each parcel an appropriate land use category. The collective efforts of the Board culminated in a large, hand- colored FLUM (consisting of numerous sections of aerial maps patched together) that was affixed to the wall of what is now the courtroom on the second floor in the County Courthouse. Testimony by former members of the Board established that the Hutchins parcel (then owned by Colin and Lucille Kelly) and the Bird Island parcel (owned by Wood, Redding, and other family members) were assigned a classification of Mixed Use-Urban Development. Because the County does not have a zoning code, the properties were never assigned a zoning classification consistent with that land use category. This classification was based upon the fact that at least two different businesses were being conducted on each parcel at the time, and the owners requested that they be given that classification. In the case of the Hutchins (then Kelly) property, it was being used to conduct a commercial fishing operation as well as a small construction company (with dump trucks, bulldozers, and front end loaders) that had a contract with Proctor & Gamble (now known as Buckeye Technologies, Inc.) to maintain roads. An office for the construction company was located in a separate mobile home placed on the property. Mr. Bird was a commercial fisherman and operated a wholesale fish business on Bird Island. Also, both he and his mother had separate homes on the property, another structure was used to store fish nets, and docking facilities for other commercial fisherman were maintained. Many of these structures were blown away during the so-called Storm of the Century on March 13, 1993, and never replaced. Except for property within the small communities of Keaton Beach, Dekle Beach, Denzel Beach, and Steinhatchee, and a few other small parcels, such as Dark Island, Cedar Island, and Intervenors' property, all of the remaining land along the coastline was placed in either Conservation or Agriculture. An unusual feature of the County is that it has one of the longest coastlines in the State (58 miles), stretching on the Gulf of Mexico from Jefferson County to Dixie County. Because around 88 percent of the coastline is owned by the State, very little waterfront land is left for development. In fact, Dr. Hutchins pointed out that except for his property and Bird Island, no other vacant, upland Gulf-front property within the County is in private ownership at this time. The FLUM, with the foregoing classifications, was adopted by the County by Ordinance No. 90-4 on June 19, 1990. Before it was submitted to the Department for its review, the County was advised by the Department that it would not accept the large, hand-colored FLUM in that format. Rather, the Department required that the map be reduced in size and digitized. To comply with this request, the original FLUM was dismantled into smaller sections and hand-carried to a firm in Crystal River that had the capability of reducing the large map into digital form. The original FLUM was then returned to the County Courthouse. When the larger map was reduced in size and converted to a digital format, it was not parcel-specific and failed to pick up the Hutchins parcel and Bird Island. Instead, except for larger tracts of land, especially in the small communities noted in Finding of Fact 8, the entire coastline was shown as being Conservation or Agriculture. This error was not detected by County officials or the affected property owners since they continued to rely upon the designations shown on the large, hand-colored FLUM in the Courthouse. The Department reviewed the FLUM, as digitized, assumed that the Hutchins and Bird Island property were Agriculture and Conservation, and found those parts of the FLUM to be in compliance. This agency action occurred on or about October 1, 1990. Thus, the Department never undertook a compliance review for either parcel with the intended higher density/intensity land use. In 1995, the room in which the original FLUM was mounted was taken over by another occupant of the Courthouse, and the original FLUM was moved to a different floor. During or after the moving process, it was lost or accidentally destroyed and its whereabouts have been unknown since that time. In 1993, Dr. Hutchins purchased his property from Colin and Lucille Kelly. Based on a conversation with a County employee, he purchased the property with the understanding that it was classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development. Although he had no specific plans to develop the property at that time, and still has none, the Mixed Use-Urban Development land use category was the major inducement for him to purchase the property. In 2005, Dr. Hutchins was approached by an investor who wished to develop the property at a later time. When the investor contacted the County to confirm its land use designation, Dr. Hutchins learned for the first time that the digitized map approved by the Department reflected the property carried an Agriculture/Rural Residential land use. Because of this, the agreement with the potential investor was never consummated. In a similar vein, Mr. Wood, who served on the Board that assigned land use designations to property on the original FLUM, and knew that the Board had designated his property as Mixed Use-Urban Development, placed the Bird Island property on the market in 2005 representing that it was classified in that category. A prospective purchaser checked with the County to verify its land use and learned that it was Conservation. Mr. Wood was unaware of this error until that time. Because of this, the sale was never consummated. After 2005, the County and Department held numerous meetings in an attempt to resolve this dispute. The Department refused to allow the FLUM to be changed to reflect the original land use designations. This led to the County adopting the two challenged amendments to correct what it characterizes as a "scrivener's error." Besides the two parcels that are in dispute here, on an undisclosed date, two other parcels (in the interior part of the County) were discovered by the County to have the wrong land use category as a result of the digitizing process. Both should have been placed in the Industrial land use category, and after a review, the Department had no objection to those errors being corrected by an amendment. The Plan Amendments On December 15, 2009, the County adopted Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17, also known as CPA 08-1 and CPA 08-3. The first amendment changed the land use on the 14-acre Hutchins parcel from Agriculture/Rural Residential to Mixed Use-Urban Development. The present land use allows one dwelling unit per 5 acres while the new land use designation allows up to 12 dwelling units per acre and a 60 percent impervious surface ratio for nonresidential development. See Department Exhibit 1, Future Land Use Policy I.3.2. Thus, up to 126 residential units and 96,476 square feet of non-residential development could be built on the Hutchins site. The second amendment changed the land use on the 3.36-acre Bird Island parcel from Agriculture-2 and Conservation to Mixed Use-Urban Development. The former land use allows one dwelling unit per 40 acres while the new land use would permit the same density/intensity as the Hutchins parcel. The new category would allow up to 30 residential units and 21,954 square feet of non-residential development. The amendments were transmitted by the County to the Department for its review in early April 2009. On June 5, 2009, the Department issued its Objections, Recommendations and Comments (ORC) report. The Department lodged objections to both amendments generally on the grounds the sites are not environmentally suitable for the proposed density and intensity increases; the amendments authorize an improper increase in density within the Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA) without proper mitigation; the amendments failed to discourage urban sprawl; and they are internally inconsistent with existing provisions within the Plan. The ORC recommended that the County not adopt the amendments. Besides the Department, DEP and the Regional Planning Council also provided written comments on the amendments. By letter dated May 8, 2009, DEP generally noted that it had concerns regarding development adjacent to the Big Bend Seagrasses Aquatic Preserve (the Preserve) where the parcels are located, and that careful planning strategies should be used for any development on the land. See Department Exhibit 4. The Regional Planning Council issued a staff report on February 25, 2010, generally concluding that the amendments were consistent with the applicable Strategic Regional Policy Plan goals and objectives. See Department Exhibit 15; County Exhibit 1. The County did not respond in writing to the ORC. On December 15, 2009, it adopted the amendments without change. On March 10, 2010, the Department published its Notice of Intent to find the amendments not in compliance in the Taco Times. On March 16, 2010, the Department filed its Petition with DOAH raising the same grounds that are in its Notice of Intent. The Property The Hutchins parcel is located in the southwest part of the County, a few miles south of Keaton Beach, with around 500 to 600 feet fronting on the Gulf of Mexico. The 14 upland acres that are the subject of this case are a sub-site of a larger 25-acre parcel owned by Dr. Hutchins, with the remaining 11 acres being adjoining wetlands on the north and south sides. Dr. Hutchins has built a home on pilings on his property along with a smaller ancillary structure. Photographs indicate that except for trees, the remainder of the upland property is vacant. Bird Island also lies on the Gulf of Mexico just northwest of the Hutchins parcel and is surrounded by water on three sides. Photographs reflect one residence and a dock still on the property. The two parcels are separated by "marsh grass and a little water." Both parcels of property are easily accessible to, and just west of, County Road 361, a paved two- lane highway that begins south of the subject properties and runs adjacent to, or near, the coastline, eventually turning northeast and terminating on U.S. Highway 19 south of Perry. Both properties abut portions of the Gulf of Mexico that have been designated as an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW). The waters are a part of the Preserve, which was established in 1985 and is managed by DEP. The Preserve has exceptional biological, aesthetic, and scientific value. The two parcels are located in the Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA). That is to say, they are in "the area below the elevation of the category 1 storm surge line as established by a Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computerized storm surge model." § 163.3178(2)(h), Fla. Stat. In order to increase density within the CHHA, the County must meet certain criteria set forth in Section 163.3178(9)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department's Objections As summarized in its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department contends that the two plan amendments are not in compliance because the sites are not environmentally suitable for the proposed density and intensity increases; there is an improper increase in density within the CHHA without proper mitigation; and the amendments fail to discourage urban sprawl. Although the Notice of Intent also raised the issue of whether the amendments are internally inconsistent with other provisions in the County's existing Plan, the Proposed Recommended Order does not address any specific internal inconsistencies, and the evidence focuses on the first three concerns. Therefore, the undersigned has assumed that those objections have been withdrawn or abandoned. Environmental Suitability With the exception of an area in the middle part of the County's coastline (where the Fenholloway River flows into the Gulf), the Preserve extends along the County's entire coastline, including the area in which the two parcels are located. The Preserve, designated as an OFW, contains various types of seagrasses, whose function is to provide habitat for a number of species, improve water quality, and reduce currents or wave energy in the event of a storm. It is undisputed that the seagrass beds near the amendment sites are high-quality, healthy, and of high environmental value. Coastal marshes are prevalent in the area of the County where the amendment sites are located. They serve many functions, including cleaning water flowing into The Preserve, functioning as a habitat for a number of species, and acting as a coastal barrier against storm surge during large storm events. Section 163.3177(6)(d), Florida Statutes, requires that local governments protect and conserve natural resources through the conservation element of the local plan. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.006(3)(b)4. A Department rule also requires local governments to limit the specific impacts and cumulative impacts of development or redevelopment upon water quality and living marine resources. See Rule 9J-5.012(3)(c)1. High-density development (up to 12 units per acre) on the parcels clearly has the potential to negatively impact coastal marshes and seagrasses adjacent to and near the subject sites. Although Dr. Hutchins indicated that he would develop his property only to the extent allowed by DEP so that the marshes and seagrasses would be safeguarded, the Department's practice for many years has been to assume that the property will be developed at its maximum allowable density and intensity. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Lee Cty, et al., Case No. 90- 7791 (DOAH Jan. 27, 1992; DCA June 28, 1993; Admin. Comm. Feb. 15, 1994)(compliance determination must be made based on maximum impacts authorized by the amendment terms, not speculation of a lesser impact). Mr. Wood's development intentions are not known. In any event, the two parcels potentially authorize 156 residential units and 113,430 square feet of non-residential uses adjacent to an OFW. Even so, the Mixed Use-Urban Development land use designation may still be permissible if specific conditions limiting the density/intensity on the parcels are incorporated into the Plan by asterisk or text language in conjunction with a new amendment. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, this planning practice has been used in other cases. Without any limitations, though, the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the maximum allowable density/intensity contravenes the cited statute and rules. CHHA Both parcels are located within the CHHA of the County. Section 163.3178(2)(h), Florida Statutes, requires that the County establish mitigation criteria for plan amendments located in the CHHA. Probably because of its small size in terms of population, and the lack of development (or ability to do so) along the coastline, the County has no goals, objectives, or policies addressing criteria for mitigation. Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)6. requires that a plan "direct population concentrations away from known or predicted coastal high-hazard areas." Also, Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)7. requires that a plan "maintain or reduce evacuation times." Prior to 2006, the Department would allow a local government to comply with the foregoing rules by allowing density increases in the CHHA if the local government decreased a similar type of density elsewhere. This practice was known as "offsets." In 2006, however, the Legislature amended the statute to include criteria for compliance with the two rules. Due to the change in the law, the Department no longer engages in the practice of offsets for land use changes in the CHHA. Instead, it requires a local government that proposes to increase density within the CHHA to meet the requirements of Section 163.3178(9)(a)1.-3., Florida Statutes. Under the statute, if the County can demonstrate a 16-hour out-of-county evacuation time for a category 5 storm event as measured on the Saffir-Simpson scale and a 12-hour evacuation time to shelter within the County for a category 5 storm event, an increase in density within the CHHA may be allowed. See § 163.3178(9)(a)1. and 2., Fla. Stat. Alternatively, the County may use one of the mitigation measures described in Section 163.3178(9)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Except for Coastal Element Objective IX-7 of the Plan, which provides that the County maintain a hurricane evacuation time of 9 hours for a category 1 storm, see County Exhibit 7, no data and analysis, such as a hurricane evacuation study for a category 5 storm event, was presented to demonstrate compliance with these requirements. Dr. Hutchins' submission during the mediation process of an evacuation plan for a category 3 storm does not satisfy this criterion. Typically, a local government will have an adopted plan for a category 5 storm, as well as an evacuation model. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the mitigation measures in Section 163.3178(9)(a), Florida Statutes, have not been satisfied. At hearing, the County and Dr. Hutchins contended that offsets should still be used in this case to satisfy the mitigation requirements. They point out that the County has recently purchased property (totaling 51.7 acres) that is designated Mixed Use-Urban Development and more than compensates for any potential increase of residents needing to evacuate if the two amendments are found to be in compliance. As noted above, however, the practice of offsets was discontinued in 2006 with the passage of the new law. Notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, there was no legal requirement that the Department notify every affected local government and property owner that it was discontinuing that practice to comply with the new law.2 Urban Sprawl Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g)1.-13. identifies thirteen "primary" indicators of urban sprawl. The Department contends that eight indicators are "tripped" or "triggered" by the new amendments and collectively they indicate that the proliferation of urban sprawl is not discouraged. No evidence was presented regarding five indicators. According to the rule, "[t]he presence and potential effects of multiple indicators shall be considered to determine whether they collectively reflect a failure to discourage urban sprawl." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J- 5.006(5)(d). Indicator 1 is tripped if the amendments allow uses in excess of demonstrated need. In this case no need analysis for additional land in the Mixed Use-Urban Development category was submitted by the County. The absence of a study is sufficient to trigger this indicator. Indicator 2 is tripped if the amendments allow "significant" amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas. The only true existing "urban" area in the County, as that term is commonly understood, is the City of Perry. Other residential and some commercial development (but to a much lesser degree) is found mainly in a few small communities on the coastline such as Steinhatchee, an unincorporated community perhaps 15 miles south of the subject parcels with probably around 1,500 residents, and Keaton Beach and Dekle Beach, both having no more than a few hundred residents each. (Official recognition has been taken of the population data.) Keaton Beach is around 2 or 3 miles north of the subject property and has condominiums and other limited residential/commercial development. In addition, Dark Island is located a short distance north of Bird Island and is classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development, which authorizes the higher density/intensity development. Given this lack of "urban areas" in the County, virtually any development outside of Perry could arguably be considered "urban development . . . in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while leaping over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.006(5)(g)2. Notwithstanding this unique (and perhaps unfair) situation, it is fair to characterize the potential addition of 12 units per acre as urban development and a total of around 150 residential units with associated commercial development as "substantial" when considering the County's size and existing development. Therefore, the second indicator has been triggered. Indicator 3 is triggered if the amendments allow urban development in "radial, strip, isolated or ribbon patterns generally emanating from existing urban development." Because urban development will occur in a rural, isolated area, this indicator is triggered. Indicator 4 is triggered if there is premature development of rural land that fails to adequately protect and conserve natural resources. The evidence supports a finding that this indicator is triggered. Indicators 6, 7, and 8 are related to the orderly and efficient provision of existing and future public services and facilities. The evidence shows that the area is not currently served by central sewer and is not near any fire or police stations. While no public facilities are planned for that area in the five year capital improvement schedule, at a meeting in March 2010 the Taylor County Coastal Water & Sewer District indicated that a request for partial federal funding to extend central sewer services to Fish Creek, which lies beyond and to the south of the subject parcels, would be placed on the April agenda. See County Exhibit 7. Whether a request was actually made at that meeting is not of record. In any event, Coastal Element Policy IX.6.5 provides that where central sewer is not available in an area classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development, septic tanks may be used within the CHHA. See Department Exhibit 1. As to fire and law enforcement support, there is insufficient evidence to establish that these services cannot be provided in an efficient manner. Given these circumstances, there is less than a preponderance of the evidence to support a finding that indicators 6 through 8 are triggered. Indicator 9 is triggered if the plan amendments fail to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that this indicator is triggered. Collectively, the presence of four indicators is sufficient to support a finding that the County has failed to discourage urban sprawl. E. Scrivener's Error The County and Intervenors rely heavily upon the fact that the plan amendments are in compliance because the amendments simply correct an error that occurred when, at the Department's direction in 1990, the original FLUM was reduced in size and digitized. While at first blush this argument is appealing, it assumes that the Department would have approved the new land use classifications in 1990 when it performed a compliance review of the original FLUM. But this never occurred, and the new amendments give the Department its first opportunity to determine if the new land uses are in compliance. It is undisputed that on an undisclosed date the Department approved an amendment based on the same type of error. While the record is somewhat confusing, it appears that in that case, the two properties were Industrial, they were not located in the CHHA, and on-going business concerns were operating on the properties. Intervenor Hutchins also cited several instances where mapping errors were allowed to be corrected by subsequent plan amendments. Where final agency action in those matters is of record, however, it shows that approval was given only after a compliance review was made by the Department.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that Plan Amendments CPA 08-1 and CPA 08-3 adopted by Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17 are not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2010.
