The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's application for supplemental compensation pursuant to Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact 1. The Petitioner holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Michigan State University. The degree was earned in the College of Communication Arts and Science. The major on the Petitioner's degree is advertising. 2. The transcript of the courses taken by the Petitioner to earn his bachelor's degree does not list any courses that appear to come within the criteria listed at Rule 4A- 37.084(5) (b)1, Florida Administrative Code. 3. The transcript of the courses taken by the Petitioner to earn his bachelor's degree lists several courses that appear to come within the criteria listed at Rule 4A-37.084(5) (b)2, Florida Administrative Code. However, there are not enough of such courses to comprise a major. 4. The transcript of the courses taken by the Petitioner to earn his bachelor's degree lists one course that appears to come within the criteria listed at Rule 4A.37.084(5) (b)3, Florida Administrative Code. 5. The Petitioner is presently employed by the Miami Beach Fire Department as a Firefighter I. The Petitioner has been employed full-time in his present firefighter position at all times material to the pending application. 6. The Petitioner's fire department duties are described in a written position description for the Firefighter I position. It is clear from the description of those duties that a Firefighter I position with the Miami Beach Fire Department is not one of the "management positions within a fire department," nor is it a position that includes "arson investigators." Such a position is also not one of the "special positions" contemplated by Rule 4A-37.084(5) (b)4, Florida Administrative Code. 7. When the Petitioner submitted his present application, Floyd Jordan, the Fire Chief of the Miami Beach Fire Department, by letter dated November 15, 2000, advised the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training as follows: After review of the attached college transcript and the City of Miami Beach Job Description for Firefighter I, it is my conclusion that this request does not meet the requirements of the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program. As of the date of the final hearing, Chief Jordan continued to be of the same view of the matter. 8. The Petitioner was previously employed by the Boca Raton Fire-Rescue Services as a firefighter/paramedic. The Petitioner's job duties in the Boca Raton position were essentially the same as his job duties in his present position. While employed with the Boca Raton Fire-Rescue Services, the Petitioner applied for supplemental compensation on the basis of the same bachelor's degree on which he bases his present application. The Petitioner's prior application was approved and he received supplemental compensation while employed with the Boca Raton Fire-Rescue Services.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Chuck Pereny, pro se 259 Northwest 90th Avenue Coral Springs, Florida 33071 For Respondent: Elenita Gomez, Esquire James B. Morrison, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying the Petitioner's application and dismissing the petition in this case. Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. = DONE AND ENTERED this CS “day of June, 2001, in CH heseu Loe € MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this Q — day of June, 2001.
Findings Of Fact After advertising, receiving several applications, and interviewing applicants, the City of New Port Richey, on 8 February 1982, hired Albert G. Pitts as Fire Chief for the City of New Port Richey. Pitts had been employed as a fireman since 1967 when he was appointed a probationary firefighter by the City of Morton Grove, Illinois. At Morton Grove he was promoted to lieutenant in 1973, served as department training officer in 1974, and appointed deputy chief in 1975. In 1976 he was appointed Fire Chief in DeKalb, Illinois, and served in that capacity until December, 1979, when he resigned to operate a family-owned restaurant (Exhibit 1 - Pitts' resume). Pitts is fully qualified by training and experience for the job as chief of the New Port Richey Fire Department. During his meetings with City personnel, Petitioner was advised that he had to become certified as a firefighter by the State Fire Marshal's Office as a condition to being employed by the City of New Port Richey. He was also advised that the personnel officer had checked with the Fire Marshal's Office and was told that Florida granted reciprocity to Illinois certified firefighters. Gail Hyslop, New Port Richey personnel assistant, did the personnel work leading to Petitioner's employment. This included calling the Fire Marshal's Office to ask about the requirements for certification. Her testimony regarding what she was told conflicts with the testimony of Paul Steckle, the individual with whom she spoke in the State Fire Marshal's Office. In a 26 January 1982 telephone conversation Ms. Hyslop spoke with Steckle and understood from the conversation that Florida has reciprocity with Illinois and certificates issued in Illinois will be accepted by Florida except EMT. Steckle testified that he told Ms. Hyslop that Florida had reciprocity with Illinois as far as training certification is concerned and to be employed in Florida the applicant needed a high school diploma or equivalent and must pass the physical exam. The Fire Marshal's Office mailed physical evaluation forms to all fire departments in Florida in January, 1982. After Petitioner was hired by New Port Richey, the City requested additional forms from the Fire Marshal's Office to process Petitioner's application for certification. On 23 February 1982 Pitts was given a physical examination by the New Port Richey city physician, Dr. Marlowe. Petitioner carried the blank medical examination form to Dr. Marlowe's office when he was given the 23 February 1982 examination. The form used by Dr. Marlowe to report this examination is FST-2, the form provided by the State Fire Marshal's Office to all fire departments. On the face of this form (Exhibit 5) the allowable limits for visual acuity are: uncorrected vision 20/200 and 20/40 with corrected vision of 20/40 and 20/20. This examination revealed Pitts had uncorrected vision right eye of 20/100 and uncorrected vision left eye of 20/200 with both eyes correctable to 20/20. This medical examination, plus other documents required for certification, was sent to the Fire Marshal's Office on March 18, 1982. When this information was evaluated, the Fire Marshal's Office advised New Port Richey that Pitts had failed the visual acuity portion of the physical examination. The date this physical examination was received was not shown; however, by letter dated March 5, 1982, New Port Richey was advised that Pitts' visual acuity was below standard and should be rechecked. This March 5 letter was mailed undated and the handwritten date added several weeks later. In any event, New Port Richey was promptly advised of the deficiency in Pitts' application by the Fire Marshal's Office upon receipt of the physical examination form. In telephone conversations between the Fire Marshal's Office and the City of New Port Richey, the latter was advised that Pitts should be reexamined, preferably by an opthamologist, and that he could qualify as a fire inspector (for which a physical examination is not required). Miss Hyslop's records show she talked by telephone with Ray Shaffner at the Fire Marshal's Office August 3, 1982, and was told: (a) to have Pitts' eyes examined by another physician; (b) that Shaffner did not care how Pitts passed the examination; (c) that Shaffner would allow the City until the end of August to complete this process before sending a letter demanding termination of Pitts; and (d) the City could change the job description and avoid all the hassle. Shaffner denies saying Pitts could be hired as Fire Chief if given another title and job description. On August 23, 1982, Pitts was examined by Dr. Rosenfeld, an opthamologist, who reported visual acuity of 20/80 in his right eye and 20/30 in his left eye. By letter dated 1 September 1982 Dr. Rosenfeld was requested by the Fire Marshal's Office to recheck his findings to see if an error was made because, with the discrepancy between the two examinations, a third would be required. By letter dated 9/13/82 Dr. Rosenfeld acknowledged a clerical mistake had been made and that Pitts' visual acuity was 20/100 and 20/200. Around June of 1982 Pitts sold his home in Illinois, purchased a home in New Port Richey, and moved his family to New Port Richey. By letter of September 16, 1982, the Fire Marshal's Office advised the City of New Port Richey that Pitts could not be certified because he did not meet the visual acuity requirements required for certification. The job description for Fire Chief at New Port Richey was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 3. This accentuates the role of Fire Chief as planner and trainer of the firemen who fight fires under the Fire Chief's supervision. The City Manager testified that he had specifically directed Pitts not to engage in actual fire fighting without having a very good reason for doing so. Two certified firefighters, one the Fire Chief of Altamonte Springs, and the other the Assistant Fire Chief at Tampa, testified to the duties normally performed by senior fire fighting personnel when extinguishment of a fire is required. New Port Richey has a 15-man fire department plus the chief, fire marshal, and an inspector. Accordingly, only five men are available on each shift. These men are one lieutenant and four firefighters. Two pieces of equipment are sent to each fire, with two men manning one and three men on the other. The chief goes to the fire at his discretion. Petitioner testified that his duties at a fire are to set up a command post outside the burning building and direct operations of the firefighters. Both certified firefighters testified that it is frequently necessary for the person in overall charge of the firefighting to go inside the burning building to see what is needed by the people actually fighting the fire. The chief of a large fire department, such as Tampa, when in charge of the operation, often goes inside the burning building. Chief Siegfried of the Altamonte Springs Fire Department generally sets up his command post outside of the burning building, puts his second-in- command in charge of that post, and goes into the burning building to direct the firefighting operations. Altamonte Springs has some 60-odd firefighters in its department. The Assistant Chief at Tampa, Howard Souther, directs the training and operations of 530 certified firefighters in the Tampa Fire Department. Souther is notified of all two-alarm fires and always goes to three-alarm fires. He assumes command-post position at fires at which he is in charge. In case of a fire in a highrise building, defined as having a top floor the ladders can't reach, the command post is set up in the burning highrise. Assistant Chief Souther and Chief Siegfried have had considerable training and experience in manning requirements for firefighting equipment. Both opined that three men on one piece of equipment was inadequate to properly man the equipment to fight the fire and five men were inadequate to man two such pieces of equipment. In their opinion it would be necessary for the chief to directly participate in fighting a fire if he was the sixth man on the scene. In his resume (Exhibit 1) Chief Pitts stated that while he was Fire Chief at DeKalb he moved the Fire Chief's office out of City Hall and into the fire station so he could be available and visible to his men. He stated he responded to most fires and his personnel generally did an excellent job but he "felt the men must be aware that I was a firefighter and not just an administrator." Breathing apparatus is standard equipment for firefighters and today few burning buildings are entered by firefighters not using such equipment. This equipment cannot be worn over glasses and contact lenses cannot satisfactorily be used in burning buildings. Breathing apparatus fitted with prescription lenses is available; however, if this equipment is damaged the visual acuity gained by using the lenses may be lost. Florida adopted most of the minimal physical standards for firefighters developed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Dr. Carl W. Irwin has served on NFPA committees for some 20 years and has been involved in the development of these minimum standards. Good eyesight is deemed essential to firefighters. When an individual has a combined visual acuity of 20/100 he can only see form and movement. He cannot read the labels on canisters. Firefighters are notoriously susceptible to head injuries. Accordingly, those wearing glasses or prescription eyeglass breathing apparatus are subject to loss of or damage to these corrective lenses. Dr. Irwin described the worst case scenario when the firefighter with defective vision loses his good eye and is forced to extricate himself from the fire with only the use of his bad eye. The eye standard of the physical requirements is deemed to be a life-threatening condition, both for the firefighter, his fellow firefighters, and the persons he is attempting to rescue. Standards for firefighters were first established by the Florida Legislature in 1969. At that time all who were serving as paid firefighters were "grandfathered-in" and did not have to meet either the state physical requirements or training requirements. Many of the cities having fire departments require physical examinations tougher than the minimum state standards and require periodic physical examinations. The state physical examination is required only by those first entering the fire fighting service as defined in Florida Statutes. Volunteer firefighters, although subject to the same dangers as paid firefighters, do not have to meet the physical requirements for state certification. Certification is not required for voluntary firefighters but is required for paid firefighters. In 1970 there were 11 firefighter deaths in Florida. A decade later this figure had dropped to two despite a doubling of the number of firefighters in Florida. Stricter physical standards for firefighters is credited with a significant portion of this improvement in firefighters' mortality rate in Florida.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent's certification as a fire fighter in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, (Department), was the state Fire Marshal and the agency responsible for the certification of fire fighters in Florida. Respondent was either an applicant for certification or a certified fire fighter in this state. On or about January 22, 1991, Respondent, James M. Yingling, submitted an application for certification as a fire fighter to the Division of State Fire Marshal, Florida State Fire College, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, on which he indicated he had not used tobacco or tobacco products for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the filing of the application. Along with the application, Mr. Yingling submitted certain documentation including his high school diploma, his driver's license, a personal inquiry waiver, fingerprints, a report of medical examination, and an affidavit of even date in which he affirmed he had not been a user of tobacco or tobacco products for at least one year immediately preceding his application for certification as a fire fighter. Provisions of Section 633.345, Florida Statutes, set out the requirements for certification as a fire fighter in Florida. One of these criteria calls for the applicant not to have used tobacco for one year prior to the filing of the application for certification. Had Respondent used tobacco or tobacco products within that year, he would not have been certified. John R. Scott, a full time employee of Grumman Aircraft in Ft.Pierce, was a part-time volunteer fire fighter at the Jensen Beach Volunteer Fire Department when the Respondent became a member in August, 1990. Mr. Scott saw Respondent at the station house on several occasions and they went out on calls together. Mr. Scott executed a sworn statement on April 11, 1991, indicating that since he has known Respondent, Respondent has been a smoker. Scott claims he has seen Respondent smoking at the station on several occasions and on one occasion at a test site in Orlando when both were there to take the test for Emergency Medical Technician, in January, 1991. He claims to have seen Respondent borrow cigarettes from several fire fighters at the station and return a pack later on. Mr. Scott is a smoker and claims to have been approached by Respondent frequently to give him cigarettes. In April, 1991, Mr. Scott requested that his daughter, Rebecca Brown, type several copies similar to that statement signed by him to be given to and signed by others who had agreed to do so. Only Mr. Schwarz and Ms. Brown actually signed such statements, however, and the others refused to do so. These signed statements, along with Mr. Scott's statement, were forwarded to the Fire Marshal's office. According to Mr. Scott, the others, who backed out, did so because they were afraid of repercussions, but none of these individuals were present to testify and the hearsay testimony of Mr. Scott on that point is insufficient to support a Finding of Fact to that effect. Both Mr. Schwarz and Ms. Brown also indicated they had seen Respondent smoking either at the station or elsewhere from the time he was hired in August, 1990, until the time he applied for certification in January, 1991. No other fire fighter from whom Respondent is supposed to have borrowed cigarettes presented evidence to that effect, however. Mr. Schwarz was recognized as a troublemaker at the fire department and was allowed to retire in lieu of disciplinary action. Ms. Brown is Mr. Scott's daughter and the wife of another fire fighter in the Department. The credibility of both is somewhat suspect. Evidence regarding Mr. Scott also detracts from his credibility. He was known in the department to be a practical joker whose pranks from time to time got out of hand or were excessive. His honesty and integrity were seriously suspect due to his tendency to bring items taken, with or without permission, from his employer, Grumman, to work projects at the department. These were not always minor items, either, and Scott frequently remarked that he had gotten them from "G-Mart" under such circumstances as to give rise to the suspicion they were stolen. On the other hand, Respondent, recognized as a hard driving, somewhat brash and bragging young man, is nonetheless well though of by the majority of his peers and superior in the Department. He categorically denies the allegations against him. Neither former Chief Yurillo nor Capt. Recta, both of whom worked with Respondent, recall having ever seen him smoke and neither was approached by Respondent for a cigarette. When the allegations involved here came up, an internal investigation was begun at the Department, a part of which included a voluntary urinalysis examination of the Respondent. The results of that test, done by an independent laboratory, reflected no evidence of the use of tobacco at the time the test was taken. Mr. Scott and Mr. Schwarz both indicate that subsequent to the filing of their affidavits, Respondent came to them and suggested that if they were not sure of the facts they had alleged, they could withdraw them. In fact, neither did so voluntarily. Scott, in April, 1991, after a meeting with Yurillo and Respondent, executed a statement typed for him by Mr. Recca in which he claims he was mistaken in his original allegations regarding Respondent's tobacco use. Scott claims he was pressured into recanting. Yurillo, Recca and Respondent claim Scott's action was voluntary. Whatever the facts regarding the withdrawal of Scott's original statement, analysis of the evidence of record indicates there is insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent used tobacco or tobacco products within a year immediately preceding his application for certification or that he falsified his application and the supporting affidavit, and it is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint in this matter which seeks to discipline Respondent, James M. Yingling's certification as a fire fighter. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 9th day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-4458 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner: - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted as the testimony of the witnesses. Not necessarily accepted as true. Rejected as testimony of Mr. Scott not considered credible. Accepted. For the Respondent: None received. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth J. Gregovits, Esquire Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Michael J. Mortell, Esquire 2801 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 2A Stuart, Florida 34996 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level - 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner, Paul F. Meloy (Meloy), is an employee of Petitioner, Alva Fire Protection and Rescue District (District), and is entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) pursuant to Section 121.051, Florida Statutes (2001). (All references to statutes are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Section 121.051 requires participation in the FRS by all employees hired after December 1, 1970. The District hired Meloy after 1970. Meloy has worked for the District as the fire chief and administrator since the District's inception in 1976. Meloy was instrumental in establishing the District. The other requirement imposed by Section 121.051 for participation in the FRS is that Meloy must be an employee. Section 121.021(11), in relevant part, defines an employee as any person receiving salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position. Respondent denies that the payments Meloy receives from the District are salary payments. Respondent asserts that the payments are reimbursement for expenses. Respondent denies that the payments to Meloy are compensation. Section 121.021(22) defines the term "compensation" to mean: . . . the monthly salary paid a member by his or her employer for work performed arising from that employment. The payments from the District to Meloy since October 1990 have been compensation. In October 1990, the District began paying Meloy a monthly salary "for work performed arising from his employment with the District." Before October 1990, the District reimbursed Meloy for expenses he incurred in housing fire trucks in the garage at Meloy's auto service business. The District also reimbursed Meloy for the maintenance and repair of District vehicles. In 1988, the District began reporting the payments made to Meloy as salary for purposes of the federal income tax. Each year from 1988 to the present, the District has reported the payments to Meloy on a W2 Wage and Tax Statement. Between 1988 and October 1990, the District stopped housing vehicles in Meloy's garage, and Meloy stopped servicing vehicles for the District. In October 1990, the amount of the monthly payment to Meloy increased substantially. Thereafter, the District provided annual cost of living increases to Meloy. The payments to Meloy from October 1990 to the present have been unrelated to expenses incurred by Meloy. Those payments have been regular monthly salary payments for work performed to implement the policy of the District and to administer the day-to-day operations of the District. Even if the payments are salary payments, Respondent argues that Meloy did not receive those payments for work performed in a regularly established position. Section 121.021(52)(b) defines a regularly established position as one that will be in existence for six months. Meloy's position has been in existence since 1976. It will be in existence for six months. Respondent asserts that the position occupied by Meloy is a temporary position defined in Section 121.021(53)(b). Section 121.021(53)(b) defines a temporary position as one that will exist for less than six months or as defined by rule, regardless of its duration. Respondent claims that the position occupied by Meloy is a temporary position because it is an "on call position" defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S- 1.004(5)(d)5. The rule defines an on call position as one filled by employees who are called to work unexpectedly for brief periods and whose employment ceases when the purpose for being called is satisfied. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.) Meloy performs some of his duties unexpectedly when called anytime 24 hours a day. He performs his other duties in the normal course of business. Meloy does not maintain any time sheets, and the District does not require Meloy to perform his duties within an established work schedule. Meloy does not occupy an "on call position" within the meaning of Rule 60S-1.004(5)(d)5. Meloy's employment does not cease when the purpose of his being called is satisfied. Meloy has been performing his on-call duties and his other duties for approximately 25 years. In 1994, Mr. William D. Wilkinson became the Chairman of the District (Wilkinson). Wilkinson is also the Court Administrator for the Circuit Court in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in which the District is located. After Wilkinson became Chairman, he determined that Meloy receives compensation in a regularly established position and is entitled to membership in the FRS. Wilkinson testified at the hearing. Meloy has sole responsibility for implementing the District's policy and administering the day-to-day operation of the District. Relevant portions of Wilkinson's testimony are instructive. Q. And whose job is it to carry out that policy? A. Mr. Meloy. Q. When you came on board in 1994, Mr. Meloy, was he employed by the district? A. That's correct. Q. How many other administrators does the district employ? A. None. Q. Who runs the day-to-day affairs of the fire district? A. Mr. Meloy. Q. He is required to work a certain work schedule? A. No, sir. Q. What is he required to do as far as hours go? A. Once we set the policy, then we expect, you know, the chief to carry that out. And for however many hours it takes during the week, you know, the month to see it is fulfilled. Q. Do you know if he is on call? A. He is on call 24/7. Q. And what does that mean? A. 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Q. Is that 365 days a year? A. That's correct. * * * Q. Let me ask you to put your other hat on as the court administrator for the 20th Judicial Circuit. Are you involved with the Florida Retirement System? A. Yes, I am. Q. And you are a participant? A. Yes, I am. Q. Your duties as the court administrator, how would you compare that to Mr. Meloy's duties as the fire chief administrator of the Alva Fire District? A. Well, with the exception that I certainly make a lot more than he does for the duties that he has, it is similar. You know, I'm paid an annual salary and expected to get the job done. If you have to work 60 hours, you have to work 60 hours. If you get through sooner, hopefully you do. But that never happens. The District requires Meloy to spend as much time as is needed to implement the policy of the District and to administer the day-to-day business of the District. The hours vary, and there are no set hours. Some days, Meloy's day begins at 6:00 a.m. Other days, Meloy does not get to work until 9:00 a.m. or noon. Some days, Meloy leaves work at 5:00 p.m. and then must return immediately to the office. "It is whatever is needed." The District employs four individuals. One is Meloy. Two are certified firefighters. The other is a part- time bookkeeper. The bookkeeper and the two certified firefighters are members of the FRS. The two full-time firefighters maintain time sheets, and the District pays them for overtime. The District compensation of its full-time firefighters is consistent with compensation on an hourly basis. Meloy is not a certified firefighter, and the District does not compensate Meloy on an hourly basis. Meloy does not maintain or submit time sheets. The District does not pay Meloy for overtime. Like the certified firefighters, Meloy performs some of his duties when called anytime, 24 hours a day. However, neither the certified firefighters nor Meloy has the option to refuse to work when called. The employment positions of the certified firefighters and Meloy do not cease when the purpose for being called is satisfied. Although the bookkeeper for the District is never on call, she maintains a schedule similar to that of Meloy. She works those hours necessary to perform her duties. Like Meloy, the bookkeeper's position does not cease when she completes her work. The District pays compensation to Meloy in accordance with an annual salary rather than an hourly rate. Meloy does not have an established schedule during which he must implement the board's policy and administer the day-to- day operations of the District. Meloy occupies a regularly established position within the meaning of Section 121.021(52)(b). Meloy is the District administrator. The position has been in existence since 1988 and is not a temporary position within the meaning of Section 121.021(53)(b) or Rule 60S-1.004(5). Respondent's final argument is that a determination of Petitioners' request to enroll Meloy in the FRS is barred by the judicial doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Respondent argues that final agency action determined that the payments received by Meloy through June 29, 1992, are reimbursement for expenses. Respondent argues that nothing has changed since that time, and Meloy cannot now revisit the issue of his compensation. Findings regarding Respondent's final argument require some historical perspective. The District joined the FRS in 1988. At that time, the District purchased past service credit for a number of employees, including Meloy. Meloy enrolled as a member of the Special Risk Class. When Meloy enrolled as a member of the Special Risk Class, a question in the enrollment form asked Meloy if the applicant was certified as a firefighter or required to be certified as a firefighter. Meloy answered in the affirmative. Meloy has always been required to be certified as a firefighter in order to receive retirement benefits as a member of the Special Risk Class. However, Meloy has never been certified as a firefighter pursuant to Section 633.35. Meloy has never completed an essential firefighting course that is a statutory prerequisite to certification. By letter dated June 29, 1992, Respondent notified Meloy that Respondent was terminating Meloy's membership in the FRS. The letter stated two grounds for termination. One ground was that Meloy had not completed the firefighting course required for membership in the Special Risk Class. The second ground was that the payments Meloy received from his employer are reimbursement for expenses rather than compensation. Meloy did not appeal either ground stated by Respondent on June 29, 1992, for the termination of benefits. Meloy does not contest the first ground and is not now seeking enrollment in the FRS as a member of the Special Risk Class. Rather, Meloy now seeks benefits as a member in a regularly established position defined in Section 121.021(52)(b). Meloy does contest the second ground stated by Respondent on June 29, 1992, for terminating Meloy's membership in the FRS. Respondent determined that Meloy did not receive compensation from 1988 through June 29, 1992. The time for appealing that determination has expired, and Meloy cannot now amend the scope of this proceeding to include any payments he received on or before June 29, 1992. Respondent asserts that its determination on June 29, 1992, also establishes that payments received by Meloy after June 29, 1992, are not compensation. Respondent argues that Meloy's duties have not changed, and the payments Meloy receives are reimbursement for expenses. On June 1, 1999, Respondent sent a letter to Wilkinson explaining Respondent's denial of Meloy's application for enrollment in the FRS. In relevant part, the letter stated: By certified letter dated June 29, 1992 (copy enclosed), the State Retirement Director, Mr. A.J. McMullian III, advised Mr. Meloy that he was inelligible for Florida Retirement System (FRS) participation since the monthly payments he received were for "expenses" and not compensation. Subsequent to Mr. McMullian's letter, a hearing was conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings and Mr. Meloy's payments were defined as expenses as a statement [sic] of fact (copy enclosed). In light of this, the Division has already made a determination that Mr. Meloy is ineligible for FRS participation from 1979 through 1992. Since your letter indicates that Mr. Meloy's duties and payments he has received have not changed since 1988, he remains ineligible for FRS participation. Respondent's Exhibit 10. The DOAH hearing referred to in the letter on June 1, 1999, involved allegations that Meloy had violated state ethics laws when he first attempted to enroll in the FRS in 1988. In 1992, the Florida Commission on Ethics (Commission) investigated Meloy's participation in the FRS. The Commission entered an order finding probable cause that Meloy violated Section 112.313(6) when he submitted his enrollment form for retirement benefits by corruptly using or attempting to use his official position to retain retirement benefits for himself and his assistant fire chief when neither was qualified to receive benefits. The findings concerning the assistant fire chief are neither relevant nor material to this proceeding. Meloy requested an administrative hearing, and the Commission referred the matter to DOAH to conduct the hearing. ALJ Susan B. Kirkland conducted the administrative hearing and entered a Recommended Order on July 8, 1994. The Recommended Order found that Meloy misrepresented his entitlement to membership in the Special Risk Class and did so with wrongful intent. The Order concluded that Meloy violated the relevant statute because Meloy attempted to use his position, or the property and resources entrusted to him, to secure a benefit. The Order recommended a civil penalty, public censure, and a reprimand. The Final Order of the Commission adopted the Recommended Order. The Recommended Order contains three paragraphs that discuss the payments received by Meloy. Those three paragraphs state: 3. In 1976, the . . . District was established. The firefighting equipment and vehicles were originally located in Meloy's garage, where he maintained an automotive repair shop. Meloy received a fixed reimbursement from the District each month for the use of his garage and for repair services which he rendered for the District. * * * 5. In 1988, the District joined the . . . (FRS). At that time the District employed four full-time firefighters and a part-time secretary. Meloy worked part-time as the administrator of the District but did not draw a salary and continued to receive remuneration in the form of the monthly reimbursement for expenses. . . . * * * 18. By letter dated June 29, 1992, [Respondent] notified Meloy that his membership in the FRS . . . was being terminated. The grounds for termination were that Meloy had been receiving payments for expenses and not compensation. . . . The Recommended Order does not operate under the judicial doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel to preclude a determination of whether the payments received by Meloy after 1988 are compensation. The Recommended Order limits the finding that Meloy received payments for expenses to those received in 1988. Paragraph 5 expressly states, "At that time. . . Meloy . . . continued to receive . . . reimbursement for expenses. . . ." The findings in paragraph 18 merely recite the grounds stated by Respondent but do not make findings on the merits of the stated grounds. The findings in paragraph 3 are not probative. The Recommended Order made no findings concerning the payments Meloy received after 1988. Respondent determined that the payments between 1988 and June 29, 1992, were payments for expenses rather than compensation. Irrespective of whether Respondent's determination was legally and factually correct, Meloy did not appeal Respondent's determination. The determination by Respondent on June 29, 1992, involved a separate and distinct application from the application at issue in this case. No determination has been made that the payments since June 29, 1992, either are or are not compensation. The application at issue in this case is a new application for different benefits. Meloy is not applying for benefits to which he would be entitled if he were a member of the Special Risk Class. Nor can Meloy apply for benefits related to the payments received on or before June 29, 1992. Respondent argues that nothing has changed in the course of Meloy's tenure with the District. Payments that were reimbursement for expenses before 1992 arguably have not now been transformed into compensation. Respondent is incorrect. Something has changed in the course of Meloy's tenure with the District. Sometime after September 1990, the payments to Meloy changed from reimbursement for expenses to monthly salary payments. The District no longer housed equipment at Meloy's garage, Meloy no longer serviced the equipment at the garage, and the amount of the monthly payments to Meloy increased from $540 to $833. Relevant portions of the transcript of the administrative hearing in the ethics case are instructive. Meloy asserted in the ethics case that in 1988, he was a volunteer fireman. As a volunteer, rather than a salaried employee, Meloy argued that he was not required to be certified as a firefighter. The attorney who represented the Commission sought to show that Meloy was not a volunteer after 1990 but was a salaried employee of the District. As long as I'm volunteering, I don't have to have it. Q. Okay. You are also the administrator for the full-time firemen, is that right? A. Yes. Q. You have the power to hire and fire them? A. Yes. Q. You set their hours? A. Yes. Q. The district also has a part-time secretary, is that right? A. Yes. Q. And currently that's Ms. Connie Bull? A. Correct. Q. She handles payroll matters? A. Yes. Q. She writes checks? A. Yes. Q. Pays bills? A. Yes. Q. She and you both answer questions that the full-time firemen might have about vacation or sick leave or retirement, is that right? A. To the best of our ability, yes. Q. Okay. Now, before 1990 you were not an employee of the fire district, is that right? A. According to how you define it, I guess. I was paid more as an expense type arrangement up until sometime around '90. I don't remember the exact date. Q. Okay, you received the expense reimbursement prior to 1990 for working on the fire equipment; is that right? A. It covered a lot of things. We worked on the fire equipment there in my business, we housed a lot of equipment there, used my facilities for -- well, we have used my facilities as a station for awhile. Q. When you say your facilities, you mean the Alva garage that you used to own? A. Right. Q. When you got the expense reimbursement, you would get the same amount every month, is that right? A. Yes. Q. It changed some over time, though, didn't it from '73 to 1990? A. Yes. Q. You got that same reimbursement amount regardless of the number of hours that you worked for the district? A. Yes. Q. And regardless of what any actual expenses might be? A. Correct. Q. Now, sometime in 1990 you became an employee of the district on a part-time basis; is that right? A. That's when they started taking out taxes and all and that reverted to more of a salary type reimbursement rather than expense. In other words, I was paying income tax and Social Security and everything and at that time it was considered more of a salary. Q. And they started doing that in 1990 sometime? A. I don't remember the date. It was approximately then. Q. When you started receiving a salary, you stopped getting the reimbursement; is that right? A. Right. Q. Isn't it true that when you first started getting the salary that the amount of the salary was several hundred dollars a month more than what the reimbursement had been? A. I couldn't tell you. Q. Isn't it a fact that the last-- A. I don't believe that would be right, though, because it didn't go up very much any one time, I don't think. I would have to see the figures to tell for sure. Q. All right. Isn't it a fact that the last time you received a monthly reimbursement you were receiving about $540 a month? A. I don't have those figures in front of me. Q. You don't remember? A. No. Q. Isn't it a fact that when you first got a salary in October 1990, you got $833 a month? A. I still couldn't tell you. I don't have those figures in front of me. I have them wrote down if I can get my papers. Q. All right. You don't know how much you get now? A. Yeah, but this ain't 1990. Respondent's Exhibit 3 at 29-32. The state argued in the ethics case that Meloy has been salaried since October 1990 and was required to be certified as a firefighter before enrolling in the FRS as a member of the Special Risk Class. The state now argues that Meloy has never been salaried and cannot enroll in the FRS as member of the regular class. The state cannot have it both ways. Meloy is entitled to membership in the FRS for the period after June 29, 1992. During that time, the District has paid a salary to Meloy that is compensation for duties performed in a regularly established position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order granting Petitioners' request for Meloy to participate in the FRS. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _________ ________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Frank Porter, Esquire Porter & Jessell, P.A. 1424 Dean Street Ft. Myers, Florida 33901 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Division of Retirement P.O. Box 3900 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-3900 Erin B. Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Mallory Harrell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents have violated various statutes and rules governing persons licensed to install and service fire extinguishers and fire suppression systems and, if so, what penalties Petitioner should impose.
Findings Of Fact General Respondents hold Class A and C licenses as fire extinguisher dealers, Class D licenses as pre-engineered systems dealers, Class 01 licenses as fire extinguisher permittees, and Class 04 licenses as pre-engineered systems permittees. Respondent Todd Jacobs (Jacobs) is the qualifier for Respondent National Fire and Safety Corporation (NFS). NFS has been in the fire-safety business for about 15 years. Jacobs received his first permit about ten years ago. Neither Respondent has been disciplined prior to the suspension of all of their licenses and permits effective May 15, 1997, for the incidents described below. The suspension has remained continuously in effect through the present. Pre-engineered systems are custom installations of fire-suppression systems. These pressurized systems, which are activated by heat-sensitive fusible links and small cylinders known as cartridges, feature large metal cylinders that supply the powder through pipes to specific hazard areas. Pre-engineered systems must be installed in accordance with pretested limitations and configurations. Petitioner has cited various violations of the standards of the National Fire Protection Association. As noted in the conclusions of law, violation of these standards, which are incorporated into the rules, provide the basis for discipline. The relevant standards of the National Fire Protection Association are divided into two sections: one governs persons dealing with fire extinguishers and the other governs persons dealing with pre-engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 10 is titled, “Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 1-3 defines a “portable fire extinguisher” as a “portable device carried on wheels and operated by hand containing an extinguishing agent that can be expelled under pressure for the purpose of suppressing or extinguishing a fire.” National Fire Protection Association 10 applies to fire extinguishers, not pre-engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 10, Chapter 4 governs the inspection, maintenance, and recharging of fire extinguishers. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-1.4 provides that “[m]aintenance, servicing, and recharging” of fire extinguishers shall be performed by trained persons “having available the appropriate servicing manual(s), the proper types of tools, recharge materials, lubricants, and manufacturer’s recommended replacement parts or parts specifically listed for use in the fire extinguisher.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.1.2 requires that persons recharging a fire extinguisher shall follow the “recommendations of the manufacturer.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.3.1 requires that persons recharging fire extinguishers use “[o]nly those agents specified on the nameplate or agents proven to have equal chemical composition, physical characteristics, and fire extinguishing capabilities ” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.3.2 prohibits persons recharging fire extinguishers from mixing “[m]ultipurpose dry chemicals” with “alkaline-based dry chemicals.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Chapter 5 governs the hydrostatic testing of fire extinguishers. Table 5-2 provides that the longest hydrostatic test interval for fire extinguishers is 12 years. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-1.2 provides that the hydrostatic testing of fire extinguishers shall be performed by trained persons “having available suitable testing equipment, facilities, and appropriate servicing manual(s).” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.1.1 requires that persons hydrostatically testing fire extinguishers first conduct an internal examination of the cylinder. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.1.2 requires that persons hydrostatically testing fire extinguishers do so in accordance with the “procedures specified in the pamphlet Methods for Hydrostatic Testing of Compressed Gas Cylinders (CGA C-1), published by the Compressed Gas Association.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.2 provides that the testing procedures for low-pressure cylinders, shells, and hose assemblies are detailed in Appendix A. Appendix A contains detailed material, but, according to a prefatory statement, “[t]his Appendix is not part of the requirements of this National Fire Protection Association document but is included for informational purposes only.” National Fire Protection Association 17 is titled, “Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 1-4 defines “pre- engineered systems,” in part, as [t]hose having predetermined flow rates, nozzle pressures, and quantities of dry chemical [with] specific pipe size, maximum and minimum pipe lengths, flexible hose specifications, number of fittings and number and types of nozzles prescribed by a testing laboratory.” National Fire Protection Association 17 applies to pre- engineered systems, not fire extinguishers. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 1-4 defines “inspection” as a “’quick’ check to give reasonable assurance that the extinguishing system is fully charged and operable.” The definition adds that this is done by “seeing that the system is in place, that it has not been activated or tampered with, and that there is no obvious physical damage or condition to prevent operation.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 3-8.3.1 requires that the dry chemical container and expellant gas assemblies of a pre-engineered system shall be located “so as not to be subjected to severe weather conditions or to mechanical, chemical, or other damage.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 3-9.1 provides that, for pre-engineered systems, the “pipings and fittings shall be installed in accordance with good commercial practices.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Chapter 9 governs the inspection, maintenance, and recharging of pre- engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-1.1 provides that, when dry chemical pressure containers are not attached to piping or hand hose lines, the discharge outlet shall have a protective diffusing safety cap to protect persons from recoil and high-flow discharge in case of accidental activation. The caps shall also be used on empty National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9- 1.4 provides that “[a]ll dry chemical extinguishing systems shall be inspected in accordance with the owner’s manual and maintained and recharged in accordance with the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual and service bulletins.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-3.2 provides that “[f]ixed temperature-sensing elements of the fusible metal allow type shall be replaced at least annually from the date of installation. They shall be destroyed when removed.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-3.2.1 provides that the “year of manufacture and date of installation of the fixed temperature-sensing element shall be marked on the system inspection tag[,]” and the “tag shall be signed or initialed by the installer.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-4.2 provides that “[s]ystems shall be recharged in accordance with the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5 requires that trained persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems have “available suitable testing equipment, facilities, and an appropriate service manual(s).” This standard requires hydrostatic testing at 12-year intervals for the dry chemical container, auxiliary pressure containers (unless less than two inches in outside diameter and two feet in length or unless they bear the DOT stamp, “3E”), and hose assemblies. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5.1 requires that persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems subject the tested components of hydrostatic test pressure equal to the marked factory test pressure or the test pressure specified in the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual. This test prohibits any leakage, rupture, or movement of hose couplings and requires test procedures in accordance with the manufacturer’s detailed written hydrostatic test instructions.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5.2 requires that persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems remove and discard the dry chemical agent from the containers prior to the test. Page Field (Counts I and II) In March 1997, Rick Clontz, a Lee County employee, asked Roland Taylor, an NFS employee, to service components of the fire-safety system at the Lee County Hazardous Materials Facility at Page Field in Fort Myers. This fire-safety system protects an area at which Lee County stores corrosive, flammable, and poisonous materials. Initially, Mr. Taylor removed three ten-pound ABC fire extinguishers. These are small portable cylinders, whose “ABC” designation refers to their ability to suppress a broad range of fires. According to the National Fire Protection Association standards, Class A fires involve “ordinary combustible materials, such as wood, cloth, paper, rubber, and many plastics.” Class B fires involve “flammable liquids, oils greases, tars, oil-based paints, lacquers, and flammable gases.” Class C fires involve “energized electrical equipment . . . .” On April 1, 1997, Mr. Taylor returned the three 10- pound ABC fire extinguishers. Later inspection revealed that Mr. Taylor had properly removed and discarded the ABC powder from each cylinder, but he had refilled only one of the three cylinders entirely with ABC powder. He erroneously filled the other two cylinders with mixtures of 75 percent and 50 percent BC powder. The improper filling of two of the fire extinguishers at the Page Field Hazardous Materials Facility threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Meeting Mr. Taylor at the Page Field facility when Mr. Taylor returned the three small cylinders, Mr. Clontz asked him to remove the 50-pound Ansul SPA 50 cylinder and hydrostatically test it. Mr. Taylor noted that the cylinder was not yet due for this test, but quoted a price to which Mr. Clontz agreed, and Mr. Taylor disconnected the cylinder from the pre-engineered system and transported it from the site. Hydrostatic testing is a hydraulic interior pressurization test that measures ductility, which is the ability of cylinder walls to expand and contract. The purpose of hydrostatic testing is to determine the suitability of a cylinder for continued service. Hydrostatic testing requires the tester to release the pressure and empty the contents of a cylinder. Using specialized equipment, the tester then fills the cylinder with water, pressurizing it to twice the service pressure or, for the systems cylinders involved in this case, 1000 pounds per square inch. Cylinder failure from the loss of structural integrity can result in a dangerous rupture, possibly causing an improperly bracketed cylinder to launch like an unguided missile. A cylinder that passes its hydrostatic test does not have to be retested for 12 years. Three days later, Mr. Taylor returned the Ansul cylinder with a tag stamped to show the date on which NFS had hydrostatically tested the cylinder. Mr. Taylor reconnected it to the pre-engineered system, changing the three fusible links. However, Mr. Taylor did not tighten the actuation piping wrench-tight, as required by the manufacturer’s specification. Instead, Mr. Taylor left the actuation piping sufficiently loose that it might cause a failure of the pre- engineered system to activate. As Respondents conceded, the loose actuation piping threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Finished with his work, Mr. Taylor gave Mr. Clontz a receipt, but no diagram or report, as Mr. Clontz usually received after such service. Consistent with the work requested by Lee County, the receipt stated that NFS had hydrostatically tested and recharged the three ten-pound and one 50-pound cylinders. However, NFS had not hydrostatically tested the 50- pound Ansul SPA 50 cylinder. NFS had not even changed the powder in the cylinder. Jacobs was personally aware of these facts and personally authorized the deceitful stamping of the tag to show a hydrostatic testing. The fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the hydrostatic testing of the Ansul SPA 50 cylinder threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Additionally, NFS had replaced the three fusible links with three other fusible links. Petitioner failed to prove that there are material differences between the two types of links so as to justify discipline. There are two differences between the links. First, NFS used Globe links rather than Ansul links. However, Ansul links are manufactured by Globe. The Ansul expert testified that Ansul subjects the links to an additional inspection. However, the record does not reveal whether Globe does not also subject its brand-name links to another inspection that it does not perform for the links that it manufactures for Ansul. The Ansul expert did not testify as to the defect rate resulting from the Ansul inspection or any difference between the performance of the “two” links. On this record, then, there is no demonstrated difference in the two brand-named fusible links. The second difference is that NFS installed an ML link rather than the newer K link currently in use. Ansul approved the ML link in the Ansul SPA 50 pre-engineered system until five years ago. At that time, Ansul authorized use of the older ML link until dealer inventories were depleted. Even assuming that the K link represents a safety advance, compared to the ML link, Ansul’s gradual introduction of the new link precludes a finding that the difference was material, unless one were to assume that Ansul disregarded public safety when authorizing the gradual introduction of the new link. Respondents conceded that they did not have a copy of the Ansul SPA 50 manual when they serviced the Ansul SPA 50 system. They have since obtained the manual. Petitioner failed to show that the failure to have the manual threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. Respondents conceded that they did not produce the inspection form for the system. They had provided such a form previously. Petitioner failed to show that the failure to produce an inspection form threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. At the hearing, Petitioner agreed not to pursue the claim against Respondents regarding the LT10R cartridge. Petitioner effectively conceded that Respondents were not required to hydrostatically test the cartridge because it is exempt from such testing. Petitioner evidently elected not to pursue the recharging issue for other reasons. Mobile Service Units (Counts III-V The service truck operated by Mark Thackeray did not have a conductivity tester, certified scales, or proper manuals. The conductivity tester ensures that the braiding is intact on carbon dioxide hoses. The certified scales ensures that the cylinder is filled with the proper amount of dry chemical. The manuals ensure that the person servicing a pre- engineered system understands all of its components and how it works. Additionally, one cylinder in the truck had a drill bit instead of a safety pin installed in the head of the bottle. Petitioner also proved that the fire extinguisher and pre-engineered system tags bore the Naples and Fort Myers addresses for NFS. As noted below, the Fort Myers location was inactive, used only for storage and drop-offs and not for shop work or retail sales activity. For several years, Petitioner’s representatives knew that the tags bore both addresses and knew that the Fort Myers location was inactive, but never objected to Respondents’ practice. The only violation involving Mr. Thackeray’s truck that threatened the public health, safety, or welfare was the failure to have certified scales. The service truck operated by Ward Read lacked an operational inspection light, six-inch vise, and proper manuals. Additionally, Mr. Read’s truck had tags with the Fort Myers and Naples addresses for NFS. However, none of these violations involving Mr. Read’s truck threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. Petitioner failed to prove that Mr. Read’s truck lacked leak testing equipment. The truck had a bottle of Leak Tech with which to detect leaks in fire extinguishers. The truck also had a cable-crimping tool. The truck lacked a Kidde tool, but Petitioner failed to prove that Mr. Read installed Kidde systems off this truck or that the crimping tool present on the truck could not service adequately Kidde installations. The service truck operated by Donald Zelmanski lacked an inspection light, a six-inch vise, certified scales, leak-testing equipment, and proper manuals. Mr. Zelmanski’s truck contained tags with the Fort Myers and Naples addresses. The only violation that threatened the public health, safety, or welfare was the failure to have certified scales. Naples and Fort Myers Facilities (Counts VI-VII) The NFS Naples facility lacked operational hydrostatic test equipment on April 9, 1997. Respondents claim that they were having the equipment upgraded and calibrated at the time of the inspection. Ordinarily, this defense might be creditable, but not in this case. While the hydrostatic test equipment was out of service, NFS accepted the Page Field cylinder for hydrostatic testing and returned it to service, fraudulently representing that the cylinder had been hydrotested. This is precisely the practice against which the requirement of operational testing equipment is designed to protect. The Naples facility also lacked certified gauges for low-pressure testing. Respondents claim that the equipment upgrade described in the preceding paragraph would allow them to test high- and low-pressure cylinders on the same machine. However, due to Respondents’ fraudulent handling of the Page Field cylinder during the equipment downtime, this defense is unavailing. The Naples facility lacked an adapter to allow Respondents to recharge an Ansul SPA 50 cylinder. Jacobs drove the Page Field cylinder to St. Petersburg to have the cylinder recharged by a competitor that had such an adapter. However, the requirement that a facility have an adapter reduces the risk that a licensee will ignore its professional responsibilities and simply return a cylinder to service without first discharging it and performing a visual internal inspection. Respondents’ failure to discharge their other professional responsibilities underscores the materiality of the requirement that they keep an adapter for the Ansul SPA 50 that they elected to accept for service. Respondents kept tags at the Naples facility with tags containing addresses of the Naples and Fort Myers facilities. At the time of the inspection, Respondents also lacked documentation for two of eight scales, including a scale in 1/4-pound increments. Jacobs’ claim that they sent the two uncertified scales for servicing immediately after the inspection does not obviate the fact that, at the time of the inspection, they were available for use and in disrepair. Respondents failed to include serial numbers of serviced fire extinguishers on the relevant invoices. Respondents also failed to include the necessary permit number on inspection forms. Respondent falsely represented that they had hydrotested the Page Field Ansul SPA 50 cylinder at the Naples facility when they had not done so. Respondents stored cylinder bottles without safety caps in place. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents did not post DOT certification near the hydrostatic testing equipment or that they stocked nitrogen cylinders without an acceptable blow-out disk in place. The blow-out disks were not Ansul brand, but Petitioner failed to prove that the disks were not UL listed or the substantial equivalent of Ansul disks. Respondents concede that the Fort Myers location lacked the items alleged by Petitioner. However, the Fort Myers location is inactive and serves merely as a drop-off or storage facility. All shop work and retail sales activities occur at the Naples location. At the time of the April 1997 inspection, Respondents surrendered the license for the inactive Fort Myers location. Other Jobs (Counts VIII-XI) Respondents installed a pre-engineered system at the SunTrust Bank in Naples. The cylinder is in the bank vault, which it is designed to protect. Petitioner charged that Respondents improperly located the cylinder in the hazard area, but Petitioner did not discuss the fact that the cylinder at Page Field was in the hazard area. Obviously, the corrosive effect of the hazardous materials at Page Field represents a greater risk to the cylinder than the corrosive effect of money and other valuables in the vault at the SunTrust. Additionally, some language in the Ansul manual cautions not to locate the cylinder in the hazard area, but only if the hazard is corrosive. Respondents replaced the fusible links at SunTrust annually. However, they failed to record the year of manufacture of the fusible links on the system tag when last servicing the system in October 1996. There is no evidence as to whether Respondents had suitable Ansul manuals and adapters when it serviced the system at that time. Respondents installed a pre-engineered system at the VFW Post in Naples. In doing so, their employee, who also misfilled the three fire extinguishers at Page Field, left the end-pipe-to-nozzle loose, so as to risk a loss of pressure in case of fire. This condition threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Although Respondents fired this employee shortly after discovering his poor performance, this action does not eliminate the safety violations for which he, and they, are responsible. Petitioner also proved that Respondents located the 260 nozzle over the griddle in the wrong location. This condition threatened the public health, safety, and welfare because the system might not extinguish a fire on the griddle. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents located the 230 nozzle in the wrong location. The Ansul manual allows this nozzle to be located anywhere along or within the perimeter of the fryer, if aimed to the center of the fryer. The 230 nozzle was so located and aimed. Respondents installed two pre-engineered systems at Mozzarella’s Café in Naples. In the course of this job, Respondents committed several violations governing documentation. Respondents improperly combined two pre- engineered systems on one inspection report, failed to include in the inspection report references to the manufacturer’s drawings and page numbers, failed to list in the inspection report a second gas valve on the front hood of one system, and failed to include in the inspection report Respondents’ permit number. However, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents failed to list in the inspection report the type of fusible links in each hood. Respondents serviced a pre-engineered system at Kwan’s Express in Fort Myers in December 1996. Respondents failed to list in the inspection report the degree and types of fusible links installed and a reference to the drawing and page number in the manufacturer’s manual. However, Respondents listed in the inspection report the model number of the system. Red Lobster (Count XII) Several months after Petitioner had suspended Respondents’ licenses and permits, counsel for both parties negotiated a settlement agreement. Under the agreement, Petitioner would immediately lift the suspension. Jacobs and his general manager, Judson Schroyer, learned that Respondents’ counsel had received an unsigned, final draft settlement agreement on Monday, August 18, 1997. The settlement conditions were acceptable to Respondents, and Jacobs knew that Respondents’ counsel had signed the agreement and faxed it back to Petitioner’s counsel for execution by Petitioner’s representative. On August 18, the general manager of the Red Lobster in Naples called NFS and spoke with Jacobs. The general manager described a job involving the installation of a new oven, which would necessitate the relocation of other kitchen equipment a few feet. Thinking that the settlement agreement would be fully executed by then, Jacobs agreed to visit the general manager at the site the following morning. The next morning, Jacobs and Mr. Schroyer met the general manager at the Red Lobster. Giving the general manager NFS business cards with their names, Jacobs and Mr. Schroyer briefly examined the pre-engineered system in the kitchen, as the three men walked through the kitchen, and assured the general manager that there would be no problem doing the work in the short timeframe that the customer required. The purpose of the visit was much more for marketing than it was for preparation for the relatively simple job that the general manager envisioned. Shortly after leaving the Red Lobster, Mr. Schroyer realized that Respondents might not have their licenses and permits reinstated in time to do the job. He conveyed this concern to his supervisor, Jacobs, who spoke with Respondents’ counsel on the evening of August 19 and learned that they could not do the job. Jacobs instructed Mr. Schroyer to call another company in Fort Myers, FireMaster, to which Respondents had referred work during their suspension. Mr. Schroyer called a representative of FireMaster, and he agreed to perform the work. FireMaster assigned the job to Ward Read, who, as is authorized by Petitioner, held a dual permit, which means that he was permitted to work for two licensed dealers. One was NFS, and the other was FireMaster. Mr. Read reported to the Red Lobster in the predawn hours of August 21, as requested by the general manager of Red Lobster. Because his FireMaster truck had insufficient supplies, Mr. Read used an NFS truck, the equipment tags, inspection report, and invoice all bore the name of FireMaster.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the State Fire Marshal enter a final order suspending the licenses and permits of both Respondents for two years, commencing from the effective date of the earlier emergency order of suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Mechele R. McBride Attorney Richard Grumberg Department of Insurance and Treasurer 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Mark H. Muller Quarles & Brady, P.A. 4501 North Tamiami Trail Naples, Florida 34103 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is employed as a full-time professional firefighter by the City of Tampa Fire Department. His primary responsibility is the prevention and extinguishment of fires, the protection and saving of life and property, and the enforcement of municipal, county and state fire prevention codes, as well as of any law pertaining to the prevention and control of fires. Petitioner received an associate in arts degree in Business Administration in May 1989 from Hillsborough Community College. In addition, he has earned 90 hours credit towards an associate in science degree from the same accredited post secondary institution. Petitioner's permanent academic record at Hillsborough Community College reveals he has successfully completed the following fire-related courses: SUMMER 1983 SEMESTER CREDITS ENS 1119 EMT AMBULANCE 5 EMS 1119 EMT AMBULANCE LAB 1 FALL 1986 SEMESTER CREDITS FFP 2601 FIRE APPARATUS PRA 3 FFP 1600 FIRE APPARATUS EQ 3 FALL 1990 SEMESTER CREDITS FFP 2420 F/F TACTICS & STRA 3 FFP 2660 RESCUE PRACTICES 3 FFP 2110 FIRE COMPANY MAN AG 3 Although Petitioner has 21 semester hours that the Department has agreed are fire related courses, 9 of these hours were credited to him after his associate in arts degree was conferred upon him in May of 1989. In order for a firefighter to be eligible for supplemental compensation related to an associate degree, he or she must have at least 18 semester hours that are fire related and are part of the firefighter's studies for the degree. Petitioner had only 12 semesters of fire related studies prior to the award of his degree. In order for Petitioner to receive eligibility credits for the full 21 semester hours in the Firefighter's Supplemental Compensation Program, he would have to acquire his second associate degree from Hillsborough Community College.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner should be denied eligibility for the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program as he did not complete at least 18 semester hours of fire related courses prior to receiving his award of an associate of arts degree. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See Preliminary Statement. Accepted. See HO #4 and #5. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark B. Maxey 6909 N. Glen Avenue Tampa, FL 33614 William C. Childers, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil Deputy General Counsel Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department, Tallahassee, Florida, on September 23, 1963, and continued in employment until May 5, 1979. (The suggestion by Petitioner that he had 24 to 27 days of leave accrued upon the last day of his employment is not utilized in determining the official termination date of employment. Beyond May 5, 1979, Petitioner was entitled to be paid for leave time, but was no longer obligated to perform as a firefighter, having been terminated effective May 5, 1979.) During his service as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department, Petitioner received a certificate of tenure in 1974, pursuant to Section 633.41, Florida Statutes. This provision has been referred to as the savings clause or grandfather clause and allows firefighters who were employed upon the effective date of that section to be certified without the necessity of complying with provisions of law related to certification through training and examination. Section 633.41, Florida Statutes became effective in 1969, thus Petitioner was certified by the terms and conditions of that provision. Petitioner left his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department to pursue private business and for reason of family obligations. Having terminated his employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department on a voluntary basis, there was no prohibition against reapplying for employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department at some future date. That eventuality occurred when the petitioner contacted the Fire Chief of the Tallahassee Fire Department in April, 1981 to discuss the possibility of reemployment. The Fire Chief of the Tallahassee Fire Department then and now is one Edwin C. Ragans. Shortly after this discussion with Chief Ragans, and in the same month, April, 1981, Ragans hired Petitioner with the effective date of Petitioner's reemployment being July 21, 1901. The delay between April and July was caused by the petitioner's need to conclude certain business undertakings before assuming his duties as a firefighter. The State of Florida, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, had been informed of the date of original employment for the Petitioner, September 23, 1963, and the date of termination, May 5, 1979, based upon a notice of termination which was submitted by Chief Ragans in behalf of the Tallahassee Fire Department. A copy of that form may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number 1 admitted into evidence. Likewise, the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training was made aware of the reemployment of the Petitioner through the filing of a form known as Qualification of New Employee. A copy of that form may be found as Petitioner's exhibit number 2 admitted into evidence. That exhibit reflects the date of reemployment or rehiring as being July 21, 1981, and further notes that the initial employment was September 23, 1963. That form does not allude to the date of original termination of employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department which was May 5, 1979. When Petitioner returned to employment in July, 1981, Chief Ragans made mention of the "two year rule", which is a reference to Rule 4A-37.14, Florida Administrative Code, (1976), dealing with the idea that firefighters who had been employed with an employing agency, such as the Tallahassee Fire Department, would not have to reapply for certification in this same fashion as the person seeking initial employment as a firefighter, if that former individual resumed full time paid employment with the employing agency within a period of two years immediately subsequent to termination of the initial employment. In this connection Ragans told the Petitioner at the point of reemploying the Petitioner in 1981, that Petitioner had two options. First, he could challenge the examination related to firefighters and gain certification or if that choice was not made it would be necessary for the Petitioner to go through a minimum standards class before recertification. At the commencement of reemployment, Petitioner was mindful of the existence of the two year provision pertaining to continuing certification for those persons who had not been away from employment as a firefighter for more than two years. Furthermore, this topic had been discussed between Petitioner and some other individuals of the fire department on one occasion. Under these circumstances, Petitioner contacted an official within the training division of the Tallahassee Fire Department and obtained books necessary to study in preparation for standing the examination for certification as a firefighter. Petitioner had commenced preparation for the examination when he happened to see Bobby Presnell a lieutenant within the Tallahassee Fire Department and president of the local firefighters union. In the course of this conversation with Presnell, Petitioner mentioned that he was going to have to be examined through a test before receiving certification. Presnell indicated that he would check into the situation and find out exactly what would be necessary to obtain certification. A couple of weeks after that conversation, Presnell called the Petitioner and told him that he had spoken with Olin Greene the then Director of the Division of State Fire Marshal in the state of Florida. Presnell reported to the Petitioner that in the course of the conversation between Greene and Presnell, Greene had stated that the Petitioner was a certified fireman. These conversations between Petitioner and Presnell occurred some time in August or September, 1981. Presnell testified that the discussion between Presnell and Greene concerned the problem which Petitioner had with the two year requirement for continuing certification without the necessity of testing or schooling. In testimony, Presnell indicated that he told Greene that the Petitioner had been reemployed and everything was "supposed to be okay, and then a month or two or three later the problem arose", meaning a certification problem. Greene, according to Presnell, stated that he would get back in contact with Presnell on this subject. Again, per the testimony of Presnell, some ten days to two weeks later, beyond the initial discussion between Greene and Presnell, Greene called Presnell and told him that as far as he, Greene, was concerned, and the Fire Marshal's office was concerned, that "They didn't have any problem with Mr. Adams' recertification or certification." Greene has no recollection of any conversation with Presnell on the subject of the certification situation related to the Petitioner. Having considered the testimony of Presnell and Greene, the Presnell testimony is accepted as factually correct. Following the occurrence wherein Presnell related remarks attributed to Greene as described before, a few days after those events, Petitioner had a discussion with District Fire Chief Raymond Love of the Tallahassee Fire Department. In this conversation Love describes a discussion which he claims to have taken place between himself and Buddy Dewar, whose actual name is Dennis Dewar, in which Dewar is reported to have said that Petitioner was certified. At that time Dewar was the Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. At present he is the Director of the Division of State Fire Marshal, having been promoted to that position in April 1982. In testimony, Love's account of the Dewar conversation concerning certification of the Petitioner, was that in the course of a fireman's convention in October 1981, Dewar asked Love if he knew Jimmy Adams, and Love replied in the affirmative. Given this opening, Love then related that he was impressed with Adams as a person and in terms of his capabilities as a firefighter. Love then recounts that he began to tell Dewar that there was a problem related to the Adams certification and if there was any help that Dewar could give, it would be most appreciated. To which, according to Love, Dewar replied that "he didn't see any problem with the recertification." Dewar, per Love's comments, did not state that he considered the Petitioner to be certified at the time of that conversation, nor was the two-year requirement pertaining to the return to the employment roles, to remain in a certified position without reapplication for certification mentioned in the Dewar conversation with Love, according to Love. Dewar, in his testimony, denied that the conversation between Love and Dewar concerned the Petitioner. His recollection is that Love asked Dewar how long the retention of certification would be valid for, to which he responded two years. Having considered the testimony and the demeanor of the witnesses, a decision cannot be reached on which of the witnesses Love or Dewar should be believed pertaining to the conversation which took place between them in October, 1981. Following discussion with Chief Love, and particularly on the next morning after that discussion, Petitioner talked to another fire chief within the Tallahassee Fire Department, whose name is Revel. This conversation was instituted by Revel in his inquiry of the petitioner on the subject of whether Petitioner was studying for the examination for certification. In response Petitioner stated that he had been but that he had found out the night before that he was certified. Revel in turn told Chief Ragans of this conversation and Ragans summoned the Petitioner to his office and the conversation between Love and Petitioner on the question of certification was recounted for the benefit of Chief Ragans. Petitioner and Love indicate that in the course of the meeting with Ragans, Ragans made a phone call and having concluded that phone call, stated that Petitioner did not have any problem with certification, or something to that effect, as Love recalls Ragans comments. Petitioner's recollection of the comment after the phone call was that Chief Ragans said, "You are a certified fireman." Ragans, in his testimony, does not relate having phoned someone on the topic of certification of the Petitioner in the presence of Petitioner and Love as previously described. His recollection is to the effect that some time prior to Love having stated in the fleeting between Ragans, Love and the Petitioner, that Dewar had confirmed Petitioner's status as a certified firefighter, he, Ragans, had talked to a Mr. Schaffner, Standards Coordinator, at the State of Florida, Fire College, and Schaffner had indicated that the time which Petitioner had been out of employment as a firefighter in a Florida department, was so close to being within the two years allowed, that Petitioner would not be required to go back through the certification process. At the time this case was placed at issue Schaffner had died. Having considered Ragans comments in the context of the other proof, it is determined that Ragans was sufficiently acquainted with Schaffner's voice to identify Schaffner in the course of the telephone conversation on the topic of the Petitioners certification. It is also concluded that this was the only conversation which Ragans had with officials within the State of Florida, Office of the State Fire Marshal, during 1981. Whether this conversation between Ragans and Schaffner occurred while Petitioner and Love were in Ragans office is uncertain. Benjamin E. Mclin, inspector with the Fire Department, speaks in terms of a conversation which he had with Olin Greene in October 1981, in the course of a seminar. Mclin introduced himself to Greene and, Greene is reputed, according to Mclin, to have asked Mclin if he knew Jimmy Adams, the Petitioner, and to have asked what kind of person Adams was. Mclin reports that he replied that he thought that Petitioner was an outstanding person as well as an impressive fireman, to which Mclin says that Greene stated, "Well, I know I did the right thing." Greene has no recollection of this conversation. Having considered the comment, even if it can be attributable to Greene, it is sufficiently ambiguous that it has no value in resolving the certification issue related to the Petitioner. After the conversation with Chief Ragans and Chief Love, which took place in Ragans office, Petitioner assumed that he was certified without the necessity of standing examination to receive certification. He had received no written indication from Respondent confirming or denying this understanding and had never personally spoken to anyone in the employ of the Respondent, on this subject. Petitioner continued his duties throughout 1981, into the beginning of 1984, serving in the capacity as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department. At that point, Petitioner had been promoted to Lieutenant within the Fire Department, and in the face of that action, a grievance was filed by another firefighter employed by the Tallahassee Fire Department indicating that Petitioner was not a certified firefighter. Ragans, in response to the grievance contacted Paul R. Steckle who was employed with the Office of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training as a Field Representative Supervisor. Steckle had been asked by Dewar to check the Petitioner's file to determine the period of time between the termination of initial employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department and reemployment with that employer. Having made this check Steckle believed that the period was beyond the two years and reported this finding to Dewar. In conversation with Ragans, Steckle had asked Ragans when Petitioner had been employed and Ragans had indicated that Petitioner had been rehired in April but did not report to work until July, 1981. Steckle told Ragans that if Petitioner had been hired in April, 1981, and had been granted a leave of absence, allowing Petitioner to start work in July, 1981, that the reemployment would have been within the two year limit. Ragans indicated that the City of Tallahassee had no policy of allowing a leave of absence such as inquired about by Steckle. Nonetheless, Ragans got the impression that petitioner was duly certified based upon remarks made by Steckle. On January 30, 1984, Ragans wrote Steckle verifying that Petitioner had not returned to work in April, in view of commitments which would not allow him to be actually at work until July. (Mention is made of 1979, but it is determined that Ragans is referring to 1981.) This correspondence also mentions the conversation between Ragans and Schaffner. A copy of the correspondence is Respondent's exhibit number 3 admitted into evidence. On February 22, 1984, Steckle wrote to the Petitioner and advised the Petitioner that a review of the records of the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training revealed that the Petitioner had been out of fire service for over two years before reemployment. This correspondence refers to May 5, 1979, as the date of termination and July 21, 1981, as the date of reemployment. It alludes to the fact that Petitioner must regain certification through provisions of Rule 4A-37.52, Florida Administrative Code, (1981) 1/ related to an equivalency examination and encloses a copy of the package related to that examination process. It requests that the examination be taken in April, 1984. Otherwise, it is indicated in the correspondence, the Petitioner would be terminated from employment with the Tallahassee Fire Department upon request from the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training to the Tallahassee Fire Department. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's exhibit number 14, admitted into evidence. On April 10, 1984, through correspondence from counsel for the Respondent to counsel for the petitioner, the case is discussed and the Petitioner is requested to stand the equivalency examination and it alludes to the fact that in view of the error of the Respondent in failing to note at the time of reemployment that Petitioner had been away from fire fighting for more than two years, Petitioner is given until February 22, 1985, to undergo an equivalency examination for purposes of recertification. In lieu of this disposition, Petitioner is afforded the opportunity for a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes hearing, which he availed himself of, leading to the present Recommended Order. A copy of the April 10, 1984 correspondence may be found as Respondent's exhibit number 15 admitted into evidence. Luther Richter had been employed as a firefighter with the Tallahassee Fire Department and was dismissed from that employment after being arrested on a federal drug smuggling charge. He subsequently pleaded nolo contendere to the charge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia in 1976 and was given a three year probation. In April of 1979 he applied to the Tallahassee Fire Department to be reemployed. Through the reemployment paperwork, Chief Ragans recommended that Richter not be accepted based upon an alleged lack of good character. In response, Dewar, the then Bureau Chief of the Fire College, wrote Ragans on May 22, 1979 stating that Richter was not eligible for employment because of his drug conviction. Another letter was sent on June 15, 1979, from Dewar to Ragans to the same effect. On July 17, 1979, Dewar requested a legal interpretation of the Richter situation from the point of view of the Respondent's duties in considering the question of Richter's certification as a firefighter in Florida. On September 10, 1979, the City of Tallahassee and Richter entered into an agreement for Richter's reinstatement as an employee with the City of Tallahassee. In the face of the action of the City of Tallahassee, the Respondent accepted Richter for purposes of certification as if he had never been dismissed. As stated in the October 16, 1979 correspondence from Olin Greene to Daniel E. A. Kleman, City Manager of the City of Tallahassee, with Richter's reinstatement as an employee of the City of Tallahassee the Respondent would ". . . have no alternative but to accept the reinstatement order and allow his certification that was in effect prior to September 1, 1975, to come back into effect." The agreement for reinstatement can be found as part of the composite exhibit number 6 of the Petitioner, admitted into evidence. The October 16, 1979 correspondence may also be found within that document. Those items are copies of the originals. In furtherance of Greene's perception, Richter having been reinstated by the City of Tallahassee was deemed by the Respondent never to have left employment. Richter's certification continues from September 1, 1975, the dismissal date, and his initial certification remains valid to this date as established in the correspondence of Olin Greene to Kleman dated January 9, 1980, a copy of which is found in the Petitioner's composite exhibit number 6. In essence, Respondent felt that in view of the reinstatement it could not refuse to recognize Richter's certification as if it had never lapsed between the interim period of his dismissal in 1975 and the agreement for reinstatement in 1979. In early 1984 a minimum standards training course for firefighters in Florida was taught at Indian River Community College. An unusually high failure rate was experienced by those students who took that course and this led to an investigation by the State Fire College. Through the investigation it was learned that one of the instructors in the minimum standards course had not been properly certified. To resolve this problem, all students who attended that course were required to take further training with a certified instructor. Following that additional training session, another examination was given and those persons who passed the second examination, in addition to those persons who had passed the initial examination, were certified. Those who failed the second examination were not accepted for certification. On other occasions where tenured firefighters, as recognized by Section 633.41, Florida Statutes, have gone beyond the two year time period for reemployment and continuing certification without examination, those firefighters have had to stand the examination, without exception.
